

NOMINATIONS

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2021 - A.M.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, Romney, Young, Barrasso, Cruz, Rounds, and Hagerty.

Also Present: Senators Durbin and Hickenlooper.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.

We are here today to consider nominees for three important positions—Ambassadors to China, Japan, and Singapore. On the first panel, we will hear from Ambassador Nick Burns, to be Ambassador to China. I understand Senator Markey will introduce Ambassador Burns. So, I will turn to him at this time.

Senator Markey?

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Senator MARKEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch.

It is my absolute honor and pleasure to introduce our nominee today, Nicholas Burns, nominated to be the Ambassador of the United States to the People's Republic of China.

Ambassador Burns is a cherished son of Massachusetts, a fellow Boston College alumnus, and a proud member of Red Sox Nation. I would also like to welcome Ambassador Burns' wife, Libby, who has joined us today.

Name a diplomatic flashpoint of the last four decades, and there is a good chance that Ambassador Burns was either a witness or an active participant. In his exemplary career as a member of the Foreign Service, he served four U.S. Presidents. Among his assignments, he spent 5 years at the National Security Council, first as Director of Soviet Affairs under President George H.W. Bush and later as Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia Affairs under President Clinton.

In those roles, Ambassador Burns helped shepherd the United States through the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of new relationships with the former Soviet bloc countries. In 1997, he was named U.S. Ambassador to Greece, where he helped to expand our bilateral defense relationship and counterterrorism.

In 2001, President George Bush selected him to serve as U.S. Ambassador to NATO. He took this post 1 month before the attacks of 9/11, just 1 month before 9/11, when the alliance invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history. He later served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the highest-ranking Foreign Service officer in Foggy Bottom.

Ambassador Burns has established a deep understanding of the United States' relationship with China and has been a returning visitor to China for more than three decades. As a junior officer, he first accompanied Secretary George Shultz in 1988 and President Bush in 1989. He later accompanied Secretary Madeleine Albright to Hong Kong in June of 1997 for its handover from the United Kingdom to the People's Republic of China.

After his retirement from the Foreign Service, Ambassador Burns turned his attention to training the next generation of diplomats and security professionals at the Harvard Kennedy School. In short, there is no more qualified person than Ambassador Burns to serve in Beijing as our top diplomat.

I am confident that Ambassador Burns will seek to engage Beijing where we must on the existential issues of the climate crisis and nuclear nonproliferation, on curbing the flow of synthetic opioids to our shores, and bringing North Korea to the negotiating table. But I am equally confident that he will speak out forcefully against the Chinese Government's abuses in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and elsewhere.

In Ambassador Burns, the men and women of the Foreign Service will have no greater champion. He has the experience, the knowledge, and the leadership skills for this critical post in a difficult, but crucial time in our relationship with the People's Republic of China.

In a commencement speech at our alma mater, Boston College, in 2002, Ambassador Burns concluded in summing up the school's ethos. "It is the core belief that how we lead our lives should not be just about and for ourselves, but about what we all can do, in the poet Tennyson's words, 'to seek a newer world' here on Earth."

We are honored that you have again decided to take this opportunity, Ambassador Burns, to once again seek that newer world here on Earth.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman, and I urge the support of every committee member for this great Ambassador.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Markey, for that glowing introduction. We appreciate it. You are, of course, an important member of our committee. So, we look forward to you joining us on the regular dais when you are finished.

Ambassador Burns, welcome to you and your wife. You are an outstanding public servant. As a career Foreign Service officer, we are grateful to you and your family for your willingness to serve our country again.

As you know, if confirmed, you will have a monumental task before you. As I have said before, the China of 2021 is not the China of 1971 or even the China of 2011. China today is challenging the United States and destabilizing the international community across every dimension of power—political, diplomatic, economic, military, and even cultural—with an alternative and deeply disturbing model for global governance.

I truly believe that China today, led by the Communist Party and propelled by Xi Jinping’s hypernationalism, is unlike any challenge we have faced as a nation before. For decades, we failed to comprehensively address China’s growing reach, from its predatory economic behavior and aggressive efforts to coerce its neighbors in the maritime domain, its dangerous flexing of military muscle against Taiwan, to the crushing of the religious and cultural autonomy of Tibet, and its campaign of genocide against the Uyghur people, as well as the imposition of a chilling system of digital authoritarianism to suppress and oppress its own people. China today is more active and more emboldened than ever before.

There should be little doubt that the right basic framework for thinking about our relationship with China today is strategic competition. Not because that is necessarily what we want, but because of the choices Beijing is making. Therefore, if confirmed, you will need to be clear-eyed about Beijing’s intentions and actions and play a key role in calibrating this administration’s still-emerging policy and strategy regarding China.

This committee has engaged extensively on China over the last several months, including passing the Strategic Competition Act with overwhelming bipartisan support. Enacting the bill is one critical step in ensuring a solid framework for White House and State Department efforts to address the challenge posed by China.

I know you bring to this job a wealth of diplomatic experience and skill. So, we are very interested in hearing from you today about how you think of the challenge and the international—that the challenge that the international community faces from China and how you think we need to frame our strategy for success in this new era of strategic competition.

I look forward to hearing your testimony. Let me turn to the ranking member for his opening comments.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO**

Senator RISCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, like most members or many members of the committee, have known Nick for a long time. We first met in the early part of the last decade in Luxembourg when he was serving as the Ambassador to NATO.

It is, I think, appropriate that Ambassador Burns was appointed to this position, which really demands a bipartisan approach, and, I think, Congress, notwithstanding our other emaciations on other issues, has certainly been—has taken a bipartisan approach to the challenges that China has presented to us and that we will face over the rest of the century, I believe.

The position of Ambassador to China is one of the most important ambassadorial nominations we will consider in this committee.

The People's Republic of China is leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and ideological power to wage strategic competition against the United States. Chinese Communist Party policies and actions threaten U.S. interests and values, as well as allies and partners, on just about every continent, but particularly in the Indo-Pacific.

While this challenge will persist for decades, the competition is here now, and we must act urgently. Advancing U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region must be our number-one foreign policy priority. If confirmed, Ambassador Burns, you will be on the front lines of this competition.

There are a few priorities that form the foundation of the bipartisan Strategic Competition Act, led by Senator Menendez and myself, which passed through this committee earlier this year. First, China's growing military might is dramatically shifting the regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific in its favor. We need to counter China's conventional and nuclear build-up that threatens our interests and our allies.

Nowhere is China flexing this military might as much as it is in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's President Tsai is right. "If our Taiwan were to fall, the consequences would be catastrophic for regional peace and the democratic alliance system." It is imperative that we work actively to deter PRC's coercion and aggression towards Taiwan.

Another issue that is not discussed as often, but must be, is China's pursuit of life sciences research with potential for weaponization, causing concern about potential violations of the Biological Weapons Convention. I have introduced legislation, the Biological Weapons Policy Act, that would give our country team in China a larger role in ensuring that biological research cooperation with China does not put us or the world at risk.

Second, our diplomatic mission in China must be strengthened to address the economic and political facets of the competition at hand. That includes providing information to decision-makers in Washington on how the CCP seeks to exert undue political influence in our open society.

On the economic front, we must ensure our economic corps in Mission China is up to the task of dealing with new challenges. China is rolling out laws and regulations to punish companies for complying with U.S. law, including our sanctions laws. The Chinese Government is also stamping out all free market activity by asserting control over its financial institutions and its technology companies.

Another challenge where we need an active economic corps is addressing pressing supply chain vulnerabilities, especially in technology and healthcare. Of course, advancing human rights must continue to be a central priority in our China policy.

Ambassador Burns, you face a tough environment. China has said it will not work with us on anything until the United States gives into the demands of its two lists. You and I discussed those lists yesterday, and some day, I hope to be able to see those lists. How the Biden administration plans to deal with that is not clear.

In our diplomatic engagements, China has repeatedly shown a lack of interest in good faith discussions. Yet the administration

continues to assert that China can be a partner on a variety of issues, notably climate. On Taiwan, I applaud recent defense sales, but we have also seen a lot of unclear messaging, including recent allusions to a Taiwan agreement.

And despite China's massive and unconstrained nuclear build-up, the administration is considering, considering, a sole purpose nuclear declaratory policy that would put U.S. allies at immense risk and shake confidence in U.S. deterrence commitments. I know that our allies have communicated serious objections to the administration on this topic.

So, far, the administration is refusing to share those communications with Congress. This issue is even more important given China's test this past weekend of a fractional orbital bombardment system carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle. Such a system would allow the PRC to completely circumvent U.S. early warning capabilities and increase the vulnerability of the continental U.S. to a nuclear attack.

I look forward to hearing how you plan to address all of these challenges and to help us win this competition.

With that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Risch.

And with that, Ambassador, you are recognized. We ask you to summarize your statement in about 5 minutes or so. We will include your full statement for the record.

And with that, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS OF MASSACHUSETTS, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Ambassador BURNS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, thanks very much for the opportunity to be with you this morning.

I am very grateful to President Biden for this nomination to be the next United States Ambassador to the People's Republic of China.

I owe profound thanks to my wife of 40 years, Libby, who is with me today, seated just behind me. Together, we have served the U.S. Government overseas in Mauritania, West Africa, in Egypt, in Israel, in Greece, and at NATO in Belgium. And both of us are grateful to our three daughters, our son-in-law, and our grandchildren.

If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to returning to public service and a State Department where I have spent the bulk of my professional career. I worked for administrations of both parties, and I would be honored to lead our team at the U.S. Mission in China. That team is on the front lines of this complicated and consequential relationship that we have with China.

I would like to explain our policy and the policy that I would like to support, if confirmed by the Senate. Secretary Tony Blinken said in March that the United States' relationship with the PRC is the biggest geopolitical test of the 21st century. We will compete and compete vigorously with the People's Republic where we should, in-

cluding on jobs and the economy, on critical infrastructure, on emerging technologies.

As President Biden has said, when the United States competes on a level playing field, there is no country on Earth that can match us. We will cooperate with the PRC where it is in our interest, including on climate change, counternarcotics, global health, and of course, on nonproliferation.

The world cannot solve the climate crisis without the PRC doing more to reduce their emissions. It is to our benefit to maintain engagements between our peoples as well, including students, scholars, diplomats, and journalists, so long as America's laws are respected.

Finally, and crucially, we will challenge Beijing where we must, including when it takes actions that run counter to American values and American interests, actions that might threaten the security of the United States or our allies and partners, or undermine the rules-based international order.

The PRC seeks to become the most powerful country economically, politically, and militarily in the Indo-Pacific. We have to stand with our allies and our friends to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific, including by maintaining America's commercial and military superiority in 21st century technologies. We also have to hold the PRC accountable for failing to play by the rules on trade and investment, including its theft of intellectual property, use of state subsidies, dumping of goods, and unfair labor practices. These hurt American workers, and they hurt American businesses.

Beijing has been an aggressor against India along their long Himalayan border, against Vietnam, the Philippines, and others in the South China Sea, against Japan in the East China Sea, and Beijing has launched an intimidation campaign against Australia and, even more recently, Lithuania.

The PRC's genocide in Xinjiang, its abuses in Tibet, its smothering of Hong Kong's autonomy and freedoms, and its bullying of Taiwan are unjust and must stop. Beijing's recent actions against Taiwan are especially objectionable. The United States is right to continue its one China policy, but we are also right to support the peaceful resolution of disputes in this region and to oppose unilateral actions that undermine the status quo and undermine the stability of the region.

The administration and Congress, together on a bipartisan basis, should help Taiwan to maintain a self-defense capability, and that is the language of Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. The Biden administration as well is surely right to seek effective channels of communication with Beijing to manage this competition responsibly, to diminish the risk of an accidental conflict, and above all, to maintain the peace. The United States has to proceed from a position of strength and pursue intense diplomacy in all these matters.

Beijing proclaims that the East is rising, and the West is in decline. I am confident in our own country. I believe that, together with our allies and our partners, we can prove them wrong. This will require very close alignment here in Washington between Congress and the executive branch. The bipartisan Senate passage of the Innovation and Competition Act earlier this year is a very wise investment in America's future and our ability to compete.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, I say this, my final point. The People's Republic of China is not an Olympian power. It is a country of extraordinary strength, but it also has substantial weaknesses and challenges demographically, economically, politically.

We should have confidence in our strengths, American strengths. Confidence in our business community, in our innovation community, in our universities, in our ability to attract the best students from around the world, confidence in our unmatched military and our first-rate Foreign Service and civil service. Confidence in our values that stand in brilliant opposition to China's authoritarian regime.

We will succeed if we build this American strength around our diplomacy with the People's Republic of China. On that basis, Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I am looking forward to working with you, the ranking member, and Republicans and Democrats on this committee. I have enjoyed my meetings over the last 3 weeks, and I hope together we can form an effective and strong policy towards China.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burns follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. NICHOLAS BURNS

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity.

I am grateful to President Biden for this nomination to be the next Ambassador to the People's Republic of China.

I owe profound thanks to my wife, Libby, who is here with me today. Together, we have served the U.S. Government overseas in Mauritania, Egypt, Israel, Greece, and Belgium. I am also grateful for the support of our three daughters, our son-in-law, and our grandchildren.

If confirmed, I look forward to returning to public service and the State Department, where I have spent the bulk of my career in administrations of both parties. I would be honored to lead our team at the U.S. Mission in China, which is on the front lines of this complicated and consequential relationship.

As Secretary Blinken said in March, the United States' relationship with the People's Republic of China is "the biggest geopolitical test of the 21st century."

We will compete—and compete vigorously—with the PRC where we should, including on jobs and the economy, critical infrastructure, and emerging technologies. As President Biden has said, when the United States competes on a level playing field, "there's no country on Earth . . . that can match us."

We will cooperate with the PRC where it is in our interest, including on climate change, counter-narcotics, global health, and nonproliferation. The world cannot solve the climate crisis unless the PRC does more to reduce their emissions. And it is to our benefit to maintain engagement between our people, including students, scholars, diplomats, and journalists—so long as America's laws are respected.

Finally, and crucially, we will challenge the PRC where we must, including when Beijing takes actions that run counter to America's values and interests; threaten the security of the United States or our allies and partners; or undermine the rules-based international order.

The PRC seeks to become the most powerful military, economic, and political actor in the Indo-Pacific. We must stand with our allies and partners to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific—including by maintaining America's commercial and military superiority in 21st century technologies.

We also must hold the PRC accountable for failing to play by the rules on trade and investment, including its thefts of intellectual property, use of state subsidies, dumping of goods, and unfair labor practices. These actions harm American workers and businesses.

Beijing has been an aggressor against India along their Himalayan border; against Vietnam, the Philippines, and others in the South China Sea; against Japan in the East China Sea; and has launched an intimidation campaign against Australia and Lithuania.

The PRC's genocide in Xinjiang and abuses in Tibet, its smothering of Hong Kong's autonomy and freedoms, and its bullying of Taiwan are unjust, and must stop.

Beijing's recent actions against Taiwan are especially objectionable. The United States is right to continue to adhere to its one-China policy. We are also right to support the peaceful resolution of disputes, and to oppose unilateral actions that undermine the status quo and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

The administration and Congress should help Taiwan "to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability," as the Taiwan Relations Act clearly states.

The Biden administration is right to seek effective channels of communication with Beijing to manage our competition responsibly, to diminish the risk of an accidental conflict and, above all, to maintain peace.

The United States must proceed from a position of strength and pursue intense diplomacy—with the People's Republic of China, and with our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and around the world. Our alliances and partnerships are a unique comparative advantage for the United States.

As in all things, the United States will lead with our values—democracy and free expression, free press and free enterprise, support for human rights and human dignity. These are at the center of the Biden administration's foreign policy.

Beijing proclaims that the "East is Rising and the West is in Decline." I am confident in our country, and believe that, together with our allies and partners, we will prove them wrong.

That will require alignment in Washington. The bipartisan Senate passage of the Innovation and Competition Act earlier this year is a wise investment in America's future.

Finally, it is important to keep our rivalry with Beijing in perspective.

The PRC is not an Olympian power. While the PRC has many strengths, it also faces substantial demographic, economic, and political challenges.

We should have confidence in our own strengths—our scientific and technological capacities, world-class universities and research institutions, our military power, our first-rate diplomatic corps across both the Foreign Service and civil service, and, especially, our values that stand in brilliant opposition to Beijing's actions. We will succeed if we build our diplomacy around these strengths and remain optimistic about America's future.

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the members of the Senate to pursue such a strategy that will protect and advance American interests in our relationship with the PRC.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Ambassador.

We will start a round of 5 minutes. Before I start mine, let me ask some questions we ask for the committee as a whole. These are questions that speak to the importance that this committee places on responsiveness by all officials in the executive branch that we expect and will be seeking from you. So, I ask you to provide just a simple "yes" or "no" answer to these questions.

Do you agree to appear before this committee and make officials from your office available to the committee and designated staff, when invited?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you commit to keep the committee fully and currently informed about the activities that will be under your purview?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you commit to engaging in meaningful consultation while policies are being developed, not just providing notification after the fact?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you commit to promptly responding to requests for briefings and information requested by the committee and its designated staff?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Well, let me start off. First of all, I think your statement encompasses many of the sentiments, concerns, and questions that members of the committee have, and so it was very encompassing of many of the issues I think we care about. And together, we have to work to make sure that Xi Jinping is wrong. That the West is not setting, but it will continue to shine.

Now many experts emphasize the importance of U.S. collaboration and joint action with allies, partners, and multilateral organizations to address the challenges that China poses. However, collaboration can be harder in practice than in theory, particularly when countries have different views and competing interests.

In what specific areas can you speak to that collaboration has been helpful in addressing the challenges that China poses? And in what areas and with which country do you see particular opportunities or constraints?

Ambassador BURNS. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I think this is the right question to ask about how we form a strategy that can be successful against the Chinese Government.

The comparative advantage that we have versus China is that we have treaty allies. We have partners who deeply believe in us, and the Chinese really do not. And so, in the Indo-Pacific, I think President Biden has tried to emphasize the need for us to be very closely aligned with Japan, with South Korea, with Australia, our treaty allies, our defense partners, the Philippines and Thailand.

As you know, and I think every administration since President Clinton has been working on this, we have a newfound security partner in India. That makes a great difference to have Indian-American interests aligned, as they clearly are, strategically in the Indo-Pacific. And President Biden, of course, has taken the QUAD idea—and I give credit to President Trump and Secretary Pompeo for reinvigorating the QUAD in 2019 and '20. But President Biden has held two head of government meetings of the QUAD, one virtual and one in person at the White House.

President Biden's initiative for AUKUS, to deepen our strategic engagement with our great ally Australia and our ally the United Kingdom, could be transformational and I think has been widely praised to be such in the Indo-Pacific. So, as we confront China, whether it is on the military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, whether it is the fight that we have to convince China, push China to play by the rules on trade, we have a coincidence of use with Japan, the European Union, the European allies on all these issues, and I think the President has focused on the Indo-Pacific, but he is also focusing on the European allies.

And I have seen a change in the last 2 or 3 years in the attitudes of most European governments, now much more skeptical about China on 5G, on China's nefarious belt-and-road initiative influence in Eastern Europe. And so I do think this is a big part of the strategy that we need to continue to work on.

The CHAIRMAN. Now let me turn to Taiwan. Given increasing aggression and threatening rhetoric from Beijing, some have called for an end to the policy of strategic ambiguity with regard to Taiwan. How do you think the United States can most effectively signal our resolve and deter Chinese aggression towards Taiwan?

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a central question these days, particularly after all the bullying and intimidation tactics of the Chinese towards Taiwan, the sending of 150 Chinese aircraft into the air identification zone of Taiwan just 10 days ago.

My own view—and fortunately, this is backed up, I think, by both the Biden administration's and every other administration going back four decades—is that we have enormous latitude—Congress and the executive branch—under the Taiwan Relations Act to deepen our security assistance to Taiwan.

The Taiwan Relations Act, written in January 1979, is remarkably modern for the strategic questions we are facing in 2021. It says that we have an unofficial relationship with Taiwan, obviously, but we have a responsibility to help Taiwan achieve a self-defense capability through the provision of defense articles and services. So, in the last—since 2009, the Obama and the Trump and the Biden administrations have provided about \$30 billion worth of assistance to Taiwan.

Given what China has done, given China's, frankly, objectionable statements towards Taiwan, I think the Congress and the executive branch have every right to continue to deepen our security cooperation, to expand our arms provisions to Taiwan. That is the most important thing we can do.

In addition to that, the Taiwan Relations Act also calls for the United States to provide the strongest possible deterrent in the Western Pacific, the language of 1979, or the Indian Ocean, as we would refer to it today. And in addition to that, as a third measure, we ought to be asking and we are asking our allies to show a real commitment to Taiwan. And we are seeing that from Japan and other allies.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we have got to be very clear about our criticism of China. And what the Chinese are trying to do to this very successful society on Taiwan, with its very healthy democracy, extraordinary performance in the coronavirus, is to simply intimidate them. And so we have all got to speak up and shine a light on those Chinese actions and Chinese rhetoric.

That is essentially the policy of the last 40 years. I think that policy is the right one and the smart one for today.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Risch?

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let us pick up with Taiwan where you left off.

How do you differentiate what happened in Hong Kong with Taiwan? In reading and listening to the Chinese, it seems to me that Taiwan is even more of an irritant to them than Hong Kong was. Fortunately, Taiwan has got the sea between themselves and China, but I really fear that we are going to see the same kind of pushing the envelope in Taiwan that gets it to a point where there is a crisis. What are your views on it?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, you are right to ask that question. I share your concern.

As Senator Markey mentioned, I was State Department spokesperson. I accompanied Secretary Albright on June 30, 1997, to the handover from the UK to the PRC on Hong Kong. And all of us remember, but I particularly remember from our meeting with the

Chinese leadership that day the commitments they made to the people of Hong Kong and to the rest of us around the world. And the Chinese have gone back on every one of those commitments.

So, if we link that to Taiwan, we obviously cannot trust China to meet the commitments it has made on the Taiwan issue. When Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, when administration after administration pursued a one China policy, we obviously did so on the presumption that there would be peace in the cross-strait relationship between Taiwan and China, and there is not much peace today. There is assertiveness and aggression.

So, I do not think we can—we certainly cannot trust the Chinese on this issue. We have to be aware of their rhetoric, aware of it. And the rhetoric of its leader and many other Chinese leaders in recent months has been that they intend to take back Taiwan.

Our responsibility is to make Taiwan a tough nut to crack, help it increase its asymmetric defenses through the Taiwan Relations Act. And other countries can do that as well. It is a central issue in the relationship now.

Senator RISCH. And I agree with that. The thing that I guess I am concerned about as much as anything, watching what they have been doing with their incursions into the air space reminds me a lot of Hong Kong. It is just pushing the envelope. It is a camel's nose in the tent, and it just gets worse and worse until it collapses. So, that is going to be something I think we are going to have to watch very closely.

Let us talk about China's nuclear build-up. Do you agree that they are pursuing a massive nuclear build-up in China?

Ambassador BURNS. It certainly appears so, both in the western part of China, where their IC—the reports of the ICBM expansion and also with this novel delivery system that has been publicized of late.

Senator RISCH. One thing that is very concerning to me and I think other members of this committee is that there is this discussion within the administration of a sole purpose nuclear declaratory policy, which is, in essence, no first use. It is another way of saying no first use, but it is not as direct. But it is the exact same thing.

I would hope you would become a spokesman within the administration about how damaging that that kind of a declaration would be, a sole purpose declaration. I am not sure if you are aware of this or not, but I can guarantee you that the allies, particularly the ones that are counting on us in the Indo-Pacific region, are very concerned about the declaration of sole purpose nuclear declaratory policy. What are your thoughts on that?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, I appreciated our conversation last evening about this in your office, and as I explained, I am a private citizen appearing before you as a nominee without access to the intelligence. I do not have a security clearance. So, I am very reluctant to speak specifically about the Nuclear Posture Review, which is underway.

But I do know that President Biden has indicated clearly that he is going to support the strongest possible and the safest American nuclear deterrent, as every President has done since President Harry Truman, and that is obviously an obligation to the American

people. I would also just add, Senator Risch—we also talked about this last week—I think the spotlight should be on China. They have said for decades, the Chinese Government, that they want to have a minimum nuclear deterrent. They are blasting past that definition, and they are rapidly engaged in a build-up of their nuclear arsenal, including the disturbing reports of the hypersonic technology.

So, I think the spotlight has to be on the Government of China.

Senator RISCH. Well, I agree with that. You having the credentials that you have on a bipartisan basis and your deep knowledge of our allies, particularly ones that we have a defense posture with, I would hope you would be a spokesman within the administration regarding this. I am very concerned about it. A lot of people are concerned about it.

And I understand that you have done an excellent job throughout your career of carrying water on both shoulders for administration from either party. I think that brings a tremendous amount of credibility to you, and I think your words in that regard would be very important as they proceed with the Nuclear Posture Review. I have no doubt they will be consulting with you, given the position you are in. So, I would urge that you communicate in the strongest terms to the administration the concern that our allies in the region have with this policy.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Cardin?

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Burns, first of all, let me thank you for your incredible career of public service. You have really advanced American values globally in every post that you have held, and I personally have appreciated your advice during very difficult times. So, thank you very much for your service to our country and your willingness to continue in this critical role as our Ambassador in China.

There are so many issues that we need to talk about, and we have already mentioned a lot of our national security concerns. We know that China is belligerent in the China seas, making claims that are outrageous and affect international commerce and our national security. We know that they are trying to change the rules of engagement economically so that they determine the rules based upon a government-controlled economy rather than an open economy, which is against our national security interests. We know how belligerent they are against Taiwan, and the list goes on and on and on.

But I want to devote my time to what President Biden has said that we are strongest when we conduct our foreign policy based upon our values. And China, in the recent decades, has just been moving in the wrong direction on universal human rights values, and we could go through the entire list, and it is a long list.

So, I guess, my question to you is: how will you balance and strategize America's presence in China through your mission to advance universal values—of the respect for individuals' religious freedom, human rights, and basic beliefs that the universal community that believes in democracy looks to America's leadership as hope for the future?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you very much for that question, and thank you for your decades of service to those issues, and I am very well aware of that.

I think you are right to suggest that as we think about our tools, our strengths, as we compete with China, it is our belief in human freedom and human rights and democracy and the rule of law and press freedoms that really stands in opposition to an authoritarian dictatorship in Beijing. And so if we can marshal those strengths—and President Biden and his administration believe this is at the center of their foreign policy—on Xinjiang, on Tibet, on Hong Kong, on the repression of the Chinese people, we cannot just do that sometimes. We cannot be silent if there are atrocities occurring or, in the case of Xinjiang, a genocide is occurring. We have to speak out.

And you have seen the President, Secretary Blinken, and all of the officials been very forthright about that since January 20 of this year. I think that will continue, and that will certainly be, if I am confirmed, a hallmark of what I try to do, speaking directly to the Chinese Government in Beijing.

Senator CARDIN. I would ask also that you inform this committee as to how we can give you a stronger hand in dealing on these issues. We have passed sanction regime laws that have been used against oppressors in China, individual sanctions such as Magnitsky as well as sectoral sanctions have been used, and I think they have their effect. I think they are extremely important.

But we need to also think beyond that as to what we can do to give you what you need. The competitiveness bill that the chairman mentioned I think is going to be an extremely important part of our strategy again in standing up to China's oppression on the economic front. But we should also be looking at what we can do as a Congress to give you a stronger hand in China in dealing with these universal rights.

So, I would welcome your advice as to what we can do to give you a stronger toolbox in dealing with these issues.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator. And I would just suggest a couple of things, and I have spoken to the chairman and other members of the committee in my individual meetings about them.

First and foremost, when the coronavirus mercifully ends and when the restrictions on China—there is a 3-week quarantine in China for visitors—at some point end, I hope that Members of Congress from both parties will travel to China. And if I am confirmed, I would like to help you to do that. I think they need to hear directly from our legislative branch on these issues. These will be difficult conversations for you and for me with the Chinese leadership, but we have to have them.

Secondly, I would encourage you, respectfully, to continue what you are doing, what this committee has done under the chairman's leadership and Senator Risch's leadership, on a bipartisan basis to speak out and legislate when necessary and to sanction when necessary.

Third and finally, President Biden was right on the issue of Xinjiang and the Uyghurs and the other Turkic Muslim peoples when he coalesced with Canada, the European Union, and the

United Kingdom in multinational sanctions against specific Chinese individuals responsible for carrying out the atrocities in Xinjiang. I think that can be helpful as well, to expand the universe of—expand our voice to work with other nations, perhaps through the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and your parliamentary exchanges with the Japanese, the Australians, and others.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Burns, thank you for your prior service and your willingness to serve in this capacity.

I agree with you that if we act intelligently, the U.S. in concert with our allies in the West, we can compete with China. China, though, has advantages in terms of very long-term, very strategic thinking, authoritarian. They do not have the back-and-forth of elections, that type of thing. So, they have utilized that long-term strategic thinking while the West literally has not done much to counter their infiltration to our institutions, their stealing of our intellectual property since their entry into the WTO.

I would just like you to comment on how do we—how do we counter what they have done, and how do we do that effectively?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you. I think it is—I think it is a central question.

We have to have a strategy to match China's strategy. I think that is beginning to develop over the last several years in the last three administrations—President Obama, President Trump, and President Biden.

And as I said in my testimony, what distinguishes us and strengthens us is the fact that we have our alliance with Japan and our alliance with Australia and South Korea. And I have been involved in my past diplomatic career in intensive discussions with the Europeans. I think they are less united perhaps in the European Union right now, but I sense that the Europeans are shifting to understand the threat, a threat to them as well as to us and our Indo-Pacific allies.

So, I think operating on an allied basis is the most important thing we can do. And sometimes that means we form institutions. So, the QUAD is an institution that both parties can be proud of. Republican and Democratic Presidents have supported the QUAD, and now President Biden is operationalizing it at the head of government level, which we had not done before.

AUKUS, three countries coming together. We need to build the institutions that are permanent and that take this policy that we are discussing this morning into the 2030s because the competition with China will be multi-decade.

Senator JOHNSON. Yes, I do want to address specifically their infiltration into our university systems, the Confucius institutes, their investment in things like medical journals. It really concerns me.

There is so much we do not know, for example, about the coronavirus, so much we do not know about COVID. I really do—I really want to get your take on a real potential fault line when we start learning more, for example, about the origin theory. I

mean, I do not know whether it was lab leak or whether it was natural origin. People are starting to look into that.

Obviously, there was a cover-up here for 18 months, and it, as a result, gave China a really good head start at burying evidence. Back in March of 2020, you participated in a virtual event at Harvard's Kennedy Center, and you definitely were critical of China, saying that this was an army exercise. But at the same time, you were very critical of President Trump for calling it the "Chinese virus" and the "Wuhan virus." You said that we all know that is wrong. We all know that is racist. We all know that is not true.

I guess I am kind of wondering how did you know? We still do not know. How were you so positive that this was not a lab leak theory, and have you changed your mind? Have you seen other evidence that would at least open up your mind to that prospect? Because if it is determined that it probably was not natural origin and did leak from a lab in Wuhan, that will have very serious geopolitical repercussions between—in our relationship with China.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator. I want to agree with you briefly on the issue of students and exchanges.

We ought to welcome Chinese students into the United States. But student visas are not a right. They have to be earned. Our laws have to be observed. There are some Chinese student applicants who have ties to the PLA, the People's Liberation Army, and China's intelligence services, and we should turn them down for visas. And we have to be clear about that.

But we also have 375,000 students in our universities and secondary schools in your State and my State, at my university, and we are better off having them in this country to learn about our democracy.

On the coronavirus, the problem here is with China. The Chinese Government withheld information very clearly from their own people and the rest of the world for about a month in late December and January of 2020. I have consistently criticized the Chinese Government for that, and they deserve to be criticized. And they have been stonewalling all of us around the world since January of 2020, including this week, when they refused to act to work with the World Health Organization's new investigative body to answer the question that you rightfully asked.

Senator JOHNSON. But again, my question, are you still so certain that lab leak is off the table? Because you were very certain back then. You said it was, you know, we all know that is not true. Have you changed your thinking on that? Because I mean, it is important if you are going to be Ambassador to China that you have a more open mind on this than you exhibited back in March of 2020.

Ambassador BURNS. So, Senator, I spoke often about this issue of U.S.-China relations at that period of time, and I believe that that quote from the Kennedy School event was directed to President Trump's use of the term "Wuhan virus," which I did not think would be effective with the Chinese Government or Chinese people or people around the world. It had nothing to do with the origins of the crisis, of the pandemic.

My position has been all along, and continues this day, we need to investigate. We do not know where the—how this virus origi-

nated for sure. There are multiple theories, and the Chinese need to answer the questions.

So, I have never been a proponent of either one of these two options. But I think, as President Biden has said, we need to push the Chinese to come clean about what happened.

Senator JOHNSON. Okay, thanks for that clarification. I appreciate it. Thank you.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen?

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Ambassador Burns, thank you for your willingness to continue to serve the United States.

As I am sure you are aware, there have been reported cases of anomalous health incidents in China, also known as “Havana syndrome” cases. Have you been briefed on the reported cases in China?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, I do not have a security clearance. So, I have not been briefed in detail about what has happened to our mission personnel there, but I have had unclassified, open conversations with the State Department. And what I would say to you is my own view, just as a private citizen, is that this is real. It is happening to our diplomats and other Government personnel all around the world. And if confirmed, my obligation to you and, more particularly, to the men and women of our mission in China is to do everything under my power to protect them, working with the Secretary of State and all of our other officials.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate that. I hope you will also request from the State Department, once confirmed, that classified briefing that also includes how to encourage personnel to respond if they are affected and what to look for in terms of those attacks because, to date, there does not seem to be a consistent response and direction for personnel.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you.

Senator SHAHEEN. You mentioned in your opening remarks and in the questioning about the increased Chinese influence in Eastern Europe and also Lithuania, which is one example of an Eastern European country that has taken a hard stance on China. In July, they actually became the first European country to allow a Taiwanese diplomatic presence using the island’s name in the country.

Can you talk about what you think the impact of Lithuania’s stance is? We know it has produced a response from China, but will it have impact on other Eastern European countries and encourage them to take a hard look at what China is doing?

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you.

Lithuania has chosen its course, and every country has a right to define its relationship with Taiwan. And I am proud that the Biden administration has stood up for Lithuania. And you know, it is extraordinary. The Chinese Government has launched an intensive intimidation campaign, economic intimidation of Lithuania, and the Lithuanians have stood up and they have held their ground. They deserve our support, as Australia does. And Australia has been subjected to the same treatment.

We have our own policy, the one China policy, which we should adhere to. Our unofficial relationship with Taiwan, which has

served us well. Every other country should have a right to determine what they want to do, and they should not be bludgeoned and bullied by the Chinese leadership.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you very much. I could not agree more with that, and I think Lithuania deserves a lot of credit for a small country being willing to stand up in the way that they have.

Earlier this month, NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg insisted that NATO must engage politically with China, but the alliance does not seem to see China as as much of a threat as they do Russia. Does China view NATO in the same way, and what do you think NATO's strategy should be towards China?

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator.

It has been really interesting for me, as a former Ambassador to NATO, to see how high on the agenda China has become over the last couple of years during President Trump's time and now President Biden's time. And the focus is right. I mean, certainly, Russia is the immediate focus of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and especially considering Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland right up on the front lines as we try to contain Russian power.

But I think the NATO countries, led by a great Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, also understand China is—the belt-and-road initiative is now in 16 countries in Eastern Europe. The Chinese are actively trying to separate countries in Eastern Europe from the European Union and NATO. And if you think about Chinese energy activities and military activities in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, which is part of the NATO littoral geography, and think about the interests of Germany and France, Italy, any of the NATO countries, they have got to be concerned by what is happening in Xinjiang Province and what has happened to Hong Kong, the threats against Taiwan, and the economic practices of China.

My last point would be if we can coalesce with the European Union, the United States and Japan, on some of the economic issues, we are well more than 60 percent of GDP. It is real leverage. So, Europe has to be part of this strategy, and I credit the Secretary General. I credit Ambassador Kay Bailey Hutchison, who was our great American Ambassador under President Trump. She pushed this issue, and she was right to do that.

Senator SHAHEEN. And do you think China has become concerned about NATO's increasing interest in what China is doing in Europe, or are they ignoring that?

Ambassador BURNS. I do not think they are ignoring it, Senator. I mean, the reason I used the term "China is not an Olympian power" in my statement, and I meant it specifically. They have enormous strengths. They have very few friends. They have no real allies.

And think of the strategic advantage we have with our 29 allies in Canada, the Europeans in NATO, and our multiple treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific. It is our comparative advantage, and I think President Biden has been working overtime with Secretary Blinken to reach out to the allies both in NATO and the Indo-Pacific to say we need to be working together strategically on China.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Let me just quickly echo Senator Shaheen's comments about Lithuania.

Lithuania and how we respond to help it is a test for the West. Because when a country stands up against China and then faces the enormous economic consequences that China is creating against Lithuanian businesses by denying them supply chain opportunities, which is a wakeup call for the world, I think it is incredibly important that we stand by Lithuania extremely strongly.

