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EXAMINING U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE

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EXAMINING U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE

THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 2022

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez presiding.

Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, Murphy, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, Romney, Young, Rounds, and Hagerty.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

The CHAIRMAN. Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.

Too often, when we hear the term security assistance we immediately think of military relationships and hard power projections of U.S. foreign policy.

However, U.S. security assistance and cooperation are critical tools of broader foreign policy. Training, arms sales, planning, and civilian-military reform are critical elements of bolstering partners, allies, and recipient countries around the world critical to U.S. foreign and security interests and, indeed, to the interests of world stability and peace.

Indeed, the State Department and this committee are charged with jurisdiction over security assistance. Many, if not most, of the current security assistance authorities and programs were created in the aftermath of September 11, placing an emphasis on short-term assistance to immediately confront and defeat al-Qaeda and its offshoot groups, but times have changed and our efforts must change as well.

We see terrorist and extremist groups becoming more localized in many countries, portraying themselves as champions of aggrieved populations ignored or beset by weak and predatory governments.

We see a return of great power competition where China and Russia compete with the United States for influence and position, offering their own versions of "security assistance" to countries around the world with what seems fewer conditions or requirements.

We witnessed 20 years of efforts or, perhaps, as has been said, 21-year efforts to build effective military and security forces in Af-

ghanistan, these largely led by the Department of Defense, only to watch them quickly crumble to the Taliban last August.

We watched Iraqi Security Forces to which we had devoted billions in equipment and training flee before ISIS thugs in pickups in 2014, although now we have a new opportunity to reset our security relationship with Iraq.

Today, we see countries in Africa, particularly in the Sahel, struggling to counter insurgents and terrorists amidst multiple coups, perverse unrest—pervasive, I should say, unrest and conflict.

It is clear that our security assistance and cooperation programs are not achieving their intended outcomes despite the billions spent and dedicated efforts of the Departments of State and Defense.

We, and Congress included, are not properly conceptualizing the problem. We need to understand that our security assistance should be rooted in concrete, measurable, and achievable outcomes rooted in sustainable security development, not just assistance.

We must develop comprehensive multi-year plans that integrate U.S. assistance programs across the board that reflect the understanding that democracy, good governance, and economic reform programs are as important as guns and grenade launchers, that judicial accountability and robust civilian control of the military are as important as the integration of aircraft and ground force operations, that a population that has faith in the basic integrity and fairness of its government is one inoculated against the lies and appeals of terrorists and extremists.

Which is why the Department of State must lead this comprehensive integration, since soon after 9/11 there has been a continued trend towards ceding State's authority as the purveyor of security assistance to the Department of Defense, which now provides nearly 50 percent of U.S.-security-related assistance.

Most of the DoD's efforts are geared to short-term projects and activities and, perhaps, necessary ones, but not those that deal with the underlying problems of good governance and many of them without the concurrence of the Secretary of State, the sole official charged in statute with overseeing and coordinating all such assistance.

It is time for a reckoning. To this end, I will be proposing legislation in the next few months to reform the U.S. security assistance process. I hope to work closely with the ranking member on this project.

Finally, let me turn to the news of the day. Over the last 2 weeks, we have seen Vladimir Putin's savage aggression against a free and democratic Ukraine. The destruction he has wrought is of the scale and criminality not seen in Europe since the Second World War, but the Ukrainian people have heroically resisted, clearly, frustrating and surprising the autocrat in the Kremlin.

Much of this resistance have been made possible by the tremendous efforts of the United States, its allies, and partners in providing anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, rifles, ammunitions, training, and institutional organizational improvements to the defenders of Ukraine freedom.

I hope and expect that our witnesses today will be able to inform the committee of this vital ongoing effort to help defend Ukraine.

The dexterity with which the State and Defense Departments have been able to rally support for Ukraine come from long-standing political and security partnerships and programs, and that is something we certainly can applaud.

I turn to the ranking member now for his opening remarks.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do look forward to working with you on the legislation you referred to, and I hope will be there at the takeoff, rather than the landing, as has been suggested in the past.

Look, never has the subject of U.S. security assistance been more important. It plays a vital role in the defense of the democratic world and our partners.

In this hearing, we need to understand their efforts and what else we can do to ensure Ukraine defeats Russia. I also hope to hear about major new security assistance programs in the Indo-Pacific where the State Department has failed to invest sufficient resources.

We owe the nation a discussion on lessons learned from security assistance, or lack thereof, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how those two efforts resulted in such remarkable failures.

Regarding the Ukraine, my wants are the same as President Zelensky's. It is simple—more and faster. While we have provided significant resources to the Ukraine and certainly the Administration is to be applauded for what it has done, particularly over the past year, packages sat on the President's desk longer than they should have, and we lost valuable time.

Now combat losses have depleted most of this aid, and Ukrainians desperately need more and faster.

My goal here is simple—enable the Ukrainian people to expel the Russians and defeat the savage and murderous Putin. Ukraine needs more.

It needs more Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, larger anti-aircraft systems, drones, and ammunition of all calibers, communications gear, protective equipment, and airplanes. Lots more also are needed. I have an ammunition manufacturer in Idaho ready to send more. They need State's sign off.

We should support our allies providing aircraft to the Ukrainians. Stop over thinking this and toughen up. Keep these supplies flowing steadily. I guarantee you the Russians are not wimping around on these matters. They are acting.

The Ukrainian people have made their stand. They are not asking us to fight on their behalf. They are merely asking for our support.

Also, as the world watches Ukraine, our Asian allies are watching. Taiwan, threatened by a massive authoritarian neighbor, wonders how vulnerable it is to the growing might of the Chinese military.

I hope the fierce resistance of the Ukrainians inspires Taiwan and casts doubt within the Chinese military on its prospects of successful aggression.

To ensure the Chinese Communist Party knows it cannot succeed, we should be doing now for Taiwan what we should have done years ago for Ukraine.

We should support investment in Taiwan's defense and help reform its planning and organization, which are needed. My Taiwan Deterrence Act proposes just that by starting a foreign military finance grant program for Taiwan, to highlight U.S. commitment to deterrence, incentivizing Taiwan to invest more in its own defense, and mandating more joint planning with Taiwan to determine the capabilities, its needs, and how best to defend itself. Time is running short. We must start this effort now.

In the Middle East, today is almost 7 months after the disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and that disaster demands we ask hard questions about U.S. security assistance.

Throughout a 20-year period, the U.S. spent over $125 billion to build the Iraq and Afghan militaries. Some efforts succeeded, especially the Syrian Democratic Forces campaign against ISIS, but we saw the larger U.S.-supported Iraqi and Afghan armies melt away in the face of ISIS and the Taliban. The U.S. Government has not institutionalized the lessons from these failures. Instead, it seems eager to forget the whole debacle.

We must ensure security assistance is truly focused on our most vital interests and supports our wider foreign policy and national security objectives, not just tactical and operational capabilities.

As the Defense Department continues efforts to cut the State Department out of security cooperation, we have seen a greater focus on short-term tactical capabilities than on unsustainable forces aligned with strategic foreign policy.

However, U.S. policy should focus on building enduring institutions, not just tactical units. We must address governance challenges, like corruption in all our activities, and we need to professionalize our security assistance workforce.

Security cooperation must support strategic and diplomatic objectives. That is why the State Department must reassert its role in the process and the Senate should support that, but State must also be an active and helpful participant helping coordinate with the Defense Department.

Security assistance is among the most essential tools of foreign policy, but this policy is being tested. We must succeed in helping Ukraine defend itself, we must pursue new efforts with Taiwan, and we must ensure that all of our efforts benefit from the hard, very hard lessons over the past 20 years.

We must also acknowledge the world is, indeed, a more dangerous place than it was 15 to 20 years ago. Our security cooperation must recognize this hard reality as we work with partners around the world to confront dangerous regimes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Risch. Let us turn to our witnesses.

It is now my privilege to welcome back to the committee Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Jessica Lewis.

There are few people better positioned to engage with Congress on United States security assistance programs than Assistant Sec-

retary Lewis, following her nearly two decades working on foreign policy issues in Congress.

Prior to assuming her role as Assistant Secretary, she served here at the committee as the Democratic staff director for 5 years, and from 2007 to 2014, Assistant Secretary Lewis was the national security adviser and foreign policy adviser, and then senior national security adviser to Senate Majority and Minority Leader Harry Reid. We welcome you back.

We also welcome Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities Dr. Mara Karlin. Assistant Secretary Karlin is now working for her sixth Secretary of Defense, where she has advised the Department on policy spanning strategic planning, defense policy, and budgeting future conflicts, and regional security affairs.

Assistant Secretary Karlin previously performed the duties of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from August of 2021 to February of 2022, and prior to that served as the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Welcome to you both. We will start the testimony. We would ask you to summarize in about 5 minutes or so, so the committee can engage in a conversation with you.

We will recognize you, Secretary Lewis, to start off.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JESSICA LEWIS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL–MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. LEWIS. Thank you.

Good morning, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you and it is great to see all the familiar faces I worked with for so many years.

I am pleased to be here to discuss United States security sector assistance with Dr. Mara Karlin, Assistant Secretary of Defense, and I agree with both the chairman and the ranking member, never has it been more important to discuss security assistance, and we do need a new path forward.

Security cooperation, including security sector assistance, is an instrument of foreign policy. It is an integral component of our national security strategy that enables foreign partners to join us in advancing global security, and our support to Ukraine demonstrates the wide array of tools that State and DoD can bring to a partner security sector.

Since assuming office last January, this Administration has provided over $1 billion to Ukraine's defensive capabilities, including through foreign military financing, the DoD Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, and other program lines.

Through the Multinational Joint Commission, we work with Ukraine and our allies to identify military requirements and match funding streams to support needed defense capabilities ranging from radars to Javelins.

Through the Excess Defense Articles program, we have delivered to Ukraine armed Coast Guard cutters to create an asymmetric maritime capability in the Black Sea.

In addition, through programs such as our International Military Education and Training authority, we have supported the development of a cadre of professional and Western-looking mid- and senior-level Ukrainian officers, and through a series of exercises DoD has strengthened the interoperability of our forces and Ukraine's tactical and operational capabilities.

As the Secretary of State said recently, last fall as the present threat against Ukraine from Russia developed, under the authority delegated by the President he authorized the Department of State to provide $60 million in immediate military assistance to Ukraine.

In December, as that threat materialized, he authorized a further drawdown worth $200 million. Then, as Ukraine took up arms with courage to fend off Russia's brutal and unprovoked assault, he authorized an unprecedented third presidential drawdown of up to $300 million, the largest in history for immediate support to Ukraine's defense.

At the same time, we continue to expeditiously process and approve requests for deliveries of U.S.-origin military equipment to Ukraine from allies and partners through our third-party transfer authority.

Considering the strategic environment and the existing architecture of security cooperation and assistance together, I also see several opportunities for Congress to help address the security challenges we are currently facing and apply valuable lessons learned.

First, I would encourage the committee to elevate security sector governance as a central consideration in U.S. security cooperation and assistance planning and treat long-term institutional capacity building as our primary mission.

As a piece of this, human rights and the rule of law is really at the center of the discussion about security sector governance, and we look forward to working with all of you and the many members on this committee who have focused on this topic.

Second, State's authorities require more flexibility. If we are to effectively address emerging crises and opportunities in today's geopolitical environment, greater flexibility is needed on several fronts.

Greater flexibility for FMF and PKO funding would allow the Department to be more responsive and, in certain circumstances, result in cost saving. I would also encourage the appropriation of funds on a more regional or functional basis.

Third, because there is no freestanding acquisition system for FMS, we encourage Congress to work with our DoD colleagues to seek efficiencies and make reforms to the federal acquisition process.

Fourth, to ensure security cooperation and security assistance serve U.S. foreign policy goals and are properly synchronized and deconflicted to make maximum efficiency of taxpayer dollars, DoD's security cooperation's authorities, existing and future's, should include Secretary of State concurrence.

Fifth, and in support of the reforms above, State Department staffing must keep pace with the increased workload and we must develop a better trained security cooperation workforce at the Department.

Mr. Chairman, what our history tells us is one thing for certain. The nature of global security is ever changing, and as it shifts and evolves so too should our security assistance toolkit.

That is why our alliances and partnerships are so vital. These alliances and partnerships, in turn, rely on security assistance and security cooperation to build capabilities, strengthen relationships, and provide interoperability, and as the Secretary has said many times, it is critical that we keep human rights at the center of that policy.

Security assistance is not just a concept to be debated in the abstract. It is a real demand of today's world, encompassing a complex and broad scope of activities.

It is therefore critical that we apply the authorities we have as effectively as we can and continue to think about how we can revise and renew them to face the next challenge.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lewis follows:]

Prepared Statement of Ms. Jessica Lewis

Good morning, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members of the Committee. It's an honor to appear before you and it is great to see all the familiar faces I worked with for so many years. I am pleased to be here to discuss United States security sector assistance with Dr. Mara Karlin, Assistant Secretary of Defense.

The subject of this Hearing is the future of U.S. Security Assistance, and I come before the committee with six recommendations for your consideration for (1) a greater focus on Security Sector Governance; (2) the need for greater flexibility; (3) the urgency of process reforms to make U.S. defense articles more available to partners and expedite their delivery; (4) the value of strengthening State-DoD coordination through concurrence mechanisms and (5) the foundational requirement to support the State Department's security assistance workforce.

Before laying those proposals out in detail, I want to review how we got to the current authorities and programs we have; what those programs are; and, the strategic context in which we are currently exercising them.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATE OF STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Security cooperation, including security sector assistance a, is an instrument of foreign policy. It is an integral component of our national security strategy that enables foreign partners to join us in advancing global security. Consequently, our national security interests can put us in a situation in which we need to evaluate hard choices between supporting the security needs of some partners or stepping back to allow those partners to buy from our adversaries. Security Assistance is also an opportunity to promote stronger and more effective security sector governance; it is a key to long-term relationship building. It is a mechanism for enhancing regional security, burden sharing, and interoperability with U.S. forces. It is a means of strengthening the professionalism of the armed forces agencies of allied and partner nations. It is also, and this is critical, just one element of our foreign policy toolkit. Security assistance is not a panacea, but rather, when applied alongside other tools of our diplomacy, an instrument by which we can support and advance security, stability, and peace.

Congress—and specifically this committee, Mr. Chairman—has been a key partner in this endeavor from its outset. We look to build on this decades' long partnership, to open a discussion by sharing some general recommendations on the way forward with you today. Of course, it is impossible to talk about the future without some discussion of how we created the security sector assistance we have today. It took many years of policymaking, legislating, planning, and partnership for the United States to develop the security assistance tools we now have at our disposal.

Security assistance took on its initial form in the early days of the Cold War, when the United States began providing surplus military equipment and military advisors to U.S. allies and partners.

Then, in the wake of the Korean War and Berlin Airlift, and facing rising security challenges in the context of the Cold War, on November 3, 1961, President John F. Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act to reorganize the structure of existing

U.S. foreign assistance programs, with Congress writing into statute the role of the Secretary of State as responsible for the "continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to determining where there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby." Thus, with the passage of the Act by Congress, U.S. foreign assistance underwent a major transformation that placed security assistance squarely under State's purview. The primary State Department security assistance tools we know today, including Foreign Military Financing, can be traced back to the Foreign Assistance Act.

The next pillar of our current system came in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. The "AECA" reformed the landscape for U.S. security cooperation, including security assistance, by setting the terms on which arms transfers could occur—including for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, and for preventing or hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Like the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act reflected the strategic thinking of the times, requiring consideration to be given as to whether the exports "would contribute to an arms race, aid in the development of weapons of mass destruction, support international terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation agreements or other arrangements."

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act establish the foundational authorities for contemporary State Department U.S. security assistance programs. The United States relied mostly on these authorities through the remainder of the Cold War to shore up NATO partners, and to solidify diplomatic accomplishments such as the signing of the Camp David Accords.

As the Cold War waned, the foreign policy landscape shifted, as did the United States' response to global threats.

Beginning in the 1980s, Congress began providing DoD with additional authorities through annual National Defense Authorization Acts. Early examples focused on counter narcotics and humanitarian assistance, focused initially on emergency challenges in Central and South America.

This trend accelerated considerably after 9/11 due to the perception that the United States needed to urgently build the capacity of local partners in the fight against violent extremists. Once of secondary importance, "security cooperation" with partner security forces was elevated to an integral part of DoD's mission.

In FY 2006, Congress enacted the first major global DoD authority (Section 1206) to be used expressly for the purpose of training and equipping the national military forces of foreign countries worldwide. DoD's global train and equip authorities have since been consolidated and expanded under Title 10 Section 333 (as of FY 2017).

Numerous country- and function-specific authorities, such as the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), The Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF), the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), and, of course, the Iraq and Afghanistan Security Forces Funds (ISFF and ASFF), have also accrued directly to DoD over the past 15 years as well.

Recognizing the potential for duplicative programming between State and DoD authorities, Congress has legislated Secretary of State concurrence, coordination, and joint planning requirements for many (but not all) DoD authorities.

My bureau, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, links diplomacy and defense to bolster U.S. national security. My team works closely with the Department of Defense, Congress, and the U.S. defense industry to deliver tools and training that strengthen our allies' and partners' abilities to provide for their defense and contribute meaningfully to the stability of the rules-based international order. Day to day, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs oversees approximately $7 billion in security sector assistance programs annually—which accounts for roughly 20 percent of the Department of State's and USAID's total annual assistance. This assistance supports grants under Foreign Military Financing to help our partners invest in U.S. training and equipment; International Military Education and Training that enables foreign military personnel to study beside their U.S. counterparts; and Peacekeeping Operations funds to help train and equip foreign forces to rise to the challenge of helping countries emerge and recover from war.

Notably, the $7B of security assistance appropriations is dwarfed by the foreign military sales funded by our allies and partners, which amounted to $28.67B in fiscal year 2021. Furthermore, for fiscal year 2021, Direct Commercial Sales to our allies and partners accounted for $103.4B in fiscal year 2021. In other words, our

global network of alliances and partnerships generated over $130B of funds to our defense industry that in turn will go back to support our national security. In addition, the Bureau coordinates State Department review of and Secretary of State concurrence with DoD activities conducted under 25 different DoD authorities.

This proliferation of DoD authorities has been matched with growing appropriations for DoD security cooperation activities. Since 2001–2022, the total amount of security sector assistance has tripled to roughly $18 billion, and the proportion managed by DoD has grown from approximately 20 percent to slightly more than half.

The State Department's resources, meanwhile, have also grown increasingly inflexible. Of the nearly $7 billion in annual assistance resources I oversee in PM, 93 percent has been subject to Congressional funding directives in recent fiscal years. Once assistance to partners such as Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Iraq are accounted for, only limited resources remain (less than $1.8 billion) to strengthen other allies in need worldwide, creating countless lost opportunities to further America's foreign policy and national security.

But within these constraints, Mr. Chairman, we make a difference.

Security assistance still holds tremendous potential to advance our foreign policy by offering new avenues of access, influencing and assuring partners, strengthening their institutional capacity, and bolstering regional stability.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

I sit before you to discuss these matters at a time where that proposition is being tested, and displayed, as at few points in history. As the bombs rain down on the hospitals and schools of Kyiv, as the Russian tanks roll through the Ukrainian countryside, as we see before our very eyes the sights of war in the European Theater that we had imagined had been retired to history, I can say that I am proud—and that you can all be proud—of the support the United States has provided to Ukraine in, and in advance of, their time of need—and proud of the remarkable courage of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Ukrainian people as they wield our assistance to push back on Russia's unforgivable assault.

And our support to Ukraine demonstrates the wide array of tools that State and DoD can bring to a partner's security sector.

Since assuming office last January, this Administration has provided over $1 billion to Ukraine's defensive capabilities, including through Foreign Military Financing, the DoD Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, and other program lines. Through the Multinational Joint Commission (MJC) we work with Ukraine and our Allies to identify military requirements and match funding streams to support needed defense capabilities, ranging from radars to Javelins. Through the Excess Defense Articles program, we have delivered to Ukraine armed Coast Guard Cutters to create an asymmetric maritime capability in the Black Sea. In addition, through programs such as our International Military Education and Training (IMET) authority, we have supported the development of a cadre of professional and Western-looking mid- and senior-level Ukrainian officers, and through a series of exercises, DoD has strengthened the interoperability of our forces and Ukraine's tactical and operational capabilities. We have repeatedly condemned President Putin's efforts to intimidate and isolate Ukraine and have provided $1 billion in assistance in the last year alone. On at least two occasions we have turned around requests within just 24 hours; an incredible speed for issues of this complexity.

As the Secretary said recently, last fall, as the present threat against Ukraine from Russia developed, under authority delegated by the President, he authorized the Department of Defense to provide $60 million in immediate military assistance to Ukraine.

In December, as that threat materialized, he authorized a further drawdown worth $200 million. Then, as Ukraine took up arms with courage to fend off Russia's brutal and unprovoked assault, he authorized, an unprecedented third Presidential Drawdown of up to $350 million for immediate support to Ukraine's defense.

At the same time, we continue to expeditiously process and approve requests for deliveries of U.S.-origin materiel military equipment to Ukraine from allies and partners under our Third-Party Transfer Authority.

Congruent to our efforts to assist Ukraine in its fight against Russia, the challenge posed by the PRC is unlike anything we have faced in recent history. The PRC is the only country with the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to seriously challenge the stable and open international system—all the rules, values, and relationships that make the world work. As we turn to the pacing threat the PRC and its model of autocracy poses to the rules-based order, we can look to security cooperation and security assistance as a key element of our response. This challenge forces us to return to our national security interests. We can either main-

tain our unprecedented network of security assistance relationships or we must acknowledge the risk of allowing these relationships to stagnate and open opportunities for China and Russia to step into the vacuum. For decades, for example, we have worked to strengthen our security cooperation with key allies such as Japan and South Korea while creating new partnerships with countries like Vietnam, all while working hand-in-glove with Taiwan to strengthen that brave island's defense and deterrence—and this Administration intends to deepen and expand that cooperation in the months and years ahead.

As shown in our response to Ukraine, our global network of allies and partners are a unique American advantage and strategic asset in competition with the PRC and Russia. As a fundamentally political, relationship-building tool, security sector assistance can play a vital role in strengthening those partnerships. Both Beijing and Moscow have invested heavily in efforts meant to drive a wedge between us and our allies and partners.

For the foreseeable future, it will be a priority for the United States to continue leveraging security cooperation to help our partners deter and defeat Russian and PRC aggression. It is especially critical that our fellow democracies on the frontlines have the means to defend themselves against their larger, autocratic neighbors. I should be clear, however, that just because a strategic competitor is willing to transfer arms to a country, it does not mean we should, or will. We will approve arms transfers only when they are actually in our foreign policy interest.

Indeed, we must keep in mind that strategic competition is not simply a struggle of might between great powers. It is at base a contest of values and norms—of two fundamentally different models of global governance. As President Biden has said, "We're living at an inflection point in history, both at home and abroad. We're engaged anew in a struggle between democracy and autocracy." And as Secretary Blinken said last year in a message to all our diplomatic posts worldwide, "in a more contested, competitive world, America's values and our commitment to supporting the rights and freedoms of people around the world are a competitive structural advantage that our undemocratic adversaries and competitors cannot match, and that we should not cede."

Therefore, the President has stressed the need to defend free societies and promote democracy around the world, including by elevating our promotion of human rights. We must keep the importance of security sector governance and respect for universal human rights front and center as we consider where to provide security assistance, and as we engage partner nations' security institutions and empower them toward modernization, accountability, and reform.

The same principles apply for security assistance intended to manage the persistent threats from violent extremists, Iranian proxies, and other destabilizing actors. These threats show no sign of decreasing even as we shift our policy focus to the long-term challenge posed by the PRC and, more immediately, by Russia. A significant share of security assistance is still allocated toward addressing these persistent threats globally.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Considering the strategic environment and the existing architecture of security cooperation and assistance together, I see several opportunities for Congress to help address the security challenges we are currently facing and apply valuable lessons learned: (1) a greater focus on Security Sector Governance; (2) the need for greater flexibility; (3) the urgency of process reforms to make U.S. defense articles more available to partners and expedite their delivery; (4) the value of strengthening State-DoD coordination through concurrence mechanisms and (5) the foundational requirement to support the State Department's security assistance workforce.

First, I would encourage the Committee to elevate security sector governance as a central consideration in U.S. security cooperation and assistance planning and treat long-term institutional capacity building as our primary mission.

It is not enough to build defense institutions in tandem with "train and equip" missions; security sector governance must be the pacesetter. Security assistance delivered before baseline standards of governance and institutional capacity are in place will at best provide little return on investment, and more likely will harm U.S. interests in the long run.

A governance-centered approach to security cooperation and assistance would better integrate our political-military tools with our foreign policy and with the diplomatic and economic instruments of statecraft, in keeping with the spirit of the Foreign Assistance Act.

Operationalizing a governance-centered approach will also require the interagency to reduce duplication and to develop a common operating picture—especially with

regards to the foreign policy risks posed by weak governance and the potential for elite capture of the security sector—and continuous, strategic-level monitoring and evaluation frameworks. The risk assessments and learning frameworks, moreover, should not merely inform program planning but meaningfully steer it.

Second, State's authorities require more flexibility if we are to effectively address emerging crises and opportunities in today's geopolitical environment. Greater flexibility is needed on several fronts.

