

Testimony of

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Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

April 8, 2003

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to testify once again before this august committee, on such an important and timely subject: the future of NATO. The Project for the New American Century, which I chair, has always supported an American foreign policy that is grounded on strong alliance ties. Indeed, in the Project's founding "Statement of Principles"—found at: <http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm>—we argued that strengthening those ties was one of four essential tasks before us if we were to correct the drift we perceived as existing in American foreign policy.

More concretely, we supported the first post-Cold War enlargement of NATO. And we support the pending one. I am pleased that we are so close to seeing that bipartisan vision become reality. And just recently, the Project helped organize two bipartisan statements proposing a key role for NATO in post-Saddam Iraq. (Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit the two statements for the record. They can also be found at: <http://www.newamericancentury.org/lettersstatements.htm>.)

In general, we continue to believe that the goal of maintaining peace and prosperity in the world is best accomplished by working with our democratic allies both to protect existing democracies and, where necessary or possible, to expand liberty's reach to other nations.

But what of the *future* of NATO and, more generally, of the trans-Atlantic relationship? Obviously, there are questions about the health of the alliance. The first thing I would say is that it is too late to paper over these questions and pretend all is well. We need, as my colleague and Project co-founder Robert Kagan has argued (see his *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*), to be honest about the differences in world view between some in Europe—especially in France and Germany—and many in the United States. Within the U.S., we need to avoid cheap partisanship that casts blame unfairly either on the last administration or the present one. Undoubtedly, both administrations have made diplomatic mistakes. What administration hasn't? But the problems with the alliance go beyond European preferences for the charm of President Clinton over the directness of President Bush—and beyond the American preference for the policies of Chancellor Kohl over those of Chancellor Schroeder.

In general, I would argue that the Bush Administration has been quite responsible with respect to the trans-Atlantic alliance. When President Bush came into office, common wisdom held that, if NATO did expand again, the expansion would be quite limited in scope and number. But it was the president's vision of a "Europe, whole and free" that has led NATO to this day. Moreover, this past summer, at Prague, the administration put forward a number of constructive proposals for reforming and re-energizing NATO. And, finally, and principally at the behest of our European allies, President Bush went to the United Nations in September 2002 and secured U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. The Bush Administration is not responsible for the current crisis in the alliance.

Who, or what, is? The answer to "who" is France—and secondarily, Germany. The answer to "what" is the new post-9/11 world to which the U.S. has reacted in one way, and France and Germany in another.

This is not the place for France-bashing. But it is the place to tell the truth. At best, the government of France is uninterested in the trans-Atlantic alliance. At worst, it wants to weaken it. France's priority lies with the European Union and/or the UN—not NATO. And there is no question that many in Paris desire to see a France-led European Union as a counterweight to U.S. power. Germany, a troubled nation with economic and demographic difficulties, and an understandable aversion to the exercise of military and nation-state power, has followed France's lead. The European Union as a whole has embraced a view of the world that is post-nationalist, post-historical, and extremely reluctant to use military force even in a just cause.

The United States is different. The "distinctly American internationalism" the president has articulated in speeches and in the White House's National Security Strategy—and with which I am in basic agreement—is quite far removed from the "European" view of the world in both the nature of the threats we face and certainly what strategies to employ to deal with them. How do we bridge the gap?

We won't entirely. Washington and the capitals of Europe cannot help but have some differences of perspective on interests and threats for the simple reason that the U.S.'s role in the world is far different from theirs. America has global responsibilities no other nation has, or will have, and that is bound to create differences in strategic outlook. That said, we cannot abandon our basic convictions because they make some Europeans uneasy. We cannot fail to confront the threats we face, and we cannot fail to carry out our historic purposes in defending and expanding freedom, because some Europeans balk. We can agree to disagree where we must, and agree to work tougher where we can. There are many such occasions—the reconstruction of postwar Iraq being one conspicuous one.

