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Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

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on

Implementation of
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
Inspection and Escort Provisions

before

The Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

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Introduction

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Senator Lugar, and Members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, it is an honor and a pleasure to appear before you today to testify on the roles of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in shaping the inspection and escort provisions of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NST) and implementing those provisions, should the Senate consent to ratification of the treaty.

After an overview of the DTRA mission, I will focus my remarks on agency roles and responsibilities regarding the NST; inspection and escort provisions of NST; inspection and escort team organization; and preparations for implementing those responsibilities under NST including training, site assistance visits and mock inspections, and inspection notifications and data management.

Agency Mission

The mission of the nearly 2,000 civilian and military personnel of DTRA is to safeguard the United States and its allies from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) – Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons, as well as high yield explosives capable of destroying buildings and critical infrastructure, by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate and counter such threats, and mitigate their effects. The proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery, and related knowledge and materials pose a grave and current threat that is growing and evolving. The need to develop and field improved Countering-WMD (C-WMD) capabilities is more important than ever and DTRA is in the forefront of the national effort to deliver such capabilities.

In addition to serving as the Director of DTRA, I am also the Director of the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD). Co-located with DTRA and fully integrated within the daily activities of the agency, the SCC-WMD assists the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command with the synchronization of Countering-WMD planning and coordination of related DoD activities across the Combatant Commands and with our interagency partners; identification of C-WMD capability needs; and advocacy for C-WMD capabilities.

DTRA provides C-WMD expertise and support at strategic (global and national), operational (regional and theater), and tactical (battlefield) levels. The agency initiates, stimulates, and participates in interagency, bilateral, and multilateral partnerships, often providing the essential expertise and leadership to get programs established and projects moving. However, the primary role of DTRA in the global C-WMD effort is that of an executing agency. Our programs span nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management, combining technology with operational considerations, and providing Combatant Commanders systems approaches to meeting their WMD challenges. In partnership with others across the U.S. Government (USG), the private sector, and our overseas allies and friends, DTRA integrates a wide range of C-WMD technical, operational, and intelligence subject matter expertise to provide integrated, readily applicable solutions to C-WMD challenges.

One of the most effective tools our nation has for countering WMD threats is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. This highly innovative and effective program dismantles and eliminates strategic WMD delivery systems and associated infrastructure; consolidates and secures WMD related technology and

materials; increases transparency; and builds foreign partnerships and collaboration. Nunn-Lugar conducts these activities consistent with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and will continue these activities consistent with the applicable NST provisions. DTRA is the Department of Defense (DoD) organization responsible for implementing this program.

To date, the Nunn-Lugar program has dismantled strategic delivery systems – fixed and mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and their launchers; Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), their launch tubes, and strategic missile submarines (SSBNs); strategic bombers and associated air-to-surface missiles – once capable of carrying over 7,500 nuclear warheads. The Nunn-Lugar program also has sealed 194 nuclear test tunnels and holes; improved nuclear weapon transportation and storage security against potential terrorist threats in Russia; destroyed over 1,300 metric tons of Russian and Albanian chemical weapons agents; built and equipped 20 biological monitoring stations; and assisted our partners in improving their capabilities to interdict illicit movements of WMD and related materials.

As these important efforts with our partners in the former Soviet Union continue, we also are taking the knowledge and capabilities acquired through Nunn-Lugar program implementation to new partners across the globe. For example, the Nunn-Lugar program will provide the DoD means for implementing the President's initiative to secure all vulnerable fissile materials worldwide by the end of 2012 and will expand its Biological Threat Reduction (BTR) efforts through new partnerships around the globe to provide for more rapid, coordinated, and effective U.S. and international responses to future disease outbreaks or biological attacks.

These new nuclear and biological threat reduction efforts exemplify DTRA's new strategy of global engagement, called "Nunn-Lugar Global Cooperation" (NLGC). Under this strategy, DTRA is adapting and applying the lessons learned from the execution of the Nunn-Lugar Program to the new partnerships across the globe. We are shaping our programs and activities so that they are more agile and flexible, anticipatory of and responsive to emerging threats and fleeting opportunities, and tailored to the individual needs and potential contributions of new international partners. In addition, the NLGC strategy will harness the full range of DTRA and SCC-WMD C-WMD expertise and capabilities, integrating Nunn-Lugar capabilities, arms control, bilateral and multilateral threat response activities, global situational awareness, partnership capacity building, and increased support to the Combatant Commanders' theater security engagement efforts.

The DTRA Arms Control Mission

DTRA's charter, DoD Directive 5105.62, designates the agency as the DoD focal point for implementation of inspection, escort, and monitoring provisions of arms control treaties. The agency provides, conducts, and manages training for on-site inspections, as well as performs activities associated with the conduct of on-site inspections by foreign inspectors at U.S. facilities. In addition, DTRA provides technical expertise to U.S. arms control treaty delegations, the compliance forums of the various treaties, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and other DoD Components, and provides staff support to the OSD Treaty Managers.