The Department faces a perennial need to deliver basic military articles, training, and services to developing partners for the purposes of building institutional capacity, preventing conflict, and promoting stability. The Peacekeeping Operations account allows us to address such needs but is heavily directed by Congress. Greater flexibility for FMF and PKO funding would allow the Department to be more responsive and in certain circumstances result in cost-saving.

I would also encourage the appropriation of funds on a more regional or functional basis. Most FMF is directed on a bilateral basis, which risks creating a latent expectancy among allies and partners and limits the Department's flexibility and responsiveness and the ability to utilize FMF in concert with diplomatic tools. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, for example, the Department of State was only able to urgently reallocate a few million dollars in FMF assistance.

Expanded use of security sector assistance funding appropriated as regional funds provides not only greater flexibility to respond to emerging needs and align to strategic priorities, but also promotes fruitful competition among program proposals.

To be clear, I am not suggesting that State is interested in greater flexibility to avoid the tough questions on security sector governance, democracy, and human rights, which are issues that this Administration is committed to prioritizing and in which Congress rightly maintains a steadfast interest. Rather, I have noted several areas where improvements are needed to State's flexibility *after* a decision is made to provide security assistance.

Third, because there is no free-standing acquisition system for FMS, we also encourage Congress to work with our DoD colleagues to provide authorities and funding consistent with Administration requests that enable efficiencies and reforms to the Federal acquisition processes, which directly impact the speed of the FMS system. Concurrently, we are working diligently in the interagency to address challenges that have been identified through the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy revision process, designed to ensure the United States remains competitive once the Administration has decided to provide security assistance. The four main areas we are working on are: expanding financing options for partners; improving the efficiency of the U.S. technology transfer approval process; building exportability into the development of new capabilities in order to get the capability to our partners more quickly; and encouraging innovative solutions by exploring options for partners that are not currently used by U.S. military, what we call non-program of record cases. These are requests from partners via the FMS system for capabilities that are not existing mainline DoD procurements, and which therefore require the addition of expertise and management processes within DoD to be able to facilitate the procurement of defense articles that are unfamiliar to the DoD system.

In the context of strategic competition, I also see an acute need to offer more attractive financing options to partners who are considering acquiring major U.S. defense articles—for example, through expanded FMF loan authorities. Currently foreign competitors offer far more flexible financing than the United States. FMF loans would provide a tool for the United States to compete for more FMS in countries where FMF grant assistance is unavailable or insufficient to support major procurements and/or where foreign partners lack the national funds to pay the purchase price upfront.

In addition, we look forward to working with Congress to identify opportunities and mechanisms to prioritize and expedite our assistance and our arms transfers to the partners who need them most urgently, in line with the requirements of those partners' defense. Taiwan is a useful case in point: we work constantly with our partners in Taiwan to develop a joint understanding of the asymmetric capabilities required for its defense; having identified those capabilities, we also need to ensure we can deliver them in a timely manner, and this is a challenge that stretches beyond government—though contracting process reform is certainly on the agenda—to industry, where production timelines have faced increased lag due to the COVID–19 pandemic.

Fourth, to ensure security cooperation and security assistance serve U.S. foreign policy goals and are properly synchronized and deconflicted to make maximal efficiency of taxpayer dollars, DoD security cooperation authorities—when requested by the Administration—should include Secretary of State concurrence.

Fifth, and in support of the reforms above, we encourage the Congress to provide requested State Department staffing resources to keep pace with the increased workload, and to develop a better trained security cooperation workforce at the Department. While DoD's Security Cooperation workforce is more than 20,000 strong, State maintains a roughly analogous political-military workforce that numbers in the low hundreds. This has remained the case despite the ever-increasing expansion of DoD authorities and funds that PM is required to jointly develop, in addition to our own funds. In short, we risk losing strong political-military talent when we must do more and more without additional personnel.

While State actively supports many DoD security sector assistance activities, the Department currently lacks sufficient staff and bandwidth to fully participate in DoD planning processes and to thoroughly review proposed programs, including when some authorities include "joint formulation" requirements.

It is also important to facilitate the development of a security cooperation expertise and capacity at the State Department. Today's security sector assistance programs are larger and more complex than those contemplated when the FAA was enacted, and they require personnel with both military and civilian areas of expertise.

CONCLUSION

What our history tells us is one thing for certain: the nature of global security is ever-changing. As it shifts and evolves so too should our security assistance toolkit. What security sector assistance looks like today is not what it looked like 10, 20, 30, or even 60-plus-years-ago when many of the key statutes, policies and process that guide the current system were developed. Our world and the political landscape we live in has changed greatly in the post-Cold-War environment.

Today, we are confronted on all sides by constantly emerging challenges and ever-present risks. Many of the security threats we face respect no borders or walls. Cyber and digital threats, international economic disruptions, climate insecurity, humanitarian crises, violent extremism and terrorism, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction all pose profound and dangers. None of these dangers can be effectively addressed by one nation acting alone—not even one as powerful as the United States. That is why our alliances and partnerships are so vital. These alliances and partnerships, in turn, rely on security assistance and security cooperation to build capabilities, strengthen relationships, and provide interoperability. Security assistance is not just a concept to be debated in the abstract: it is a real demand of today's world, encompassing a complex and broad scope of activities. It is therefore critical that we apply the authorities we have as effectively as we can—and continue to think about how we can revise and renew those authorities and processes to face the next challenge.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Karlin.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARA ELIZABETH KARLIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. KARLIN. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the invitation to testify before you today on security cooperation and I am honored to do so alongside my close colleague, Assistant Secretary Lewis.

I respectfully submit my written statement for the record and will provide brief opening remarks.

The United States is at a pivotal moment with our allies and partners to confront unprecedented challenges to our security, including the People's Republic of China's global ambitions and Russian aggression that threatens the territorial integrity of Europe. All the while, we battle historic transnational threats.

One of the most important ways that we will rise to meet these challenges is by renewing a U.S. strategic advantage—our unmatched network of allies and partners.

The forthcoming National Defense Strategy will emphasize how the Department will strengthen these alliances and partnerships through integrated deterrent, which, as Secretary Austin underscores, involves integrating our efforts across domains and the spectrum of conflict to ensure that the Department closely collaborates with the rest of the government and our allies and partners on the most critical security challenges. Security cooperation is an important part of this.

The Department of Defense has learned from large-scale assistance programs that for lasting impact a comprehensive engagement plan must mean more than training and equipping. Resilient relationships thrive when values and deeds align. Security cooperation aims to uphold that approach.

We aim to help partners with not only specific capabilities, but also with institutional integrity and an ability to promote our shared values, notably, the promotion and protection of human rights and good governance and legitimacy of the security sector.

We view this as a strategic advantage that distinguishes us from our competitors. The degree of partnership should not be measured by the quantity of security cooperation programs, but rather by their quality. That includes transparency and effectiveness.

We are building a culture of learning and adaptation, drawing on lessons from program successes and program challenges.

To seize the opportunity for meaningful change, we are focusing on three priority areas: prioritizing who and what we invest in, focusing on sustainable impact, and adopting a holistic integrated approach to how we execute security cooperation programs.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, the U.S. network of alliances and partnerships is a strategic advantage, but this advantage is not a given.

It requires active involvement by the entire U.S. Government and listening to partners' concerns and contexts, and taking a thoughtful and deliberate approach to how we employ our resources to meet our priorities.

That is facilitated by good strategy, good policy, and close partnership among the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and Congress.

I appreciate your leadership on this critical issue and thank you for the opportunity to share our vision for security cooperation.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Karlin follows:]

Prepared Statement of Dr. Mara E. Karlin

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on examining U.S. security cooperation and assistance. The United States is at a pivotal moment with our allies and partners as we work to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. Together, we confront unprecedented challenges to our security, including the People's Republic of China's (PRC) global ambitions to rival the United States and Russian aggression that threatens the territorial integrity of Europe, while we also battle historic transnational threats.

One of the most important ways that we will rise to meet these challenges is by renewing a U.S. strategic advantage—our unmatched network of allies and partners. The forthcoming National Defense Strategy will emphasize how the Department will strengthen these alliances and partnerships to advance national security through integrated deterrence. As Secretary Austin underscores, integrated deterrence is incorporating our efforts across domains and the spectrum of conflict to ensure that the Department closely cooperates with the rest of the government and our allies and partners on the most critical security challenges. Security cooperation is an important tool that helps key allies and partners strengthen their defense and enhances our ability to rely on one another in a time of need.

Resilient partnerships thrive when values and deeds align; security cooperation aims to uphold that approach. Key planning assumptions, such as ensuring the technology and capability we provide can be absorbed, maintained, and sustained by the recipient are the basics; to fully realize our shared interests, assistance must align with our strategic objectives and include foundational aspects. On the last point, we aim to help allies and partners with not only specific capabilities, but also with institutional integrity and an ability to promote our shared values.

THE DEPARTMENT'S APPROACH TO SECURITY COOPERATION

Our relationships provide us with a reservoir of strength. They allow us to operate by, with, and through our allies and partners to meet shared security challenges. The degree of partnership should not be measured by the quantity of security cooperation programs, but rather by their quality. The Department of Defense has learned from large-scale assistance programs that for lasting impact, a comprehensive engagement plan involves more than training and equipping. Importantly, we are building a culture of learning and adaptation, drawing on lessons from program successes, as well as, from programs that did not have the desired impact. We are building a learning agenda and integrating it into decision processes, and measure program impact in a way that assesses real change, rather than counting our own inputs into programs as successes in themselves. We seek to learn lessons and avoid the fallacy of sunk costs by ruthlessly prioritizing programs that are strategic, and setting appropriate expectations for programs that provide more of a tactical advantage. Through this approach, we can unlock the comparative advantages our allies and partners bring as we collectively work together to meet our shared objectives.

A key aspect of the success of the security cooperation enterprise is the collaboration among and within the Department, most notably DoD's close collaboration with the State Department ensures that programs are designed and executed with broader national security interests in mind. Internal to the Department of Defense, we recently reorganized—bringing the Defense Security Cooperation Agency under the umbrella of Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in the Office of the Secretary of the Defense for Policy to facilitate better collaboration and coordination. Success requires teamwork, and I can assure you that our entire team is focused on embracing it.

WHO AND WHAT WE INVEST IN

I'll begin with who and what we invest in. First, we focus our global assets and resources to safeguard the most pressing concerns held by allies and partners who play critical roles in our shared security. The Department's invigorated focus on tailored allied and partner roles is one of the hallmarks of our evolving approach.

The way we approach security cooperation with states on China and Russia's periphery fundamentally differs from how we employ security cooperation elsewhere. Here, our approach emphasizes building resilience and capability to counter coercive or revisionist activity.

By contrast, when we look to the rest of the world, the Department wants to cultivate select security partners who can appropriately and effectively be regional security anchors, especially during crises.

By leveraging these approaches, we are able to identify, export, and implement those capabilities that shape the strategic calculus and allow us increased operational flexibility. Whether the vehicle is Department of Defense security cooperation, foreign military sales, or co-development, we will work to provide critical capabilities with allies and partners in a way that makes a real difference. This requires employing the full security cooperation toolkit including engagement tools, capacity building, training, professional military education, and our regional centers in each area of responsibility.

Security sector assistance with the United States is not simply about training and equipping. It is based on a holistic concept of security sector reform and governance that seeks to shape partners' defense institutions to enshrine shared values. Our

system of security sector assistance is premised on the rule of law, human rights, and transparency. This is not simply a box we check; it is a strategic advantage. Predatory activities by rival powers seek to win power and influence. The United States believes that these activities are shortsighted and in the long-run, they disadvantage those nations that accept what is sold as assistance from such powers. And many of these nations are coming to realize the costs of the compacts they have joined. The United States offers an alternative. By incorporating security sector reform into the security sector assistance process, our capacity building shapes ally and partner defense institutions in a way that foments long-term growth, development, and enshrinement of critical values.

SUSTAINABLE IMPACT

For each of these investments, we emphasize the tangible change that will happen as a result of our efforts, and keep our focus on a sustained impact that outlasts the particular investment. This requires robust assessment, monitoring, and evaluation. We are no longer satisfied with measuring inputs or outputs, but rather we are taking a longer view of the way our partners can sustain capabilities we provide. To this end, we are adopting rigorous learning, encouraging our workforce and partners to identify past pitfalls to draw out what success looks like in security cooperation and tailor it to the partner's context. This learning will be supported by objectives that ensure our efforts are specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and anchored in a time frame, ensuring the sustainability of our programs.

The Department of Defense, in close collaboration with the Department of State, has also instituted a robust strategic evaluation agenda focused on making public key findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We are working every day to find ways to quantify, interpret, and evaluate return on investment with our security cooperation dollars. Currently, strategic evaluations span the effectiveness of maritime security, institutional capacity building, the State Partnership Program, the Counter-ISIL Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), and International Professional Military Education.

INTEGRATED APPROACH TO HOW WE DO BUSINESS

Third, we recognize that how we do business matters in achieving impact. We employ an integrated approach to partnership that includes longer-term thinking and a whole-of-government effort to achieve sustained and resilient partnership, consideration of the elements within our control and our partner's control that determine whether the investment is effective, and consideration of external threats and third parties that may compromise the investment.

Security cooperation programs often fall short when they do not take into account higher order questions of mission, organizational structure, and personnel. The President's *Strategy on Countering Corruption* highlights the need to integrate corruption considerations in our work as well, which includes our security cooperation programs. We are building our tools to address these issues with partners by improving our institutional capacity and our dialogue with partners, and making tough choices when partners are not willing or not able to make critical changes. This is especially relevant for sustainability, ensuring that our partnerships are resilient to shocks and stresses, and can endure well past the day when we are consistently investing in them.

We continue to invest in the professionalization of our security cooperation workforce by requiring increasingly rigorous training. We are investing in the concept of institutionalizing the defense diplomacy role the Department's representatives in embassies play, ensuring that the partnerships they promote are consistent with our national security interests and values.

What ultimately sets apart the United States in an environment of strategic competition are the values we represent. Our ability to maintain and continue to set a high bar for human rights, humanitarian affairs, and rule of law—including our civilian oversight of the military—is a critical tool we can leverage to help our partners meet their goals and advance those shared values. Doing so is both a moral and strategic imperative.

We also take our responsibility in the humanitarian sector very seriously, as we play an important supporting role in the interagency in supporting civil authorities in countries facing crises. Whether it is managing crisis response capacity building under the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account, employing Foreign Disaster Relief, or maintaining Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), the Department is committed to supporting our partners' efforts to provide humanitarian services to their civilian populace. During our recent reorganization within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), we have merged

the offices of Stability and Humanitarian Affairs and Security Cooperation to form a new Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships. This shift deliberately integrated humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and human rights with the existing processes related to security cooperation to emphasize the centrality of these areas of defense cooperation that benefit allies and partners in need. Women, Peace and Security; civilian protection; and respect for the rule of law also fall into this issue set. This integration will help us look more holistically at the needs and challenges our partners and their diverse populations face, particularly when those needs can spiral into crises that spill outside the country's borders.

Of course, none of this is possible without close collaboration with our interagency partners. We rely heavily on our colleagues at the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development to achieve the effects we need to achieve, whether through joint development and planning, supplementing and coordinating security programs through structured diplomatic and military engagement, or ensuring that security cooperation fits into broader foreign policy goals.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I began by sharing with you how the U.S. network of alliances and partnerships is a strategic advantage that competitors cannot match. I conclude by sharing that this advantage is not a given. It requires active involvement by the entire U.S. Government, listening to partners' concerns and contexts, and taking a thoughtful and deliberate approach to how we employ our resources to meet our priorities. That is facilitated by good strategy, good policy, and close partnership among the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and Congress. I appreciate the Committee's leadership on this critical issue and thank you for the opportunity to share our vision for engagement with allies and partners through security cooperation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both. Your full statements will be included in the record. We will start a round of 5 minutes.

Let me first start off before I get to the broader policy questions here, there is bipartisan support for providing Ukraine with fighter jets of neighboring countries that they would know how to fly and engage in, and I understand that the Polish decision may have complicated how we achieve that, but what is our present status in terms of exploring potential paths to providing the fighter jets to Ukraine?

Ms. LEWIS. Thank you, Senator, and I know that this is something that is very much on the committee's minds.

Secretary Blinken actually addressed this yesterday and I will comment, and then happy to turn it over to Dr. Karlin as well.

Look, we understand, first of all, when it comes to the planes that it is up to any country. It is a sovereign decision about the transfer of the planes and, as you noted, that there were some complexities with the plan that was provided and we heard yesterday from the Department of Defense on that particular proposal.

At this point, we are consulting very closely with Poland and our other NATO allies on the best way forward. We are working hard on this and as we—as that consultation develops, we will stay in close touch with you and the committee to make sure that you have the information you need.

The CHAIRMAN. Time is of the essence. The Ukrainians are getting bombarded and they do not have—at least as their country's leaders suggest and assert, they do not have the wherewithal to compete in the sky.

I understand why NATO and the United States are not engaged in the no-fly zone. That has potential direct conflict with Russia, but I do not understand why we are not working expeditiously to facilitate planes to Ukraine.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you for raising this issue, Senator, and looking holistically, of course, I would just cite the tremendous statement by Assistant Secretary Lewis in her opening remarks about the unprecedented level of support to Ukraine. It has been extraordinary.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about planes. I have no doubt that we have been giving enormous assistance to Ukraine. We are going to vote, hopefully, today, and continuing to do that. I am talking specifically about planes.

Dr. KARLIN. Absolutely, Senator. Thank you for that.

We are really focusing in particular on what we see as them needing most—anti-armor and air defense capabilities. Ukraine's air force does have several squadrons of mission capable aircraft in this contested airspace, but what we are seeing is that they really need greater air defense and, frankly, as we and our allies and partners are rushing this assistance to them, we are seeing the operational impact of it on the battlefield every single day.

The CHAIRMAN. You are saying they do not need airplanes?

Dr. KARLIN. What I am saying, sir, is that we are trying to provide everything we can that really helps them with air defense and we do not see significant effectiveness tied to those airplanes specifically. I would——

The CHAIRMAN. If we are giving them air defense other than airplanes, we better give it to them soon. Horrific pictures yesterday, or today's news, about the bombing of a maternity hospital. If we cannot be moved by that, I do not know what we can be moved by.

I am not going to belabor the point except to say either we are going to get them some air defense systems so that they can protect themselves with or we need to engage with them in terms of the jet question.

Let me turn to some broader questions.

Secretary Lewis, recognizing you have been on the job for less than 6 months, but also recognizing that you were sitting on this side of the dais before that, do you believe that State's role in setting bilateral security assistance policies diminished over the last several years?

Ms. LEWIS. Senator, I certainly agree that there has been a shift over a number of years in terms of—particularly, on security assistance from the State Department to the Defense Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. That is a diplomatic way of saying yes. To what extent is this a problem for U.S. foreign policy? What reforms—you mentioned some reforms. What should be done to strengthen State's security assistance programs?

Ms. LEWIS. I think, first, and one of the things I did mention is making sure that the State Department has concurrence on the Defense Department programs that overlap with us, which we do in a number of areas, but not 100 percent, and we are working on that issue.

I think the second piece is looking at creating more flexibility in the State Department funding so that we can be—have State Department be ready to respond. There is more flexibility in the Defense Department funding and so that enables them sometimes to move more quickly.

I think those would be the top of my list in terms of two changes to make immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Karlin, do you agree that DoD security assistance and cooperation programs unavoidably involve the foreign relations of the United States?

Dr. KARLIN. Mr. Chairman, I do believe that security assistance to be effective has to absolutely fall under the rubric of our foreign policy interests.

The CHAIRMAN. Based upon that, should not the Secretary of State have concurrence authority over all DoD foreign security assistance and cooperation activities to fulfill his statutory responsibility to oversee and coordinate all U.S. foreign policy activities?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you for raising this issue, Mr. Chairman.

The State Department and Department of Defense staff work very closely to collaborate on all of these programs.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Okay. That is a nonanswer.

The reality is that there is one person statutorily who has the responsibility for this assistance in terms of foreign policy. That is the Secretary of State.

The Defense Department, over years and administrations, has taken more and more of this responsibility without the statutory responsibility of the Secretary being engaged, and I expect the State Department to get what it is rightfully responsible for.

I do not care what type of brotherhood or sisterhood exists between the two departments. You need to meet your statutory responsibility and that is what the committee is going to continue to pursue.

Finally, I know that—as you may know, I have long been concerned about the circumstances under which we provide U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan.

A report that I commissioned under the GAO was released last week that found that over several years the State Department and DoD failed to meet statutory reporting requirements to Congress on the impact of U.S. assistance on the military balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

This is deeply concerning as Azerbaijan's actions in the Nagorno-Karabakh region have led to the deaths of more than 6,000 people, extracted a steep toll on Armenians, uprooting them from—thousands from their homes.

Are you familiar with the report's findings, Secretary Lewis, and do you commit to review State's compliance with the 907 waiver requirements for providing assistance to Azerbaijan?

Ms. LEWIS. Yes, Senator, I am familiar, and yes, I commit to do that, and I am aware that the GAO report raised concerns about providing additional information related to those waivers and we will—it is a priority for me to look into that and ensure that we provide the information required.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a priority for me to conduct the oversight to make sure this happens. I do not want to see this anymore. It is really—I should not have had to commission a report to get what we all know, that there has been a failure to justify this assistance.

Senator Risch.

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Look, I am going to belabor the point on airplanes some. I do not usually feel comfortable in speaking for the Republican Caucus, but I am this time, and that is we are unanimous that this needs to be done.

I watched Tony the other night, who I consider a friend, try to explain why we are not giving them airplanes. That does not wash. The people on the ground are saying they need airplanes. There are people here in DC saying, well, this is going to be a problem, or that is going to be a problem.

Give them the airplanes. I mean, we really, really need to do that. If it turns out they cannot use them, then so be it, but I would hate to be in the position where we have things that they can defend themselves with and we will not give them to them.

In addition to that, you really also need to focus on the intermediate missiles. You got a spectrum there, with the Stingers being at the low end and the Patriots being at the large end, but there is half a dozen systems in between that they could really, really use to defend the skies.

My plea would be get at it. We need to help these people, and not tomorrow, but today, this stuff needs to start moving. I do not know what juice you have up there to push this thing along, but I am telling you this is—it is an embarrassment to be here and be in a position where we can give them something to defend themselves with and not being able to do it.

Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I would like to yield the rest of my time to Senator Portman, who has another meeting, and he wants to get a couple of words in before he goes.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Senator Portman.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Secretary Karlin, you have said that you cannot give planes to them because they really need "better air defense." We do not particularly think they need planes. They think they need planes.

Are you saying the only reason that the Department of Defense is against providing these MiG–29s to Ukraine is that you know better than them what they need to defend themselves? Is that your only reason?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you for raising this issue, Senator Portman.

Senator PORTMAN. I need to go quickly.

Dr. KARLIN. Of course. I would say that we are trying to get Ukraine everything that it can use immediately in the field today. That is the priority.

Senator PORTMAN. In your judgment. Your judgment is overriding their judgment as to what they need? Because they say they need airplanes.

Dr. KARLIN. We have spoken closely with them and, to be frank, it is, ultimately, a sovereign decision for Poland. We are——

Senator PORTMAN. No. No. No. We have spoken closely with them also, including the president of Ukraine. Are you saying that that is the reason?

Dr. KARLIN. Senator, I will convey all of your concerns back. I——

Senator PORTMAN. No. No. Just answer my question. Are you saying that is the reason that you—that your judgment supersedes that of the Ukrainian military?

Dr. KARLIN. I am not saying that.

Senator PORTMAN. Is that the reason?

Dr. KARLIN. I am saying that they have multiple squadrons that are mission capable.

Senator PORTMAN. Okay. You are saying that is—because the other reason I have heard is that somehow this would make Vladimir Putin upset if we were to send these weapons. In fact, we already are sending Stingers and Javelins, correct?

In fact, you just said that the air defense weapons are more effective and that is what we should be sending. You are saying that what we would like to send is something that is more effective that, therefore, should offend Vladimir Putin more——

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you for raising——

Senator PORTMAN. —than the airplanes, correct?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you for raising that.

Senator PORTMAN. Yet, you cannot send airplanes. What is the logic behind that?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you for raising that, Senator. We are, indeed, providing the assistance that you highlighted, as have many of our allies. Indeed, there are——

Senator PORTMAN. Are you saying that you are concerned about provoking Vladimir Putin? Is that not one of your reasons?

Dr. KARLIN. I think escalation considerations do need to factor into all of these——

Senator PORTMAN. You are saying you are escalating with a weapon that you think is less effective than other weapons you would like to send them. How does that makes sense, logically?

Dr. KARLIN. Our intelligence community has looked at this issue. I am more than willing to discuss it further in a classified session, but I do believe that we are———

Senator PORTMAN. We do not need a classified session. Here we are. You are saying the two reasons we are now learning is, one, that your judgment is superseding that of the Ukrainian military and, two, you think that it is somehow more provocative, even though you are saying that you should be sending them and want to send them something you think is more effective in the field that, by definition, would be something the Russians would be more concerned about, correct?

Dr. KARLIN. We are giving them capabilities that they are using immediately. We are looking very closely at escalation throughout this entire——

Senator PORTMAN. They would use this equipment immediately. Their pilots are ready to go. They are repairing airfields to be able to use it. They are willing to take off from highways.