We should seek new or improved institutional arrangements through which to work together. Coalitions of the willing are fine, and sometimes necessary. But, where possible, longer-lasting organizational arrangements would be preferable. Does this mean re-vitalizing NATO? I hope so. Does it mean reforming NATO? I think so—perhaps, for example, by moving to a super-majority vote to authorize action, binding of course only on those who choose to contribute, but still under the NATO umbrella. In a sense, this would institutionalize the coalition of the willing. It would also increase Washington's interest in using and working with NATO. And, finally, it would give our allies a healthier say in these decisions.

We also might want to explore new institutional arrangements that allow us to work in particular ways with our new allies in Central and Eastern Europe, and our friends elsewhere in Europe, as well. We can't confine ourselves to Cold War structures. Institutional creativity is needed for a new world. There may also be ways to institutionalize our friendship, and common interests, with democracies like Turkey, Israel, and India, in conjunction with NATO or outside of NATO.

No one thinks it a good thing for the U.S. to go it alone—though, at times, we may have to act with fewer friends than one might wish. Nor, I trust, do we want to hand over U.S. interests or decision-making to the United Nations—an organization that seeks to speak for the “international community” but actually reflects the particular state interests of its Security Council members. At its best, NATO represents a healthy multilateralism, a multilateralism that rests on shared democratic principles and a shared history of meeting the challenge posed by Soviet communism. The challenge in the days ahead will be to see whether NATO, as presently constituted, is up to meeting the new threats we face. Some positive steps have been taken: NATO's intervention in Kosovo was an important precedent. The contribution made by our allies and soon-to-be allies to the military effort in Afghanistan and Iraq are also significant. The question we have to ask is whether such efforts will be the exception rather than the rule in the future.

I think the Bush Administration is off to a good start in moving NATO in the right direction. The world is a dangerous place and we need help in dealing with these dangers. Accordingly, we need to do as good a job as we can in creating an alliance that has the military and institutional capabilities to confront these dangers effectively. But, at the end of the day, our priority has to be dealing with these dangers, not placating allies who are more concerned with the exercise of American power than the threats we face.

Statement on Post-War Iraq

March 19, 2003

Although some of us have disagreed with the administration's handling of Iraq policy and others of us have agreed with it, we all join in supporting the military intervention in Iraq. The aim of UNSC Resolution 1441 was to give the Iraqi government a "final opportunity" to comply with all UN resolutions going back 12 years. The Iraqi government has demonstrably not complied. It is now time to act to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime from power.

The removal of the present Iraqi regime from power will lay the foundation for achieving three vital goals: disarming Iraq of all its weapons of mass destruction stocks and production capabilities; establishing a peaceful, stable, democratic government in Iraq; and contributing to the democratic development of the wider Middle East.

To enhance the prospects of success, American efforts in the weeks, months, and years ahead must be guided by the following principles:

- Regime change is not an end in itself but a means to an end - the establishment of a peaceful, stable, united, prosperous, and democratic Iraq free of all weapons of mass destruction. We must help build an Iraq that is governed by a pluralistic system representative of all Iraqis and that is fully committed to upholding the rule of law, the rights of all its citizens, and the betterment of all its people. The Iraqi people committed to a democratic future must be integrally involved in this process in order for it to succeed. Such an Iraq will be a force for regional stability rather than conflict and participate in the democratic development of the region.
- The process of disarming, stabilizing, rebuilding, reforming, preserving the unity of, and ultimately democratizing Iraq will require a significant investment of American leadership, time, energy, and resources, as well as important assistance from American allies and the international community. Everyone - those who have joined our coalition, those who have stood aside, those who opposed military action, and, most of all, the Iraqi people and their neighbors - must understand that we are committed to the rebuilding of Iraq and will provide the necessary resources and will remain for as long as it takes. Any early fixation on exit strategies and departure deadlines will undercut American credibility and greatly diminish the prospects for success.
- The United States military will necessarily bear much of the initial burden of maintaining stability in Iraq, securing its territorial integrity, finding and destroying weapons of mass destruction, and supporting efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance to those most in need. For the next year or more, U.S and coalition troops will have to comprise the bulk of the total international military presence in Iraq. But as the security situation permits, authority should transfer to civilian agencies, and to representatives of the Iraqi people themselves. Much of the long-term security presence, as well as the resources for reconstruction, will have to come from our allies in Europe and elsewhere - suggesting the importance of involving the NATO Alliance and other international institutions early in any planning and implementation of the post-conflict stage.
- American leadership - and the long-term commitment of American resources and energies - is essential, therefore, but the extraordinary demands of the effort make international support, cooperation, and participation a requirement for success. And just as a stable, peaceful and democratic Iraq is in the region's and the world's interest, it is important that the American-led stabilization and rebuilding effort gain the support and full involvement of key international organizations in the work of rebuilding Iraq.

