

**Testimony of Rose Gottemoeller
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March 26, 2009
Senate Foreign Relations Committee**

Good afternoon, Madame Chairwoman, Senator DeMint and members of the Committee, and thank you.

It is a great honor for me to come before this Committee today and be considered for the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance. I am grateful for the confidence that President Obama and Secretary Clinton have shown in nominating me for this position, and I am fully cognizant of the important responsibilities that I will undertake on behalf of our country should I be confirmed by the Senate.

I am also very grateful to Senator Lugar for introducing me to the Committee: his warm words give encouragement for the difficult tasks ahead. Madame Chairwoman, as I begin my testimony, I would like to repeat a phrase from Secretary Clinton's statement before this Committee. "For me," she said, "consultation is not a catch-word. It is a commitment." I wanted to let you know I share this commitment with the Secretary, and I look forward to working closely with all of you should I be confirmed by the Senate.

Since its establishment in the 1980s – then as part of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Bureau of Verification and Compliance, as it is known today, has gone through a series of organizational evolutions. Most recently in 2005 it underwent additional changes as part of a broader restructuring of the so-called "T-family" of bureaus overseen by the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Since its founding, however, the Bureau's verification role has been a constant. For over twenty-five years, the Bureau has advanced U.S. national security by promoting verifiable agreements and verification technologies, and by working to ensure compliance by other countries with respect to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments. In 2005, the Bureau's portfolio was expanded to include implementation responsibilities for nuclear agreements such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear

Forces (INF) Treaty, as well as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and related European security arrangements, including the Open Skies Treaty and confidence and security building measures under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Today, these core missions place the Bureau at the center of key national security initiatives of the Obama Administration. The Bureau's missions have direct relevance to resolving the nuclear issues in Iran and North Korea, the President's goal of ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Also, the Bureau's START and CFE responsibilities will directly involve it in several key negotiations. As I am sure the Committee is aware, START will expire before the end of this year, and President Obama is committed to negotiating a follow-on agreement to replace START and to continuing along the path to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

If confirmed as Assistant Secretary, as part of my responsibilities, I would head up this START follow-on negotiation on behalf of the United States Government. If confirmed, I would also be directly involved in negotiations to resolve the current CFE Treaty impasse, and would work to ensure that the importance we attach to the CFE treaty is reflected in any broader discussion of European security. In December 2007, Russia suspended its implementation of the CFE Treaty, and concerted efforts will be needed to resolve this situation satisfactorily so as to advance the security of the United States and our Allies.

These issues underscore the serious responsibility that I will undertake if confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State. Let me now review each one of these issues in greater detail, beginning with the negotiation of a START follow-on agreement.

Negotiating a START Follow-On Agreement

The 1991 START Treaty has provided a foundation of stability, transparency, and strategic cooperation in the evolving post-Cold War relationship of the United States and the Russian Federation, as well as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which are also parties to the Treaty. The impending expiration of the START Treaty presents the United States with an opportunity. The President and Secretary Clinton have already emphasized the need to place the negotiation of a follow-on agreement on a fast-track in hopes that a new agreement could be concluded and enter into

force before December 5, 2009, when the Treaty expires. If a follow-on agreement that protects U.S. national security interests and is in keeping with our deterrence needs cannot be reached by December, then the United States and Russia may need to find a mutually acceptable means of continuing to implement essential elements of the START Treaty. If I am confirmed, I will expect to work closely with this Committee and with the Senate throughout the coming year. Close communication between us will be vital to the success of this effort.

With the upcoming expiration of the START Treaty, the United States has a new opportunity to achieve greater security for our country by reinforcing stability and predictability in the strategic nuclear relationship with Russia. The Obama Administration intends to seize this opportunity.