I mean, they want this right away, and, again, I go back to what the chairman and ranking member have said about the situation is dire. We do not have time here. I mean, the maternity hospital you raised is an example.

This is a deliberate bombing of a maternity hospital. We know that because Lavrov responded by saying, yes, they—sometimes they had militia there. The bigger context is here this is an ally

of ours. This is a sovereign country. It is okay for us to have Russia go in and bomb people and take all kinds of weapons in, but it is somehow not appropriate for us to help facilitate what Poland wants to do and, hopefully, other countries as well?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. To my colleague, Senator Risch, thank you for indulging me with giving me some of your time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate that this is not a decision that is being made at the level that either of you are operating, but I just want to weigh in with all of my colleagues.

There is bipartisan support to provide these planes. It is disappointing to see the reluctance on the part of the Administration and it is coming across as indecision and bickering among members of the Administration, which is not helpful to the cause and not helpful to the Administration.

I hope you will share that with those you report to and get us a better answer. I mean, if there is a good answer for why we are not doing this, we all can understand that, but we have not gotten a good answer to the question.

I want to go on to another issue, and thank you, Secretary Lewis, for your testimony today and for working with our office to address an issue that we have—a private company has to try and get answers on a commercial sale. I know you are working hard to help us get that resolved and I really appreciate that.

I want to talk a little bit about the women, peace, and security law that we have in New Hampshire, because—or in Congress and in the United States, because I think it is important as we think about how we address conflicts, whether it is in Ukraine, Afghanistan, around the world, and I know that there are different levels of implementation of the law.

I wonder if each of you could address where you think your Department is with respect to that implementation and how you see it working.

Ms. LEWIS. Senator Shaheen, first of all, I really want to thank you for your leadership on this issue. It truly is inspirational to all of us, and I am always happy to work with your office to try to resolve any pending issues before the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and I know we talked about this a little bit in my nomination hearing.

I want to highlight three pieces of work that we have worked on specifically under the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

First of all, let me start talking about the Global Peace Operations Initiative. We call it GPOI. It is the world's largest peace operations capacity building program, and we have partnered with more than 50 countries that work with the U.N. and the African Union peacekeepers to support women's participation and leadership in peace operations, to train women peacekeepers, and to integrate gender-related topics focused on gender and women's participation in peace operations.

I am also going to mention something that sounds mundane, but is incredibly important. Although through GPOI, PM continues to work to remove barriers to women's participation in training

through gender-inclusive facility upgrades, including accommodations, bathrooms, and showers at partners' peace operations training centers. These are the kinds of things that can keep women from being able to participate.

Senator SHAHEEN. Can I just interrupt you for a minute?

Ms. LEWIS. Of course.

Senator SHAHEEN. Because I think one of the things that is missed sometimes is why this is important both for security. Do you want to speak to that?

Ms. LEWIS. Absolutely. If we do not have women, who are 50 percent of the population, participating on security-related issues then we miss a whole host of important issues. Women understand what is going on in their communities.

They understand, particularly in peacekeeping operations, how to help keep people safe, including women and children, and they bring a unique lens and vision to security-related issues.

If we do not have women at the table, often we miss key things that make differences like, again, as we are looking at peacekeeping operations making sure that women's rights are respected. This is not just important to women. This is important to the whole community.

Senator SHAHEEN. I have only got a few seconds left.

Dr. Karlin, I wonder if you could speak to what DoD is doing in this area.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you for raising this issue, Senator, especially serendipitously during the week of International Women's Day.

I very much agree with everything Assistant Secretary Lewis said and, indeed, we have a number of efforts across our combatant commands to ensure that women, peace, and security issues are really looped into what they are doing.

I think Assistant Secretary Lewis made the argument exactly right. We have got to involve the entire populations that they are bought in to the meaningful change that we all seek. Thank you.

Senator SHAHEEN. I would just point out that we have very good data that shows when women are bought in and they are at the table that those negotiations last longer and are more stable, and that is really important. There are very good data-driven reasons why this makes sense.

Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Romney.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I fully concur with the introductory comments made by the chairman and the ranking member and by Senator Portman and Senator Shaheen.

I simply do not understand the logic for not getting the MiGs to the Ukrainians immediately. There is no logic which has been provided to this committee or to the nation for the lack of rapidity in making this decision and getting them the MiGs.

It makes no sense. If there are people in the Administration that know the answer, I would suggest we get the occasion to meet with them, perhaps in a classified setting, but we need to know the reason why those MiGs have not been transferred already. I believe there is a sentiment that we are fearful about what Putin might do and what he might consider as an escalation. It is time for him to be fearful of what we might do.

The only way to get Putin to act in a way that may be able to save lives of Ukrainians is if he fears us more than we fear him, and the truth of the matter is that his military is exposed in Ukraine—bogged down, unfed, without fuel. They are in a very precarious position. He has got to think about what happens if he provokes us because they could be obliterated by the forces of NATO.

I would suggest that the continued—we have had this discussion now day after day after day of people from the State Department like yourself saying we are talking, we are considering.

This is war. People are dying. We need to get this aircraft immediately to the people of Ukraine. That is what they are asking for.

By the way, the idea that somehow we are calculating what is effective for them to run their war and that our Stingers and our Javelins are better than our aircraft, it makes no sense at all.

They are better at running their own war. They know what the conditions of the ground are. They are there. We are not. Further, our A–10s would help. We need to get them A–10s. That is the aircraft that is really ideally designed for this kind of warfare. Why are we dithering on that as well?

This makes no sense to me at all, and I would respectfully request that as you return to the State Department you indicate to them that we, this committee, deserve a response, because as Senator Shaheen has said, our caucuses—both sides of the aisle—are united on this. Get them the aircraft.

I would also note that I would anticipate that there are going to be some adjustments in our military strategy with regards to Moldova, Georgia, the Balkans.

What changes do you see with regards to arms and support going to other nations that Putin has his eyes on? Because it is now very clear, I think, to the entire world that this is a person who is trying to reestablish the old, if you will, boundaries of the Soviet Union and bring more and more nations under his control, and that is unacceptable.

What has happened in Ukraine could spread to other places. What do we do militarily to prepare them for or to make them less vulnerable to his attack?

Ms. LEWIS. Senator Romney, thank you for that question and for your leadership on this issue.

We have been thinking through exactly this question that you are raising, which is how to make sure the Eastern Flank is shored up.

One of the things I know is that in the CR that, I think, is moving quickly there is about another $200 million in presidential drawdown authority and then, I think, when the final appropriations passes another significant—potentially, billions, and we want to——

Senator ROMNEY. I was going to say these are small numbers, very small numbers for helping these nations defend themselves.

Ms. LEWIS. I think the good news is there are bigger numbers in the appropriations bill—the Omni. I know there is over $3 billion there in presidential drawdown assistance and another $500 million in foreign military funds, and we can use those funds as well for the Eastern Flank countries.

We have already started working on exactly what their needs are to make sure that they are shored up and I think lessons learned from this conflict will apply in terms of both training and the type of equipment they need.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I did read somewhere that—I do not know if it is Moldova now looking for arms, and we need to have a discussion with them as to what they think they need or not, but I agree with the senator.

Senator Van Hollen.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank both of you for your testimony today.

Assistant Secretary Karlin, you have written a book on the challenges of building militaries in fragile states.

I chair the Africa Subcommittee, and perhaps there is no other area where those challenges are greater, especially with respect to the Sahel region, which has seen seven successful or attempted coups in just the last 18 months, and that is despite an influx of U.S. security assistance funds.

In fact, the military officers alleged to have received U.S.-funded training have been implicated in several of these coups.

Now, I am historically and still a supporter of the IMET program, but if you look at the sort of oversight on some of these countries and IMET programs over the years, you find big shortcomings.

Back in 2011, a GAO report found that civil-military relations was identified as a priority for IMET training in only one-third of the most repressive African states.

More recently, in 2019, a GAO report found, "DoD does not systematically track human rights training, including civil-military relations," and as a result, GAO could not fully report on this in 2019.

My question is pretty simple. You would agree that it is not a good idea for the United States to be providing training to people who then turn around and use that training to engage in military coups, right?

Dr. KARLIN. Senator, I very much share your concern about the examples that you raised and, indeed, our training emphasizes the need for the appropriate role of the military in society.

When these sorts of events do occur, as you know, we immediately consult with our colleagues at the State Department to pause and——

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Right. What have you done since 2019 specifically to both provide greater reporting that indicates it is a priority and do you dispute the 2011 finding that it is not a priority in many of your programs?

Dr. KARLIN. Senator, thank you for raising this issue. We have, indeed, focused in particular on lessons learned so that when these events happen we can step back and try to figure out why did they occur, what do we need to do.

What we have also seen with our IMET training, as you highlighted, is that it often leads to leaders of the military, say, chiefs of defense or service chiefs. Indeed, I think there is more than 1,100 international PME alumni who have served in those roles.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Madam Assistant Secretary, I am not disputing the overall benefits of the IMET program. Back in the 1980s, I used to write justifications for the IMET program at the Defense—what was then the Defense Security Assistance Agency.

I am not disputing the overall value of the program, but clearly a program that at least is applied to countries in Africa ends up training people who then engage in military coups, that cannot be defined as a success.

I am going to ask you beyond this hearing to get back to us with specifically what additional measures you are taking to address the shortcomings that were identified in both the 2011 and 2009 GAO reports. Is that all right?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you, Senator. I would welcome doing so.

I would just say, broadly, one of the things that has become clear to us is that we cannot take an Excel spreadsheet approach to how we do security cooperation and I think the examples you are highlighting really exemplify that.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. No, I appreciate that.

Now, the IMET program is subject to the Leahy Law disclosure and reporting requirements and human rights requirements, but we also provide forms of security assistance in an operational setting under Section 127(e) of Title 10. Would you agree that with respect to those engagements we should also vet them to ensure that the participants have not engaged previously in gross violations of human rights?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you for raising this issue, Senator. Indeed, as you say, Leahy vetting is not required. However, there is a security vetting process that this does go through.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Would you have any objection if we applied a Leahy Law vetting requirement subject to a waiver?

Dr. KARLIN. I would welcome working with my colleagues at the State Department to look at this issue.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Okay, because we are working with some of our colleagues in the House right now and submitted an amendment to the last NDAA. It was not adopted, but I look forward to working with you and your colleagues at the State Department as well on this issue because I think, given the track record, especially in the Sahel, we have more questions than answers at this point.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Young.

Senator YOUNG. Thank you, Chairman.

I have seen reports in the press that Putin's invasion of Ukraine has prompted a further delay in internal assessment of the much-anticipated National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.

Now, I recognize the realities of our current security environment and I understand that those realities sometimes intervene in the policy planning process, but we cannot permit Vladimir Putin's reckless actions to undermine our long-term strategic imperatives in the Indo-Pacific.

Ms. Karlin, as the official responsible for developing the NDS and matching ends with means, can you commit that changes to our strategy in Europe will not undermine both our commitments

to Taiwan and our efforts to increase their resistance to the Chinese Communist Party's pressure, including their defensive military capabilities?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much for raising this issue, Senator.

I cannot speak to the National Security Strategy, but on the National Defense Strategy, I can assure you that we have been working very hard at it and, indeed, thanks to the tremendous work of the U.S. intelligence community, we have been all quite cognizant of Russia's aggression in Europe for months now, in fact.

I can also assure you that, as Secretary Austin has said, China is the pacing challenge for the U.S. Department of Defense. We are, of course, accounting for Russian aggression as well.

Finally, regarding support for Taiwan, it is absolutely a priority to ensure that Taiwan is getting the asymmetric capabilities that it needs that is most appropriate for the challenge that it faces.

Thank you.

Senator YOUNG. I could not agree more. Thank you for your response.

I was encouraged to hear the President recently emphasize the need for bolstering Taiwan's defenses through the use of asymmetric weapons, including Harpoon weapons—the anti-ship weapons. That seems appropriate to me. We need to move more in that direction is my assessment.

As a further means of follow up, we are a decade removed from the so-called pivot to Asia. It has been—to a great extent it has been a rhetorical pivot, but some very concrete initiatives have taken place.

It is clear that resources did not fully pursue the strategy—did not follow the strategy, especially with respect to security assistance, though.

Ms. Lewis, how are you prioritizing the flow of security assistance to the Indo-Pacific and fixing the imbalance that currently exists between how we support partners in East Asia versus partners in other regions?

Ms. LEWIS. First of all, Senator Young, thank you for that question, and I do think, as you point out, that we really need to focus on our security assistance to the Indo-Pacific—to the region.

Let me answer your question specifically. One of the challenges that we have, which I pointed out in my initial testimony, is most—I think it is 93 percent—of our funding is actually earmarked in the FMF category, which gives us little flexibility to make those kinds of changes. Again, something we are happy to work with you on.

What I would say is I look at this from, I want to highlight, three different ways to look at this. One is Taiwan specifically, and I think, as you know, our support remains rock solid.

We have provided $18 billion to Taiwan since 2017 in security assistance and then an additional through commercial sales, which are—we regulate commercial sales in my bureau—another $2.3 billion to Taiwan since 2017, and very focused on the asymmetric weapons you are talking about, which we can talk about in more detail.

I think we both have to focus on the Indo-Pacific and the whole region, developing additional partnerships with Japan, who purchased the F–35—the Philippines, Vietnam, also AUKUS.

Then the last piece, which I would be remiss in not mentioning, is I actually think as we look at China as the pacing challenge, we also need to look at countries in Africa and in Latin America to deepen and strengthen our security relationships there because China is focused on those regions as well.

Senator YOUNG. Indeed. You mentioned—it is a sobering figure—93 percent of FMS assistance is earmarked. Not a lot of flexibility there. Every Administration wants more flexibility. Every congressional body wants more of a say.

Do we need to just increase the top line? Could that be a solution?

Ms. LEWIS. In addition, that could be a solution.

Senator YOUNG. Okay. Thank you.

Senator CARDIN [presiding]. Chairman Menendez will be back in a moment so I have the gavel. I will recognize myself.

Secretary Lewis, it is great to see you back in our committee.

Dr. Karlin, welcome. Wonderful to have both of you before us.

I listened to the exchanges in regards to the fighter jets. I raised that issue with Secretary Nuland during our hearing on Ukraine itself, and my request is please keep us informed as to how this process is unfolding.

You see the concern on both sides of the aisle to make sure that we do everything we can to help the Ukrainians defend themselves.

My request is that you provide us timely information—if it needs to be in a classified setting, in a classified setting—as to how we can make sure that we provide everything we possibly can either directly or through our allies to help the Ukrainians in their moment of need, and timely action is critically important.

I want to go to a subject that both of you talked about and that is that human rights is the bedrock centerpiece of our security assistance goals.

Both of you mentioned that in your opening statements, but we did not talk too much in specifics. I would add to that we want to make sure that our security assistance is not used to further corruption in corrupt regimes, and then also, of course, we had the Leahy rules in regards to requirements in regards to assistance.

Secretary Lewis, can you just tell us how the Biden administration is carrying out that commitment, that in our security assistance our values in promoting human rights and good governance, anti-corruption, are being advanced?

Ms. LEWIS. Senator, thank you for this question, and I know that you personally have worked on this issue for your entire time in Congress and really have played a leadership role here in the Senate.

I want to walk through a few things and then take a minute specifically to talk more about security sector governance, which I really highlight in my written testimony in more detail.

As you know, the Administration is putting together a new conventional arms transfer policy, which is the policy that governs the work of the whole interagency on security assistance and coopera-

tion, and what we are including in that is a renewed focus on human rights.

I think this is absolutely critical and reflective of the President's commitment, and so we look forward to working with you and briefing you on the details of that as that moves forward. One, we have got to get the policy governing it right.

The second thing I really want to focus on is security sector governance and the reason why, which you highlight, is to me, security sector governance—it is the core of bringing together democracy, anti-corruption, human rights, and it is the reason I focused on it so much in my testimony.

If we are working with security sectors, if we are working with the ministry of defense, and through our training, our cooperation, we include simple things like working on procurement, which reduces corruption, making sure that it has integrated—human rights and the rule of law are integrated into the training they receive from us and that it builds into their entire security sector, not just one or two people, that human rights are part of the discussion from the beginning, middle, and end.

I think this is a real need for us to shift our focus in this way. I have only been here 4 or 5 months, but I have already tasked my team to looking at this and developing it further.

The last piece I would say on this is for the State Department to do security sector governance right and for PM to do that right and for us to get human rights and anti-corruption right we have to be working with USAID, the Justice Department, and other parts of the State Department because what we are talking about is all of those pieces working together trying to create rule of law, respect for human rights, and good governance in a country, and so that also requires coordination.

Senator CARDIN. Dr. Karlin, I want to just drill down a little bit on what Secretary Lewis is saying. I recognize the sincerity of our Commander-in-Chief on this issue. He talks about it frequently. Secretary Blinken has talked about this frequently.

In the Department of Defense, I do not challenge the Secretary's commitment on the subject, but it is tough to get the players to recognize that good governance, human rights, are a priority when they are dealing with a more narrow focus objective that may have a military aspect to it and they do not focus on the human rights or governance factor.

How can you show leadership to make sure that we do carry out our commitment to human rights and good governance as part of our security assistance program?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you for raising this issue, Senator, and for your leadership on it.

Look, it is not just the right thing to do. It is critical to the efficacy of our efforts so it has to be central.

I can assure you that we have emphasized that throughout the Defense Department, and when we are talking with partners with whom these are very real concerns, I can very much pledge to you this is always on the agenda and we are always raising it, again, because it is not just the right thing to do, it actually has a direct relationship to the efficacy of what we are all trying to achieve.

Thank you.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you.

Senator Rounds.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to both of you for being here with us today.

I think I am going to begin my questioning with Dr. Karlin. It is good to see you again.

I want to explore a little bit more the issue in Ukraine and what the options really are for us to provide additional assistance. My concern is I think there is a real desire on the part of a lot of the members here in Congress, me included, to provide as much additional assistance as possible to Ukraine.

Clearly, the attacks on their country are—there is no reason for it. They are the innocent victim of an attack by Putin who is, clearly, in the wrong, and the human atrocities that are there are something which the American people simply are frustrated with, angered by, and, as usual, want to do something about.

Yet, at the same time, we recognize that we have a nuclear-armed aggressor and we have to be well aware of that as we make decisions about how to proceed.

One of the items that has been discussed is the possibility of using Polish MiG-29s and they, as a member of NATO, have what are now—and I think this is fair to say—equipment which is designed to fight on behalf of NATO.

I recognize that we are in an unclassified session and so the answers back and forth may be a little bit broader than what we would like to have, but I think it is important for the American public to hear and our colleagues to hear the challenges that we have in getting those, first of all, into the appropriate hands and, second of all, protecting them and making them effective.

Dr. Karlin, can we walk through this a little bit in terms of just the logistics of what it takes to get a MiG-29 out of Poland, get it prepared, getting the pilots that would be Ukrainian to be able to get them somewhere and then to find locations within Ukraine in which they could safely land, be equipped to attack, find the appropriate equipment or weapon systems, and then the command and control to get it to where they could actually be effective?

Can you talk us through that a little bit, please?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Senator. It is good to see you again, and I really appreciate all of your cooperation and leadership in all of us together being able to support Ukraine in, really, this unprecedented way.

I would just underscore, as we all know, that there is only one man who is responsible for the despicable and horrific situation that we are seeing in Ukraine and that is Mr. Putin.

I really appreciate your point on this issue of these MiGs and, of course, it is a sovereign decision by Poland. We have had many, many discussions with them and with other allies on it, but exactly as you highlighted, there is a whole lot of logistics that would have to happen should Poland wish to transfer them, again, should they wish to do so. It is up to them, rather, than of course them going through us.

We are really focused on what Ukraine's military can use today immediately on the field and, frankly, we are seeing the extraor-

dinary impact of that paired with the Ukrainian people's extraordinary willingness to fight against this horrific Russian aggression.

Senator ROUNDS. Look, let me drill down to this a little bit because I think there is ways to work it through that if they wanted to deliver it to another base that we had, that is one thing that I do not have an objection to that.

I am concerned about the actual logistics, the time frames that we are talking about to prepare the aircraft to actually be able to be used there and the equipment that would go with it—the systems, the weapon systems that would be identified, and then protecting those MiG-29s once we got there.

Are you aware of airports that are currently in a position to receive them and do we have the ground assets to protect those? Does Ukraine have the ground assets to protect those aircraft once they are in Ukraine?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you. While I cannot speak to kind of specific bases, what I can tell you is that right now, today, Ukraine's air force does have several squadrons of mission capable aircraft, but we really have not seen that playing a massive role in the conflict.

What we have seen is what they have been doing on air defense. That has really helped them have a pretty major impact on Russia's efforts to contest this airspace.

Senator ROUNDS. I just think it is important that we do everything we can in an efficient manner and deliver whatever weapon systems we possibly can to help Ukrainians in their fight against this Russian aggression, and if it means that we can get these in in an expedited manner, that would be great. It would be a really good thing.

At the same time, if there are other weapon systems that may need to be delivered that could have more effect I think we should do that as well as quickly as possible, but thank you very much for the discussion.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Murphy.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me, first, just associate myself with the comments and, I think, a question that you posed in the opening round, and I will not initially have a question on this because I am not sure that we can get a lot of helpful input from our panel on this question. The decision is much—is made at a slightly higher pay grade than those that are testifying here today.

This transition of security assistance away from the Department of State to the Department of Defense is certainly something that this committee needs to be aware of and care deeply about.

According to one study, the DoD manages 48 of the 50 new security assistance programs that were created after the 9/11 attacks, and out of the 107 existing security assistance programs today, DoD manages 87—a whopping 81 percent of those programs. That is a fundamental transition from the way in which we used to manage security assistance.

My worry is that it takes out of the equation the people who have the clearest and most important visibility on the ground as

to the impact of that security assistance and those transfers, and so I join with the chairman in raising concerns.

As for this question of the transfer of MiGs that has been raised by a number of colleagues here, I will put up my bona fides supporting Ukraine's sovereignty against anybody's. I have been there as many times as anybody on this committee.

At the same time, I do think we need to recognize the extraordinary moment that we are in today. Never before has the United States and Russia been in this close military conduct, whether it was Afghanistan or Czechoslovakia or Hungary.

When Russian forces during the Cold War moved into sovereign nations, the United States in those instances did not overtly support the forces fighting on the other side.

Now, you can claim that was a mistake, but this is an unprecedented moment, and I think the Administration is wise to make sure that we are providing support to Ukraine based on whether or not it supports the outcomes we seek to achieve, which is an end to the war, rather than just in service of blind escalation or momentum.

I appreciate the thought that the Administration is putting into this question of how and if we flow MiG fighter jets or other very expensive advanced systems.

In the very small time I have left, I do want to ask one question and that is one that I do not know that has been covered here, which is we just spent $87 billion in military assistance over 20 years in Afghanistan and the army that we supported went up in smoke overnight.

That is an extraordinary waste of U.S. taxpayer dollars and it mirrors a smaller, but similar investment we made from 2003 to 2014 in the Iraqi military, who disintegrated when they faced the prospect of a fight against ISIS.

Clearly, there is something very wrong with the way in which we are flowing military assistance to partner countries, especially in complicated war zones.

I have got a minute and 10 seconds, so maybe you can just preview some lessons that we have learned or the process by which we are going to learn lessons from all of the money that we have wasted in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ms. LEWIS. Senator, I will be brief so that Dr. Karlin can jump in as well.

I think we do need to learn lessons. We need to make sure, as I was just saying to Senator Cardin, that when we provide security assistance we also look not just at train and equip, but we look at other things like how the ministries of defense operate, is there security sector governance, are we creating an infrastructure that is going to actually work.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you for raising this issue, Senator, and I can assure you that the Department of Defense is in the process of commissioning a study on this exact issue.

I will just say, in line with Assistant Secretary Lewis, it is really important that when we look at these efforts we spend time assessing political will and we do not take an Excel spreadsheet approach to building partner militaries.

That misses the higher order issues that are deeply relevant to security sector governance that will fundamentally show us the extent to which we can, ultimately, be successful or not with a partner.

Thank you.

Senator MURPHY. In Iraq, the last time I was there we were spending four times as much money on security assistance as we were on nonsecurity assistance, and what Afghanistan taught us, amongst many things, is that if you have a fundamentally corrupt government then all the money you are flowing into the military is likely wasted in the end because that government cannot stand unless the military cannot stand.

It also speaks to rebalancing the way in which we put money into conflict zones to not think that military assistance alone does the job. You have got to be building sustainable governments that serve the public interests in order to make your security assistance matter and be effective.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Hagerty.

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Murphy, I would like to follow up on the question you raised with Assistant Secretary Lewis, but before that I would just like to reach out to Assistant Secretary Karlin to follow up on Senator Rounds' questions.

As I observed the situation with Poland's offer to transfer MiG-29s, initially, Secretary Blinken greenlighted that and then we saw the Department of Defense walk that back.

My request of you would be that if there is new intelligence, if there is a new assessment, if you could arrange to work with this committee in the appropriate setting to share with us what is driving that decision.

I understand there are a number of operational and logistical considerations that must be relevant, but I would appreciate your help in getting that information, again, in an appropriate setting to us so I can understand how we can have such a difference of opinion occur or a difference in direction, I should say, occur in such a short period.

