Testimony on Anti-Semitism in Europe

by
David A. Harris
Executive Director
The American Jewish Committee

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Mr. Chairman,

Permit me to express my deepest appreciation to you and to your distinguished colleagues for holding this important and timely hearing, and for affording me the opportunity of testifying before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations regarding the state of anti-Semitism in Europe.

I have the privilege of speaking on behalf of the American Jewish Committee, the oldest human relations organization in the United States. I am proud to represent over 125,000 members and supporters of the American Jewish Committee and a worldwide organization with 33 offices in the United States and 14 overseas posts, including offices in Berlin, Geneva, and Warsaw, and association agreements with the European Council of Jewish Communities and with the Jewish communities in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Spain.

Founded in 1906, our core philosophy for nearly a century has been that wherever Jews are threatened, no minority is safe. We have seen over the decades a strikingly close correlation between the level of anti-Semitism in a society and the level of general intolerance and violence against other minorities. Moreover, the treatment of Jews within a given society has become a remarkably accurate barometer of the state of democracy and pluralism in that society. In effect, though it is a role we most certainly did not seek, it can be said that by dint of our historical experience, Jews have become the proverbial miner's canary, often sensing and signaling danger before others are touched.

For nearly a century we have struggled against the scourge of anti-Semitism and its associated pathologies by seeking to advance the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and pluralism; by strengthening ties across ethnic, racial, and religious lines among people of good will; and by shining the spotlight of exposure on those who preach or practice hatred and intolerance.

Never in recent memory has that work been more important. We have witnessed in the last three years in particular a surge in anti-Semitism. Some of its manifestations are eerily familiar; others appear in new guises. But the bottom line is that Jews throughout the world, and notably in Western Europe, are experiencing a level of unease not seen in the postwar years.

I myself have been witness to the changed situation. I spent a sabbatical year in Europe in 2000-01, and continue to travel regularly to Europe, stay in close contact with European political and Jewish leaders, and follow closely the European media.

What sparked this new sense of unease? It cannot be separated from developments on the ground in the Middle East.

If I may be permitted to generalize, too many European governments, civic institutions, and media outlets rushed to condemn Israel after the promising peace talks of 2000 collapsed, despite the determined efforts of the Israeli government, with support from the United States, to reach a historic agreement with the Palestinians. Once the Palestinians returned to the calculated use of violence and terror in September 2000, for many Europeans it was as if those peace talks had never taken place. It was as if there had never been a proposal pushed relentlessly by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, with strong backing from President Bill Clinton, to achieve a two-state solution that included a partition of Jerusalem. And it was as if Chairman Yasir Arafat had not even participated in the talks, much less sabotaged them by rejecting out of hand the landmark deal offered him.

Israel was widely portrayed in Europe as an "aggressor" nation that was "trampling" on the rights of "stateless" and "oppressed" Palestinians. As Israel faced the daunting challenge of defending itself against terrorism, including suicide bombings, some in Europe went still further, seeking to deny it the right reserved to all nations to defend itself against this vicious onslaught. Such an attitude, if you will, became a new form of anti-Semitism.

I fully understand that Israel's actions, like those of any nation trying to cope with a similar threat, may engender discussion and debate or, for that matter, criticism, but what was taking place in these circles was something far more malicious. Tellingly, those engaged in portraying Israel as the "devil incarnate" for every imaginable "sin" were totally silent when it came to the use of Palestinian suicide bombers to kill innocent Israeli women, men, and children; they were even less prepared to address other compelling issues in the region surrounding Israel, such as Syria's longstanding and indefensible occupation of neighboring Lebanon or persistent patterns of gross human rights violations in such countries as Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

The frenzied rhetoric, especially in the media and human rights circles, kept escalating, to the point where some, including a Portuguese Nobel laureate, began recklessly using Nazi terminology to describe Israeli actions. Others, particularly at the time of the stand-off at the Church of the Nativity, reawakened the deadly deicide charge, which had been put to rest by Vatican Council II in 1965.

In highly publicized incidents, a few British intellectuals and journalists called into question Israel's very right to exist, and there were a number of attempts to impose boycotts on Israeli academicians and products. In one notorious case at Oxford University, a professor sought to deny admission to a student applicant based solely on the grounds that he had served in the Israel Defense Forces. Of course, we remember the shocking expletive used by the French ambassador to the Court of St. James regarding Israel, just as we recall that he was never punished by the French Foreign Ministry. And who can forget the travesty in Belgium as Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and a number of Israel military officials were threatened with legal action under the country's universal jurisdiction law, as were several prominent Americans, including former President

George Bush, until the country's political leaders finally came to their senses and amended the law?

I could go on at length describing a highly charged atmosphere in Western Europe. Israel was accused, tried, and convicted in the court of public opinion. Furthermore, that court was encouraged, however inadvertently, by governments too quick to condemn Israel's defensive actions and by media outlets that, with a few notable exceptions, presented consistently skewed coverage, frequently blurring the line between factual reporting and editorializing. It would be enough to follow the reporting of some prominent Greek, Italian, Spanish, or even British media outlets for a few days to get a feeling for the inherently unbalanced, at times even inflammatory, coverage of the Middle East. The coverage of the Jenin episode in the spring of 2002 was particularly revealing. Israel was accused of everything from "mass murder" to "genocide," when the reality was a far cry from either, as confirmed by outside human rights experts.

Mr. Chairman, I personally witnessed a pro-Palestinian demonstration in Geneva, just opposite the United Nations headquarters, in which the chant alternated between "jihad, jihad" and "Mort aux juifs," "Death to the Jews." Similar chants could be heard in the streets of France and Belgium. To the best of my knowledge, no action was taken by the authorities in any of these cases.

My children attended a Swiss international school where a 16-year-old Israeli girl was threatened with a knife by a group of Arab pupils. When she complained to school officials, the response was, and I quote, "This is a matter between countries. It does not involve our school." My youngest son had a more or less similar experience on the campus with, again, no action taken by the school authorities.

Is it any wonder that in such an atmosphere many Jews in the countries of Western Europe became concerned on two fronts? First, they were worried for their physical safety as they encountered a new form of anti-Semitism—the use of criticism of Israel and Israeli practices as justification for violence against Jews, who became "legitimate" targets by virtue of their real or presumed identification with Israel, Zionism, or simply the Jewish people. This became evident in the many documented threats and attacks that took place against Jews and Jewish institutions in Europe, especially France. And second, to varying degrees, they were no longer quite as certain that they could rely on the sympathy and understanding of their governments for the physical and, yes, emotional security they needed – the certainty that the state would be there to ensure their protection.

Strikingly, those governments and institutions to a large degree professed ignorance of the problem.

For example, the American Jewish Committee met in November 2001 with the then-foreign minister of France. We raised our concern about growing threats to Jews, as well as growing tolerance for intolerance. In turn, we were treated to a revealing lecture from the minister. Initially, he denied there was any problem at all, though the facts

contradicted him. Jews in France were being assaulted, synagogues were being torched, and Jewish parents were anxious about the safety of their children. Then he tried to muddy the problem by suggesting that crime had increased in France and Jews were among its many victims, but certainly not singled out. That, too, was belied by the facts, namely the specificity of the attacks against Jews and Jewish institutions. And finally, he attempted to rationalize the problem by linking it to the Middle East and inferring that, tragic though the anti-Jewish incidents were, they were an inevitable consequence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and would likely continue until that conflict was resolved.

Frankly, we were appalled by this response. Could it be that the foreign minister of a country which had given birth to the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and which had been the first European country to extend full protection to its Jewish community, had been unwilling or incapable of understanding and responding to what was going on in his own nation? In reality, France fell short in its responsibility to provide protection to its citizens from the fall of 2000 until the summer of 2002, a 20-month period during which many French Jews felt abandoned and left to their own devices.

Meanwhile, French officials created a straw man—the false charge that France was being depicted as an anti-Semitic country—and went about refuting it. In reality, those concerned with developments in France were talking about anti-Semitic acts *within* France and never sought to describe the nation as a whole as anti-Semitic, which would have been an unfair and inaccurate characterization.

While much attention has been focused on France because it is home to Europe's largest Jewish community and the greatest number of violent acts against Jews have taken place there in the past three years, the discussion by no means should be limited to France. During this period, we have also met with European Union commissioners in Brussels to discuss our concerns, but with little apparent success. Further, we have met with government leaders in other Western European countries and, with the exception of Germany, our efforts to call attention to a festering problem have fallen on largely deaf ears.

The obvious question is why there has been such a widespread failure to acknowledge and address a problem as obvious as it is real.

Could it be linked to hostility to Israel, particularly after the left-of-center Barak government gave way to the right-of-center Sharon government? Could it be an unwillingness to confront the reality that within the remarkable zone of prosperity and cooperation created by the European Union, a cancer was still lurking that needed treatment? Could it be a fear of antagonizing growing Muslim populations in countries like Belgium and France, where they were rapidly becoming an electoral factor and, in some cases, were proving restive because of their difficulty in integrating? Or could it be a subliminal reaction, perhaps, to the decade of the 1990s when many countries had been compelled to look at their wartime actions in the mirror yet resented those who held up the mirror?

Whatever the reason, it is clear that anti-Semitism still lurks in Europe, but not only in Europe, of course. Its main center of gravity today is in the Muslim world. The speech earlier this month by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad at the Organization of the Islamic Conference was a prime example of the use of classical anti-Semitic themes. And not only did none of the many political leaders in attendance walk out of the hall to protest his offensive remarks, but he was greeted with a standing ovation and, subsequently, laudatory comments to the media by such leading officials as Egypt's foreign minister.

European history, as we know so well, contains glorious chapters of human development and scientific breakthroughs. But it also contains too many centuries filled with an ever expanding vocabulary of anti-Semitism—from the teaching of contempt of the Jews to the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions; from forced conversions to forced expulsions; from restrictions on employment and education to the introduction of the ghetto; from blood libels to pogroms; and from massacres to the gas chambers at Auschwitz.

Who better than the Europeans should grasp the history of anti-Semitism? Who better than the Europeans should understand the slippery slope that can lead to demonization, dehumanization, and, ultimately, destruction of a people?

What, then, can Europe do at this moment to address the changed situation of the past three years?

First and foremost, precisely because of their history, it is the countries of Europe that could take the lead in confronting and combating the growing tide of global anti-Semitism, whatever its source, whatever its manifestation. That would be an extraordinarily positive development. And given Europe's substantial moral weight in the world today, it could have real impact.

Whether anti-Semitism comes in its old and familiar guises from the extreme right; in its various disguises from the extreme left, including the combustible mix of anti-Americanism, anti-globalization, and anti-Zionism; or from Muslim sources that peddle malicious conspiracy theories through schools, mosques, and the media to spread hatred of Jews, Europe's voice must be loud and consistent. Its actions need to match its words.

To date, experience has shown that a strong European response is far more likely when anti-Semitism emanates from the extreme right than when it comes from either the extreme left or the Islamic world. The reaction must be the same regardless of who is the purveyor.

Preserving the memory of the Holocaust is highly laudable, as many European countries have sought to do through national days of commemoration, educational initiatives, and memorials and monuments. But demonstrating sensitivity for the legitimate fears of living Jews is no less compelling a task. Whether it is a relatively large Jewish community in France or a tiny, remnant Jewish community in Greece, the fact remains that no Jewish community comprises more than one percent of the total population of any

European country, if that, and many remain deeply scarred by the lasting impact of the Holocaust on their numbers, their institutions, and, not least, their psyche.

When the Greek Jewish community awoke one morning shortly after 9/11 to read mainstream press accounts filled with wild assertions of Jewish or Israeli complicity in the plot to attack America, they understandably felt shaken and vulnerable, even if the charges were patently false. With less than five thousand Jews remaining in Greece after the devastation wrought by the Holocaust in a nation of over ten million, is it any wonder that these Jews might worry for their physical security at such a moment?

Second, political leaders need to set an example. Joschka Fischer, the foreign minister of Germany, is someone who has a grasp of the lessons of history when it comes to Europe and the Jews, and he understands Israel's current difficulties and dilemmas. He has not hesitated to speak out, to write, and to act. After all, it is political leaders who set the tone for a nation. By their actions or inactions, they send a clear and unmistakable message to their fellow citizens. When a French ambassador is not penalized for trashing Israel in obscene terms, what are the French people left to conclude? The same can be said of Lech Walesa, the former Polish president, who in 1995 remained silent in the face of a fiery anti-Semitic sermon delivered in his presence by his parish priest in Gdansk. He only reluctantly addressed the issue ten days later after pressure from several governments, including the United States.