Resolving the CFE Treaty Impasse

If I am confirmed, helping to resolve the impasse with Russia on the CFE Treaty also will be one of my top priorities. The CFE Treaty provides the only legally-binding and verifiable limits on conventional armed forces Europe-wide. Despite Russia's unilateral decision to cease observing its CFE obligations – an action not provided for by the Treaty, and not justified by customary international law – our NATO Allies and other Treaty partners still consider CFE implementation to be a key element of Europe's security architecture, one that embodies fundamental principles on which the stability and security of Europe are based. Although NATO Allies and other states continue to implement CFE, Russia's non-performance, if it persists, will eventually undermine the Treaty.

It is my understanding that the United States has taken the lead within NATO in an effort to end the current impasse by pursuing an agreement with Russia that would address Russia's concerns about the Treaty, while also taking into account the legitimate views of other CFE states, such as Georgia and Moldova. Unfortunately, it does not appear that Russia has engaged seriously on this package thus far. If confirmed, I will turn my attention to working with my colleagues, our Allies, and the Russians to solve this problem, in order to advance Euro-Atlantic security.

Addressing Nuclear Proliferation: CTBT and FMCT

In her confirmation hearing statement, Secretary Clinton underscored that that "the Nonproliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime, and the United States must exercise the leadership needed to shore

up the regime.” To this end, the Obama Administration has developed a multifaceted nuclear nonproliferation strategy founded on several key initiatives. Effective verification is fundamental to each of these initiatives.

First, the Administration is strongly committed to obtaining Senate advice and consent to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and to launching a diplomatic effort to bring on board the other states that must ratify the Treaty for it to be brought into force. I expect that, if confirmed as Assistant Secretary, I will work closely with you and your staffs during the Senate’s reconsideration of the CTBT.

As Secretary Clinton has noted, substantial progress has been made over the last decade in our ability to verify a comprehensive nuclear test ban. One of the first tasks that I will undertake, if confirmed, would be a review of the capability of the United States to effectively verify the CTBT, in particular taking into account technical advances over the last decade in verification. We now have the experience of installing and operating much of the network comprising the International Monitoring System, which serves as part of the verification mechanism established by the Treaty. We also, of course, have our own national technical means. We will need to assess what improvements have been made to both systems since the Senate last considered the Treaty. We also will need to examine how the Treaty may serve to reinforce the broader nonproliferation regime.

Second, the Administration is committed to negotiating a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). The Conference on Disarmament has been deadlocked on the FMCT negotiation issue, with China, Iran, and Pakistan blocking any forward movement. I understand that one element of this deadlock had been the question of whether or not to include international verification provisions. We must use smart diplomacy to break this deadlock and pursue a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty that includes verification provisions. If confirmed, I intend to focus comprehensively on verification issues affecting both the CTBT and FMCT, drawing on experience and expertise from the VC Bureau and across the U.S. Government, including the Intelligence Community and the Departments of Energy and Defense.

Finally, the international body that implements NPT-mandated safeguards – the International Atomic Energy Agency -- must be revitalized. The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism

reported that, because of budgetary constraints and an aging staff, the “IAEA now faces uncertainties about its long-term ability to perform its fundamental mission – detecting the illicit diversion of nuclear materials and discovering clandestine activities associated with nuclear weapons programs.” Within the Department of State, IAEA issues are principally handled by the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau, not the Verification and Compliance Bureau. However, the VC Bureau is responsible for assessing compliance by NPT States Parties and, if confirmed, I will be a strong advocate for the IAEA.

Iran and North Korea

The United States, and indeed the world, needs to know that any illicit nuclear weapons activities in states such as Iran and North Korea have been terminated and that those governments have charted a new course to join the international community in respecting international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments. That is why effective verification of their compliance with such agreements is so crucial.

There is deep concern among the United States and our key allies about Iran’s nuclear program and intentions. President Obama and Secretary Clinton have made it clear that an Iran capable of producing nuclear arms is unacceptable and that the United States will pursue tough and direct diplomacy to avoid such a dangerous situation. If a negotiated solution is achieved, it is essential that effective verification measures be built into that agreement, so that it can be determined that there is no longer a basis for concern that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.