Senator Romney?

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I wish to associate myself with the comments of the chairman and the ranking member at the beginning of this hearing. It is good to see you, Ambassador, and very deeply appreciate your willingness to serve once again your country at a critical time.

We all know China's ambition. They have described what it is. They seek to replace us as the global leader. The prospect of a global order led by China is one which is troubling for many reasons. We could see what that might look like based upon what they are doing even now, censoring their media, blacking out social media in their country, stealing intellectual property from us and from others, reneging on treaties and promises they made, repressing religion and people of faith, monitoring their own citizens and assigning social grades based upon their loyalty to the Chinese regime, the Communist regime, oppressing minorities of all kinds and, of course, committing genocide.

We say that quickly, but genocide. Eliminating a people, enslaving a people, as they are—all these things suggest that a global order led by China would be something which the world could not possibly endure.

There was probably a time a decade or so ago when, if you were the Ambassador to China, you could go in and pound your fist on the table, and they would take note and perhaps change course on some of the things we care most about because they were worried about their access to the U.S. market. Is that true today? Can we sort of tell China what to do, and do they respond? Or are we no longer in that position?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you, and I appreciated the conversation we had in your office 2 weeks ago about all these issues.

I think our relationship is fundamentally different now than it was 10 years ago or 20 years ago. And I have spoken to most of the former American Ambassadors about this, and we are in an entirely new age where we have got to have channels of communication to work with the Chinese.

First of all, we want to mitigate the danger of an accidental conflict. We want to maintain the peace, but we also want to have clear messaging, and I think multiple channels make sense. If confirmed, I will be on point for the country and the Government in Beijing talking directly to the Chinese. I think it is very important for Members to travel there, Members of Congress, and ultimately, most important for the President to have direct conversations, as he is seeking to do. He has had phone conversations with President Xi Jinping.

But these are difficult conversations, and you have seen the aggressiveness of the Chinese officials. You have seen the nationalism. You have seen the warrior diplomacy. It is part of the fabric of what we are dealing with now.

And my final point, Senator, would be to say we are a strong country. We should be confident of our values and our interests, and we can stand up to the Chinese, but our allies and partners can help to do that so that there is real weight and leverage. And I do think that is the focus.

Senator ROMNEY. What is your sense of the commitment of our allies to that effort? We have spoken already this morning about NATO and our friends and allies there. Perhaps Germany is not quite as committed as, let us say, Lithuania. But as you look at our allies, are we advancing in terms of our mutual efforts, or is there some retreat on the part of key allies?

Ambassador BURNS. I do not see retreat. Certainly, I think we are seeing a stiffening of the resolve of Japan, which is so important for us. Australia, rock solid on these issues. India, not an ally, not a treaty ally, but a strategic military partner in the Bay of Bengal and the Western Pacific. Very important for us.

Europe is different. There are so many countries with different views. Of course, we are waiting for the formation of the German Government. So, we will have to wait and see what the Social Democrats and the Greens do, but I would note that the Greens were very critical of China during the recent campaign in Germany. And certainly, President Macron has spoken out about the dangers of China in the Indo-Pacific, and France is unique among the European powers because it is an Indo-Pacific country as well.

And so, I think, we have got to work both the North Atlantic Alliance, the European Union, but especially our Indo-Pacific allies to be successful.

Senator ROMNEY. There are some who look at China and say it is a juggernaut. There is no way to slow it down. It is on a course that is unstoppable. Do you see it that way? Is there a way of dissuading China from a course as malevolent as what we are seeing today? Do they have some fundamental weaknesses that the rest of the world recognizes and can get them to divert from the course they are on?

Ambassador BURNS. It is certainly—yours is certainly a key analytical question, and none of us can deny the extraordinary growth in the power of China militarily, technologically, economically, and politically over the last 30 to 40 years. But we should not exaggerate that power. I said in my statement China has significant demographic challenges over the next few decades. It has angered nearly all the countries on its border by being overly aggressive and overly acquisitive.

Think of the South China Sea and the outrageous attempts by the Chinese Government to run roughshod over the Law of the Sea Treaty and the legal obligations that China is ignoring. Think of the East China Sea and their attempt to intimidate, but they have not succeeded, our ally Japan, and think of Taiwan.

And so I think the Chinese have, by being so aggressive, they have now stirred up a lot of opposition to them, and I think we ought not to exaggerate their strengths or underestimate the

strengths of the United States. What we need is self-confidence that the United States is a strong country, and I do think our values are the strongest part of our strategy towards China.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Ambassador.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Coons?

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.

Thank you, Ambassador Burns, for your willingness to continue your service overseas. You are the right nominee at the right moment for what is an absolutely critical relationship for the 21st century, and I think in your opening statement you laid out wisely the challenges that are before us.

So, I am particularly pleased, given your deep experience in the Foreign Service, as Ambassador to Greece and to NATO, your work leading the Aspen Strategy Group, through which I have gotten to see your remarkable talents of both strategic insight and interpersonal diplomacy. And my thanks to Libby, to the support you have gotten from your spouse and your family across a long career in service.

Just a few questions, if I might, because I know there are many others who have questions. But first, I think part of what you bring to this is an understanding of how to effectively deploy that key strategic advantage of allies and partners, and I think you correctly point out that China's greatest current global weakness is the absence of any real partners or allies.

So, given your experience as Ambassador, first to Greece and then later to NATO, how do you envision the U.S.-Europe Transatlantic alliance responding to the strategic competition with China, the values competition? And how do you think you can best play a role in engaging our allies in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you very much for those comments and for your question.

In my entire diplomatic career, probably the lesson I learned most most vividly was 9/11, when I was a very new Ambassador. I was in my 12th day, and we were hit hard, 3,000 people dead in the United States. And we could not reach the Pentagon, the White House, and the State Department because they had all been evacuated, but my phone started to ring at NATO headquarters, and it was the Canadian Ambassador, David Wright, and the German Ambassador, and the Italian and French Ambassadors. "We are with you. We want to invoke Article 5." That is the bond.

We invoked Article 5 the next day, and that is the bond we have in our allies. And it is based in part on strategic interests that we have in common, but it is fundamentally based on values and belief in democracy and human rights. And that is the coalition that we need to form vis-à-vis China.

And I credit President Biden. When he came to office from his inaugural speech, to his first speech at the State Department, to his G7 and NATO and EU meetings—and you know this very well, Senator, because you are so close to him—he has been consistent in saying we are going to succeed most if we are with our allies. And Secretary Blinken has been working tirelessly on this.

And I think it is going to be, frankly, most challenging perhaps in Europe. It is not the fault of the Europeans, but it is a big group of countries and a multiplicity of views. NATO is in one way the

right institution for certain issues, and we are working those there, but the European Union on others.

And I would just say, and we had a chance to talk about this this morning together, we need to be together on human rights. We need to stand up together, Europeans and Americans, on the Uyghur issue, on Tibet, on Hong Kong, and on Taiwan. And we need to be together on trade because both of us are victims of Chinese unfair trade practices.

And think of the power of the EU, the U.S., perhaps Japan, working together. I think that is the part of the strategy that we have to operate.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ambassador.

I do think we are in an era where concerns about the digital world and the role of the individual in a digital age are also at the forefront. I am very concerned about the way in which China has developed and deployed the technology to surveil and to censor, to even control its own population and actions they have taken to export not just that technology, but that attitude to other countries around the world.

How do you think we can best work with global partners to offer an alternative vision in which digital technologies serve democratic values and then to embed that in a common trade framework with the values partners you were just referencing?

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator.

This is also a central question, and President Biden, from his inaugural speech on, has been talking about the need for democracies to recognize the threat from the authoritarian world. And that is principally the People's Republic of China and Russia and others around the world.

And to see the pernicious use of—misuse of technology to repress their own citizens and then to try to export that technology in countries where there is a struggle between democratic, small “d” democratic forces and authoritarian forces, we have got to be operating all across the world to help the democratic forces and to help blunt this technological impact.

I think it is a very important issue. I know the State Department and Secretary Blinken are seized by it.

Senator COONS. Well, thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I look forward to supporting your nomination and working closely with you. I think better understanding China, better communicating with China about our risks and opportunities is an important and critical role, but also clearly advocating for America's interests and values is an essential role, and I think you will be an excellent Ambassador. I look forward to supporting your nomination.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Barrasso?

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Burns, welcome to the committee.

The Chinese Communist Party cannot be trusted. The world has seen China's brutality, deception, illegal activities. We have seen China cover up, spread disinformation about the coronavirus. We have seen China destroy Hong Kong's autonomy. We have seen them engage in unlawful military activities in the South China

Sea. We have seen China steal American intellectual property, commit terrible human rights abuses.

Now these, to me, are actions of a dangerous and authoritarian regime. It is not a nation committed to the rule of law, to free markets, to protecting the rights of people. It is clear the United States and the international community must hold China accountable for its increasingly dangerous behavior.

So, just recently, the CIA Director Bill Burns stated that China “presents the greatest challenge to U.S. interests and to international order.” He also announced the creation of a new China Mission Center to “strengthen our collective work on the most important geopolitical threat that we face in the 21st century, which is an increasingly adversarial Chinese Government.”

Do you concur and believe that China’s increasingly adversarial government is the most important geopolitical threat that the United States faces in the 21st century?

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator.

I agree with my longtime friend and Foreign Service colleague Director Bill Burns. I agree with the statement he made. I noticed it. I read his statement. He and I grew up in the first 10 years of our career where the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was the greatest threat.

There is no question in the 21st century, given Chinese power that we have talked about this morning, China is the greatest threat to the security of our country and of the democratic world.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you.

I want to ask you about the U.S.-China Phase One agreement. Remember, January of 2020, the United States and China signed a Phase One trade agreement. China committed to buy \$468 billion of U.S. goods, energy, agriculture, and services over a 2-year period of time. But they really do—China appears to be failing to comply to this agreement.

Reports indicate that China’s purchases have fallen far short for both 2020 and 2021. Do you believe China is committed to abiding by its promises under this agreement, and what are options available to us to ensure that China does fulfill the terms of the agreement?

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator.

This is going to be a contentious issue, and it has been for a long time between our two countries. I think you know that the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Katherine Tai, gave a speech here in Washington 2 1/2 weeks ago, and she was very forthright in saying—I will just summarize, which—her main point, saying that she would talk to her Chinese counterpart about that Phase One deal and about the performance of the Chinese Government in meeting or not meeting its commitments.

And I think she was right to suggest that that has to be the first order of business on trade with China. And obviously, we in the United States need to make investments in our own economy to strengthen it, which the President and Congress are working on. And we have to overcome the ravages of COVID-19 before we can probably get on to bigger initiatives, but I think she was right to start there. Hold China to account for what it promised President

Trump, and I think most observers and experts would say they have not fulfilled their obligations.

Senator BARRASSO. In addition to goods and energy and agriculture products, there is also intellectual property obligations under this U.S.-China Phase One agreement. What steps can we take to ensure that China fully implements and complies with the intellectual property?

Ambassador BURNS. That is a key issue because it gets to the systemic violations of China's WTO commitments. I named some of them in my statement—intellectual property theft, dumping, state subsidies, unfair labor practices. So, when we talk to the Chinese about trade, part of it is our two-way \$559 billion trade relationship in goods and then more in services. Part of it is getting at these systemic problems that I think every recent President has wrestled the Chinese on.

Senator BARRASSO. For my final question, earlier this year, China and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding in which China would invest as much as \$400 billion in Iran over the next 25 years. Last month, Iran was accepted as a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China has long been importing Iranian oil in contravention of the U.S. sanctions on Iran. Sanctioned Iranian airlines continue to fly to China.

Not simply a matter of a few Chinese companies violating U.S. law, there is a lot going on here. It appears to be a strategic decision by the Chinese Government to allow these violations to take place. What is your assessment of the current relationship between China and Iran?

Ambassador BURNS. This is a very serious issue. As you portray it, and you are right, this is a closer relationship than China and Iran had, say, when I was the Iran negotiator for Secretary Condoleezza Rice, when China joined us in three U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions Chapter 7 against the Iranians in 2006, '07, and '08. And now they have a closer relationship.

I think what we ought to do and we will do, I am sure, under President Biden's administration, talk to the Chinese directly about this and, obviously, hold the Chinese to account to abide by every U.N. Security Council sanctions resolution that prohibits most of this activity.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Murphy?

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much for your long service to the Nation, for your willingness to continue in a very difficult, but critical post.

When the Obama administration negotiated the Paris Accords, it was critical that they secure commitments from the fastest-growing economies, which happened to be the fastest-growing polluters, to make significant commitments. Of course, India and China are at the top of this list. We lost 4 years in holding both of those nations to their commitments, and so you and this administration are going to be making up for lost time.

India is, arguably, in the neighborhood of being able to make their commitment in Paris. China is not. In fact, a recent report

found that Chinese emissions in 2019 were so big that they were larger than that of the entire developed world as a whole.

And so I would be interested to hear from you what you believe are the commitments that can be realistically made by the Chinese, especially in the short term as we get ready for COP26, and the extent to which our ability to pass significant climate legislation will enable you to be a more forceful interlocutor with the Chinese on questions of climate.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator. Another central question.

And it does—this is a side of the relationship where we have to engage China and seek cooperation, if it is possible. And this makes this relationship so difficult because we are competing, and we are engaging at the same time.

Climate is perhaps the signature issue on the cooperation side, and obviously, President Obama was able to work with President Xi Jinping back in 2015. That was positive. Former Secretary John Kerry is now working tirelessly on this issue. And China, as I understand China's current position, its emissions will not begin to diminish until 2030. And most climate experts, if not all, think that is not sustainable, that China needs to make a greater effort to diminish its carbon emissions before 2030.

And also they say they will be carbon neutral by 2060. It has got to be well before that. Because you are right, China is by far the larger emitter of carbon in the world today, by a long mile past the United States and any other country. And so they have an obligation to the rest of us. Beginning at COP26 and going on, this will be a major issue in our relationship.

Senator MURPHY. I want to ask you, second, about your assessment of the scope and breadth of Chinese diplomacy today. There was a sort of flurry of attention to a milestone in 2019, where China surpassed the United States with respect to the number of diplomatic posts it has around the world.

I was in Ireland that same year, where there was an important telecommunications tender, and we were hearing stories about a surge of diplomats being sent to the embassy in Dublin. Meanwhile, we had one very nice and capable military attache, who was the beginning and end of our diplomatic team working on behalf of U.S. companies for this tender.

It seems as if China is—has diplomatic reach in new places and has an ability to be flexible and nimble in a way that we do not. One of the things that I believe we should be engaging in is more subnational diplomacy, using our State leaders and our local leaders to engage all around the world on behalf of the United States, something that China does fairly well.

Just a quick assessment from you as to the state of Chinese diplomatic efforts around the world, how it has changed over the past 5 or 10 years, and any recommendations that you might give to this committee as we seek to empower U.S. diplomacy to compete with China.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator.

The Chinese have sought to become the most active, in their minds, and most powerful diplomatic force in the world. For my entire career until a couple of years ago, the United States had more

embassies and consulates in the world than any country. As of last autumn, China had 275 embassies and consulates, and the United States 273. Is it meaningful? Yes.

It means we have to compete—we are competing militarily. We are competing economically. We have got to compete diplomatically. I can assure you we have an outstanding Foreign Service. I have gotten to know over the last couple of months the men and women of the China desk in our East Asia Bureau. They are superb experts, and we do need to make a commitment, as the President and Secretary Blinken are doing, to modernize, strengthen our Foreign Service and our civil service. That is part of our diplomatic power.

And finally, Senator, I think you are right. Diplomacy is not just for people like me, State Department diplomats. We need multiple channels to create the coalitions and friendships that can limit China, and that can be State governors and legislatures and NGOs, subnational actors, as you call them.

And I think we have got to have an all-country embrace of connecting with our allies to support our interests vis-à-vis China.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Hagerty?

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Burns, nice to have you here today. I would like to talk with you about China's strategy to dominate the 21st century.

We just learned over the weekend that China has deployed for the first time what is known as the hypersonic glide missile. As the Financial Times reported, and I am going to quote, "China tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile in August that circled the globe before speeding toward its target, demonstrating an advanced space capability that caught U.S. intelligence by surprise."

If China deploys hypersonic glide vehicles, this would enable China to circumvent U.S. ballistic missile defense and strike the U.S. homeland without warning.

Ambassador Burns, this new military capability is deeply worrisome, but I believe the even bigger alarm is continued complacency about China, complacency that we still see far too much in the national security establishment here in America. We see this when China probes and menaces our democratic ally Taiwan, and the administration responds with silence or with presidential talk about a so-called Taiwan agreement that does not exist.

Xi Jinping has made clear that the Chinese Communist Party has a plan for China to dominate the world diplomatically, economically, technologically, and militarily. Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party want to achieve dominance and displace the United States by 2049, the 100-year anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. And they are certainly locking in every advantage that they can along the way.

President Trump awakened our Nation to the Chinese threat, and the Biden administration has inherited a very strong China strategy, one that I helped to craft and implement when I served as U.S. Ambassador to Japan. As part of the China strategy, the Trump administration also rightly determined that China is engaged in genocide and crimes against humanity with the Uyghur population and other Muslims that live in the Xinjiang Province.

I worry that the Biden administration will try to strike some sort of naive grand bargain on climate or other issues with China that effectively might erase the strong position that we have with China today. Such a naive deal could significantly weaken our energy independence.

Meanwhile, China will continue to burn more coal and emit more greenhouse gases than all of the developed world combined, with an unenforceable pledge to reduce their carbon footprint at some undetermined time in the future. Ambassador Burns, that is my view of what is at stake strategically, but let us focus on China's immediate threat with respect to Taiwan.

It is clear that the Chinese Communist Party is stepping up its military posture in the Taiwan Strait. The world is alarmed, and Taiwan could be the first domino to fall in the Indo-Pacific. Ambassador, what is your view on the Taiwan issue, and should the United States revisit the issue of strategic ambiguity with respect to Taiwan?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you, and thank you for your service as a U.S. Ambassador to Japan.

I agree with you that China is our strongest, I would say most dangerous, competitor in the world. President Biden has followed a very tough-minded policy against China. I counted up yesterday at least 15 sanctions or executive orders limiting the ability of the Chinese Government to be influential around the world or in our own society. So, I think there has been—under President Obama, President Trump, now President Biden—an increasing emphasis on what we need to do to limit China, and President Biden's policies are very tough and very strong.

On Taiwan, we need to do multiple things. We need to strengthen our commitment to Taiwan's security under the Taiwan Relations Act. The Biden administration proposed the sale of M109A6 Howitzers this past spring, a \$750 million deal that would help the Taiwan authorities to defend themselves. There is substantial leverage in the Taiwan Relations Act available to the executive and legislative branches to continue to provide arms sales for defensive purposes, defense articles and services, to Taiwan.

And maybe the most important thing we can do is maintain a strong American military deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. You were part of that as Ambassador. Our alliance with Japan, our alliance with the Republic of Korea, our alliance with Australia, the presence of our Navy and Air Force at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, our rotational deployments. Of course, our deployments through the international waters of the South China Sea. This is all-encompassing strategy designed to support our side and to strengthen our ability to help Taiwan defend itself.

Senator HAGERTY. I agree with you on our military strategy and our posture. We need to maintain it. We need to strengthen it. I am interested still, though, in your view on whether we should revisit our posture of strategic ambiguity, how we talk about the Taiwan situation.

Ambassador BURNS. This is an important question. My own view is that we are better off and will be more effective in staying with the one China policy of the last four decades. We recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China, and

yet we have unofficial relations with Taiwan, and we have under the Taiwan Relations Act the ability, in fact, the imperative of helping Taiwan to defend itself.

Every President, Republican and Democrat, has followed that policy. In the face of the Chinese build-up—and they are more aggressive now—that is the best way for us to strengthen the ability of Taiwan to defend itself.

Senator HAGERTY. My time has come to a close. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KAINE [presiding]. Absolutely. Ambassador Burns, I am sitting in while Senator Menendez votes, and it is my turn in the order.

So, congratulations to you. You are a wonderful public servant.

I am going to ask you a couple of questions about assumptions. So, pre-2000, China had to sort of make a case to the United States every year to be granted Most Favored Nation status, and it was an annual decision that the President would make. And China, that annual decision provided a forum for discussions about human rights issues and such.

In 2000, Congress granted China permanent normal trade relation status, which paved their path to becoming a member of the WTO. So, we no longer have that annual determination and opportunity, and I think possibly we have lost some focus on some of the human rights and other issues for that reason.

The decision was made because of a belief that if China was part of the WTO, they would conform themselves to global trade rules, and I think everyone, whatever their thought at the time, would say that China's behavior has been disappointing, that they have not done what we hoped. I am curious, do you think that was a mistake for us to grant China legal permanent trade relations in 2000?

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator Kaine.

I was not involved in U.S.-China relations at that time. I was focused on Greece and NATO in those years. And of course, it is always perilous to be a Monday morning quarterback and sit in judgment of people I really admire. But personally, the assumptions that many made about China in those years turned out not to be accurate.

China took advantage of its presence in the WTO as a so-called developing country. China then did not meet its obligations under the WTO, and who suffered? American workers and American businesses. And you and I have met with a lot of American businesses who had their IP ripped off by the Chinese and made their business decisions very difficult.

So, I do think at this point in 2021, I hope there will be bipartisan support for a very aggressive American policy to hold China to account. If you read Ambassador Tai's speech of 2 1/2 weeks ago, Ambassador Katherine Tai's speech, the U.S. Trade Rep, she was very clear about her determination on behalf of the President to protect American workers and protect American businesses, and I think that has to be the focus of our efforts right now.

Senator KAINE. Thank you for that answer.

Some of my Republican colleagues actually have filed a bill to undo the legal permanent trade relations that we accorded China

21 years ago. It might be hard to get the genie back in the bottle because supply chains and others have sort of reformed and recombined to reflect the new reality.

But I think with the best of intentions, there were a lot of optimism and hopes about China—members of both parties, Presidents of both parties—that have proven to be wrong. And we have to be willing, as we were with the Competitiveness Act we recently passed, to lean much more forward in the relationship.

There is another assumption, and you touched on it in your discussion. The United States has a wonderful network of allies, but China really does not. China really does not. And we see this again and again. I think it is a statement that is actually true.

But here is something I worry about. When I see China and Russia doing joint naval exercises in the Straits of Japan, as they recently did, or other joint military exercises—they have done joint military exercises with Iran in the Persian Gulf—I start to worry a little bit about an assumption that we have long made in national security thinking that China and Russia will never be too cooperative. They seem to be combining frequently now.

They are very different countries, but they both are authoritarian nations that do not respect democratic norms and institutions and actually believe democracy is a dying governmental model. How worried should the United States be about increasing cooperation between China and Russia, especially on military matters?

Ambassador BURNS. It is a very—it is a reality, and I think a lot of us maybe 10, 20 years ago would not have anticipated that China and Russia would begin to work together strategically, but they are. All the more reason why we need to deepen our own alliances and partnerships.

I would say this, Senator, and this is just speculative. I spent 5 years of my career at the White House on Soviet and Russian affairs. My numbers may be a little bit off, but I think there are 6 or 7 million Russians living east of the Ural Mountains in that vast expanse, and there are 300 or 400 million Chinese living below them. The Russians are going to have to worry long term about economic domination of Russia by China.

And in response to what Senator Risch asked me, the Russians ought to be worried about a Chinese nuclear weapons build-up in the western part of China, about the hypersonic missile that Senator Hagerty—test that Senator Hagerty just raised, and the fact that China is completely unconstrained.

Of the five permanent nuclear powers of the Security Council, it is the only one that refuses to be part of any arms control regime. We have been part of one for 60 years, since the Test Ban Treaty of 1963. And so, obviously, that has got to be a focus for all of us, I would say including the Russians, going forward.

Senator KAINE. Thank you. I am over my time. I believe Senator Young by Webex is next up?

Senator YOUNG. Yes, Senator Kaine, Chairman, thank you so much.

Yes, Mr. Burns, I am sorry I just hopped on, Ambassador, but congratulations on your nomination, and thank you for your years of distinguished service.

This week, we have seen public reporting suggesting that China successfully tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile. Earlier this summer, we saw additional reporting indicating that China had dramatically increased the size and scope of its nuclear arsenal. These reports have evoked fears of a new cold war with China.

These nuclear weapons concerns come amid rapidly escalating tensions over Taiwan. Our strategic competition, of course, is nothing new, but I am concerned with the growing risks of miscommunication or misinterpretation of our actions. In your view, sir, what is motivating these sorts of provocative actions from Beijing?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator Young, thank you, and thank you for your leadership on the strategic innovation bill that is so important to the future of our country.

I think you are right to focus on this issue. Part of what we will need to do in the U.S.-China relationship is mitigate the possibility of an accidental conflict and to maintain the peace between our two countries and in the region. And that will require our military leadership, the civilian leadership of the Defense Department, the State Department, and the White House to have effective communication channels into the Chinese leadership.

And of course, every administration has wanted to do this, has worked on it, but we need to work on it very intensively because, at all costs, we want to compete with China, but we do not want to find ourselves, in the words of my Harvard colleague Joe Nye, being “sleepwalkers” into a conflict with China. So, part of the job of an American Ambassador to China, if I am confirmed, will be to work with my colleagues in the U.S. Government to make sure we have those effective communications channels with the Chinese leadership.

And finally, Senator, I would just say to you I completely agree with you. We should all be concerned by the nuclear build-up in China, and that has to be a concern for allied nations as well as the United States.

Senator YOUNG. Well, thank you. I wish you luck. If there is any way Congress can be constructive in helping open up those channels of communication, whether it is through visits to the country, expressing our collective desire to make sure that we are talking, we avoid any scenarios that our leadership and our peoples would regret, I am—enlist me in the cause, sir.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you.

Senator YOUNG. My State of Indiana, Ambassador, is the most manufacturing-intensive State in the United States, and our businesses rely on a diversified supply chain and market access. Over the years, China has used localization requirements, intellectual property theft, and forced transfer of data to hamstring our enterprises that are dependent on technology.

I firmly believe the United States should advocate for integrity in digital trade provisions of our trade agreements. This includes holding bad actors accountable, especially Communist China. I am currently working on a resolution to solidify the U.S. commitment to high-standard digital trade principles.

If confirmed, how will you address continued action by China that purposefully causes harm to American businesses, knowing that you will need to coordinate with Ambassador Tai on this?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you.

In my opening statement, I focused on this issue of trade because of the enormous damage to your State and every other State, to our workers, and to our businesses. This is a high priority for the Biden administration, and obviously, if confirmed, I will be working very intensively on this issue with the White House, with the Commerce Department, the Treasury Department, and of course, principally with Ambassador Tai and her colleagues.

Senator YOUNG. Ambassador, accept my apologies if you discussed this in your opening statement, but could you just explain why actions like IP theft and data localization requirements are issues of national security, not just economic issues?

Ambassador BURNS. In thinking about this job, I have been consulting with a lot of experts on China across the country, and it has really been interesting to hear. But I think the great majority of them would say that the focal point, the most important part of our competition with China will be on economics and technology in the future.

We are going to have a military competition for power, which we had with the Soviets in the old Cold War. What distinguishes our competition with China, which makes it unlike the old Cold War, is the fact that they seek dominance on technology, on AI and machine learning, quantum sciences, biotechnology. They seek to militarize those technologies.

That may be the central focus of the competition. So, therefore, we in the executive branch and you in Congress need to unite on a bipartisan basis and be fundamentally focused on it.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you.

Senator YOUNG. And I would say, Ambassador, thank you for bringing up my legislation. That is the purpose, to address this threat, technology threat, economic threat, that China poses to us, the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act. So, I hope that broadly bipartisan legislation passes before year's end.

Thank you so much, sir.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you for your leadership.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Hollen?

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And congratulations, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you for your long service to this country, and to your family.

Just picking up on some of the points Senator Young made, and I was pleased to hear you mention in your opening remarks the issue of China's systematic theft of intellectual property. That is why Senator Sasse and I teamed up, and we passed a bipartisan bill here in the Senate called Protecting American Intellectual Property Act. It is actually incorporated in the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, which, as you know, passed the Senate and is pending in the House.

And the whole idea is that U.S. companies that are victimized by intellectual property theft do not have just sole recourse in the United States courts. And so in those situations where we are not talking about garden-variety trademark violations, but in fact, sys-

tematic theft of U.S. strategic technology and other cutting-edge technologies, the U.S. Government would weigh in and be authorized to impose economic sanctions and penalties. This was a measure supported by the previous administration and I think also by the current administration.

I want to flag that because I look forward to working with you as we get that through the congressional process because there has to be a price to pay. And when you are talking about the Chinese Government weighing in and being part of this theft, you cannot leave it simply to the court system to defend American companies.

Similarly, I believe China has got to be paying a higher price for its malign actions and its violation of international agreements, and we have seen a gross violation of those agreements in the case of Hong Kong, where China has cracked down on democracy. Senator Toomey and I passed legislation last year called the Hong Kong Autonomy Act. It is in—part of the law now.

This administration has used it to apply sanctions to 24 individuals who were complicit in cracking down on democracy in Hong Kong. But we would like to see them identify some of the banks and financial institutions that are aiding and abetting that activity because the sanctions also apply to them.

But my broader question here relates to how we raise the price China has got to pay for these malign actions. Yes, we have got to make sure we strengthen our own position, both at home and around the world, certainly with our allies, certainly provide Taiwan with more of the means to defend itself. But how can we raise the cost to China of the kind of actions they have taken in Hong Kong, and do you agree that they have felt the pain at all of international response, for example, in Hong Kong? Is there more we can be doing?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you very much, and thank you for authoring that legislation. I do think it was particularly effective to sanction specific individuals in Hong Kong who are responsible for the repression of the people of Hong Kong, and that is similar to the Biden administration sanctions on those individuals in Xinjiang Province who did the same.

I do think that we are stronger if we can create global alliances on all of these issues. So, encouraging the European Union to be with us, not just in condemning human rights violations, but sanctioning. And that was the case, they were with us in sanctions on Xinjiang. And I think Hong Kong is particularly important.

I mentioned earlier in the testimony I was with Secretary Albright in Hong Kong on the day of the handover, June 30, 1997, and all of us with Secretary Albright remember the specific commitments China made, and it has reneged on all of them. So, this is not just a U.S. concern. It has to be a global concern.

And I do think one of the changes President Biden has brought to our strategic policy towards China is to emphasize our allies and partners on this issue as well as the others that we have been talking about.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I appreciate that. I think you have to have that multiplier effect in order to make these sanctions ultimately effective. If not reversing the actions that China has taken, letting

them know that they will pay a higher price for similar actions going forward.

Just in conclusion, you are obviously going to be our Ambassador to China and talking about these important issues between our two countries, but how important is it that we strengthen ourselves here at home, both in terms of modernizing our infrastructure and trying to address the depolarization that we face in this country?

Ambassador BURNS. It may be the most important thing we could do is to invest in our technological future, as the Senate is doing with your strategic innovation bill, which I very strongly—that the administration very strongly supported, and I do, too. And it is to prepare ourselves to strengthen—to have a clean energy future; strengthen our technology base; be funding, I would hope, our universities and research institutions because that is where the cutting-edge technology is happening.

Supporting our businesses because they are the ones who make America powerful economically in large part. And so that strategy is probably the most important thing we can do to stand up to the China challenge over the next 20 to 30 years. I do think this is going to be a long-term challenge.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Rounds?

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Burns, first of all, let me just begin by saying thank you for the time that you spent with us last evening. It is appreciated, and I most certainly enjoyed the conversation.

As you know, I sit on the Senate Armed Services Committee and its Strategic Forces Subcommittee. I would be very interested in your thoughts on China's nuclear stockpile and its expanding capabilities, specifically with regard to our challenge right now here within the discussions going on that some of our members think it is okay if we were to perhaps not modernize our own triad. In fact, they question whether anybody really cares whether we have a triad or not.

China—and this is on an unclassified level—they have been increasing their stockpile. Some folks do not think that we need to be improving and upgrading and modernizing our own nuclear triad. I think China is aggressively growing their own, and I think this is a critical part of their foreign policy strategy, and I think it is one way in which the PRC in terms of their diplomatic efforts uses it as a hammer when they deal with other countries. Could you share a little bit about how you see that impacting your ability to negotiate with the PRC once you are there?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you, and thank you for the conversation we had in your office last evening.

And as I explained to you, one of the curiosities of coming up for confirmation as a private citizen is that, quite properly, I do not have access to classified information. So, in this realm, and Senator Hagerty asked me about it as well, I am a little bit limited by not having that access. But I will say this.

Based on the press reports, we should all be concerned by the build-up of China's nuclear forces in the western part of China. And then many Members have asked me about these press reports of these novel delivery systems, these hypersonic systems. What I

think has to bother all of us is the attitude of the Chinese Government. They do not believe that they should be constrained in any way, shape, or form by arms control.

The United States submits to that. Russia submits to that, at least did in the past. Our other nuclear allies—the United Kingdom and France—do. And so I think it is going to be very important.

I know the Trump administration made an effort to do this and was right to do it, to push the Chinese to think about their obligations, and I think it is very important that we do that on a bipartisan basis. But certainly, these are troubling developments, and I said earlier, Senator, the Chinese have been saying for decades that they would like to have a minimum nuclear deterrence, and they seem to be quite rapidly moving away from that older policy of the Chinese Government.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you.

Let me just continue down that line a little bit. It is more than simply nuclear development. There is also the issue of artificial intelligence. They will be a key player with regard to the deployment of artificial intelligence not just in regard to national defense issues, but in all areas of technology. We have got before us the opportunity and I think the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence made major requests to Congress to fund artificial intelligence activity and opportunities, not real expensive, but clearly something that is not just the United States, but China is working on.

Could you talk about the need for the United States to continue to take a very active role in the most technologically advanced fields, including artificial intelligence, in order to maintain our leadership role not just with regard to defense, but with regard to trade as well?

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator.

Two years ago, I organized a meeting of the bipartisan Aspen Strategy Group. I am the Director of the group. And we focused over 3 days on this issue, and we had some of the best experts from the U.S. Government and the private sector, the tech companies come and talk to us. And they identified the same concern that you have, that China will be competing us for commercial superiority in AI and machine learning—and this is their stated 2025 policy—in quantum sciences and biotechnology.

They are obviously going to try to militarize those technologies, and the United States cannot let ourselves be in an inferior position and have the Chinese leapfrog over us on these technologies 5 or 10 or 30 years from now. So, I think I agree wholeheartedly with you. We need to make strategic investments, and the Senate is doing that.

And we need to continue to do that in this strength of the American economy, innovation, high tech, biotech because it is likely to be the central arena of competition between us with China. And if I am confirmed, it will be a central focus. It already is of the Biden administration, but I will be very focused on it.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, sir, and I look forward to supporting your nomination.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Merkley?

Senator MERKLEY. Thank very much, Ambassador, for service over a long career.

I wanted to start with recognizing you have noted that China is not an Olympian power, and that just catches my attention because the Olympics in China are just 4 months away in February. And as we discussed in my office, I am very concerned about the fact that the International Olympic Committee has placed the Olympics in a nation that is conducting genocide against its own people.

And my preference would certainly have been for the Olympic Committee to say China had failed to follow its 2015 promises on human rights and that the Olympics were to be moved. That is not going to happen. The IOC has made that very clear.

However, there are things that can be done to keep China from using the Olympics to gloss over its horrific human rights activities. For example, a diplomatic boycott. Another example would be fiercely defending the right of athletes to express themselves on what is going on in China while they are in China performing.

What do you think is—what would you recommend to essentially try not to have China be able to use the Olympics as a way to create a cheerful facade over their horrific activities against minorities in their own country?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you.

And I used the term “Olympian” not to refer, as you know, to the Olympics, but just to suggest that and if you think about ancient Greece, China is not all-powerful.

Senator MERKLEY. No, understood.

Ambassador BURNS. On the question of the Olympic Games, the Winter Games to be held in Beijing, it looks like it is going to be the most unusual games ever. It looks like, if you look at the rules and regulations that the Chinese authorities have worked out with the International Olympic Committee, there will be really nobody there from around the world because the precautionary measures that people are being asked to take, and obviously given a pandemic, will make it almost impossible for spectators from Japan or the United States to be there. So, I think you will largely have a Chinese audience.

I think you are right, and I enjoyed our conversation about this 3 days ago. We obviously want to make sure that the American athletes, if they are there, and other athletes are able to speak their minds, are able to have access to the media to say what they wish to say because they come from democratic countries. And I hope and trust that the International Olympic Committee will make that possible.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you, Ambassador. And I think fierce advocacy will be very valuable and in coordination with other nations.

The Olympic Committee members say it is all about the athletes so we do not really want to bring up “political issues” like human rights. But what they have done is force the athletes to become unwilling or unwitting participants in this—well, this effort to put a very bright and happy face on China at the same time there are such tragic and horrific practices.