Third, many European countries have strict laws on the books regarding anti-Semitism, racism, and Holocaust denial. In fact, to its credit, the French parliament recently toughened the nation's laws still further. These laws throughout Europe must be used. In that regard, we were pleased to hear French President Jacques Chirac, at a meeting last month in New York with American Jewish leaders, speak now of a "zero-tolerance" policy toward acts of anti-Semitism and penalties for those found guilty of such acts that would be "swift and severe." He also expressed concern about the unchecked influence of the Internet in spreading anti-Semitism and other forms of racism, and indicated a desire to explore means for restricting this influence.

No one should ever again be compelled to question the determination of European countries to investigate, prosecute, and seek maximum penalties for those involved in incitement and violence.

To cite one specific example, we are watching with particular interest what the British Home Office will do about two British Muslim youths who were quoted earlier this year in the *New York Times* (May 12, 2003) calling for the murder of Jews and whose cases were brought to the attention of the authorities.

And finally, all countries that aspire to the highest democratic values, including but not limited to European nations, must constantly remind themselves that anti-Semitism is a cancer that may begin with Jews but never ends with Jews. Anti-Semitism left unchecked metastasizes and eventually afflicts the entire democratic body.

Given the global nature of anti-Semitism, there is an opportunity for the democratic nations of the world to work cooperatively. The United States has always shown leadership in this regard. It has been an issue that unites our executive and legislative branches and our main political parties.

One venue that currently exists for such cooperation is the 55-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which in June held its first conference devoted exclusively to the subject of anti-Semitism. This is a step forward, offering the chance to assess developments, compare experiences, and set forth short- and long-term strategies for combating anti-Semitism. This mechanism, while not in itself a panacea, should be regularized for as long as necessary, and ought to be viewed as an important vehicle for addressing the issue, but by no means the only one.

Mr. Chairman, I have deliberately omitted any reference to the nations of the Former Soviet Union because my colleague, Mark Levin of NCSJ, will address that subject in his testimony. But let me offer a positive note regarding the nations of Central Europe, ten of which have been included in the first and second rounds of NATO enlargement. I should add in this context that the American Jewish Committee was among the first nongovernmental organizations in this country to enthusiastically support both rounds of NATO enlargement.

While the history of anti-Semitism in many countries in this region runs very deep indeed, we have witnessed important progress in recent years, particularly with the collapse of communism and the ensuing preparations for membership in both NATO and the European Union. There has been a praiseworthy effort by the countries of Central Europe to reach out to Israel and the larger Jewish world, and to encourage the rebuilding of Jewish communities that suffered enormously under Nazi occupation and later under communist rule.

In other words, there is good news to report here. And one of the reasons for this good news has been the welcome recognition by post-communist leaders that their commitment to building truly open and democratic societies will be judged in part by how they deal with the range of Jewish issues resulting from the Nazi and communist eras.

Yet problems remain. In some countries, extremist voices seek votes and attempt to rehabilitate Nazi collaborators, but, fortunately, they are in the distinct minority. And some countries lag behind in bringing to closure the remaining restitution issues arising from Nazi and, later, communist seizure of property. We hope these matters will soon be addressed, with the ongoing encouragement of the United States government.

Mr. Chairman, by convening this hearing today, the United States Senate has once again underscored its vital role in defending basic human values and human rights around the world. Champions of liberty have always looked to our great country to stand tall and strong in the age-old battle against anti-Semitism.

In examining the scope of anti-Semitism today and exploring strategies for combating it, this subcommittee, under your leadership, looms large as a beacon of hope and a voice of conscience. As always, the American Jewish Committee stands ready to assist you and your distinguished colleagues in your admirable efforts.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism: A New Frontier of Bigotry

By Dr. Alvin H. Rosenfeld*

"Hitler Had Two Sons: Bush and Sharon" reads the slogan on a so-called "peace-poster" carried in European anti-war rallies; and in this and countless other crude formulations of a similar nature, one finds expressed a hostility toward America, Israel, and the Jews that has been gaining force across much of Europe in the last few years. The American-led war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, launched in March 2003, may have brought this animus to a head, but it was in evidence well before the war began. Indeed, an American Jew visiting Europe in the spring of 2002 would have been justified in feeling doubly uneasy, for these passions were then at their most intense: Anti-Semitism of a vocal and sometimes violent variety was in greater evidence than at any time since the end of World War II; and anti-Americanism was making itself felt as an increasingly common and acceptable form of public expression.

As I intend to show, anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism reveal certain structural similarities and often take recourse to a common vocabulary of defamation and denunciation. While their developmental histories may differ, the hostilities they release may converge, driven as they are by the same negative energies of fear, anger, envy, and resentment. We are witnessing such a convergence today, with consequences that have the potential to do serious harm.

In the news media, over the Internet, in street demonstrations, and in common parlance, anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism have taken on global dimensions and now have a worldwide reach. They have become intimately bound up with one another, so much so that it sometimes seems that the growing hatred of America is but another form of Judeophobia—and vice versa. Precisely what drives these animosities is not always clear, but their resurgence in our time is an ominous development and should not be treated lightly. Observing the extremity of some of the rhetoric being voiced these days about America, Israel, and the Jews, one becomes aware that it moves well beyond principled disagreements with American or Israeli policies and into the realm of the fantastic.

To demonstrate how anti-American and anti-Semitic attitudes mingle in this bizarre realm and to expose the kinds of trouble they can create, I turn first to an examination of these trends in Germany, a country in which even the slightest offense of this nature makes one sit up and take notice. Thereafter I shall look at some of the same issues on a broader front,

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* Alvin H. Rosenfeld is a professor of English and Jewish Studies and director of the Institute for Jewish Culture and Arts at Indiana University. He was named by President George W. Bush to the United States Holocaust Memorial Council in May 2002.
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examining in particular France, the European country that seems most seriously infected with anti-American and anti-Semitic biases.[1]

The Significance of Germany

Europe's largest and economically most powerful country, Germany exerts a sizable influence on the continent's political priorities and some of its more prominent social and cultural trends. In addition, its close diplomatic alliance with France and determined effort to act with that country as a European counterweight to American interests in foreign affairs puts Germany in the foreground of attention. Add to these reasons Germany's Nazi past, and it should be clear why any signs of hostility to Jews and others within its borders warrant serious attention. German authorities are well aware of the damage their country could suffer if these tendencies get out of hand, and they usually make special efforts to restrain the open expression of anti-Semitic and anti-American biases.

These animosities sometimes seem to have a will of their own, however, and erupt periodically in ways that can introduce a note of discord into the country's cultural life and disrupt its normally well-managed international relations. Tensions of this kind surfaced this past year on both the cultural and diplomatic fronts.

I was in Germany for two weeks in May 2002, when some of these trends were coming to the fore. Before describing what I observed, however, it will be helpful to advance the calendar by a few months and recall that on September 22, 2002, German voters reelected Gerhard Schröder to a second term as chancellor. Schröder's victory was by no means a certainty in the months leading up to the election. In fact, for most of that time, the polls showed him several points behind his chief rival, Edmund Stoiber, the prime minister of Bavaria and the candidate of the conservative alliance of the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union parties. In the final weeks of the campaign, Schröder closed this gap and ultimately prevailed.

According to most commentators, he won the election as a result of two key factors: his media-savvy handling of a crisis in the eastern part of the country brought on by a destructive flood; and his clever but costly strategy of running the last leg of his race not so much against Stoiber as against President George W. Bush. The American president, who was accused of "playing around with war," became a prominent election issue, and Schröder did not hesitate to level heavy rhetorical assaults against him. The chancellor declared that he would not "click his heels" to an American commander-in-chief and categorically refused any German support for American military "adventures" in Iraq, even if such action had the sanction of a United Nations mandate. These moves were calculated to attract voters on the left of the German political spectrum, among whom a militant pacifism is part of the cultural norm. (In fact, an ingrained pacifism has become a part of the postwar mentality of much of the younger generation of Germans.) At the same time, Schröder's evocation of a special "German way" in the formulation of foreign policy might sit well with nationalist sentiment on the political right. His open defiance of the United States would also appeal to voters in the former communist states in the eastern part of Germany, who had been educated to see America as the enemy and still hold lingering resentments against it. The strategy worked, and Schröder managed to squeak through by the thinnest of margins.

But at a price. Angela Merkel, leader of the opposition Chris-tian Democrats, went on record on the day of the election as saying, "German-American relations were never as bad as they are this evening.... This is a high price to pay for this campaign."[2] Wolfgang Schäuble, a fellow Christian Democrat, agreed, stating, "German-American relations are at their lowest level since the founding of the state in 1949."[3] Coming from two prominent members of the political opposition, these views are not surprising, but other, less partisan voices confirmed this negative assessment. Christian Hacke, a political scientist at Bonn University, for instance, declared: "For the first time in fifty years a German government has become anti-American in both style and substance. This is a catastrophe."[4] Seemingly agreeing with this sentiment, Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. secretary of defense, saw German-American relations as "poisoned" and refused to meet with Peter Struck, his German counterpart, at an international meeting of allied defense ministers in Warsaw shortly after Schröder's victory.

Whether for opportunistic or other reasons, a change of attitude toward America was becoming apparent in Germany. Moreover, while Schröder certainly exploited anti-American feelings for his own purposes, he did not have to newly create them. Such sentiments were there already and, as Henry Kissinger wrote at the time, may now be a "permanent feature of German politics."[5] It did not take long for these sentiments to surface aggressively under the sanction that the German chancellor's blunt and highly public criticism of the American president had seemed to give them. In one especially notorious incident, Schröder's justice minister, Herta Däubler-Gmelin, reportedly compared President Bush's tactics toward Iraq to those of Hitler: "Bush wants to divert attention from his domestic problems. It's a classic tactic. It's one that Hitler also used."[6] In another instance, Ludwig Stiegler, a member of Parliament from Mr. Schröder's party, likened Mr. Bush to an imperialist Roman emperor bent on subjugating Germany. (Embarrassed by these incidents, Schröder relieved both of his colleagues of their jobs in the postelection period, but by then the damage had already been done.) If further proof were needed that the climate had turned nasty, it was provided by Rudolf Scharping, Schröder's former defense minister, who reportedly stated, at a meeting in Berlin on August 27, 2002, that President Bush was being encouraged to go to war against Iraq by a "powerful—perhaps overly powerful—Jewish lobby" in the United States.[7] In Scharping's formulation, reminiscent of older, far-right claims about excessive Jewish power, anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism come together as common bedfellows.

Anti-Bush Demonstrations

I was in Berlin on May 22, 2002, when President Bush came for a stay of less than twenty-four hours. It was his first trip to Germany and followed an earlier visit to the White House by Chancellor Schröder. (As matters transpired, it was probably to be the last visit to the White House by Schröder or any other German government official for a long time.) Anti-Bush sentiments, including popular derision of the American president as an unruly Texas "cowboy," had surfaced long before this visit and intensified notably during the president's brief stay in Berlin. Ten thousand German police, some in riot gear and backed up by armored vehicles, were assigned to safeguard him. The center of Berlin was cleared of all traffic, and the area around the Brandenburg Gate, where the president's hotel was located, was closed off almost entirely.

Public protests began on Tuesday and carried on for two more days. On Wednesday, a crowd estimated at 20,000 was out on the streets, most peacefully demonstrating, but some determined to be more aggressive in voicing their opposition to the American president. Signs denouncing Bush as a "terrorist" and a "warmonger" were on display, together with others declaring that "war is terror" and demanding a "stop [to] Bush's global war." By now, such public displays of oppositional politics had become common fare throughout Europe and were hardly restricted to Germany. But to be in Berlin at the same time as the American president and observe that it was deemed necessary to field a small army of German police to protect him was startling. One is no longer surprised to learn of virulent anti-Americanism in places like Cairo, Tehran, and Ramallah, but to witness the public torching of America's flag in the capital of a European country that supposedly is a close ally was disconcerting and brought me to reflect on what was stirring in Germany to fuel such passions.

