Testimony Presented to the United States Senate
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

NATO Enlargement

James J. Townsend Jr.

March 11, 2008

Mr. Chairman, it is a great honor and privilege for me to be invited to testify before you and this Committee on NATO enlargement and other security issues impacting the broader Euro-Atlantic relationship, recognizing the fact that one cannot talk about NATO enlargement in isolation from other security issues which will also shape NATO's future direction.

The Chairman of the Atlantic Council, General James Jones, has brought together from the US and Europe a group of well-regarded experts and former senior level Government officials well-versed in transatlantic security that he calls his "Strategic Advisors Group." This group frequently comes together to work through these issues and to offer policy recommendations to NATO and Allied governments. Many of the ideas in my testimony grow out of the work of this group. That said, the opinions expressed here are my own.

NATO Enlargement: Should Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia be invited to Join NATO?

When the Alliance began to enlarge again at the end of the Cold War, we all knew the day would come when enlargement would present us with candidates whose histories, geography, and struggles with building democracies and establishing relations with neighbors would bring more complex issues into the debate than we had to address in the first rounds. The candidacies of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia to join NATO bring with them both the strengths that come with new members as well as the complex issues reflecting their history and geography.

Many of the questions and issues about their candidacy are familiar:

- Have these nations successfully used the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to structure their armed forces to be able to work with Allied forces and be "producers of security, not just consumers" and is there civilian control of those armed forces?

- Are the civil societies of these candidate nations based on democracy, rule of law, and do they have a market economy and civil institutions which foster these values--and is there broad support in their societies for NATO membership?
- Will all NATO nations be prepared to commit to come to these countries' aid if they are attacked militarily?
- Do the candidates have and can they maintain good relations with their neighbors?

Drawing on the core of what is known as the "Perry principles," after what Secretary of Defense Bill Perry identified as the standards for new members, these principles still provide important guidelines for candidates to know what the Alliance is looking for in an Ally and for Allies to consider as they decide on accession. They also remind Allies what those values are that we share and that make the transatlantic community more than just a Treaty construct, but a real community strong enough to stand the tests of time and tensions, which we have seen in abundance over the past few years.

As we consider whether to invite Albania, Croatia and Macedonia to join us as Allies, how well these nations are doing in meeting these principles can guide our decision making. All three countries have had reform efforts underway for years in both their civil and military sectors, shaped by their participation in NATO's Membership Action Plan, their efforts to meet EU Stabilization and Association Agreements as well as EU membership criteria, and by their work with the US and other Allied nations.

An important indicator of the readiness of these nations to join NATO is whether their people support membership: strong majorities in all three countries favor membership, majorities that should withstand any changing political winds. Levels of defense spending are another indicator, with levels close to or over 2% of GDP being consistently maintained, which hits the NATO 2% target and is above the level of defense spending for most Allies.

On the military side, NATO planners I have spoken with affirm that all three nations have enthusiastically met and implemented most of the military reform suggestions made to them through MAP and are in better shape militarily than most of the newest members were when they entered the Alliance. Their armed forces have been downsized and professionalized, obsolete equipment and facilities removed, and brigades reorganized. Croatia has particularly made great strides in building a deployable and interoperable force. Its Strategic Defense Review has set a goal of developing "usable forces" with 40% of its forces deployable, and 4% deployed at any one time. It even hosted a NATO Response Force exercise last year. All three nations have forces abroad as part of UN,

NATO or EU missions, including ISAF operations in Afghanistan and operations with coalition forces in Iraq (Albania and Macedonia).

While such metrics show progress and a clearly positive reform trajectory, there remains work to do by all three nations, especially on the civil side. But metrics alone do not provide the justification for why we may want these nations in NATO. To do that, we must consider their membership in the context of why we bring in new members and what our experience has been with enlargement since 1999.

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty says that the parties may invite any other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area (emphasis added). I find the Treaty drafters did a good job of using just a few words to describe what we want a new Ally to be able to do, while leaving enough latitude for future decision makers to take into account the security requirements of their day as they consider new members.