Prior to the establishment of DTRA on 1 October 1998, these activities were performed by the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) in

support of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Threshold Test Ban Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, Vienna Document, Open Skies Treaty, and START. OSIA brought its unique expertise to DTRA, which continues to perform the inspection mission for those treaties still in effect, as well as escort-only operations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Negotiations

DTRA supported the NST negotiations by providing analytical, technical, and staff support to the lead negotiators and to DoD and USG interagency working groups. Of the 56 members of the Geneva negotiating team, 18 were DTRA personnel. The DTRA team provided years of arms control implementation expertise and negotiating experience, linguistic ability, and administrative support to the Delegation as a whole and to the chief negotiator, Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller. DTRA personnel fulfilled key roles in the negotiating working groups on Inspection Activities, Conversion and Elimination, Treaty Articles and Definitions, and Notifications, and played a critical part in the development of those portions of the new treaty. DTRA military linguists augmented the language support staff at the U.S. Mission, providing much-needed help in translating the large number of negotiating documents. Our linguists were frequently called on to interpret for high profile or technically oriented meetings due to their exceptional language abilities and precise knowledge of arms control terms.

Inspections under New START

Building on the success of the INF Treaty, START had a verification regime in which on-site inspections played a major role. These inspections ensured that declared systems were accurately accounted for and helped to verify compliance with Treaty provisions. The NST inspection regime builds on the experience gained from 15 years of START implementation, in which over 1100 on-site inspections were conducted.

START had nine different types of on-site inspections. Under the NST, that number has been reduced to two: Type One inspections, which focus on sites with deployed and non-deployed strategic systems, for instance operational ICBM, submarine, and bomber bases; and Type Two inspections, which focus on sites with non-deployed strategic systems such as storage and training facilities and can also be used to confirm conversions or eliminations of items subject to the Treaty. After entry into force, each side will have the right to conduct ten Type One inspections and eight Type Two inspections per year. NST does not provide for a baseline inspection of every facility as had been conducted under START.

Building on the past 15 years of START experience, the sides agreed that it would not be necessary to conduct baseline inspections at facilities that had been subject to inspection under START. They also agreed that it was unnecessary to conduct technical exhibitions for arms that had been previously exhibited under START. Exhibitions will be required only for those current and future types of strategic offensive arms that had not been exhibited under START – such as the RS-24 mobile ICBM for Russia and the B-2 heavy bomber for the United States. In addition to exhibitions for these new types, New START provides for exhibitions related to conversion or elimination of

items that are subject to the Treaty, in order to demonstrate the procedures used to render such items incapable of employing nuclear weapons.

Inspection and Escort Operations under New START

DTRA will staff, train, equip, and lead U.S. inspection teams in Russia and escort Russian inspectors at U.S. facilities, and will maintain the same basic organization to support NST that it had established for START, with detachments in Yokota Air Base (AB), Japan and Travis AFB, California, as well as the DTRA European Operations Division in Darmstadt, Germany. There are 35 facilities in Russia that will be subject to inspections and 17 facilities in the United States that will be subject to inspections.

As it had under START, DTRA will prepare for and conduct inspection activities at facilities in Russia, to collect data that will assist the USG in determining treaty compliance. However, the agency does not make verification or compliance judgments. DTRA inspectors and escorts are responsible for observing, documenting, and reporting the factual findings of their inspection activities to the interagency policy community responsible for making requisite judgments concerning verification and compliance.

The NST retains the START construct of two points of entry for each country, through which inspection teams will transit to conduct inspections. The points of entry for U.S. inspectors in Russia are Moscow in western Russia and Ulan-Ude for inspection sites in eastern Russia. The points of entry for Russian inspectors are Washington, DC and San Francisco, CA. All U.S. inspection missions to Russia will originate at the Defense Threat Reduction Center at Fort Belvoir, VA

where inspection teams will assemble, draw necessary equipment, and conduct initial mission briefings.

Teams conducting missions in western Russia will proceed to the DTRA gateway in Darmstadt, Germany, where they will conduct detailed mission planning and preparation. Inspectors will conduct a thorough study of the inspection facility and its systems, previous inspection history for the site, and the data declared by Russia for that facility. Nearly all of the facilities under the NST were also inspectable under START, and we have substantial START inspection history to draw upon as teams prepare for missions. They will review the treaty provisions applicable to the inspection site, assign individual roles and responsibilities for each team member, and plan the conduct of the inspection. Teams conducting missions in eastern Russia will conduct similar preparation at the DTRA facility at Yokota AB, Japan.