German spokesmen took pains at the time to explain that these protests were not directed at America per se or at the American people but only against specific policies being promoted by President Bush. In part, such explanations ring true, but only in part. There is widespread dislike of what is commonly denounced as American "unilateralism" and open displeasure over America's pulling away from international agreements on the environment, ballistic missiles, trade, and other things. Many West Europeans do not take well to this American president's personal style any more than they like his policies, and this generation of Germans, in particular, has been nervous about what they see as his penchant for aggressive use of the military to solve international problems.

These and a host of other differences had contributed to a widening gap between Washington and Europe—a "continental drift" that had preceded President Bush's assumption of office, but his coming into power brought numerous problems to the fore. It was precisely to quiet German nerves on these matters, and especially on the matter of a possible war with Iraq, that President Bush came to Berlin and addressed the German Parliament. As one commentator put it at the time, he could not possibly settle people's minds on all of these issues with even the best of speeches, but he gave a "moving and important speech, if there's anyone left in Europe to be moved."[8]

The skepticism in these words is justified, for the more closely one looks at anti-American rhetoric, the more one sees that it often moves beyond criticism of specific policies to expose envies, fears, and resentments of a deeper kind. These are not new, and no matter what it is that may prompt them, their recurrence and exaggerated expression suggest that a cultural repetition compulsion is at play. Consider the following news items, for instance, taken from the German press:

> A cover page of *Stern* magazine ... showed an American missile piercing the heart of a dove of peace.... Prominent German politicians also freely [have] expressed such attitudes. Oskar Lafontaine, deputy cochairman of the Social Democratic Party [SPD], called the United States "an aggressor nation." Rudolf Hartnung, chairman of the youth organization of the SPD, accused the United States of "ideologically inspired genocide" in Central America, among other places. Another SPD politician, state legislator Jürgen Busack, had this to say: "The warmongers and international arsonists do not govern in the Kremlin. They govern in Washington. The United States must lie,

> cheat, and deceive in an effort to thwart resistance to its insane foreign policy adventures. The United States is headed for war."[9]

Students of German political history will recognize that, while the language quoted is of a piece with today's accusatory rhetoric, it actually comes from the Germany of the early 1980s. Some twenty years ago, when another American president was regularly identified with the Wild West and denounced as a trigger-happy cowboy, Germany's media and many of its political figures were voicing the same charges against President Reagan now made against President Bush. The images in both cases were virtually identical: Governed by political leaders who are not only crude philistines but reckless and aggressive warriors, America is a menacing country that threatens world peace. It is for this reason that, in confronting German and other European views of America, one is tempted to consider anti-Americanism not just as a form of cultural and political criticism but as a form of psychopathology.

Definition of Anti-Americanism

To understand its nature, let's borrow a working definition of anti-Americanism from Paul Hollander's book on the subject: The term "anti-Americanism," Hollander writes, denotes a "particular mind-set, an attitude of distaste, aversion, or intense hostility the roots of which may be found in matters unrelated to the actual qualities or attributes of American society or the foreign policies of the United States. In short, ... anti-Americanism refers to a negative predisposition, a type of bias which is to various degrees unfounded.... It is an attitude similar to [such other] hostile predispositions as racism, sexism, or anti-Semitism."[10]

Hollander is correct in recognizing that anti-Americanism implies more than taking a critical view of real American shortcomings, but rather has an irrational side. It expresses a sharp distrust and dislike not just of what America sometimes does but of what it is alleged to be—a mighty but willful, arrogant, self-righteous, domineering, and dangerously threatening power. What we confront here are fantasies that posit an untamed, ferocious country, unrestrained by moral conscience or international laws—in short, an "American abomination" or "American peril." Observing that America is sometimes seen in just such terms, Hollander correctly notes the resemblance of anti-Americanism to other kinds of deeply felt aversions and hostilities, including those that fuel anti-Semitism. The link between these two biases became evident during my time in Germany last spring.

George Bush and Ariel Sharon: Parallel Images

One way to observe this linkage is to reflect on the two figures who, more than any others, seem to occupy the German and general European imagination today as larger-than-life figures of menace: George Bush and Ariel Sharon. Popular images of the American president as a wild man and a warmonger have already been cited. As exaggerated as these are, they are at least matched, and sometimes even superceded in their extremity, by the images projected of Ariel Sharon. Ever since the Israeli prime minister's visit to Jerusalem's Temple Mount, on September 28, 2000, Sharon has been regularly described in the German media in terms that demonize him as a "bull," a "bulldozer," a "warmonger," and a "slaughterer." He has been compared to Hitler and Nero and said to be "Israel's highest-ranking arsonist." Other references peg him as a "political pyromaniac," an ungainly "old war criminal," a

"right-wing extremist," a "warhorse," and "catastrophe personified." In addition to these epithets, Sharon is frequently referred to in terms of his physical traits and mocked as being "constipated" and "pot-bellied," a "fat, lonely old man' with the "sluggish gait of an elephant." He is also described as being "politically deranged" and thirsty for Palestinian blood. (According to *Die Welt*, "a lot of blood clings to his hands, starting from his Kibiya days in the 1950s, to Sabra and Shatila, up to his most recent provocation in the mosque in [September] 2000.") In sum, the Israeli prime minister is seen as a loathsome monster running amok, the very personification of "the ugly Israeli."

Insofar as Ariel Sharon is seen as representative of his country's Jewish populace, Israeli society too is being portrayed as implacably brutal and as associated with the rule of war criminals.[11] It is little wonder, then, that Israel has taken on something like pariah status and is sometimes even referred to as "the most hated country in the world."[12]

The distinction of being reviled in such terms is one that Israel shares with only one other country: the United States of America. The two are now commonly denounced as "outlaw nations" or, in the demonology of Muslim orators, as "the Great Satan" and "the Little Satan."

German political rhetoric does not generally approach anything so extreme, although the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk not long ago named America and Israel as the only two countries today that strike him as being "rogue states."[13] More typically, Germans are content if they feel they have the right to "criticize" Israel. At the same time, they bristle at the thought that some of the more extreme forms their criticism may take might themselves be subjected to criticism not to their liking. In the run-up to the German elections in the spring of 2002, for instance, when the FDP politician Jürgen Möllemann seemed to lend public sanction to the murderous assaults of Palestinian suicide bombers against Israeli civilians, Jews in Germany were troubled. Michel Friedman, a prominent figure in the Jewish community of Frankfurt and the host of a popular television talk show, was especially sharp in his criticism of Mr. Möllemann, who in turn excoriated Mr. Friedman, declaring that it was figures like Ariel Sharon and Friedman himself, "with his intolerant and malicious manner," who provoke anti-Semitism in Germany.[14] Although Mr. Möllemann's colleagues in the FDP were slow to react to these ill-tempered charges, Jews in the country immediately recognized that in blaming the Jews for anti-Semitism and then complaining that he was being unfairly called to task for doing so, Möllemann was employing a tactic from the familiar repertoire of anti-Semitic clichés. At about the same time, Martin Walser, a prominent German writer, published a highly controversial novel, *Tod eines Kritikers* ("The Death of a Critic"), which liberally exploited this same repertoire by projecting an altogether contemptible Jew as one of his main characters. Walser's novel was roundly denounced as a "document of hate" by some critics and defended by others. Before long, a debate about lifting the taboos regarding criticism of Israel and Jews living in Germany became another in a long series of German debates about anti-Semitism and the burden of Holocaust memory on postwar German society.[15]

Pairing America and Israel as Rogue States

To return to Sloterdijk's singling out of America and Israel as rogue states: Pairing the two countries in this way is hardly new, nor is the temptation to link them as outlaw nations indulged in only by German intellectuals. Some thirty years ago, the British historian Arnold Toynbee remarked that "the United States and Israel must be today the two most dangerous of the 125 sovereign states among which the land surface of this planet is at present partitioned."[16] And more recently the British columnist Polly Toynbee, granddaughter of Arnold, has written that "ugly Israel is the Middle East representative of ugly America."[17] Numerous other references of this kind could be cited as well, linking the Jewish state and the United States as paramount threats to world peace. The message is unsubtle and can be handily summed up by a few words on a popular sign-board carried at European peace rallies: "Bush and Sharon, Murderers," or, in a more extreme formulation of this same charge, "Bush + Sharon = Hitler."

What lies behind these obscenities is worth pondering. The easy application of Nazi-era references to Israel and America is one of the most repugnant features of present-day anti-Semitic and anti-American rhetoric. It is also becoming commonplace, and not only in the sensationalizing language of the mob talk that often accompanies street demonstrations. The Portuguese writer and Nobel Prize laureate José Saramago famously likened the Israeli siege of Yasir Arafat's compound in the West Bank city of Ramallah to nothing less than Nazi actions against Jews in Auschwitz.

The Israeli incursion into Jenin, which cost the lives of twenty-three Israeli soldiers while killing some fifty-two Palestinians, most of them armed fighters, was likened to "Leningrad" and denounced as "genocide." Others in Europe, mainly on the intellectual left, think in similarly extravagant terms. When they say "Israeli" or "Jew"—and in the minds of many, the two have become almost one—they are not far from thinking "oppressor" or "murderer." The shorthand term for this despised type is now "Sharon" or, stated simply but perversely, "Nazi."

President Bush is similarly branded, his visage adorned with swastikas and his name changed to "George W. Hitler." As in the case of the former German Minister of Justice, such coarse semantic switches are now made all too easily, as if an off-the-cuff association of the president of the United States with the most monstrous figure in German history were both natural and acceptable.

As Dan Diner has shown convincingly in two recent books on this subject, anti-Americanism has a well-established history in Germany dating back at least to the nineteenth century. Animated at times by cultural motives and at other times by political motives, German hostility to America crystallized ideologically in the early twentieth century as a reaction to modernity itself. Urbanization, commercialization, secularization, social mobility, mass culture, meritocracy, democracy, feminism—these and other components of modernity were considered unwelcome encroachments on traditional ways of life. In opposing them, German critics of the United States tended to conflate fears and resentments regarding America's alleged imperial hegemony with similar fears regarding imagined Jewish money, power, influence, and control. Diner quotes Max Horkheimer to this effect: "...everywhere that one finds anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism is also prevalent." Horkheimer further explains that

America is frequently singled out as the scapegoat for a host of German and general European problems, brought on, at the time he was writing, by "the general malaise caused by cultural decline." In seeking causes for this malaise, people "find the Americans and, in America itself, once again the Jews, who supposedly rule America."[18]

Horkheimer was hardly alone in this analysis. Following the defeat of Germany in World War I, numerous others expressed anti-American sentiments in ways that directly implicated the Jews. According to Diner:

> It became commonplace to characterize America, according to the words of Werner Sombart, as a "state of Jews" (*Judenstaat)*. In particular after Taft's presidency, this view saw the "Jewish" influence on public life in the United States as having gained the upper hand. Jews were thought to be pulling the strings in the trade unions, which were also centers of power and influence. During the war they succeeded in moving into big capital and supposedly profited substantially from Allied war loans. Jews were also believed to have considerable intellectual influence. In early nationalist literature, for instance, Wilson's Fourteen Points were depicted as a product of Jewish minds. The "enslavement" of Germany was also ascribed to the Jews.[19]

In the aftermath of World War I and into the Nazi period, charges of this kind became prevalent in Germany, and an ideologically tempered anti-Americanism intimately linked to anti-Semitism became commonplace. It saw American culture as degenerate, its debased condition a function of Jewish influence. "My feelings against America are those of hatred and repugnance," Hitler said, "half-Judaized, half-negrified, with everything built on the dollar."[20] Beyond purportedly corrupting culture, however, this presumed Jewish influence was seen to be everywhere: in the person of Bernard Baruch, Wilson's hand-picked representative at the Versailles Conference, who was prominently identified as a Wall Street financial magnate who allegedly had pushed hard for war to advance his personal fortune as well as the aims of Jewish world domination; in the person of Henry Morgenthau, Roosevelt's secretary of finance during World War II, who was widely seen as a Jewish avenger out to destroy Germany economically; and other "Jewish" influentials who were regarded as hostile to German interests, such as New York mayor Fiorello LaGuardia; Felix Frankfurter, the law professor and Roosevelt confidante; and even President Roosevelt himself, sometimes (mis)identified as being really named "Rosenfeld." America, in sum, was under a "Jewish dictatorship" and, as such, implacably anti-German. Indeed, it was the Jews, so the charge went, who forced the United States to enter the war in the first place.[21]

Following the defeat of Nazi Germany, blatant conspiracy theories were not commonly voiced in Germany. Nevertheless, the notion that Jewish "influence"" continued to make itself felt in invidious ways hardly disappeared, and to this day polls of German public opinion regularly show sizable numbers of Germans affirming the notion that Jews exercise too much power in world affairs. Jews are believed to do so in their own right and through their alleged "control" over American foreign policy. For instance, in 1991, prominent figures on the German left held Jews responsible for the first Persian Gulf war, alleging that the battle was being waged on Israel's behalf, not Kuwait's. As Sander Gilman summed up the mood at the time, the Gulf War "showed how anti-Americanism in Germany and especially anti-Jewish resentment in the peace movement and among its fellow travelers saw the war as an American/Jewish/Israeli invasion. The virulent shouts that it was *Israel* that

was causing the Gulf War, rather than Iraqi expansionism, simply echoed the cries against American imperial hegemony that carried on the anti-Semitic associations of Jew and American from the nineteenth century."[22]

A "Cabal" of Neoconservatives

The issues examined here within a German context are now observable on a much broader front, and the Jews once again have been blamed for propelling America into war in the Persian Gulf. A powerful "cabal" of American supporters of Israel—Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, Elliott Abrams, William Kristol, and others of the so-called "neoconservative war party"—are said to be shaping American foreign policy and to have pushed President Bush into attacking Iraq to serve the ends of a stronger Israel. In this view, President Bush is portrayed as little more than a client of Ariel Sharon, and American national security interests remain in the grip of the "Zionist lobby" or powerful "East Coast" influentials—code words employed by writers who seem to believe, but generally will not bring themselves to say outright, that the Jews are really running America's affairs.