One of the biggest factors is the treatment of the Uyghurs and essentially engaging millions in slavery, many high-tech practices, forced sterilization, forced birth control, forced labor that is slave labor, and in Hong Kong, where they have stripped the political rights. The Congressional Executive Commission on China held a hearing in which we heard advocate after advocate say this is a moment for the United States to grant P2 status to those who are trying—are particularly vulnerable in these two situations, both in Hong Kong and, if you will, among Xinjiang Province, the Uyghur community.

This is status given to groups of special humanitarian concern. Individuals still have to establish their personal vulnerability within that group that allows them to apply from inside or outside the country and that it is the right fit. Is P2 status for those who are vulnerable in Hong Kong and in Xinjiang Province something that you would support?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you.

What I would like to do is check with the State Department, because I am unsure of the answer to your question, and come back to you with an answer. Perhaps we can do that in written form, or I can—we can meet and talk about it.

I do know that President Biden has allowed Hong Kong residents to stay in the United States on a lengthier basis than they normally would because of the fear of persecution should they go back, given what has happened in Hong Kong. But I am just not aware of what other measures the administration has taken or is planning, but I am happy to take that question for the record.

[The response to Senator Merkley's question follows:]

The United States Government is exploring migration policies that would best support Hong Kongers. The Department of State also remains focused on the humanitarian concerns of the Uyghur community by coordinating with UNHCR to ensure it can refer vulnerable Uyghurs to the United States Refugee Admissions Program for resettlement consideration without delay and to determine if there are other steps needed to ensure humanitarian access to resettlement.

If confirmed, I will continue to support policies that show our unwavering support for the Uyghur community, as well as for people in Hong Kong, including humanitarian pathways to the United States.

Senator MERKLEY. Yes, that status of deferred and forced departure has been granted to those from Hong Kong who are already in the country.

Ambassador BURNS. Right.

Senator MERKLEY. It is an 18-month provision, has not been granted to Uyghurs. We had testimony from Uyghurs who have been here for 4 years because of their high vulnerability in return and have lost—their families have lost any formal status in our country, and they are awaiting action.

I will just close with a comment. If the chair feels there is time to respond, fine, but I am over time. Which is that I would really love to see champions in our diplomatic team push for an official determination of genocide in Myanmar because the actions against the Rohingya fully justify it, just horrific activities. The hesitation amongst some in the State Department has been to be critical because there is a fledgling democracy, except there is no longer a fledgling democracy because the military conducted a military coup and put Aung San Suu Kyi under arrest.

When we fail to call out genocide in Myanmar, it undermines the legitimacy of the strength of our position on genocide elsewhere, including Xinjiang Province. So, I am encouraging consistency in calling out such horrific human practices when they occur.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Cruz?

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Burns, welcome. I have long believed China poses the single-greatest geopolitical threat to the United States for the next century. There are many domains on which we are standing up to China. One of the most important concerns Taiwan, and I worry that the threat to our Taiwanese allies is becoming acute.

This week, the Chinese filled commercial ships with dozens of military tanks and practiced their amphibious landing capabilities in preparation for “future battlefields.” Earlier in the month, 149 Chinese aircraft made incursions into Taiwan’s air defense zone over the span of just 4 days. U.S. commanders have publicly assessed that an invasion of Taiwan is “much closer to us than most think.”

Meanwhile, Taiwan has been asking the United States to expedite the delivery of several squadrons of F-16s ordered in 2019. I strongly believe we have to do more to get them what they need to defend themselves, and I want to ask you a couple of questions about that.

Number one, how do you see the Chinese threat to Taiwan, and what should we be doing to deter that threat?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you.

It is a growing Chinese threat to Taiwan, attempts to bully and intimidate and to send these 149 aircraft into the air defense identification zone of Taiwan. And you combine that with the statements of the Chinese leadership, which are very aggressive and clear, we obviously have a self-interest and under the Taiwan Relations Act an obligation and commitment to help deepen our involvement in helping Taiwan to defend itself. And Congress and the executive branch—and we talked about this when we met in your office—have that authority and have that responsibility.

On the F-16 issue, the Biden administration has come forward with advanced Howitzer sale of \$750 million. I think a lot of experts believe that Taiwan needs a greater asymmetric defense capacity, needs to spend money on that to repel, as you say, an amphibious, the threat of an amphibious invasion or an airborne invasion, whatever the Chinese are thinking of. And I think that in the Taiwan Relations Act, it talks about the United States needing to make clear that its deterrent is in place, the power of our military, in the Indo-Pacific, and our allies, of course, have to be part of this.

So, I think everyone here who has talked about Taiwan, and myself included, ought to be more concerned because the Chinese clearly are on a different path than they were 30 or 20 years ago.

Senator CRUZ. I think one of the most important steps we can and should take to stand with Taiwan is help prepare and equip them to defend themselves and to defend themselves effectively against a serious military incursion from China. I am intending to introduce legislation, the Taiwan Arms Act, that raises Taiwan’s status for arms sales to that of our closest allies and partners.

It is important, and I look forward to working with my colleagues on this committee and other committees to see that it expeditiously becomes law.

But let me turn to another aspect. One part of the solution to ensuring that our Taiwan allies have what they need to defend themselves involve arms sales such as the legislation I am introducing, the Taiwan Arms Act. Another component of it, however, derives from our current policy of strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan and towards Taiwan status. And I am concerned that that longstanding policy—and it is a policy that has existed across Democrat and Republican administrations. I am concerned that it is undermining our efforts to bolster Taiwan.

I have long advocated there is great virtue to clarity in foreign policy. The State Department is notorious for embracing lack of clarity, and strategic ambiguity seems to be one of the favorite tools of Foggy Bottom. In the context of China and Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party I believe interprets ambiguity as weakness and as a signal that we are not committed to Taiwan's security.

How do you assess our current efforts to deter China, and what do you think the role that strategic ambiguity has in those current efforts?

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator.

My own view, and this is also the view, of course, and more importantly of the Biden administration, is that the smartest and effective way for us to help deter aggressive actions by Taiwan—by China, excuse me, across the Taiwan Strait will be to stay with the policy that has been in place, and that is the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint statements of 1972, '79, and '82, and President Reagan's six assurances of 1982.

They are time-tested. They allow under the Taiwan Relations Act the executive and Congress to do more, if you choose to do more, if both branches choose to do more to help Taiwan defend itself. Clearly, this is a different situation. You are right about that, but this is a policy that can succeed if we execute it consistently and with some strength.

And as I said before, and I do not mean to repeat myself, but maybe the most important thing we could do is maintain the American military position in Japan, in the Republic of Korea, in that first island chain, but also out to our Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, and to be an effective deterrent to keep the peace. That is also part of the Taiwan Relations Act, that the United States has a role. Japan has a role.

And I think under the banner or the umbrella of a one China policy, where we recognize the People's Republic as the sole legal Government of China that has been the policy since 1979, we also have this unofficial relationship with Taiwan, and we can exercise responsibilities within that context. And I think that is the smartest way to deter the Chinese from trying to exercise force, as opposed to keeping the peace and having a more respectful, long-term conversation with Taiwan.

Senator CRUZ. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Thank you.

Thank you, Ambassador, for your answers to the questions that have been posed.

The record for this particular part of the hearing will remain open until the close of business on Thursday, October 21. Please ensure that questions for the record are submitted no later than Thursday. I would urge you, Ambassador, that upon receipt of questions for the record that you answer them as expeditiously and as fully as possible so that we can schedule your nomination for a business meeting.

And with that and the thanks of the committee, you are excused at this time.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

We have two nominations on the next panel, and we will ask those nominees to come forward.

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. I would ask our nominees to take their seats. We have two nominations on this second panel. They are Rahm Emanuel to be the Ambassador to Japan and Mr. Jonathan Kaplan to be the Ambassador to Singapore.

I understand that Senator Durbin and also Senator Hagerty will be introducing Mayor Emanuel today and that Senator Hickenlooper will be introducing Mr. Kaplan.

So, I see Senator Durbin is here with us. Let me turn to Senator Durbin.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD J. DURBIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS**

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Risch.

It is an honor to have the opportunity to share a few words of introduction for Rahm Emanuel to be our next Ambassador to Japan. Yesterday, a few colleagues and I had a chance to speak with the new IAEA Director General, Mariano Grossi. I think several of you may have met with him as well.

We talked about not only Iran's future and nuclear program, but also North Korea. It reminded me that Japan, one of our most important allies in Asia, is at the forefront of several key national security priorities for our Nation. Notably, the nuclear threat on and from the Korean peninsula, Chinese actions in the South China Sea, and regional economic pressure, the undermining of Hong Kong's democracy and threats against Taiwan.

With the dawn of the AUKUS pact, America has signaled a national commitment to the Indo-Pacific region. We need to be certain that our allies and friends and partners like Japan have a clear understanding of our goals. That is why the appointment of a new Ambassador to Japan is timely and critical. Rahm Emanuel is the right person for that responsibility.

I have known Rahm for more than 30 years. Perhaps his wife Amy is the only one in the room who has known him longer. I have worked with him in many capacities, his work as staff leader in the Clinton White House, as a member of the Illinois congressional delegation, when he became chief of staff to President Obama, and

most closely when he was mayor of the city of Chicago. I can tell you what is obvious. He is bright, energetic, and focused.

Any mayor who can cobble together a budget in the Chicago City Council is ready for major league diplomacy. He has repeatedly shown that he can build winning coalitions at every level, and he has delivered with a legacy that we still enjoy in the city of Chicago and State of Illinois. We can still see his good work today in the Chicago Public School System, transportation modernization, and in the game-changing projects like the Riverwalk in the city of Chicago.

I understand Senator Hagerty is also going to introduce Rahm. I thank him for that, and he previously served as Ambassador to Japan and knows the challenges all too well.

Quite simply, Rahm Emanuel's lifetime of public service has prepared him to speak for America on the global stage. As such, I hope this committee will look favorably on his nomination.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Durbin.

I see Senator Hickenlooper is with us. So, let me turn to Senator Hickenlooper.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN W. HICKENLOOPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO**

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Chair and Ranking Member. Appreciate your time and effort on this committee.

I am honored to join you today to introduce Jonathan Kaplan, President Biden's nominee for U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Singapore.

Mr. Kaplan—well, in politics, as you all know, you get to meet a number of remarkable people, and Mr. Kaplan is one of the more, if not one of the most, perhaps the most remarkable person I know. But before I go into some of the accolades on Mr. Kaplan, let me give a little context.

Singapore is a crucial partner in an important region, Asia's largest recipient of U.S. foreign direct investment, a close ally in cooperation on security and defense. There is a truly dynamic trade relationship with Singapore, and they share our commitment to the rule of law. It is also a part of the world that has an enduring sense of possibility.

Both of our countries are diverse, multicultural hubs of innovation. They are both grappling with the looming threat of climate change and the rise of China. So, much in common and a lot to learn from one another, and it is essential to have someone of great quality to steer this partnership at such a sensitive moment.

And that leader we have in Jonathan Kaplan, who shares that enduring sense of possibility. He is a tested entrepreneur who understands the importance of bringing people together to achieve common goals to solve problems in the most effective and efficient ways possible.

He is the chair of EducationSuperHighway, a nonprofit organization dedicated to bridging the digital divide in schools. Jon and his team built a bipartisan movement across all 50 States to bring high-speed Internet to over 99 percent of American schoolchildren.

He worked with governors like me. In 2016, Colorado partnered with EducationSuperHighway on Kids Link Colorado and expanded

quality, affordable broadband to schools across the State. It was a huge success, and these investments proved critical when learning went online during COVID.

Jon has the mindset of an inventor and an innovator. As an inventor, he has the patents to prove it. He never accepts things as they always have been. He is always envisioning how they could be better and then bringing people together to create that future.

Maybe you will remember the flip phone video, which he was behind and responsible for. His numerous business ventures have transformed how we use not just technology, but how we record video, as I said, how we play online games, and even how you get your lunch to go.

He has extensive experience in the East Asian theater. He has traveled to over 75 countries around the world. He has worked especially closely with corporate and government officials in China, Japan, and South Korea. He has exactly the right perspective and exactly the right experience to represent the United States in Singapore, a country that embodies the same commitment to innovation and that same enduring sense of possibility for this vitally important partner at this vitally important time.

It has been now almost 4 years since this post was last filled. It is critical that we act swiftly to confirm a U.S. Ambassador to Singapore and, hopefully, with a large majority, which sends a message in and of itself.

So, I support Jon's nomination, and I hope this committee will do the same.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hickenlooper.

I see that Senator Hagerty has joined us as well and wants to join in introducing Senator—excuse me, Mayor Emanuel.

**STATEMENT OF HON. BILL HAGERTY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE**

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch. I appreciate your holding this hearing.

I want to thank you for allowing me to introduce the person I think will be the next U.S. Ambassador to Japan. It is a position that I hold very near and dear to my heart, having served as our most recent Ambassador to Japan from 2017 to 2019.

And I would like to say this. That representing one's own country is one of the greatest honors in the world. It really brings home the importance of the exceptional nation that the United States is, and it is an incredible honor that is being bestowed upon those of you that will serve our Nation as Ambassador. It is certainly an incredible honor that my family and I cherished, and I feel certain that you will, too.

Today, I am here in a very different role. I am here as a member of the committee that oversaw my nomination. I am over here in a different seat to introduce the nominee to be our next Ambassador to Japan.

While our political backgrounds could not be more different and I am sure there are many issues upon which we strongly disagree, but through our recent discussions it has become clear to me that Mayor Emanuel shares my unwavering conviction that the U.S.-

Japan relationship is the cornerstone for peace and prosperity in the entire Indo-Pacific region. It is a region that has become even more dangerous day by day, and that makes the position of U.S. Ambassador to Japan all the more important for the United States. This is a position that has remained vacant for too long.

When I served as U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo, my ability to directly engage in person with senior Japanese Government officials, with business leaders, and most importantly, the Japanese people helped to bring our strategic relationship with Japan to new heights. During my tenure, tensions in the region were remarkably high, with North Korea launching multiple ballistic missiles over Japan and Communist China threatening Japan's administration of the Senkaku Islands in the South China—in the East China Sea. The Japanese people and the world needed to hear directly from the U.S. Ambassador when those threats occurred, and they did.

As the global security focus continues to shift toward the Indo-Pacific to counter Russia's aggression and the predatory actions of Communist China, the U.S.-Japan alliance must remain the cornerstone of peace, prosperity, and security in the region. And for this posture to hold, the U.S. Ambassador will need to play a critical role in advancing the relationship.

Today, we have a great threat from Communist China toward our mutual friend Taiwan. This is a threat that requires a strong and unified response from both the U.S. and Japan. Mayor Emanuel understands this critical circumstance and has assured me that he will do everything in the immense power of the U.S. Ambassador to Japan to stand strong for Taiwan's freedom, for their democratic rule.

Our next Ambassador to Japan must be prepared to continue a strong and clear-eyed stance for America's interest in the Indo-Pacific. He must stand for the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance throughout the region while continuing to support and strengthen our military presence in Japan. This presence is the largest complement of U.S. military forces stationed anywhere in the world. Mayor Emanuel has committed to me that he will be that Ambassador.

As a former Ambassador, I know that sometimes challenges occur from within the host nation. Japan has an outdated judicial system that places that nation at a constant competitive disadvantage. We have American citizens—today, a Tennessee citizen—who are caught in the Japanese judicial system, suffering from unfair and barbaric treatment in the so-called hostage justice system of Japan. It is cruel, it is inhumane, and it is unjust.

Mayor Emanuel has assured me that he will make addressing this sad and difficult situation a top priority if he is confirmed. This matters a great deal to me, and it matters to the people of Tennessee. We must stand for the human rights of U.S. citizens. And when our citizens are unjustly held, they must be returned home.

The region and the world will need to hear that the commitment of the United States to defend Japan remains ironclad and unwavering. That was my message as Ambassador, and it is a message that I am confident Mayor Emanuel will deliver if he is confirmed.

While the United States will remain the predominant global power for the foreseeable future, the emerging set of challenges in the Indo-Pacific region will require our friends to stand shoulder to shoulder with us, especially Japan. As I mentioned, Mayor Emanuel and I have had many long and productive conversations about this position, both the challenges of the position and the expectations. I welcome him today, and I intend to provide him with the bipartisan support that I was fortunate to receive from this committee during my U.S. Senate confirmation. A critical post like this deserves no less from a qualified and capable nominee.

I once again congratulate Mayor Emanuel and his family. I welcome them here. And as I said at the beginning of my remarks, I hope this committee takes into consideration the importance of the position and the consequence for our national security if this post were allowed to remain vacant any longer.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hagerty. Thank you for your service to our Nation as our former Ambassador to Japan. We appreciate that service and your insights here on the committee, and we appreciate you lending your bipartisan vote—voice Mayor Emanuel's nomination.

Let us turn to the nominees. Mayor Emanuel, it is good to see you again. We welcome you and your family. And I want to note that your son Zach is with us, who is a U.S. Naval officer, and we appreciate his service to our country.

I believe that you have the necessary knowledge and experience to represent us well in Japan. As you know, Japan is one of our four most important allies in the world. For over 70 years, the U.S.-Japan partnership has played a vital role in ensuring peace, stability, and economic development in Asia and beyond. Our bilateral alliance serves as proof that two nations can overcome past differences and work together towards a better future.

If confirmed, I trust that Mayor Emanuel's vast experience, both in public service and in the private sector, will serve him and our country well as he navigates the opportunities and complexities of the U.S.-Japan relationship and safeguarding our partnership, one that is grounded in common interests and common values. I will look forward to hearing from you about how you plan to approach Japan and the region as well and the type of Ambassador you hope to be.

As you are aware, today is also the anniversary of the murder of Laquan McDonald. My heart goes out to his family on this day. I believe all of us share that sentiment. And just so many other victims and their families, as we work to deliver meaningful reforms to the black and brown communities who endure injustices every day. And certainly, we will give you an opportunity to speak to that in the course of this hearing.

Mr. Kaplan, congratulations on your nomination. We welcome your family as well. Singapore, as I know you appreciate, is central for our engagement in Southeast Asia and with ASEAN, and success in Southeast Asia is central to our success in the Indo-Pacific and with our challenge with China.

While the Biden administration has launched significant initiatives to bolster the broader regional architecture, including through

AUKUS and the QUAD, I believe that more attention is needed in Southeast Asia, including on issues like regional trade engagement and economic statecraft. At the end of the day, how we integrate with the region's political economy is far more consequential than our military or security presence alone, and Singapore is, of course, a key regional trade and economic partner.

I was encouraged by recent agreements with Singapore to support our common goals in addressing climate change, cybersecurity, and supply chain resilience. Overall, I believe we need to reinvigorate our diplomatic presence and outreach to Singapore, and I trust that you will be up to that task. I look forward to hearing your goals for how we can deepen this important diplomatic relationship even further.

We recently—Senator Risch and I recently had the Singaporean foreign minister here, and he spoke about how he desires—he and Singapore desires to see our engagement. But when we have not had a confirmed Ambassador in Singapore for almost 5 years now, it is tough to have diplomatic engagement, which underscores the importance of getting you in place as soon as possible.

With that, let me turn to the ranking member for his remarks.

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, both of you, to our nominees for your willingness to serve, and your families as well.

On the nomination of Ambassador to Japan, our alliance with Japan is the bedrock of our ability to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific. Over the past decades, the U.S.-Japan alliance has become a critical example of how strong defense ties can bring about stability and prosperity.

As we look forward to working with the new Japanese prime minister and his team, it is vital that we strengthen and sustain this critical alliance, especially in the face of growing regional threats. We have seen important steps in that direction, including the emphasis on cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India through the QUAD.

The U.S. and Japan are also working together with other partners in the region to finance the construction of a reliable and secure undersea cable connecting Palau to the rest of the Indo-Pacific as well as bring electricity to Papua New Guinea. This is the foundation for future U.S.-Japan cooperation in advanced technology, supply chain diversification, global health, and other critical areas.

On the security front, we must maintain and strengthen the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. I have said it before, and I will say it again now. A sole purpose nuclear declaratory policy or any perceived weakening of our extended deterrence is a betrayal of our alliance in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan. We must ensure our system is equipped to provide advanced capabilities to our allies in the region. To achieve this, Japan must do its part and work with us on cybersecurity and technology security as committed during the Suga summit, or the Biden-Suga summit.

However, certain parts of the State Department that come up with reasons not to provide these critical capabilities are a major impediment on this issue. If confirmed, you are—Mayor Emanuel, you are going to see the security environment we face firsthand, and I expect that you will encounter instincts and policies that

would weaken our security ties with Japan. We should not tolerate those.

On the nomination, Mr. Kaplan, to be Ambassador to Singapore, if confirmed, you will be our steward in one of our closest partners in Southeast Asia. Idahoans know just how important our security partnership with Singapore is. We are proud to host, and have for some time, Singaporean F-15 pilots and their families as they train at Mountain Home Air Force Base in Mountain Home, Idaho. We should all support expanding our security cooperation with Singapore, building on the memorandum of understanding renewed in 2019.

On the economic side, I want to hear how you will apply your private sector background to growing economic cooperation with Singapore, including on supply chain issues. Singapore is an important trading partner for the State of Idaho.

On the defense side, Singapore has made clear that while it seeks a close relationship with the United States, it also seeks to maintain cooperation with China, including through increased defense ties. Another critical task for our next Ambassador is to work with Singapore on the issues where China seeks to exert pressure or undue influence in the country.

And along with the chairman, I want to underscore the meeting that we had that was, I think, a very significant and forward-looking meeting we had with the people from Singapore. I look forward to hearing your thoughts on all of those issues. With that, I yield back, Mr. chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Risch.

We will turn to our nominees. We ask you to summarize your statements in about 5 minutes. Your full statements will be included in the record, without objection.

And we will recognize Mayor Emanuel first.

STATEMENT OF HON. RAHM EMANUEL OF ILLINOIS, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO JAPAN

Mr. EMANUEL. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you as President Biden's nominee to serve as the United States Ambassador to Japan. I appreciate the confidence that President Biden has placed in me, and I am grateful for the consideration of this distinguished committee.

Over 23 years in public service, there has been one constant in my life—Amy, my wife of 27 years. Six elections, two White House appointments, and one nomination later, she is the reason I am here today. Amy is living proof of the timeless truth that behind every successful person is an astonished spouse.

Together, we have raised three great children. Zach graduated from UCLA and is serving as an intelligence officer in the United States Navy. Ilana, a Brown graduate, joined a cable news network, and Leah is a junior at Princeton.

This post has been held by distinguished Americans—Vice President Walter Mondale, Speaker Tom Foley, Senator Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Mike Mansfield, and Ambassador Caroline Ken-

nedy. This long list also includes a member of this committee, Senator Hagerty. I want to thank him for his words and his comments earlier. If confirmed, I will continue the example he and his predecessors set and ensure America's interests in the region remain paramount.

An Ambassador is only as effective as the civil and Foreign Service professionals and U.S. armed forces who surround them. In Japan, these Americans have advanced our Nation's ideals without an appointed Ambassador for 2 years. I want to take this opportunity to thank them for their patriotism and professionalism to our mission in Japan, and I hope soon to serve our country alongside them.

We are at a critical juncture in our foreign policy, in American foreign policy in this region. What we build in partnership with Japan over the next 3 years will determine America's posture for the next 30. The challenges and opportunities we face underscore the imperative of strengthening our bonds with our closest ally, Japan.

For more than 60 years, the partnership between the United States and Japan has been the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in a free and open Indo-Pacific. Our alliance advances our shared interests and shared values. If confirmed, my top priority will be to deepen these ties while we confront our common challenges.

China aims to conquer through division. America's strategy is security through unity. That regional unity is built on the shoulders of the U.S.-Japan alliance. If confirmed, I will draw on my two and a half decades of public service. As senior adviser to President Clinton and chief of staff to President Obama, I served as a trusted adviser on domestic and national security issues.

As mayor, my administration made it a priority to bring the world to Chicago and Chicago to the world. During my tenure, Chicago led the Nation in corporate relocations and foreign direct investment for 7 consecutive years. I also presided over the most active sister city organizations in America.

As mayor, I traveled to Japan to meet with public and private sector leaders and signed the Japan-Chicago Partnership Agreement with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and eight additional ministries, marking the first time the Japanese Government entered into a formal agreement with a North American city.

In addition, the Governor of Tokyo signed the Chicago Climate Charter, a first-of-its-kind municipal agreement. This trip laid the groundwork for deepening Chicago and Japan relations, including corporate relocations by two preeminent Japanese companies, DMG Mori and Beam Suntory, and many cultural exchange initiatives.

Two people inspired me to enter public service nearly 30 years ago. My mother, Marsha Emanuel, has spent her entire life serving others as a nurse, social worker, and a leader of CORE, the Congress On Racial Equality, in Chicago, where she was instrumental in the integration of Chicago's beaches and housing in the early '60s.

This past October 3 marked the 2-year anniversary of my father's passing. Dr. Benjamin Emanuel immigrated to this country in 1953 with just \$13 in his pocket after fighting in Israel's War

of Independence. He campaigned for national healthcare during the early '60s and quit the AMA over its opposition.

He then sued the City of Chicago for lead in household paint and started a pediatrics practice based on one rule. No child was rejected because their parents could not pay. Through his years, he built his practice into one of the largest in Chicago.

If confirmed, this will be the first professional pursuit I will undertake without my best friend, my father, by my side. The drive and values I have come from my parents, who always loved and supported me, even though I did not become a doctor like my older brother.

For my mother and father, America was a place of possibility. In his wallet, my father carried a picture of the boat that brought him to the United States. That photo represents what he instilled in me and my two brothers, the beacon of hope, possibility, and endless opportunity this country is to the world.

I wish he were here today. First, while my mother is proud, he would be shocked and amazed that I am sitting here. And second, it would reaffirm his belief in that special place we all love, America.

And the final thing I have to say is the first thing I want to do, work closely with this committee and the Congress as a whole to ensure that we work seamlessly across the aisle, across the Capitol, and across the Pacific to advance America's interests in the vital Indo-Pacific region.

I would like to thank this committee for your consideration of my nomination. If confirmed, I intend to work with you to promote our economic prosperity, strengthen our national security, and ensure our democratic values remain paramount to the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Under your leadership, Mr. Chairman, working with the ranking member, Senator Risch, this committee has continued its proud bipartisan tradition of putting country ahead of party. That is a mission and a mandate I proudly share.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Emanuel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. RAHM EMANUEL

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the committee: It is an honor to appear before you as President Biden's nominee to serve as the United States Ambassador to Japan. I appreciate the confidence that President Biden has placed in me, and I am grateful for the consideration of this distinguished committee.

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vanced our nation's ideals without an appointed Ambassador for two years. I want to take this opportunity to thank them for their patriotism and professionalism to our Mission in Japan, and I hope to soon serve our country alongside them.

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China aims to conquer through division. America's strategy is security through unity. That regional unity is built on the U.S.-Japan alliance.

If confirmed, I will draw on my two-and-a-half decades of public service. As Senior Advisor to President Clinton and Chief of Staff to President Obama, I served as a trusted advisor on major domestic and national security issues.

As Mayor, my administration made it a priority to bring the world to Chicago, and Chicago to the world. During my tenure, Chicago led the nation in corporate relocations and foreign direct investment for seven consecutive years. I also presided over the most active sister cities organization in America.

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Two people inspired me to enter public service nearly 30 years ago. My mother, Marsha Emanuel, has spent her entire life serving others as a nurse, a social worker, and head of CORE—the Congress of Racial Equality—in Chicago, where she was instrumental in the integration of Chicago's beaches and housing in the early 1960s.

October 3rd marked the two-year anniversary of my father's passing. Dr. Benjamin Emanuel immigrated to this country in 1953 with just \$13 in his pocket after fighting in Israel's War of Independence. He campaigned for national health care during the early 1960s and quit the American Medical Association in protest over its opposition. He then sued the City of Chicago for lead in household paint and started a pediatric practice based on one rule: No child was rejected because their parents could not pay. Through his years, he built his practice into one of the largest in Chicago.

If confirmed, this will be the first professional pursuit I will undertake without my best friend—my father—by my side. The drive and values I have come from my parents, who always loved and supported me—even though I didn't become a doctor like my older brother.

For my father and mother, America was a place of possibility. In his wallet, my father carried a picture of the boat that brought him to the United States. That photo represents what he instilled in me and my two brothers: the beacon of hope, opportunity, and endless possibility this great country is to the world.

I wish he was here today. First, while my mother is proud, he would be shocked and amazed that I was sitting here. Second, it would reaffirm his belief in that special place we love—America.

The final thing I have to say is the first thing I want to do: work closely with this committee and the Congress as a whole to ensure that we work seamlessly, across the aisle, across the Capitol, and across the Pacific, to advance America's interests in the vital Indo-Pacific region.

I would like to thank this committee for your consideration of my nomination. If confirmed, I intend to work with you to promote our economic prosperity, strengthen our national security, and ensure our democratic values remain paramount through the U.S.-Japan alliance. Under your leadership, Mr. Chairman, working with Ranking Member Senator Risch, this committee has continued its proud bipartisan tradition of putting country ahead of party. That is a mission and a mandate I proudly share.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mayor.
Mr. Kaplan?

**STATEMENT OF JONATHAN ERIC KAPLAN OF CALIFORNIA,
NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND
PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO
THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE**

Mr. KAPLAN. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members of the committee, I am proud and honored to be asked to serve our country as the Ambassador to the Republic of Singapore, and it is my privilege to appear here before you today.

I would like to begin my remarks by thanking President Biden and Secretary Blinken for their trust and confidence in me. I am also grateful to share this day with my friends, family, and especially my daughter, Samantha.

Finally, I would like to thank Senator Hickenlooper for his words of introduction and to the hard-working professionals at the State Department and the White House for their steadfast support of my nomination throughout this process.

Vice President Harris noted during her August visit to Singapore our world is embarking on a new era, one with many new challenges and exciting new opportunities. Our partnership with Singapore is critically important to strengthen our relationship and defend our positions within the Indo-Pacific region. For 55 years, U.S.-Singapore diplomacy has fostered a strong friendship, a mutual respect, and a steadfast commitment to one another.

The United States and Singapore's enduring partnership is based on mutual economic interests, robust security and defense cooperation, and strong people-to-people ties. Our two countries are close partners in support of a rules-based economy and unwavering security throughout the region.

Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, Singapore is a vital economic partner to the United States. More than 5,400 U.S. companies are registered in the city-state, and these businesses provide responsible, sustainable investment for the region and directly support more than 215,000 American jobs here at home.

In 2003, the United States and Singapore signed a free trade agreement, our first bilateral goods and services agreement with any Asian country and the cornerstone of a now \$90 billion trade partnership. The United States is the largest foreign investor in Singapore with more than \$270 billion in direct investments, making Singapore the largest recipient of U.S. investment in the Indo-Pacific.

If confirmed, I plan to strengthen our bilateral trade relationship, advance an economic agenda that promotes a shared prosperity, further secure our economic resiliency and access to supply, and work closely with Singapore to tackle the climate crisis.

Singapore is a critical partner in enabling strong U.S. security presence in the region. It is Southeast Asia's largest purchaser of U.S. military equipment, with more than \$20 billion invested in both direct commercial sales and foreign military sales over the past decade.

Singapore's agreement to purchase the F-35B aircraft highlights the historically close relationship between our air forces and exemplifies our close security cooperation. The cornerstone of this partnership is the 1990 U.S.-Singapore Memorandum of Under-

standing, which governs our presence in Singapore and allows for the rotational deployment of both U.S. littoral combat ships and Navy P-8s. If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to strengthen our security cooperation and defend a rules-based international order, which has supported peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.

The United States and Singapore have also benefitted from a strong law enforcement and home security partnership. This work strengthens the security of our citizens, our companies, and our nations by combatting the difficult challenges of commercial crime, terrorism, cybercrime, and illicit trade. Personal relationships are the foundation of a strong and secure Indo-Pacific region. U.S.-Singapore people-to-people ties are robust, and Singaporeans are active participants in U.S. educational and exchange programs.

Prior to the pandemic, more than 4,000 Singaporeans were studying in the United States, and more than 1,000 Americans studied in Singapore. In fact, more than half of Singapore's cabinet ministers have studied in the United States, including the current prime minister, who studied at Harvard.

The United States and Singapore have also bonded together through our third-country training program. For more than 10 years, the program has provided technical assistance and educational opportunities to over 1,500 ASEAN officials, drawing on the depth and breadth of the U.S.-Singaporean friendship and our expertise.

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this committee to advance the United States interests in Singapore, to create an even stronger set of relationships between our two countries, and to help further a secure and rules-based Indo-Pacific region overall.

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear here today, and I look forward to any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kaplan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JONATHAN ERIC KAPLAN

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members of the committee, I am proud and honored to be asked to serve our country as the Ambassador to Singapore and it is a privilege to appear before you today.

I'd like to begin my remarks by thanking President Biden and Secretary Blinken for their trust and confidence in me. I'm also grateful to share this day with my friends, family, and especially with my daughter, Samantha. Finally, I'd like to thank Senator Hickenlooper for his words of introduction and to the hardworking professionals at the State Department and the White House for their steadfast support of my nomination throughout this process.

Over the past several decades, I have had the pleasure to visit more than 75 countries, 22 of them within Asia. I've been a successful executive, entrepreneur, and philanthropist. I've built diverse teams with common purpose and have led large organizations through difficult times and within challenging environments.

As Vice President Harris noted during her August visit to Singapore, our world is embarking on a new era—one with many new challenges and exciting new opportunities. Our partnership with Singapore is critically important to strengthen our relationships and defend our positions within the Indo-Pacific region. U.S.-Singapore diplomacy has fostered a strong friendship, a mutual respect, and a steadfast commitment to one another.

For 55 years, the United States and Singapore have forged an enduring partnership based on our mutual economic interests, robust security and defense coopera-

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The United States and Singapore have also benefited from a robust law enforcement and homeland security partnership that strengthens the security of our citizens, our companies, and our nations by combating the complex challenges of commercial crime, terrorism, cybercrime, border security, and illicit trade.

Personal relationships are a foundation of a strong and secure Indo-Pacific region. U.S.-Singapore people-to-people ties are robust, and Singaporeans are active participants in U.S. educational and exchange programs. Prior to the pandemic, more than 4,000 Singaporeans were studying in U.S. universities, while more than 1,000 Americans studied in Singapore. In addition, more than 350 Singaporeans participated in other cultural and educational exchanges in the United States in 2019, most notably through the Fulbright Program, the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, and the Southeast Asia Youth Leadership Program. More than half of Singapore's cabinet ministers have studied in the United States, including the current Prime Minister who studied at Harvard University. Over the past decade, the United States and Singapore have partnered together through the Third Country Training Program to provide technical assistance and educational opportunities for over 1,500 ASEAN officials, drawing on the depth and breadth of U.S. and Singaporean friendship and expertise.

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this Committee to advance the U.S. interests in Singapore, to create even stronger relationships between our two countries, and help to further a secure and rules-based Indo-Pacific region overall.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today, and I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both.

We will start a round of 5-minute questions. Before I recognize myself for that, let me ask some questions that are on behalf of the committee as a whole. They speak to the importance that this committee places on responsiveness by all officials in the executive branch and that we expect and will be seeking from you. So, I would ask each of you to provide a "yes" or "no" answer to the following questions.

Do you agree to appear before this committee and make officials from your office available to the committee and designated staff, when invited?

Mr. EMANUEL. Yes.

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you commit to keeping the committee fully and currently informed about the activities under your purview?

Mr. EMANUEL. Yes.

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you commit to engaging in meaningful consultation while policies are being developed, not just providing notification after the fact?

Mr. EMANUEL. Yes.

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you commit to promptly responding to requests for briefings and information requested by the committee and its designated staff?

Mr. EMANUEL. Yes.

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The nominees have both responded “yes” to all those questions.

Well, let me start off. Mayor Emanuel, I want to talk to you about our previous nominee. We were talking about China a lot, and Japan is going to play a big role in that. Given the realities of our new era of strategic competition with China, what do you think the U.S.-Japan alliance needs to concentrate and act upon to be capable to meet the new and emerging regional challenges? In essence, how do we get them to be all in?

Mr. EMANUEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question.

As we discussed yesterday, I think the world has learned a lot in COVID. We exposed some of our vulnerabilities, and I think China has been exposed for their venality. You can ask that of India. You can ask that of the people leaving Hong Kong. You can ask that of what has happened now to Australia in that area, and you can also see it by how Philippines have reacted to what has happened to their fish fleet out and in their border.

The region is desperate for America’s leadership, and that was seen recently with AUKUS. The entire strategy in the region, when we repeat the words “Indo-Pacific,” that actually was an architectural frame first deposited by former Prime Minister Abe. And we have all adopted it, which means that our ally sees their vision as one that we have adopted and will advance.

Every effort we make in bringing our allies together not only militarily or strategically, but also with economic integration, also with cultural and political, is built on the shoulders of a U.S.-Japan relationship. And to me, the way we confront China, their entire strategy, as I think everybody can see, is to literally make sure that all roads—it is a one-way road to Beijing’s benefit.

And the countries in that area know that. They are desperate for America all in, and Australia showed they are ready to bet long on America. That is also true of Japan, our longest, deepest ally in the region. And what we must do is make that a cornerstone of both military efforts, strategic efforts.