Under Article 10, NATO has steadily increased its ranks with nations Allies concluded would further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to the security of the Alliance. Each decision was made on the merits of the candidate nation, both their current capability and their future potential. Most importantly, each decision was shaped by how the decision makers of the day interpreted the security needs of the Alliance and how that candidate could contribute.

In 1949, as the Alliance was going through its first effort to bring in members, the priority for an Allies' contribution to the security of the Alliance was primarily a military one, given the military threat the West was under from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. But even during the Cold War, an Allies' contribution to the security of NATO did not require that each Ally provide military forces, given that one of the first Allies, Iceland, did not even have a military force. But despite this fact, Iceland was welcomed into the Alliance because it contributed to Alliance security in ways other than by providing military forces (such as political solidarity with the West and strategic geography).

Since the end of the Cold War, the Article 10 standards for new Allies to be in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the Alliance took on a new interpretation based on Alliance security considerations of a new time. No longer was the security of the North Atlantic area seen in the context of facing off against the military threat from the Soviet Union; instead, security was defined in less immediate military/strategic terms but

in a more broadly political/strategic way as assuring stability through the effort to create a Europe "whole, free and at peace."

Bringing former adversaries into NATO (and the EU) became an important part of creating this Europe "whole free and at peace" and thereby ensuring North Atlantic security. NATO membership provided assurance of security and hence provided the psychological underpinnings for countries to get on with the business of democratization and developing liberal, Western economies.

The new Allies were given NATO membership not because of their military prowess (though all were expected to modernize their military forces and did so in fits and starts), but because their membership helped repair the divisions of Europe left by the Cold War. And NATO membership would help these nations develop the potential we knew they had for developing over time the Western military and civil institutions important to the Alliance.

So the Alliance grew over the past 10 years: first in 1999 came Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, followed in 2004 by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The Alliance consensus was that all 10 candidates met the Article 10 standard that they were in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and would contribute to the security of the Alliance. They also met the Perry principles. However, all of these new Allies were given membership despite still having work to do to meet NATO military requirements and complete civil reform efforts at home.

Now, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia are following in the train of those first 10 new members and are being considered for membership after working closely with NATO for years through membership in the Partnership for Peace and participating in the Membership Action Plan. But unlike the 10 nations that preceded them just a few years ago, there is debate about their readiness for membership.

But we have to consider their candidacy in the same context we used to consider the latest 10 new members—will their membership contribute to Alliance security by creating a Europe "whole, free and at peace?" Like the 10 nations that preceded them as candidates, do Albania, Croatia and Macedonia meet the Article 10 requirements as we interpret them today that they be in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the Alliance? Will today's NATO allies be willing to honor their Article 5 commitments if any of these countries were subject to aggression?

The answer to those questions is that NATO membership for these three is just as logical, just as consistent with past decisions and just as important for Alliance

security as was membership for the 10 newest Allies--if not more so, given Alliance security concerns in their region, especially with Kosovo's declaration of independence last month.

Bringing in new members to NATO as a way to address European regional security concerns has been an important role for NATO, dating back to the inclusion of Germany as a member in 1955 as part of an agreement to allow Germany to rearm. At the end of the Cold War, as the West began to deal with simmering ethnic tensions, NATO's role as an agent for regional stability became even more useful, especially in the Balkans.

This newest round of enlargement would also build upon the reasoning behind Slovenia's NATO (and EU) membership as the first nation from the former Yugoslavia to join these institutions, which was partially based on the importance of enhancing regional stability by increasing Slovenia's clout as a leader in organizing and promoting regional confidence building initiatives. NATO and EU membership for Slovenia also sent a signal to nations in the region, many with ethnic problems and civil dysfunction like corruption, that reforming domestic laws and institutions to conform to European standards can lead to integration into European institutions.

Membership in such institutions as the EU and NATO brings peer pressure on members to act responsibly; nations if left on their own are freer to exploit regional problems to their advantage. The pressure by peers and by the institutions will make it very difficult for members to engage in acts that contribute to regional instability. The personal relationships that develop between leaders, and the peer pressure and institutional help that come from NATO membership, is one reason why Turkey and Greece have not engulfed the Eastern Mediterranean in war over the past 60 years.