The use of coded language has gone so far that it is no longer unusual for writers who comment on the neoconservative movement to use the term "neocon" as synonymous with "Jew," excepting those with similar views who lack Jewish roots. Whenever such inferences are drawn, it is now common to point to "plots" underway that threaten to steer American policy in the wrong direction—namely, the direction its Jewish manipulators, and not America's elected officials, would have it go.

Antiwar conservatives like Patrick J. Buchanan espoused conspiracy theories regarding the origins of the war against Iraq. Buchanan wrote in the *American Conservative* on March 24, 2003:

> Here was a cabal of intellectuals telling the Commander-in-Chief, nine days after an attack on America, that if he did not follow their war plans, he would be charged with surrendering to terror. … What these neoconservatives seek is to conscript American blood to make the world safe for Israel. They want the peace of the sword imposed on Islam and American soldiers to die if necessary to impose it.[23]

But it wasn't only right-wingers like Buchanan who claimed that the war served Israel's, not America's, security objectives. On the left, too, there were those who saw the war as being waged at the behest of Israel and, more cynically, also in pursuit of American Jewish political support. In writing about the "power" of the neocons in the *New York Review of Books*, Elizabeth Drew refers to both of these motives.

> Because some—but certainly not all—of the neoconservatives are Jewish and virtually all are strong supporters of the Likud Party's policies, the accusation has been made that their aim to "democratize" the region is driven by their desire to surround Israel with more sympathetic neighbors…. But it is also the case that Bush and his chief political adviser Karl Rove are eager both to win more of the Jewish vote in 2004 than Bush did in 2000 and to maintain the support of the Christian right, whose members are also strong supporters of Israel.[24]

To those who share these views, the Jewish hand is to be seen virtually everywhere. Robert J. Lieber, summing up the conspiracy theory in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, found that it had many proponents:

> A small band of neoconservative (read, Jewish) defense intellectuals, led by the "mastermind," Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz (according to Michael Lind, writing in the *New Statesman*), has taken advantage of 9/11 to put their ideas over on an ignorant, inexperienced, and "easily manipulated" president (Eric Alterman in *The Nation*), his "elderly figurehead" Defense Secretary (as Lind put it), and the "dutiful servant of power" who is our secretary of state (Edward Said, *London Review of Books*).[25]

The tendency to ascribe exaggerated power to Jews in public life is not new—nor is the belief that "Jewish power" is deployed to achieve Israeli objectives. Here, for instance, is how the historian Perry Anderson puts it:

> Entrenched in business, government, and media, American Zionism has since the sixties acquired a firm grip on the levers of public opinion and official policy toward Israel…. The colonists have in this sense at length acquired something like the metropolitan state—or state within a state—they initially lacked.[26]

Sentiments of this nature exist among Germans, but they are usually muted, especially with reference to Jews. With regard to America, the German rhetoric became less inhibited in the time leading up to the invasion of Iraq. The writer Peter Schneider recently said that he has "never seen so much anti-Americanism in my life, not in the Vietnam war, never."[27]

The public voicing of such sentiments regarding both Jews and Americans is by no means confined to Germany. Abandoning coded language altogether, Tam Dalyell, a member of the British Parliament from the Labour Party, told an interviewer for *Vanity Fair* flat out that both Tony Blair and George Bush were "being unduly influenced by a cabal of Jewish advisers." Never mind that most of George Bush's closest advisers are Protestants or that most of those helping to guide British Middle East policy are also not Jewish.[28] To Mr. Dalyell and others like him, it has become open hunting season on Jews, and even the suspicion of Jewish ancestry is enough to inspire wild accusations.

We are living at a time when hostility to America has become almost a worldwide phenomenon, and a parallel dislike of Israel and distrust of the Jews frequently accompany this hostility. When a member of the Canadian Parliament can be heard to declare on television, "Damn Americans. I hate those bastards"; when a French diplomat posted to England is widely quoted as referring to Israel as that "shitty little country" pushing the world toward war; when a prominent Irish poet denounces Jewish settlers living on the West Bank as "Nazis [and] racists" who "should be shot dead" and is on record as stating, "I never believed that Israel had the right to exist at all," we are in a troubled time.[29]

French Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism

Much of the worst of this trouble has taken place over the past two years in France, where anti-Americanism has become highly vocal in both political and cultural life and anti-Semitism has turned more openly aggressive than at any time since the end of World War II. These antagonisms reflect a political disposition toward the Middle East conflict that is highly critical of Israel and also sharply at odds with the United States, understood to be Israel's guardian. French attitudes toward both countries are often negative. It is small wonder then that militant members of France's large Muslim communities openly proclaim their hatred of the United States and regard French Jews as surrogate Israelis whom they feel

entitled to abuse at will. Some have been doing just that, as if the verbal violence against Israel in the French media can be taken as justification for physical assaults against French Jews.

At the same time, teachers who are prepared to teach about the Holocaust in French classrooms are often intimidated from doing so by angry Muslim students, some of whom act aggressively to prevent knowledge of Jewish victimization during World War II from being disseminated in the schools. The subject has fallen effectively under a taboo, and many of these schools are now almost extraterritorial enclaves.[30] The suppression of this history, together with frequently expressed attitudes of hostility toward Israel, adds to the unease of Jews in today's France.

Anti-Jewish hostilities began to surge in France in the fall of 2000 and have continued in waves of greater or lesser virulence to this day. On the night of October 3, 2000, a synagogue in the town of Villepinte, not far from Paris, was set ablaze. French police at first explained the incident as accidental, but six Molotov cocktails discovered at the site belied the notion that the building's near destruction was the result of nothing more than a trash fire.[31] Within the next ten days, four more synagogues in the greater Paris area also were burned, and nineteen Jewish homes and businesses likewise became the target of arson attempts. There have been hundreds of other assaults against individual Jews and Jewish property throughout France, most of them perpetrated by young Muslims. In the spring of 2002, the front gates of a synagogue in Lyon were intentionally rammed by two cars driven by masked and hooded men, and the synagogue itself was then set on fire. In April, the Or Aviv Synagogue in Marseilles was torched, and in Toulouse shots were fired at a kosher butcher shop. A bus carrying Jewish children to the Tiferet Israel School in Sarcelle was stoned; shortly afterward, the school itself was destroyed by fire; the same happened to the Gan Pardess School in Marseilles; Molotov cocktails were thrown at a Jewish school in Créteil and at a synagogue in Garges-les-Gonesse; Jewish students have been assaulted at Metro stops in central Paris and subjected to verbal and physical abuse in schools; Jews walking to synagogue have been variously insulted and harassed; a Jewish soccer team was roughed up at Bondy, a suburb of Paris; and in March 2003 Jewish teenagers were beaten with metal bars during antiwar protest marches in the French capital; banners equating Sharon with Hitler and intermingling the Star of David with the Nazi swastika have become familiar sights at these marches; and at some, shouts of "Kill the Jews!" can be heard.

French authorities were slow to acknowledge the true character of these outrageous actions and for too long passed them off as part of a general social unruliness that reigns in France's often destitute immigrant suburbs. Criminal acts against Jews, in other words, were to be understood as merely part of a more general phenomenon of heightened criminality in French cities as a whole. Or the anti-Jewish violence was explained away as part of a "natural" interethnic rivalry, an inevitable spillover onto French shores of the continuing violence between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East. President Jacques Chirac for a time even insisted, "There is no anti-Semitism at all in France." Jewish houses of worship were being set on fire, but during the height of these outrages, neither Chirac nor then Prime Minister Lionel Jospin saw fit to visit the sites of the desecrated synagogues. (Only later, on the eve of

his reelection campaign in the spring of 2002, did the French president bother to pay a sympathy call to Le Havre, where a small synagogue had been attacked.)

The sheer volume of assaults on Jews and Jewish institutions render such public denial untenable, however, and in recent months, with the appointment of Nicolas Sarkozy as the new interior minister, a greater resolve to curb such violence seems in evidence. And well it should, for the dynamic of French anti-Semitism long ago moved beyond public slurs against Jewish symbols to open aggression against Jews and Jewish property. Between January and May 2001, more than 300 attacks against Jews took place in France. By the spring of 2003, the number of such hate crimes since January 2001 stood at over 1,000. Marie Brenner, who has reported on these incidents extensively, notes that in the first three months of 2003 there were already 326 verified reports of anti-Jewish violence in Paris alone. While any analogies to Vichy would be far-fetched, the social environment has clearly changed for Jews in today's France, and the country no longer seems so hospitable. As French writer Alain Finkelkraut recently put it, "To their own amazement, [French] Jews are now sad and scared."[32] Some are leaving the country for Israel or are giving serious thought to settling in the United States or Canada.

The outbreak of violent anti-Semitism in France has occurred at a time when anti-Americanism has also become a more prominent feature of French political and intellectual life. Hostile attitudes toward America are not new but have a history in France that dates back to the eighteenth century. The degree of French antipathy to the United States has heightened in the last few years, however, for reasons that are as much related to France's ambivalence about its place in the new Europe and its reduced standing in the world as about real policy differences with America. The latter are not insignificant, as became all too clear in the diplomatic feud that Paris aggressively waged with Washington during the run-up to the war against Iraq. However, over and beyond the tensions between the two countries that accompany France's determination to present itself as a rival power to America in the international arena, the polemical nature of French anti-Americanism has deeper causes.

The best analysts of this phenomenon are the French themselves, and in the past two years French authors have produced a number of perceptive books on the obsession with and national disdain for America. Among the best of these are Philippe Roger's *L'Ennemi américain: Généalogie de l'antiaméricanisme français* ("The American Enemy: A Genealogy of French Anti-Americanism") and Jean-François Revel's *L'Obsession anti-américaine: Son fonctionnement, ses causes, ses inconséquences* ("The Anti-American Obsession: Its Functioning, Causes, and Inconsistencies").[33] In addition to these studies, there has also been a spate of books on "Why the Whole World Hates America," which exemplify the very phenomenon that the analytical studies set out to clarify. The most extreme of these is Thierry Meyssan's *L'Effroyable imposture* ("The Frightening Deception"). Its bizarre thesis is that the received accounts of the 9/11 terror attacks are mostly an American government fabrication; in fact, so Meyssan alleges, the strikes were actually carried out by reactionary elements of the American military. Yet this outlandish work quickly became a big hit, selling almost a quarter of a million copies in the first few months of publication. While one would be hard put to find many serious people in France who would credit Meyssan's argument as plausible, his book's popularity underscores the basically irrational, but evidently appealing, character of French anti-Americanism.