During her February 2009 trip to Asia, Secretary Clinton stated that the “most acute challenge to stability and security in Northeast Asia” comes from North Korea and its nuclear program. At that time, the Secretary reaffirmed that President Obama and she are committed to working through the Six-Party Talks to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. The Obama Administration is committed to confirming the full extent of North Korea’s past plutonium production and any uranium enrichment activities and is focused on achieving a Six-Party written agreement on verification. It will be important for the United States to work closely with our partners in the Six-Party process to reach such an agreement, and, if confirmed, I would work to support our Six-Party efforts to ensure that North Korea abandons all nuclear weapons and existing

nuclear programs, as it committed to do in the September 2005 Joint Statement. It is also essential that important questions about North Korea's proliferation activities with other countries, most notably Syria, are fully resolved.

I believe that it is important to keep in mind that sometimes countries can have a moment of clarity and change their ways, embarking on a return to the international community. Witness the remarkable shift in relations between the United States and Libya. After years of terrorism and illicit efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, Libya recognized that those activities had seriously undermined its security and well-being and the prosperity of its people. In 2003, Libya committed to end its WMD programs with full international transparency. The Bureau for Verification and Compliance played a central role on the ground in Libya, verifying the elimination of those WMD programs. Libya's commitment, good faith, and openness transformed confrontation into normalization. The United States ended all sanctions against Libya, and in 2006, after a 27-year hiatus, the United States reopened its Embassy in Tripoli.

Libya provides a compelling example for other states to follow. Without effective verification, however, any agreements reached with Iran or North Korea to terminate illicit nuclear weapons activities are but empty promises, making the world less rather than more secure.

Madame Chairwoman, Senator DeMint, if you have had a chance to review my biography, you will have seen that I have been at this business a long time, with links even farther back than my age would indicate, to the early history of the nuclear age. I was privileged to begin my career at the Rand Corporation, where my first boss was Colonel Thomas W. Wolfe, who served as air attaché in Moscow during the late 1950s, when the United States first was transfixed by the threat of nuclear bomber and missile gaps with the USSR. Thanks to a Council on Foreign Relations Fellowship in 1990 and 1991, I had the honor of serving on the START delegation as a State Department representative. Two formidable U.S. ambassadors—Richard Burt and Linton Brooks—taught me about negotiating with the Soviets, lessons that have stuck with me ever since.

As the Soviet Union fell apart, I watched in admiration as Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar, along with then-Congressman Les Aspin, devised the early stages of a program that eventually became instrumental in dismantling

Soviet START-accountable weapons systems, even as Russia ran out of money to pay the Strategic Rocket Forces officers who manned them. This initiative, which we know as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, was vital to ensuring that strategic nuclear weapons were peacefully and completely withdrawn from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus during the 1990s. I had the honor of participating in the negotiations to bring about this successful outcome.

Madame Chairwoman, Senator DeMint, respected members of the Committee, I don't want to take too much of your time in recounting my own history. I did, however, wish to indicate my indebtedness to a few of the many people who have inspired me by taking it as a personal challenge to alleviate the threat of a nuclear holocaust. Some of them worked in the depths of the Cold War, when productive negotiation with the USSR was impossible. Others joined the effort later, when détente opened the door to nuclear arms control and reductions. Each of them worked to a common purpose, to preserve and strengthen the security of the United States. If I am confirmed by the Senate, I will be privileged to join them, and not only to achieve a follow-on to the START Treaty, but also to work on the wide spectrum of national security goals that President Obama has articulated. Of course, verification of, and compliance with, treaties and agreements must play a critical role in this policy arena.

Thank you, Madame Chairwoman, Senator DeMint, and members of the Committee for your time and attention today and for your consideration of my nomination. I would, of course, be pleased to answer any of your questions. Thank you.