To Senator Murphy's point, Assistant Secretary Lewis, you and I have worked a great deal on this topic and that is foreign military sales. Certain of our allies are very important partners.

When I served as ambassador to Japan, I put a great deal of time into this, working not only with the DoD, the State Department, the Department of Commerce, but also with the United States Senate, trying to find ways to accelerate the time line for foreign military sales.

What I learned when I was serving in my previous role is that the time line is far too long to get our allies equipped with the latest technology that they would desire to have and that we would desire for them to have.

Given the rate of technology development that is occurring right now, these time lines that are denominated in years are far too long and the bureaucratic paperwork consumes more than the production time, typically, to get this done.

Again, Assistant Secretary Lewis, you and I have talked a great deal about this. I would be very interested to have you highlight for us the major areas where you think we could work together to compress this time line to make ourselves more interoperable with our allies to get more leverage out of our own investment in military defense technology because our allies are going to be more interoperable and more capable if we can get this done faster.

Ms. LEWIS. Senator, I really appreciate the question and, frankly, your leadership on this has been extraordinary and I appreciate the time we have gotten to spend together on this. I am going to tick through a few things, and happy to discuss in more detail.

We really learned some lessons from the work you did in Japan, frankly, which was, number one, we have got to make sure that our two systems are working together and what we discovered in Japan and what we see in other places is sometimes we literally have things that sound mundane, but really make big differences. Different procurement time lines—we have got to get those lined up.

The second thing we have to do is make sure that we have the security agreements in place so that when we are ready to move things are ready to go.

The third piece, which, I think, we are going to need to work on over time is, really, looking at the time lines both as things move through DoD. There is a long time line in sort of the upfront process. We have worked very hard to improve the time lines on our side and I know often we are able to move things much more quickly, depending on the system.

Then, finally, as you talked about and we talked about previously, we are working with our companies who right now are facing some—there are some real production time line challenges. Some of that is due to COVID. Some of that we need to continue to work with them on.

Senator HAGERTY. I appreciate that. I think, given the fact that we are about to vote on a significant military budget, we need to be looking for every opportunity we possibly can to increase the efficiency of how our budget is deployed and, again, opportunities to leverage our military expenditures with our allies so that they are as interoperable as they possibly can be so that they have the latest technology that they are equipped to operate.

I think that increases our broader footprint. The example in Ukraine and our need to work with our partners could not be more glaring, and I very much appreciate the effort that you and your team have put forward.

Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Lewis.

Ms. LEWIS. Thank you, sir.

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Is there any other—no? Okay. Let me close.

Secretary Karlin, let me go back. You have now, in various answers to members' questions, alluded to the fact that Ukraine has several squadrons. I understand a squadron to be anywhere between 12 and 24 aircraft.

If there are several squadrons, are you suggesting that the Ukrainians have aircraft that they are not presently using?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

What I am focusing on is that the materiel we have given Ukraine to help protect its population is, quite literally, being used every day and that is really what we are trying to prioritize. Those systems that we are seeing are having this effect and that they are immediately able to get out into the field.

As you know, many of our allies have also given assistance and those are, of course, sovereign decisions.

The CHAIRMAN. With all due respect, you have perfected the nonanswer so let me try again. The only thing is that I have endless time so we will get to an answer that is responsive.

You said, in answer to several members' questions, Ukraine has several squadrons of aircraft. Now, that would imply that they have aircraft that they are not using.

Is that a correct or incorrect statement?

Dr. KARLIN. I think it is probably better to get that answer from Ukraine. I would not want to speak, of course, for a sovereign government, but we have not seen them employing those aircraft to the extent that one might suggest.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Because even though we do not expect you to speak for a sovereign government, we have our own intelligence. You have your own assessments, and this is not—Putin understands what they have and do not have and what they are using and not using so we are not giving away anything that is truly classified, at the end of the day. How many squadrons do they have, to our knowledge?

Dr. KARLIN. They have several squadrons. I do not know that I am best suited to give you the specifics beyond that.

The CHAIRMAN. Is several two? Three? Four?

Dr. KARLIN. It is a handful. I do not know that I am best suited to give you more beyond that. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Here is the problem. Either there is a very good reason that the Administration needs to explain as to why we should not be facilitating fighter jets to Ukraine so they can defend themselves over the air space—if that happens to be that they have dozens of fighter jets that they are not using and then we get to the heart of why they are not using it, then that might be an explanation. If they need some type of logistical support to take the aircraft that they have to put into space that might be another answer.

Both of your departments need to give us an insight. If that has to be in a classified setting, so be it, but it has to have an insight. There has to be an answer. Nonanswers to questions are not answers. Do we understand each other?

Ms. LEWIS. Yes. We will take that back, Senator. We certainly appreciate the questions that you are asking and the insight that you need to have into——

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Karlin, do we understand each other?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Senator. Yes, and as Assistant Secretary Lewis said, we will take back your concerns.

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—Dr. Karlin's response to the Chairman's request was given during a classified briefing.]

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. When you take back my concerns, I would like to get an answer to my concerns.

Senator HAGERTY. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to associate myself with your comments, too, and say that I would very much——

The CHAIRMAN. This committee has jurisdiction over arms sales. I do not like using that jurisdiction in a way that does not facilitate our foreign policy and national interest and security, but if I cannot get answers to the fundamental questions, then I will.

There may be a perfectly valid and good reason I think all of us should know so we can pivot to something else, but if there is no perfectly valid and good reason, then we need to know that, too.

Secretary Lewis, do you agree that U.S. security assistance needs a comprehensive strategy for each recipient country, integrating all relevant aspects of U.S. security and foreign assistance?

Ms. LEWIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If so, then do you agree that the State Department is the right agency to lead and coordinate those efforts?

Ms. LEWIS. Yes, and, obviously, in coordination with other departments.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Let us talk about that. Within State, for example, there are bureaus and offices that also do security assistance of various sorts. I am not convinced that they are all coordinated with your particular department.

Should there not be an overall coordination to oversee and integrate State's various programs as well as those of other agencies like DoD and USAID?

Ms. LEWIS. Senator, I agree that we need to make sure that we are coordinated and, as you point out, there are other parts of the State Department that work on these issues.

Right now, we are regularly interacting with them. They weigh in, give opinions as we work through sales, as we work on all of these issues, but happy to discuss further with you if you have additional ideas on improving coordination.

The CHAIRMAN. We do. Do you feel that your position is empowered to do that or should it fall to (T)?

Ms. LEWIS. I am not going to comment here where I think that should fall. Obviously, (T) as you know, is the under secretary who oversees my bureau. I think our bureau does an excellent job at what we do.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. We are going to follow it up with you because we think that there is better coordination to be had.

How is State and DoD's cooperation on DoD Section 333 programs and other security assistance programs?

Ms. LEWIS. I would say we have excellent coordination. We work really hand-in-glove with them. I would say that as we look at the increases in funding that are going to be coming, we need to make sure that we have a workforce that is large enough and trained enough to deal with these increases coming our way.

The CHAIRMAN. Does State have the ability to veto or significantly alter DoD's assistance programs in planning or in implementation if it feels that significant foreign policy priorities are not being appropriately reflected?

Ms. LEWIS. We do have that authority, yes. Let me clarify. Over some of the programs where we have concurrence, we have that authority.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Okay. Have authority. Do you have the ability?

Ms. LEWIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes? Okay. Let me ask one last round of questions on—that are focused on human rights.

A 2019 Government Accountability Office—GAO—report found shortcomings in tracking and evaluating human rights-related training for foreign security forces that are required under DoD Section 333—required—State's international military education and training and other security assistance and security cooperation authorities.

Some prior GAO reports have also found inconsistent implementation of required Leahy Law human rights vetting processes for security assistance recipients.

How, if at all, have State and DoD improved implementation of these statutory requirements?

Ms. LEWIS. I am glad you raised this issue because this is one of the things that I have been focused on since arriving at the Department. We have worked to improve these processes.

One of the ways as, I think, you know is we coordinate with the bureau that also oversees human rights to make sure that when we are supplying the security assistance that is provided that has to be vetted under the Leahy Law that we are tracking, making sure we know if there are units that have issues and making sure that the funding would not go to them.

I think we have seen improvements. There is always more to do and I will continue to be focused on that.

The CHAIRMAN. DoD?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you for raising this, Mr. Chairman.

I would absolutely align myself with Assistant Secretary Lewis' comments. We are indeed making a lot of progress to ensure that we are tracking, and the moment that we see anything concerning either with a unit or with an individual we are immediately stepping back to try to understand what is happening and if we do need to, ultimately, pause or suspend such cooperation.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you both evaluated the effectiveness of human rights training?

Ms. LEWIS. That is something we are looking at right now. I think one of the things—to go back to my opening statement, I think human rights training is important in and of itself, but it also has to be broader than that, and that is why I am focused on this question of security sector governance.

It is not just about the training that we provide for individuals or individual units. It has to be part of the entire way the ministry of defense operates.

Dr. KARLIN. Mr. Chairman, I would completely agree with Assistant Secretary Lewis' comments. It is not just that human rights operating appropriately for a military in that vein is nice to have. Frankly, it is directly related to that military's effectiveness.

If a population cannot trust its military to treat it appropriately, it is probably not going to feel comfortable with how its military is exerting its sovereignty over its territory.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Then, finally, my understanding from the testimony I heard here today, partly in response to answers, is that the United States and—the United States believes that Taiwan should be focused on acquiring more asymmetric military capabilities to offset Chinese military superiority, should it invade, rather than acquiring more conventional military weapon systems. Is that a correct statement?

Ms. LEWIS. Senator, I am very much glad you raised that issue. I think the lessons learned and we are continuing to learn from Ukraine is exactly that. What we believe is that Taiwan needs to focus, and let me define asymmetric. It needs to be cost-effective, mobile, resilient, and decentralized defensive systems.

I think we have seen those used to great effect in Ukraine. We are looking at things like ISR systems, short-range air defense systems, naval sea mines, and coastal defense and cruise missiles.

The other piece I would add to that is what we call reserve reform, which, really, what we have seen in Ukraine is the population has to be ready to fight.

Obviously, we do not want there to be a conflict in Taiwan, but what they are doing is taking steps to address this issue.

They have just created the establishment of an all-out defense mobilization organization and they are working with our National Guard as they develop this program.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the United States and Taiwan have a shared understanding in operational definition for asymmetric?

Ms. LEWIS. We are working on that with them today. I think we have a much deeper understanding of that right now.

The CHAIRMAN. That is critical if we are going to have a combined understanding of what asymmetric means.

Doctor, what was the last time the Department of Defense and the Taiwan MND undertook a joint assessment of its needs?

Dr. KARLIN. Mr. Chairman, I cannot give you the exact date, but I can assure you there are very regular consultations on this exact topic so that we can help them ensure that they are most appropriately building a military tailored to the threat that we all see.

As Assistant Secretary Lewis said, I think the situation we are seeing in Ukraine right now is a very worthwhile case study for them about why Taiwan needs to do all it can to build asymmetric capabilities to get its population ready so that it can be as prickly as possible should China choose to violate its sovereignty.[1]

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether any such meetings have taken place this year?

Dr. KARLIN. Mr. Chairman, I cannot speak to that. That would——

The CHAIRMAN. Would you respond to that for the record for me?

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[1] At the conclusion of the hearing, the Department of Defense requested that "sovereignty" be changed to "territorial integrity."

Dr. KARLIN. I would be glad to. It is another part of our Department, but I would be glad to get you that exact answer after this hearing.

Thank you.

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—Dr. Karlin's response to the Chairman's request was given during a classified briefing.]

The CHAIRMAN. Lastly, Secretary Lewis, the Safeguarding Human Rights in Arms Export, or SAFEGUARD Act, that I introduced last year with a half dozen of my colleagues would update the Arms Export Control Act to ensure that human rights are given proper consideration in arms exports and that such exports are monitored to ensure they are not used for human rights abuses.

Do you know if the Department of State supports that objective?

Ms. LEWIS. I think we definitely support the objective and happy to work with you as you continue to develop that legislation and the other legislation you are working on.

The CHAIRMAN. I would look forward to that opportunity.

With that, and seeing no other members before the committee seeking recognition, this hearing's record will remain open until the close of business on Friday, March 11. Please ensure that questions for the record are submitted no later than tomorrow.

With the thanks of the committee for your service—Senator Hagerty?

Senator HAGERTY. Mr. Chairman, just less than a minute if I might add to your point on Taiwan and Taiwan's military capabilities, particularly in the asymmetrical area.

This is evolving rapidly. We are seeing with Ukraine the need and the desire to have our friends and allies equipped sooner than later, and as we see the threat continue to mount from China, I would encourage you to, again, put the notion of speed that we have talked about, Secretary Lewis, into your thought process—Dr. Karlin as well. We need to move quickly and not to be looking at this in hindsight, but to be prepared.

Again, if we can include in our conversations, moving forward, Assistant Secretary Lewis, how we will incorporate that, particularly with the focus on Taiwan I would appreciate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

With the thanks of the committee for your service and your testimony and looking forward to the responses to some of those things, both for the record and otherwise, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF MS. JESSICA LEWIS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Afghanistan: The swift collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), which received nearly $90 billion in U.S. training and equipment over two decades, has prompted much speculation about the U.S. strategies and policies that preceded the collapse. Numerous sources contend that conflicting directives, the prioritization of short-term tactical gains, the lack of an integrated U.S. policy, and poor U.S. understanding of social, cultural, and political contexts in Afghanistan contributed to undermining U.S. security assistance from the onset.

Other observers have found that U.S. security assistance overemphasized tactical skills and neglected strategic-level expertise, forced the ANDSF to be heavily reliant on airpower and technology that Afghans could not maintain independently, and excluded Afghan involvement or input in equipping decisions.

How is the ANDSF collapse changing the way the United States conducts security assistance?

Answer. The collapse of the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces illustrated that security sector assistance alone cannot overcome or 'fix' underlying structural or political challenges. Rather, it must be part of a broader effort alongside lines of effort in the areas of justice, democratization, economic growth, countering corruption, and addressing stakeholder equities and concerns across the political spectrum. It is not enough to build defense institutions in tandem with "train and equip" missions; security sector governance must be the pacesetter. We are working to operationalize a more governance-centered approach to security assistance through strategic-level advisory support, and better risk assessments—especially with regards to the foreign policy risks posed by weak governance and the potential for elite capture of the security sector—and continuous, strategic-level monitoring and evaluation frameworks.

Question. What oversight requirements might ensure Congress is better informed of the capabilities and weaknesses of other major U.S. security assistance recipients?

Answer. PM values its close relationship with the Committee and is happy to provide briefings on security assistance programs as questions or concerns arise. We recognize the value of strong monitoring and evaluation, but also acknowledge the challenges, given the complexities and interagency aspects of many programs. PM has strong program-level monitoring and evaluation, including through annual Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education Training Reports (with targeted bilateral/regional assessments) and ongoing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of individual programs such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative and Conventional Weapons Destruction programs.

We are working to operationalize a strategic-level monitoring and evaluation framework by developing a diagnostic tool to holistically assess our partners' security sectors and evaluate the long-term contributions of the Bureau's activities to foreign policy outcomes—an important complement to our program-level monitoring and evaluation efforts.

We also have ongoing discussions with DoD colleagues about improving data-sharing, a common operating picture on assistance resources and outputs, and shared approaches to M&E. It is a work in progress, but with commitment on both sides demonstrated through joint planning activities and collaborative forums such as the interagency M&E community of interest. Ensuring the Department has the resources and personnel to support such initiatives is important to sustain momentum.

Question. To what extent are other U.S. partners as reliant as the ANDSF on U.S. intelligence, air power, and contracted logistics support?

Answer. The United States provides a wide range and variety of intelligence, surveillance, logistics and other support, based on the capabilities and requirements of our partners. For more information, I would refer you to the Department of Defense.

Question. Given this history, what are the main lessons you, personally, have learned from the failure of U.S. security assistance programs in Afghanistan? How will you seek to take those lessons and best practices and instill them in other security assistance efforts?

Answer. Our experience in Afghanistan shows how important it is to focus on long-term sustainment to ensure partner forces can achieve greater self-sufficiency in a reasonable amount of time. This long-term success requires fully integrating programs that build capacity and resilience in parallel sectors beyond just the military, such as the economic, health, education, agricultural, justice, and governance sectors. Government legitimacy and the respect for human rights and inclusivity must grow alongside military development, so that communities from across the political spectrum feel they have a stake in the existing political process.

Afghanistan also shows that we cannot defer anti-corruption efforts in the security sector until after we build security force capacity through train and equip programs. If we don't address both needs concurrently, we risk institutionalizing corruption in the security sector and undermining legitimacy and defeating our long-term security objectives.

Consequently, I am working to elevate security sector governance as a central consideration in U.S. security cooperation and assistance planning and treat long-term institutional capacity building as our primary mission. Implementing the new *U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption* and methodically assessing the risks to and effectiveness of U.S. Government security sector assistance activities are both important to this effort.

Question. Strategic Competition with China and Russia: How have State and DoD aligned or realigned resources and activities toward strategic competition with China and Russia, outside of Ukraine?

Answer. Security assistance and security cooperation are vital tools in the context of strategic competition, helping the United States realize broader foreign policy goals and enabling our unparalleled network of allies and partners to address shared threats. We align resources to help front line partners enhance their defensive capabilities and deter aggression from strategic competitors. State Department and DoD actively align resources through EUCOM and the Countering Russian Influence Fund in Europe, and INDOPACOM and the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative in the Indo-Pacific. Through various regional assistance accounts, arms transfers, and global initiatives, such as the Countering Chinese Influence Fund, we are working to counter coercive and corrupt practices by building good governance, interoperability, institutional capacity, and strengthening security relationships with partners to help strengthen U.S. force posture and maintain the international rules-based order.

Question. How is U.S. security assistance countering China in the Indo-Pacific?

Answer. The State Department's security assistance in the Indo-Pacific strengthens our partners' ability to maintain their territorial integrity, effectively govern the maritime domain, and respond to emerging threats. Funding for this region has increased significantly in previous years, and in FY 2020, Congress included a new appropriation for the global Countering Chinese Influence Fund that continued in FY 2021. Currently, the principal recipients of the Department's security assistance in the South China Sea (SCS) are the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia. The SCS is of particular importance because of our defense treaty with the Philippines, close security partnerships with SCS claimant countries, as well as the vast volume of trade that transits its waters. The PRC's expansive and unlawful SCS maritime claims, continuing construction of, and improvements to, military facilities on reclaimed land in disputed areas, and other provocations and intimidation tactics severely undermine the rules-based maritime order.

U.S. Security cooperation offers a clear advantage to our partners in their transparency, the quality of the capabilities we offer, and the depth of the relationship that comes with them. As Secretary Blinken said in his July 2021 message to our diplomatic posts worldwide, our values and commitment to rights and freedom are a competitive advantage our adversaries and competitors cannot match.

As such, they are a key part of the toolkit in addressing strategic competition on a global basis. More broadly, building interoperability through existing defense trade relationships and export regulations is a key part of achieving our Indo-Pacific Strategy objectives, as well as deepening our overall defense and security relationships with regional allies and partners. Through our efforts to increase and strengthen security cooperation, we aim to optimize force posture, readiness, and interoperability with partners in furtherance of bolstering Indo-Pacific security. We will continue to maximize our security cooperation—to include security assistance—to demonstrate the reliability of the United States as a security partner and reassure allies and partners of our strong, sustained presence in the region.

Question. What, if any, lessons can be learned from nearly two decades of counterterrorism-focused security assistance activities?

Answer. The most valuable general lesson we have learned is that counterterrorism-focused security assistance works especially well when the beneficiaries demonstrate clear political will; when the assistance package is thoughtfully designed, focused on clear goals, and coordinated with interagency and international partners; and when the assistance activities are monitored closely, enabling adjustments as needed. Counterterrorism-focused security assistance has enabled security actors in beneficiary countries to protect U.S. interests, to save lives by preventing and disrupting terrorist attacks, to apprehend known and suspected terrorists, and to prevent terrorist travel.

We have also learned that good governance impacts the effectiveness and sustainability of partners' security sectors, whether in support of counterterrorism or broader security assistance activities. We have seen that over the longer term, states will not be able to deliver acceptable levels of security to their populations and safeguard

human rights unless their security forces can operate effectively and under democratic control—and even then, only within a broader context of political, economic, and even social reforms.

The United States is proficient at training and equipping partners in the fight against violent non-state actors, and at times this has helped those partners achieve short-term gains on the battlefield. But without the institutional capacity to sustain and deploy those capabilities—and without the backing of a national government worth preserving—those gains can dissipate or even unravel over the long-term—or, in the worst case, contribute to the militarization of political disagreements or even result in U.S. assistance being tainted by the behavior of bad actors.

We have also learned that security assistance provides only limited leverage in cases where partners' interests are not fundamentally aligned with those of the United States. Years of U.S. efforts to condition Pakistan's security assistance, for example, failed to change Islamabad's fundamental perception of the threats in its immediate neighborhood.

Security assistance still holds tremendous potential to advance our foreign policy by offering new avenues of access, influencing and assuring partners, strengthening their institutional capacity, and bolstering regional stability. However, we must continually assess how best to leverage this tool of statecraft effectively in the years ahead.

Question. What, if any, are the potential implications for scaling down counterterrorism-focused activities in Africa and the Middle East, especially as Russia and China increase their influence in those regions?

Answer. Our traditional security assistance programs provide flexibility in helping to address a range of security needs, including maintaining access and influence, countering terrorism, and competing against the increased engagement by Russia and China worldwide. However, countering terrorism remains a significant concern, and the Department continues to support counterterrorism capacity-building activities through our security assistance programs with many partners and is working with interagency partners to assess the implications of any reduction in counterterrorism-focused activities in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

Question. As we look across the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere we are increasingly seeing a tangible competition in terms of military presence and particular arms sales, notably from China. How do we balance our policy priorities with protecting U.S. technology and security?

Answer. The State Department considers multiple factors when determining whether a potential arms transfer is in the national interest and consistent with U.S. values. Transfers are assessed on a case-by-case basis, based on conditions at the time of the proposed transfer or sale. Considerations include the degree to which the transfer reduces the ally's or partner's dependence on U.S. competitors, the ability and willingness of the partner to protect U.S. technology, and the risk of diversion. Additionally, each review considers the recipient's history of compliance with end-use requirements, and whether the recipient maintains strong export controls and nonproliferation practices.

In an increasingly competitive environment, the U.S. Government and industry will need to balance the need to protect sensitive technologies with the risk of losing the opportunity to deepen security cooperation. The United States has long been the security cooperation partner of choice, and we must continue to pursue policies, processes, and regulatory changes that drive efficiencies in the security cooperation field and provide conventional capabilities to vetted partners in a timely manner.

We are doing in-depth thinking about the work we and industry need to do to innovate and improve our competitiveness. As an illustrative example, to better compete, we need to consider issues such as developing exportable versions of systems early in process. This could allow us to deepen security cooperation with partners in line with our national security interests and consistent with defense trade advocacy procedures.

Question. What are the potential risks and rewards of reorienting U.S. security assistance programs in Africa to focus on global power competition? What kinds of activities or policies might such an approach involve? What would define success in this context?

Answer. Along with traditional security assistance programs in Africa, PM currently has two programs focused specifically on addressing strategic competition: 1) programs under the Countering Chinese Influence Fund (CCIF) using Foreign Military Financing, and 2) the new Countering Strategic Competitors program funded with Peacekeeping Operations. There are risks to providing assistance solely focused on strategic competition, including with regard to the assumptions the United

States must make regarding our ability to influence decision-making in the partner's government and our ability to accurately measure that impact. Another risk is a partner engaging with strategic competitors simply to try and get USG funds. However, programs like CCIF have made resources available to undertake activities in countries to whom PM might not have traditionally provided resources, but are now open to working more closely with the United States. PM is committed to working with AF to take advantage of those opportunities where the resources can have an impact. Success in this context could be defined as the United States becoming the primary security partner of choice, or continuing to maintain as much influence and access as possible to be in a position to exploit any future opportunities.

Question. Africa: Over the last year and a half, coups have occurred in Mali, Chad, Guinea, and Burkina Faso. Successive administrations have funded robust security assistance programs in all of these countries. However, the Sahel is less stable now than ever; Extremist groups have multiplied and expanded, and recipient militaries, despite years of training, are still not capable of countering terrorist threats. Officers we trained in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea have overthrown their own democratically elected civilian governments and installed themselves as Heads of State.

Would you consider our security assistance programs in West Africa successful? Knowing that hindsight is always 20–20, are there things we could have done differently in the Sahel with regard to our security and counter-terrorism assistance?

Answer. The U.S. Government has been successful in providing West African countries with critical capabilities that contribute to their ability to degrade violent extremist groups in the region and to provide security for their citizens. The Department recognizes that the fight against violent extremists is multi-faceted, and progress is required in areas beyond security and counter-terrorism assistance, including with respect to good governance and economic opportunities. The Administration recognizes the importance of ensuring all U.S. Government programming in the Sahel is coordinated and complementary, such that security assistance is fully synchronized with other U.S. Government programs that address the drivers of armed conflict and violent extremism. The Department is working diligently to ensure that individual programming efforts are not planned and implemented in isolation, and that coordination processes within the Department and with the interagency are revitalized. The development of a 5-year interagency Sahel Strategy is intended to take a more balanced approach with respect to focusing on good governance, respect for human rights, and rule of law.