David Pryce-Jones partly clarifies the psychological grounds of this appeal in commenting on Phillipe Roger's study: "Since the eighteenth century, the French have been treating America less as a real country than as a theater in which to work out fears and fantasies of their own."[34] Or, in the words of Roger himself, "We keep creating a mythological America in order to avoid asking ourselves questions about our real problems."[35]

Why Anti-Americanism Functions Like Anti-Semitism

Anti-Americanism, in this understanding, clearly has some benefits for those who embrace it. It functions as both a distraction and a relief, diverting attention from issues that can be divisive within French society: ongoing economic concerns, political discord, the challenges of absorbing large and still growing immigrant populations, and vexed questions of national identity in a society rapidly becoming more diverse in its ethnic, racial, and religious makeup. To one degree or another, many European countries have problems of this nature, but not all of them look to place the blame for their troubles on America. To the degree that France does, it gains neither credit nor effective help. Far from being an efficient way to engage real problems, anti-Americanism is no more than a trumped-up means of diverting attention from them.

Seen in this light, anti-Americanism functions in much the same way that anti-Semitism has over the centuries—as a convenient focus for discontents of many different kinds and a ready-made explanation of internal weaknesses, disappointments, and failures. It is, in short, both fraudulent and counterproductive.

The French writer Pascal Bruckner precisely captures the self-deluding nature of anti-Americanism and sees its link to anti-Semitism: "We delight in casting all our sins onto this ideal scapegoat, because everything that goes wrong in the world can be laid at Washington's door. In the imagination of many intellectuals and political leaders, America plays the role the Jews once did in National Socialist demonology."[36]

If hostility to America were confined to the French elites that Bruckner singles out, it would be bad enough, but there is evidence that anti-Americanism is now broadly shared by the French public at large. At the height of the war against Iraq, for instance, *Le Monde* published the results of a poll that showed 30 percent of the French actually wanted Iraq, and not the coalition led by America, to win the war.[37] This view is of a piece with notions, also broadly held in France and elsewhere, that between George Bush and Saddam Hussein, it was the American president who was the more menacing figure and the greater threat to world peace. Such judgments are less political in nature than pathological, but they can take on a political resonance of a harmful kind. In light of such extreme prospects, Bruckner concludes: "It is hard to tell what is most hateful in present-day anti-Americanism: the stupidity and bitterness it manifests or the willing servitude that it presupposes toward a superiority it denounces.... The time for being anti-American has passed."[38]

One can only voice a hearty "amen" to Bruckner's words and add to them the wish that the time for being hateful to Jews might also quickly pass. Unfortunately, though, most of the signs point to an increase rather than a lessening of anti-American and anti-Semitic

hostilities. Indeed, many of the same kinds of developments described within the borders of Germany and France have been occurring across much of Europe over the past two years or so and show no signs of diminishing. According to a recent report, the number of anti-Semitic attacks in Great Britain increased by 75 percent during the first three months of 2003.[39] There has also been a rise of such incidents in the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere. In all of these countries, anti-American resentments have surfaced alongside resentments of Israel, and allegations are commonly made that "Zionist interests" and the "Jewish lobbies" are working manipulatively behind the scenes to the detriment of the world order.

In an especially irresponsible display of such accusations, the *New Statesman* of London on January 14, 2002, ran a cover displaying a gold Star of David piercing the British Union Jack over the caption "A Kosher Conspiracy?" Similarly vicious graphics have appeared in newspapers and journals elsewhere in Europe. Almost everywhere, the passions that give rise to regular denunciations of Israel and conspiratorial charges against the Jews are blended with sentiments that British writer Michael Gove says produce "myths of America the Hateful." "Yankee-phobia," as Gove calls it, and Judeophobia have now coalesced, and what they have produced is not good: "Both America and Israel were founded by peoples who were refugees from prejudice in Europe. Europe's tragedy is that prejudice has been given new life, in antipathy to both those states."[40]

Who Is an Anti-Semite?

What has brought us to such a sorry moment, how long it is likely to last, and what its consequences may be are matters that deserve serious reflection. Yet not everyone agrees that Europe is witnessing a serious increase in hostility to either Jews or America. The former, it is argued, is an unpleasant but limited affair, carried out mostly by disaffected Muslim immigrants, who are themselves subjected to acts of racial hatred and discrimination. What Jews label as anti-Semitism is something that really does not exist in Europe in any substantial way, but whose "purported existence is being cynically manipulated by some in the Israeli government to try to silence debate about the policies of the Sharon government."[41] In this view, the Jews are seeking to squelch criticism of Israeli actions against the Palestinians by putting those who make such criticisms beyond the pale. In the words of one British commentator, "Criticize Israel and you are an anti-Semite just as surely as if you were throwing paint at a synagogue in Paris."[42] To cite the words of another, Timothy Garton Ash, "Pro-Palestinian Europeans [are] infuriated by the way criticism of Sharon is labeled anti-Semitism."[43] Those who are so accused, the argument goes, then turn against their accusers and brand them as media manipulators working on behalf of the "Jewish lobby" to advance Jewish and Israeli interests.

This is a vexed and increasingly contentious issue. No one likes to be called an anti-Semite, and no one should be called an anti-Semite who is not one. At the same time, anti-Semites exist, and their words and actions cause great harm. It should come as no surprise, then, that Jews who are alert to the resurgence of anti-Jewish hostilities in Europe are naturally concerned and are not reluctant to call attention to them. They understand that Israel, like all states, makes its share of mistakes and should not be immune from criticism. At the same time, legitimate criticism of Israeli policies sometimes escalates into condemnation of Israel

as an entity. Especially on the left, the European debate about the Arab-Israeli conflict has taken on the character of a polemic about the Zionist project itself and calls into question the moral standing of the Jewish state and sometimes even its right to exist. At its furthest extreme, such "criticism" of Israel amounts to a rejection of Israel, mirrored in the vilification of the Israeli prime minister as a "war criminal" comparable to Milosevic and of the Israeli people as latter-day fascists or Nazis. In the Muslim world, these views are standard fare, but they show up in Europe as well. To call them anti-Semitic is to call them by their proper name.

On another level, the European media debate about Israel is less crude and not necessarily hostile in tone, but its obsessional quality and its espousal by people who focus their criticism almost exclusively on Israel and show little interest in injustice elsewhere in the world raise questions of another kind. Shalom Lappin, a professor at King's College, London, has written about this phenomenon in an especially perceptive way and comes to conclusions that are sobering. After making the by-now ritual acknowledgment that not all criticism of Israel is unfair, he demonstrates that a lot of European commentary is in fact excessive, historically inaccurate, and distorted by ideological prejudices:

> A large part of the contemporary European left has inherited the liberal and revolutionary antipathy toward a Jewish collectivity, with Israel becoming the focus of this attitude. While acculturated intellectuals and progressive Jewish activists are held in high esteem, a Jewish country is treated as an illegitimate entity not worthy of a people whose history should have taught them the folly of nationalism. The current intifada is regarded as decisively exposing the bankruptcy not so much of a policy of occupation and settlement, but of the very idea of a Jewish polity.[44]

In other words, the arguments that some of Israel's most determined critics now pose are no longer about 1967 and political issues involving territories that Israel has held since the Six-Day War, but about 1948 and existential issues involving the fundamental right of the Jews to a state of their own. Hostility to Israel along these lines, in sum, is the result of a basic failure to reconcile with the idea of Jewish political independence and national sovereignty. Such opposition was prominent in some circles prior to the establishment of the Jewish state. No less a figure than Karl Marx, for example, famously held that a "state which presupposes religion is not yet a true, real state" and that "the political emancipation of the Jew … is the emancipation of the state from Judaism."[45] But the reappearance of this idea after more than half a century of Jewish statehood is astonishing. Lappin correctly claims that attitudes of this kind render illicit any idea of the Jewish people as a nation. Deeply rooted in both religious and secular European culture, as well as in the Islamic world, such attitudes represent an aversion to the idea of Jewish empowerment itself and, in essence, delegitimize the State of Israel in its present configuration. Most Jews would see the public voicing of such an aversion as inherently anti-Semitic. But whatever one calls the propagation of such ideas is less important than the recognition of their fundamentally hostile character. Not to see them for what they are and not to resist them would be to live in denial, a luxury that Jews, of all people, cannot afford.

Denial of Anti-Americanism

Just as there are those who deny that anti-Semitism exists, there are also those who deny that anti-Americanism exists. They stress that the world publicly expressed its sympathy for

America in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes against New York and Washington, and they claim America has squandered the goodwill it enjoyed at the time through its arrogant and ill-conceived policies in the international arena.

It is true that large numbers of people in many countries displayed solidarity with America following the shocks of 9/11, a solidarity they evidently could express readily so long as they perceived Americans to be victims. (As Pascal Bruckner reminds, us, though, "By the evening of September 11, a majority of our citizens, despite their obvious sympathy for the victims, were telling themselves that the Americans had it coming."[46]) At times, the world's sympathy has also flowed toward the Jews, when it has been perceived that they, too, have been victimized. Assertions of American or Jewish *strength*, however, seem to quickly neutralize these benevolent reactions and turn them into their opposite.

Some of what animates anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, in other words, is distrust of American and Jewish power and the fear that such power will be used in menacing ways. "The American administration is now a bloodthirsty wild animal," declared British playwright Harold Pinter, long before a drop of blood was spilled in the second Gulf War; [47] and, similarly, bloodthirsty behavior was also widely attributed to Ariel Sharon. In both cases, it is the specter of the unrestrained use of force that seems to generate such concerns. They are heightened many times over when the Jews are imagined to be the ones who actually control such might and can unleash it anytime, against anyone, and in unpredictable ways. In a climate of such exaggerated feeling, restraints on political rhetoric fall away. So an American congressman, Representative James Moran, Democrat of Virginia, charges in public, "If it were not for the strong support of the Jewish community for this war with Iraq, we would not be doing this. The leaders of the Jewish community are influential enough that they could change the direction of where this is going, and I think they should."[48] An American poet, Amiri Baraka, links Israel to the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center, alleging that the Jews had advance warning of what was coming on September 11 and stayed home from work in the Twin Towers on that day; and various people throughout the world indulge in the fantasy that the space shuttle *Columbia* disaster was actually the work of "a secret Jewish-Israeli conspiracy."[49] As evidenced by these and other similarly wild charges, conspiracy theories about the pernicious effects of American-Jewish "power" seem widespread.

As already noted, some of what drives this lunacy may be fear, but analysts of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism also recognize other factors at work. Writing shortly after 9/11, the British historian Bernard Wasserstein noted:

> A century ago, anti-Semitism was called "the socialism of fools." Now something similar threatens to become rampant: anti-Americanism. Psychologically, it fulfills some of the same functions as anti-Semitism. It gives vent to a hatred of the successful, and is fueled by envy and frustration.... Like historical anti-Semitism, [anti-Americanism] transcends ideological barriers and brings together economic, social, religious, and national animosities in a murderous brew.[50]

The brew is a poisonous one, mixing such noxious ingredients as classical anti-Semitic blood libel charges and conspiracy theories about a Jewish drive for world domination with annihilationist rhetoric, directed against both Israel and America. As part of this destructive

mix, Hitler-era language, as we have seen, is often used to smear the American president and the Israeli prime minister, and Holocaust denial also sometimes figures in. In such a climate, Jews are regularly denounced as "Zionist pigs" and Americans as rapacious thugs and murderers. In general, when Jews are now demonized, anti-American charges are likely to proliferate as well. It is a heady combination, especially in the Muslim world, where the language of violence has helped to unleash the most destructive forces aimed at those who are routinely condemned as "the enemies of Islam"—preeminently "Crusaders" (= Americans) and "Jews."[51]

In analyzing this situation, Josef Joffe, editor of the prominent German newspaper *Die Zeit*, finds a number of common links:

> Images that were in the past directed against the Jews are now aimed at the Americans: the desire to rule the world; the allegation that the Americans, like the Jews in the past, are invested only in money and have no real feeling for culture or social distress. There are also some people who connect the two and maintain that the Jewish desire to rule the word is being realized today ... by the "American conquest."

