WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Ben Cardin (D-Md.), Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sent a letter to the Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Phillip Swagel, requesting an analysis on how the United States should respond to the changing nuclear strategic environment, specifically an aggressive PRC nuclear buildup and continued Russian disengagement from nuclear arms control agreements. In his letter, Chair Cardin underscored that these geopolitical conditions necessitate an informed debate in Congress about how to respond and requests an analysis from CBO on the matter.
“A debate is underway in the United States and the Congress about how the United States should respond to the changing strategic environment in order to preserve deterrence and stability,” wrote Chair Cardin. “Some contend that the United States must be prepared to develop larger nuclear arsenals than either Russia or China to preserve its own nuclear deterrent. Others have argued for a more cautious approach, warning about the effects of a buildup on both arms-race and crisis stability and counseling for more efforts at preserving or reestablishing arms control.”
“To help the Congress as it considers these issues in the coming years, the Committee requests that the Congressional Budget Office examine a range of possible approaches that the United States might take in response to those changes and estimate their costs,” he continued.
Full text of the letter is available below.
Dear Dr. Swagel:
The United States is in the middle of an effort to replace essentially the entirety of its nuclear forces and supporting infrastructure. Those programs, which started initial development efforts about ten years ago, are intended to replace aging systems on a roughly one-for-one basis over the next two decades. That approach is consistent with the limits on force size in the 2011 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia, which limits the number of strategic nuclear weapon warheads and delivery systems that each of those countries may field.
However, underlying geopolitical conditions have changed over the last decade. Specifically, there are two factors that could affect U.S. plans for nuclear forces: the expansion of nuclear capabilities by both China and Russia, and the approaching expiration of the New START treaty.
In recent years, both Russia and China have expanded the capabilities of their nuclear forces. Russia has announced that it is developing new and novel nuclear weapon capabilities, including new ballistic and cruise missiles as well as a long-range nuclear-powered torpedo with a very high nuclear explosive yield. Concurrently, the PRC has substantially expanded both the types and numbers of nuclear delivery systems they field.
The 2011 New START treaty initially was slated to last for ten years but was extended by five years in 2021; that extension will end in February 2026. The current status of the treaty is also in question, with Russia declaring in early 2023 that it was suspending its participation in the treaty. If the New START treaty is not extended or replaced by a new agreement, there will be no limits on the size of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia for the first time in more than 30 years. The end of New START will also eliminate most of the remaining transparency and confidence-building measures that both parties rely on to understand the other side’s capabilities. For its part, the PRC has shown little interest in participating in arms control negotiations with the United States.
A debate is underway in the United States and the Congress about how the United States should respond to the changing strategic environment in order to preserve deterrence and stability. Some contend that the United States must be prepared to develop larger nuclear arsenals than either Russia or China to preserve its own nuclear deterrent. Others have argued for a more cautious approach, warning about the effects of a buildup on both arms-race and crisis stability and counseling for more efforts at preserving or reestablishing arms control. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States has also proposed a number of responses.
To help the Congress as it considers these issues in the coming years, the Committee requests that the Congressional Budget Office examine a range of possible approaches that the United States might take in response to those changes and estimate their costs. That analysis should include both offensive nuclear forces (including both strategic and tactical forces, as well as the nuclear weapons complex and command and control systems that are essential to their functioning), missile defenses, and other aspects that could affect the United States’ nuclear deterrence posture. CBO’s analysis should, to the extent possible, consider the deterrence philosophies that underlie each approach. Finally, CBO should, to the extent possible, identify areas where arms control might be useful for addressing the instabilities that might arise in a three-party nuclear world. It should also examine opportunities to better leverage U.S. alliances to bolster our collected extended deterrence.
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