And I would conclude on this one point. The recent prime minister gave a speech and said that they are going to raise their budget in defense spending above 1 percent, which has been the norm. That means for the first time—I know that Senator Hagerty must have been lobbying on that constantly—it is happening.

Making sure that they do the type of weapons acquisitions that are interoperable with us, but also part of our strategic blueprint and frame makes that a key opportunity. Because I think now not just in the region, but in this particular friendship and partnership, it is at an inflection point. As I said in my remarks, and I want to echo it again, what we do over the next 3 years will determine our presence, our vision for the next 30 in the region.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me turn to Japan in terms of the context of being one of the world's leading technology industries, especially in fundamental technologies like semiconductor components. How do we facilitate greater cooperation between the United States and Japan on tech and innovation, and how do we make steps to better integrate those efforts with a regional strategy more broadly?

Mr. EMANUEL. Well, Mr. Chairman, I see this as a unique opportunity. Whether it is on intellectual property, whether it is on infrastructure investment, whether it is on supply chain, we have a partner that is begging for America's continued investment window. When Australia, by way of example, bet long on the United States, China's reaction was to say we want to end TPP. That was an attempt to say we are going to be the dominant player.

Everything we do has to send one message, one signal. It is a good bet to bet long on the United States. And Japan has a huge partnership, whether it is in the pharmaceutical space, the IP in general, infrastructure, supply chain, to be that partner. And you can see that already by President Biden and his partnership is not only in the QUAD, the two meetings they have had, but also in his discussions with individual or with the Japanese prime minister.

The issue of supply chain, the issue of microchips is key to that strategy, and I think Japan is ready for the type of next stage in U.S.-Japan relationships. And that as we make these investments, it is an opportunity to actually start to, as I would say, tighten the economic integration of the largest and the third-largest economy. When those two are tight, it is a very, very strong force.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Lastly, as I noted earlier, I would like to give you an opportunity to address the committee concerning Laquan McDonald. So, take a moment to do so.

Mr. EMANUEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity to address the question.

Seven years ago, a young man had his life taken on the streets of the city of Chicago. He had all the promise ahead of him, and a police officer took his life, killed him. I said then I am the mayor, and I am responsible and accountable for fixing this so this never happens again.

And to be honest, there is not a day or a week that has gone by in the last 7 years I have not thought about this and thought about the "what ifs" and the changes and what could have been. And I think we all know that over the last 10 years, there is not a city in this country, regardless of size, that has not dealt with the gulf between police activities and the oversight and accountability that is necessary, and Chicago is no different.

As soon as events happened, IPRA, the oversight authority, is on the scene. Shortly after that, the State's attorney opened an investigation, and not too far from then, the U.S. attorney and the FBI

opened an investigation. And you have three ongoing investigations happening simultaneously of that night and events thereof.

As you know, there is a longstanding protocol and practice that nothing is released in the middle of an investigation for fear of either prejudicing a witness or endangering the prosecution. That was the practice longstanding not just in Chicago, but across the country.

And as recently as May 2 of this year, the New York Times wrote a story saying—or reported a story that there is no uniform standard or policy for the release of police video. It does not exist today, and it did not exist back in 2014 and 2015, except for the policy that had been place about the integrity of an investigation. And you do not want to prejudice a witness. You do not want to prevent a prosecution because of premature release of video or any prima facie evidence.

Now that view and that principle runs headlong into another very important value, and that is the deep suspicion, distrust, and skepticism that exists in the community about the authorities investigating the authorities and getting to the bottom of what happened. And the longer an investigation goes on, the greater the distrust and the greater the skepticism about what is really happening here, that it is not about finding out what happened and getting to the bottom of it, but this is a whitewash and a cover-up.

And you have this kind of tension to conflict between the integrity of an investigation, so you do not harm it, and the deep, well-deserved, and well-earned distrust by the community in the authorities. Now I see in that—and this is my view—that the last person you want to make a unilateral decision about the release of a video while the FBI and the U.S. attorney, the State's attorney, and IPRA are investigating is a politician. It should be made by professionals.

The moment a politician unilaterally makes a decision in the middle of an investigation, you politicize that investigation and, more importantly, you may have endangered the prosecution in bringing somebody to justice.

Second, I would say in the first term of my tenure, I made a number of changes that dealt with oversight accountability, and it is clear to me those changes were inadequate to the level of distrust. They were, on the best, marginal. I thought I was addressing the issue, and I clearly missed the level of distrust and skepticism that existed, and that is on me.

In addition, I would say, third, the point of afterwards, there was a number of inquiries both by the inspector general, a special prosecutor, all looked at what happened and the events afterwards, and nobody suggested or concluded that anybody in my office or I, myself, did anything improper.

Now this committee is in the possession of a lot of letters of support, from the leadership of the Black Caucus in Chicago to the leadership in the House, Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker; Majority Leader Hoyer; Whip Clyburn; the chairmen of the two committees, Greg Meeks, your sister committee in the House; Chairman Adam Schiff.

You also have letters from the Chamber of Commerce and the Chicago Federation of Labor and Building Trades. All speak to my

professional capacities. You also have a letter from Pastor Marvin Hunter. He is a reverend on the West Side of the city of Chicago. And the reason that is relevant is he speaks to my person and my character, not just my professional abilities. And he is Laquan McDonald's great uncle.

We have prayed together over the last couple of years, gotten to know each other. Gotten to talk about if we had a magic wand how we would fix what is broken in our criminal justice system. Talked about current events. We have even argued about the Cubs and the Sox.

But most importantly, we have gotten to find a common understanding, and I am appreciative of his support for my nomination, as I am of the other leaders in Chicago and the leaders here in the House that I served with. And I am appreciative of what they have said.

That all being said, Mr. Chairman, it does not take away from the fact that a grave tragedy occurred 7 years ago to this day on the streets of the city of Chicago, and that tragedy sits with me, as it has every day and every week for the last 7 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

And you mentioned letters in the possession of the committee. All of those letters will be included in the record, including Mr. McDonald's relative.

[The information referred to above is located at the end of this hearing transcript.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch?

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Hagerty has an important engagement and has asked me to yield to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Happy to have you defer to Senator Hagerty. Senator Hagerty?

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Risch and Chairman Menendez. I will have to confess that that important engagement is my ninth grade daughter's parent-teacher conference that is coming up, and I appreciate your accommodating me to take care of that.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a super important engagement.

Senator HAGERTY. Indeed, sir. Thank you.

Mayor Emanuel, I would like to talk about the relationship between the United States and Japan. As you know, we have a critically important economic relationship with Japan. In fact, Japan is the number-one investor in my home State of Tennessee, more than all the other nations combined, in fact. That has been a vital and critical relationship with my home State.

But today, there exists a real impediment to that relationship. It has to do with the case of a U.S. citizen, a Tennessee citizen named Greg Kelly, and it is in our Nation's interest to resolve this situation quickly.

I would like to go through the facts. Greg Kelly of Tennessee was arrested in Tokyo, Japan, on November 19, 2018. Greg, a lawyer at Nissan, was charged by a Tokyo prosecutor with conspiring to underreport Carlos Ghosn's compensation as a Nissan director. Greg's defense attorneys plan to present their closing arguments

next Wednesday, October 27, 35 months after Greg was deceived into leaving his home in Tennessee and he was arrested in Japan.

Let me underscore that. It has been 35 months to get to this point where his defense attorneys are actually able to close their case. For reasons that defy logic, a verdict is not expected until March of next year, 18 months after the trial began and more than 3 1/2 years after Greg's trial—after Greg was first detained.

Here is the injustice. Impartial Japanese expert observers, including private corporate lawyer Keiko Ohara, have said that this matter should have been handled internally, not in a courtroom. Media reports indicate even Prime Minister Shinzo Abe held this view. Former Japanese prosecutor Nobuo Gohara and criminal accounting specialist Yuji Hosono have publicly stated Japan's judicial system has violated Greg's human rights and that there was no reason to arrest him because there was no criminal violation.

Mr. Kelly's lawyers believe the evidence introduced at his trial made abundantly clear that no crime was committed. In reality, this was a coup by those within Nissan management who resisted further integration into the parent Renault, and they were willing to do anything to take down someone standing in their way.

I have conveyed this concern directly to the cabinet level in Japan. I have let them know that America is the largest investor in Japan, that American executives see this as an issue that rightfully should have been resolved in a courtroom, not in a prosecutor's office. This is a terrible message to send to the rest of the world.

It is bad for Japan's brand, and it is devastating to any American that happens to get caught in this system. With this type of justice system, I fear that American executives will start thinking twice about doing business in Japan.

So, here is the duty. Our embassy has a responsibility to protect U.S. citizens, to protect Mr. Kelly from this injustice. Mayor Emanuel, if you are confirmed as Ambassador, will you make it matter of top priority to see that Mr. Kelly's name is cleared and he is returned to the United States as soon as possible?

Mr. EMANUEL. Senator Hagerty, as you know, we have talked about this. The good news is there is Japanese media here. So, I want them to hear exactly, if I am fortunate to have the support of this committee. I have already started to inquire about this, and I want a report on my desk. You and I both know that if you start asking that, that goes from here to up here as a top priority.

Number two, this is a constituent. I was a former congressman. I am going to not treat this as a piece of business as being an Ambassador. I am going to treat this as would a former congressman approach when a constituent is in trouble and underscore what I think is an important point right now. Number-one responsibility of an embassy and an Ambassador is to make sure of the safety and ensure the safety of a U.S. citizen on foreign soil.

You have my word. As I said to you privately, I am saying it publicly. Again, I am not confirmed, and I wish I—hope I do get the confidence of this committee. But I know that the Japanese media is here. So, they can hear it directly.

This is not just another piece of business to be checked off. I am going to be approaching this subject as a former U.S. congressman who knows what it means when you have a constituent at heart.

Senator HAGERTY. Well, thank you very much. I intend to support your confirmation, and I appreciate your taking on this matter of critical interest to Tennesseans and to my constituent, but also a matter of critical national interest for our two nations.

Thank you.

Mr. EMANUEL. Senator, I have had a ninth grader, a 9-year-old on my watch, three of them. You get the medical slip right now. I would get over there.

Thank you.

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cardin?

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And let me thank both of our nominees for their willingness to serve our Nation in critically important positions.

Mr. Kaplan, later today I am going to be chairing a hearing of the U.S.-Helsinki Commission on the freedom of the media. We will have the OSCE representative Ribeiro, who is the representative for the freedom of the media. I mention that because when people think of Singapore, and I have been to Singapore, you know its economic power, and you know what it means as a strategic location in the shipping lanes. You recognize the importance of this economic partnership that the United States has with Singapore, including the free trade agreement.

But there is another part of Singapore. It is a rigid country. It is ranked by Reporters without Borders as 160th out of 180 in its annual World Press Freedom Index behind its neighbors such as Cambodia and Myanmar.

So, my question to you, President Biden has made it clear that our foreign policy is going to be wrapped in our values, and freedom of the media is critically important for any democratic state. How will you make this a priority, that the safety of reporters and the freedom of the media will have a voice in our mission in Singapore?

Mr. KAPLAN. Thank you very much for that question, Senator.

You know, for 55 years, the United States and Singapore have been incredible partners. We have been partners on counterproliferation. We have been partners on maritime security. We have been, as you said so eloquently, incredible trading partners and economic partners.

And when it comes to fundamental freedoms, especially freedom of the press, which is an incredibly important topic for us as a country for sure, you know, I think this is an area where, if I am confirmed, we are going to have to engage with the Singapore Government. The nice thing is friends are able to talk about difficult topics. They may not want to change. We are going to want them to change, but we are going to have a dialogue.

This is an area of fundamental freedoms. This is a topic of importance for the administration, and this is a priority for me.

Senator CARDIN. Will you make your office available for those in Singapore who need a voice in regards to the freedom of the media?

Mr. KAPLAN. Absolutely.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

Mr. KAPLAN. Again, globally, this is an important issue. It is not just an issue that is personally important to me, but is important to the United States and to the administration overall.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

Mayor Emanuel, it is good to see you. Thank you for your willingness to continue to get involved in helping our communities. You have taken on some tough assignments, from the chief of staff of a President to being a congressman dealing with the day-to-day activities of keeping the constituents happy to being a mayor of Chicago.

I want to talk about one issue in regards to our relationship with Japan. We can talk about a lot of different issues. We have already talked about some of the military aspects.

We have 50,000 troops stationed in Japan. We are in a process of negotiating the special measures agreement that will deal with a transition—you already mentioned the 1 percent, but the transition to the post World War II concept of Japan being a strategic partner of the Western powers in dealing with protecting democracy.

So, I just really want to get your thoughts as to how you will be engaged with our committee, with Congress, and certainly with the Defense Department and the White House as we talk about Japan's modernization of its military capacity and commitment and how that will affect U.S. military presence in Japan and the current arrangements that we have between our two countries?

Mr. EMANUEL. Senator, thank you very much for the question.

As we have talked before, Japan today willing to go from 1 percent to 2 percent is a sea change in thinking. It is a reflection that they know they have a greater role to play and they have greater threats. Not just the percentage of a number, but what that number would reflect. What are they looking at buying. What are they looking at adding. That is essential for their security and also essential for our partnership and that effort.

I do think not just in that 2 percent and that strategy, I do not think it gets lost on all of us that they were the first country to articulate the idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific. That has now become the nomenclature and the term that we use, they use, and our other allies do.

And it is also a bulwark that it makes sure that China hears that this is a part of the world that we are going to stay in, that our ally, our number-one ally in the region is now upping its game in a way that could not happen before. If you look over the span of the last 60 years, Japan has moved forward each time in taking a more critical and a more, for lack of a better way of saying it, forward-leaning effort.

But I would like to also stress the military hardware is one thing. It is just a component when you link up the United States and Japan. It is also the opportunity to seek climate change investments, infrastructure investments, IP protection, IP investments. Those are not challenges. Those are opportunities.

And so, when we do that together not only do we send a signal to China, but more importantly, we send a signal about America. We are strong because of our allies and our unity.

China has one strategy, a one-way road to Beijing's benefit, and everybody in that region—most importantly, Japan—know that a United States doubling down on its commitments in the Indo-Pacific area makes them more secure, makes the region more safe and open. And it is a values-based system, not based on one country's proclivity. And anything that challenges that must be met with the united force of all of our allies and friends in the region.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Risch?

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mayor Emanuel, you and I have talked about this, but I want to underscore again this particular subject. As you know, our extended nuclear deterrence underpins U.S. security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, and of course, a part of that is strategic ambiguity. You maybe heard our discussions a bit about consideration at least of U.S. adopting a sole purpose statement, as opposed to strategic ambiguity.

I would urge that when you go to the Indo-Pacific and you hear not only from Japan, but from all of our partners there, their concerns about this, I hope you will convey that in the strongest terms to the current administration. Can I get your thoughts on that?

Mr. EMANUEL. Thank you, Ranking Member Risch.

It is a good question, and I would—as I said to you privately, you and I know that the last time there was a review of our posture in the region, there was no country—and not just in the region, internationally, around the world—no country was greater consulted and whose views were greater considered as we enunciated our policy than Japan. While I am not privy to those conversations today, I would be shocked that it was not following that pattern, that Japan's security interests are paramount to the articulation and vision as we look to the policy.

And I will just say nothing about the current events, whether that is what is happening in North Korea, what China just did over the last 2 weeks vis-a-vis Taiwan or with the hypersonic, has given anybody any sense that as we review this policy, it has to be done in consultation with our allies and friends in the area. And none more important than Japan.

And so when I articulate it, but it is not me, it is President Biden who has said everything we do there is built on the shoulders of the U.S.-Japan friendship, that is where the rubber hits the road exactly on that area.

Senator RISCH. Well, I am glad to hear that. And with your experience, I have no doubt that you are able to deliver tough messages sometimes when people do not want to hear it. So, I will be—

Mr. EMANUEL. Senator, Mr. Ranking Member, I think it can be said, a moment of self-awareness, nobody has ever walked out of a meeting saying, "I wonder where Rahm stands on this?" So, you have my assurance.

Senator RISCH. That is comforting. Thank you so much for that.

Mr. Kaplan, I really am impressed with the fact that the administration has seen fit to appoint someone with your qualifications from the private sector, a capitalist, if you would, to Singapore. Our trade relationship with Singapore, I think, is not very much appre-

ciated by most Americans, and your appointment there I think will help underscore that.

In Idaho, they are one of our important trade partners. We have enjoyed a great relationship with them, and of course, they have the troops stationed there that are in constant training. So, appreciate you doing that. I hope that you will take into consideration how important they are as a trading partner and continue to encourage that. It is a great benefit both ways.

So, thank you much.

Mr. KAPLAN. I look forward to it. Thank you, sir.

Senator RISCH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine?

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and congratulations to both of the nominees.

Mr. Kaplan, your background of work in Asia makes you uniquely suited for this position, and Mr. Mayor, it is good to see you here. The Japan-U.S. relationship requires that an Ambassador go to Japan and the Japanese understand this is somebody who is very close to the President, that they really want to see an Ambassador who has a direct line to the President. And you do, and I believe that is the reason you have been chosen.

I appreciate you sharing at length about Mr. McDonald because what a tragedy. And I was a mayor, and every day in cities, beautiful things happen, and tragic things happen. And that is the case in any city, and you cannot be a mayor, especially of a city like Chicago, without picking up some scar tissue on the way.

But your description of what you learned along the way, the levels of distrust that some in communities feel toward people in power, toward politicians, toward police, I had to learn and then relearn those lessons often in my time as the mayor of a majority African-American city. And I am sure, since Chicago is a much bigger city than Richmond, Virginia, those lessons were challenging and painful for you during your entire tenure, but you served in an admirable way.

I want to just ask you one question that really it is maybe a little bit about Japan's domestic politics, which Ambassadors do not get involved in. But you pointed out accurately that the U.S. network of alliances in the Indo-Pacific is incredibly important as we think about the China threat. And there is no alliance that is more important than the U.S.-Japan alliance.

I am very excited that numerous Presidents now have invested in this notion of the QUAD and that—and President Biden is really operationalizing it beyond strategic dialogue to do vaccine diplomacy and other things. But as I look at the QUAD, there is an obvious omission, and that is South Korea.

South Korea should be in that, and yet the challenges between Japan and South Korea have been of longstanding—you know, longstanding historical challenges. What might you be able to do as an Ambassador to Japan to help encourage closer and closer relationships between these two nations that are such great allies of the United States and have so much in common in terms of the threats that they face in the region?

Mr. EMANUEL. Senator Kaine, thank you for the question.

I think that Japan, I mean, to be—Japan has a new prime minister, and there is a new election. That will also be true in the spring of the coming year in South Korea. I think we are both familiar, having run for office, what that does.

As a general principle, and this has been articulated by the President, and I have heard him in different situations in the prior—when I wore a different hat than mayor, but as a chief of staff. I think as it relates to this as a general kind of 10,000 feet, you never want the 20th century to rob us of the opportunities of the 21st century.

Not that those are not heartfelt and serious, and they are. So, it is, one, keeping people focused on the future and our commonality, not what divides us. And the United States and our Ambassador both from the United States here, but also in South Korea can play an important role in facilitating that focus on the future rather than any tensions that legitimately exist about the past.

And that said, and I am aware like you of politics, which is not a bad word, is nobody at this point, you do not want to embarrass or shame any one of the two parties publicly. So, the goal would be to keep the private conversations moving forward so there is no sense in a public way that they have been from their own respective roles and responsibilities to their publics are not cornered from the opportunity to make the most of the 21st century.

What Japan faces, South Korea, the United States, I see the—what people refer to as either climate change, infrastructure, IP protection, investments in the supply chain, those are not challenges. They are tremendous opportunities for greater integration, greater advancements of our cooperation, and strengthening a rules-based system that all three share.

So, from the challenges, make them opportunities for greater cooperation between the three parties. Two, focus on the 21st century opportunities, not the challenges of the 20th century, and do not let the 20th century rob us of what we can build together, the three. And third, do not do anything that surprises people in public so they have the opportunity to be, for lack of another way of saying it, to lean forward in a collaborative and productive way.

Senator Kaine. Thank you for that.

And Mr. Kaplan, I am going to be very proud to support your nomination. I am just going to ask you a question about press freedom, the same question that Senator Cardin asked. There is so much right in the U.S.-Singapore relationship. The low ranking of Singapore on global press indices is a continuing challenge, and I will look forward to—I am confident you will be confirmed, and I will look forward to working with you on this.

Mr. Kaplan. If I am confirmed, I will obviously look forward to working with you.

Senator Kaine. Thank you so much. Thanks, Mr. Chair.

The Chairman. Senator Coons?

Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And Mayor Emanuel and Mr. Kaplan, I very much look forward to our exchange today and appreciate the testimony you have already provided. And let me also thank your families for supporting you. To Amy and to Zach, who I had the opportunity to meet in person but had spoken to before, and to Ilana and other family

members, Leah, who are watching. And thank you, Mayor, for sharing your personal story and journey and what that has brought to you in your decades of public service.

And to Mr. Kaplan and your daughter, Samantha, and other members of your life who are with us today, it is wonderful to have both of you in front of us and to have this chance to interact with you about these two important positions that have been vacant for too long with two absolutely vital Indo-Pacific partners for the United States.

I am, as I think you both know, the chair of the Appropriations Subcommittee responsible for our foreign assistance. Japan is also a major donor in development assistance in the region, and one of the reasons I worked with a number of my colleagues to help create the Development Finance Corporation was so that we had a new and more modern tool, more capable of partnering with JBIC and ADB, the Asian Development Bank and Japanese investment entity.

How do you believe, Mr. Mayor, that we can use the DFC to more closely partner with Japan's development entities, and how do you think partnering with our regional allies, whether it is Australia or Japan, South Korea, others, in development finance that might actually create a new chapter in providing alternatives that are more transparent, that are more sustainable for the development of the region?

Mr. EMANUEL. Senator Coons, thank you for that question.

I do want to take one second and personally, as I have privately, thank you publicly. When you were on a CODEL to Korea, you personally called Zach to check in on him. In a high order, you made one Jewish grandmother and mother very happy, and that is a very tall order. So, I want to thank you, Senator, for doing that personally.

On a serious note, in the process of talking to a lot of people, one, I did not realize that Japan is an actually larger investor in infrastructure around the region than China. We hear a lot about belt and roads, about the China plan. Japan is actually by about a number of about 75 billion in U.S. dollars bigger than China in the region. That is a big asset with our ally.

Second, on top of it, if you do polling among the public in the region, Japan is the most popular country. Again, a big asset in our partnership.

Third, as I have repeated—as I said earlier and I want to repeat, the architecture from Prime Minister Abe lives on and is now adopted by all, which is a free and open Indo-Pacific.

I think making these investments in infrastructure, our creative financing, our strategy to make an opportunity both for these type of economic opportunities that would exist and infrastructure that is linked in with the United States and Japan. And two, because we will do it in a way that is open, based on a rules-based system, it will stand in direct contrast to the violations of China's belt and roads that does not meet the standards of OECD standards.

And I think that opportunity for us to talk to future countries that may be looking at the United States or Japan and say here are the way we are going to do this so you do not become debt dependent like often happens with China. That is a key opportunity

with an ally, a popular ally who shares the same values and commitment to a rules-based system. That is something that we want to harness to our strategic overall interests in the region.

Senator COONS. Thank you.

Let us talk a little bit more, if we can, about the modern digital economy and ways in which trade and better integration with Singapore, with Japan, with the region would actually serve our interests. The digital trade agreement between the United States and Japan that we concluded in 2019 could be a useful starting point.

Singapore has been a leader in creating digital trade agreements with its trading partners, and USTR Katherine Tai recently met with her Singaporean counterpart, and they expressed an intent to work together on digital trade. I would be interested in hearing from both of you, if I can, how we could advance work with Japan and with Singapore to set rules and standards for the digital economy that can serve as a model for the region, model for the world, and help provide a more attractive alternative to digital authoritarianism.

Mr. EMANUEL. Do you want to go first?

Mr. KAPLAN. Sure. Thank you so much for that question.

I think, as I said, since 2003, we have enjoyed an incredible free trade agreement with Singapore, and the \$90 billion that is passing between our borders is a critical component to the economic success of really the region and of both countries. And I think as the world moves digital, I think it is going to be incredibly important for me, if I am confirmed, to make sure that Singapore understands this, make sure that we are involved in these discussions, make sure that as Japan and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region start to develop these agreements that the United States is right there front and center.

Mr. EMANUEL. I want to echo my friend. Ambassador-to-be, hopefully, Kaplan has said we talked about this in our training, and I would just say, again, if I have the opportunity to be confirmed, work alongside. A digital writing of the rules is exactly what we want to be doing by saying this is a rules-based system, not based on one country's own self-interest, but what stands the test of time for all the countries in the party.

And as somebody who has been a student of our politics, talking about it this way, approaching the digital piece of the economy, the writing of rules gets us away from the kind of what I would call hunger games of our politics the moment you say the word "trade" or the moment you talk about that. But dealing with writing the rules goes to the strength of a partnership based on a values-based, rules-based system rather than going and dealing with I think the weaker part of our politics.

And I think that would advance our interests in the region, and it is very clear that the Ambassador to the USTR for the United States, she has made that clear as well.

Senator COONS. Well, thank you both. Mr. Mayor, you have demonstrated your diplomatic skill with the breadth of who introduced you today. You were both introduced by wonderful colleagues. I look forward to visiting Japan and Singapore in the future and to working with you in your roles.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand Senator Van Hollen is with us virtually?

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And congratulations to both of these nominees. I wanted to get back in person, but the scheduling prevented that.

So, to Congressman Emanuel, good to see you back on Capitol Hill. I want to ask you about the North Korean threat because, as you know, just a few days ago, North Korea launched a ballistic missile into the waters off of Japan. This has been part of a pattern over many, many years as North Korea has also strengthened its nuclear weapons capacity.

Japanese Prime Minister Kishida said in response to the most recent launch, "We cannot overlook North Korea's recent development in missile technology and must work with them and the threat—work to address the threat in the region."

So, a number of years ago, Senator Toomey and I worked together. The Congress passed something called the BRINK Act, the Otto Warmbier BRINK Act. And it requires the executive branch to impose secondary sanctions on financial institutions that are helping North Korea escape the sanctions regime. I think we need to do a better job at making sure that we are imposing those sanctions because it seems to be a pretty leaky sanctions regime right now.

But given the interest that Japan and, of course, South Korea have in addressing the ongoing threat of North Korea, what should this administration be doing, the Biden administration be doing, and what will you do, if confirmed as our Ambassador to Japan, to help address this threat?

Mr. EMANUEL. Senator Van Hollen, thank you for the question.

I would like to note since we usually—since we were in the first—our classes together when we got elected to Congress, we talk to each other by first name, but Senator Van Hollen. Look, I think North Korea's recent actions in just the past month, a number of tests of new missiles and new offensive weapons, has alerted Japan and South Korea to the collaboration and cooperation that is essential with the United States of having a common front. And my intention is to work as a representative for the United States Government and doing everything to facilitate, as I think I said to an earlier question, that we make sure that we deal with 21st century issues as allies and partners and not let the 20th century rob or mug that opportunity.

This is a serious challenge as it relates to security, and it is security related to both South Korea and Japan. And therefore, it is a security concern for the United States. And it will be one of the top priorities I will have is to work on that collaboration and understanding so there is a united front with the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

And I will be put—you know, obviously, this is much higher, if I was to be confirmed, than my pay grade, but I will be putting my oar in the water to pull alongside and make sure that the objectives laid out by the Secretary of State, the President of the United States, as we confront this common challenge is make sure that it is executed upon and that it stays front and center.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. No, I appreciate that. Look, I think the new administration, the Biden administration is still sort of framing its approach to North Korea. But I think this most recent missile test underscores the importance of determining exactly what approach we are going to take and, obviously, working closely with our allies Japan and South Korea and others.

Speaking about security arrangements and allies, the QUAD has become an increasingly important sort of structure for addressing security and economic and other issues in the Indo-Pacific region. Can you talk a little bit about how you envision working with Japan to strengthen the QUAD partnership?

Mr. EMANUEL. I mean, you are exactly right, and I would say, if you could, we could hold the QUAD up, and what the President is doing is taking something that was a bipartisan concept started in prior administrations and really has evolved, including under President Trump and prior to that President Obama, and President Biden has put some real meat on the bones, and it is not an accident. That is, the QUAD, both virtually and in person, is the only entity that he has met with now twice in his short tenure as President.

And all the parties—India on its own border, Australia with the recent change in the nuclear sub, nuclear-powered sub acquisition, and then Japan with its own recent budget on its defense investment—know that the partnership here is an essential one for the strategic interests as we—all the parties confront a threat both by China and any threat strategically or militarily.

And so I see the QUAD as the President has enunciated, as the backbone of both economic and security interests in the region of the United States and working with our closest allies who have the same sense that this is an important—for now a very, very important tool for America's foreign policy in the area in strategic interests being articulated and acted upon.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Thank you. Thank you, and Mr. Chairman, thank you. And my best to Amy and the family, and I look forward to supporting your nomination.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Merkley?

Senator MERKLEY. Oh, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both. Extensive records of public service. And Mayor, there is no question, as members of the Senate have pointed out, you have an extensive depth and breadth of public service that brings a tremendous amount of knowledge to serving the United States, when confirmed.

But I feel it is important to explore one piece that you have made reference to. We received on the committee a letter from a dozen aldermen, State representatives, State senators, a county commissioner, asking we take a close look at the question of systemic racism and how the role of city leaders working closely with police departments sustains inequities.

And certainly in my home State, we have wrestled with this. My largest city, Portland, has a predominantly white police force. It has a record of shootings and shootings of members of the minority community, black and Hispanic citizens, that has been a very contentious issue.

And Chicago had this as well. 2010 to 2015, police fired 528 cases. They hit citizens 262 times. They fatally shot 92 individuals. Of those who were hit, 94 percent were members of minority communities, Asian, black, or Hispanic.

When you and I met—and I appreciated your comments and thoughts—you said kind of the big mistake you made was that you took at full faith an evaluation from a group of police officers that the shooting of Laquan McDonald was a “good shooting,” a term that apparently the police use. That group of officers that rendered that, was that an official police review board?

Mr. EMANUEL. We said, Senator—and I thank you for the question—and I think there are two parts. So, I would like to address both, if I could?

Senator MERKLEY. But please do not eat up all my time.

Mr. EMANUEL. Oh, no, I will not.

Senator MERKLEY. I know that is a great tactic, but I really wanted to get to the heart of this, and I just want to understand since that is the key thing that you said was a mistake. I want to understand was an official police board that rendered that evaluation?

Mr. EMANUEL. No, no. The police leadership the next morning after a police-involved shooting reviews a shooting.

Senator MERKLEY. It was the morning after?

Mr. EMANUEL. Right. Yes, yes. Right.

Senator MERKLEY. So, you had conveyed to me that that kind of shaped your thinking up through the eventual release the following—a year later, and then your public commentary in November of 2015.

My understanding is that the mother of Laquan McDonald learned about the nature of the shooting when she was called by the funeral house who said to her, “Do you realize your son was shot multiple times? That his body is riddled with bullets.” She did not know apparently at that point. That information had not been shared with her.

And then her attorney subpoenaed records in November of 2014, and when the attorney subpoenaed records, did that trigger the conversation that filled you in? I know you have said you never saw the videos, but filled you in on the fact that this was an unusual case where a child had been shot 16 times?

Mr. EMANUEL. As I said in the answer to Chairman Menendez, there is an investigation going on by three entities—the U.S. attorney, the State’s attorney, IPRA. They were the ones dealing with this, and as I believe, you do not want a politician to make a unilateral decision while those investigations are going on because it would violate a sacrosanct protocol and principle of ensuring that nothing is out prior to an investigation being wrapped up.

Senator MERKLEY. Yes, Mayor, but that was not my question. My question was when her attorneys sought the evidence from the city, is that when you learned about the nature of what had happened from the city attorney or from the police or—

Mr. EMANUEL. As I said, when the video became public is when I learned what happened and the consequence and what happened that night.

Senator MERKLEY. Okay. So, in December, the family viewed the tapes, and the city required that they enter into a nondisclose agreement. That is a pretty significant decision. You are saying you had no idea of the circumstances of the shooting? No one had told you that a child had been shot 16 times or that the child was lying on the ground, that a revolver was reloaded? You had no idea in December when the family reviewed the tapes?

Mr. EMANUEL. Senator, is that situation, the family approached the city about a settlement. An NDA is a standard practice at that time, and also the public information, as you know, when the city council is asked to work with the family, come up with the resources for the compensation, all the members of the city council heard that, and it passed 50 to 0. So, that was the kind of description that was in the public domain when it was voted on.

Senator MERKLEY. Yes. Of course, I did not ask about the NDA. I asked if at that point you were briefed on the details of the shooting?

Mr. EMANUEL. Oh, I am sorry. The details were in the public domain when the corporation counsel briefed the aldermen.

Senator MERKLEY. So, in February and March, the city reached out proactively. Please, Chairman, can I finish a few questions here?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know about a few questions, but this has been explored, and it is now almost 2 minutes over. So, I will give you another minute.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will submit questions for the record so that you can address these things. But I think that in this time of national reckoning with the challenge of Black Lives Matter, when aldermen and State representatives and State senators say this was an issue that there was close cooperation during your time as mayor between the mayor's office to essentially discourage the release of information and to not develop significant reforms, which I know that you have a story to tell about the reforms. And I will submit questions for the record so you can tell that story.

I think it is important for this committee to actually weigh this. And so thank you for meeting with me before. Thank you for addressing this now.

But just to clarify, because all these things happened—the family requested the video. The city attorney reached out proactively before there was a lawsuit to ask for a settlement. The settlement was approved in a less than 1 minute meeting with no public discussion. It seems hard to believe that all those things happened, and yet you were never briefed on the details of the situation when you were leading the city.

Mr. EMANUEL. Since you brought up the aldermanic letters, as you will see also here, the leadership of the Black Caucus has signed a letter in support of my nomination. Those are the members that worked with me. That does not take away from the fact, as I have said before, and I want to repeat because I think it is important, all those are not technicalities.

This is a tragedy that happened, as you know, as you have made reference to what is going on in Portland. And as I said, no city of any size has not confronted the gulf and the gap that exists be-

tween police practices and the oversight and accountability. I made efforts of them. They missed the mark because they totally missed how deep that distrust is and, as in the reverend or the pastor's letter, how broken the system is that we all relied on.

Senator MERKLEY. Yes, and I did note that—

The CHAIRMAN. The chair—the chair would just say to my distinguished colleague I have allowed you to go 4 minutes over the 5 minutes. So, I think that questions for the record would be appropriate.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Kaplan, before we adjourn this hearing, I do not want you to think you are not the object of my affection for the position you are going to have. So, let me ask you, Singapore along with other countries in the region face a time of increasing geopolitical uncertainty with China's growing assertiveness in the Pacific. What is your assessment of how Singapore's thinking on China has evolved in recent years?

How do we influence Singapore's approach towards both confronting and competing with China in a way that aligns it more with our values, which I believe they generally share, versus the values that China is promoting?

Mr. KAPLAN. Thank you very much for that question.

The U.S. must engage with China from a position of strength, and strength comes from our partnerships and our partnerships within the region. We have talked about this throughout this hearing, and I believe that Singapore is a tremendously strong partner of the United States. They are involved in our F-35 program. We have naval operations that we do with them. As the ranking member mentioned, we train their air force.

So, if I am confirmed, I look forward to continuing to work with the Government, continuing to come up with ways for us to support a partnership that addresses these threats that China continues to bring upon not just the United States, but the world overall.

The CHAIRMAN. Enduring support for ASEAN is critical to the United States posture in the Indo-Pacific and central to the engagement with our partnership with Singapore. When the foreign minister was here, we had a significant conversation about ASEAN.

What steps would you take to help Singapore in bolstering ASEAN centrality in the Asia-Pacific region?

Mr. KAPLAN. Well, I think the President and the Secretary of State want to have a multifaceted approach to the region. They have AUKUS. We have QUAD. And of course, we have ASEAN. And Singapore is a founding member of ASEAN. The United States has always been a firm supporter of ASEAN. The Secretary and the President have reaffirmed their commitment to ASEAN.

And again, if confirmed, I look forward to working with the Government, working with industry, working with Singapore to ensure that everyone knows that we are behind ASEAN. Singapore remains an important part of ASEAN, and ASEAN will play a critical role in the safety and security of the region.

The CHAIRMAN. And finally, Mayor Emanuel, I want to just go back to Japan very quickly, but importantly. We need—and I said this to leaders from both countries who have come to visit us here

in Washington. We need Japan and South Korea to understand that their unity along with us is critical to deal with the regional security questions and certainly with North Korea.

And I think, in my 30 years of doing foreign policy between the House and the Senate, this is not one of the best moments I have seen between the two countries. I hope you will use, upon confirmation, your efforts to try to get the Japanese from their side and then we will get our person in South Korea to do the same to find some common ground.

There are historical issues. I understand that. But the security of both nations and its people should supersede their common interests in that regard. Is that something we can count on you to try to do?