Joffe also sees envy as a factor contributing to a common hostility against Americans and Jews:

> They are the two most successful states in their surroundings—the U.S. in global surroundings, and Israel in the Middle East. Israel is in fact a constant reminder to the Arab world of its failure in economic, social, political, and gender-related development. So much so that it is difficult to decide whether the Jews are hated because of their close alliance with the U.S., or whether the U.S. is hated because of its alliance with the Jews.[52]

To many, Americans and Jews are not only paired but are now virtually interchangeable as targets of a common hostility. During the Nazi period, a popular slogan clearly identified the source of Germany's troubles: "The Jews are our misfortune." Today it is the Americans who are the focus of such an exaggerated grievance. But the Jews have hardly disappeared. Rather, negative images of them have blended with negative images of Americans, and the two together—symbolized by the ubiquitous bogeymen, "Bush and Sharon"—are commonly denounced in a single breath. Indeed, in France one now finds the new coinage "Busharon" to designate this invented ogre. As a French Jewish woman recently put it, "When they say 'America' they think 'Israel,' and when they think 'Israel,' they think 'Jewish.'"[53]

Fantasies and their Antidotes

Or, one could say more accurately, they don't think at all. For what I have been describing has very little to do with real Americans and real Jews and points instead to largely phantasmagoric figures that inhabit the heads of growing numbers of people throughout the world. In confronting the passions that fuel anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, in other words, we enter the realm of symbolic identities and see mostly spectral figures—imagined Americans, imagined Jews.

A phenomenon as widespread and intensely animated as this one is not likely to soon pass from the scene. The branding of the United States and Israel as outlaw nations is a serious matter, and the political, ideological, and religious passions that give rise to such hostility will not quickly dissipate. Writing in 1985, years before the American-led wars in the Persian

Gulf, Stephen Haseler predicted: “Anti-Americanism is here to stay, as long as the United States retains its powerful role on the world stage.” Since it is unlikely that America will soon reduce its power or the reach of its global presence, it is also unlikely that opposition to it will lessen; on the contrary, it is likely to only increase. Some fifteen years ago, Haseler, in fact, accurately predicted the present moment with uncanny insight:

> The United States will continue to be isolated at the United Nations; anti-American protests and rioting will increase; tensions within America’s alliance systems will continue; and a powerful intellectual and emotional critique of the direction of American foreign and defense policy can be expected at home.[54]

The new era ushered in by the terror attacks of 9/11 was not in sight when Haseler offered this view, but otherwise his prognosis is accurate.

As to what might be done to counter such developments, the best antidote to anti-American animosities, Haseler avers, is not a lessening of American power and resolve but the opposite—a reassertion of American strength and self-confidence. Such assertions of national will were marshaled impressively in the war against Iraq, and yet it is precisely the projection of such power that unnerves people abroad and contributes to their wariness of the United States. Ironically, therefore, while it may be true that nothing succeeds like success, success American-style seems to have the unintended consequence of provoking the kinds of fear and resentment that help to foster anti-American sentiments.

As for antidotes to anti-Semitism, these are harder to identify, largely because anti-Jewish passions have been around for so long and are energized today on so many different fronts. In the Muslim world, Jew-hatred is now pervasive, but in Europe and elsewhere, anti-Semitisms of every imaginable kind—political, social, cultural, theological, economic—are no longer held in check by the taboos that have restrained them in recent years but circulate openly and broadly. Judeophobias are so many and various today, in fact, that a full taxonomy would require a large book. The reemergence of such hostility has come as a shock, especially to those who have thought that the scandal of the Holocaust was so great as to inhibit public manifestations of anti-Jewish feelings for generations to come. In fact, though, that sense of the scandalousness of the Holocaust has greatly weakened over the years or been perversely transferred to Israel, which is repeatedly accused of resembling a Nazi state for its allegedly “genocidal” treatment of the Palestinians, who have been elevated to supreme victim status as the “new Jews.”

Among the many pernicious elements in the repertoire of anti-Semitic stereotypes, the inversion and manipulation of the Holocaust is potentially the most lethal. For those intent on usurping the history of Jewish suffering and mobilizing it against the Jewish state are also intent on bringing about the end of that state by delegitimizing the very ground of its existence. If, after all, there really is no difference between Israelis and Nazis, then Israel itself has no moral basis for continuing. That is what the sinister equation “Sharon = Hitler” really means. Adding the name of the president of the United States to this formula, as in the vile epithet at the beginning of this essay, only deepens the aggression and adds to the challenges that we face in a world in which anti-Semitism, a notoriously light sleeper, is now awake and stirring and has been joined by a resurgent anti-Americanism. Neither is new, but

their convergence is potent and the obsessive focus of so much of their negative energies on Israel and on America as a faithful ally of Israel is ominous. Unless they are effectively checked, the two together will influence the condition of life for Americans and Jews in the years ahead in ways that will not be easy for either.

June 27, 2003

Notes

1. The National Consultative Committee on Human Rights, a French government watchdog organization, reports an "explosion" in anti-Semitic incidents in France in 2002—a sixfold increase over 2001 in acts of violence against Jewish property and persons. See Elaine Sciolino, "French Rallies against War Shift Focus to Israel," *New York Times*, March 30, 2003.

2. *New York Times*, September 23, 2002.

3. Wolfgang Schäuble, "How Germany Became Saddam's Favorite State," *Wall Street Journal*, September 19, 2002.

4. Charles P. Wallace, "Recalcitrant Ally," *Time*, September 23, 2002.

5. Henry Kissinger, "Why U.S.-German Rift Could Set Europe Back 100 Years," *Scotland on Sunday*, October 20, 2002.

6. *New York Times*, September 20, 2002.

7. William Safire, "The German Problem," *New York Times*, September 19, 2002.

8. Robert Kagan, as quoted by Steven Erlanger, "Wary Praise for Berlin Speech," *International Herald Tribune*, May 24, 2002. For a well-informed analysis of the growing divisions between Europe and America, see Kagan's brief but important book, *Of Paradise and Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).

9. Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad 1965-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 381. Hollander republished this book, adding some new material to it, under the title *Anti-Americanism: Irrational and Rational* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1995). For more on anti-Americanism, see Stephen Haseler, ed., *The Varieties of Anti-Americanism: Reflex and Response* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1985) and *Anti-Americanism: Origins and Context*, a special edition of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, ed. by Thomas Perry Thornton (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1988). For studies specifically focused on manifestations of anti-Americanism within Germany, see Andrei S. Markovits, "On Anti-Americanism in West Germany," *New German Critique*, Issue 34 (Winter 1985), pp. 3-27 and, by the same author, "Anti-Americanism and the Struggle for a West-German Identity," in Peter H. Merkl, ed., *The Federal Republic of Germany at Forty* (New York: New York University Press, 1989), pp. 35-54; see also Konrad Jarausch, "Intellectual Dissonance: German-American (Mis)Understandings in the 1990s," and Berndt Ostendorf, "The Americanization-of-Germany Debate: An Archaeology of Tacit Background Assumptions," in Frank Trommler and Elliott Shore, eds., *The German-American Encounter: Conflict and Cooperation between Two Cultures, 1800-2000* (New York: Berghan Books, 2001), pp. 219-33, 267-84. For a highly informed study of the history of German anti-Americanism and its links to anti-Semitism, see Dan Diner, *Verkerhrte Welten* (Frankfurt: Vito von Eichborn Verlag, 1993), published in English translation under the title *America in the Eyes of the Germans: An Essay on Anti-Americanism* (Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996); Diner republished this book, with new material, under the title *Feindbild Amerika: Über die Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments* (Munich: Propyläen Verlag, 2002).

10. Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad*, p.viii.

11. Citations are from a report commissioned by the American Jewish Committee entitled "The Mideast Coverage of the Second Intifada in the German Print Media, with Particular Attention to the Image of Israel," June 2002, http://www.ajc.org/InTheMedia/Publications.-asp?did=539. The report was done by scholars at the Duisburger Institut für Sprach-und Sozialforschung and covered the period from September 2000 to August 2001.

12. Avishai Margalit, "The Suicide Bombers," *New York Review of Books*, January 16, 2003.

13. Sloterdijk made these remarks in an interview that appeared in the Austrian journal *Profil*, September 24, 2002.

14. Michel Friedman, vice president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, came under a barrage of negative publicity recently when he was the object of a drug raid that allegedly turned up traces of cocaine in his home and office. His subsequent suspension from his television talk show and the lack of charges against him brought new discussions of what is "normal" in German Jewish life. See Mark Landler, "German TV Host Finds Shoe on Other Foot," *New York Times*, June 27, 2003. Möllemann died on June 5, 2003, in a parachuting accident in Marl-Loehmühle that police officials consider a possible suicide. There were hostile comments made after Friedman's drug raid that Möllemann should have lived to see Friedman's humiliation.

15. For more on Möllemann, Walser, and related matters, see Alvin H. Rosenfeld, *"Feeling Alone, Again": The Growing Unease among Germany's Jews* (New York: American Jewish Committee, International Perspectives 49, 2002).

16. Toynbee's words are cited by David Brooks in "Among the Bourgeoisophobes: Why the Europeans and Arabs, Each in Their Own Way, Hate America and Israel," *The Weekly Standard*, April 15, 2002.

17. Polly Toynbee's words are quoted by Murray Gordon in *The "New Anti-Semitism" in Western Europe*, American Jewish Committee, International Perspectives 50, 2002.

18. Diner, *America in the Eyes of the Germans*, pp. 26, 21.

19. Ibid., p. 62

20. Hitler's words are cited in ibid., p. 83.

21. Ibid., pp. 63, 97.

22. Sander Gilman, in the Introduction to ibid., p. xiv.

23. Patrick J. Buchanan, "Whose War?," *The American Conservative*, March 24, 2003.

24. Elizabeth Drew, "The Neocons in Power," *New York Review of Books*, June 12, 2003, p. 22.

25. Robert J. Lieber, "The Neoconservative-Conspiracy Theory: Pure Myth," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, May 2, 2003. See also David Frum, "Unpatriotic Conservatives: A War Against America," *National Review*, April 7, 2003, pg. 40. Frum labels this movement "paleoconservatism" and describes it as wishing "to see the United States defeated in the War on Terror."

26. Perry Anderson, "Scurrying Towards Bethlehem," *New Left Review* (July-August 2001). For a brief but penetrating analysis of Anderson's position, see Shalom Lappin, "Israel and the New Anti-Semitism," *Dissent*, Spring 2003, pp. 18-24.

27. Schneider's words are cited in Nina Bernstein, "Young Germans Ask: Thanks for What?" *New York Times*, March 9, 2003.

28. Colin Brown and Chris Hastings, "Brit MP Dalyell Attacks Bush and Blair's 'Jewish Cabal,'" *The Telegraph*, May 3, 2003.

29. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Losses, Before Bullets Fly," *New York Times*, March 7, 2003. For further examples of North American invective against Israel and the Bush administration, see Lawrence F. Kaplan, "Toxic Talk on War," *Washington Post*, February 18, 2003. See also "Hateful Name-Calling vs. Calling for Hateful Action," *New York Times*, November 23, 2002.

30. Emmanuel Brenner, *Les Territoires Perdus de la Republique* (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2002).

31. For a report of this incident and much else of a similar nature, see Marie Brenner, "France's Scarlet Letter," *Vanity Fair*, June 2003, pp. 106-128. See also Murray Gordon, *The "New Anti-Semitism" in Western Europe* (New York: American Jewish Committee, International Perspectives 50, 2002), and Michel Gurfinkel, "France's Jewish Problem," Commentary, July-August 2002, pp. 38-45. I owe much of the information here recorded about French anti-Semitism to material in these sources.

32. Finkelkraut's words are taken from a paper he delivered at a YIVO-sponsored conference on anti-Semitism, held in May 2003 at the Center for Jewish History in New York.

33. For a well-informed review of this literature, see Tony Judt, "Anti-Americans Abroad," *New York Review of Books*, May 1, 2003, pp. 24-27.

34. David Pryce-Jones, "The Latest Paris Fashion ... and Also an Old One: Anti-Americanism in the Land of Tocqueville," *National Review*, November 11, 2000.

35. Quoted in John Vinocur, "Why France Disdains America," *International Herald Tribune*, October 9, 2002.

36. Pascal Bruckner, "Europe: Remorse and Exhaustion," *Dissent*, Spring 2003, p.14.

37. Brenner, "France's Scarlet Letter," p. 128.

38. Bruckner, "Europe: Remorse and Exhaustion," p. 15.

39. The figures are from the Community Security Trust, which monitors anti-Semitic incidents in the U.K. "Hundreds of Graves Desecrated," BBC News (May 9, 2003), http://news.bb.co.uk/2/hi/uk.