A Type One inspection consists of two major components, a warhead inspection of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers, and an inspection of any non-deployed strategic offensive arms that might be present at the facility (spare missiles in the ICBM maintenance facility or within bunkers at a submarine bases, for example). The overall objective of this inspection is to confirm the exchanged data for the facility being inspected.

No later than 32 hours prior to the inspection team's arrival in Russia and during normal working hours, the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center will notify the Russian government of our intent to conduct an inspection. The team will be met by a Russian escort team at Moscow or Ulan Ude and conduct arrival procedures. Within four hours of arrival at the point of entry, the U.S. team chief will designate the site to be inspected in writing, after which the escort team has 24 hours to transport inspectors to the site.

Upon arrival at the base, the inspection team will be told how many reentry vehicles are loaded on each deployed ICBM or SLBM, or how many nuclear armaments are loaded on heavy bombers and, the number of deployed and non-deployed items located at the base. Inspectors will also be provided a site diagram annotated to show the location of declared items on the base. The inspection team will select a single ICBM or SLBM or three heavy bombers for inspection. The base will prepare the missile or heavy bombers for inspection by partially dismantling the front section and covering the RVs with either soft or hard covers for ICBMs and SLBMs or covering nuclear armaments if any are loaded onto a bomber. The inspection team will then observe the covered objects and confirm the declared number. In the case where objects declared to be non-nuclear are present (penetration aids on missiles or conventional weapons on bombers), those objects may be subject to Radiation Detection Equipment measurements to confirm that they are non-nuclear.

Upon completion of the reentry vehicle inspection, the inspection team will inspect the rest of the facility, to include structures and vehicles within the inspectable boundaries, to confirm the number of non-deployed items declared for that facility. For Heavy Bomber bases, the inspection is limited to 30 hours. Due to safety and handling considerations at ICBM and submarine bases, there is no time limit on the conduct of the warhead inspection. Upon completion of the warhead inspection, inspectors have 24 hours to inspect the rest of the ICBM or SLBM base for non-deployed items. Inspectors will then complete the official inspection report, which will be signed by both the inspection and escort team chiefs. After completion of inspection activities, teams return to the respective gateway via the point of entry for post-mission activities and reporting.

For on-site inspections of U.S. facilities, Russian inspectors arriving at the Washington point of entry will be escorted by personnel from DTRA headquarters. Our detachment at Travis AFB will escort Russian inspectors arriving at the San Francisco point of entry. DTRA will oversee the conduct of all NST escort operations at U.S. facilities. DTRA will maintain an escort team on standby at each POE upon the treaty's entry into force.

Under NST, the inspecting party must notify the inspected party of the arrival of an inspection team during normal working hours and no later than 32 hours before the team's scheduled arrival time. After receiving the notification of Russia's intent to conduct an inspection via the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, the DTRA Operations Center will notify all U.S. facilities subject to inspection associated with a particular point of entry and DTRA will prepare to receive the inbound inspection team. No more than four hours after the team arrives at the point of entry, the Russian team chief will declare in writing the site to be inspected. After site designation, the DTRA escort team will immediately notify the selected facility and will coordinate with that facility to gather the necessary information, determine preferred arrival time and prepare for the inspection. DTRA escorts will coordinate with the Air Force's Air Mobility Command to transport the team to the site within 24 hours of the time of site declaration. Site personnel will make the necessary preparations for the arrival of the inspectors and their escorts. Such preparations include complying with pre-inspection restrictions, readying the site for inspection, and making logistical arrangements to feed, billet, and transport the inspectors and escorts while they are at the facility.

Upon completion of the inspection, the escort team will coordinate the return of the Russian inspection team to the point of

entry and facilitate its departure from the United States. From the time of their entry into the United States until their departure, the activities of Russian inspectors will be supervised by a DTRA escort team.

Inspection and Escort Team Organization

Inspection teams consist of technical experts in the areas of ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber inspections. As was the case under START, inspection teams are limited to a total of ten inspectors. Each team is led by a DTRA core element consisting of team chief, deputy team chief, weapons specialist, and two linguists. The remainder of each 10-person team will consist of selected experts from DTRA and other USG agencies. The inspection team chief is the official USG representative.

The escort teams consist of the same core group, but are augmented by local personnel from the facility being inspected. Escort teams will support inspections throughout the United States and also serve as the on-site USG representatives during the escort activities. In addition to facilitating the inspection process, escorts are responsible for coordinating transportation, billeting, meals, interpreting, emergency support, and security.