Mr. EMANUEL. A hundred percent, Mr. Chairman. And I would just, in the remaining minutes here, say this is, no doubt there has been highs and lows in the relationship between Japan and South Korea. I think that given what North Korea has done and is doing, what China has done and is doing, makes this an opportunity in an organizing way to have both parties try—meaning the United States, Japan, and South Korea—to now focus on what is not a theoretical threat, but a reality, as the recent test just the other day by North Korea has shown. That this is not theoretical, given the sub test that was just—submarine test that was just done.

So, that, to me, underscores there is a level of urgency for all parties to now find the common ground, focus on the future, focus on what binds us together, and not allow tensions of the past and disagreements to actually in any way endanger, and I do think—endanger the relationship.

I would close with one other thought. China, Russia, North Korea are trying to find cracks and fissures in the alliances between the United States and Japan, the United States and South Korea, the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Our job, as a facilitator, is to create the bonds of unity that we speak with one voice, one interest, and one imperative. This is one of, if not the highest priority to find that unity so we can confront the attempt by China and North Korea to divide us.

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, as in all relationships, the question of press freedom of Singapore was raised earlier. In this case, more than 475 U.S. children have been kidnapped in Japan, and the U.S. has named Japan a top three worst offender of international parental child abduction. There has been no significant improvement between since Japan acceded to the Hague Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction in 2014.

So, when you are confirmed, I hope that you will make one of your priorities to get the Japanese Government to understand that when you enter into an international convention and when American children are involved, we certainly expect you to live up to your obligations under the convention.

Mr. EMANUEL. And Mr. Chairman, I would underscore at this point, if I was fortunate to get the committee and the full Senate's support to be confirmed, your word is your bond. If you signed into an agreement to be trusted as a partner and ally, you must uphold the principle of that agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. This record for this hearing will remain open until the close of business tomorrow, Thursday, October 21. To members of the committee, please ensure that questions for the record are submitted no later than Thursday.

To our nominees, I would just urge you upon receipt—inevitably, there will be questions for the record—that you answer them expeditiously and fully so that then we can consider your nominations before the committee for a business meeting.

And with the thanks of the committee, this hearing is adjourned.

Mr. EMANUEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KAPLAN. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 1:37 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

Additional Material Submitted for the Record

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. As you know, the U.S.-China Phase One Agreement requires China to change several of its regulations concerning intellectual property protection. However, many of the ways that China undermines intellectual property protections are through informal coercion or outright theft.

- If confirmed, how will you help to ensure that China fully implements and complies with the intellectual property requirements in the U.S.-China Phase One Agreement?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that we closely monitor the PRC's implementation of its IP commitments under the Phase One Agreement. Along with our inter-agency partners, we will hold the PRC accountable using the full range of tools we have and develop new ones in order to defend U.S. economic interests from the PRC's harmful policies and practices. As we enforce the terms of the Phase One Agreement, I will also work with allies and partners and press Beijing bilaterally to address our concerns with the PRC's unfair, non-market practices that distort competition by propping up PRC state-owned enterprises and limit market access, and its coercive and predatory practices in trade and technology.

Question. The Chinese Government has not provided sufficient details regarding how it intends to comply with several of the intellectual property obligations contained in the U.S.-China Phase One Agreement, including those related to biopharmaceutical innovation.

- If confirmed, how will you help to ensure that China complies with its intellectual property obligations under the U.S.-China Phase One Agreement?

Answer. The IP Chapter of the Phase One Agreement identified 133 IP-related commitments that the PRC must take action on, including related to biopharmaceutical innovation. If confirmed, I will ensure that we closely monitor the PRC's implementation of all its IP commitments under the Agreement. Along with our inter-agency partners, we will hold the PRC accountable using the full range of those tools we have and develop new ones in order to defend U.S. economic interests from the PRC's harmful policies and practices.

Question. As Ambassador, will you commit to making the case of Kai Li and his return back to his family a priority?

Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate for the immediate and unconditional release of all those wrongfully or arbitrarily detained, and for the immediate lifting of travel restrictions for those subject to coercive exit bans in the PRC. I will work closely with the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs and the Bureau of Consular Affairs to resolve the case of Kai Li and the cases of other U.S. citizens wrongfully detained or subject to coercive exit bans by the PRC.

The use of human beings as bargaining leverage is unacceptable, has been condemned by the global community, and is inconsistent with China's international human rights commitments.

USICA

Question. As you know, earlier this year, the Senate passed a sweeping China competitiveness legislation that included this committee's Strategic Competition Act. This legislation puts core American values and human rights at the heart of our foreign policy, replenishes sources of our national strength here at home, supports our alliances and stability, and prioritizes fair economic competition. What are your thoughts on the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act?

Answer. I strongly support the Senate's passage of the Innovation and Competition Act and the leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee on this vital issue. This bill will strengthen the ability of the United States to compete with China in the decades ahead. As Secretary Blinken has made clear—our domestic renewal and our strength in the world are completely entwined. A key component of the policy is revitalization of our democracy and economy here at home. This also requires we invest in American workers, companies and technologies to outcompete the PRC.

Question. What should the United States be doing to deter and respond to such aggression in the digital space?

Answer. All instruments of national power are available to respond to malicious cyber activity, including diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement, and public attribution capabilities. We collaborate with our like-minded partners to uphold our shared vision for a cyberspace that allows all to prosper and to hold accountable those that would use it to cause harm and sow instability.

Shared concerns regarding the PRC's malicious cyber activities are bringing countries around the world together to call out those activities, promote network defense and cybersecurity, and act to disrupt threats to our economies and national security. We cannot protect against malicious cyber activity on our own. Our allies and partners are a tremendous source of strength, and our collective approach to cyber threat information sharing, defense, and mitigation helps hold countries like the PRC to account.

We have raised our concerns about specific incidents, including the Microsoft Exchange hacks, as well as the PRC's broader malicious cyber activity with senior PRC Government officials, making clear that the PRC's actions threaten security, confidence, and stability in cyberspace. The United States and our allies and partners are not ruling out further actions to hold the PRC accountable.

Question. How can the United States strengthen its cooperation with like-minded countries to promote collective norms and values surrounding cyberspace and other emerging technologies?

Answer. The United States takes a whole-of-government approach to combating malicious cyber activities. As part of that effort, the Department has achieved international consensus on the elements that make up a framework of responsible state behavior and is building a robust coalition of likeminded states who are willing to hold irresponsible states accountable when they transgress the framework, including through the imposition of consequences when appropriate. In July 2021, 38 countries joined the United States in calling out the PRC's role in the Microsoft Exchange hacks.

In addition, the Department is also ramping up its coordination of U.S. inter-agency efforts to develop policies and processes to respond quickly to destructive, disruptive or otherwise destabilizing cyber incidents. The Department also works to promote cybersecurity due diligence globally and to strengthen transnational cooperation in the fight against cybercrime.

Question. How should the United States evaluate critical supply chains and protect itself from chokehold vulnerabilities and security risks? If confirmed, as Ambassador, what would you see as your role in China?

Answer. More secure and resilient supply chains are essential to our national security, our economic security, and our technological leadership. The administration's efforts to diversify supply chains, support increased trade between like-minded partners, and encourage best practices to screen potentially threatening investments will help to build resilience and reduce the impact of PRC coercion. The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed vulnerabilities in our global supply chains for critical products, including medical equipment, supplies, and semiconductors. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts to build diverse, secure, and resilient supply chains for the future.

Question. In addition to export control measures, what other actions do you believe the United States should take to limit the Chinese Government's access to

technologies that enhance its military capabilities and facilitate repression in Xinjiang and Hong Kong?

Answer. If confirmed, I will leverage the full breadth of authorities available to us to protect our economic and national security interests, and support enhanced investment screening efforts. I will support the Biden-Harris administration efforts to ensure the PRC cannot exploit U.S. capital markets to support the PRC's national strategy of military-civil fusion and PLA military modernization and the use of PRC surveillance technology in human rights abuse. If confirmed, I would also work with our allies and partners to encourage and strengthen national security-focused investment screening mechanisms to mitigate the risks of concerning third-country investments, including from PRC-backed companies making third country investments.

Question. Do you see opportunities for technology collaboration with China? How would you propose the United States pursue these opportunities?

Answer. If confirmed, I will pursue cooperation with the PRC where it is in our interest, and in consultation with the Congress, our allies and partners, and other stakeholders.

South China Sea

Question. I welcomed the Trump administration's clarification of our legal position on China's unlawful claims in the South China Sea. But as you know, international law is not self-enforcing, and having now taken this position, it is critical that we make our legal position a reality, not just a rhetoric.

- How would you, if confirmed, intend to implement this approach? And how would you plan to work with partners and allies to forge unified approach to the South China Sea?

Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has reaffirmed the July 2020 policy statement on the U.S. position on maritime claims in the South China Sea and regularly consults with partners and allies to support international law in this crucial waterway. We have made clear that we stand with Southeast Asian claimant states in resisting PRC coercion. The administration is committed to upholding a free and open South China Sea. As a result of U.S. efforts with allies and partners in Asia and beyond, we have seen a greater willingness by countries to underscore the importance of making and pursuing maritime claims in accordance with international law.

Question. How can the United States—working with our partners in the international community—be effective in supporting the people of Hong Kong? If confirmed, what role would you expect to play as Ambassador?

Answer. The United States must stand with the international community on Hong Kong. We must create global partnerships on this issue in both condemning human rights violations and abuses as well as considering responsive actions including sanctions. This is not just a U.S. concern, but a global concern. If confirmed, I will continue President Biden's policy of emphasizing the role of our allies and partners on Hong Kong, as well as other areas of human rights concern in the PRC.

Hostage Diplomacy

Question. I am relieved about the release of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, however, I am disturbed by implications of "hostage diplomacy" in an apparent trade for Meng, which may incentivize China to continue this type of troubling behavior.

- Do you share this assessment? As Ambassador, how will you approach any similar cases that may arise?

Answer. The Department of Justice said it reached the decision to offer a deferred prosecution agreement with Ms. Meng based on the facts and the law, and an assessment of litigation risk.

If confirmed, I intend to raise individual cases with the PRC Government and insist that U.S. citizens wrongfully or arbitrarily detained be released, that coercive exit bans be lifted, and that the PRC refrain from using such measures in the future.

Human Rights

Question. The Chinese Government is openly hostile to universal human rights and democratic values. We have seen this over and over again, including in its continuous abuses in Tibet and of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang.

- If confirmed, what will you do to defend fundamental human rights in China?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to promote accountability for People's Republic of China (PRC) officials responsible for genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and other human rights abuses in Tibet and elsewhere in the PRC. I will also support efforts to protect human rights in the PRC, including for religious and ethnic minorities.

If confirmed, I will consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability for those responsible to end abuses, to include but not limited to, actions already implemented by the U.S. Government: visa restrictions, import restrictions, export restrictions, and financial sanctions.

I will also commit to meet regularly with members of civil society and to raise specific cases of arbitrary detention or human rights violations directly with the PRC Government.

International Organizations and Standard Setting Bodies

Question. The Chinese Government has demonstrated an increasingly malign presence and willingness to abuse their positions in international organizations and standard setting bodies.

- If confirmed, as Ambassador, what would you do to address these issues in China?

Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) seeks to advance its national agenda in a manner that often undermines the independence, impartiality, and transparency, of international organizations. Through partnerships, we have had some success at defending against these attempts and upholding the rules-based international order. In China I will seek to broaden these partnerships to shore up international resolve. If confirmed, I will work with allies and partners to ensure that international organizations operating in China, including those affiliated with the UN system, remain aligned with UN principles and values, including relating to human rights, and do not inappropriately promote PRC policies to third countries. If confirmed, I will also confront PRC hypocrisy as it rhetorically espouses "true multilateralism" while coercing countries to support its unilateral objectives in international organizations.

Question. If confirmed, do you think you will be able to support Special Envoy Kerry by diffusing China's conflation of issues with climate, and create some space for progress on working to enhance China's climate ambition?

Answer. Yes. The United States is engaged in stiff competition with the PRC, but also has an interest in working together on vital transnational challenges, such as climate. We reject the linkage of action on climate to other issues in the bilateral relationship, and we have made this clear to the PRC. We are taking action on climate because it is an existential crisis, and we discuss this with the PRC because that is what responsible nations do—and that is what we have done with other countries around the world to raise the global ambition. As two large nations, we both have responsibilities, and that is why we are engaging and exploring areas where our interests align. The Biden administration is right to seek effective channels of communication with Beijing, in order to manage this competition responsibly. Climate is one of several transnational issues where our interests align, and former Secretary of State John Kerry works tirelessly on this issue. The PRC is by far the largest emitter of carbon in the world today. The world cannot solve the climate crisis without the PRC doing substantially more to reduce its emissions at the pace and magnitude required to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius as the science requires.

Nury Turkel

Question. Nury Turkel serves as the Vice-Chair of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, appointed by House Speaker Pelosi. For decades, he has shed light on the PRC's atrocities against the Uyghur community and advocated for political dissidents and refugees. Because of Turkel's human rights work and now serving in on a U.S. Government commission, the PRC has engaged in a campaign of harassment against his family members—specifically his ailing parents. Despite Turkel's efforts to reunite with his ailing parents in the past 12 years, Chinese security will not let them leave China to be with their two US citizen sons and five grandchildren born in the US. I understand that Deputy Secretary Sherman raised Turkel's case during her trip to China in July. However, we are not aware of any concrete follow-up related to Turkel's parents' passports. Further delay may signal to the Chinese Government that the U.S. Government is not serious about securing the elderly Turkels departure from China.

- Can you commit to reviewing and prioritizing the Turkels' case; including sharing with us any specific, concrete steps that the Biden administration is considering taking next?

Answer. I am very concerned by the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s mistreatment of Mr. Turkel's parents, to include blocking them from leaving China. If confirmed, I will advocate vigorously on their behalf with the PRC Government and work to secure their reunification with Mr. Turkel and with their other children and grandchildren.

Question. How would you navigate the situation if the Chinese Government insists on passing the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law in Hong Kong, and American and other international firms are forced to decide whether to comply with Chinese law or US law?

Answer. Hong Kong's success as an international business hub has been built on a transparent regulatory framework and adherence to the rule of law. This law, if imposed, will further undermine the transparency that has been the bedrock of Hong Kong's business environment. Failure to comply with U.S. sanctions can result in civil and criminal penalties under U.S. law. If confirmed, I will advocate for U.S. businesses operating in Hong Kong, provide these companies with my best advice on Hong Kong's operating environment, and will advise companies with questions about their sanctions compliance obligations to contact OFAC.

Question. What is your assessment of how the U.S. Government should respond to the potential passage of Article 23 legislation in Hong Kong which will further increase the potential penalties for foreign NGOs and pro-democracy activists in the city?

Answer. I am very concerned by the potential passage of Article 23 legislation. When attempts were made to introduce this legislation in 2003, Hong Kongers made clear that they did not agree with the legislation, which would severely curb their rights and freedoms. I was with Secretary Albright in Hong Kong on the day of the handover in 1997. I clearly remember the specific commitments Beijing made, which it has failed to meet. The PRC's actions have undermined Hong Kong's "high degree of autonomy" and Hong Kongers' rights and freedoms protected under the Sino-British Joint Declaration. If confirmed, I will work with the administration to support people in Hong Kong and will continue to stand up for the human rights and freedoms they are guaranteed.

Question. Taking into account the current Evergrande crisis, what is your view of Blackrock's recent call for investors to triple their equity holdings in China? How would you navigate a situation where there was a sudden string of property firms defaulting and American investors were caught in the middle? What would you say to the financial executives who will be lobbying you to increase and deepen ties between US and Chinese financial markets? Is this in our interests? What steps should the United States take to protect the international financial system from CCP digital surveillance that undermines human rights and freedoms?

Answer. There are significant concerns regarding the lack of transparency in the PRC financial market and the recent series of politically-driven regulatory actions. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor these risks from the field and will work to raise awareness for U.S. and global investors, in support of efforts by the Treasury Department and other economic agencies.

Beijing's recent actions to strengthen political control over financial markets—and the broader economy and society—are drawing international attention to the risks of doing business in an economy that is required to operate at the behest of an autocratic regime, even when this is at odds with market principles.

The United States must continue to demonstrate the strength of our own financial system, including the value of transparency, openness, rule of law, and respect for privacy. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the American business community to help remove barriers to its success in China.

Question. Further to this issue, billions of USD is currently invested in Chinese technology firms with ties to the Xinjiang surveillance state, as well as in Chinese state-owned banks which fund firms with ties to the PLA. Can this be justified in the era of ethical—or ESG investing?

Answer. Certain transactions with PRC firms can create exposure to a range of risks. These risks include sanctions, human rights abuses, threats posed by the PRC national strategy of military-civil fusion, thefts of intellectual property, and other threats to U.S. national security and technological competitiveness. The President took an important step in issuing Executive Order 14032 on June 3, 2021, "Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments That Finance Certain Companies of the

People's Republic of China." If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the U.S. business community and other U.S. parties, such as state and local governments, are aware of these risks, including those outlined in the Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory and applicable U.S. laws, and will encourage them to conduct heightened human rights due diligence on their investments in high-risk markets in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises. If confirmed, I will also work with allies and partners on these issues.

Question. In the Spring of this year, H&M faced a major boycott of its goods in China because it refused to source Xinjiang cotton. Do you agree that something is wrong when firms which take the moral stance are punished while those who continue to source cotton farmed by slaves' benefit? Do you agree that the time has come to level the playing field, correct the market inefficiency which encourages the use of slave labor, and that the best and easiest way of doing this would be to introduce a ban on cotton from Xinjiang, similar to that proposed in the United States?

Answer. As a matter of law and policy, the United States is opposed to forced labor. At the June 2021 G7 Summit in Cornwall, United Kingdom, the world's leading democracies stood united against forced labor, including in Xinjiang, and committed to ensure global supply chains are free from the use of forced labor. USTR Katherine Tai and the other G7 trade ministers said in their October 22 statement they are seriously working to identify areas for strengthened cooperation and will continue working together to protect individuals from forced labor, to ensure that global supply chains are free from the use of forced labor, and those who perpetrate forced labor are held accountable. The Department is working across multiple bureaus and the interagency to end forced labor and hold those accountable who knowingly contribute to these human rights abuses in our global supply chains. If confirmed, I will support and advocate for the end of forced labor and elimination of human rights abuses in our global supply chains.

Anomalous Health Incidents

Question. I am very concerned about directed energy attacks on U.S. Government personnel (so-called Anomalous Health Incidents). Ensuring the safety and security of our personnel abroad falls largely on individual Chiefs of Mission and the response of officers at post. It is imperative that any individual who reports a suspected incident be responded to promptly, equitably, and compassionately.

- Do you agree these incidents must be taken seriously, and pose a threat to the health of U.S. personnel?

Answer. I am deeply troubled by the anomalous health incidents that have affected U.S. Government personnel and their family members. Serving one's country overseas should not come at the cost of one's health. I agree that such incidents may pose a threat to the wellbeing of U.S. personnel and must be taken extremely seriously. If confirmed, the health, safety, and security of Mission China staff, their family members, and all those supporting the Mission will be my highest priority. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that all reported potential anomalous health incidents are given serious attention and reported swiftly through the appropriate channels. I will also ensure that staff who are affected by these incidents receive prompt access to the treatment, support, and medical care that they need. If confirmed, I commit to meeting with medical staff and the RSO in Mission China during my first working day at the embassy to discuss past reported anomalous health incidents so that I am most prepared to protect the safety of Mission China staff and ensure that all protocols regarding anomalous health incidents are being followed appropriately.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that any reported incident is treated seriously and reported quickly through the appropriate channels, and that any affected individuals receive prompt access to medical care?

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that all reported potential anomalous health incidents are given serious attention and reported swiftly through the appropriate channels. I will also ensure that staff who are affected by these incidents receive prompt access to the treatment, support, and medical care that they need.

Question. Do you commit to meeting with medical staff and the RSO at post to discuss any past reported incidents and ensure that all protocols are being followed?

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to meeting with medical staff and the RSO in Mission China during my first working day at the embassy to discuss past reported anomalous health incidents so that I am most prepared to protect the safety of Mis-

sion China staff and ensure that all protocols regarding anomalous health incidents are being followed appropriately.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. Please describe, in detail, what U.S. policy towards China should be.

Answer. The U.S.-China relationship is the most consequential and complex bilateral diplomatic relationship in the world. How we manage this relationship will be the biggest geopolitical test that the United States faces in the 21st century. We will compete vigorously with China where we should, including on jobs, the economy, on critical infrastructure, and on emerging technologies. We will cooperate with China in areas that are in our national interest, including climate change, counter-narcotics, global health security, and nonproliferation. Finally, we will challenge the PRC in areas we must, including when it takes actions that are contrary to American values and interests and that threaten American national security and the security of our partners and allies or undermine the rules-based international order, including on human rights.

Question. What are the top 2-3 issues in U.S.-China relations?

Answer. I highlighted the top issues on the U.S.-China agenda in my October 20 testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee. If confirmed, I look forward to regular consultations with committee members and staff.

We will compete vigorously with the PRC where we should, including on jobs and the economy, critical infrastructure, and emerging technologies. As President Biden has said, when the United States competes on a level playing field, “there’s no country on Earth . . . that can match us.”

We will cooperate with the PRC where it is in our interest, including on climate change, counternarcotics, global health, and nonproliferation. The world cannot solve the climate crisis unless the PRC does more to reduce their emissions. And it is to our benefit to maintain engagement between our people, including students, scholars, diplomats, and journalists so long as America’s laws are respected.

Finally, and crucially, we will challenge the PRC where we must, including when Beijing takes actions that run counter to America’s values and interests; threaten the security of the United States or our allies and partners; or undermine the rules-based international order.

Question. What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of the Indo-Pacific strategy declassified at the end of the Trump administration? Which parts would you continue, if confirmed?

Answer. I welcome the bipartisanship that has shaped and characterized our engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and if confirmed I look forward to continuing these efforts. As Vice President Harris stated during her August 24 speech in Singapore, the United States will continue to pursue a free and open Indo-Pacific that promotes our interests and those of our allies and partners. Our alliances and partnerships are a unique advantage for the United States. If confirmed, I will work to continue strengthening our treaty alliances, particularly with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. If confirmed, I will work multilaterally, through longstanding institutions, like ASEAN and APEC, which remain central to the region’s architecture. I will also work with new, results-oriented groups, like the Quad.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. I welcome the bipartisanship that has shaped and characterized our engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and the Biden administration has continued to focus on allies and partners. If confirmed I look forward to continuing these efforts. As Vice President Harris stated during her August 24 speech in Singapore, the United States will continue to pursue a free and open Indo-Pacific that promotes our interests and those of our allies and partners. Our alliances and partnerships are a unique advantage for the United States. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen our treaty alliances, particularly with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. If confirmed, I will work multilaterally, through longstanding institutions, like ASEAN and APEC, which remain central to the region’s architecture. I will also work with new, results-oriented groups, like the Quad.

Question. Do you agree the U.S. and China are in a strategic competition that encompasses military, economic, technological, political, and ideological competition?

Answer. Yes, the Biden-Harris administration has based its policy on a sober assessment of strategic competition. We will continue to strengthen our own competitive hand to out-compete the PRC and work closely with our allies and partners on our shared vision. We are approaching Beijing from a position of strength and engaging in robust diplomatic, economic, technological, and military competition. That said, we should also cooperate with Beijing when our interests align.

Question. The Chinese Government has doubled down on its “all or nothing” negotiating strategy, demanding the U.S. meet its “two list” criteria—most of which are fundamentally incompatible with U.S. policy and national interests—before China is willing to cooperate with the U.S. on key issues. How should the U.S. engage—and how will you do so in your role if confirmed—with its counterparts if the Chinese Government refuses to cooperate without us meeting their list of demands?

Answer. The U.S. is not beholden to any list of demands from the PRC Government. We reject the linkage of action on transnational challenges, such as climate, to other issues in the bilateral relationship. Strategic competition, however, does not, and should not, preclude working with the PRC when it is in the U.S. national interest. If confirmed, I will make clear to my PRC counterparts that we will welcome the PRC Government’s cooperation on issues where our interests align and where the PRC has a global responsibility to act such as the climate crisis, global health security, strategic stability, counter-narcotics, and nonproliferation, while being clear-eyed about the challenges that our relationship with the PRC poses, and will work with the interagency and our allies to overcome those challenges.

Question. Do you think the Foreign Service is prepared to execute sustained competition with China? Are there any changes or reforms that need to be made to ensure our diplomatic corps is better positioned to advance these goals? What are some ideas you have in this vein that can be executed in Mission China?

Answer. Yes. The Foreign Service is prepared to execute sustained competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as it has with strategic competitors in generations past. As part of this effort, the Department is realigning resources and personnel and developing nimble new organizational structures and strategic approaches. The Department also continues to benefit from Congressional funding to support this new effort, such as the Counter China Influence Fund (CCIF).

All of our foreign posts have dedicated “China Watchers”—reporting or public diplomacy officers covering the PRC as part of their portfolio. These China Watchers collaborate with interagency colleagues to monitor and counter PRC problematic behaviors in State’s global network of posts and missions, under the strategic direction of Chiefs of Mission. In 2019, the Department established the Regional China Officers (RCOs) program, which has recently expanded to 19 officers. RCOs help assess and respond to problematic PRC behavior at the sub-regional, regional, and global levels, in coordination with posts’ “China Watchers” and leadership.

Mission China also continues to work tirelessly and under increasingly difficult conditions to engage the PRC on several important challenges and matters of shared interest, and to provide the best possible reporting back to Washington. To enhance our effectiveness in achieving these diplomatic efforts, Mission China continues to require support for the facilities and personnel appropriate to match the PRC’s rapidly expanding resources and capabilities.

Question. Do you commit to messaging to China the dangers and risks of its destabilizing actions against Taiwan?

Answer. Yes. The Biden-Harris Administration has repeatedly underscored to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that the PRC’s actions are destabilizing, risk miscalculations, and undermine regional peace and stability. If confirmed, I commit to continuing to emphasize those points to Beijing and to undertaking efforts to shine a light on those PRC actions and PRC rhetoric.

Question. What should we be doing now to deter China from aggressive and destabilizing action in the Taiwan Strait?

Answer. This is a priority for the Biden-Harris Administration, which continues to take steps to strengthen deterrence in the Western Pacific. First, we have continued to make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our “one China” policy. In doing so, we are in particular focused on helping Taiwan implement an asymmetric defense strategy that best aligns Taiwan’s resources and advantages against the threat posed by the PRC. Second, we are building international support for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and for Taiwan, as the joint statements between President Biden and former Prime Minister Suga and President Moon respectively as

well as the G7 Leaders Communiqué, Joint AUSMIN statement, and increasing unilateral messaging from other allies and partners illustrates. Third, we are supporting Taiwan beyond our security cooperation to demonstrate the strength of our partnership, push back on the PRC's destabilizing pressure tactics, and elevate Taiwan's contributions to the international community—we have donated COVID vaccines to Taiwan, restarted Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) talks, and advocated for Taiwan's membership or meaningful participation in international organizations.

Question. Do you commit that, in your role, you will always pursue policies that enable the Taiwan people to choose their own future?

Answer. Yes, and if confirmed, I would continue to support a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan. I would urge Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic, and economic pressure against Taiwan, and instead engage in meaningful dialogue with Taiwan. I will support the longstanding U.S. policy to assist Taiwan in maintaining maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our "one China" policy.

Question. What are your views on exercising economic, financial, and other tools to limit China's ability to benefit from Hong Kong as a financial center—both to impose costs for violating a treaty and to deter action against Taiwan? That would be a bit more than some individual visa sanctions.

Answer. I think it was particularly effective to sanction specific individuals in Hong Kong who are responsible for the repression of the people of Hong Kong. If confirmed, I will continue to consider all available policy tools to impose costs on Beijing for its actions in Hong Kong, including sanctions and highlighting unacceptable PRC behavior through joint messaging with partners and allies.

Question. The PLA has established its first overseas military base in Djibouti, and the U.S. is concerned about PLA presence at Ream in Cambodia. How would you address this issue, if confirmed?

Answer. Strategic competition, including military competition, with the PRC will remain a major feature of the bilateral relationship for the foreseeable future. The U.S. Government is closely watching the PLA's activities in Djibouti. I have serious concerns about the PRC's military presence and construction of facilities at Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand. Maintaining an independent and balanced foreign policy is in the best interests of the Cambodian people. If confirmed, I will make this a priority issue.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. Strategic competition, including military competition, with the PRC will remain a major feature of the bilateral relationship for the foreseeable future. The U.S. Government is closely watching the PLA's activities in Djibouti. I have serious concerns about the PRC's military presence and construction of facilities at Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand. Maintaining an independent and balanced foreign policy is in the best interests of the Cambodian people. If confirmed, I will make this a priority issue. If confirmed, I am open to providing more information about this issue and the administration's policy to respond to PRC overseas basing during a closed briefing after I have had the opportunity to consult on the specifics with the Department of State, Department of Defense, and National Security Council.

Question. Do you commit that you will not advocate for or take steps to restore China programs under Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act without prior and meaningful congressional consultation?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary's goal of working with this Committee and Congress to ensure this Administration meets the China challenge. I commit to prior and meaningful consultations with Congress on this issue.

Question. Do you support the designation of certain PRC entities under the Foreign Missions Act?

Answer. Organizations in the United States that are wholly owned or effectively controlled by a foreign government ought to operate transparently and in accordance with U.S. laws. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Office of Foreign Missions to advance that goal.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. It is my understanding that the Foreign Missions Act (FMA) permits the Secretary to treat certain types of non-diplomatic organizations as "foreign missions" for FMA purposes. It is also my understanding that the issue of whether any particular organization is eligible and should be treated as a foreign mission under the FMA requires a fact-specific review. As a general matter,

organizations in the United States that are wholly owned or effectively controlled by a foreign government ought to operate transparently and in accordance with U.S. laws. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Office of Foreign Missions to advance that goal.

Question. What are your views on the issue of undue influence actors in the PRC in U.S. universities?

Answer. This is a major concern and high priority for the U.S. Government. A clear understanding of the organizations and entities Beijing uses to attempt to influence U.S. society is important. They must be held to the same standard as all organizations operating in the United States. Of particular concern are activities that lack transparency and attempt to hide or downplay their affiliations and objectives.

If confirmed, I will continue to promote transparency on the topic to relevant stakeholders within the United States, including state and local governments, universities, and business associations, as appropriate.

Question. Do you think there should be greater scrutiny of foreign donations and contracts between U.S. universities and donors from countries that do share our interests, such as China and Russia? If so, how can Mission China contribute to that goal?

Answer. I am supportive of measures to ensure that donations and contracts between U.S. universities and foreign entities benefit the United States and are not subject to undue foreign influence, including by the Government of the People's Republic of China. If confirmed, I will encourage Mission China to support the State Department's efforts to educate and inform educational institutions about their possible exposure to undue foreign influence through such arrangements.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. I am supportive of measures to ensure that donations and contracts between U.S. universities and foreign entities benefit the United States and are not subject to undue foreign influence, including by the Government of the People's Republic of China. If confirmed, I will also ensure Mission China supports the State Department's efforts to educate and inform educational institutions about their possible exposure to undue foreign influence through such arrangements.

Question. If confirmed, will you highlight corrupt Chinese practices, including by government officials and PRC companies operating in the domestic and foreign markets?

Answer. If confirmed, I will push back on corrupt or coercive political and economic practices that damage our interests and those of our partners, including control over resources, predatory lending practices, and the abusive use of new security technology.

Question. In your view, what are the implications of China being able to pressure and punish U.S. persons and companies into accepting or at least not pushing back on the political positions of the Chinese Government, even when those positions undermine the fundamental political principles and values of the United States? What can and should private sector actors be doing to address this issue? What is the proper role of the U.S. Government?

Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage the business community to consider the risks of doing business with the PRC. I will also stress the importance for U.S. companies to ensure they avoid complicity with forced labor in the PRC, adhere to U.S. sanctions, and align their activities with the high standards of responsible business conduct we expect from U.S. firms. While we are not asking U.S. companies to advocate actively for our foreign policy, we expect them to take positions that align with American values and U.S. law. If confirmed, I will work to help U.S. companies to build resilience against PRC efforts to coerce them to take positions at odds with human rights, the rule of law, and responsible business conduct.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. U.S. companies face a difficult balancing act in China. Many, from large multinationals to smaller firms operating in the U.S. heartland, have longstanding business relationships and operations in the PRC, whether in manufacturing or sourcing their goods and inputs for Chinese and global markets, or selling to Chinese consumers.

If confirmed, I will encourage the business community to consider the risks of doing business with the PRC. I will also stress the importance for U.S. companies to ensure they avoid complicity with forced labor in the PRC, adhere to U.S. sanctions, and align their activities with the high standards of responsible business conduct we expect from U.S. firms. While we are not asking U.S. companies to advocate actively for our foreign policy, we should expect them to take positions that align with

American values, their own corporate values, and the expectations of their shareholders. If confirmed, I will work to help U.S. companies to build resilience against PRC efforts to coerce them to take positions at odds with human rights, the rule of law, and responsible business conduct.

In instances where American corporations are publicly or privately coerced by the PRC to take actions that violate their corporate values or are punished for taking corporate positions that run counter to the PRC's false political or human rights narratives, I will, if confirmed, work to provide them with all available U.S. Government support. I also commit to working with like-minded partners to discourage companies from third countries from backfilling commercial opportunities when American companies stand their ground against the PRC or must refrain from pursuing opportunities due to their compliance with U.S. sanctions. Effective resistance to PRC coercion is most successful when we stand together with our partners and allies to encourage the business community to do what is right in China.

Question. In your view, what are the goals of “One Belt, One Road”?

Answer. The Belt and Road Initiative uses projects spread across 125 countries to create new markets for Chinese exports, new sources of energy and other raw materials for the PRC's factories and power plants, and new avenues for rewriting international rules and standards to serve Beijing's own interests.

Unlike the United States and most G20 countries, PRC state-backed lending disregards international standards and best practices that stress transparency, sustainability, and quality. Beijing's state banks generally do not consider debt sustainability risks in the borrowing country, conceal or obfuscate the amount and terms of the country's loans, and discourage borrowing countries from reporting through borrower non-disclosure arrangements. Instead of fair competition, the PRC channels billions of dollars in government subsidies to its exporters and civil engineering companies, allowing it to unfairly undercut its global competitors. BRI projects also often fail to implement international labor standards and environmental and social safeguards.

If confirmed, I will promote development that emphasizes democratic governance, social and economic safeguards, transparency, and sustainable financing. I will work with our allies and partners to shine a spotlight on how the PRC's opaque loans and investments threaten fiscal stability and good governance while contributing to developing countries' unsustainable debt loads.

Question. The Trump Administration undertook a major push to keep products from China's Huawei out of 5G networks in countries across the world, especially in allied nations in Europe. Multiple countries have chosen to exclude Huawei from their emerging 5G networks, including the United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Poland, Sweden, Estonia, Romania, Denmark, and Latvia.

- How will you address the issue of keeping 5G networks clean from Chinese equipment and the consequent security hazards?

Answer. The Biden-Harris administration views 5G security as a top priority because the stakes for securing these networks could not be higher. The United States advocates for a vibrant digital economy worldwide that enables all citizens to benefit from the promise of 5G and future telecommunications networks. At fora such as the Quad, the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, the G7, and at the upcoming Third annual Prague 5G Security Conference, and in our bilateral relationships, the Department actively promotes 5G network security and vendor diversity, in partnership with the interagency, as part of that approach.

Question. The Trump Administration undertook a major push to keep products from China's Huawei out of 5G networks in countries across the world, especially in allied nations in Europe. Multiple countries have chosen to exclude Huawei from their emerging 5G networks, including the United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Poland, Sweden, Estonia, Romania, Denmark, and Latvia.

- Looking beyond 5G, what other emerging technologies do you think would create risks for the United States and its allies if we have an undue reliance on untrusted vendors? Are there areas you will prioritize, and how so?

Answer. The Biden-Harris Administration views emerging technologies, infrastructure, and energy as critical to the U.S. future national security and economic prosperity. Advanced and future telecommunications technologies—5G, 6G, and beyond—as well as the semiconductors and microchips that are integral to those and so many other technologies, are high priorities. So too is the responsible stewardship of trustworthy artificial intelligence (AI) that is developed and used in line with democratic values and respect for human rights. Supercomputing, cloud computing, data storage, and quantum information technologies are already changing the way

we live—a trend that will only increase. Advanced energy—from renewable energy and storage to microreactors and fusion energy—will power these technologies. If confirmed, I will work with allies and partners, companies, universities, and civil society organizations that promote democratic values and share a commitment to design and deploy technology for the benefit of all people.

Question. Do you commit that you will not advise Secretary Blinken, the President, or any other official to sacrifice other U.S. interests for the sake of an agreement with or promises from China on climate change?