Question. Where has U.S. security assistance been most effective in Africa, and what situations have posted the greatest challenges? How can and should U.S. officials measure impact and effectiveness?

Answer. U.S. security assistance has been most effective in countries that want our assistance, are committed to truly partnering with the United States, and share our values of democracy and civilian control of the military; examples include Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, and Senegal. Additionally, by continuing to build long-term military-to-military relationships by bringing students through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs to the United States, we are helping to foster access to future military leaders. IMET graduates in countries that have not traditionally received much U.S. security assistance have been able to influence their militaries to expand cooperation with the United States.

U.S. security assistance is least effective in African countries where the U.S. the country is less interested in our assistance and where the U.S. is unwilling to provide the type of assistance that other countries might provide (such as operational support that Russia provides in the Central African Republic). However, even in those situations, it is important to continue to provide some IMET funding so that if there are future political opportunities, there are U.S.-trained personnel with whom to engage.

PM and AF have contracted monitoring and evaluation teams focusing on Foreign Military Financing, IMET and Peacekeeping Operations-funded assistance to measure the impact and effectiveness of PM-funded programs in Africa.

Question. How satisfied are you with the investments we are making to improve defense institutions and civilian oversight of the military in Africa, and what must be done to ensure that our security assistance programs train militaries to be subordinate to civilians as opposed to deposing civilian governments?

Answer. A core principle of providing security assistance in Africa is strengthening defense institutions and civilian oversight of the military. One PM program that supports this effort is Expanded-International Military Education and Training, which focuses on enforcing the criticality of responsible defense resource man-

agement; fostering greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military; contributing to cooperation between military and law enforcement personnel with respect to counter-narcotics law enforcement efforts; and improving military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights. Additionally, the Peacekeeping Operations account funds the Africa Military Education Program, which supports the capacity building of individual African military education and training institutions; and the Security Force Professionalization program, which is aimed at increasing the capacity of foreign militaries to operate in accordance with appropriate standards relating to human rights and the protection of civilians. We recognize that more needs to be done, and PM plans to work with AF and Posts in the region to take advantage of new programming opportunities and approaches that incorporate U.S. values, such as civilian control of the military, respect for human rights, and the creation of strong military justice systems.

Question. Is the amount of support we provide to the Sahel in development and governance assistance commensurate, in your view, with the amount of money we have spent on security assistance? In other words, are we appropriately investing in the development arm of the three D's—Defense, Diplomacy, and Development?

Answer. Four of the five Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger) are among the seven least developed countries in the world. Therefore, U.S. foreign assistance to the Sahel countries includes a focus on addressing the critical need for life-saving assistance, a need exacerbated by conflict and violent extremism. To overcome instability also requires a significant focus on building the capacity of Sahelian governments to improve governance. Addressing root drivers of conflict at the local level, including by supporting dispute resolution mechanisms, delivering public goods, and respecting human rights, can help reduce conflict. The recently approved interagency Sahel Strategy is our roadmap for addressing these drivers.

Question. Are there currently security assistance programs being carried out in Chad, where there was a coup last year? Why did the Administration continue to propose security assistance programs in light of the military takeover?

Answer. The Administration's current approach is to maintain sufficient security assistance to Chad to enable continued Chadian participation in key regional security initiatives, such as the Multi-National Joint Task Force and MINUSMA, as well as conduct civilian-led investigations of terrorist activities. Chad continues to play a critical and irreplaceable role in these regional efforts, and the interagency assesses that U.S. assistance improves the effectiveness, professionalization, and respect for human rights of participating Chadian forces. The Department carefully reviewed events in Chad and concluded that the military coup restriction in section 7008 of the annual appropriations act had not been triggered with respect to Chad. We continue to urge the Transitional Military Council to hold an inclusive national dialogue that incorporates members of the diaspora, armed groups, and the opposition to ensure there is a viable democratic process at the end of the 18-month transition period.

Question. U.S. security assistance for Africa decreased in recent years after peaking in FY 2015–FY 2016, but arguably remains high by historic standards as perceived threats to U.S. interests have grown. Looking ahead, do you expect security assistance for Africa to increase, decrease, or remain flat—and why?

Answer. Consistent with the Administration's Interim National Security guidance and the State-USAID Joint Regional Strategy for Africa, the Administration will continue to prioritize funding for assistance efforts that advance mutual peace and security interests in Africa.

These efforts will leverage regional cooperation to counter terrorism, including support for countries fighting the spread of ISIS and al-Qaida throughout Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Security assistance programming in the Gulf of Guinea and East Africa will also reinforce partner nation efforts to capitalize on economic opportunities inherent in the blue economy, while countering Chinese efforts to secure commercial ports on SSA's vast coastlines. Assistance will also continue to support partner nation efforts to counter poaching, narcotics, trafficking, and other illicit transnational activities by strengthening African law enforcement.

To support these efforts, Administration requests for Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education Training, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, Peacekeeping Operations and Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs funding for bilateral and regional operating units in SSA have remained consistent over the past 5 fiscal years. The President's Budget Request included $291.5 million for these accounts for SSA in FY 2018, and $461.1 million in the FY 2022, though the FY 2022 request included $149 million

for Somalia that was historically requested in the Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities account. We look forward to discussing security assistance for Africa in the President's FY 2023 President's Budget Request.

Question. What lessons can U.S. policymakers learn from the Sahel, where security and humanitarian conditions have deteriorated significantly over the past decade despite an influx of U.S. security assistance funds? Beyond the elite U.S.-trained counterterrorism force known as Danab, how would you assess the impact of U.S. security assistance to Somali security forces?

Answer. Our experience in the Sahel demonstrates the importance of a balanced approach in which gains within the security space are matched by an emphasis on improving good governance and livelihoods for the populations living in conflict-afflicted areas. The experience in the Sahel also illustrates the importance of ensuring that security forces respect human rights and do not victimize marginalized groups, as such actions can help fuel the spread of violent extremist groups and instability. Finally, our experience in the Sahel demonstrates the importance of strengthening defense institutions as well as tactical and operational capabilities, to ensure our partners are capably led, sustained, and held accountable for any abuses.

There is currently minimal U.S. assistance to the Somalia National Army (SNA) beyond the Danab Brigade through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. IMET has helped the SNA professionalize in leadership positions. We have also seen modest gains in the professionalization and capacity building of some select civilian police forces through International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining funding and Related (NADR) funding. With NADR funding, Somalia Police Force counterterrorism units have responded to and investigated over 500 terrorism incidents. NADR funding has also established a network of watchlisting and screening capabilities to inhibit terrorist travel and a framework to better disrupt terrorist financing.

Question. What has been the impact of recent U.S. decisions to suspend (e.g., Cameroon in 2019) or publicly threaten to suspend (e.g., Burkina Faso in 2020) security assistance due to human rights concerns?

Answer. Burkinabé authorities have been somewhat responsive to concerns over allegations of human rights violations and abuses by security forces. The government increased training on human rights to prevent future violations and abuses and deployed provost marshals during operations to encourage proper treatment of detainees. We have seen a notable reduction in allegations of abuses over the past year. We continue to work with Burkina Faso to build capacity to conduct investigations and prosecutions where there is an available authority to do so, given that Burkina Faso is subject to the restriction in section 7008 of the annual appropriations act. In Cameroon, the U.S. reprogrammed a significant amount of military assistance in 2018. We are constantly reviewing the different tools available to hold human rights violators accountable, including sanctions, and continue the practice of reviewing security assistance on a case-by-case basis. We continue to pursue engagement with the Swiss, France, key allies, and UN Security Council member states, to find ways to promote a peaceful resolution of the ongoing violence.

Question. How has the application of coup-related aid restrictions to Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso affected U.S. regional security and foreign policy objectives?

Answer. U.S. foreign assistance for the governments of Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali (including their militaries) is restricted under section 7008 of the annual appropriations act. Some programs that are in the best interests of the U.S. have continued through the use of available authorities. The U.S. Government stopped funding Mali's and Guinea's participation in regional and country-specific security programs. These restrictions have hindered these transition governments' ability to effectively manage security threats, creating conditions that could enhance fragility and exacerbate instability. The Department is assessing the impact of section 7008 restrictions on Burkina Faso's security forces and their capacity to support regional security objectives.

Question. Why were such restrictions not applied to Chad after a military takeover there in 2021?

Answer. The Department carefully reviewed events in Chad and concluded that the military coup restriction in section 7008 of the annual appropriations act had not been triggered with respect to Chad.

Question. To what extent do legal restrictions enhance U.S. leverage over the behavior of partner security forces?

Answer. The Department can—and will—calibrate security assistance to leverage partner behavior. However, we recognize that there are limits on U.S. influence and the impact of our security assistance over the policies, priorities, or behaviors of recipient governments beyond their immediate security capacity objectives. We will continue to seek ways to build partner capacity and exert effective pressure on partner countries to uphold democratic norms, respect human rights, and promote accountability and the rule-of-law, in pursuit of a free and open international order.

Question. State Department OIG inspections of U.S. embassies in Africa have repeatedly identified challenges in vetting foreign security force units pursuant to the "Leahy laws," which prohibit the provision of U.S. security assistance to units implicated in gross human rights violations. In Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria, for instance, delays in Embassies' submission of vetting requests have reportedly led to program delays and/or expedited vetting.

To what extent have such delays and other identified administrative challenges impeded rigorous investigations into evidence of past commission of human rights violations by recipient security force units?

Answer. In all cases in which a foreign security force unit is submitted for Leahy vetting, the Department of State investigates any and all credible allegations of a gross violation of human rights against such unit that are discovered during its thorough vetting process. We are fully committed to rigorously implementing the Leahy Law, and we do not proceed with the provision of assistance unless and until vetting is complete and such assistance is deemed to meet the requirements of the Leahy Law.

Question. What is the Administration's plan for addressing such issues?

Answer. The Department of State continuously seeks to improve its Leahy Law implementation. In 2019, we fielded the enhanced International Vetting and Security Tracking-cloud global enterprise Leahy vetting system, which improved the efficiency and effectiveness of the vetting process by leveraging the latest available technology. Our officers at embassies around the world also regularly engage with our foreign security force security partners to stress the importance of our vetting requirements, seek the timely provision of information required to complete Leahy vetting, and overcome challenges in the vetting process. In Washington, our Leahy team is working to develop and publish updated Leahy vetting guidance to further aid in both enhancing the Department's Leahy Law compliance and further streamline the vetting process worldwide.

Question. To what extent are U.S. Embassies capable of effectively monitoring the end-use of U.S.-provided defense materiel in Africa? What are the key barriers to end-use monitoring?

Answer. DoD's Golden Sentry end-use monitoring (EUM) program for defense material procured through Foreign Military Sales has well-established procedures that are time-tested and are implemented through U.S. Embassies' Security Cooperation Offices. There are inherent personnel limitations with respect to EUM depending on the volume of requests and breadth of security cooperation with our African partners that impact both the State and Defense Departments' ability to conduct inquiries beyond the norm.

Regarding State's Blue Lantern EUM program for defense articles exported via direct commercial sales (DCS), over the last 2 fiscal years embassies in African countries have completed on average 8.8 percent of our total Blue Lantern checks globally despite their host nations being listed as destination countries on only 1.4 percent of defense trade authorizations. Host nation governments receiving limited DCS defense articles are likely to have infrequent interactions with the Blue Lantern program, resulting in procedural delays when they are subject to end-use checks. To counter this trend, our posts have engaged with partners to educate them on the Blue Lantern program and sensitize them to the benefits of EUM cooperation. Such benefits include the potential for a stronger defense trade relationship when in-country end users are complying with U.S. export control requirements. Additionally, to ensure Blue Lantern officers in the field stay proficient in their EUM duties, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) disseminates updated guidance every fiscal year to all U.S. diplomatic posts on the conduct of Blue Lantern end-use checks. This year DDTC also introduced a long-distance learning course to provide Department personnel with web-based training on all aspects of the Blue Lantern program.

Question. Nigeria: Successive administrations have proposed that we sell arms—specifically planes and helicopters with lethal capabilities—to Nigeria, a country

whose security forces have a very troubling human rights record, and notoriously weak accountability structures in the military.

What thought has the Administration put into investing in programs and activities in Nigerian institutions that would have a transformative difference in terms of the capability and conduct of the Nigerian military?

Answer. The primary goal of U.S.-Nigeria security cooperation is to build more capable, professional, and accountable Nigerian security forces that respect human rights and protect civilians. We support training programs and doctrinal changes in Nigerian institutions to do this. Our assistance includes training in civilian harm mitigation, adherence to the laws of armed conflict, air-to-ground integration between the services, improved sustainment processes, and other Professional Military Education. Our assistance includes DoD and State support for an Air-to-Ground Integration (AGI) program to build close air support capabilities while avoiding civilian casualties. As a result, Nigeria recently qualified its first Joint Terminal Attack Controllers, trained to NATO standards. DoD also provides support for the development of route clearance capabilities and tactical unmanned aerial systems. The Department of State funds military advisors to complement DoD programs, with current efforts to support advisors with a focus on AGI, military intelligence, and military justice institutions. Department of State assistance supports Nigerian infantry training capacity, as well as its maritime capacity. In addition, Nigeria is one of the largest recipients of International Military Education and Training (IMET). Our monitoring and evaluation efforts provide an opportunity to holistically assess the extent to which our interventions are having transformative impacts in Nigerian institutions and how we can improve U.S. interventions.

Question. Should we be focused on arms sales in the absence of a comprehensive security development plan for Nigeria?

Answer. The Nigeria strategic framework approved in October 2021, is a whole-of-government approach that includes a comprehensive security development plan. Our engagement goes beyond arms sales and supports Nigeria to address its many security challenges and its underlying governance issues. We support training programs and doctrinal changes in Nigerian security institutions to build more capable, professional, and accountable security forces that respect human rights and protect civilians. We supported the Government of Nigeria in establishing and implementing a defection and reintegration program for former Boko Haram fighters. We are working to strengthen linkages between civilian-led early warning and early response initiatives and local security force engagement. More broadly, we support peacebuilding programs and dialogue efforts with the government, civil society, faith leaders, youth, and others to prevent and mitigate intercommunal conflict and livelihoods programs to steer susceptible youth away from violence.

Question. Interagency Coordination: What is the significance of legislation mandating "concurrence," "coordination," or "joint formulation" between DoS and DoD when designing, implementing, and overseeing security assistance programs? How do each of these terms affect DoS's influence in and oversight of DoD's Title 10 security cooperation programs?

Answer. Secretary of State concurrence provides an important opportunity to ensure that foreign policy considerations are included in DoD security cooperation programs. The concurrence mechanism helps State identify proposed DoD activities that are problematic from a legal or policy perspective and align DoD security cooperation programs with foreign policy objectives. The effective veto that concurrence provides over DoD programs makes it far superior to coordination, which does not always provide State sufficient influence to stop or reshape programs deemed problematic. Legislation requiring both concurrence and joint formulation gives State the greatest degree of influence and oversight over DoD security cooperation activities. Joint formulation allows State to be involved in DoD programs from inception through program design to implementation and helps State and DoD to deconflict activities and often design them to be complementary. This level of State Department planning requires further investment in staffing at the State Department, since State's workforce is dwarfed by the DoD security cooperation enterprise.

Question. Partner Nation Considerations: In your view, should the United States impose U.S. institutional standards on partner forces?

Answer. While we strive to lead by the power of our example, promoting sustainable security sectors aligned with American values, security assistance cannot overcome or 'fix' underlying structural, economic, or political challenges. Rather, it must be part of broader, holistic efforts to enhance civilian security through improved access to justice, democratic governance, and economic growth—addressing stake-

holder equities and concerns across the political spectrum. We must also be realistic about the limited influence or leverage of U.S. security assistance over the policies, priorities, or behaviors of recipient governments beyond their immediate security capacity objectives. In addition, if we are to leverage security assistance, we must ensure that the Department has the resources and staffing to monitor those conditions and, more importantly, be able to respond effectively and decisively if our partners are not abiding by the conditions to which we agreed.

Question. Are there benefits and drawbacks to imposing conditions on U.S. security assistance?

Answer. To be most effective, security sector capacity-building programs should be part of broader efforts to improve civilian security through improved access to justice, democratic governance, and economic growth. While we lead with these values, our ability to influence the policies, priorities, or behaviors of partner governments is often limited. In contexts where U.S. interventions are unlikely to overcome obstacles or change a partner's behavior, reducing the scope of security assistance may be necessary. We should seek opportunities to incentivize partner progress on key foreign policy objectives but must be clear-eyed that the incentives of receiving U.S. security assistance are often not strong enough to overcome the local political obstacles or economic incentives. Furthermore, we want to avoid forcing our partners into a binary choice, particularly in the context of competition with the PRC.

Question. Are there examples of security assistance activities that have helped partners professionalize their own forces in their own ways?

Answer. Security assistance activities funded by the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program help partner nations professionalize their militaries by enhancing critical thinking and analytical skills, which prepares participants to design procedures, policies, and doctrine for their own militaries. In one example, a Lebanese Air Force officer changed procedures for protecting military personnel and equipment and instilled a culture of safety by implementing practices learned in a U.S. safety training course. In another example, a Hungarian senior military leader leveraged knowledge gained from a senior professional military educational experience to create doctrine guiding the development of the Hungarian Land Forces.

Security assistance investments in enlisted and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) also professionalize partner military forces in countries such as Botswana, Bulgaria, and Kazakhstan. In Angola—historically partnered with Russia on military training and education—an officer who attended staff college through IMET prioritized improvement of the NCO corps within his military and helped break down barriers to cooperation with the United States.

The Peacekeeping Operations-funded Global Defense Reform Program (GDRP) professionalizes partner security forces as well. In North Macedonia, an embedded GDRP senior advisor supports defense modernization by helping the Ministry of Defense update strategic documents, improve planning and programming processes, and develop force generation and procurement plans—all of which contribute to more professional defense forces.

Question. To what extent has DoS or DoD established dedicated corps of security assistance trainers, whether through direct U.S. Government hires or third-party implementers?

Answer. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) implements security assistance training through a combination of active-duty military personnel and third-party contractors. For training implemented through DoD, drawing on resources such as the U.S. Army National Guard State Partnership Program, where applicable, provides a relatively consistent pool of trainers and facilitates the establishment of relationships with partner countries over time. Additionally, the U.S. Army's establishment of Security Force Assistance Brigades provide a pool of military trainers organized and oriented to support security assistance/security cooperation activities.

For third-party contractor trainers, contracting mechanisms tailored for specific security assistance programs enable the Department to draw trainers from a single or limited group of vendors with whom the Department can work to develop subject matter expertise, for example, by holding vendor conferences and routinely sharing program information or even conducting training of trainers. Additionally, PM is expanding the use of longer-term, contracted mentors and advisors embedded in partner country institutions, both at the strategic level as well as in operational and tactical-level organizations. Advisors provide a dedicated, persistent presence, better enabling security assistance activities to influence partner country behavior.

Other security assistance providers within the Department, including the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the Bureau of

Counterterrorism (CT), provide non-military security assistance to civilian law enforcement and criminal justice sector stakeholders. INL bilateral programs are typically co-developed with partner governments to tailor capacity building to the country context and legal frameworks. INL implementing partners—which include the U.S. interagency, U.S. state and local partners, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and contractors—are then selected based on their ability to advance the agreed programmatic outcomes. Like INL, CT's implementing partners include subject matter experts from the U.S. interagency, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and contractors that are selected based on their ability to advance the agreed program objectives, which are tailored to the beneficiary country or regional context.

The Department of State defers to DoD to more fully address the question of DoD's implementation approach.

RESPONSES OF DR. MARA ELIZABETH KARLIN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ WAS GIVEN DURING A CLASSIFIED BRIEFING

Question. Afghanistan: The swift collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), which received nearly $90 billion in U.S. training and equipment over two decades, has prompted much speculation about the U.S. strategies and policies that preceded the collapse. Numerous sources contend that conflicting directives, the prioritization of short-term tactical gains, the lack of an integrated U.S. policy, and poor U.S. understanding of social, cultural, and political contexts in Afghanistan contributed to undermining U.S. security assistance from the onset. Other observers have found that U.S. security assistance overemphasized tactical skills and neglected strategic-level expertise, forced the ANDSF to be heavily reliant on airpower and technology that Afghans could not maintain independently, and excluded Afghan involvement or input in equipping decisions.

How is the ANDSF collapse changing the way the United States conducts security assistance?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What oversight requirements might ensure Congress is better informed of the capabilities and weaknesses of other major U.S. security assistance recipients?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. To what extent are other U.S. partners as reliant as the ANDSF on U.S. intelligence, air power, and contracted logistics support?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Given this history, what are the main lessons you, personally, have learned from the failure of U.S. security assistance programs in Afghanistan? How will you seek to take those lessons and best practices and instill them in other security assistance efforts?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Strategic Competition with China and Russia: How have State and DoD aligned or realigned resources and activities toward strategic competition with China and Russia, outside of Ukraine?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. How is U.S. security assistance countering China in the Indo-Pacific?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What, if any, lessons can be learned from nearly two decades of counterterrorism-focused security assistance activities?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What, if any, are the potential implications for scaling down counterterrorism-focused activities in Africa and the Middle East, especially as Russia and China increase their influence in those regions?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. As we look across the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere we are increasingly seeing a tangible competition in terms of military presence and particular arms sales, notably from China. How do we balance our policy priorities with protecting U.S. technology and security?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What are the potential risks and rewards of reorienting U.S. security assistance programs in Africa to focus on global power competition? What kinds of activities or policies might such an approach involve? What would define success in this context?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Africa: Over the last year and a half, coups have occurred in Mali, Chad, Guinea, and Burkina Faso. Successive administrations have funded robust security assistance programs in all of these countries. However, the Sahel is less stable now than ever; Extremist groups have multiplied and expanded, and recipient militaries, despite years of training, are still not capable of countering terrorist threats. Officers we trained in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea have overthrown their own democratically elected civilian governments and installed themselves as Heads of State.

Would you consider our security assistance programs in West Africa successful? Knowing that hindsight is always 20–20, are there things we could have done differently in the Sahel with regard to our security and counter-terrorism assistance?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Where has U.S. security assistance been most effective in Africa, and what situations have posted the greatest challenges? How can and should U.S. officials measure impact and effectiveness?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. How satisfied are you with the investments we are making to improve defense institutions and civilian oversight of the military in Africa, and what must be done to ensure that our security assistance programs train militaries to be subordinate to civilians as opposed to deposing civilian governments?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Is the amount of support we provide to the Sahel in development and governance assistance commensurate, in your view, with the amount of money we have spent on security assistance? In other words, are we appropriately investing in the development arm of the three D's—Defense, Diplomacy, and Development?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Are there currently security assistance programs being carried out in Chad, where there was a coup last year? Why did the Administration continue to propose security assistance programs in light of the military takeover?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. U.S. security assistance for Africa decreased in recent years after peaking in FY 2015–FY 2016, but arguably remains high by historic standards as perceived threats to U.S. interests have grown. Looking ahead, do you expect security assistance for Africa to increase, decrease, or remain flat—and why?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What lessons can U.S. policymakers learn from the Sahel, where security and humanitarian conditions have deteriorated significantly over the past decade despite an influx of U.S. security assistance funds? Beyond the elite U.S.-trained counterterrorism force known as Danab, how would you assess the impact of U.S. security assistance to Somali security forces?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What has been the impact of recent U.S. decisions to suspend (e.g., Cameroon in 2019) or publicly threaten to suspend (e.g., Burkina Faso in 2020) security assistance due to human rights concerns? How has the application of coup-related aid restrictions to Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso affected U.S. regional security and foreign policy objectives? Why were such restrictions not applied to Chad after a military takeover there in 2021? To what extent do legal restrictions enhance U.S. leverage over the behavior of partner security forces?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. State Department OIG inspections of U.S. embassies in Africa have repeatedly identified challenges in vetting foreign security force units pursuant to the "Leahy laws," which prohibit the provision of U.S. security assistance to units implicated in gross human rights violations. In Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria, for instance, delays in Embassies' submission of vetting requests have reportedly led to program delays and/or expedited vetting. To what extent have such delays and other identified administrative challenges impeded rigorous investigations into evidence of

past commission of human rights violations by recipient security force units? What is the Administration's plan for addressing such issues?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. To what extent are U.S. Embassies capable of effectively monitoring the end-use of U.S.-provided defense materiel in Africa? What are the key barriers to end-use monitoring?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Nigeria: Successive administrations have proposed that we sell arms—specifically planes and helicopters with lethal capabilities—to Nigeria, a country whose security forces have a very troubling human rights record, and notoriously weak accountability structures in the military.