NATO membership for Albania, Croatia and Macedonia will bring to bear that historic role of NATO as agent for regional stability as described above. Membership will give these three nations a focus on regional stability, and the responsibility for security that comes with NATO membership will make these three nations regional activists for stability. All three have already demonstrated such efforts through their work in the Southeast European Defense Ministerial initiatives, participation in its regional peacekeeping force (SEEBRIG) and leadership hosting PfP exercises and programs. Finally, like with Slovenia, admission of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia to NATO will send an important signal to other nations in the region, like Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Montenegro, that the door to membership is open to those nations that accept the values and institutions shared by the Allies.

But most importantly, the peer pressure both from fellow Allies and from NATO as an institution will ensure that as the Balkans continue to move beyond its painful and violent transition to a stable and democratic region, these three nations will themselves ratify their roles as part of the solution to regional issues, and not be part of the problem. These three nations have shown by their actions that they understand the responsibilities which come with NATO membership, and are already acting as agents of stability and security in the Balkans.

Europe truly cannot be said to be "whole, free and at peace" without the Balkan nations being part of those institutions, NATO and the EU, that produce and guarantee that state. It is illogical to leave these three outside of an integrating Europe at a time when Balkan tensions can be lessened by adding the presence of three NATO Allies in the region.

However, I am also concerned about the amount of work that remains to be done and the usefulness of the "carrot" of NATO membership in helping governments make difficult decisions about reform. My experience with NATO enlargement from its earliest days is that reform efforts can lose momentum after a nation enters the Alliance, as political imperatives go elsewhere. Increases in military spending and painful civil reform decisions become harder to make when NATO membership no longer tops the Prime Minister's priority list.

Therefore, I would like to recommend to the Committee that at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, invitations for membership be extended to Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. But it should be recognized explicitly that each nation still must meet or make credible progress towards meeting an achievable but essential capability goal or goals in civil or military areas. A Summit deadline to accelerate civ-mil reform efforts was used with good effect during the first round of enlargement, when Allies felt aspirant progress in key areas was too slow. If nations do not meet these goals or if NATO planners cannot certify that significant progress is being made towards meeting them, then accession to NATO membership is postponed until such time as progress can be certified.

Timing is key. Invitations extended at Bucharest must then be ratified by each of the 26 NATO allies, some *pro forma* and some, like the approval of the US Senate, both rigorous and systematic. While time is short for this ratification period, which ideally should be completed before NATO's 60th anniversary summit in 2009 where it is intended that new Allies will be welcomed into the Alliance, there should be enough time to begin an intensive effort to make significant progress in important civ-mil areas. I have no doubt that this Committee and the full Senate will want to be assured of that progress.

While I leave the specific capability goals to be determined by NATO planners and experts, the three nations could use the next year to intensify efforts to make civil reforms, such as fighting corruption or organized crime, or military reforms to improve the deployability, sustainability or interoperability of their forces. The requirement to meet civil-military capability goals for NATO accession should provide Ministries political clout in capitals to meet important goals before the NATO accession process is completed, rather than afterwards, when NATO is no longer the priority.

Therefore Mr. Chairman, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia should be offered invitations to join the Alliance at the Bucharest Summit, invitations that will continue the construction of a Europe whole, free and at peace. But let us use the time between invitation and accession to initiate an intensive effort to make further progress towards meeting important objectives in their civil-military reform efforts.

Should NATO offer to Ukraine and Georgia participation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP)?

Arguments are similarly strong for offering participation in NATO's Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest Summit. While MAP in and of itself is not assurance of membership, it is a powerful tool when used by planners in MAP countries to accelerate reform efforts, many of which are shaped by the MAP.