Answer. I reject the linkage of action on climate to other issues in the bilateral relationship. As Special Presidential Envoy Kerry has noted, climate is a critical standalone issue, and other aspects of the U.S.-PRC relationship will not be traded for separate U.S. interests. We will compete, and compete vigorously, with the PRC where we should, and we will cooperate with the PRC where it is in our interest, including on climate change. The PRC is by far the largest emitter of carbon in the world today. The world cannot solve the climate crisis without the PRC doing substantially more to reduce their emissions at the pace and magnitude required to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as the science requires. This is a major issue for the entire world, as well as in our relationship. At the end of the day, this Administration will look at what Beijing does—not what it says it will or will not do—to determine whether the PRC is serious about climate action.

Question. Do you commit that you yourself will not take any steps to trade other U.S. interests for the sake of an agreement with or promises from China on climate change?

Answer. Yes, I commit that I will not take steps to trade other U.S. interests for the sake of an agreement or promises from the PRC on climate change.

Question. To the best of your understanding, does Mr. Kerry have authority to be involved in any other issues in our China policy, other than climate?

Answer. No. As Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, former Secretary of State John Kerry's role is to lead U.S. diplomatic efforts worldwide to reassert U.S. climate leadership and raise global ambition to meet the daunting climate challenge. His climate diplomacy work is closely coordinated with other U.S. diplomatic efforts.

Question. If Mr. Kerry begins playing a major role in non-climate aspects of the U.S.-China relationship, what will you do to remedy that?

Answer. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate (SPEC) Kerry has not done so. His role is to lead the U.S. diplomatic efforts worldwide to reassert U.S. climate leadership and raise global ambition to meet the challenge. His climate diplomacy work will continue to be closely coordinated with other U.S. diplomatic efforts. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with SPEC Kerry on pushing the PRC to take stronger and faster climate action. I have very high regard for John Kerry and his experience and effectiveness as a negotiator.

Question. Mr. Kerry and Secretary of Commerce Raimondo have both said that if we cooperate with China on climate and commercial ties, it will help us to cooperate in other areas. Do you agree with that assessment?

Answer. I agree with the administration's competitive approach to the PRC. I believe we should continue to strengthen our own competitive hand vis-à-vis the PRC. This does not preclude cooperation in areas where our interests align, such as climate. If confirmed, I will pursue cooperation with the PRC where it is in our interest, and in consultation with the Congress, our allies and partners, and other stakeholders.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. I agree with the administration's competitive approach to the PRC. The United States will compete vigorously with the PRC where we should, and we will cooperate with the PRC where it is in our interest.

I believe we should continue to strengthen our own competitive hand vis-à-vis the PRC. This does not preclude us from raising areas where we have concern with the PRC's actions nor from cooperating in areas where our interests may align, such as climate. If confirmed, I will pursue cooperation with the PRC where it is in our interest, and in consultation with the Congress, our allies and partners, and other stakeholders.

Question. Mr. Kerry stated in a Bloomberg interview on September 22 in response to a question about “how one trades off climate against human rights” (the interviewer's exact words): “Well life is always full of tough choices in the relationship between nations. Even as there were egregious human rights issues [with the Soviet Union], which Ronald Reagan called them out on, we had to find a way forward to

make the world safer and protect our countries and act in our interests. We can and must do the same thing now. Yes, we have issues, but first and foremost, this planet must be protected.”

- Do you agree that climate should come “first and foremost” in the U.S.-China relationship?

Answer. As Special Presidential Envoy Kerry has noted, climate is a critical standalone issue, and other aspects of the U.S.-China relationship will not be traded for separate U.S. interests. This administration will compete, and compete vigorously, with the PRC where we should, and we will cooperate with the PRC where it is in our interest. Climate is perhaps the signature issue on the cooperation side. The United States is committed to working with the international community and the PRC on climate as an urgent issue, and I hope Beijing will engage with us on the same basis.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. As Special Presidential Envoy Kerry has noted, climate is a critical standalone issue, and other aspects of the U.S.-China relationship will not be traded for separate U.S. interests. This administration will compete, and compete vigorously, with the PRC where we should, and we will cooperate with the PRC where it is in our interest.

The administration has consistently said climate change is an area where our interests align, and has regularly raised with the PRC the importance of taking bold actions to address the climate crisis. There is simply no way to solve the climate crisis without the significant emission reductions from the country that today leads the world with 28% of global emissions.

The United States is committed to working with the international community and the PRC on climate as an urgent issue, and I hope Beijing will engage with us on the same basis.

Question. Do you think there is a “tough choice” between promoting human rights in China and coming to an agreement on climate?

Answer. No, as Special Presidential Envoy Kerry has noted, climate is a critical standalone issue, and other aspects of the U.S.-China relationship will not be traded for separate U.S. interests. We will compete, and compete vigorously, with the PRC where we should, and we will cooperate with the PRC where it is in our interest, including on climate change. Human rights will remain a major priority issue on the U.S. agenda with China.

Question. In various publications, you’ve written we need China to “mitigate environmental catastrophe or engineer a stable, global economy,” or cooperate with China on “transnational threats” such as “combatting piracy and drug and crime cartels and responding to pandemics of the future.” You’ve also written that we share interests with China and Russia on “climate change, terrorism, Iran, and North Korea” and “proliferation.” Are there other issues where you have a similar view? What do you think China is willing to do in each of these issue areas?

Answer. I am clear-eyed about the challenges that our relationship with the PRC poses and, if confirmed, will work with the interagency and our allies to overcome them. Strategic competition does not, and should not, preclude working with the PRC when it is in the U.S. national interest to do so. In fact, we will welcome the PRC Government’s cooperation on issues such as the climate crisis, global health security, strategic stability, counter-narcotics, and nonproliferation when our interests align.

We actively seek the PRC’s cooperation in efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear program, as it has no interest in seeing Iran develop a nuclear weapon and the profoundly destabilizing impact that would have in a region upon which China depends for its oil imports.

On climate issues, the PRC is by far the largest emitter of carbon in the world today. The world cannot solve the climate crisis without the PRC doing substantially more to reduce their emissions at the pace and magnitude required to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as the science requires. This is a major issue for the entire world, as well as in our relationship. At the end of the day, this Administration will look at what Beijing does—not what it says it will or will not do—to determine whether the PRC is serious about climate action.

Question. The Chinese Communist Party is cracking down against financial institutions, technology companies, and individual wealth accumulation. What is your assessment of the future of China’s economy, and what risks do these regulatory changes present to U.S. businesses in China or with supply chains in China?

Answer. The PRC’s increasingly intrusive business regulations, political demands, and national security laws are contributing to a deteriorating investment climate

and rising political risk for companies. If confirmed, I will encourage the business community to consider the risks of doing business with the PRC. I will make every effort to help U.S. businesses to succeed in China.

Question. How will you strengthen the economic corps in Mission China?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Mission China economic corps has the resources and support they need to advance a foreign policy for the middle class, to ensure American businesses are positioned to compete and win on a global stage, and to confront the PRC's economic abuses.

Answer [revised—11/8/2011]. *If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Mission China economic corps has the resources and support they need to advance a foreign policy for the middle class, to ensure American businesses are positioned to compete and win on a global stage, and to confront the PRC's economic abuses. If confirmed, I will ask my Country Team to assess ways in which the economic corps could be strengthened, and if needed, work with State Department colleagues and Congress to identify corresponding resources.*

Question. What will you ask the economic corps in Mission China to prioritize? Please be specific.

Answer. We must hold the PRC accountable for failing to play by the rules on trade and investment, including its theft of intellectual property, use of state subsidies, dumping of goods, and unfair labor practices. These actions harm American workers and businesses. The best way to meet this challenge is to form common cause with U.S. allies and partners to confront the PRC's anti-competitive, market distorting, and coercive behaviors. If confirmed, I will also work to create a level playing field for U.S. businesses, coordinating with Congress and interagency partners, including the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Agriculture, along with partners and allies to develop policies that counter the PRC's abusive and unfair economic practices.

Question. In particular, how would you, if confirmed, and the economic corps at Mission China help deal with the PRC's growing use of laws and regulations to pressure foreign companies not to comply with U.S. laws, including our sanctions laws?

Answer. President Biden is firmly committed to taking on the challenge of the PRC's abusive and unfair practices. The best way to meet this challenge is to work alongside U.S. allies and partners to confront the PRC's anti-competitive, market distorting, and coercive behaviors. If confirmed, I will work to create a level playing field for U.S. businesses, coordinating with Congress and interagency partners, including the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Agriculture to develop policies that counter the PRC's abusive and unfair economic practices and hold Beijing accountable when it employs them.

The administration should not be deterred from taking actions to hold Beijing accountable for human rights violations, the erosion of Hong Kong autonomy, and other problematic behavior. If confirmed, I will work to help American businesses to succeed, while also encouraging the business community to consider the risks of doing business with the PRC. If confirmed, I will also support and encourage U.S. businesses to respect human rights in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.

Question. Do you agree on the need to move certain supply chains out of China?

Answer. I fully support the Biden-Harris administration's effort to realize resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains to ensure our economic prosperity and national security, including by encouraging American companies to diversify their People's Republic of China (PRC) sourcing and supply chains to create more resilient supply chains that can reduce vulnerabilities to economic coercion and other PRC actions. Chief among our concerns are the PRC's use of state-led, non-market interventions, to capture large portions of value chains in sectors crucial to U.S. national and economic security. Our approach must also reflect other vulnerabilities, such as pandemics and other biological threats, climate shocks and extreme weather events, and cyber and terrorist attacks. The PRC has used its dominance of critical sectors as economic leverage to advance its own geopolitical agenda, including numerous cases of economic coercion against trading partners who do not fully support Beijing's policies. If confirmed, I would support U.S. efforts to diversify critical supply chains beyond China to avoid the unacceptable risk that the United States could be placed in a similar situation.

Question. Do you agree with the need to reduce our reliance on China overall in terms of supply chains? If so, what sectors or items would fall into either of these categories for you?

Answer. I fully support the Biden-Harris administration's effort to reduce U.S. reliance on the PRC for critical supply chains. Chief among these are the critical sectors noted in Executive Order (E.O.) 14001 on public health supply chains and E.O. 14017 on America's Supply Chains, which identified semiconductors and advanced packaging, high-capacity batteries, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, and active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), and supplies necessary for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Administration's efforts to review supply chains related to six industrial bases—for defense, energy, transportation, information, and communication technology (ICT), public health, and agriculture and food—may yet identify additional critical sectors of concern with respect to the PRC's current or prospective dominance that may merit further action.

Moreover, American companies must ensure that their PRC supply chains are free of forced labor, including those for silica-based products, and those for cotton and tomatoes produced in Xinjiang. As President Biden made clear at the G7 Summit, the United States will not tolerate forced labor in our supply chains.

Question. What will you do to help U.S. companies achieve either of the goals of reducing reliance on China in terms of supply chains and moving certain supply chains out of China, and to withstand costs imposed by the PRC Government of doing so?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with U.S. companies to reduce our reliance on the PRC for critical supply chains. This includes actively engaging with industry and other key stakeholders, including labor and civil society, to fully understand the complex nature of supply chains that originate in the PRC as well as the risks and vulnerabilities that they pose. I will also work within the Administration to use the full extent of our trade, commercial and diplomatic tools to support U.S. firms' efforts to diversify, as appropriate, their PRC-based critical supply chains and sourcing activities. I will also vigorously defend the interests of U.S. companies if PRC authorities punish them for actions taken to support resilient supply chains in the U.S. national interest.

Question. The Biden Administration updated a Trump-era executive order addressing the threat of securities investments by Chinese companies linked to the People's Liberation Army. The Trump Administration formed the ICTS process to protect against untrusted information communications technology and services in U.S. supply chains. The SEC is taking a stronger stance on Chinese companies not abiding by accounting and auditing standards. There is greater attention on the presence of PRC companies listed in capital markets that also work with the Chinese military or are potentially complicit in human rights abuses. The State Department can play a role in providing valuable information to support some of these processes. It can also advocate inside the interagency for rigorous enforcement of these tools.

- Do you commit to making this a priority?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my interagency colleagues to hold PRC firms to the same audit compliance standards that apply to other companies around the world as a requirement for listing in U.S. financial markets. I would also work with our allies and partners to encourage and strengthen national security-focused investment screening mechanisms to mitigate the risks of concerning third-country investments, including from PRC-backed companies making third country investments. If confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris Administration efforts to ensure the PRC cannot exploit U.S. capital markets to support PLA military modernization and the use of PRC surveillance technology in human rights abuse.

Question. If so, what steps will you take to do so?

Answer. If confirmed, I will leverage the full breadth of authorities available to us to protect our economic and national security interests, and support enhanced investment screening efforts. I would confront unfair and inappropriate trade practices—including intellectual property theft for commercial and military enhancement and coercive economic practices, use of state subsidies, dumping of goods, and unfair labor practices.

Question. You supported TPP. Would you advocate inside the administration for the U.S. joining CPTPP, especially now that China has made a bid for it?

Answer. Trade policy in the Indo-Pacific is a key part of the Biden-Harris administration's effort to Build Back Better. The administration's approach to trade is fo-

cused on supporting American working families, defending our values, and protecting the long-term prosperity and security of the United States. As President Biden has said, the United States is focused on making investments in U.S. workers and U.S. competitiveness before he signs new trade agreements, including in the Indo-Pacific. The United States is working with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region to identify ways to address specific trade issues such as infrastructure, the digital economy, and energy.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. If confirmed, I will faithfully represent the administration's trade policies. The administration's approach to trade is focused on supporting American working families, defending our values, and protecting the long-term prosperity and security of the United States. As President Biden has said, the United States is focused on making investments in U.S. workers and U.S. competitiveness before he signs new trade agreements, including in the Indo-Pacific. Ambassador Tai has stated, "We will create durable trade policy that benefits a broad range of stakeholders by rebuilding trust with our workers and aligning our domestic and foreign policies."

Question. PRC military modernization and expansion is dramatically shifting the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Do you commit to ensuring the U.S. does not weaken its defense posture in the Indo-Pacific, or take any measures that would lessen our security commitments to our allies and partners in the region?

Answer. The Peoples Republic of China's (PRC) military build-up and coercive activities highlight Beijing's increasing comfort with employing military forces to achieve its foreign policy objectives. The United States and its allies and partners will continue to make every effort to strengthen our ability to deter and defend against aggression, and the administration has been clear that our security commitments to our allies and partners will remain strong and credible.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. Yes. The Peoples Republic of China's (PRC) military build-up and coercive activities highlight Beijing's increasing comfort with employing military forces to achieve its foreign policy objectives. The United States and its allies and partners will continue to make every effort to strengthen our ability to deter and defend against aggression, and the administration has been clear that our security commitments to our allies and partners will remain strong and credible.

Question. What do you think is motivating China's massive nuclear build-up?

Answer. China's build-up highlights why the administration will pursue strategic stability measures to reduce the dangers from the PRC's growing nuclear arsenal. These efforts will be paired with actions to bolster deterrence in the region. Because Beijing is the least transparent member of the P5 nuclear weapons states, accurate assessments of its nuclear intentions are difficult. I defer to the Intelligence Community for a specific assessment of the factors driving the PRC's rapid nuclear build-up.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. China's build-up highlights why the administration will pursue strategic stability measures to reduce the dangers from the PRC's growing nuclear arsenal. These efforts will be paired with actions to bolster deterrence in the region. Because Beijing is the least transparent member of the P5 nuclear weapons states, accurate assessments of its nuclear intentions are difficult. I defer to the Intelligence Community for a specific assessment of the factors driving the PRC's rapid nuclear build-up. If confirmed, I commit to brief you and your staff after I have had the opportunity to consult within the administration.

Question. In light of China's nuclear build-up, do you think it is the right decision for the United States to adopt a 'sole purpose doctrine' or a 'no first use' policy, based on information that's in open source?

Answer. I understand the concerns expressed among some allies and partners, members of Congress, and experts regarding potential U.S. adoption of a no-first-use or sole purpose policy. In the face of the PRC's rapid nuclear build-up, the Administration will ensure our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies and partners remain strong and credible, while also taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. The ongoing analysis within the Department of Defense-led Nuclear Posture Review will inform the Administration's approach to nuclear posture and policy. I do not want to get ahead of that process.

Question. Do you believe that unilateral U.S. nuclear reductions would enable the United States to negotiate with Russia and China from a position of strength?

Answer. I would never support unilateral reductions that endanger U.S. security or weaken U.S. negotiating leverage. The U.S. should maintain a modern, credible and effective nuclear deterrent.

Question. What do you think would incentivize China to engage in arms control discussions?

Answer. The Administration hopes that Beijing will come to see that arms control is in its own security interest, as such measures would contribute to reducing the risk of military crises and would manage the threat of destabilizing arms races. U.S. allies and partners will be key to success in these efforts. If confirmed, I commit to consulting with Congress at an appropriate time on potential measures to be pursued with Beijing.

Question. If we are not able to commence discussions on arms control with China, what should the U.S. be doing instead to address various arms controls issues we have with China?

Answer. Given the PRC's rapid military expansion, the United States and its allies and partners need to strengthen their ability to deter and defend against aggression. Beijing's nuclear build-up highlights that there is a need for crisis communication, risk reduction, and strategic stability. These efforts will be paired with actions to bolster deterrence in the region.

Question. Do you think the United States should cooperate with countries where we have concerns about compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention on biotechnology, pathogen research, and other categories of biological research that could be weaponized or serve a dual-use function?

Answer. It is my view that the United States should not cooperate with countries of compliance concern on specific biological research where we believe there is significant potential that information, technology, or material we provide could be used for nefarious purposes. In this vein, I strongly support oversight of life sciences dual use research of concern. It is important, however, to continue dialogue with those countries to clarify and resolve compliance concerns. Further, if certain countries have the only access to certain pathogens, then the United States must find a way to ensure that public health experts can continue their necessary collaborative work to be able to protect us from naturally occurring outbreaks and accidents, while minimizing risks to our national security.

Question. Would you work to limit cooperation with the PRC on biotechnology, and to increase scrutiny of any such cooperation?

Answer. The United States has oversight policies and regulations for federally funded research. These policies require careful consideration of risks and benefits of proposed research, and where appropriate, measures to mitigate those risks. Policy development is led by the National Security Council and by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and decisions about the funding of specific research proposals are made by the responsible funding agency. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ISN and AVC Bureaus on issues concerning the PRC to ensure that policy development considers both our international obligations and the international implications of policy choices.

Question. Do you commit to prioritizing engagement with industry, academia, the health research community, and other stakeholders outside traditional national security circles on the United States' compliance concerns with respect to the Biological Weapons Convention? If so, what three steps will you take to make good on this commitment, should you be confirmed?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to working with the AVC Bureau to engage those outside traditional national security circles (e.g., industry, academia, the health research community) and with international counterparts about United States' concerns regarding other countries' compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention. The State Department plans to engage those outside (and inside) traditional national security circles in the run up to the BWC Review Conference and during the BWC Review Conference itself through bilateral engagements and briefings, NGO roundtables, workshops, and public outreach events.

Question. Do you think the U.S. Government should be funding research with China on pathogens, viruses, and toxins? If so, do you think the State Department should have a role in reviewing whether such proposals are in the national security interests of the United States?

Answer. It is my view that the United States should not cooperate with countries of compliance concern on specific biological research where we believe there is sig-

nificant potential that information, technology, or material we provide could be used for nefarious purposes. It is important, however, to continue dialogue with those countries to clarify and resolve compliance concerns. Further, if the PRC has the only access to certain pathogens, the United States must find a way to ensure that public health experts can continue their necessary collaborative work to be able to protect us from naturally occurring outbreaks, while minimizing our national security risks.

The United States has federal funding and oversight for research that might pose safety or security risks and require additional oversight by Departments that fund such research. These policies establish a high bar for funding based on a careful assessment of risks and benefits and require steps to mitigate any risks. The AVC Bureau would be consulted if the proposed cooperation raised any potential issues related to compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

Question. What is your assessment of the strategic threat China presents in the Arctic?

Answer. China is pursuing greater influence in the Arctic, seeking to leverage investments in scientific research and critical infrastructure to secure footholds and extend its soft power across the region. We coordinate closely with allies and partners in the Arctic on the protection of critical infrastructure and to keep Arctic states at the forefront of governance in the region

Question. According to the 2019 National Drug Threat Assessment, fentanyl and other highly potent synthetic opioids continue to be the most lethal category of illicit substances in the United States. The 2020 DEA report on fentanyl flows to the United States highlights that China remains the primary source of fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances trafficked into the United States, increasingly through Mexico. Mexican transnational criminal organizations are producing increased quantities of fentanyl and cartels such as the Sinaloa and the New Generation Jalisco cartel are the primary trafficking groups responsible for smuggling fentanyl into the United States from Mexico.

- Please explain your understanding of the actions and steps the Chinese Government needs to take to reduce, and eventually eliminate, the transshipment of fentanyl precursor chemicals to Mexico.

Answer. The PRC is the primary source for precursor chemicals used to manufacture fentanyl, opioids, methamphetamine, and other synthetic drugs globally. Addressing this challenge is an Administration priority. If confirmed, I will support this priority and coordinate closely with interagency partners to raise this issue through bilateral channels and multilaterally with allies and partners. If confirmed, I will press the PRC to take a number of actions that could reduce the transshipment of fentanyl precursor chemicals, including the investigation and prosecution of the use of false documents and shipping labels, implementation of “know your customer” regulations.

Diminishing shipments of fentanyl precursors from the PRC to Latin American transnational criminal organizations to stop flows to the United States will require tangible working-level with Beijing and cooperation with allies and partners, including in Congress. If confirmed, I also will work with interagency partners to utilize all available tools to promote accountability for illicit actors involved in the fentanyl supply chain. I look forward to close continued consultation and cooperation with Congress on this issue.

Question. Please describe your understanding of U.S. concerns with Chinese malign behavior in the Western Hemisphere.

Answer. The Secretary called our competition with the PRC a defining challenge for the 21st century. The PRC represents a serious challenge to U.S. interests in the region, with its growing security ties and opaque infrastructure investments that undermine transparency and sovereignty. The Department does not oppose Beijing’s engagement and investment throughout the region. The Department, however, echoes the long-standing calls from Latin American capitals that PRC actions respect local laws and interests, particularly regarding the human rights of all, including workers, and protections for the environment.

Question. Do you agree with these concerns?

Answer. The Department seeks to strengthen the Western Hemisphere as a coalition of resilient democracies that champions our shared values. The Department does this by working with allies and partners, with a sustained commitment in virtually every dimension of our bilateral and multilateral relationships. As Secretary Blinken has made clear, we do not seek to force our partners to choose between the United States and the PRC. We offer a partnership that works in our interests and

those of our partners, undergirded by our shared values of democratic governance; respect for human rights; entrepreneurship; transparency; inclusive economic growth; environmental stewardship; and diversity, equality, and inclusion.

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps will you recommend to diminish Chinese malign influence in the Western Hemisphere region?

Answer. I support the Administration's efforts to build on our shared values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. We welcome our allies and partners' expertise and resources to support the region's COVID-19 response, entrepreneurship, and sustainable infrastructure. We support high-standard investment in infrastructure and transparent economic development that creates jobs essential for regional pandemic recovery. We employ a diverse range of tools to strengthen regional prosperity, security, and democracy, from diplomatic engagement to technical exchanges, public diplomacy and targeted foreign assistance, and partnership with the private sector and civil society.

Question. Please describe your views about Chinese illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the waters of the Western Hemisphere?

Answer. IUU fishing by foreign vessels in our Western Hemisphere waters, particularly by PRC-flagged and PRC-associated vessels, raises serious concerns. The Department works with the interagency community, including U.S. Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the U.S. Agency of International Development, to improve diplomatic and enforcement tools and to promote respect for maritime sovereignty and international standards in environmental and labor practices. IUU fishing activities negatively affect coastal countries in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean, whose coastal communities rely on fishery resources. The actions of a large, primarily PRC-flagged fishing fleet that targets squid in the high seas outside of South American exclusive economic zones have raised substantial concerns. Analysts have linked this fleet to IUU fishing activities in the past, and its behaviors, such as vessels turning off identification systems for periods of time, have raised questions about the fleet's activities. Analysts have most frequently cited PRC-associated vessels as engaging in IUU fishing activities in other countries' jurisdictions. PRC-associated vessels around the world also engage in other concerning behavior—including overfishing, using forced labor, operating in disputed waters accompanied by the Chinese Coast Guard, and reinforcing unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea.

Question. Please explain how you would convey U.S. concerns about IUU fishing in the Western Hemisphere to the Chinese Government.

Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend continuing to raise our concerns about IUU fishing in the Western Hemisphere to the PRC in bilateral meetings, as well as through public statements and cooperation with like-minded coastal, fishing, and market states. IUU fishing remains a growing global concern. The Department urges the PRC to operate transparently about its fishing activities, enforce its own stated "zero-tolerance" policy regarding IUU fishing, and fulfill its flag state responsibilities to monitor and control its fleet.

Question. Please describe your concerns about the objectives of Chinese military engagement throughout Latin America.

Answer. The United States must maintain its substantial edge in military cooperation and sales to the hemisphere. The PRC's growing military engagement with the hemisphere remains limited but is growing and requires close attention.

Question. Please describe your concerns about the purpose of the so-called space station and the threat it presents to national security.

Answer. We have publicly discussed our concerns regarding the People's Liberation Army's efforts to develop bases around the world. Those concerns apply to the ground station in Argentina that supports the PRC's space operations. We would be happy to provide you with more detail about our national security concerns about that particular facility in a closed session.

Question. Chinese companies such as ZTE and Huawei have made significant inroads in Latin America. Chinese surveillance system providers have updated security and telecommunications infrastructure in countries like Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela, among others, and have sought to export Chinese surveillance techniques and equipment throughout the region.

- Please describe the threat Chinese surveillance systems present to the safety and security of citizens in these countries.

Answer. The Chinese Communist Party seeks to obtain sensitive personal data around the world. The PRC could compel PRC-linked companies to provide access to data, facilities, and equipment to security and intelligence services, potentially including those companies that export communications equipment and services around the world, including in the Western Hemisphere. The financing of “safe cities” in the region, often through the sales of surveillance technology, is not altruism—it is potentially unimpeded access to bulk surveillance data and the export of the tools of authoritarianism.

Question. Chinese companies such as ZTE and Huawei have made significant inroads in Latin America. Chinese surveillance system providers have updated security and telecommunications infrastructure in countries like Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela, among others, and have sought to export Chinese surveillance techniques and equipment throughout the region.

- How does the proliferation of Chinese telecommunications infrastructure in Latin America threaten U.S. national security interest?

Answer. The United States is deeply concerned about the dangers of installing networks that can be manipulated, disrupted, or controlled by governments that have no regard for privacy or human rights. In the PRC, where vendors are beholden to the whims of the PRC, this control is spelled out explicitly in the Chinese National Intelligence Law: “Any organization and citizen shall, in accordance with the law, support, provide assistance, and cooperate in national intelligence work, and guard the secrecy of any national intelligence work they are aware of.” There can be no trust when a company lacks meaningful judicial recourse to challenge government overreach. These vendors could provide the PRC the capability and opportunity to disrupt or weaponize critical applications and infrastructure.

These concerns are not hypothetical—we have all seen news reports of the PRC attempting to coerce countries by withholding COVID-19 vaccines or threatening economic or trade retaliation if they do not allow Huawei access to their markets.

Question. What is your assessment of the human rights situation in China?

Answer. Human rights and democracy are at the core of U.S. foreign policy. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is committing genocide and crimes against humanity, including sexual violence, against members of ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang, including Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim. The PRC continues a government policy of widespread forced labor, including through the continued mass arbitrary detention of more than one million Uyghurs, and members of other Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang. The PRC Government is repressing Tibetans’ distinct language, religion, and culture. It is eroding Hong Kong’s autonomy and democratic institutions and processes. The PRC continues to detain lawyers and other human rights defenders and to curtail the freedoms of expression, religion and belief, and movement throughout the country. The United States has called on the PRC to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to adhere to its obligations with regard to Hong Kong.

If confirmed, I will seek to promote accountability for those responsible for PRC human rights violations and abuses and support efforts to protect human rights in the PRC, including for religious and ethnic minorities.

Question. What additional tools are available to the United States Government to incentivize the Chinese Government to improve its human rights record?

Answer. If confirmed, I will consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability for those responsible to end abuses, to include but not limited to, actions already implemented by the U.S. Government: visa restrictions, import restrictions, export restrictions, and financial sanctions.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. If confirmed, I will consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability for those responsible to end abuses, to include but not limited to, actions already implemented by the U.S. government: visa restrictions, import restrictions, export restrictions, and financial sanctions.

In consultation with the White House and within the State Department, I will actively consider additional tools to incentivize the PRC government to improve its human rights record.

Question. Do you commit to implementing laws passed in the 116th Congress on both Hong Kong and Xinjiang?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you commit that you will prioritize investigating forced labor issues in China to inform broader interagency efforts such as sanctions and issuance of withhold release orders?

Answer. Human rights and democracy are at the core of U.S. foreign policy. If confirmed, I will ensure that the PRC is held accountable for its human rights abuses and support efforts to protect human rights in the PRC, including for religious and ethnic minorities.

Answer [revised]. Human rights and democracy are at the core of U.S. foreign policy. The sanctions against two PRC nationals for their role in serious human rights abuses in Xinjiang, and the release of an updated business advisory pointing to growing evidence of the use of forced labor in Xinjiang demonstrate the administration's continuing commitment to human rights. If confirmed, I will implement the administration's priorities, ensure that the PRC is held accountable for its human rights abuses, including forced labor, and support efforts to protect human rights in the PRC, including for religious and ethnic minorities.

Question. Do you commit to prioritizing this issue even if it endangers U.S. climate goals with China?

Answer. As Special Presidential Envoy Kerry has noted, climate is a critical standalone issue, and other aspects of the U.S.-China relationship will not be traded for U.S. interests.

Question. Do you commit to contributing to ensuring that U.S. Government financing does not touch—in any way, shape, or form—any entity in China that engages in forced labor?

Answer. Forced labor and human rights abuses in the PRC span multiple sectors and regions, and PRC officials continue to obstruct international efforts to identify and monitor these abuses. If confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris Administration's steadfast commitment to combat forced labor.

Question. Should the Development Finance Corporation invest in solar projects that source equipment from China until the United States has a fuller understanding of how prevalent forced labor is in solar panel and other related supply chains in China?

Answer. Forced labor and human rights abuses in the PRC span multiple sectors and regions, and PRC officials continue to obstruct international efforts to identify and monitor these abuses. Addressing this will require work with allies and partners, as well as a whole-of-government effort to diversify solar supply chains away from the PRC and end their dominance of the sector. If confirmed, I will work to support the Biden-Harris Administration in its steadfast commitment to combat forced labor while promoting the global clean-energy transition with secure, diversified supply chains.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. Forced labor and human rights abuses in the PRC span multiple sectors and regions, and PRC officials continue to obstruct international efforts to identify and monitor these abuses. The world's largest producers of silicon metal and polysilicon have known ties to forced labor programs in Xinjiang, which could taint global solar supply chains and other industries that rely on silicon metal and products, such as electronics, automobiles, and shampoos, deodorants, and skincare. DFC is exploring opportunities in the solar sector to support geographical diversification of the supply chain as well as technologies that may not have the same reliance on traditional solar panels. In the meantime, I believe we must carefully scrutinize PRC sourcing of each solar project that comes before the board on a case-by-case basis. Addressing this will require work with allies and partners. If confirmed, I will work to support the Biden-Harris administration in its steadfast commitment to combat forced labor while promoting the global clean-energy transition with secure, diversified supply chains.

Question. Do you believe Beijing should have the honor of hosting the 2022 Olympics while it is conducting ongoing human rights abuses, including crackdowns on nearly all types of civil liberties, a genocide against the Uyghur minority, and obliterating Hong Kong's autonomy at the expense of thousands of protestors?

Answer. If confirmed, I will closely review the issue of China hosting the Winter Olympics in 2022, particularly in light of its abhorrent human rights record and genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang.

The administration will consult closely with Congress, allies and partners to define our common concerns and establish a shared approach to the PRC in advance of and during the 2022 Beijing Games.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. Developing a position on the Beijing Winter Olympics is important. If confirmed, I will closely review the issue of China hosting the Winter Olympics in 2022, particularly in light of its abhorrent human rights record and genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang.

Further, if confirmed, I will consult closely with Congress, allies, and partners to define our common concerns and establish a shared approach to the PRC in advance of the 2022 Beijing Games.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to working with the American Olympic Committee to ensure the safety of our athletes while in Beijing or while trying to exit China after the 2022 Olympics?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Olympic Committee to help ensure the safety of American athletes in Beijing. I am deeply concerned by the PRC's continued use of arbitrary or wrongful detentions and coercive, non-transparent exit bans on foreign citizens. As a former Consular Officer serving in Egypt, I understand protecting U.S. citizens overseas is a fundamental obligation of the U.S. Government.

The use of human beings as bargaining leverage is unacceptable, has been condemned by the global community, and is inconsistent with China's international human rights commitments. If confirmed, I will raise arbitrary or wrongful detentions and coercive exit bans at every opportunity. I will also call on Beijing to end arbitrary travel restrictions imposed on U.S. citizens and other foreigners in China.

Question. Do you believe that the United States Government should execute a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Olympic Games to be held in Beijing? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I will consult closely with key stakeholders in developing our approach in advance of and during the 2022 Beijing Games.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. I agree that developing an appropriate U.S. Government posture for the Beijing Winter Olympics is important, and I will participate in these discussions in consultation with the White House and Department of State, if I am confirmed. If confirmed, I will consult closely with key stakeholders on our approach in advance of and during the 2022 Beijing Games.

Question. The recent deal between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Canadian Government to engage in hostage diplomacy was a win for the CCP. How do you intend to keep Americans safe when traveling within China?

Answer. The use of human beings as bargaining leverage is unacceptable, has been condemned by the global community, and is inconsistent with China's international human rights commitments.

I am deeply concerned by the PRC's continued use of arbitrary or wrongful detentions and coercive, non-transparent exit bans on foreign citizens. As a former Consular Officer serving in Egypt, I understand protecting U.S. citizens overseas is a fundamental obligation of the U.S. Government. If confirmed, I will raise arbitrary or wrongful detentions and coercive exit bans at every opportunity. I will also call on Beijing to end arbitrary travel restrictions imposed on U.S. citizens and other foreigners in China.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to pursuing release for all Americans who are being held as hostages or are detained on political grounds with a robust engagement within the interagency to secure their immediate release?

Answer. I am deeply concerned by the PRC's continued use of arbitrary or wrongful detentions and coercive, non-transparent exit bans on foreign citizens. Protecting U.S. citizens overseas is the U.S. Government's highest priority.

If confirmed, I will raise arbitrary or wrongful detentions and coercive exit bans at every opportunity and pursue the release of all Americans imprisoned. I will also call on Beijing to end arbitrary travel restrictions imposed on U.S. citizens and other foreigners in China.

Question. The CCP has detained millions of Uyghurs and put them into internment camps with little to no hope of escape or reuniting with their loved ones. This includes family members of American citizens, especially as retribution for speaking out about the atrocities committed against their community and families. If confirmed, do you commit to raising these cases directly with the CCP?

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to raising individual cases with the PRC Government directly, including cases of family members of U.S. citizens affected by these atrocities and other human rights defenders.

If confirmed, I will work with likeminded partners and the international community in calling on the PRC to end atrocities in Xinjiang, immediately and unconditionally release all those arbitrarily detained, abolish internment camps, and end forced labor. I will also continue pressing for the international community to protect those from Xinjiang who seek asylum and to resist PRC pressure to forcibly return these asylum-seekers back to the PRC.

Question. China is ranked #177 out of #180 on Reporters Without Border's (RSF) 2020 Press Freedom Index, indicating one of the most restrictive and oppressive environments for journalism in the world. What is your assessment of freedom of the press in China, and if confirmed, do you commit to working with civil society on bolstering press freedom in country?

Answer. Unfortunately, the pandemic has provided a pretext for repressive governments to intensify pressure on independent media. The hostile environment that media now face in these countries means that freedom of expression is even more crucial in alerting the public to abuses and corruption and in countering dangerous misinformation and disinformation.

I am deeply concerned with the increasingly harsh surveillance, harassment, and intimidation of U.S. and other foreign journalists in the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC Government's harsh rhetoric, promoted through official state media, toward any news it perceives to be critical of PRC policies, has provoked negative public sentiment leading to tense, in-person confrontations and harassment, including online verbal abuse and death threats of journalists simply doing their jobs. We have called on the PRC Government to release citizen journalists arrested and detained for their work covering the pandemic.

If confirmed, I will continue to call on PRC officials to ensure that journalists remain safe and are able to report freely.

Question. According to RSF, China jailed the most journalists globally in 2021, totaling more than 115 persons. If confirmed, what actions are available to you to advocate for the release of these journalists?