What thought has the Administration put into investing in programs and activities in Nigerian institutions that would have a transformative difference in terms of the capability and conduct of the Nigerian military?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Should we be focused on arms sales in the absence of a comprehensive security development plan for Nigeria?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Answer. *Interagency coordination*: What is the significance of legislation mandating "concurrence," "coordination," or "joint formulation" between DoS and DoD when designing, implementing, and overseeing security assistance programs? How do each of these terms affect DoS's influence in and oversight of DoD's Title 10 security cooperation programs?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Partner nation considerations: In your view, should the United States impose U.S. institutional standards on partner forces? Are there benefits and drawbacks to imposing conditions on U.S. security assistance? Are there examples of security assistance activities that have helped partners professionalize their own forces in their own ways? To what extent has DoS or DoD established dedicated corps of security assistance trainers, whether through direct U.S. Government hires or third party implementers?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Strategic competition: How have DoS and DoD aligned or realigned resources and activities towards strategic competition? How is U.S. security assistance countering China in the Indo-Pacific? What, if any, lessons can be learned from nearly two decades of counterterrorism-focused security assistance activities? What, if any, are the potential implications for scaling down counterterrorism-focused activities in Africa and the Middle East, especially as Russia and China increase their influence in those regions?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. DoD reforms: What is the implementation status of FY 2017 NDAA-mandated security cooperation reforms? In what ways have the reforms been successful? What reforms remain outstanding and how does DoD intend to implement them?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. AM&E: What is the implementation status of the FY 2017 NDAA-mandated AM&E requirement? What is the current AM&E policy DoD and how does it differ from that of DoS? How many strategic evaluations have been completed? What quantitative and qualitative metrics and/or evaluation activities are used to assess U.S. security assistance success and effectiveness in the context of countering strategic competitors?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Data management: Has DoD's Global-Theater Security Cooperation Information Management System (GTSCMIS) been successfully transferred and integrated into Socium? What is the implementation status of Socium? What is the implementation status of DoS's Strategic Impact Assessment Framework (SIAF), and the replacement for its International Vetting and Security Tracking (INVEST) database system? What types of records or information sources are consulted to accomplish vetting, and how does this vary by country, mission, or training program?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

RESPONSES OF MS. JESSICA LEWIS TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. Has the Department of State's role in setting bilateral security assistance policies diminished over the last two decades? If yes to the previous question, to what extent is this a problem for U.S. foreign policy?

Answer. The Department of State's role in setting bilateral security assistance policies has diminished over the last two decades. As DoD's share of U.S. security sector assistance funding has grown to approximately half of the current $18 billion investment, DoD has exerted greater influence in setting priorities for how assistance resources are spent. DoD's growing role makes greater State-DoD coordination important to ensuring a unified approach that supports U.S. foreign policy priorities. With an increase in the State Department's own capacity, along with legislation requiring State concurrence and joint formulation over those DoD security cooperation activities still lacking them, State would be better positioned to have foreign policy drive security sector assistance.

Question. What actions has the Department of State taken to re-establish leadership over security assistance?

Answer. Given the bifurcation of security sector assistance programming between State and DoD, coordination at every level—from resource allocation decision-making to program design—is more important than ever. As a result, State has established coordination venues to ensure programs align with U.S. foreign policy objectives. State recently held a Strategic Sector Review on security sector assistance that brought together over 170 policymakers, programmatic officials, and regional and technical experts from the State Department, DoD, and other departments and agencies to further strengthen the effectiveness of security sector assistance and align it with the highest foreign policy priorities. This review will be followed in Spring 2022 with the Joint Security Sector Assistance Review, which will convene the State Department and DoD stakeholders to identify priorities, opportunities, and tradeoffs for program planning by both departments.

Question. What additional capacity and capability to plan and execute security assistance has the Department of Defense acquired over security assistance?

Answer. The DoD security cooperation enterprise has grown to more than 20,000 personnel across the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, military services, combatant commands, and Defense Security Cooperation Agency. To support its ability to plan and execute both DoD-funded security cooperation activities and State Department-funded security assistance programs as well as Foreign Military Sales, DoD established the Defense Security Cooperation University and developed a continuous learning and certification program to properly train and professionalize its Security Cooperation Workforce.

Question. What, if anything, can or should be done to strengthen the role of the Department of State?

Answer. While the Department of State enjoys many opportunities to inform DoD-led security cooperation activities, it lacks the human and financial resources required to fully participate in myriad DoD planning processes, including when some authorities include "joint formulation" requirements. Consequently, the State Department tends to focus only on the largest or most problematic programs rather than the full range of activities proposed by DoD. We continue seeking ways to enable State to maximize its ability to conduct due diligence and move beyond coordination and concurrence to a more proactive joint formulation role, including joint evaluation and learning.

Question. What DoD authorities currently do not require Secretary of State concurrence, but should?

Answer. Several DoD security cooperation authorities should be amended to require Secretary of State concurrence. In particular, DoD's Combatting ISIS Train and Equip Fund lacks a concurrence requirement even though DoD's other train and equip programs such as 10 U.S.C. Section 333 Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity and FY 2016 NDAA Section 1263 Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative include a legal requirement for concurrence. Secretary of State concurrence helps ensure DoD train and equip authorities align with foreign policy priorities and are implemented consistently with analogous State authorities under Title 22 such as the Foreign Military Financing and Peacekeeping Operations accounts. For that reason, the concurrence of the Secretary of State should also be required for DoD's use of several authorities analogous to State's International Military Education and Training program, including, among others, 10 U.S.C. Section

342 Regional Centers for Security Studies and 10 U.S.C. Section 345 Regional Defense Combating Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Fellowship Program. Finally, Section 1202 of the FY 2018 NDAA, Support of Special Operations for Irregular Warfare, should be amended to require Secretary of State rather than Chief of Mission concurrence, as currently written, in order to provide greater foreign policy oversight over DoD activities conducted under this authority.

Question. What flexibility is needed for State Department security assistance?

Answer. Of the nearly $7 billion in annual security assistance I oversee, 93 percent has been subject to Congressional earmarks or directives in recent fiscal years, unintentionally resulting in limited resources to strengthen other allies in need worldwide and creating lost opportunities to further U.S. foreign policy and national security. We would welcome more flexibility to adjust, on a real-time basis, our assistance to address emerging realities and requirements. This could include fewer earmarks and directives; the appropriation of funds on a regional or functional basis (rather than bilateral); and, particularly in the context of strategic competition, the ability to offer more attractive financing options through expanded Foreign Military Financing loan authorities.

Question. How should security assistance address corruption?

Answer. Security assistance can help partners create systems of transparency and accountability in the security sector, which reduce opportunities for corruption. U.S. security assistance includes programs to improve partners' security sector governance and institutional capacity-building, including by enhancing civilian oversight of security institutions; modernizing human resource and public financial management systems for the security sector; and reforming defense acquisition systems for greater transparency. Further, security assistance planning should include risk assessments and, where risks are identified, mitigation measures to reduce the chances that U.S. taxpayer dollars will be diverted or used illicitly or ineffectively. However, security assistance alone cannot 'fix' the political or economic drivers of corruption and should be part of an integrated U.S. anti-corruption strategy that includes diplomatic engagement and civilian assistance.

Question. Has corruption been sufficiently accounted for in USG security assistance programs?

Answer. In the new *U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption* the Biden-Harris administration identifies several ways the U.S. Government can better address the risks that corruption poses to foreign assistance and to security assistance specifically. The interagency is now working to implement these lines of effort, which include developing protocols for assessing corruption risks and partners' political will, incorporating standards for security sector governance into assistance planning and arms transfer decision-making, and more frequent evaluations of security cooperation initiatives in countries with significant corruption risks. These efforts will strengthen existing mechanisms, such as end-use monitoring, that help counter corruption risks to U.S. security assistance.

Question. How should security assistance address human rights issues?

Answer. Security assistance can help build professional and accountable security institutions that respect human rights, international humanitarian law, and the rule of law. Through training, advising, and other institutional capacity-building programs, U.S. security assistance helps partners strengthen military codes of conduct in accordance with internationally recognized human rights standards, improve military justice systems to hold accountable security forces responsible for human rights abuses, and mitigate the risk of civilian harm during military operations. To be most effective, security sector capacity-building programs should be part of a broader effort to improve civilian security through improved access to justice, democratic governance, and economic growth. In contexts where U.S. interventions are unlikely to overcome the political obstacles to improving a partner's human rights record, withholding or reducing the scope of security assistance may be the best policy to address human rights concerns.

Question. How should the USG best balance human rights among the interests involved in security assistance?

Answer. As President Biden and Secretary Blinken have made clear, we cannot separate our values from our interests. It is squarely in the United States' national interests and strengthens our national security when human rights are protected and reinforced worldwide. Security assistance is no exception to this principle. As one of many tools in the bilateral relationship, security assistance must be calibrated on a case-by-case basis with each partner. In the context of countries whose

policies or actions contradict human rights obligations, we must always continue to make clear our concerns, including that violations of human rights undermine security. We must seek ways to exert effective pressure on those countries to uphold democratic norms, respect human rights, and promote accountability.

Question. What are the major obstacles to faster processing and delivery of FMS cases?

Answer. The USG infrastructure to support Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is built into the existing domestic structure of DoD acquisitions. Policies, databases, and organizational elements supporting FMS vary among DoD agencies that manage FMS cases, so improving the processing and delivery times for FMS cases is a complex, multifaceted challenge.

The FMS process is complex and, for major weapons systems, may last for many years due to FMS concepts like the Total Package Approach that support a sale throughout its lifecycle. Encouraging and allowing DoD to find efficiencies in its own acquisition, logistics, financial, and training processes can and will improve FMS processing and delivery timelines, and the Department is working closely with DoD to explore ways to improve the system.

Question. What are the major obstacles to faster processing and delivery of DCS cases?

Answer. The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) has continued its in-office presence throughout the COVID–19 pandemic, keeping average export license processing time well below the standard of 60 days and ensuring that U.S. defense trade continues to run smoothly. From time to time our adjudication of more complex transfers may extend beyond this standard due to myriad factors; however, we are very cognizant of the need to balance a robust assessment of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives with the impact of prolonged timelines on the defense industry. Notably, with respect to the Ukraine crisis, DDTC staff have worked closely with the defense industry and our foreign partners to expedite authorization for permanent transfers and re-exports from third countries, often providing approval within a matter of hours; since January 2022, DDTC has authorized more than $130 million in DCS exports to Ukraine.

With respect to deliveries, the Department is not involved in the physical transportation of defense articles authorized under a DCS license, so I would respectfully refer you to individual defense companies regarding any supply chain or logistical issues they may encounter.

Question. What reforms and efficiencies to the Defense Acquisition System would be most helpful to improve the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system?

Answer. I will refer you to the Department of Defense, specifically the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition and Sustainment, who is responsible for the management of the Defense Acquisition System. The PM Bureau is working closely with the interagency to identify actions and reforms to the FMS system that can make the United States more competitive.

Question. How, if at all, should State's security assistance programs be reformed? What might such reforms accomplish?

Answer. First, we should elevate security sector governance as a central consideration in U.S. security cooperation and assistance planning and treat long-term institutional capacity-building as our primary mission. A governance-centered approach to security cooperation and assistance would better integrate our political-military tools with our foreign policy and with the diplomatic and economic instruments of statecraft, in keeping with the spirit of the Foreign Assistance Act. Second, the State Department's authorities—which were built to respond to the Cold War—require more flexibility if we are to effectively address emerging crises and opportunities in this new era of strategic competition. This could include making Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the State Department's primary military assistance authority, more responsive to evolving requirements, and appropriating funds on a more regional or functional (as opposed to bilateral) basis. Third, I see an acute need in the context of strategic competition to offer more attractive financing options to partners who are considering acquiring major U.S. defense articles—for example, through expanded FMF loan authorities. FMF loans would provide a tool for the United States to compete for more FMS in countries where FMF grant assistance is unavailable or insufficient to support major procurements and/or where foreign partners lack the national funds to pay the purchase price upfront. Fourth, DoD security cooperation authorities should require Secretary of State concurrence—and, ideally, joint formulation—to ensure security cooperation and security assistance serve U.S. foreign policy goals and are properly synchronized and

deconflicted to make maximal efficiency of taxpayer dollars. Lastly, and in support of the reforms above, it is also important to facilitate the development of the State Department's political-military workforce to ensure staff have the expertise and capacity to fully carry out the Secretary's responsibility to provide foreign policy direction for security cooperation and assistance.

Question. How does State plan for security assistance?

Answer. The Department of State has a robust, multi-year budgetary planning process for security assistance. The security assistance planning process begins with the initial development of security assistance requirements by uniformed Security Cooperation Officers overseas and embassy country teams, based on U.S. and partner nation priorities, ongoing programs, and emerging needs. These requirements are then reviewed and coordinated with DoD colleagues, and through rounds of adjudication within the Department. This process informs the security assistance accounts in the President's Budget Request, allocations in the year of appropriation, implementation of prior year funds, and rapidly changing needs and priorities. Additionally, both the State Department and DoD engage in numerous joint planning conferences each year, including the annual Joint Security Sector Assistance Review, and often participate in bilateral security assistance planning conferences.

Question. How does State set its priorities for security assistance?

Answer. The Department takes many factors into consideration when contemplating security assistance for any country, including questions of allocation increases, decreases, changes in program activities, or suspension. The framework the Department uses for budget development, program planning, and execution of security assistance looks at many considerations to inform security assistance prioritization, but this is not an exhaustive list as there are numerous issues that arise during each stage in a program's lifecycle that can impact security assistance programming. Such considerations include:

- Does the requirement directly support U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, to include U.S.-supported operations and coalitions, or support specific requests?
- Will the provision or continuation of security assistance enhance ongoing access and influence opportunities?
- Are there legislative earmarks or MOU commitments?
- Is the recipient country capable of utilizing assistance effectively?
- If assistance requires sustainment, maintenance, or modernization, is there a plan in for preserving the investment, long-term?
- Does the partner have the required political will or institutional capacity to implement and sustain assistance provided?
- Are similar programs furnished through other accounts or agencies? Are State Department security assistance programs complementary or redundant activities?
- Have we determined whether the existing program is making progress toward identified political and/or military capability objectives?

Question. What gaps exist in the current State workforce, both in numbers and in training or expertise?

Answer. While DoD's Security Cooperation workforce is more than 20,000 strong, the Department of State maintains a roughly analogous political-military workforce that numbers in the hundreds. This makes it difficult to fulsomely engage DoD in joint development and coordination of its growing Title 10 assistance programming. Additionally, the Department lacks bespoke career development and training structures tailored to a security cooperation career path. Today's complex security assistance activities require integrated foreign policy and technical expertise.

Question. How can we best fill gaps in the current State workforce?

Answer. Additional staffing would support the management, implementation, and monitoring of Title 22 authorities, support coordination and foreign policy oversight of Title 10 resources, and enable staff training. In addition, authorizing the Peacekeeping Operations Account (PKO) to support domestic personal service contractors, something State currently lacks, would significantly expand the Bureau's capacity in the long run to implement PKO activities through State contracting mechanisms, which can substantially reduce delivery times and provide notable cost savings. In contrast to third-party contractors, domestic personal service contractors can perform inherently governmental functions such as contracting and financial management. State would also benefit from legislation that would allow Directorate of De-

fense Trade Control (DDTC) registration fees to fund the hiring of Federal Government personnel who perform defense trade control licensing duties. If DDTC funds all positions with registration fees, the Directorate would be able to hire strategically, without constraints inherent in managing different funding types. It would also save the Department's operational budget approximately $10 million annually.

Question. When should we expect delivery and briefing of the Javits report?

Answer. We are working urgently to get this report to you. I anticipate sending the report to you in the next few weeks. Upon delivery, we will reach out to you to schedule a briefing of the report.

Question. Do the current vetting requirements for foreign military training in CONUS present undue burdens to NATO allies and other trusted partners?

Answer. The new vetting requirements are more stringent than what is required by Sec 1090 of the FY 2021 NDAA. The Department is continuing to engage with DoD on the new vetting requirements to ensure security without creating an undue burden on our partners.

Question. What is the objective of U.S. security assistance for Ukraine?

Answer. In response to Russia's aggression, the United States has provided over $3 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since 2014, and over $2 billion in the past year. Our security assistance has focused on training and equipment to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, better monitor and secure its borders, and deploy its forces more safely and effectively. We have provided Ukraine with lethal defense items as part of our assistance to ensure it has the capabilities it needs for self-defense against Putin's unprovoked war of choice.

Question. If the objective of U.S. security assistance is not to enable the Ukrainians to defeat the Russian invaders, why not?

Answer. The objective of U.S. security assistance to Ukraine is to support Ukraine's defense of its sovereignty and its ability to defeat Russia's unprovoked invasion. The Administration has been responsive to the most pressing Ukrainian needs. The United States remains committed to increasing the capabilities of the Ukrainian military to defeat Russia as it pursues this unprovoked war of choice.

Question. Does the USG believe Ukraine can win?

Answer. Yes. The Ukrainian people, including the Ukrainian military, have demonstrated remarkable courage fighting against a technically and numerically superior force. We will continue our unprecedented levels of security assistance to help Ukraine in its fight.

Question. While backfilling Allies and partners who supplied assistance to Ukraine should be a major priority, as reflected in the recent Ukraine supplemental appropriation, can you confirm that the top priority for the Ukraine PDA included the supplemental will be the timely provision of critical military assistance to Ukraine?

Answer. I can assure you the Administration's top priority is working to fill the immediate defense requirements of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to assist them in repelling the ongoing Russian invasion. We are working closely with DoD to expedite provisions of key defense material to Ukraine. In fact, multiple deliveries of U.S. security assistance have already arrived and continue to arrive daily to Ukraine to support and sustain the Ukrainian Government's ability to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity from Russia's ongoing aggression.

Question. Why does the U.S. Government view the transfer of capable air defense, drone, and anti-tank systems as not escalatory towards Russia, but views the transfer of aircraft as escalatory?

Answer. Russia may mistakenly allege security assistance to Ukraine is escalatory and would increase the prospects of a conflict with NATO. However, since the invasion of Ukraine began in 2014, Russia has been the only escalatory actor. In light of Russia's atrocities and alleged war crimes, we do not view security assistance to Ukraine as escalatory. Aid to Ukraine is lawful, justified, and a national decision any country can determine for themselves. We will continue to explore ways to help the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as the citizens of Ukraine, who are defending their country with great skill and bravery.

Question. What specific evidence is there that the transfer of aircraft will be viewed by Russia as escalatory?

Answer. Russia has stated the transfer of MiG-29s to Ukraine is escalatory and could increase the prospects of a conflict with NATO. However, since the invasion

of Ukraine began in 2014, Russia has been the only escalatory actor. In light of Russia's atrocities, and credible allegations of Russian war crimes, we do not view security assistance to Ukraine, including the transfer of aircraft, as escalatory. Aid to Ukraine is lawful, justified, and a national decision any country can determine for themselves. We will continue to explore ways to help the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as the citizens of Ukraine, who are defending their country with great skill and bravery.

Question. Was the transfer of fighter aircraft by the Soviet Union to the North Vietnamese escalatory?

Answer. The significant differences between the current war in Ukraine and the Vietnam War make it difficult to draw any parallels regarding the implications of fighter aircraft transfers on the two respective conflicts.

Question. Has the USG approached Turkey to donate its S–400 air defense systems to Ukraine? If so, what was the response? If not, why not?

Answer. The United States continues to urge Turkey at every level not to retain the S–400 system. Separately, we are continuing to encourage Allies and partners to provide assistance to help Ukraine defend itself.

Question. What is the USG doing to get more capable air defense systems to Ukraine?

Answer. Over the past year, the United States has committed more than $2 billion worth of critical security assistance to Ukraine, including the largest use of Presidential Drawdown Authority in U.S. history. This aid includes air defense systems of both U.S. and non-U.S. origin, to include man-portable air defense systems and air defense radar systems. The Administration is working with Ukraine to mitigate critical capability gaps and help resupply weapons Ukraine has indicated it needs to continue to defend itself against Russia's invasion. We are also continuing to press our Allies and partners to transfer systems that Ukraine will be able to swiftly deploy and use.

Question. Who is in charge of coordinating the logistics and supply of military assistance to Ukraine?

Answer. While the Department of State has a role in policy questions on military assistance to Ukraine, the Department of Defense oversees the logistics and supply of military assistance to Ukraine from the United States. Specifically, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency leads the logistics and contracting piece, and EUCOM maintains a coordination cell in charge of implementation, coordination, and management of this complex effort. I would refer you to DoD for any further details.

Question. What is the plan to ensure continuity of supplies and assistance into Ukraine?

Answer. The Department of State is committed to providing Ukraine the aid it needs to help defend itself against Russia's ongoing aggression, in cooperation with our interagency and international partners. This includes utilizing the maximum authority currently available to continue to provide Ukraine with the types of weapons and protective equipment required to meet the armored, airborne, and other threats it is facing. It also includes working to expedite the transfers of U.S.-origin military equipment from our Allies to resupply the weapons that Ukraine has indicated it needs to defend itself. Multiple deliveries of U.S. security assistance continue to arrive daily in support of our multi-pronged strategy to assist Ukraine in its brave stand against Russia.

Question. What are the next steps in building out Ukraine's air defense capabilities now that large numbers of MANPADS have been delivered?

Answer. There are various challenges to increasing Ukraine's air defense capabilities, which include cost, technology release concerns, training, and time constraints. While the U.S. Government has already provided over $2 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since 2014, we continue to explore various avenues to support Ukraine's air defense readiness needs in line with our capability assessment and have encouraged our Allies and partners to assist meeting Ukrainian defense priorities, including air defense. Additional details on these efforts are best conveyed in a classified setting.

Question. What efforts are underway to source MANPADS and other air defense capabilities from allies and partners?

Answer. The Department of State is committed to providing Ukraine with the aid it needs. Together with our Allies and partners, we are working to transfer hundreds of MANPADS to the Ukrainian Armed Forces to enable them to adequately

meet the complex airborne threats they are facing. In addition to direct transfers from the Department of Defense and from partner countries that have donated non-U.S. origin equipment, the Department has authorized 14 Third Party Transfer requests for U.S.-origin air defense systems and anticipates additional transfers as more countries contribute to Ukraine's urgent defense requirements. In total, these armaments will help mitigate critical capability gaps and help resupply weapons Ukraine has indicated it needs to defend itself against Russia's renewed invasion.

Question. What is the State Department's policy regarding American citizens traveling to volunteer to fight for the Ukrainians?

Answer. The Secretary has repeatedly stated that Americans should not travel to Ukraine. Our Level 4 Ukraine Travel Advisory remains in effect: U.S. citizens in Ukraine should depart immediately if it is safe to do so using any commercial or other privately available ground transportation options. The Department will not be able to evacuate American citizens from Ukraine. For those who want to help Ukraine, there are many ways to do so, including by supporting and helping the many NGOs that are working to provide humanitarian assistance. Individuals that choose to disregard the Travel Advisory not to enter Ukraine should review the Department's website for additional considerations on travel to high-risk areas, including potential steps to consider prior to travel.

Question. What efforts is State taking to make it easier for volunteer organizations, non-profits, and others to donate or send military equipment to Ukraine?

Answer. The Department is working closely with organizations across civil society to advise on the process to receive authorization to export defense articles to Ukraine, and we have worked with our interagency partners to expedite the review of certain export requests where there is a clear need to do so. However, we continue to conduct all requisite due diligence when adjudicating requests in support of Ukraine to ensure that the transfers also comport with the national security and foreign policy of the United States.

Question. Is State considering waiving any application fees or expediting processes for non-government organizations who wish to donate or send military equipment to Ukraine?

Answer. Currently, we are not considering waiving application fees; however, we are applying all appropriate urgency to requests supporting Ukraine and thinking critically about existing flexibilities in our authorities while continuing to ensure that transfers are assessed in a manner consistent with the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and applicable regulations. My team has engaged closely with the Embassy of Ukraine and other international partners, the defense industry, NGOs, and our interagency colleagues to ensure that legitimate requests for the export or re-export of defense articles to Ukraine are expedited; we are conducting twice-daily audits of pending direct commercial sales export licenses, and in instances where an application has required additional due diligence to verify the bona fides of the transaction we have been able to confirm validity of official documentation and approve certain transactions within hours.

Question. The 2022 budget supplemental includes $500M for Foreign Military Finance grant assistance for Eastern Europe and Ukraine. What are the USG's objectives for this assistance?

Answer. The Department of State will work closely with key stakeholders, including U.S. European Command, to identify the most urgent requirements for the $650 million in Foreign Military Financing provided for Ukraine and "countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine" in the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriation Act, 2022. As Russia wages a premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war against Ukraine, it is clear that partners in the region, including those on the frontline in NATO's Eastern Flank, will require U.S. support to bolster their defenses against Russia. Many of these countries answered the call to provide direct military assistance to Ukraine, and this funding will help support them and others impacted by Russia's continuing aggression.

Question. What is the plan to use those funds?

Answer. The Department is moving expeditiously to identify both immediate and medium- to longer-term requirements in coordination with the Department of Defense, including U.S. European Command. Assistance needs in Ukraine and the region involve different timelines. Given the multiple security assistance authorities available through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, we will work closely with the interagency to identify funding authorities that best meet the timelines involved for each partner. Priorities may include assistance for NATO's Eastern Flank

to support key defense capabilities to counter Russia's aggression and influence, and to resupply partners' military stockpiles depleted from their rapid deployment of assistance to Ukraine. As we continue to work on this issue, we are committed to keeping Congress informed of our efforts.

Question. The 2022 budget supplemental includes $4B for Foreign Military Finance loan authority for Eastern Europe and Ukraine. What are the USG's objectives for this assistance?