Georgia

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has developed a number of ways for nations to establish a relationship with the Alliance short of membership. For example, membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) offers many nations a way to tailor their relationship with NATO so that it suits their nation's ambition and abilities and has always been a necessary way station to NATO membership for those who want it. The Membership Action Plan, by contrast, is a step beyond PFP and is offered as a further and deeper relationship with NATO for countries that want to become members. Work with NATO through MAP helps aspiring members make those additional civil and military reforms necessary to be considered a viable candidate for membership. But participation in MAP is no guarantee of membership in NATO, it merely offers a path in that direction...the decision is up to the Allies. However, NATO should not offer – and has never in the past offered -- MAP to an aspirant whom Allies collectively do not think has the potential for eventual membership, or to a nation where the people do not want NATO membership.

Georgia has been in PfP since 1994 and took another step towards membership by beginning an Intensified Dialogue with NATO in 2006. The Georgian people and government have made clear they would like to join the Alliance and Georgia has made great strides in military and civil reform efforts, illustrated by Georgian forces deployed in Iraq and in Afghanistan and especially by improvements in the Georgian economy. Participation in MAP will help Georgia continue to make progress in its march towards membership, especially in judicial reform, where NATO has stressed the need for a more independent Georgian judiciary. The frozen conflicts in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia complicate Georgia's relationship with NATO and make some Allies squeamish about extending MAP. Progress must be made in finding a solution to these problems, and US leadership in helping Georgia to find a way forward is critical. But as the process towards membership continues, Georgia should not be penalized if it works to resolve these problems and others do not.

Georgian aspirations were dealt a blow last November when, in response to opposition protests, a state of emergency was declared and there was violence in the streets. Efforts at political outreach by the Saakashvili government and upcoming parliamentary elections this spring may help restore faith that Georgian democracy is back on track.

The issue of MAP for Georgia should be an easy one: MAP should be extended to Georgia at the Bucharest Summit. If, however, there is not consensus to do so, I would like to offer a suggestion made by former Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer for NATO at ministerial or ambassadorial level to decide the question of MAP after the spring parliamentary elections, if Allies need reassurance that democratic reform is working again in Georgia. At a minimum, the Alliance could offer a program of intensive military reform assistance to Georgia similar to that between NATO planners and Ukraine to give Georgian reform efforts a boost until there is consensus at NATO to offer Georgia participation in MAP.

However, in the minds of some observers, the question surrounding MAP for Georgia is not just whether it (and NATO) are ready to move to a closer relationship. The question is whether the offer of MAP is worth it if it were to provoke a harsh reaction by Russia to what it sees as a hostile NATO penetrating into an area that some Russians still cannot accept as no longer a part of its sphere of influence. At its root, the issue is not MAP, but what MAP represents—the ability of a sovereign Georgia to decide for itself whether it wants to join a transatlantic institution that Russia sees, at least here, as encroaching upon its own interests in a way it regards as unacceptable. Russia has legitimate interests in the security policies of its neighbors, but has no legitimate reason for concern if those neighbors wish to join NATO. At the end of the day, the long-term NATO-

Russia relationship cannot be built on the basis of a cordon sanitare between Russia and its NATO neighbors.

The issue is not new. When the three Baltic Republics expressed a desire to join NATO, there was Russian concern about that as well. But the Baltic nations and NATO pressed ahead with developing a relationship based on the simple but important truth that the decisions of sovereign nations were theirs alone to make and not the province of third parties. Georgia as a sovereign nation has the right to seek NATO membership, and the Alliance should make that decision based on its needs and its criteria.

Ukraine

NATO has a special relationship with Ukraine and even a special committee devoted to developing NATO-Ukraine initiatives—the NATO-Ukraine Commission. NATO has worked closely with Ukraine for years, and has established an office there, to develop and implement initiatives that help Ukraine with reform efforts, especially on the military side.

Participation in MAP is a logical next step for Ukraine, and MAP should be extended to Ukraine at the Bucharest Summit. This will take Ukraine one step closer to NATO membership. Progress in economic reform in Ukraine since independence in 1991 is impressive, with a growing market economy, foreign investment and consistently some of the highest growth rates in Europe.