Answer. Many foreign journalists say they face the toughest conditions reporting in the PRC since 1989. I also know the number of U.S. reporters in the PRC right now is roughly half what it was just two years ago. The United States draws on a range of diplomatic tools to advocate for press freedom online and offline, and to protect journalists and media workers worldwide. In her July 26 meetings with PRC officials in Tianjin, Deputy Secretary Sherman specifically raised the importance of media access, freedom from harassment, and press freedom for journalists working in the PRC. If confirmed, I will continue to call on PRC officials to ensure that journalists remain safe and able to report freely.

Question. Does the definition of human rights include the right to "safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment?" why or why not?

Answer. The United States recognizes that climate change and environmental degradation can affect the enjoyment of human rights. A "right" to a clean environment has no agreed definition in international law. In our view, trying to define a right detracts from the important work of ensuring that States have strong environmental laws and enforcement.

If confirmed, I will continue to support the rights of all individuals to freedoms of association, peaceful assembly, and expression, which includes the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information. These rights protect environmental defenders, facilitate public awareness of environmental information, and contribute to good environmental policy making.

Question. Last year, Beijing implemented the "National Security Law" in Hong Kong, which effectively put Hong Kong's legal system and law enforcement under Beijing's control and severely undermined China's international treaty obligations to respect Hong Kong's autonomy and the rights protected in the Basic Law.

- How will the Biden administration address these violations of international law?

Answer. The Biden-Harris administration will continue to consider all policy tools available, including sanctions, highlighting unacceptable PRC behavior through joint messaging with partners and allies, and exploring ways to support Hong Kongers that fear persecution.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. The Biden-Harris administration will continue to consider all policy tools available to address Beijing's failure to meet its commitments, including sanctions of individuals involved in the implementation of the National Security Law or other actions that have reduced Hong Kong's autonomy, highlighting the National Security Law and other unacceptable PRC actions through joint messaging with partners and allies, and exploring ways to support Hong Kongers that fear persecution.

Question. Will you commit to continue imposing costs on Beijing for its oppressive actions in Hong Kong?

Answer. The Department will consider all available policy tools to impose costs on Beijing for its actions in Hong Kong, including responsive policies such as sanctions.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. Yes. Since the implementation of the National Security Law, the United States has sanctioned 42 Hong Kong or PRC nationals. If confirmed, I will work with the Department to continue considering all available policy tools to impose costs on Beijing for its oppressive actions in Hong Kong, including responsive policies such as sanctions.

Question. Do you believe that our government has effectively taken measures to counter Beijing's actions in Hong Kong? Please explain your answer.

Answer. The Department of State, often in concert with the Departments of the Treasury, Homeland Security, and Commerce, as well as the White House, has undertaken a number of actions to counter Beijing's escalatory actions in Hong Kong, including issuing the Hong Kong Business Advisory warning of emerging risks, sanctioning senior PRC and Hong Kong officials, authorizing Deferred Enforced Departure for Hong Kongers in the United States, and pursuing sustained joint messaging with likeminded allies and partners. If confirmed, I will continue to pursue policies that hold Beijing to account for its unacceptable actions to undermine Hong Kong's autonomy and stifle the democratic freedoms of people there.

Question. Various countries globally have forcibly returned Uyghurs to China at the request of the CCP. What actions can you take, specifically within the interagency, to end this practice?

Answer. I am clear-eyed about the challenges that our relationship with the PRC poses and, if confirmed, will work with the interagency and our allies to overcome them.

If confirmed, I will work with likeminded partners and the international community in calling on the PRC to end atrocities in Xinjiang, immediately and unconditionally release all those arbitrarily detained, abolish internment camps, and end forced labor. I will also continue to press other governments to protect those subjected to PRC atrocities, harassment, and surveillance, including those seeking asylum. I will also work within the interagency to ensure we leverage all possible tools to combat PRC Government transnational repression and will work with civil society to identify perpetrators of these abuses that expand well beyond the PRC's borders.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. I am clear-eyed about the challenges that our relationship with the PRC poses and, if confirmed, will work with the interagency and our allies to overcome them. If confirmed, I will work with interagency partners to urge third countries to act to avoid complicity in the PRC's human rights violations and abuses committed against Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities from Xinjiang, including by providing protection to and preventing the forcible return of individuals seeking to flee the PRC's repressive policies. I will also work within the interagency to ensure we leverage all possible tools to combat PRC government transnational repression and will work with civil society to identify perpetrators of these abuses that expand well beyond the PRC's borders.

Question. The Chinese Government continues to "Sinicize" religions, which the Congressional Executive Commission on China describes as "a campaign that aims to bring religion in China under closer official control and into conformity with officially sanctioned interpretations of Chinese culture." These policies affect Christians, Muslims, Han Buddhists, Taoists, and many others. What can the Biden Administration do to support freedom of religious practice for the people of China, free from interference and enforced conformity?

Answer. I share your concerns regarding the ongoing deterioration of freedom of religion or belief in the PRC. The PRC demonstrates blatant disregard for freedom of religion or belief and exercises extreme hostility toward members of all religious and spiritual communities, particularly Muslim Uyghurs, Tibetan Buddhists, Protestants, Catholics, and Falun Gong.

If confirmed, I will speak out consistently with allies and partners to condemn these abuses against members of minority religious groups, and I will consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability for those responsible and to deter future abuses. I will also continue to press the PRC to uphold its international commitments with respect to freedom of religion or belief for all individuals and call on the international community to condemn with a united voice the PRC's genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang.

Question. Various bureaus within the State Department have been developing programs with civil society to bolster internet freedom in China. How can you, if confirmed, assist with this endeavor?

Answer. If confirmed, I will remain committed to the principle that people everywhere should enjoy the human rights online that are inherent to their dignity offline.

For over a decade, the U.S. Department of State has funded programs to advance Internet freedom globally—and especially in Internet-repressive environments such as the People’s Republic of China, where governments and other actors actively restrict the right of individuals to be free from arbitrary violations of their privacy and deny fundamental freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and association online.

These programs support research to identify the greatest threats to Internet freedom, seek to secure and safeguard protections for human rights online under the rule of law through policy advocacy, support essential digital security capacity-building and emergency response services for civil society organizations and members of at-risk and vulnerable populations, and support the development, localization, deployment, and operation of anti-censorship circumvention tools that allow unrestricted access to the open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet.

Question. Do you believe that internet shutdowns are a threat to human rights?

Answer. In May, Secretary Blinken condemned the use of partial or complete government-imposed Internet shutdowns, among other tactics, to prevent the exercise of freedom of expression online. I believe that in addition to restricting the exercise of human rights, Internet shutdowns disrupt access to essential services such as healthcare and emergency services, and negatively affect the economy. If confirmed, I will raise U.S. concerns bilaterally and will support the U.S. Government’s continued participation in multilateral fora that raise awareness, such as the G7 and the President’s Summit for Democracy process, and our efforts in multi-stakeholder coalitions to address Internet shutdowns such as the Freedom Online Coalition, where I understand the United States plays a leadership role.

Question. Big Tech companies like Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, and others have been forced to cease or significantly scale back their operations in China due to the CCP’s encroaching demands on free speech. Most of these companies are American and inherently want to provide access for free speech and dialogue online.

- How will you engage with the Chinese Government on this particular issue?

Answer. Beijing’s use of propaganda and disinformation overseas through its state-owned media platforms to undermine and interfere in democracies, while restricting freedoms of the press and speech in China, is a serious concern for the U.S. and our allies. If confirmed, I will work with like-minded allies and partners to define an affirmative, rights-respecting vision for the global information space, build resilience against these threats, and expose the PRC’s activity. I will also raise these areas of concern directly with the PRC Government.

Question. How will you engage with American companies on free speech and human rights issues?

Answer. Defending freedom of expression in the global information space is a priority concern for me. Beijing’s use of propaganda and disinformation overseas through its state-owned media platforms to undermine and interfere in democracies, while restricting freedoms of the press and speech in China, is a serious concern for the United States and our allies. The PRC continues to target its own citizens, as well as the people of the United States and countries around the world, through well-resourced state-run media operations.

If confirmed, I will encourage the business community to consider the risks of doing business with the PRC and ensure they are aware of Beijing’s disinformation and propaganda efforts. If confirmed, I will also support and encourage U.S. businesses to respect human rights in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.

If confirmed, I will support efforts of the Global Engagement Center (GEC) and other bureaus in the Department to counter PRC coercive and corrupting information activities and boost understanding of the tactics, techniques and procedures the PRC uses to advance its interests in the information space.

Question. In my China-Europe report released last year, I laid out a strategy to combat malign Chinese influence at and within the United Nations. Are you familiar with this report and its recommendations? What are your views on these recommendations?

Answer. The United States and Europe share interests in ensuring that qualified and independent candidates are selected to lead the U.N., its specialized agencies, and related organizations; reforming key institutions to be more effective, accountable, and transparent; and using our combined influence to protect the values, principles, and institutions that have built and kept the peace, fostered sustainable development, and promoted respect for human rights for more than 75 years. If confirmed, I would consistently engage allies and partners at senior levels on our multilateral priorities, expanding outreach beyond European countries and the European Union to include allies and emerging partners in other regions.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. I am familiar with the report and its recommendations. I agree that the United States and Europe, working together with other developed and developing countries, should build upon existing efforts and strengthen transparency, accountability, and good governance throughout the U.N. system. I also agree with the report's recommendations that the United States and its partners share interests in ensuring that qualified and independent candidates are selected to lead the UN, its specialized agencies, and related organizations; reforming key institutions to be more effective, accountable, and transparent; and using our combined influence to protect the values, principles, and institutions that have built and kept the peace, fostered sustainable development, and promoted respect for human rights for more than 75 years. If confirmed, I will engage allies and partners at senior levels on our multilateral priorities, expanding outreach beyond European countries and the European Union to include allies and emerging partners in other regions. If confirmed, I would also appreciate the opportunity to continue consultations with you and your staff on these matters.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to working with the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, and the Secretary to combatting this malign influence at every opportunity?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, and the Secretary to defend and strengthen the rules-based international order. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs has established a new office focused in part on advancing this effort, including opposing efforts by the PRC to reshape the international system. If confirmed, I will work with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs to address the PRC's harmful efforts both within China and in international organizations.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to engaging with Congress and my office about campaigns to elect qualified, independent candidates to important posts like Doreen Bogdan-Martin to lead the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support efforts to ensure appointment and election of qualified, independent candidates to leadership positions in the UN system, including the U.S.-nominated candidate for Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union, Ms. Doreen Bogdan-Martin. U.S. candidates are critical to ensuring the UN operates effectively and in line with its foundational principles and values. They bring strong technical and policy skills that enhance the performance and outcomes within the UN system, which, in turn, bolster our efforts on UN reform and good governance.

Question. If confirmed, how will you engage with your interagency partners as you push back on CCP goals in the International Organization space?

Answer. The United States' Mission to China can provide critical support to Department and interagency efforts to strengthen and defend the rules-based international order, including through international organizations. This includes analyzing how the PRC seeks to reshape international values and principles or to use international organizations to advance its unilateral priorities, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. If confirmed, I will work with interagency partners based in Beijing as well as through interagency processes to assist in the development and implementation of strategies to address these challenges.

Question. In March 2020, the Peace Corps evacuated nearly 7,000 volunteers across the globe, including from China. The Peace Corps in China had already been slated to close and the Peace Corps was in the process of phasing out new cohorts of volunteers. Do you believe that the Peace Corps should have a mission in China? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I will consult closely with key stakeholders in determining whether to resume Peace Corps operations.

Question. The Dalai Lama is the most important spiritual leader of Tibet and self-selection of its next leader should be paramount to you, if confirmed. In 2011, Chinese leadership asserted that only China should be able to select the next Dalai Lama and no recognition should be given to any other succession candidate.

- Who do you believe should select the next Dalai Lama?

Answer. The matter of the Dalai Lama's succession should strictly be left to Tibetan Buddhists to decide in accordance with their faith, beliefs, and traditions. If confirmed, I am committed to supporting Tibetans' religious freedom, including their ability to select, educate, and venerate their religious leaders, like the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, according to their own beliefs and without government interference.

Question. Do you commit, if confirmed, to engaging directly with the Chinese on this religious freedom and human rights issue?

Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to putting human rights, democratic values at the center of our foreign policy and to standing up for democracy, human rights, and human dignity. If confirmed, I will always be willing to speak out on behalf of our values and the rights of the people of China. Also, if confirmed, I plan to work with the Office of the U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, and will press Beijing to return to direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, without preconditions, to achieve meaningful autonomy and religious freedom for Tibetans.

Question. Do you commit, if confirmed, to publicly disavowing Chinese meddling of the selection of the next Dalai Lama?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to promoting respect for the religious freedom of all Tibetans globally and to taking all appropriate measures to promote accountability for PRC Government officials who attempt to interfere in the Dalai Lama's succession, consistent with the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020.

Question. The Vatican recently extended an agreement with the Chinese Government that establishes a process for appointing bishops in China. Under the Agreement, bishops in China are in communion with Rome but also approved by the Chinese Government. The details of this agreement have never been made public. Despite the agreement, Catholic bishops not affiliated with the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association continue to face persecution.

- Will you, if confirmed as Ambassador, raise this issue with your counterparts?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would urge PRC officials to uphold the PRC's international commitments with respect to the right to freedom of religion or belief for all individuals in China, including Catholics.

Question. In your testimony before this committee, you mentioned the necessity of working with the United States' treaty allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

- What role, if any, do you believe that NATO and its member allies should play in standing up to China's wide variety of abuses, assertiveness, and aggression?

Answer. The revitalization and modernization of U.S. alliances is a central pillar of President Biden's strategy to reinforce the rules-based international order. NATO's partnerships with U.S. treaty allies in the region should foster inter-theater strategic alignment, including on the PRC, and NATO's Asia-Pacific Four format for consultation with its partners in the region is a novel forum for collaboration.

In June, NATO Allies pointed out the challenges the PRC poses to our values and collective security. Cooperation with our Transatlantic Allies is essential to maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and enrich the fabric and resilience of the international order.

Question. How do you plan to leverage your NATO experience to best represent U.S. interests in the PRC?

Answer. China has very few friends and no real allies. Our 29 NATO allies in Canada and Europe, and our multiple treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific are our comparative advantage. I understand that President Biden has been working with Secretary Blinken to reach out to allies, both in NATO and the Indo-Pacific, to emphasize the need to work together strategically on China. If confirmed, I will use my NATO experience working with these same partners and allies to promote security, stability and the rules-based international order, to meet the challenge posed to U.S. interests by the PRC.

Question. Do you believe that Freedom of Navigation Operations conducted in the South China Sea by NATO members like France are useful to the United States' goals in the region? Why or why not?

Answer. I believe that Freedom of Navigation Operations conducted by France and other NATO allies are supportive of U.S. goals in the region. The United States believes that all nations—whether they are NATO members or not—enjoy as a matter of international law the freedoms of navigation, overflight and other lawful uses of the sea. The exercise of those freedoms ought to be routine and not elicit particular notice or attention. That said, in the context of the South China Sea, a country's exercise of those rights and freedoms can also be a strong symbol of support for the rights enjoyed by all states under the international law of the sea.

Question. What capabilities, either military or diplomatic, would you advise NATO allies to strengthen in order to better stand up against China's abuses, assertiveness, and aggression?

Answer. The PRC is a full-spectrum, long term, systemic threat, and the most significant geopolitical test of the 21st century for the international order. At the June 2021 NATO Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government declared that the PRC's "stated ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security." If confirmed, I will continue this Administration's work with allies to prepare NATO for the challenges the PRC poses, including from its rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, opaque military modernization, military-civil fusion strategy, investments in critical infrastructure that can threaten Allies' resilience, and cyberspace threats.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to regularly engaging with your counterpart, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO?

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage regularly with my counterpart, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, to work together strategically to advance our and our Allies' readiness to counter the challenges the PRC poses to our values and collective security.

Question. How do you believe China views the NATO alliance?

Answer. The NATO alliance is a comparative advantage for all NATO members, and the PRC recognizes that. In June, the PRC Mission to the EU denounced a NATO statement that declared the PRC a "security challenge" as a "slander on China's peaceful development, a misjudgment of the international situation and (NATO's) own role." If confirmed, I will draw from my NATO experience to reach out to our NATO allies and other partners to promote security, stability, and the rules-based international order that PRC continues to challenge. The persistent strength of NATO signals to Beijing that members stand together to safeguard the security of members and their surrounding regions.

Question. What is your understanding of the way that Germany, a leader in the European Union, views the PRC and its business interests in the PRC?

Answer. In line with the EU, Germany sees the PRC as a partner, economic competitor, and systemic rival. The German government has maintained an uneasy balance in protecting German firms' access to the PRC market while increasingly criticizing Beijing's crackdowns in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet. A leader in shaping a more assertive China policy in the EU, including pushing for an EU-level investment-screening mechanism, Germany has increasingly countered the threats the PRC's aggressive actions pose to the rules-based international order. If confirmed, I will work to find a strategic alignment with Germany so that we can both successfully manage our relationships with the PRC.

Answer [revised—11/8/2021]. In line with the EU, Germany sees the PRC as a partner, economic competitor, and systemic rival. The German government has maintained an uneasy balance in protecting German firms' access to the PRC market while increasingly criticizing Beijing's crackdowns in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet. A leader in shaping a more assertive China policy in the EU, including pushing for an EU-level investment-screening mechanism, Germany has increasingly countered the threats the PRC's aggressive actions pose to the rules-based international order. If confirmed, I will encourage Germany to continue working closely with the United States to advance our shared interest in countering the malign influence of the PRC.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to working with Embassy Berlin to decrease China's influence in Germany?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Embassy in Berlin and German counterparts in Beijing to deepen U.S.-German cooperation to further increase the

scrutiny of China's influence in Europe. Germany's September 2020 Indo-Pacific policy guidelines outline plans to expand defense cooperation and call for more economic transparency, sustainability, and fair competition. As the United States finalizes its own national Indo-Pacific Strategy, we will seek to identify opportunities to bolster the United States' and Germany's strategic and security ties with Indo-Pacific partners; diversify and strengthen our countries' economic ties with the region; and jointly tackle global challenges like climate change and protection of universal human rights.

Question. How do you believe China views its relationship with Russia?

Answer. I understand that China and Russia cooperate in certain areas, touting their relationship as a "comprehensive strategic partnership," but remain competitors in others. If confirmed, I would work to stop Beijing and Moscow from undermining U.S. leadership and reshaping the rules-based international order, particularly in the defense, democracy, and human rights realms. The partnership is still one of convenience and transaction, and the PRC appears to view it as such.

Question. What benefits do you believe China gets from its seemingly growing relationship with Russia?

Answer. Russia and China share certain common goals, including undermining the United States' global leadership role and subverting the international rules-based order to advance their own interests. Russia's aggression in foreign affairs can be both an asset and a liability to the PRC, depending on the situation. They have supported each other's efforts in international fora to advance ideology and policy of mutual interest, including jointly blocking the appointment of candidates for senior UN positions. The two countries have also repeatedly threatened to veto UNSC resolutions and block Presidential Statements and other products to keep them from being tabled and have stymied other discussions, including on the Venezuelan presidency crisis. Given the alignment of their interests in the multilateral realm, Russia and China are likely to remain in lockstep.

Question. What, in your opinion, is the most concerning aspect of the China-Russia relationship?

Answer. President Biden, from his inaugural speech on, has discussed the need for democracies to recognize the threat from the authoritarian world, including Russia and China. In addition to their concerning and aggressive joint military exercises, I am concerned about their mutual misuse of technology to repress their own citizens and continued joint efforts to export that technology to states struggling to maintain a democratic governance system.

Question. In 2020, the United States—European Union China Dialogue was initiated. Do you believe that this collaboration has thus far proven useful to the United States?

Answer. The dialogue appears to be facilitating an increased convergence in understanding between the United States and the EU of the challenges the PRC poses to our shared values, prosperity, and the rules-based international order. I welcome the joint public statements made since the dialogue's launch identifying the PRC as a systemic rival and competitor; concerns about Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong; the risks of PRC economic coercion; and the importance of Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and colleagues in Washington and Brussels to carry out joint and coordinated actions with the EU, including through this dialogue.

Question. In 2020, the United States—European Union China Dialogue was initiated. What elements does the Dialogue not address that you believe it should?

Answer. I do not have any knowledge of the non-public specifics of the dialogue, including meetings that may have taken place or topics that have been discussed since the first high-level meeting in May 2021. The public messaging from the United States and EU around this dialogue has been positive and appears to outline a strong basis for cooperation, including on important issues such as Taiwan, human rights, disinformation, and cooperation with the PRC on areas of shared concern. If confirmed, I will prioritize working with EU counterparts to ensure this dialogue is a forum not only to exchange views but also to identify concrete areas for U.S.-EU cooperation and implement them.

Question. In 2020, the United States—European Union China Dialogue was initiated. How do you believe China thinks about this Dialogue?

Answer. At the first U.S.-EU Dialogue on China in May, the two sides underscored the shared U.S.-EU interest in strengthening the rules-based international

order and pledged further close cooperation in support of democratic values, global and regional stability, and human rights. The two sides reiterated that the United States' and EU's relations with China are multifaceted and comprise elements of cooperation, competition, and systemic rivalry. They also discussed pursuing constructive engagement with China on issues such as climate change and non-proliferation, and on certain regional issues.

The U.S.-EU Dialogue on China signals to Beijing the intent of the United States and the EU to work together and coordinate our approaches to China on issues including security, economics, human rights, and strengthening the rules-based international order.

Question. The Belt and Road is planned to cut straight through Central Asia to reach Europe by land. Central Asian nations have strived to maintain a balance among the increasing influences of the West, the Middle East, Russia, and China. Now, China has been making inroads by funding infrastructure projects and embedding itself in their economies.

- Does the fall of Afghanistan and a decline in U.S. leadership in the region leave C5 countries vulnerable to outsized Chinese influence?

Answer. Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, U.S. leadership and engagement in Central Asia remain strong and growing. Russia and China remain involved in the region for historical and geographic reasons. Three ministerial-level C5+1 diplomatic platform meetings in 2021 led by Secretary Blinken, Homeland Security Advisor to the President Sherwood-Randall, and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Kerry, demonstrate U.S. commitment and involvement in the region and the meetings' outcomes reflect success advancing U.S. national security interests.

Answer [revised 11/8/2021]. China has influence with C5 countries due to its geographic proximity and strong economic ties. To support the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Central Asian states, U.S. leadership in Central Asia has increased during this Administration. More senior-level engagements, including through the C5+1, increased programming, and shared security interests have elevated our regional and bilateral relationships and counters the growth of Chinese government influence.

Question. How can the U.S. best compete with Chinese targeted investment and infrastructure embedment in Central Asia?

Answer. The U.S. Central Asia Strategy represents a clear-eyed vision for advancing U.S. values and interests in Central Asia, including enabling an environment for business in Central Asia that is transparent, open, fair, attractive to U.S. businesses, and supportive of broader development goals. The United States is working with each Central Asian country to undertake the reforms needed to attract more quality foreign investment, including from U.S. businesses.

Question. Mission China has been under enormous stress over the last few years, in large part due to COVID.

- What is your understanding of morale throughout Mission China?

Answer. I am advised that Mission China faces a very challenging work environment due to rigid quarantine restrictions and additional travel and other restrictions put in place by Chinese authorities. These realities have a major impact on morale. I take morale very seriously and will work hard, if confirmed, to improve it and the quality of life and work environment for all our personnel.

Question. How do you intend to improve morale at Mission China?

Answer. I will make morale at Mission China an immediate priority, if confirmed. Based on my prior experience as a Chief of Mission, I know how important it is that we listen to all our personnel, respond quickly to their concerns and seek to improve conditions of work and daily life for them and for their families. As in my past leadership roles, I will seek to meet each employee in my first weeks in Beijing at the embassy. I will seek to travel to each of our Consulate Generals in my first months as Ambassador to meet our employees in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan and Shenyang. If confirmed, one of the issues that will be at the top of my management agenda will be supporting any personnel affected by health incidents. Finally, I will advocate personally for our mission employees with the State Department and other cabinet agencies in Washington on issues that affect morale.

Question. How do you intend to create a unified mission and vision at Mission China?

Answer. One of the keys to our diplomatic success in China will be a unified mission based on the President's instructions to me and overall U.S. policy toward China. I will lead regular country team meetings and visit each of our embassy offices to listen to the ideas of my colleagues and to ensure that all understand our policy objectives in China.

Question. Management is a key responsibility for chiefs of mission.

- How would you describe your management style?

Answer. As Ambassador to Greece and NATO, as Under Secretary of State and during my time at Harvard University, I have taken my management and leadership responsibilities seriously and treated them as very high priorities. My practice has been to meet frequently with my colleagues, to communicate openly, to invite ideas and constructive criticism and to help each employee to succeed in his or her responsibilities. If confirmed as Ambassador to the PRC, it will be my responsibility to ensure the President's guidance, instructions and policy priorities are being carried out faithfully and effectively by Mission China.

Question. Do you believe it is ever acceptable or constructive to berate subordinates, either in public or private?

Answer. No. I believe it is always more productive and effective to deliver feedback or criticism in a constructive, respectful and helpful manner.

Question. What lessons did you learn from your prior tenures as a chief of mission?

Answer. I learned many lessons about mission management and leadership. I learned to listen carefully to mission colleagues about policy issues and to invite alternative views and constructive criticism so that we avoided group think and challenged our working assumptions. I also learned the effectiveness of delegating responsibility when that is possible. While the Ambassador must lead on priority issues, our mission colleagues respond well to the delegation of responsibility. In particular, it is important for the training and formation of mid-level and junior officers that they be given real responsibilities in their areas of competence. Finally, I learned how important it is to have a close-knit country team, to meet with the team regularly and to form a sense of collegiality on policy and administrative issues.

Question. In order to create and continue employee excellence at the Department, accurate and direct employee evaluation reports (EERs) for Foreign Service Officers are imperative, though often lacking.

- Do you believe that it is important to provide employees with accurate, constructive feedback on their performances in order to encourage improvement and reward those who most succeeded in their roles?

Answer. Yes. Mission employees deserve honest, constructive feedback on their work. This can have a major, positive impact on morale.

Question. If confirmed, would you support and encourage clear, accurate, and direct feedback to employees in order to improve performance and reward high achievers?

Answer. Yes. This will be a priority for my management of the mission.

It is imperative that U.S. diplomats get outside of posts abroad to meet with local actors, including host government officials, non-government organizations, and everyday citizens.

Question. In your experience, do U.S. diplomats get outside of our embassy walls enough to accomplish fully their missions?

Answer. Based on my prior experience in the Foreign Service, it depends on local and national conditions, the security and terrorist threats and whether or not the host government is friendly and takes its responsibility seriously to provide external security for the embassy and its employees. It also depends on mission leadership. I believe it is important that our mission officers get outside of the embassy as frequently as possible and to travel in the country. This is essential for them to be successful in their work. Protecting mission personnel from terrorist and criminal threats is also a fundamental responsibility for mission management. If confirmed, I will take that responsibility seriously and be attentive to the need to protect all our employees.

Question. How do you intend to improve the ability of U.S. diplomats to access all local populations?

Answer. I agree that we should insist on reciprocal treatment to that afforded to PRC diplomats in our own country. If confirmed, I will work with other mission leaders to facilitate the work of our employees and to encourage them to be in contact with Chinese citizens in all regions of the country.

Question. What is the public diplomacy environment like in China?

Answer. The operating environment for United States public diplomacy in the PRC is challenging. Yet, our public diplomacy programs are critical to the U.S. Government's ability to engage with current and future government and civil society leaders. Exchange programs provide authentic first-hand experiences of the United States and its people. Exchange experiences can lead participants to a more nuanced understanding of U.S. policy objectives, and demonstrate the benefits to political, economic, and social life of a diverse, engaged civil society.

Exchanges that involve athletes, musicians, and other artists show the dynamism of American culture that thrives in our free society. They advance conversations on American values that lead to positive change in important areas such as human rights.

Question. What public diplomacy challenges do U.S. diplomats face in China?

Answer. PRC authorities restrict the ability of U.S. diplomats to engage with university faculty and students. Despite the strong interest in, and expressed need for, English to contribute to China's development, Mission China educational programs also face increasing challenges reaching Chinese secondary school students.

Despite these difficulties, Mission China continues to reach out to contacts in the academic and think tank communities to discuss how they can work together to convene important conversations on topics of common concern.

Question. How do you balance the importance of Main State versus the in-country mission when it comes to tailoring public diplomacy messages for foreign audiences?

Answer. Effective public diplomacy must be strategic. We must survey the global terrain to ascertain America's natural competitive advantages in meeting threats and challenges.

Every Mission's Public Affairs Section undertakes an annual strategic planning process to align public diplomacy activity to foreign policy goals. If confirmed, I will ensure our strategic planning takes into account both local conditions and Main State priorities and guidance.

Question. "Anomalous health incidents," commonly referred to as "Havana Syndrome," have been debilitating and sidelining U.S. diplomats around the world for years. They have caused serious, negative consequences for U.S. diplomacy, yet many believe that the Department is not doing enough to care for, protect, and communicate to its personnel.

- If confirmed, do you commit to taking this threat seriously?

Answer. Yes. It will be a high priority for me as Chief of Mission. As the Department does, I consider the safety and health of our employees and their family members as my top priority. If confirmed, I will energetically support the Department's established reporting and care protocols for possible anomalous health incidents.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to talking as openly as you can to Mission China personnel?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will tackle this issue on my first day as Ambassador in Beijing, meet with employees to discuss it, invite their views and remind them that every report will be handled with sensitivity and the utmost discretion, consistent with appropriate regulations and protocols. Communication that is clear, complete, concise, and timely is a central part of leadership and management. I believe that a well-informed workforce is a more effective one. If confirmed, I will use the Mission's weekly Country Team meetings, regular meetings with top managers, established procedures for notices and policies, and town hall meetings to convey our mission and vision and to give all information needed to enable our success.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS BY SENATOR TIM KAINE

Question. Dr. Gulshan Abbas, a medical doctor who spent her career caring for patients in Xinjiang and whose family resides in Virginia, has been unjustly detained by the Government of China since September 2018. Dr. Abbas is being held due to her daughter Rushan Abbas' advocacy on behalf of the Uyghur community

in China. Ms. Rushan Abbas is a former journalist for Radio Free Asia and U.S. Government translator.

If confirmed, how would you push China to end its unjust detention of Uyghurs, especially the continued detention of individuals with family members in the United States?

Answer. If confirmed, I will consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability for those responsible and deter future abuses, to include but not limited to, actions already implemented by the U.S. Government: visa restrictions, import restrictions, export restrictions, financial sanctions. If confirmed, I will advocate for the release of Dr. Abbas and other detained individuals with family members in the United States.

Question. China is utilizing transnational repression—like family intimidation and detention—to silence dissent among diasporas and exiles aboard. As Ambassador, how would you confront China over the use of these tactics?

Answer. The United States opposes People's Republic of China (PRC) efforts to repress its citizens outside of the PRC and continues to provide support for Uyghurs and dissidents and coordinate with allies and partners to speak out against such actions and to provide protection to targeted individuals. If confirmed, I would call on PRC authorities to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion or belief, consistent with the PRC's international obligations and commitments, within its borders and outside of them.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. As you know, there is bipartisan consensus on the need to address the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) human rights abuses and genocide against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang. My and Senator Merkley's Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act would go a long way to end the financial incentives for the CCP's oppression of the Uyghurs. However, there are recent concerns that certain figures in the Biden administration would prefer this legislation not get enacted, because they believe it is acceptable to sacrifice America's commitment to human rights in order to extract empty promises from the CCP to address climate change.

- Are you aware that there are voices inside the Biden administration lobbying against the bipartisan Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act?

Answer. As a nominee, I am not yet part of the President's administration and cannot speak to the validity of these claims. If confirmed, I remain committed to working with the administration to address forced labor practices in Xinjiang and elsewhere in the PRC. I will also work closely with you and other Members of Congress on this important issue.

Question. What are your views on this legislation? Do you support its passage?

Answer. I am aware of the legislation and, if confirmed, will plan to work with the administration to address forced labor practices in Xinjiang and elsewhere in the PRC. If confirmed, I also plan to work with you and Members of this Committee to address forced labor practices in China, and will follow all U.S. laws as they pertain to this issue.

Question. If confirmed, how will you approach those in the administration who would rather the United States give up its support for Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Chinese victims of the CCP's human rights abuses in hopes that the CCP will support global efforts to reduce carbon emissions?

Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate vigorously to promote accountability for the PRC's human rights abuses and support efforts to protect human rights in the PRC, including for religious and ethnic minorities. I will not advise that the United States sacrifice vital U.S. interests for PRC promises on climate change. As Special Presidential Envoy Kerry has noted, climate is a critical standalone issue, and other aspects of the U.S.-PRC relationship will not be traded for separate U.S. interests.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to regularly advocate for the basic rights and fundamental freedoms of all Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers and Chinese in your interactions with senior Chinese officials?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will advocate vigorously to promote accountability for the PRC's human rights abuses and support efforts to protect human rights in the

PRC, including for religious and ethnic minorities. Human rights and democracy are at the core of U.S. foreign policy. I agree with the Biden-Harris administration's position that the PRC is committing genocide and crimes against humanity against members of ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang, including Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim. It is repressing Tibetans' distinct language, religion, and culture. It is eroding Hong Kong's autonomy and democratic institutions and processes. The United States has called on the PRC to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to adhere to its obligations with regard to Hong Kong.

Question. If so, what does this support look like in actionable terms?

Answer. If confirmed, I will consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability for those responsible to end abuses, to include but not limited to, actions already implemented by the U.S. Government: visa restrictions, import restrictions, export restrictions, and financial sanctions.

Question. Do you believe that it is possible to rule out the use of forced labor for producing solar panels in China?

Answer. Forced labor and human rights abuses are widespread in the PRC, including in sectors other than the solar industry. If confirmed, I will support and amplify the administration's ongoing efforts to ensure that suppliers in the solar industry and other industries that use forced labor are unable to import goods into the U.S. market and promote accountability for human rights abuses.

Question. If so, how can this be done in an environment in which PRC authorities do not permit companies to conduct proper due diligence?

Answer. I support U.S. Government efforts, such as the Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory, to highlight the risks for U.S. businesses with supply chain and investment links to Xinjiang and other locations in the People's Republic of China where entities are complicit in forced labor and other human rights abuses. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to make clear that U.S. businesses and individuals that do not exit supply chains, ventures, and/or investments connected to Xinjiang run a risk of violating U.S. law.

Question. In your opinion, can climate targets and human rights be treated on different tracks when negotiating with Chinese officials?

Answer. Support for human rights and human dignity go hand-in-hand with climate progress. If confirmed, I will advocate for both issues to remain at the forefront of American foreign policy.

Question. If confirmed, how do plan to press the CCP to stop its oppression of the Uyghurs and other groups forced to work in renewable energy supply chains?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the work of the Department, in coordination with the interagency, to promote accountability for the PRC's human rights record in Xinjiang. I will support the administration's efforts to impose costs on Beijing's use of forced labor, signaling to the renewable energy industry the imperative to diversify and clean up its supply chain. I will work with like-minded partners and the international community to call on the PRC to end genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, immediately and unconditionally release all those arbitrarily detained, abolish internment camps, and end forced labor. I will also urge the international community to protect those from Xinjiang who seek asylum and to resist PRC pressure to forcibly return these asylum-seekers back to the PRC. We will continue utilizing public messaging, diplomacy, and other foreign policy tools to bring attention to the PRC's poor human rights record in Xinjiang.

Question. Do you commit to bringing up human rights cases—including all of those identified by the CECC—in your discussions with PRC officials?

Answer. The United States has utilized public messaging, diplomacy, and other foreign policy tools to bring attention to the PRC's poor human rights record in Xinjiang and elsewhere. If confirmed, I will raise directly with PRC officials specific human rights cases to promote accountability.

Question. Do you commit to prioritizing seeking the release of prisoners who are the family of American citizens and legal permanent residents?

Answer. If confirmed, this will be a major priority for me. I commit to raise directly and vigorously the need for the PRC to release prisoners who are the family of American citizens and legal permanent residents. If confirmed, I commit to working closely with the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs and the Bureau of Consular Affairs to resolve the cases of U.S. citizens wrongfully detained or subject to coercive exit bans by the PRC. I also commit to keeping you and interested

members informed, in concert with my colleagues and in accordance with applicable privacy concerns.

I am deeply concerned by the PRC's continued use of arbitrary or wrongful detentions and coercive, non-transparent exit bans on foreign citizens. Protecting U.S. citizens overseas is the U.S. Government's highest priority.

Question. I noticed that since 2011 you have served as a Director for Entegris, Inc. According to its website, Entegris has operated in China for more than 25 years, and has offices in Shanghai, Beijing, Xi'an, Xiamen, and Wuhan. I understand that Entegris produces inputs for use in the electronics and technology industry. I've called out this administration for failing to fully confront the CCP's injecting of forced labor into global supply chains, notably for the solar and apparel industries. Last week, we learned that Special Envoy for the Climate John Kerry holds large investments in Chinese companies determined by the previous administration to be complicit in the surveillance, detention, and repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Knowing this, you can understand why I'm concerned by your ten-year tenure on the board of a company that operates in China's technology sector.