The successful disarming, rebuilding, and democratic reform of Iraq can contribute decisively to the democratization of the wider Middle East. This is an objective of overriding strategic importance to the United States, as it is to the rest of the international community - and its achievement will require an investment and commitment commensurate with that. We offer our full support to the President and Congress to accomplish these vitally important goals.

Ronald Asmus Max Boot Frank Carlucci Eliot Cohen

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Second Statement on Post-War Iraq

March 28, 2003

We write in strong support of efforts by Prime Minister Tony Blair to "get America and Europe working again together as partners and not as rivals." While some seem determined to create an ever deeper divide between the United States and Europe, and others seem indifferent to the long-term survival of the transatlantic partnership, we believe it is essential, even in the midst of war, to begin building a new era of transatlantic cooperation.

The place to begin is post-war Iraq. There should be no question of our common determination to help the Iraqi people establish a peaceful, stable, united, prosperous, and democratic Iraq free of weapons of mass destruction. We must help build an Iraq that is governed by a pluralistic system representative of all Iraqis and fully committed to the rule of law, the rights of all its citizens, and the betterment of all its people. Such an Iraq will be a force for regional stability rather than conflict and participate in the democratic development of the region.

The Iraqi people committed to a democratic future must be fully involved in this process in order for it to succeed. Consistent with security requirements, our goal should be to progressively transfer authority as soon as possible to enable Iraqis to control their own destiny. Millions of Iraqis are untainted by service to the Ba'athist dictatorship and are committed to the establishment of democratic institutions. It is these Iraqis - not Americans, Europeans or international bureaucrats - who should make political and economic decisions on behalf of Iraq.

Building a stable, peaceful and democratic Iraq is an immense task. It must be a cooperative effort that involves international organizations - UN relief agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other appropriate bodies - that can contribute the talent and resources necessary for success. It is therefore essential that these organizations be involved in planning now to ensure timely allocation of resources.

Of particular concern, the effort to rebuild Iraq should strengthen, not weaken transatlantic ties. The most important transatlantic institution is NATO, and the Alliance should assume a prominent role in post-war Iraq. Given NATO's capabilities and expertise, it should become integrally involved as soon as possible in the post-war effort. In particular, NATO should actively support efforts to secure and destroy all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and production facilities (a task that should unite the United States, Canada and all European allies committed to peace and non-proliferation), ensure peace and stability are maintained in postwar Iraq, and assist in the rebuilding of Iraq's infrastructure and the delivery of humanitarian relief. The Atlantic Alliance has pledged to confront the new threats of the 21st century. No current challenge is more important than that of building a peaceful, unified and democratic Iraq without weapons of mass destruction on NATO's own borders.

Administration of post-war Iraq should from the beginning include not only Americans but officials from those countries committed to our goals in Iraq. Bringing different nationalities into the administrative organization is important because it allows us to draw on the expertise others have acquired from their own previous peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts. It will also facilitate closer and more effective ties between the security forces in post-war Iraq and those charged with administrating the political and economic rebuilding of Iraq.

International support and participation in the post-Iraq effort would be much easier to achieve if the UN Security Council were to endorse such efforts. The United States should therefore seek passage of a Security Council resolution that endorses the establishment of a civilian administration in Iraq, authorizes the participation of UN relief and reconstruction agencies, welcomes the deployment of a security and stabilization force by NATO allies, and lifts all economic sanctions imposed following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait a decade ago.

Gordon Adams	Ron Asmus	Max Boot
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