Its military reforms, lacking adequate funding and not keeping pace with reforms on the more successful civil side, have created smaller, more deployable units that have deployed abroad, taking part in NATO operations in the Balkans and in coalition operations in Iraq. Ukraine is also one of the few European nations with strategic lift! All indicators show extending MAP to Ukraine at the Bucharest Summit as a logical next step in the NATO-Ukraine relationship.

However, unlike Georgia, support for NATO membership by the government of Ukraine has been inconsistent and support for membership by the Ukrainian people is weak, reflecting the internal divisions in that country over the nature of its relationship with Russia and its western neighbors. While this lukewarm support for NATO membership should not be an obstacle to extending MAP to Ukraine, it makes Allies doubt Ukraine's commitment and ultimate direction towards membership. However, after years of indecision, in January of this year Ukraine's President, Prime Minister and Speaker of the Parliament signed a letter to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer asking to participate in the MAP process.

Low public support for NATO membership has not kept MAP from being extended to other aspirants in a similar situation, who have used the MAP to help build support in their country for NATO membership. But clearly, successful MAP participation will require on Ukraine's side not only a clear and unambiguous desire and commitment to undertake the work that comes with MAP participation, but also real confidence that that commitment is backed by a broad consensus of the Ukrainian people. The outreach effort in Ukraine will be hard, especially given the difficulty in solidifying support for NATO in the government. Despite this weak support for NATO membership—which is not the issue here—MAP should be extended so that reforms can become sharper and more focused, while the Ukrainians sort out their future relationship with NATO.

But there is a similarity with the Georgian case for MAP, and that is Russia. Ukraine represents both an emotional and strategic center of gravity for Russians, and Ukrainian membership in NATO raises for Russians not just misplaced fears of NATO encroachment on its borders, but a shrinking of what Russian strategists see as their "sphere on influence." Like with Georgia, some Russians still have a hard time adjusting to a sovereign Ukraine. But Russian pressure should have no control over the decisions that a sovereign nation like Ukraine should make about what institutions it wants to affiliate with. Russia should have no veto in Kyiv, Tbilisi or in Brussels.

Russia

Good relations with Russia are important for Georgia and Ukraine and for NATO. One of the great disappointments of the past 10 years is the deterioration in the relations between Russia and many nations and institutions in the transatlantic community, even as democracy itself has deteriorated in Russia.

Since Russia joined PfP, the NATO-Russia relationship has been based on practical cooperation, with NATO-Russia joint operations in the Balkans and in Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) in the Mediterranian. A Russian flag officer is even posted at SHAPE. The NATO-Russia Council too meets regularly, but recently there has not been much movement on joint NATO-Russia initiatives. Just this history of cooperation should demonstrate that Russian perceptions of NATO as a threat are misplaced and that there is a foundation of cooperation that can be built upon to help dispel this perception. But the mistrust that has grown recently between Russia and the West has caused us to lose an historic opportunity to work together at NATO to ensure transatlantic security—security just as important to Russia as it is for the other nations of the transatlantic community.

One of the many challenges of the period ahead will be to renew and strengthen the NATO-Russia relationship. This will take hard work on both sides; Russia and

the nations of NATO will have to want to make the relationship work, which we all have an interest in given that our security is bound up with each other. This will call for creative ideas and determined leadership within NATO and in Moscow to figure out how we can get the relationship moving forward again in a practical direction.

The new Russian President would be pushing on an open door at NATO if he chooses to pursue mutual trust and a new strategic partnership. He could begin to demonstrate such leadership by supporting joint NATO, US and Russian work in missile defense for Europe.

Afghanistan

In my judgment, a vibrant NATO depends on enlargement to bring in new Allies with energy, new ideas and capabilities to keep NATO relevant and robust. The NATO of the future that new Allies will join will be shaped by many things, chief among them the outcome of the international effort to help Afghanistan stand on its own feet as a sovereign nation and not become a failed or failing state. NATO plays a critical role in that effort by providing a safe and secure environment for the international community to assist the Afghans in rebuilding their country, as well as assisting the Afghan government in security related development, including mentoring Afghan security forces.