40. Michael Gove, "The Hatred of America Is the Socialism of Fools," *The Times* (London), January 8, 2003.

41. Peter Beaumont, "The New Anti-Semitism?" *The Observer*, February 17, 2002.

42. Ibid.

43. Timothy Garton Ash, "Anti-Europeanism in America," *New York Review of Books*, February 13, 2003, p. 34.

44. Shalom Lappin, "Israel and the New Anti-Semitism," *Dissent*, Spring 2003, p. 23.

45. Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," *Deutsch-FranzösischeJahrbücher*, 1844, http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/Teaching/1000.06b-fall2002/ojq.html. Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, find date or.

46. Bruckner, "Europe: Remorse and Exhaustion," p. 12.

47. Pinter's words are quoted by Norman Mailer in "Only in America," *New York Review of Books*, March 27, 2003, p. 49.

48. Representative Moran's remarks are quoted in "Congressman Is Chastised for Remarks on Jews and Iraq Policy," *New York Times*, March 12, 2003.

49. Shlomo Shamir, "Anti-Semitic Shuttle Conspiracy Theories Swamp the Internet," *International Herald Tribune Online*, http://www.iht.com /cgi-bin/generic.cgi?template=articleprint.tmplh&Articled= 87387.

50. Bernard Wasserstein, "Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, September 28, 2001.

51. On anti-Semitism in the Muslim world, see Bernard Lewis, *Semites and Antisemites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice, with a New Afterword* (New York: Norton, 1999), and Robert S. Wistrich, *Muslim Anti-Semitism: A Clear and Present Danger* (New York.: The American Jewish Committee, 2002).

52. Joffe's words are quoted in Yair Peleg, "Enemies, a Post-National Story," *Ha'aretz*, English edition, March 9, 2003.

53. See Craig Smith, "French Jews Tell of a New and Threatening Wave of Anti-Semitism," *New York Times*, March 22, 2003.

54. Stephen Haseler, *The Varieties of Anti-Americanism*, pp. 42, 43.

Letter from the Anti-Semitism Front
by
David A. Harris
Executive Director, American Jewish Committee

July 31, 2003

Much has been written and said—and rightly so—about changing attitudes toward Jews. There is no need to restate the case at length. Suffice it to say that an increasing number of Jews—and some non-Jews as well—have noted a growth in anti-Semitism, including new mutations of the world's oldest social pathology, and, as disturbingly, a steady decline in the antibodies that have fought it off in the postwar period.

This change appears most pronounced in Western Europe, where anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, and anti-globalization are merging in a dangerous mix. Purveyors tend to come overwhelmingly from the precincts of the universities, the intelligentsia, the media, and the extreme left.

And, of course, the extreme right, finding new life in railing against the growing immigrant populations in Western European countries, may have put the Jews on the back burner for the moment, but the essential ingredients of racism, xenophobia, and, yes, anti-Semitism remain intact as the pillars of their ideology and pose no less a long-term threat.

The principal danger, though, emanates from within the Islamic world. Since Muslims comprise a majority in 56 countries and a growing minority in scores of others, in essence, this represents a global phenomenon.

It would be highly irresponsible to paint with a broad brush stroke and suggest that all Muslims are implicated, when in fact this is far from the truth. At the same time, it would be equally shortsighted to pretend that anti-Semitism is non-existent in the Islamic world, or restricted to a tiny number of extremists, or nothing more than discontent with this or that Israeli policy. The problem is real, it is serious, and it can't be swept under the rug.

By contrast, in the United States, Jews have felt relatively secure and immune from the disturbing trends abroad, believing in the "exceptionalism" of American society. Yet a series of recent and highly publicized events on American campuses and in the lead-up to the war in Iraq has raised concerns about whether these are simply isolated and ephemeral incidents or, conversely, harbingers of more to come from a country undergoing profound sociocultural changes.

What's been less discussed, however, is what to do about all this.

Let's be realistic. Given its longevity, anti-Semitism in one form or another is likely to outlive us all. That seems like a safe, if unfortunate, bet. No Jonas Salk has yet come along with an immunization protocol to eradicate forever the anti-Semitic virus, nor is any major breakthrough likely in the foreseeable future.

Europe's sense of responsibility and guilt for acts of commission and omission during the Shoah, such as it may have been, is rapidly waning. Instead, we hear unapologetic references from various quarters to Israelis as the "new Nazis," descriptions of Jews as "manipulative,"

"clannish," and "excessively influential," and even paeans to terrorists and suicide bombers as "freedom fighters." Not very encouraging, is it, especially against the backdrop of a Holocaust that took place on European soil and that was preceded by centuries of mistreatment of Jews?

And not long after celebrating the milestone of an observant Jew being selected by a major political party for the second spot on its presidential ticket, American Jews have witnessed the "poet laureate" of New Jersey, who bizarrely placed blame for 9/11 on Israel, being given a standing ovation by audiences at such leading universities as Yale. Meanwhile, pro-Palestinian students are planning a national conference at Rutgers in October that calls for a Palestinian state "from the river to the sea" and glorifies homicide bombers who kill Israeli women, men and children. And a U.S. congressman publicly called on Jews to press the Bush administration regarding Iraq, suggesting that Jews, having allegedly pushed for war, were uniquely positioned, by dint of the power ascribed to them, to stop it.

At the same time, we've learned something about how best to try to contain anti-Semitism, marginalize it, discredit it, and build a firewall around it. In other words, we've come to understand what's likely to work and, for that matter, what's not.

Given everything that's going on, this may be a good moment to review, however briefly (even if this letter is not short), various strategies. I've identified at least eight key "actors" in the fight against anti-Semitism.

First, let's get down to basics.

At the risk of stating the obvious, societies based on democracy, pluralism, and equality before the law are the best guarantors for Jews or any minority (and for the majority as well). Freedom and respect for all mean freedom and respect for everyone.

When that notion is deeply entrenched, the results can speak for themselves. Among the best examples was the Danish rescue of its Jewish population, who were targeted for deportation by the occupying Nazis exactly sixty years ago. The Jews were seen as Danes who happened to attend a different house of worship. In helping the Jews, non-Jewish Danes felt they were simply assisting fellow Danes, an entirely natural and unexceptional thing in their own minds.

Second, democratic societies are a necessary but insufficient condition for defending against anti-Semitism (or other forms of racially, religiously, or ethnically motivated hatred). Translating lofty ideals into daily realities requires many things, not least the exercise of political leadership. And this is where we meet head-on the challenge of what works and what doesn't.

Let me explain this point at some length because it is especially important. Political leaders set the tone for a country. By their words or silence, by their engagement or indifference, they are able to send messages of one kind or another to the nation as a whole.

It's hardly worth considering the role of leaders in those Muslim countries where the problem is most virulent because they've either been encouraging anti-Semitism, or else they've lacked the courage and will to tackle it. In any case, democracy, pluralism, and equality before the law are rare commodities in such places.

Still, I can't help but wonder what would happen if a prominent Arab leader like President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt woke up one morning and decided that enough is enough—anti-Semitism is not only wrong, but a stain on the Arab self-image of tolerance and moderation—and led a

campaign in the Arab world against those who demonize and otherwise dehumanize Jews. The effect would be electrifying. Dream on, you probably say, and I can't argue with you, but hope does spring eternal.

In Europe, with few exceptions, leaders in recent years have fallen short when it comes to confronting anti-Semitism.

Take the case of Lech Walesa, the hero of the Solidarity movement. In 1995, as president of democratic Poland, he attended a church service in Gdansk. The priest, Rev. Henryk Jankowski, a known anti-Semite, did not disappoint. He referred to the Star of David as "associated with the symbols of the swastika as well as the hammer and sickle," and that wasn't the half of it.

What did President Walesa do in response? Did he walk out of the sermon? Did he issue a statement immediately after the service? Did he disassociate himself from Father Jankowski? None of the above. He simply chose to remain silent.

The American Jewish Committee met with President Walesa shortly after this incident took place. It was a revealing session.

We pressed the Polish leader to speak out and quickly. We argued that any further delay would only reinforce the image that Father Jankowski's venomous remarks were acceptable to Walesa and legitimate in mainstream Polish society.

He pushed back, contending that there was no point in turning a small incident into a national story.

We responded that the presence of the Polish president in the church during such a sermon made it, by definition, a national, indeed, an international, story. The onus was on Walesa to repudiate the priest's bigotry.

Our message, we feared, fell on deaf ears. We left the meeting feeling we had utterly failed in our mission.

Ten days after the sermon, though, and with pressure coming from the U.S. and Israeli governments, the president grudgingly issued a statement, but the damage had been done. A not-so-subtle message had already been sent to the people of Poland. And, in any case, there was no condemnation of the priest, only some general words about Walesa's repugnance of anti-Semitism and his appreciation of the Star of David.

Or take the case of Jacques Chirac, the French president. No one who knows him would suggest that he harbors anti-Semitic feelings. To the contrary, he has always demonstrated friendship for the French Jewish community, even if his foreign policy is heavily tilted toward the Arab world.

Yet this leader, who had the courage in 1995 to accept French responsibility for the crimes of Vichy—something none of his predecessors had done—was painfully slow to react to the wave of anti-Semitic attacks that hit France starting in the fall of 2000.

And, to be fair, since there was a government of "cohabitation" between Chirac and Lionel Jospin, the prime minister at the time and a Chirac foe, Jospin's cabinet was no quicker to respond. Yet Jospin, like Chirac, was known as a friend of the Jewish community.

Why, then, the delayed reflexes when these leaders must have understood that not only Jews were under attack, but—and this point must be emphasized again and again—the highest values of democratic France as well?

Whatever the reasons, and there is much speculation about them, the bottom line is that, inevitably, a message was sent out to the perpetrators—North African youth living in the suburbs of major French cities—that their despicable acts were not taken terribly seriously. The result: they concluded they could act with impunity.

Incidentally, in the past year since a new prime minister and cabinet have taken office, a very different—and much tougher—message has been projected, especially by the minister of the interior, responsible for law enforcement, and the minister of education. Some positive results have been achieved, even if the challenge is enormous, and the French Jewish community at least no longer feels a sense of total abandonment by the government.

Let me offer one other example, though it involves non-Jews. Nonetheless, it is instructive.

Beginning in the early 1990s, shortly after German unification, right-wing violence against foreigners erupted. The towns of Rostock, Mölln, Hoyerswerda, and Solingen became synonymous with expressions of hatred. In Solingen, for example, five women of Turkish origin were killed when skinheads torched a home. And in Rostock, not only was a shelter for foreigners, mostly Vietnamese and Romanian gypsies, burned to the ground, but many town residents took to the streets and openly encouraged the right-wing extremists.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl, a decent man who skillfully presided over the mammoth task of German unification, underestimated the significance of these tragic events.

Rather than speak out forcefully and seek opportunities to identify with the targeted victims, he adopted a low profile, to put it charitably. When the American Jewish Committee and others urged the chancellor to be more visible, a spokesman indicated that Kohl did not engage in "condolence tourism." I wish he had.

I could offer many more examples.

It's striking how many times we've raised the issue of anti-Semitism with European leaders in the last couple of years, only to be told, in the case of a European Union commissioner, that she was "unaware of its existence," or, in the case of a foreign minister, that there was no evidence of anti-Semitism, even as a poll had just come out indicating that anti-Semitic stereotypes were a serious problem in his country. Why the blind spot? Why the denial? Again, there are several possible explanations, none of which offers any reassurance.

By way of contrast, Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister, challenged his compatriots to confront the problem of anti-Semitism. In a newspaper article he wrote:

> Do we actually comprehend what Nazi barbarism and its genocidal anti-Semitism did to us, to Germany, its people and its culture? What Hitler and the Nazis did to Germany's Jews they did first and foremost to Germans, to Germans of the Jewish faith! Albert Einstein was as much a German as was Max Planck…. That is why the question whether German Jews feel secure in our democracy and, though even today this can only be a hope, might one day be able to feel "at

> home" in it again, is not a minor one, but a question par excellence about the credibility of German democracy.

More such thoughtful and courageous statements from political leaders, bolstered by appropriate actions, are precisely what's needed. In America, perhaps, we've come to expect them, as when our government publicly condemned the rash of anti-Semitic canards blaming Jews for 9/11 or, just before, boycotted the hate fest under UN auspices at Durban. But elsewhere, at least when it comes to Jews, such statements and actions have been far less frequent or forceful.