Based on the projected workload and the number of inspections that can be conducted under the new treaty, the personnel requirements for NST are less than they were for START. Under START, DTRA was prepared to escort multiple visiting inspection teams simultaneously, as well as conduct both short notice and elimination inspection missions. It was possible to have four U.S. inspection teams in Russia (two short notice and two elimination inspections) while at the same time receiving a Russian inspection team at each

U.S. point of entry. New START allows for only one inspection team in country at any given time. Coupled with the reduction in number of inspections, these changes will allow DTRA to reduce from ten teams under START to five inspection teams under NST.

Although there will be fewer inspections under NST, the Type One inspections will be more demanding on both DTRA and site personnel, as it combines the main parts of what were formerly two separate inspections under START into a single, more lengthy inspection.

New START Treaty Preparations

DTRA is preparing and planning to perform its inspection and escort responsibilities should the Senate consent to ratification.

Inspector and Escort Training

To prepare for implementation of the treaty, DTRA will train the agency's cadre of inspectors and escort personnel on the provisions of the new treaty and how to implement those provisions. The agency has rigorous team training programs to support inspections and escorting for all treaties, including a specific training program to prepare our personnel for NST. DTRA will ensure that the techniques and lessons learned under START are carried forward. Initial certification of DTRA inspectors and escorts will occur over the May-October 2010 timeframe and involve formal instruction on treaty provisions, self-study, mock inspections at U.S. facilities, and team certification standards and boards

The agency recently conducted a START to New START Transition Workshop, and will be conducting our first NST training course this October. This course provides the core training for

interagency personnel, service representatives, and Treaty Compliance Officers from U.S. facilities, as well as our own inspectors and escorts, on the operating principles and inspection procedures for NST. This course is modeled on the highly successful semiannual treaty course DTRA has conducted for START.

Site Assistance Visits and Mock Inspections

DTRA works closely with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Office of Treaty Compliance and the services to prepare U.S. facilities for the new treaty by providing training, assisting in the development of inspection plans, conducting site assistance visits, and providing full “red-on-blue” mock inspections. Since NST was signed this April, DTRA has been actively coordinating with the Air Force and the Navy to prepare facilities subject to inspection under New START. This has and will involve working through the inspection procedures for each site, and conducting site assistance visits and mock inspections as needed. Full mock inspections will utilize base personnel, a DTRA escort team, and a DTRA team playing the role of Russian inspectors. These events provide opportunities for DTRA to simulate an actual inspection and refine training for inspection and base personnel.

Arms Control Enterprise System

DTRA uses the web-based Arms Control Enterprise System (ACES) to support data reporting requirements and notifications for all treaty limited equipment and accountable items. This system includes data handling capabilities and reporting procedures for compliance tracking of weapons systems subject to treaty restrictions. The ACES module that previously supported START and INF requires upgrading

for NST's provisions for the use of unique identifiers and counting of warheads, as well as the change in structure of the semi-annual database report and updated notification formats. DTRA is in the process of upgrading ACES to meet NST requirements, and will ensure that the necessary interim data management and reporting measures are in place during the transition to the new module.

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program

DTRA implements the Nunn-Lugar program which promotes the elimination of systems to achieve force reductions required by treaty obligations and provides transparency. Nunn-Lugar is currently engaged in decommissioning, disassembly, dismantlement, and elimination activities for a variety of systems, including: SS-25 ICBMs, mobile launchers, and regimental base infrastructure; SS-N-20 SLBMs and components; SS-N-18 SLBMs and components; SS-18 ICBMs and silos; SS-19 ICBMs and silos; and SLBM launchers and reactor units from TYPHOON- and DELTA III-class submarines. All Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination activities have been conducted consistent with START and all future activities will be conducted consistent with NST. These activities have continued without disruption through the expiration of START and following the signature of the NST.

We have reviewed the elimination procedures for each of these systems and are working closely with the Executive Agent for the Russian Government, the Federal Space Agency (FSA), to consider adjustments to ongoing elimination activities to take advantage of efficiencies resulting from NST provisions while maintaining our mutual non-proliferation and threat reduction goals within the NST treaty environment.

Further, in cooperation with the FSA and Rosatom, the Nunn-Lugar program will continue to identify potential cost sharing opportunities for each system that will enable the Russian government to assume increased responsibilities for strategic system eliminations.

We will continue to monitor the elimination work in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations governing payments for completed work. Technical site visits will continue as they have in the past under the same procedures agreed to under the CTR Umbrella Agreement which was signed by the U.S. and Russian Federation Presidents.

Conclusion

DTRA's preparations for executing its responsibilities under NST have been thorough and build upon our experience with START and INF. Implementing the new inspection regime will not be unfamiliar to the agency and we will be prepared to carry out all of its inspection and escort provisions with the utmost accuracy and efficiency. We are proud of our record of success in arms control implementation and look forward to the challenges ahead. I thank you for this opportunity, and welcome your questions.