The Atlantic Council released an issue brief last month here in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee room that expressed great concern with the state of this recovery effort in Afghanistan by both the international community (including NATO) and the Kharzai Government. This study was concerned about NATO efforts because Allies were not providing the capabilities requested by military commanders and lacked a sense of commitment to see the job through.

Mr. Chairman, I will let our study speak for itself, but among the recommendations we made, I would like to highlight the need for a comprehensive strategy that coordinates the civil and military security and reconstruction effort by the international community in Afghanistan. We recommended that NATO host with the Afghan Government a conference that pulls together the parties in the international community (such as the World Bank, the EU, the major NGOs) who are the primary contributors to Afghan civil reconstruction. Together with NATO, the international institutions represented at the Conference could develop such a strategy. Once completed, this comprehensive strategy could be given UN approval and used by the Afghan Government and UN Representative Kai Eide to better coordinate and implement international reconstruction efforts with the Kharzai Government. At the Bucharest Summit, the Alliance must address not only the shortfalls in its ISAF mission in Afghanistan, but its "Vision Statement"

on Afghanistan should be strong enough to move the international community to better organize its reconstruction efforts as well.

Missile Defense in Europe

A future mission for the Alliance that new members will face is missile defense. At one end of the missile defense spectrum, NATO is considering how best it should protect deployed NATO forces in theater from missile attack. At a more strategic level, the United States has embarked on a bilateral – actually trilateral -- program to build a third ballistic missile defense site with elements in Poland and the Czech Republic to provide most of NATO Europe with protection from ballistic missile threats, both today but especially from prospective threats in the future. NATO has begun internal discussions about expanding NATO's own planning to include a capability to defend those parts of alliance territory – in southeast Europe and Turkey -- that because of proximity to the potential Iranian threat will be outside the coverage of the Third Site.

The Atlantic Council hosted a conference on the US "third site" effort last year, and it was clear that most nations, including the two hosts for the site, were anxious to have the US and NATO efforts joined together. Having NATO involved in an appropriate way in the Third Site effort helps both host nations build support domestically for participating in the US project and helps build acceptance more broadly across Europe and makes clear that the US initiative is genuinely directed at contributing to multilateral security and is not a manifestation of supposed American unilateralism. There may be other ways where the US and NATO could cooperate on European missile defense. NATO and Russia have worked together on missile defense as well, and it would be a natural fit for NATO, Russia and the US to work jointly on missile defense and so ease the paranoia that has grown up around the US program, especially in Moscow. Such a joint approach should be raised at the Bucharest Summit with Russian President Putin should he participate.

NATO and the New Threats

Another issue that will shape NATO is how it prepares for a future security environment that includes security threats that are not the traditional military ones, but can have their own destructive impact, such as cyber attack or the use of energy access as a weapon. Certainly, Estonia considered itself under attack last year when its cyber space was invaded and computer systems brought down.

These new types of non-military threats to the Transatlantic community call for a new way of thinking for Allies as we consider NATO's role in dealing with a future security environment that includes such non-traditional threats as cyber

attack and energy security. These issues are difficult at NATO because there is no agreement among Allies that these threats should even involve NATO. If NATO did become involved, questions are raised about what NATO could do on a practical basis in response.

First, energy security needs to be recognized at NATO as a legitimate security issue for the Alliance where it has a role to play, a role perhaps not even imagined today. Therefore, Allies need to think through possible NATO roles in energy security and include them in NATO defense planning. Ensuring energy security can be an important NATO-EU mission as well, where both institutions have equities at stake in ensuring the security of their member's access to energy supplies. Both institutions would bring to the table important tools to provide for that security. For example, the Alliance could work with the EU and with nations to help protect vital energy infrastructure in Europe which much of Europe depends on for energy transport. Both could also develop together better maritime domain awareness, which would help NATO and the EU respond to any threats to sea movement of energy resources. Finally, NATO and the EU could help train the military forces or law enforcement in energy-producing nations where security of energy infrastructure is a problem.