Answer. The Department of State will work closely with the Department of Defense to identify military requirements that can best be met through this loan authority. Objectives may include supporting key military capabilities in NATO Allies most at risk from Russia's aggression, including NATO Eastern Flank countries. We are in the processing of identifying these requirements and we are committed to keeping Congress informed of our efforts.

Question. What is the plan to use those funds?

Answer. The Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, includes $4 billion in FMF loans and an additional $4 billion in FMF loan guarantees for Ukraine and NATO Allies. The Department of State will work closely with the Department of Defense to identify military requirements that can best be met through such a loan program. Such requirements may include longer-term and higher value procurements, such as air defense systems and fixed wing aircraft, among others. As we further develop these plans, we are committed to keeping Congress informed of our efforts.

Question. Eastern European allies have donated large quantities of defense articles to Ukraine. They still need to deter Russian aggression against themselves. What articles need to be backfilled to maintain deterrence?

Answer. As you know, the United States is working to facilitate the transfers of U.S.-made military equipment from our Allies to Ukraine. As part of this process, we are exploring options to help backfill munitions and equipment that our Allies may provide Ukraine from their own reserves. This is an ongoing process, and we are currently assessing and identifying which Allies require backfills and whether the United States has an equivalent system that could fulfill the requirement.

Question. What is the USG doing to expedite such backfills?

Answer. The United States is currently exploring options to backfill munitions and equipment that our Allies and partners may be providing to Ukraine. This ongoing process includes assessments on backfill requirements, capability equivalents, and industry supply chain capacity. We are working with the Department of Defense to identify the most pressing partner needs and to identify ways we can expedite backfills from current and future production, as well as security assistance and loans that could help assist countries with long-term defense procurements. We are committed to keeping Congress informed of our efforts.

Question. What is U.S. industry doing to expedite production and delivery?

Answer. The United States is exploring options to increase our defense production capacity to help backfill munitions and equipment that the United States and our Allies are providing Ukraine. This interagency process is underway, and includes an assessment of our most pressing requirements, operational solutions, and industry capacity and production timelines. We are committed to keeping Congress informed of our efforts.

Question. Does the 2014 Wales summit pledge of 2 percent GDP spending for defense still make sense in the face of Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

Answer. The Wales Defense Investment Pledge is a critical commitment related to Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, which requires Allies to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." Allies have committed, as recently as the March 24 NATO Summit, to continue to share the responsibility of our collective security against new and existing threats, both conventional and non-conventional. Russia's invasion of Ukraine puts in sharp relief the need for Allies to meet their Wales Pledge commitments by investing in national defense, including readiness, force generation, and capabilities. We welcome the pledges made by some Allies since Russia's further invasion of Ukraine to meet their Wales Defense Investment Pledge targets sooner than previously planned and further welcome the pledges of several Allies to exceed it. We must ensure the Alliance has the sufficient, capable, and ready, integrated defense posture required to maintain a credible defense and deterrence in the 21st century threat environment.

Question. What is the Biden administration doing to ensure NATO allies spend more?

Answer. The Biden administration is continuing to ensure Allies equitably share the responsibility of NATO's collective security. Allies recommitted to the Wales Defense Investment Pledge at the March 24 Brussels Summit. The Administration has reframed burden sharing as investing in the capabilities, readiness, and force generation needed to maintain a credible defense and deterrence posture and fulfill NATO missions and operations. We will continue to consult with Allies and with Congress to ensure NATO has the sufficient, capable, and ready forces required to fulfill this pledge.

The Administration is ensuring that the revision of NATO's Strategic Concept proceeds from sound analysis of the evolving security environment to offer a clear approach to current and future threats and challenges. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, bordering NATO's eastern flank, has put the need for increased defense spending in sharp relief, and several Allies have announced renewed vows to increase national defense investment as a result.

Question. Germany has announced a major shift in its defense policy. What actual tangible steps has it taken to put this policy into action?

Answer. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz responded to Russia's invasion of Ukraine with a pledge to begin spending more than 2 percent of German GDP on defense each year starting in 2022 and announced a new $110 billion special fund to this end. Germany added 350 troops to its now 850-soldier NATO deployment in Lithuania, where it leads an enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup. Germany is also participating in a new NATO combat unit in Slovakia and has extended its air policing mission in Romania. Germany sent 1,000 anti-tank weapons and 500 Stinger surface-to-air missiles to Ukraine and authorized Estonia and the Netherlands to supply Ukraine with German-produced weapons. Germany also supports EU efforts to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine. Additionally, Germany is modernizing its Air Force and has announced the procurement of 35 F–35 aircraft.

Question. What other European Allies have announced defense policy changes in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

Answer. Below is a list of notable defense policy changes made by European Allies, close NATO partner Sweden, and the EU in the wake of Russia's war of choice in Ukraine. Additionally, all European Allies have provided humanitarian and/or military assistance to Ukraine; for some Allies, the decision to provide lethal aid represents a significant shift in defense policy, with Germany and the Netherlands as key examples.

- Belgium:
  - On February 25, the Government of Belgium announced it will increase defense spending from its current level of 1.1 percent of GDP to 1.54 percent of GDP by 2030.
- Denmark:
  - On March 6, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen called on Danish citizens to overturn Denmark's ability to opt-out from EU defense policy and announced a referendum to do so that will be held on June 1.
  - PM Frederiksen also announced a 7 billion kroner ($1 billion USD) increase to defense, diplomacy, and humanitarian spending over the next 2 years. Denmark plans to meet NATO's Wales Pledge (2 percent of GDP towards defense spending) by 2033.
- EU:
  - Given that the majority of NATO Allies are also EU member states, it is significant to note that in late February the EU agreed to finance 1 billion euros (1.1 billion USD) in assistance to the Ukrainian military, including lethal assistance for the first time ever.
- Germany:
  - In late February, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a plan to increase German military spending significantly and imminently, pledging 100 billion euros ($112.7 billion USD). Scholz also pledged to spend more than 2 percent of GDP on defense, allowing Germany to meet NATO's Wales Pledge, and Germany agreed to buy 35 F–35 fighter jets. Germany currently spends only 1.53 percent of GDP on defense, further highlighting the significance of this policy shift.

- In late February, Germany agreed to send lethal aid to Ukraine, shifting from a policy of not sending weapons to active conflict zones.

- Netherlands:
  - On February 18, the Dutch Government announced its decision to supply Ukraine with military assistance, a shift from previous policy that precluded the deployment of lethal assistance to conflict zones.

- Poland:
  - On March 3, Polish Deputy Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski announced that Poland will increase defense spending immediately, with a goal of increasing the defense budget from 2.1 to 3 percent of GDP in 2023. He pledged additional increases in the following years.

- Romania:
  - On March 1, President Iohannis announced Romania would increase its defense spending to 2.5 percent of GDP, but this still requires parliamentary approval. We believe the increase in spending will go to military acquisitions (and not personnel salaries) and allowing Romania to modernize even further.

- Sweden (close NATO partner):
  - On March 10, Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson announced that Sweden will increase its defense spending from 1.3 percent to 2 percent of GDP "as soon as is practical."

Question. What is the status of the German dual-capable aircraft replacement program?

Answer. On March 14, 2022, Germany announced it would procure 35 F–35 aircraft to replace its aging nuclear-capable Tornados. The F–35 procurement may help Germany maintain critical continuity in its contributions under the NATO nuclear sharing program. We look forward to working with the German Ministry of Defense to maintain Germany's key contributions to NATO missions.

Question. What is the status of the German heavy lift helicopter replacement program?

Answer. Germany is still in the process of completing its aircraft selection for its $6 billion Heavy Lift Helicopter program. Both contenders are U.S. platforms, the Lockheed Martin's King Stallion CH–53K Helicopter and the Boeing Chinook CH–47F, and the contract award is contingent upon U.S. Government provision of pilot and technical training through at least the first 5 years of the program. Germany contracted via the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program for 22 pilots to be trained in the United States in 2021 and 30 in 2022.

In order to receive a FMS offer for a heavy lift helicopter Germany must down select a platform and submit a Letter of Request (LOR) for Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). It is possible that Germany may request a LOR for LOA for both platforms to maintain flexibility and avoid the appearance of bias. Germany requested one final set of pricing and availability data from each competitor that will be provided in early April 2022. We anticipate Germany will make a selection by second quarter 2022.

Question. What is the status of the German air defense replacement program?

Answer. Lockheed Martin and Matra BAE Dynamics and Alenia Deutschland are in a joint venture to develop and produce Germany's next-generation air and missile defense system, the PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC–3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) End-to-End Missile Model (ETMM). Germany calls this program the *Taktische Luftverteidigungssystem* ("Tactical Air Defense System;" or TLVS). Germany submitted a Letter of Request in April 2019 for PAC–3 MSE–ETMM; however, Germany stopped the development of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance in March 2021 due to lack of a budget plan in 2021 or 2022 for the TLVS program. Germany has not informed the USG if it intends to continue the program.

Question. How does security assistance support U.S. interests regarding strategic competition with Russia?

Answer. Security assistance revitalizes and bolsters alliances and partnerships to counteract Russia's destabilizing and subversive agenda in Eastern Europe. In Ukraine, the USG has provided over $3 billion in security assistance since 2014 to strengthen the capabilities and readiness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces—and the results are evident. We have provided security assistance to enhance conventional capabilities and address the asymmetrical threat of Russian hybridized warfare to

other Eastern European countries, including the Baltic States, collectively the largest recipient of security assistance in Europe after Ukraine. Moreover, we are working to build capacity, good governance, and to strengthen relations, with security partners around the world, from Africa to Latin America, to better enable them to reject Russia's destabilizing activities.

Question. How have or will Western sanctions and export controls affect Russia's ability to compete with the U.S. for defense exports?

Answer. The sanctions imposed by the United States and many other countries as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine will make defense transactions with Russia even more difficult and risky. All countries must now consider the extreme risk of negative consequences from supporting a heavily sanctioned Russian defense sector. This support could also result in future inability to acquire military equipment, including spare parts and maintenance for their own forces.

Question. What changes has the Biden administration made in our security relationship with Taiwan in the last year to help bolster Taiwan's ability to deter increasing Chinese military aggression?

Answer. Our defense relationship with Taiwan continues to be commensurate with the threat we assess from the PRC, consistent with our one China policy and in the context of our Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Taiwan's ability to deter China from using military force or coercion to invade, occupy, and unify the island is in the strategic interest of the United States. The U.S. Government's approach to Taiwan has shifted from one of insisting Taiwan deprioritize buying high profile, symbolic platforms to a more proactive approach on the provision of arms and the services that support Taiwan's self-defense in a manner commensurate with the threat from China. Further, the U.S. Government is consulting with the Taiwan Authorities to ensure there is alignment on the capabilities needed to deter the PRC and defend the island.

Question. Please define the term "asymmetric" as regards Taiwan's defense requirements.

Answer. The U.S. Government seeks to assist Taiwan in procuring asymmetric capabilities. These capabilities should be cost-efficient, mobile, lethal, resilient, and cable of operating and surviving in a contested environment. Further, these capabilities need to be able to deter the PRC, complicate PRC military planning, and should a conflict occur, they must be effective in the defense of the island. The Departments of State and Defense are discussing this terminology with Taiwan to ensure Taiwan's defense procurements align with this definition of asymmetric. Taiwan's definition of asymmetric is codified in greater detail in its national Defense Report 2021, section 2 "Planning for Force Buildup."

Question. How would the Biden administration make best use of a new security assistance funding program for Taiwan?

Answer. Provided the U.S. Government receives appropriations along with the authorization for security assistance funding for Taiwan, such funding would be used to support programs that align with our defense trade and defense priorities writ large. These priorities include anti-ship missiles, integrated air and missile defense, C2, data links, ISR, redundant communications, and electronic warfare capabilities.

Question. What changes have the Department of State and Department of Defense made in their processes to accelerate and expedite getting necessary defense capabilities to Taiwan (not just for Foreign Military Sales, but also Direct Commercial Sales or any other process relevant for Taiwan), other than reversing the bundling policy?

Answer. The Departments of State and Defense are looking at the entire defense trade enterprise to see where efficiencies can be made and what delivery timelines of defense articles can be improved. We lowered the approval authority for the transfer of defense articles and services, and we are looking to review anticipatory policies, outline defense trade priorities to Taiwan and to industry to increase transparency and predictability, expedite Third Party Transfers, discuss arm sale exports from other countries, push for the conclusion of defense agreements related to defense trade, and look at opportunities to improve Taiwan's indigenous industrial defense capability.

Question. What are the top 2–3 things the Department of State and the Department of Defense are working on to shorten delivery timelines for arms sales to Taiwan?

Answer. The Departments of State and Defense are seeking to shorten delivery timelines for numerous Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales cases under contract as well as those in the pipeline. Three notable cases that the U.S. Government is seeking to expedite include Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles, F–16 new buy deliveries and induction of F–16 retrofit airplanes, and Stinger missiles. Specific areas where the Department of Defense has focused in FMS are: 1) opportunities to prioritize Taiwan production and delivery as appropriate and 2) working with the defense industry to employ strategic contract strategies that enable early procurement of items that have long lead times.

Question. What does the Department of State or Department of Defense need from Congress to shorten delivery timelines for arms sales to Taiwan?

Answer. We encourage Congress to work with the Department of Defense to seek efficiencies and make reforms to the Federal acquisition processes that govern all U.S. Government acquisitions and directly impact the speed of Foreign Military Sales case execution for Taiwan. Title 22 and Title 10 security assistance programs are subject to the U.S. procurement regulations, such as the Balance of Payments Program, that in large part limit procurements to U.S. sources. In some cases, there may not be a U.S.-origin capability that can meet Taiwan's immediate requirements. Although the ability to acquire capabilities from foreign commercial or government sources would be particularly beneficial to the Department in executing security assistance programs for Taiwan, receipt of a blanket authority to procure foreign-made equipment, including license-produced items, under Title 22 and Title 10 building partnership capacity authorities would vastly increase the Department's ability to provide capabilities globally in alignment with defense priorities.

Question. How are the Department of State and Department of Defense thinking about Taiwan's civilian defense and resilience needs in planning out future engagements with Taiwan?

Answer. While the U.S. Government has focused extensively on supporting Taiwan through the acquisition of asymmetric capabilities, the Departments of State and Defense are also coordinating closely with Taiwan on non-material solutions to improve Taiwan's defenses. This includes working with Taiwan on increasing its resiliency and jointness across the military and non-military domains by looking at its reserve and mobilization reforms and civil-military integration.

Question. Are the Department of State or the Department of Defense considering any funding or programming that would address civilian defense and resilience needs?

Answer. We would be willing to discuss security assistance funding with Congress. Historically, the Department of State has not provided any security assistance, including Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education Training, to Taiwan due to its high-income status and ability to use national funds for foreign military sales and given that a substantial amount of FMF would be required to support the highly sophisticated capabilities that Taiwan needs. This is not feasible without significant support from appropriators. The annual global FMF account is about 93 percent earmarked by Congress, and State is therefore constrained by very limited discretionary funds. The Department of Defense has been supporting Taiwan via section 333 (Train & Equip) and continues planning for 333 funding in out-years.

Question. How have the Department of State and Department of Defense engaged with industry on supply chain delays for Taiwan's purchases?

Answer. On March 14, the Department of State, in close coordination with the Departments of Defense and Commerce, will initiate a discussion with the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council (USTBC) and its members to discuss: 1) The U.S. Government's defense trade priorities for Taiwan; and 2) Solicit U.S. defense industry's recommendations for shortening the timeline from initial requests to delivery of a capability. The Department of State seeks to continue engaging through the USTBC to obtain industry wide recommendations. We will also engage in one-on-one discussions with defense contractors to discuss ways to mitigate supply chain issues for specific weapon systems to Taiwan.

Question. The Biden administration says that China is the pacing threat for the U.S. and our allies. How much of the State Department's security assistance budget goes to the Indo-Pacific region, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage?

Answer. The Administration's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) requests and Congressional appropriations are historically constrained by enduring commitments. For example, roughly 88 percent of the global FMF account is earmarked for the

NEA region, which usually leaves the Department with limited flexibility in discretionary FMF funds, particularly when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. In recent years, the Department has allocated nearly a third (32 percent in FY 2021) of its discretionary FMF to the Indo-Pacific. I appreciate Congress' receptiveness to our concerns over the inflexibility of the FMF account and I was pleased to see fewer earmarks and restrictions in the FY 2022 appropriations, which is a step in the right direction. I will keep you apprised as we determine resource alignment against the Administration's new Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Question. What are the most pressing capability gaps among U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific? Please provide responses for each country to which the United States has provided security assistance in the prior 3 years.

Answer. Over the past 3 years, we have focused our security assistance on addressing the following pressing capability gaps: maritime capacity, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, peacekeeping operations, institutional capacity building, military professionalization and training, border security, counterterrorism, and cyber. Particularly given the publication of the new Indo-Pacific Strategy, we will continue working closely with DoD to identify critical gaps, opportunities, and requirements to ensure FY 2022 resources are aligned with priorities, and out-year budget planning and funding requests include emerging requirements. Given that many discussions on capabilities and gaps are classified—such as the South China Sea asymmetric working group—I would be happy to further engage on this topic in a classified setting.

Question. What steps has the Biden administration taken to prioritize and expedite Foreign Military Sales to Japan?

Answer. We are working with Japan, the Department of Defense, and industry to achieve efficiencies wherever possible within the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. For example, we encourage Japan to make greater use of multi-year procurements. This supports DoD's ability to move cases faster and at lower cost, which will improve our forces' interoperability and ensure our alliance can adapt quickly to a changing security landscape with the necessary capabilities and military readiness. Following efforts to streamline case development, case processing time has reduced by 16 percent.

Additionally, we welcome Japan's progress toward establishing the security infrastructure necessary to implement FMS cases in a timely fashion. For example, the May 2021 signing of the Advanced Weapons Systems Special Security Agreement (AWS SSA) will greatly reduce case execution time and increase the predictability of Japan's requirements.

Question. What else can the Biden administration do to speed the process of Foreign Military Sales to Japan?

Answer. We will continue exploring options for generating increased pricing data for Japan's internal purposes and to further reduce timelines for successful Foreign Military Sales (FMS) implementation. Over the coming months the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and Japan's Acquisition Technology and Logistics Agency will pursue increased efficiency through pricing and availability estimates within Japan's budget process timelines. Staffing is underway to confirm what FMS policy exceptions are required and ensure buy-in from the services. DSCA is also looking at finance options to speed the implementation of FMS cases, saving months on the timeline from Letter of Offer and Acceptance signature and authority to enter contracting actions on Japan's behalf. We also look forward to working with the Government of Japan as it takes steps to increase pricing fidelity and programmatic efficiencies.

Question. What, if anything, is new about AUKUS, when it comes to security assistance with Australia?

Answer. The AUKUS trilateral partnership signals our commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region, providing impetus to ensure Australia has advanced capabilities to fulfill its part. This initiative extends beyond nuclear-powered submarines to include cyber, quantum, artificial intelligence, additional undersea, and other advanced conventional capabilities necessary to meet the region's dynamic security challenges. What is not new is that as we evaluate the transfer of any of these advanced conventional capabilities, we will continue to do so via the lens of our Conventional Arms Transfer policy, including ensuring that U.S. information and technology is appropriately protected. We will also continue to notify Congress in accordance with our obligations under the Arms Export Control Act.

Question. Based on current circumstances, in which Indo-Pacific countries is the United States under-investing in terms of security assistance because of certain constraints?

Answer. State and DoD work closely together to deconflict Title 22 and Title 10 funding for countries and capabilities, considering critical factors such as political objectives, defense requirements, absorptive capacity, partner nation investments, access, influence, assurance and reciprocity, ability for embassies to manage increased resources, comparative advantages, end-use agreements, Congressional restrictions and legal considerations, and funding pipelines. Additionally, approximately 93 percent of State's FMF annual appropriation is earmarked, which reduces our ability to shift resources to priority regions and countries. All these issues can act as constraints; and we carefully review such variables prior to the allocation of funds, while also utilizing our assessment, monitoring, and evaluation resources to help inform out-year budget requests and allocations.

Question. What constraints are there in the Indo-Pacific for investing in security assistance? Please provide a country-by-country breakdown.

Answer. The Department of State and DoD work closely together to deconflict Title 22 and Title 10 funding for countries and capabilities, considering critical factors such as political objectives, absorptive capacity, partner nation investments, access, influence, assurance and reciprocity, ability for embassies to manage increased resources, comparative advantages, end-use agreements, funding pipelines, and Congressional restrictions and legal considerations. All these issues can act as constraints; and we carefully review such variables prior to the allocation of funds, while also utilizing our assessment, monitoring, and evaluation resources to help inform out-year budget requests and allocations. I would be happy to have further discussions on specific country issues.

Question. Based on current circumstances, how much more Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training could each of the countries absorb, if the United States had the security assistance funds to provide them with more FMF or IMET? Please provide a country-by-country breakdown.

Answer. Absorptive capacity is a significant consideration when allocating both Title 22 (including Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training, or IMET) and Title 10 security assistance resources. We assess that the President's FY 2022 Congressional Budget Justification is sufficient to meet current demand signal in the region, and as deconflicted with Title 10 resources and other variables. IMET, in particular, requires special consideration given the frequent misperceptions of the topline regional and bilateral allocation amounts. When determining bilateral IMET allocation levels, we consider several factors, the most important of which are absorptive capacity of the recipient country (e.g., the ability to identify candidates at the appropriate rank with the necessary language skills) and U.S. military schoolhouse capacity. Additionally, several countries 'cost share' the attendance of their students to U.S. schools (i.e., IMET pays the tuition, the recipient country covers travel/per diem), which increases the number of students partners can send. We work very closely with the Security Cooperation Offices at our embassies and attend all Geographic Combatant Command strategy and resourcing conferences, as well as the regional Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Groups to validate individual country requirements on an annual basis. I look forward to continuing resourcing discussions to ensure we have sufficient funding to meet demand signals from our partners. I would be happy to have further discussions on specific country issues in a different setting.

Question. Do you consider the Philippines to be a strategically important ally of the United States? Please explain your position.

Answer. Yes, the long-standing alliance between the Philippines and the United States is anchored by our collective commitment to democracy, which has contributed to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region for more than 75 years. As documented in the joint statement of the 2021 U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Strategic Dialogue, the United States and the Philippines are coordinating on fundamental matters of peace and stability, including unimpeded lawful commerce, freedoms of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, along with many other matters of vital importance to the national security of the United States.

Question. The United States military currently cooperates with the Armed Forces of the Philippines on counterterrorism and maritime security. Multiple members of Congress have proposed limiting or cutting off U.S. security assistance to the Philippine military because of concerns over human rights abuses.

Do you believe that taking such a step is in U.S. interests?

Answer. The Philippines and United States maintain an ongoing dialogue about all aspects of our relationship, including human rights. Such sustained constructive engagement is essential for promoting both respect for human rights and U.S. security interests. Our security assistance supports respect for, and understanding of, human rights in the Philippines, for example through the International Military Education & Training program. Furthermore, security assistance is subject to Leahy vetting to ensure that no proposed recipient is a member of a unit credibly implicated in a gross violation of human rights. I believe that we need to continue to monitor U.S. security assistance to the Philippines to ensure that it is striking the correct balance between promotion of respect for human rights and U.S. security interests.

Question. The United States military currently cooperates with the Armed Forces of the Philippines on counterterrorism and maritime security. Multiple members of Congress have proposed limiting or cutting off U.S. security assistance to the Philippine military because of concerns over human rights abuses.

Do you believe that taking such a step would improve human rights conditions in the Philippines?

Answer. The U.S. Government utilizes the International Military Education & Training (IMET) program to foster respect for and understanding of human rights in the Philippine military. Consistent with the Leahy Law, the Department vets all assistance to security force units nominated for assistance and restricts any training or other assistance to units credibly implicated in a gross violation of human rights. This helps incentivize the Armed Forces of the Philippines to respect human rights and to investigate and address, as appropriate, allegations of human rights violations. I believe that we need to continue to monitor U.S. security assistance to the Philippines to ensure that it is striking the correct balance between promotion of respect for human rights and U.S. security interests.

Question. The Philippines is a state party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Is that compatible with being a U.S. ally and security assistance recipient?

Answer. While the Bureau of Political Military Affairs does not handle this issue directly, the United States has stated that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) risks negatively affecting nuclear deterrence, extended nuclear deterrence, and our security relationships. We have repeatedly noted our concerns to those allies and partners who have expressed an interest in the TPNW, including its state parties. The Treaty may reinforce divisions that hinder the international community's ability to work together to address pressing proliferation and security challenges.

Question. Have we made clear that the U.S. will not protect the Philippines against nuclear threats or coercion?

Answer. While the Bureau of Political Military Affairs does not handle this issue directly, the United States has stated that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) may reinforce divisions that hinder the international community's ability to work together to address pressing proliferation and security challenges. It also risks negatively affecting nuclear deterrence, extended nuclear deterrence, and our security relationships. It remains to be seen how TPNW states parties will interpret and implement many of the treaty's provisions and how this might impact their security relationships with nuclear weapons states.

Question. How does security assistance support U.S. interests regarding strategic competition with China?