Frankly, given Europe's historical record, it should be precisely these countries—knowing as they do where the slippery slope of hatred can lead—which assume worldwide leadership in the struggle against the cancer of anti-Semitism. Wouldn't that send a powerful message about learning from the past? We've challenged many European leaders to play just such a role, but admittedly with only limited success to date.

The words of Søren Kierkegaard, the nineteenth-century Danish philosopher, ought to serve as a useful reminder: "Life must be lived forward, but can only be understood backward."

The third area for consideration is the role of law, law enforcement, and the judiciary.

This gets tricky, I realize. American and European laws on what constitutes a punishable crime in the realm of incitement can be quite different. There are varying approaches to the proper balance between protecting free speech and criminalizing the propagation of racial or religious hatred.

For instance, a number of European countries, including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland, have laws that make denial of the Holocaust a criminal offense, whereas the United States does not.

As one illustration, Switzerland adopted a law in 1994 that outlaws "public denial, trivialization and disputation of genocide or other crimes against humanity," with a maximum prison sentence of three years.

Ironically, we hear persistent complaints from countries like Austria and Germany that much of their anti-Semitic material, including video games and books, originates in the United States. The problem has only grown more acute with the rapidly increasing popularity of the Internet. We are often asked if there isn't a way around First Amendment protections to stop these unwelcome American "exports."

Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, as we learned in a recent meeting with the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State:

> It is an offense to use threatening, abusive, or insulting words or behavior with intent or likelihood to stir up racial hatred against anyone on the grounds of color, race, nationality, or ethnic or national origins. Under recent anti-terrorism legislation, the maximum penalty for the offense was increased from two to seven years' imprisonment. Under the same legislation, it is also now an offense to stir up hatred against a racial group abroad, *such as Jews in Israel* [emphasis added].

The range of ways in which democratic, law-based societies seek to deal with hate speech and hate crimes could fill volumes, as would an evaluation of the impact of such efforts.

Moreover, there is an entire body of international conventions (and organizations) to consider in the struggle against anti-Semitism.

The Soviet Jewry movement relied heavily on such instruments as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act to buttress the case for the rights of Jews in the USSR.

So, too, do we need to consider as tools the protections enshrined in documents like the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. Article 20 of the latter document, as one example, includes the following language: "Any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence shall be prohibited by law."

One recent and effective use of an international organization was the two-day meeting in Vienna devoted to anti-Semitism that was convened by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Importantly, there is agreement among the governments involved to gather again next year.

The topic of national and international law and covenants, touched on only briefly here, is unquestionably important. In the final analysis, it goes without saying, what really counts is not just the laws and mechanisms on the books, significant though they may be, but the degree of commitment to their implementation and enforcement.

Fourth, there is the media, which, as we all well know, plays an extraordinarily powerful role not only in shaping individual attitudes, but also in influencing the public policy agenda and priorities of decision-makers. As someone once suggested, "If CNN didn't report on it, did it ever actually happen?"

In parts of the Muslim world, of course, the media, whether in government or private hands, or the murky space in between, is a convenient vehicle for propagating anti-Semitism. Professor Robert Wistrich, an expert on anti-Semitism and the author of a superb monograph for the American Jewish Committee entitled *Muslim Anti-Semitism: A Clear and Present Danger*, offers several examples of the media's role in peddling unadulterated anti-Semitism.

In Europe over the past three years, there have also been numerous documented instances of anti-Semitic images and stereotypes seeping into mainstream, not fringe, outlets.

Among the most disturbing developments were during the period of the Church of the Nativity standoff, when some newspapers reawakened the deicide charge—finally put to bed by the Catholic Church, in 1965, at Vatican Council II—and, more generally, the transference of Nazi images onto Israel, with the Israeli prime minister equated with the Fuehrer, the Israeli military likened to the Wehrmacht or even the SS, and the West Bank represented as an Israeli-run concentration camp.

Such depictions go well beyond any conceivable legitimate criticism of Israel to something far deeper and more pernicious, and must not be left unchallenged.

Here in the United States, while there have been some distressing images, my principal concern has more to do with belated—and insufficient—reporting on anti-Semitism in the Arab world as well as its reemergence in Europe. The media must be helped to understand the significance and newsworthiness of these issues. It's certainly not a lost cause, but it is an uphill battle.

To be sure, there have been stories here and there and the occasional column or editorial. But they have been relatively few and far between. I was especially struck by the lack of media interest in the Wistrich study, which, incidentally, makes for hair-raising reading.

Released at a press conference at the National Press Club in May 2002, it generated only a few articles, all in the Jewish or Israeli press. A Reuters reporter covered the event and filed a long story, but, we later learned, her editors apparently didn't find the topic of sufficient interest. One wonders what it would take to capture their attention on the subject. And this is not the only such example, either.

The study of Saudi textbooks, cosponsored by the American Jewish Committee and released in January 2003, met essentially the same fate. The major media outlets never reported on what was the first detailed report documenting the hatred and contempt of the West that Saudi children are taught from Grade One. Is this not deemed relevant to a fuller understanding both of 9/11 and the larger war on international terrorism?

Fifth, there is the role of the "values" community, including religious, ethnic, racial, and human rights leaders and their institutions.

Ideally, each of these actors should regard an assault on any one constituency, e.g., an anti-Semitic or racist incident, as an attack on all—and on the kind of world we are seeking to create—and respond forcefully. In a way, without wishing to stretch the analogy, it would be akin to a NATO member seeking support from other members under Article 5, which deems an attack on one as an attack against all.

Alas, there is no charter binding the values community, although there is an important provision in the Fundamental Agreement between the Holy See and the State of Israel, signed in December 1993, which might provide a model. Article 2 includes the following language:

> The Holy See and the State of Israel are committed to appropriate cooperation in combating all forms of anti-Semitism and all kinds of racism and of religious intolerance, and in promoting mutual understanding among nations, tolerance among communities and respect for human life and dignity.

Virtually identical language could be used to create a charter for nongovernmental organizations committed to advancing human relations and mutual respect. What's needed, in effect, is a Coalition of Conscience in the voluntary sector.

Meanwhile, there are best-practice examples that can help guide us.

Shockingly, a cinder block was thrown through a bedroom window displaying a Chanukah menorah in Billings, Montana, ten years ago. It was the room of a five-year-old boy. Fortunately, he wasn't hurt. What followed was quite remarkable.

Led by local church leaders, the police chief, and the editor of the Billings *Gazette*, the town, previously quite apathetic, responded by placing thousands of paper menorahs in the windows of shops and homes. It was an exceptional and effective way of reacting. It said to the hate mongers: We are one community and we will not allow you to divide us.

In the same spirit, responding to the wave of arson attacks targeting African-American churches in the south in the 1990s, the American Jewish Committee joined with the National Council of

Churches and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, in a display of ecumenical partnership, to raise millions of dollars to rebuild the damaged houses of worship. Moreover, AJC adopted the Gay's Hill Baptist Church in Millen, Georgia, and helped construct it from the ground up after it was completely destroyed in an act of hate.

The concept of a Coalition of Conscience also explains why the American Jewish Committee sent a delegation to a mosque in Cologne, Germany, in 1993 to attend the funerals of the five women of Turkish origin killed in their home in Solingen, and why, more recently, we chose to mobilize our resources to assist Muslim victims of Serbia's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

Every major religion has a variation of the golden rule. As Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel once remarked, "We are commanded to love our neighbor: this must mean that we can." We can, but do we?

Words are important, but timely and principled actions are what really count. And those within each faith tradition committed to the values of compassion and concern for all must lead the way.

Sixth, there is the long-term and irreplaceable role of education. As the Southern Poverty Law Center put it:

> Bias is learned in childhood. By the age of three, children are aware of racial differences and may have the perception that "white" is desirable. By the age of 12, they hold stereotypes about numerous ethnic, racial, and religious groups, according to the Leadership Conference Education Fund. Because stereotypes underlie hate, and half of all hate crimes are committed by young men under 20, tolerance education is critical.
>
> About 10 percent of hate crimes occur in schools and colleges, but schools can be an ideal environment to counter bias. Schools mix youths of different backgrounds, place them on equal footing and allow one-on-one interaction. Children are naturally curious about people who are different.

There are a number of tested and successful school-based programs designed to teach mutual respect. Incidentally, I'm not a big fan of using the word "tolerance" in this particular case; it strikes me as rather weak. The goal should not be simply to teach people to "tolerate" one another, but, ideally, to respect and understand one another.

That said, organizations like the Southern Poverty Law Center, Facing History, the Anti-Defamation League, and the American Jewish Committee have all developed acclaimed programs used in schools across the U.S. and, increasingly, in other countries where diversity is a factor in the population, which these days is just about everywhere. And the State of New Jersey has led the way in creating a curriculum based on the lessons of the Holocaust for all high-school students.

The challenge in the United States, given its vast size and decentralized school system, is to reach enough schools, then to get a long-term commitment to inclusion of such programs in the curriculum. Moreover, there is a need, of course, for adequate teacher training and also for monitoring impact, both over the short term and the longer term as well.

In addition to such programs, the American Jewish Committee has developed another model for schools. Named the Catholic/Jewish Educational Enrichment Program, or C/JEEP, it links

Catholic and Jewish parochial schools in several American cities. Priests and rabbis visit each other's schools to break down barriers and familiarize students with basic elements of the two faith traditions. Students who might otherwise never meet have an opportunity to come to know one another. The goal is to "demystify" and "humanize" the "other," and it works.

Again, as with the curriculum-based programs, the biggest challenge here is the sheer number of schools and the resources involved—not to mention the occasional bureaucratic hurdle—in order to reach anything approaching a critical mass of students.

(It remains to be seen what impact Mel Gibson's upcoming film, *The Passion*, will have on Catholic attitudes toward Jews, but, given current reports, it is hardly likely to be positive.)

One more word on education. When schools in Saudi Arabia or *madrassas* in Pakistan teach contempt, distrust, or hatred of others, be they Christians, Jews, or Hindus, or, for that matter women, we face a whole other challenge.

Shining the spotlight of exposure on these school systems is vital, which is why the American Jewish Committee cosponsored the Saudi study. Sharing the information with governments that have influence in these countries is necessary. For instance, Saudi spin doctors talk of the "enduring values" between their country and the United States. Surely, then, that gives Washington some leverage in Riyadh. And from our long experience in dealing with problematic curricula and textbooks, perseverance is the key. Things seldom happen overnight.

Seventh, there is the role of the individual. In a more perfect world, the combination of family environment, education, religious upbringing, and popular culture all lead in the same direction—to molding individuals with a strong commitment to the values of mutual respect and mutual understanding, social responsibility, and moral courage.

Our world is far from perfect. We may never succeed in completely eliminating anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred. Still, we must always strive to build the kinds of societies in which the altruistic personalities of the good women and men of Denmark, or the French village of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon (described as "the safest place in [Nazi-occupied] Europe for Jews"), or the likes of an Abraham Joshua Heschel, Jan Karski, Raoul Wallenberg, Martin Luther King, Jr., or Andrei Sakharov, are increasingly the norm, not the exception.

As I look around today, I see countless decent people, whether in the United States or elsewhere, who reject any form of anti-Semitism. But, frankly, there are too few prominent non-Jews of the likes of a Per Ahlmark, the former deputy prime minister of Sweden, prepared to speak out on the danger posed by contemporary anti-Semitism.

And finally, in the struggle against anti-Semitism, new or old, we must take into account the key role of the Jewish world, including the State of Israel and local, national, and international Jewish organizations.

The Jewish community looks radically different than it did, say, sixty or seventy years ago. Today, there is an Israel; then, there was not. Today, there are sophisticated, savvy, and well-connected Jewish institutions; then, Jewish institutions were much less confident and sure-footed.

Collectively, we have the capacity to track trends in anti-Semitism, exchange information on a timely basis with other interested parties, reach centers of power, build alliances within and

across borders, and consider the best mix of diplomatic, political, legal, and other strategies for countering troubling developments.

We may not succeed in each and every case. But we've come a very long way thanks to a steely determination, in Israel and the Diaspora, to fight vigorously against anti-Semitism, while simultaneously helping to build a world in which anti-Semitism—and everything it stands for—is in irreversible decline.

Note: This is #32 in a series of occasional letters on topics of current interest. To receive copies of previous letters, please contact Rebecca Neuwirth at neuwirthr@ajc.org or 212-891-1403.