Summary

In summary Mr. Chairman, while I have touched on many issues today, they all involve NATO's future. I believe bringing Albania, Croatia and Macedonia into the Alliance is important to NATO's future, but even more important for stability and security in Europe, especially in the Balkans. These three cannot rest on their oars however, they have much work to do. Extending a membership invitation at Bucharest with accession in 2009 made contingent by NATO nations in the ratification process on their meeting or making progress on priority civil-military capability goals will help them accelerate their work. I also believe extending MAP to Ukraine and Georgia is important for NATO's future; MAP will help these countries take forward their already impressive reform efforts so that, one day, when NATO membership for these two countries is before this Committee, they will be ready.

The NATO that nations continue to want to join as members must remain as vibrant, relevant and capable into the future as it was when the North Atlantic Treaty was drafted and signed in 1949. Those first transatlanticists who drafted the North Atlantic Treaty wrote a document that continues to speak directly to issues of security and peace almost 60 years later, when countries unimaginable in 1949 as Allies either have joined or are on the cusp of joining the Alliance. These new nations will meet the challenges laid out by the Treaty drafters in Article 10, and will be in a position to take forward the principles of the Treaty and to ensure

the security of the Alliance. I hope Albania, Croatia and Macedonia will be joined by other new members over time. But one thing is certain, members new and old will face new threats to that security, and the Alliance needs to begin planning for those new challenges now.

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NATO Enlargement: Should Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia be invited to Join NATO?

The candidacies of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia to join NATO bring with them both the strengths that come with new members as well as the complex issues reflecting their history and geography.

Drawing on the core of what is known as the "Perry principles," after what Secretary of Defense Bill Perry identified as the standards for new members, these principles: civilian control of the military, civil societies based on democracy, rule of law, a market economy and good relations with neighbors, still provide important guidelines for candidates to know what the Alliance is looking for in an Ally and can guide our own decision making.

All three countries have had reform efforts underway for years shaped by the NATO Membership Action Plan and by EU criteria as well. Strong majorities favor membership, defense spending levels are close to or over 2% of GDP.

On the military side, NATO planners I have spoken with affirm that all three nations have enthusiastically met and implemented most of the military reform suggestions made to them through MAP and are in better shape militarily than most of the newest members were when they entered the Alliance.

But metrics alone do not provide the justification for <u>why</u> we may want these nations in NATO. To do that, we must consider their membership in the context of why we bring in new members and what our experience has been with enlargement since 1999.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Article 10 standards for new Allies took on a new interpretation based on Alliance security considerations of a new time. Security was now defined in a more broadly political/strategic way as assuring transatlantic security through the creation of a Europe "whole, free and at peace."

Bringing former adversaries into NATO (and the EU) became an important part of creating this more stable and integrated Europe. This led to NATO's largest period of enlargement, when 10 former adversaries entered the Alliance beginning in 1999. Now, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia are following in the train of those first 10.

We have to consider their candidacy in the same context we used to consider the latest 10 new members—will their membership help create a Europe "whole, free and at peace?"

The answer to that question is that NATO membership for these three is just as logical, just as consistent with past decisions and just as important for Alliance security as was membership for the 10 newest Allies--if not more so, given Alliance security concerns in their region, especially with Kosovo's declaration of independence last month.

Membership in such institutions as the EU and NATO brings peer pressure on members to act responsibly; nations if left on their own are freer to exploit regional problems to their advantage. The pressure by peers and by the institutions will make it very difficult for members to engage in acts that contribute to regional instability.

This newest round of enlargement would also build upon the reasoning behind Slovenia's NATO (and EU) membership as the first nation from the former Yugoslavia to join these institutions, which was partially based on the importance of enhancing regional stability.

NATO membership for Albania, Croatia and Macedonia will bring to bear that role of NATO as agent for regional stability as described above.
Membership will give these three nations a focus on regional stability, and the responsibility for security that comes with NATO membership will make these three nations regional activists. Like with Slovenia, admission of these nations to NATO will send an important signal to other nations in the region that the door to membership is open to those nations that accept the values and institutions shared by the Allies.

However, I am also concerned about the amount of work that remains to be done and the usefulness of the "carrot" of NATO membership in helping governments make difficult decisions about reform.