Answer. Security assistance is vital to strengthening our alliances and partnerships, which serve as a source of strength and are a unique American advantage. These alliances and partnerships enable us to present a common front, defend access to the global commons, and hold countries like the People's Republic of China accountable for aggressive actions. Our security assistance helps to strengthen military-to-military cooperation and our overall bilateral and multilateral relationships, and to build the defensive capabilities, institutional capacity, and good governance of key partners, enabling them to defend their rights, make independent political choices free of coercion, reject unlawful maritime claims, and strengthen and maintain the international rules-based order.

Question. How many missile or drone attacks did the Houthis launch against Saudi Arabia and UAE in 2021?

Answer. The Department understands there were more than 400 cross-border drone and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia during 2021, killing dozens and wounding many more.

Question. What is the Biden administration doing to support them in countering these threats?

Answer. The Administration has been clear with our partners that we will continue to support their territorial defense against cross-border attacks, including through relevant arms transfers. We appreciate Congressional support for these capabilities when they enter the Congressional review process.

Question. What specific security assistance efforts are underway to counter these threats?

Answer. The interagency continues to process air defense related arms transfer requests for systems such as Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) that have been instrumental in defeating cross-border attacks. The Department continues to work closely with our Department of Defense colleagues to expedite the necessary processes ahead of any proposed defensive capability transfers.

Question. What air and missile defense capabilities have the Saudis or Emiratis requested from the U.S. that have not yet been approved or provided?

Answer. Aside from systems of record such as Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, the interagency is processing requests for additional counter-unmanned aerial vehicle capabilities, many of which are still in development. The Department continues to work closely with our Department of Defense colleagues to expedite the necessary processes ahead of any proposed defensive capability transfers.

Question. China has exploited the USG's failure to export drones and other capabilities to establish growing military relationships in the Middle East. What is the Biden administration doing to counter these growing Chinese efforts?

Answer. Following an interagency review, the Biden-Harris administration decided to maintain the unmanned aerial systems Export Policy, including to invoke national discretion for a subset of Missile Technology Control Regime-controlled systems. These transfers are considered on a case-by-case basis. In addition, as part of the Administration's review of the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, the Administration is exploring ways to make U.S. arms transfers more competitive, including flexible financing options and building exportability into platforms and technology early in the acquisition process.

Question. Has the UAS export policy damaged U.S. interests in the Middle East?

Answer. No, the policy reflects American values while still accounting for the security needs of our partners. As with all arms transfer requests, unmanned aerial system cases are reviewed on a case-by-case basis to ensure the transfer aligns with U.S. national security, human rights, and other foreign policy objectives.

Question. Has the UAS export policy damaged U.S. interests in the Middle East?

Answer. The United States is committed to advancing the security of our partners across the Middle East. As with all arms transfer requests, unmanned aerial vehicle cases are reviewed on a case-by-case basis to ensure the transfer aligns with U.S. national security, human rights, and other foreign policy objectives.

Question. What is the status of deliveries of KC–46 refueling aircraft to Israel? Are deliveries being expedited?

Answer. I would defer to our Department of Defense colleagues for an update on the status of these contracts and delivery timeline.

Question. The U.S. spent roughly $125B over 20 years in mostly failed efforts to build the Iraqi and Afghan militaries. Please describe any formal efforts that the USG has conducted to institutionalize lessons from these security assistance efforts. What lessons have been learned?

Answer. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan taught us that security assistance delivered before baseline standards of governance and institutional capacity are in place may provide little return on investment and may even harm U.S. interests in the long run. It is a matter of finding the correct balance in delivering security assistance, as a certain level of security is necessary for the implementation of baseline standards of governance and the growth of institutional capacity in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction and the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction have led the

USG's formal efforts to assess and document lessons learned to inform future reconstruction efforts. For both Special Inspectors General, the USG's security sector assistance was a central focus. Among the key lessons that emerged: 1) the lag in developing host nation ministerial and security sector governing capacity hindered planning, oversight, and the long-term sustainability of their security forces; and 2) providing advanced weapons and management systems to host-nation security forces without also providing the appropriate training and institutional infrastructure created long-term dependencies, required increased U.S. financial support, and hampered efforts to make those security forces self-sustaining.

Question. How have these lessons been institutionalized in the State Department and Defense Department?

Answer. With our DoD colleagues, we are cognizant of past challenges in our support to Iraqi and Afghan security forces. In Iraq, we continue to update and refine our security cooperation and security assistance goals and objectives. While remaining focused on helping the Iraqis prevent the re-emergence of ISIS, we are working to institute a more "normal" security cooperation relationship, with emphasis on defense institutions, security sector reform, and security sector governance. Outside the context of Iraq, we recognize as a matter of principle that partners' institutional capacity to absorb and sustain U.S. training and equipment must be the pacesetter for U.S. security cooperation and assistance activities. Through improved planning, assessments, and interagency coordination, we are working to ensure security cooperation and assistance for each partner is integrated into a broader political strategy that advances our foreign policy interests and addresses the underlying drivers of insecurity. I would refer you to DoD colleagues for more details on how the Department of Defense is institutionalizing these lessons internally.

Question. What are the objectives of U.S. security assistance to Africa?

Answer. Our objectives include improving the capacity of African partners to advance regional stability and security by enabling more professional, apolitical, capable, and accountable government security actors that provide for their own security and stability, actively support shared security interests in the continent, and build sustainable security sector capabilities and institutions. The U.S. supports the development of institutions and processes required for accountable and responsive governance, thereby mitigating societal grievances and root causes of conflict that exacerbate global competitors' efforts to replace the United States as the partner of choice and undermine security, as exemplified by Wagner Group activities.

Question. What are the priorities for U.S. security assistance to Africa?

Answer. The U.S. is focused on building professional and capable security forces and institutions that enjoy popular legitimacy, support good governance and the rule of law, and respect human rights norms and the rules of armed conflict. We prioritize security assistance to countries leading efforts to reduce terrorist threats emanating from the continent to the U.S. Homeland region, U.S. interests and persons in Africa, and the region. U.S. security assistance also contributes to frustrating global competitors' efforts to replace us as the partner of choice and actively undermine security in some areas, as exemplified by Wagner Group activities. We support efforts to maintain open and legal access to major sea lines of communications and trade in the Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, and the Gulf of Aden as an important priority.

Question. What is the status of the AH–1Z sale to Nigeria?

Answer. An FMS case for the proposed sale of up to 12 AH–1Z attack helicopters was submitted for Congressional staff consultations on January 8, 2021. Because this case remained under review so long, the cost increased to $997M, in contrast to the $875 million figure originally transmitted. The original notification was removed from consultation on February 1, 2022; we resumed consultations on March 22, 2022 with the updated case. This is a priority for the Administration's bilateral relationship, and Nigeria remains committed to the purchase.

Question. Is additional U.S. security assistance required to support U.S. strategic goals regarding competition with China and Russia in Africa, especially potential basing issues?

Answer. U.S. strategic goals regarding competition with the PRC and Russia in Africa require a whole-of-government approach. State works closely with DoD to align policy goals with military planning. State oversees approximately $300M annually in military assistance funding to sub-Saharan Africa to accomplish a number of objectives, including countering strategic competition. Several countries in Africa have benefited from the new Countering Chinese Influence Fund, and PM also cre-

ated the new Countering Strategic Competitors program within the Peacekeeping Operations account to support activities in Africa. We will continue to work with interagency partners to make the right investments in capabilities to counter the PRC and Russia, in addition to violent extremist organizations.

The Administration is committed to strengthening and expanding cooperation to enhance our ability to work by, with, and through our partners. Globally, but particularly in Africa, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has been expanding the number of enabling agreements to deepen defense cooperation and flexible access for U.S. forces to respond to contingencies or support disaster relief. Mindful of adversaries' activities, we prevail with the superior quality of U.S. engagement, exercises, and training and advantages of interoperability. We have recently concluded agreements with Cabo Verde, Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, and are in the process of concluding an agreement with Gabon.

When it is apparent the PRC has clear plans to establish a military base in Africa, as is likely the case in Equatorial Guinea, both State and the NSC have engaged quickly at senior levels. We share the concern of our African and European partners over potential militarization of the Gulf of Guinea. This includes the possible construction of a PRC naval installation. The United States does not expect the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to end partnerships with other countries, but we have made clear that certain potential steps involving PRC-basing activity would raise U.S. national-security concerns both for the United States and Equatorial Guinea's neighbors.

Question. What are the objectives of U.S. security assistance to the Western Hemisphere?

Answer. U.S. security assistance for the Western Hemisphere focuses on building a safe and secure hemisphere with four primary objectives: 1) combat irregular migration-related security risks by protecting U.S. citizens, ensuring secure borders; promoting safe, humane, and orderly immigration and asylum systems; enhancing protections for refugees and displaced persons; and promoting stability in areas impacted by migration; 2) build safe communities through violence prevention and intervention, including a focus on addressing gender-based violence; 3) strengthen host country resilience to malign foreign influence through partner nation capacity building, including bolstering law enforcement, judicial, criminal justice sector, and military institutions; and, 4) counter transnational criminal organizations and illicit networks.

Question. What are the priorities for U.S. security assistance to the Western Hemisphere?

Answer. U.S. security assistance for the Western Hemisphere prioritizes programs that combat transnational criminal organizations, terrorist groups, gangs, violence, (including gender-based violence) and corruption that drives irregular migration. These groups threaten borders by moving drugs and contraband (including illegal arms), trafficking in persons, and engaging in illicit finance and money laundering. Our assistance prioritizes regional efforts to bolster the rule of law and confront illicit activities by these groups through strong diplomatic engagement and support for local efforts to professionalize justice, police, and other security forces; to strengthen communities to resist violence and the lure of irregular migration; and to counter competitors and external actors of concern seeking to undermine regional democratic institutions and our collective security. Our assistance aims to build capacity among our partners and provide them with training, equipment and other assistance to address these issues.

RESPONSES OF DR. MARA ELIZABETH KARLIN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH WAS GIVEN DURING A CLASSIFIED BRIEFING

Question. Has the Department of State's role in setting bilateral security assistance policies diminished over the last two decades?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. If yes to the previous question, to what extent is this a problem for U.S. foreign policy from the perspective of the Department of Defense?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What actions has the Department of State taken to re-establish leadership over security assistance?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What additional capacity and capability to plan and execute security assistance has the Department of Defense acquired over security assistance?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What, if anything, can or should be done to strengthen the role of the Department of State from the perspective of the Department of Defense?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What DoD authorities currently do not require Secretary of State concurrence, but should?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What flexibility is needed for State Department security assistance from the perspective of the Department of Defense?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. How should security assistance address corruption from the perspective of the Department of Defense?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. How does DoD plan for security assistance?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. How does DoD set its priorities for security assistance?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What gaps exist in the current DoD workforce, both in numbers and in training or expertise?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. How can we best fill gaps in the current DoD workforce?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. EUROPE AND EURASIA: *Security Assistance for Ukraine*: What is the objective of U.S. security assistance for Ukraine from the perspective of the Department of Defense?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. If the objective of U.S. security assistance is not to enable the Ukrainians to defeat the Russian invaders, why not?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Does the USG believe Ukraine can win from the perspective of the Department of Defense?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. While backfilling Allies and partners who supplied assistance to Ukraine should be a major priority, as reflected in the recent Ukraine supplemental appropriation, can you confirm that the top priority for the Ukraine PDA included the supplemental will be the timely provision of critical military assistance to Ukraine?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Why does the U.S. Government view the transfer of capable air defense, drone, and anti-tank systems as not escalatory towards Russia, but views the transfer of aircraft as escalatory?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What specific evidence is there that the transfer of aircraft will be viewed by Russia as escalatory?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Was the transfer of fighter aircraft by the Soviet Union to the North Vietnamese escalatory?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Has the USG approached Turkey to donate its S–400 air defense systems to Ukraine? If so, what was the response? If not, why not?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What is the USG doing to get more capable air defense systems to Ukraine?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Who is in charge of coordinating the logistics and supply of military assistance to Ukraine?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What is the plan to ensure continuity of supplies and assistance into Ukraine?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What are the next steps in building out Ukraine's air defense capabilities now that large numbers of MANPADS have been delivered?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What efforts are underway to source MANPADS and other air defense capabilities from allies and partners?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What is DoD's policy regarding American service members traveling to volunteer to fight for the Ukrainians?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What efforts is State taking to make it easier for volunteer organizations, non-profits, and others to donate or send military equipment to Ukraine?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Security Assistance for Eastern Europe: The 2022 budget supplemental includes $500M for Foreign Military Finance grant assistance for Eastern Europe and Ukraine.

What are the USG's objectives for this assistance?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What is the plan to use those funds?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. The 2022 budget supplemental includes $4B for Foreign Military Finance loan authority for Eastern Europe and Ukraine.

What are the USG's objectives for this assistance?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What is the plan to use those funds?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Eastern European allies have donated large quantities of defense articles to Ukraine. They still need to deter Russian aggression against themselves.

What articles need to be backfilled to maintain deterrence?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What is the USG doing to expedite such backfills?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What is U.S. industry doing to expedite production and delivery?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Security Assistance for NATO and Europe as a Whole: Does the 2014 Wales summit pledge of 2 percent GDP spending for defense still make sense in the face of Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What is the Biden administration doing to ensure NATO allies spend more?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Germany has announced a major shift in its defense policy. What actual tangible steps has it taken to put this policy into action?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What other European allies have announced defense policy changes in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What is the status of the German dual-capable aircraft replacement program?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What is the status of the German heavy lift helicopter replacement program?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What is the status of the German air defense replacement program?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. How does security assistance support U.S. interests regarding strategic competition with Russia?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. How have or will Western sanctions and export controls affect Russia's ability to compete with the U.S. for defense exports?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. EAST ASIA AND THE INDO–PACIFIC: *Security Assistance for Taiwan*: What changes has the Biden administration made in our security relationship with Taiwan in the last year to help bolster Taiwan's ability to deter increasing Chinese military aggression?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Please define the term "asymmetric" as regards Taiwan's defense requirements.

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. How would the Biden administration make best use of a new security assistance funding program for Taiwan?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What changes have the Department of State and Department of Defense made in their processes to accelerate and expedite getting necessary defense capabilities to Taiwan (not just for Foreign Military Sales, but also Direct Commercial Sales or any other process relevant for Taiwan), other than reversing the bundling policy?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What are the top 2–3 things the Department of State and the Department of Defense are working on to shorten delivery timelines for arms sales to Taiwan?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What does the Department of State or Department of Defense need from Congress to shorten delivery timelines for arms sales to Taiwan?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. How are the Department of State and Department of Defense thinking about Taiwan's civilian defense and resilience needs in planning out future engagements with Taiwan?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Are the Department of State or the Department of Defense considering any funding or programming that would address civilian defense and resilience needs?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. How have the Department of State and Department of Defense engaged with industry on supply chain delays for Taiwan's purchases?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Security Assistance for the Indo-Pacific: The Biden administration says that China is the pacing threat for the U.S. and our allies.

How much of the DoD's security assistance budget goes to the Indo-Pacific region, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What are the most pressing capability gaps among U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific? Please provide responses for each country to which the United States has provided security assistance in the prior 3 years.

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What steps has the Biden administration taken to prioritize and expedite Foreign Military Sales to Japan?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What else can the Biden administration do to speed the process of Foreign Military Sales to Japan?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What, if anything, is new about AUKUS, when it comes to security assistance with Australia?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Based on current circumstances, in which Indo-Pacific countries is the United States under-investing in terms of security assistance because of certain constraints?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What constraints are there in the Indo-Pacific for investing in security assistance? Please provide a country-by-country breakdown.

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Based on current circumstances, how much more Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training could each of the countries absorb, if the United States had the security assistance funds to provide them with more FMF or IMET? Please provide a country-by-country breakdown.

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Do you consider the Philippines to be a strategically important ally of the United States? Please explain your position.

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. The United States military currently cooperates with the Armed Forces of the Philippines on counterterrorism and maritime security. Multiple members of Congress have proposed limiting or cutting off U.S. security assistance to the Philippine military because of concerns over human rights abuses.

Do you believe that taking such a step is in U.S. interests?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Do you believe that taking such a step would improve human rights conditions in the Philippines?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. The Philippines is a state party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Is that compatible with being a U.S. ally and security assistance recipient?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Have we made clear that the U.S. will not protect the Philippines against nuclear threats or coercion?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. How does security assistance support U.S. interests regarding strategic competition with China?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND AF/PAK: Middle East partners are increasingly being targeted by Iranian-origin missiles and drones.

How many missile or drone attacks did the Houthis launch against Saudi Arabia and UAE in 2021?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What is the Biden administration doing to support them in countering these threats?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What specific security assistance efforts are underway to counter these threats?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What air and missile defense capabilities have the Saudis or Emiratis requested from the U.S. that have not yet been approved or provided?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. China has exploited the USG's failure to export drones and other capabilities to establish growing military relationships in the Middle East.

What is the Biden administration doing to counter these growing Chinese efforts?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Has the UAS export policy damaged U.S. interests in the Middle East?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What is the status of deliveries of KC–4 aircraft to Israel? Are deliveries being expedited?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Lessons Learned from Iraq and Afghanistan: The U.S. spent roughly $125B over 20 years in mostly failed efforts to build the Iraqi and Afghan militaries.

Please describe any formal efforts that the USG has conducted to institutionalize lessons from these security assistance efforts.

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What lessons have been learned?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. How have these lessons been institutionalized in the State Department and Defense Department?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. SUB–SAHARA AFRICA: What are the objectives of U.S. security assistance to Africa?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What are the priorities for U.S. security assistance to Africa?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What is the status of the AH–1Z sale to Nigeria?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Is additional U.S. security assistance required to support U.S. strategic goals regarding competition with China and Russia in Africa, especially potential basing issues?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. WESTERN HEMISPHERE: What are the objectives of U.S. security assistance to the Western Hemisphere?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What are the priorities for U.S. security assistance to the Western Hemisphere?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

RESPONSES OF DR. MARA ELIZABETH KARLIN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY WAS GIVEN DURING A CLASSIFIED BRIEFING

Question. What concrete actions has the Department of Defense taken or plans to take to configure U.S. nuclear policy with the January 3, 2022 P5 Statement—from the leaders of China, France, the United Kingdom, Russia and the United States—declaring that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought?"

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. The Department of Defense pledged in an email to my office on September 23, 2021 that the Department would contract out an independent analysis to "objectively review the technical feasibility of extending the life of MMIII Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) past 2030 to inform future analysis."

Has the Department contracted out that independent study, and if so, to whom?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Did the Department reach out specifically to the JASONs to gauge its capacity to conduct an independent analysis, and if so, what was its response?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. In a subsequent email to my office, the Department appeared to have narrowed the scope of the promised independent analysis, saying that they would conduct an "external study of diverse views on the intercontinental ballistic missile-leg of the nuclear triad." If the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) "external study" does not "objectively review technical feasibility questions," as pledged, what are the Department plans to conduct such a review before release of the Nuclear Posture Review this year?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. Will the Department make the CEIP study publicly available? Will it provide the Statement of Work for that study to my office as the Department's Office of Legislative Affairs pledged it would do in its September 23, 2021 email?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

RESPONSES OF MS. JESSICA LEWIS TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHRIS VAN HOLLEN

Question. In August, I asked Deputy Assistant Secretary Resnick about the circumstances under which the Department investigates allegations of human rights violations under the Leahy Laws, and requested that the Department provide information on any Leahy Law investigations pursued over the preceding year, including those that did not result in a finding of a violation. I appreciated the Department's recent classified response to that question, which my staff and I reviewed.

In your view, does the Department have adequate resources to investigate all credible allegations of human rights violations to the extent necessary to fully determine whether or not a violation of the Leahy Laws has occurred?

Answer. The Department has adequate resources to implement its current Leahy vetting program. However, there is more work to be done, and the Department continuously seeks to improve this program. We welcome any additional resources to assist in these efforts.

Question. In August, I asked Deputy Assistant Secretary Resnick about the circumstances under which the Department investigates allegations of human rights violations under the Leahy Laws, and requested that the Department provide information on any Leahy Law investigations pursued over the preceding year, including those that did not result in a finding of a violation. I appreciated the Department's recent classified response to that question, which my staff and I reviewed.

Please provide, in classified format if necessary, a breakdown by country of all Leahy investigations pursued in calendar year 2021, including those which did not result in a finding that the law had been violated, listing each country for which at least one investigation was conducted and the number of investigations conducted for that country.

Answer. Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act, also known as the Department of State Leahy law, requires that the Department of State vet each proposed recipient foreign security force unit of a covered transfer to ensure compliance with the statutory prohibitions on transfers. If the statute cannot be complied with, the transfer does not occur. We will work to provide the specific information you request about the Department's Leahy vetting program through the appropriate channels.

Post	Total Completed Cases, CY 2021
ABIDJAN	694
ABUJA	1559
ACCRA	1323
ADDIS ABABA	383

Post	Total Completed Cases, CY 2021
ANTANANARIVO	234
BAMAKO	919
BANGUI	3250
BANJUL	86
BRAZZAVILLE	233
BUJUMBURA	28
CONAKRY	131
COTONOU	692
DAKAR	1086
DAR ES SALAAM	2660
DJIBOUTI	405
FREETOWN	320
GABORONE	381
HARARE	24
JUBA	48
KAMPALA	1639
KHARTOUM	1
KIGALI	431
KINSHASA	802
LIBREVILLE	163
LILONGWE	871
LOME	395
LUANDA	360
LUSAKA	855
MAPUTO	1030
MASERU	143
MBABANE	75
MONROVIA	2265
NAIROBI	2951
NDJAMENA	669
NIAMEY	1602
NOUAKCHOTT	468
OUAGADOUGOU	1474

Post	Total Completed Cases, CY 2021
PORT LOUIS	263
PRAIA	27
PRETORIA	1096
WINDHOEK	184
YAOUNDE	926
MALABO	18
MOGADISHU (NAIROBI–S	2910
BANDAR S.B.	41
BANGKOK	2622
BEIJING	8
CANBERRA	23
DILI	141
HANOI	795
JAKARTA	2835
KUALA LUMPUR	1659
MAJURO	5
MANILA	12046
PHNOM PENH	501
PORT MORESBY	82
RANGOON	4
SEOUL	31
SINGAPORE	177
SUVA	59
TAIPEI	76
TOKYO	30
ULAANBAATAR	259
VIENTIANE	742
WELLINGTON	8
ANKARA	291
ATHENS	871
BAKU	139

Post	Total Completed Cases, CY 2021
BELGRADE	484
BERLIN	2
BERN	10
BRATISLAVA	88
BRUSSELS	11
BUCHAREST	688
BUDAPEST	168
CHISINAU	423
COPENHAGEN	45
DUBLIN	18
KYIV	4929
LISBON	34
LJUBLJANA	110
LONDON	13
MADRID	33
NICOSIA	70
OSLO	4
PARIS	0
PODGORICA	158
PRAGUE	147
PRISTINA	1079
REYKJAVIK	2
RIGA	846
ROME	19
SARAJEVO	2221
SKOPJE	764
SOFIA	454
TALLINN	246
THE HAGUE	7
TIRANA	493
VIENNA	21
VILNIUS	377
WARSAW	518

Post	Total Completed Cases, CY 2021
YEREVAN	214
ZAGREB	448
TBILISI	821
VALLETTA	92
ABU DHABI	28
ALGIERS	190
AMMAN	2544
BAGHDAD	2528
BEIRUT	752
CAIRO	473
DOHA	1
KUWAIT	59
MANAMA	637
MUSCAT	391
RABAT	1748
RIYADH	11
SANAA	321
TEL AVIV	113
TRIPOLI	296
TUNIS	1178
ASHGABAT	138
BISHKEK	382
COLOMBO	862
DHAKA	1189
DUSHANBE	1088
ISLAMABAD	954
KABUL	2193
KATHMANDU	1022
NEW DELHI	2418
TASHKENT	395
NUR–SULTAN	1119

Post	Total Completed Cases, CY 2021
THIMPHU	14
ASUNCION	831
BELMOPAN	949
BOGOTA	19433
BRASILIA	1746
BRIDGETOWN	1054
BRIDGETOWN–ST LUCIA	13
BUENOS AIRES	745
CURACAO	0
GEORGETOWN	508
GUATEMALA CITY	7433
KINGSTON	1067
LA PAZ	38
LIMA	4838
MEXICO CITY	16131
MONTEVIDEO	661
NASSAU	214
OTTAWA	9
PANAMA CITY	3440
PARAMARIBO	193
PORT AU PRINCE	1288
PORT OF SPAIN	1013
QUITO	3576
SAN JOSE	2150
SAN SALVADOR	3391
SANTIAGO	526
SANTO DOMINGO	2495
TEGUCIGALPA	3714
CY 2021 Total Cases	176076

RESPONSES OF DR. MARA ELIZABETH KARLIN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHRIS VAN HOLLEN WAS GIVEN DURING A CLASSIFIED BRIEFING

Question. A 2011 GAO report (GAO–12–123) found that civil-military relations was identified as a priority objective for IMET training in only a third of the most repressive African states, those ranked "not free" by Freedom House, receiving IMET. And an August 2019 GAO report (GAO–19–554) found that "DoD does not systematically track human rights training [including civil-military relations] and, as a result, only limited information is available on the provision of and funding for these activities."

What, if any, actions has the Department taken since the 2011 report to ensure that civil-military norms are a priority objective of IMET-funded professional military education?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

Question. What if any actions has the Department taken since the 2019 report to improve its tracking of human rights training, including civil-military relations?

[Response was given during a classified briefing.]

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