Therefore, I would like to recommend to the Committee that at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, invitations for membership be extended to Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. But it should be recognized explicitly that each nation still must meet, or make credible progress towards meeting, an achievable but essential capability goal or goals in civil or military areas. If nations do not meet these goals or if NATO planners cannot certify that significant progress is being made towards meeting them, then accession to NATO membership is postponed until such time as progress can be certified. I have no doubt that this Committee and the full Senate will want to be assured of that progress.

Should NATO offer to Ukraine and Georgia participation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP)?

Arguments are similarly strong for offering participation in NATO's Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest Summit.

Georgia

The Georgian people and government have made clear they would like to join the Alliance and Georgia has made great strides in military and civil reform efforts, illustrated by Georgian forces deployed in Iraq and in Afghanistan and especially by improvements in the Georgian economy.

The issue of MAP for Georgia should be an easy one: MAP should be extended to Georgia at the Bucharest Summit. If, however, the events during last November's crackdown on political opposition has weakened Allied consensus to extend MAP at Bucharest, I would like to offer a suggestion made by former Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer that NATO Ministers or Ambassadors decide the question of MAP after the spring parliamentary elections.

However, in the minds of some observers, the question surrounding MAP for Georgia is whether the offer of MAP is worth it if it were to provoke a harsh reaction by Russia to what it sees as a hostile NATO penetrating into an area that some Russians still consider a part of its sphere of influence. At its root, the issue is not MAP, but what MAP represents—the ability of a sovereign Georgia to decide for itself whether it wants to join a transatlantic institution that Russia sees, at least here, as encroaching upon its own interests in a way it regards as unacceptable. Russia has legitimate interests in the security policies of its

neighbors, but has no legitimate reason for concern if those neighbors wish to join NATO.

Ukraine

Participation in MAP is a logical next step for Ukraine, and MAP should be extended to Ukraine at the Bucharest Summit. Unlike Georgia, however, support for NATO membership by the government of Ukraine has been inconsistent and support for membership by the Ukrainian people is weak, reflecting the internal divisions in that country over the nature of its relationship with Russia and its western neighbors. However, after years of indecision, in January of this year Ukraine's President, Prime Minister and Speaker of the Parliament signed a letter to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer asking to participate in the MAP process.

Low public support for NATO membership has not kept MAP from being extended to other aspirants in a similar situation, who have used the MAP to help build support in their country for NATO membership. Despite this weak support for NATO membership—and membership is not the issue here—MAP should be extended so that reforms can become sharper and more focused, while the Ukrainians sort out their future relationship with NATO.

But there is a similarity with the Georgian case for MAP, and that is Russia. Ukraine represents both an emotional and strategic center of gravity for Russians, and Ukrainian membership in NATO raises for Russians not just misplaced fears of NATO encroachment on its borders, but a shrinking of what Russian strategists see as their "sphere on influence." But Russian pressure should have no control over the decisions that a sovereign nation like Ukraine should make about what institutions it wants to affiliate with.

Russia

Good relations with Russia are important for Georgia and Ukraine and for NATO. One of the great disappointments of the past 10 years is the deterioration in the relations between Russia and many nations and institutions in the transatlantic community, even as democracy itself has deteriorated in Russia.

Since Russia joined PfP, the NATO-Russia relationship has been based on practical cooperation, with NATO-Russia joint operations in the Balkans and in Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) in the Mediterranean. A Russian flag officer is even posted at SHAPE. The NATO-Russia Council too meets regularly, but recently there has not been much movement on joint NATO-Russia initiatives. Just this history of cooperation should demonstrate that Russian perceptions of

NATO as a threat are misplaced and that there is a foundation of cooperation that can be built upon to help dispel this perception.

One of the many challenges of the period ahead will be to renew and strengthen the NATO-Russia relationship. This will take hard work on both sides; Russia and the nations of NATO will have to want to make the relationship work, which we all have an interest in given that our security is bound up with each other. The new Russian President would be pushing on an open door at NATO if he chooses to pursue mutual trust and a new strategic partnership.