- Could you explain why you thought it was in the best interests of the United States to support a U.S. company that sells key products needed for semiconductor fabrication to China?

Answer. I am proud of my service on the Board of Directors of Entegris, Inc. since 2011. Entegris is a successful firm headquartered in the United States with significant manufacturing and Research and Development operations in Texas, Colorado, Minnesota, Massachusetts, California, Pennsylvania, Connecticut and six other states. A majority of the firm's roughly 6,600 employees are located in the United States and the firm expects to have hired approximately 1,000 additional employees in the United States this year.

Entegris produces products and solutions used by the global semiconductor ecosystem, as well as other high-technology industries, including life sciences. For example, Entegris developed a unique high-purity bag used for the cold storage of biologics. This bag has been critical to the Covid-19 global vaccination campaign.

Entegris sells its products and solutions to many markets around the world, including China, in full compliance with all applicable laws. Entegris has never transferred any manufacturing to China.

Question. Are you aware of the CCP's goal to become independent of foreign semiconductor manufacturing and to eventually dominate the global industry?

Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has invested heavily in its semiconductor industry to build indigenous capabilities and has ambitions to develop the most advanced chips that can support military applications. If confirmed, I will work with allies and partners to strengthen diverse, resilient, and secure supply chains that will maintain U.S. technological advantage over strategic competitors such as the PRC and create good jobs for U.S. citizens in the semiconductor field.

Question. Do you understand the tremendous risks to our national security that would result if the CCP were to succeed in this endeavor?

Answer. The United States is engaged in strategic competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and technology is the central domain of that competition. The PRC's objectives are to undercut U.S. longstanding technological advantage and to displace the United States as the global leader in cutting edge research and development, and the technologies and industries of the future. The national security and economic consequences of allowing that to happen are simply unacceptable. It is a critical U.S. interest to make sure we protect the technology and intellectual property that is produced in this country and that, if used to advance the PRC's military modernization, could undermine our security.

Question. Are you confident that Entegris' supply chains in China are free of inputs produced through the forced labor of Uyghurs and other groups?

Answer. Yes. I consulted with the company, and can confirm the following information. Entegris performs regular reviews of its supply chain to ensure that its inputs are not produced through the forced labor of Uyghurs and other groups. Entegris does not source material from regions identified for using the forced labor of Uyghurs and other groups and, to Entegris' knowledge, none of the suppliers utilized by Entegris use the forced labor of Uyghurs and other groups. Furthermore, Entegris has maintained a supply chain that does not have significant reliance on operations in China. For the first three quarters of 2021, less than 3 percent of Entegris' overall supply spending was for goods exported from China.

Question. Do you believe that your ten-year history with Entegris has created biases that will shape your decisions and influence U.S. policy towards China?

Answer. No. If confirmed, I will take an oath of office to support and defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and will swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office. I will serve the United States with professional excellence, the highest standards of ethical conduct, and diplomatic discretion and effectiveness.

Question. Specifically, will you commit to making decisions in the best interests of the United States, even if those decisions stand to significantly reduce the profitability of Entegris' operations in China?

Answer. If confirmed by the Senate as U.S. Ambassador to China, I will always act in the best interest of the United States. If confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris administration's commitment to use of the full array of tools necessary to counter the PRC's abusive economic practices and hold Beijing accountable.

Question. If confirmed, will you resign immediately from Entegris' Board of Directors and divest yourself from the company?

Answer. If confirmed by the Senate, I will resign from the board of Entegris and divest all my stock holdings as soon as practicable but no later than 90 days after confirmation. The ethics agreement I entered into with the State Department's Designated Agency Ethics Official was provided to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Question. If confirmed, what specific actions will you take to press the PRC authorities to allow a credible international forensic investigation of the Wuhan Institute of Virology and other labs in question?

Answer. Reaching any conclusive assessment on the COVID-19 virus's origin would likely require cooperation from Beijing, yet the PRC continues to hinder the global investigation, resist information-sharing, and shift blame elsewhere throughout the world. If confirmed, I support using the tools that could have the greatest chance of getting to the goal of the PRC Government's cooperation to an international inquiry. I would not cease to keep up the pressure on this issue, in conjunction with partners in the international community. If confirmed, I will also continue working with likeminded partners around the world to press the PRC Government to participate in a full, transparent, evidence-based, expert-led study into the origins of COVID-19 and to provide access to all relevant complete, original data and samples.

Question. U.S. federal agencies funded risky research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology that could have contributed to the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2. Until we can get to the bottom of what exactly caused the pandemic, what will you do, if confirmed, to prevent U.S. funding and collaboration for risky lines of research involving human pathogens and potential pathogens?

Answer. The COVID-19 pandemic, regardless of its origins, underscores the need to prevent, detect, and address emerging threats to global health security—whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the Department, interagency, and intelligence community to ensure appropriate oversight of life sciences research collaborations with China.

Question. More generally, what would you do as Ambassador to ensure that the United States does not unintentionally contribute to research in the PRC that has dual-use applications, or the potential to enable the PRC to develop a technological edge over the United States in emerging fields?

Answer. Whether in life sciences or other sectors, we need to be vigilant against transactions that could potentially facilitate the transfer of sensitive technologies to the PRC that could threaten our national security. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the Department, interagency, and intelligence community to work to ensure appropriate oversight of life sciences research collaborations with China.

Question. If confirmed, what are your plans for CCP leaders to understand that the United States is serious about its "rock-solid" commitment to Taiwan, and will respond forcefully to any acts of aggression or coercion aimed at Taiwan?

Answer. I would continue to reinforce to PRC leaders that the Biden-Harris administration remains committed to upholding the principles of the Taiwan Relations Act, namely: that the United States will continue to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability; that the United States would regard any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to the

peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the United States; and that the United States will maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.

Question. U.S. policy toward Taiwan differs in many important respects from the PRC's "one-China principle." If confirmed, do you commit to articulating those key differences and resisting PRC efforts to conflate our policy with theirs?

Answer. Our one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, has fostered peace and prosperity in the region for over 40 years. We will continue to note publicly that our policy differs from the PRC's "one China principle."

Question. Specifically, will you oppose all suggestions that the United States must recognize Taiwan as a part of the PRC?

Answer. Consistent with our one China policy, we do not take a position on the ultimate status of Taiwan—we acknowledge the PRC's position on this, but we do not accept it. We will continue to make clear that we support a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues, consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan.

Question. Will you instead insist that Taiwan's status remains unresolved, and that a PRC resort to force to resolve Taiwan's status will be met with a robust counter response from the United States and our allies and partners?

Answer. The United States has a long abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The United States will continue to make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability that is commensurate with the growing PRC threat. We also will continue to deepen our security relationship with Taiwan in line with the one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. And we will continue to underscore to the PRC that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means is a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the United States.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to counter the CCP's propaganda about the "superiority" of its totalitarian system, and to promote Taiwan instead as a model of how democracy can flourish in a Chinese speaking society?

Answer. Taiwan is a leading democracy and critical economic and security partner. Working with allies and partners, we have highlighted Taiwan's successful democratic processes as well as its importance to the global community. The international community has increasingly expressed its concern over the PRC's coercive and aggressive behavior toward Taiwan.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS BY SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY

Question. The reported use of Cambodia's Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand by the People's Republic of China (PRC) is inconsistent with Cambodia's status of neutrality under the Paris Peace Agreements, which the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia later defined, in part, as: "not permit(ing) any foreign military base on its territory." When confirmed, will you pledge to report regularly with the Committee on the People's Republic of China's (PRC) activities at the Ream Naval Base and all those related to its Belt and Road Initiative?

Answer. Yes, I pledge to do so. I am concerned about PRC activity in the region, including the PRC's military presence and construction of facilities at Ream Naval Base. The State Department has raised these concerns at the highest levels of the Cambodian government. The Government of Cambodia has not been fully transparent about the intent, nature, and scope of this project nor the role the PRC military is playing in its construction, raising concerns about the intended use of the naval facility. I agree with the administration's concerns that the erosion of multiparty democracy in Cambodia has exacerbated this situation.

Question. The PRC has thus far been unwilling to engage with the United States on substantive discussions on nuclear weapons policy and doctrine. As Ambassador, how will you specifically encourage Beijing to engage on these issues? What motiva-

tion is behind efforts by the PRC to increase the role of nuclear weapons in its military strategy?

Answer. President Biden has indicated clearly that he is going to support the strongest possible and the safest American nuclear deterrent, as every president has done, since President Harry Truman. The administration will pursue strategic risk management measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's (PRC) growing nuclear arsenal. These efforts will be paired with actions to bolster deterrence in the region. The administration is developing and evaluating specific proposals to be pursued with the PRC. Beijing's larger nuclear arsenal will buttress a broader PRC military build-up and its increasingly assertive and threatening behavior to U.S. allies and partners. Precisely because Beijing is the least transparent member of the P5 nuclear weapons states, accurate assessments of its nuclear trajectory and intentions are difficult.

Question. We must find ways to lower tensions and avoid miscalculation in the Taiwan Strait to avoid an inadvertent conflict. In your experience, what role can Track 1.5 dialogues—those that include a mix of government and non-government officials—play in reducing mistrust between countries? As Ambassador, will you commit that the State Department will actively promote such dialogues on regional stability issues in the Indo-Pacific?

Answer. Yes. The administration seeks to minimize the risk of miscalculations on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and dialogue is a means to do that. If confirmed, I will speak directly to the PRC Government about the importance of a stable and peaceful dialogue across the Taiwan Strait free from coercion.

Question. President Biden and President Xi Jinping are due to hold a virtual summit in December 2021. If confirmed by that date, will you commit to advocate that negotiating nuclear risk reduction measures with the PRC will be a focal point of that summit?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Biden administration to seek effective channels of communication with Beijing to manage competition responsibly, to diminish the risk of an accidental conflict, and above all, to maintain the peace. The United States has to proceed from a position of strength and pursue intense diplomacy in all these matters. The administration will pursue crisis communications, risk reduction, and strategic stability measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's (PRC) growing nuclear arsenal. The administration hopes that Beijing will come to see that reducing nuclear risks is in its security interest and the administration has raised these issues with the PRC, making very clear the U.S. interest in substantively engaging with China.

Question. In your testimony, you signaled your support for the longstanding U.S. "One China" policy and for a robust unofficial U.S. relationship with Taiwan consistent with our commitments under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The TRA makes it U.S. policy: "to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area." Is it your assessment that creating a fellowship program with Taiwan—modeled on the Mansfield Fellowship with Japan—would strengthen implementation of this provision of TRA and expand U.S. Government employee's knowledge of the Indo Pacific region?

Answer. Taiwan is a leading democracy, an important economic and security partner, and force for good in the world. If confirmed, I will support the Department's longstanding efforts and will work with Congress to deepen our people-to-people ties and enhance our ability to learn from each other and work on issues of common concern. If confirmed, I will be happy to discuss the Fellowship proposal with you.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS BY SENATOR TED CRUZ

Question. China and Iran struck a deal earlier this year which resulted in a \$400 million commitment by the Chinese to invest in Iran's oil and gas sector, in addition to a military cooperation component. While U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil exports are still on the books, enforcement has faded to insignificance. According to an August report by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Iran's crude oil production fell to an almost 40-year low in 2020. This decline in production was triggered in 2018, when President Trump pulled the U.S. out of the JCPOA, and reimposed

sanctions on Iran. Today, China receives half of all Iran's crude and condensate exports.

- What do you assess is going wrong with sanctions enforcement?

Answer. The United States has been engaged with JCPOA participants, including China, in an effort to achieve a mutual return to compliance with JCPOA commitments with Iran. Current Iran-related sanctions remain in effect. China has long been importing Iranian oil, and the administration will continue to oppose Iranian sanctions evasion efforts, including those involving Chinese entities.

The administration will continue to raise this issue directly with the Chinese as part of its dialogue on Iran policy and I agree that, in general, this is a more effective path forward to address our concerns.

I agree with the administration that while strategic competition defines many aspects of our relationship with China, multilateral cooperation to constrain Iran's nuclear program is vital, as the world has no interest in seeing Iran develop a nuclear weapon. If confirmed, I will engage vigorously with China to discourage them from taking steps vis-a-vis Iran that threaten our interests.

Question. Please assess the benefits that China gets from such sanctions-busting.

Answer. The U.S. opposes China's decision to permit some of its companies to import oil from Iran in contravention of U.S. sanctions. While strategic competition defines many aspects of our relationship with China, multilateral cooperation to constrain Iran's nuclear program is very much in its interest, as it has no desire to see Iran develop a nuclear weapon and the profoundly destabilizing impact that would have in a region upon which China depends for its oil imports.

The President is committed to ensuring as broad a multilateral coalition as possible to address Iran's nuclear program and destabilizing activities. That will mean seeking to work with China, which has close ties to Iran, and some of whose small independent refiners continue to transact with Iran notwithstanding U.S. sanctions. China's large state-owned oil companies have avoided purchasing Iranian oil because they place greater weight on the risk of exposure to U.S. sanctions due to their global business.

If confirmed, I will engage vigorously with China to discourage them from taking steps vis-a-vis Iran that threaten our interests.

Uyghur Human Rights Case

Question. The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) engage in sustained, systematic, and granular intimidation of dissidents in China and abroad. That harassment includes the abuse and imprisonment of dissidents' family members.

Nury Turkel is a Uyghur-American lawyer and leading critic of the PRC's atrocities against, and genocide of, the Uyghurs. In addition to testimony, op-eds, speeches, and other activities he currently serves as the Vice Chair of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom.

The PRC is engaged in a campaign of intimidation to silence Turkel by targeting his family members. They refuse to let his ailing parents leave China and be reunited with him.

This campaign directly harms U.S. citizens: his parents have two sons who are U.S. citizens and five U.S.-born grandchildren, who they've never met. Additionally, the campaign is an effort to interfere in American internal affairs and exercise leverage over U.S. policy on religious freedom.

U.S. officials have reportedly raised Turkel's case with the Chinese, but there has been no sustained follow-up and the Chinese are apparently under the impression the inquiries were pro-forma.

- What leverage does the U.S. have to mitigate the harassment and intimidation of family members of Chinese dissidents, especially American citizens?

Answer. The United States opposes PRC efforts to repress its citizens or their family members, whether inside or outside of China. If confirmed, I will continue administration efforts to provide support for Uyghurs and other human rights defenders and coordinate with allies and partners to speak out against such actions and to provide protection to targeted individuals. If confirmed, I also commit to raising individual cases with my PRC Government counterparts.

Question. Can you commit to conveying to the Chinese that the United States expects and demands they allow Turkel's parents to be reunited with their American citizen children and grandchildren?

Answer. I am very concerned by the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s mistreatment of Mr. Turkel's parents, to include blocking them from leaving China. If con-

firmed, I will advocate strongly on their behalf with the PRC government and work to secure their reunification with Mr. Turkel and with their other children and grandchildren.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO HON. RAHM EMANUEL BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. As Ambassador, will you be prepared to work with the organizing committee to find ways to alleviate the financial harm shouldered to U.S. companies in this regard, including Jet Set Sports?

Answer. Regarding Jet Set Sports (JSS), I understand that neither the U.S. Government nor the Government of Japan is a party to the commercial contract between the Tokyo Organizing Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games and JSS. If confirmed, I will encourage both parties to seek an amicable resolution in accordance with the terms of their agreement.

Question. What do you plan to do to encourage the Japanese to continue and expand their reconciliation program for former American POWs of Japan and their families that began in 2010?

Answer. The Japanese-American POW Friendship Program has signaled an important step in our bilateral relationship and is giving both Japan and the United States an opportunity to remember and learn from the U.S. POW World War II experience and to reflect on our past, present, and future. We have come far since the dark days of the Pacific campaign to today's world where the U.S.-Japan Alliance had its 50th Anniversary; this program is yet another important chapter in our shared history.

Question. What opportunities and what challenges do you see for the Quad's resurgence in the region, and in our foreign policy?

Answer. The U.S.-Japan Alliance has served as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and across the world for more than six decades, and it has never been stronger. The American and Japanese people share deeply rooted values of defending freedom, championing economic and social opportunity and inclusion, and respecting human rights, and the rule of law. We welcome Japan's expanding position as a leader not just in the Indo-Pacific but globally. Its founding role in creating the Quad was an example of this leadership. If confirmed, I would work with Japan to take advantage of the Quad forum to support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, solutions to the climate crisis, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Question. If you're confirmed as Ambassador to Japan, what role do you anticipate playing as it relates to the Quad?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support Japanese leadership in the Quad and work with Quad counterparts and other likeminded nations to better coordinate and advance our common goals of prosperity, security, and freedom in the Indo-Pacific. The Embassy Tokyo team is expanding joint engagement with partners such as Australia and the UK, and I would seek to continue partner-focused outreach.

Question. Where do you think the U.S.-Japan alliance needs to concentrate, and act, to be capable to meet new and emergent regional challenges?

Answer. In an increasingly challenging security environment, the United States and Japan will continue to closely coordinate on how to effectively deter and, if necessary, respond to growing threats to the U.S.-Japan Alliance and regional security in the Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I would work with Japan to promote greater mutual investment in defense and improve our forces' interoperability to ensure our alliance is able to adapt quickly to a changing security landscape with the necessary capabilities and military readiness. Japan is in a position to play an even greater role on regional security issues by supporting and encouraging closer cooperation with other like-minded partners.

Question. What specific steps would you take as ambassador to help improve relations between Tokyo and Seoul?

Answer. A robust and effective trilateral relationship between and among the United States, the ROK, and Japan is critical for our shared security and common interests. If confirmed, I would work to strengthen the relationship with our key allies, Japan, and the ROK, both trilaterally and bilaterally.

Question. What role should Japan play in facilitating nuclear and missile diplomacy with North Korea?

Answer. We have worked hand-in-hand with Japan and the ROK on the security challenges related to the DPRK, including through Deputy Secretary Sherman's bilateral and trilateral discussions with her South Korean and Japanese counterparts, as well as discussions between Special Representative for the DPRK Sung Kim and his counterparts. Japan is and will continue to be a key player on this and all security issues in the region.

Question. Has there been any indication from North Korea that it will attempt to address the Japanese abductions issue?

Answer. I understand that Prime Minister Kishida is prepared to meet with the DPRK leader Kim Jong Un without preconditions and remains committed to the immediate resolution of the abductions issue. We hope the DPRK will respond positively. As President Biden and former Prime Minister Suga reaffirmed in their April 2021 Joint Leaders' statement, the United States is committed to the immediate resolution of the abductions issues.

Question. What are the economic and strategic implications for the United States of not participating in these initiatives and how can the United States ensure that its economic priorities are shaping regional trade rules?

Answer. We are looking at a range of options to forge stronger economic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific that promote shared goals of cooperation and inclusive prosperity. We are committed to strengthening trade and investment in the region in a manner that promotes good paying American jobs, high standards, and supply chain resiliency and offer the same benefits for our Indo-Pacific partners. The administration is reviewing the CPTPP to evaluate its consistency with the Build Back Better agenda. If confirmed, I will support trade policies that advance the interests of all Americans, support U.S. innovation, and enhance our competitiveness.

Question. Where do you see opportunities for US-Japan development cooperation in Southeast Asia and with the Pacific Islands, including to address climate change and a transition to a zero-carbon future?

Answer. The United States-Japan Climate Partnership provides a strong basis for U.S.-Japan cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. If confirmed, I would work with Japan to further these shared objectives in the region, including supporting the energy transition, enhancing resilience, and ensuring we reach our collective climate goals. The United States and Japan held the first Japan-U.S. Clean Energy Partnership (JUCEP) meeting on June 10, chaired by the U.S. Department of State and the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. The United States and Japan will focus JUCEP cooperation in the Indo-Pacific to address climate change, support competitive energy markets, facilitate universal access to affordable, clean, and reliable energy, and engage Indo-Pacific partners to encourage rapid deployment of clean energy and drive the decarbonization of their economies. In addition, we are working with Japan through the Japan-U.S. Mekong Power Partnership (JUMPP) to promote sustainable energy in the Lower Mekong region. If confirmed, I would push forward U.S.-Japan cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands under JUCEP, JUMPP, and other initiatives.

Question. How can we facilitate greater collaboration between the United States and Japan on tech and innovation? What steps can be taken to better integrate those efforts with the regional strategy more broadly?

Answer. Japan is one of our closest partners on technology development and deployment. Joint initiatives have produced results in such fields as clean energy, infectious diseases, particle physics, advanced computing, fusion plasma, materials discovery, natural resources, neuroscience, space, cancer biology, and natural disaster resiliency. Our two countries have ongoing cooperation and hold regular bilateral meetings on a full range of the most challenging and relevant science and technology issues, including cyber security, AI, quantum computing, and "beyond 5G" telecommunications networks. If confirmed, I would work to deepen these ties with Japan to help ensure we are working effectively with them and all of our regional partners to advance technology and innovation.

Question. Beyond the quiet diplomacy that has been tried for years, what specifically will you do, if confirmed, to prioritize the reunification and return of the hundreds of American children kidnapped to Japan?

Answer. These cases of family separation are painful and tragic. If confirmed, the rights and wellbeing of U.S. citizen children and parents would be one of my highest priorities. While it has been a long time coming, I understand there has been im-

provement in terms of Japan's record in parental child abduction cases over the last four to five years. We cannot undo the pain of the past, but I believe Japan's ratification of the Hague Convention on International Child Abductions in 2014 was an important step forward in recognizing that custodial determinations should be made solely with the court of competent jurisdiction in the child's place of habitual residence, and not necessarily where the child is located. If confirmed as Ambassador, I would work with our Consular officials in resolving these cases and advocate for the parental rights of American citizen parents.

Question. Anomalous Health Incidents: I am very concerned about directed energy attacks on U.S. Government personnel (so-called Anomalous Health Incidents). Ensuring the safety and security of our personnel abroad falls largely on individual Chiefs of Mission and the response of officers at post. It is imperative that any individual who reports a suspected incident be responded to promptly, equitably, and compassionately.

- Do you agree these incidents must be taken seriously, and pose a threat to the health of U.S. personnel?

Answer. I am also deeply troubled by potential anomalous health incidents that have affected U.S. Government personnel and their family members. Serving one's country overseas should not come at the cost of one's health. I agree that such incidents may pose a threat to the wellbeing of U.S. personnel and must be taken extremely seriously.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that any reported incident is treated seriously and reported quickly through the appropriate channels, and that any affected individuals receive prompt access to medical care?

Answer. If confirmed, the health, safety, and security of Mission Japan staff, their family members, and all those supporting the Mission will be my highest priority. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that all reported potential anomalous health incidents are given serious attention and reported swiftly through the appropriate channels. I will also ensure that staff who are affected by these incidents receive prompt access to the treatment, support, and medical care that they need.

Question. Do you commit to meeting with medical staff and the RSO at post to discuss any past reported incidents and ensure that all protocols are being followed?

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to meeting with medical staff and the RSO team at Mission Japan and to discuss past reported anomalous health incidents so that I am most prepared to protect the safety of Mission Japan staff and ensure that all protocols regarding anomalous health incidents are being followed appropriately.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO HON. RAHM EMANUEL BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. What are the core American strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, and what role does Japan play in securing those interests?

Answer. For more than 60 years, the partnership between the United States and Japan has been the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in a free and open Indo-Pacific. Our alliance advances our shared interests, shared values, and shared goals. As Ambassador, my top priority would be to deepen these ties while we confront our common challenges.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. The United States is a proud part of the Indo-Pacific. Our exports to the Indo-Pacific region in 2019 supported more than three million American jobs, and in 2020 the United States conducted \$1.75 trillion in two-way trade in the region. As part of the Indo-Pacific community, I believe the United States shares a strategic interest in helping to bring forth the vision we share with Japan and other key allies of peace and stability, freedom of the seas, unimpeded lawful commerce, protecting human rights, a commitment to the international rules-based order, and the recognition that our common interests are not zero-sum. These shared interests also include peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and support for Taiwan's participation in the international community. As I mentioned in my testimony, the United States is committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific, a vision we closely share with Japan. I believe there is no country more central to our interests—political, strategic, or economic—in the Indo-Pacific than Japan.

Question. In your opinion, what is going well in the U.S.-Japan alliance right now, and where should Japan be taking on a greater role and responsibility?

Answer. As the most dynamic and fastest-growing region on earth, the Indo-Pacific is a vital region that is a leading priority for U.S. foreign policy. The concept of a free and open Indo Pacific (FOIP), first coined by former Japanese Prime Minister Abe, has shaped the vision of all of our allies in the region. In an increasingly challenging security environment, the United States and Japan will continue to closely coordinate on how to effectively deter and, if necessary, respond to growing threats to the U.S.-Japan Alliance and regional security in the Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I would work with Japan to promote greater mutual investment in defense and improve our forces' interoperability to ensure our alliance is able to adapt quickly to a changing security landscape with the necessary capabilities and military readiness. Japan is in a position to play an even greater role on regional security issues by supporting and encouraging closer cooperation with other like-minded partners.

Question. If confirmed, will you encourage Japan to increase its defense spending?

Answer. Yes. And as recently as last week, Japan's new prime minister announced the goal to increase defense spending. Simply put, security costs more in today's increasingly challenging regional environment. Only with greater mutual investment in defense can we ensure the U.S.-Japan Alliance is positioned to adapt quickly to a changing security landscape with the necessary capabilities and military readiness. We appreciate Japan's acknowledgement that its alliance contributions must expand to meet future challenges.

Question. Do you agree the Senkaku Islands are covered by our Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan, and that any attack on these islands would fall under our security commitments to mainland Japan?

Answer. Yes. Every recent president from President Obama to President Trump to President Biden has emphasized that the United States' commitment to Japan's security is absolute. This is the stated policy of the United States. I understand that the Senkaku islands fall within the scope of Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and that the U.S. Government is opposed to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East China Sea. The U.S.-Japan Alliance has never been more important, and, if confirmed, I would stand firmly behind this commitment.

Question. Do you support Japan's acquisition of independent counterstrike capabilities designed to defend against missile threats from China and DPRK?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Department of Defense and my counterparts in the Government of Japan to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow and defend against threats to our shared security interests. I would consult closely regarding the appropriate mix of offensive and defensive capabilities required to effectively deter and, if necessary, respond to growing threats to the U.S.-Japan Alliance and regional security in the Indo-Pacific region. I would work with these officials to facilitate a strategic plan to meet the challenges posed by the People's Republic of China and North Korea.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. Against the backdrop of an increasingly challenging regional security environment, if confirmed, I would welcome the expansion of Japan's contributions towards enhancing our mutual defenses against threats to our shared security interests. I understand Japan's deliberations regarding these capabilities are internal and under political consideration, but if confirmed, my top priority would be to strengthen our alliance, so of course I would welcome Japan's decision if it decided to acquire new capabilities. I would work with the Department of Defense and my counterparts in the Government of Japan to ensure we collaborate closely to effectively deter and, if necessary, respond to growing threats to the U.S.-Japan Alliance and regional security in the Indo-Pacific region.

Question. What are your views on deployment of U.S.-origin intermediate range missiles in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with Japan to defend against threats to our shared security interests and consult closely with relevant U.S. and Japanese officials regarding our defense posture and capabilities. I understand the Department of Defense continues work on capabilities that would previously have been prohibited under the INF Treaty. I defer to DoD for further program details, but the United States would consult with allies, partners, and Congress prior to any foreign deployments.

Question. Where do you think our conversations with Japan on missile defense should be focused now that Aegis Ashore has been cancelled?

Answer. For decades, U.S.-Japan Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) cooperation, and Japan's deployments of missile defense capabilities, have been critical not only for Japan's own self-defense but also for the U.S.-Japan Alliance and regional stability in East Asia. The United States worked closely with Japan to assist in their study of Aegis Ashore alternatives and I understand its decision demonstrates Tokyo's determination to enhance its BMD capabilities. The development of Aegis System-Equipped Vessels will improve the alliance's defensive coverage of the Japanese archipelago. If confirmed, I would ensure that the United States and Japan continue to coordinate closely on how to deter most effectively and defend against increasingly sophisticated regional missile threats.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. The United States worked closely with Japan to assist in its study of Aegis Ashore alternatives. I understand its decision to develop Aegis System-Equipped Vessels demonstrates Tokyo's determination to enhance its ballistic missile defense capabilities. Recognizing the increasingly challenging range of regional ballistic and air-breathing missile threats, the Japanese are studying additional defensive options. As allies with shared security interests, the United States and Japan must continue to coordinate closely on how to deter most effectively and defend against increasingly sophisticated regional missile threats. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with the Department of Defense and Japanese leaders to continue improving the alliance's defensive coverage of the Japanese archipelago.

Question. What role do you see Japan playing in the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) deal in which UK will help Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines?

Answer. AUKUS builds on the administration's commitment to two key priorities: 1) revitalizing and modernizing our alliances and partnerships around the world; and 2) enhanced engagement in the Indo-Pacific to advance our long-term interests. It is about connecting with existing U.S. allies and partners in new ways and amplifying our ability to collaborate. Japan is foremost among our regional allies and this initiative is an important supplement to—not a replacement for—the other institutions and mechanisms we have in the Indo-Pacific region to advance security cooperation.

Question. Does Japan have a role in helping in the construction or development of the nuclear-powered submarines for Australia?

Answer. The pact announced in September between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, AUKUS, is about more than submarines. It will bring together our sailors, our scientists, and our industries to maintain and expand our edge in military capabilities and critical technologies. Much of the history of the 21st century will be written in the Indo-Pacific, and I was pleased Japan welcomed the partnership, which is why it is crucial for us to deepen cooperation on new and emerging areas of interest. We need to be able to address both the current strategic environment in the region and how it may evolve. Through AUKUS, we will significantly deepen cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities.

Question. Military readiness is critical to deterring aggression by China. If confirmed, how will you work in cooperation with U.S. Forces Japan to encourage the Japanese to improve training and readiness of the Japanese self-defense force and Japan-based U.S. forces?

Answer. The U.S.-Japan Alliance and U.S. forward-deployed forces in Japan continue to benefit both our countries and are the cornerstone of peace, stability, and freedom in the Indo-Pacific region. In that spirit—one of friendship and seriousness about the challenges ahead—I understand Japan acknowledged that its alliance contributions must expand to meet future challenges. Greater mutual investment in training is essential to ensuring U.S. and Japan forces are able to adapt quickly to a changing security landscape with the necessary capabilities and military readiness.

Question. Do you support the adoption of a “sole purpose” nuclear declaratory policy?

Answer. I understand the administration is undertaking a review of various national security policies, including nuclear deterrence issues through the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I would contribute to those processes. I understand the concerns expressed among some allies and partners, members of Congress, and experts regarding U.S. adoption of a sole purpose policy. I do not want to get ahead of the NPR process, but if confirmed, that ongoing analysis would inform my own view on declaratory policy.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. I understand that the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in deterring a conventional or chemical and biological weapon attack against the

United States or its allies and partners is among the issues being evaluated as part of the ongoing DoD-led Nuclear Posture Review. It would be premature to comment prior to that analysis being completed.

Question. What impact would a U.S. sole purpose nuclear declaratory policy have on our extended deterrence commitments in the Indo-Pacific, especially to Japan?

Answer. I understand the administration is working to reinvigorate and modernize U.S. alliances and partnerships around the world and has highlighted the need to ensure extended deterrence commitments to U.S. allies remain strong and credible. It is my understanding that various declaratory policy options are being reviewed as part of the Department of Defense-led Nuclear Posture Review. I do not want to get ahead of the NPR process, but if confirmed, I look forward to working with U.S. and Japanese leaders to ensure our nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. Whether nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or chemical and biological weapon attack against the United States or its allies and partners is among the contingencies being evaluated as part of the ongoing DoD-led Nuclear Posture Review. It would be premature to comment prior to that analysis being completed. Regardless of the U.S. nuclear declaratory policy, President Biden has underscored the United States' unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan through the full range of U.S. capabilities, including nuclear weapons. I strongly support this decades-long commitment.

Question. Do you think a sole purpose doctrine would increase or decrease Japan's security?

Answer. President Biden has underscored the United States' unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan through the full range of U.S. capabilities, including nuclear weapons. It is my understanding that various declaratory policy options will be reviewed as part of the Department of Defense-led Nuclear Posture Review, which includes consultations with close allies such as Japan. I do not want to get ahead of that process, but if confirmed, that ongoing analysis would inform my own view on declaratory policy.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. Whether nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or chemical and biological weapon attack against the United States or its allies and partners is among the contingencies being evaluated as part of the ongoing DoD-led Nuclear Posture Review. It would be premature to comment prior to that analysis being completed. Regardless of the U.S. nuclear declaratory policy, President Biden has underscored the United States' unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan through the full range of U.S. capabilities, including nuclear weapons. I strongly support this decades-long commitment.

Question. Do you agree that weakening U.S. nuclear deterrence increases the likelihood that Japan would develop its own nuclear capabilities?

Answer. While the administration will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, it will ensure our nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible. Japan is party to and in full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, forswearing its development of nuclear weapons.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. As stated in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the administration will ensure that our strategic deterrent will remain safe, secure, and effective, not be weakened. For decades, U.S. extended deterrence has formed the basis for allied and partner security, which enables most to eschew possession of nuclear weapons. In addition, Japan is party to and in full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, forswearing its development of nuclear weapons.

Question. Please describe your views on China, including your views on what you think U.S.-China policy should be. In your opinion, is China the number-one foreign policy challenge for the United States?

Answer. I do believe the PRC is the number one foreign policy challenge for the United States. The PRC has adopted an aggressive foreign policy. It is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to the stable and open rules-based international order. As Secretary Blinken has said, our relationship with the PRC should be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be.

Question. Japan has been the target of Chinese economic coercion, which other U.S. allies, such as Australia, have also experienced. What role can the United States play in helping to push back against such coercion and support our allies and partners who are harmed?

Answer. I understand the goal of the administration is to reassure allies that the U.S. economy is a safe and strong bet. That means reviewing IPR, 6G, AI, climate change, supply chains, semiconductors infrastructure—strengthening our economic ties with Japan and expanding opportunities for greater collaboration and integration to help Japan and the United States withstand any economic coercion from malign actors. The United States must continue to work with Japan to strengthen economic security to ensure critical technology and technical expertise will not illicitly flow into countries of concern. At the same time, we will need to hold the PRC accountable for its unfair economic practices and its coercive actions around the world. If confirmed, I would support work bilaterally and multilaterally, including through the Quad, to advance economic opportunity and our vision for a rules-based international order in the region. If confirmed, I would work towards a free and open Indo-Pacific in partnership with Japan.

Question. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said recently that commercial ties with China will help improve our relationship overall. John Kerry has also said we should prioritize climate cooperation with China so we can make gains on other issues like cyber and nuclear non-proliferation.

- Do you agree with Secretary Raimondo’s statement?

Answer. As Secretary Blinken has said, our relationship with the PRC will be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be. The United States has longstanding concerns about the PRC’s unfair business practices. If confirmed, I will work with Japan and other allies and partners in the region to stop the PRC’s state-centered, non-market trade practices that distort competition by propping up state-owned enterprises, limit market access, and undermine the global trading system.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. If confirmed as the Ambassador to Japan, I will not only work to deepen our trade and investment ties with Japan, but also work with Japan to stop the PRC’s state-centered, non-market trade practices that distort competition by propping up state-owned enterprises, limit market access, and undermine the global trading system. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has recently raised a number of areas where we have concern with the PRC’s actions, including actions related to human rights, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, the South China Sea, and Taiwan, yet made clear that we will also continue to engage with the PRC at a senior level to ensure responsible competition. At the same time, strategic competition does not, and should not, preclude working with the PRC when it is in the U.S. national interest.

Question. Do you agree with Mr. Kerry’s statement?

Answer. This administration will compete, and compete vigorously, with the PRC where we should, and we will cooperate with the PRC where it is in our interest. Climate is perhaps the signature issue on the cooperation side. The PRC has consistently sought to link their action on climate with us making changes in the bilateral relationship, and we reject that linkage. If confirmed, I will pursue cooperation with the PRC where it is in our interest to do so, and in consultation with the Congress, our partners and allies, and other stakeholders. I would work to rally allies such as Japan to join us in promoting our shared interests, pooling our negotiating leverage, and showing our collective power and resolve.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. I have not had the opportunity to discuss with Special Presidential Envoy Kerry the above statement or the exact context of the remarks. But I will note that Special Presidential Envoy Kerry has regularly made clear that he approached his engagement with China on climate as a standalone issue, and that other aspects of the U.S.-PRC relationship will not be traded for separate U.S. interests. Japan has taken a similar approach on its engagement with China on its climate policy. If confirmed as the Ambassador to Japan, I will work with Japanese officials, Congress, the administration, and other stakeholders to press the PRC and other countries to raise their ambition to address the climate crisis.

Question. In your opinion, on what evidence were Secretary Raimondo and Mr. Kerry relying upon with regard to our past experience with China?

Answer. I defer to Secretary Raimondo and Secretary Kerry on their statements. However, I would reiterate that the relationship with the PRC will be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be.

We must manage the relationship responsibly and work with Beijing when our interests align, including parts of the trade relationship.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021] I have not discussed the statements with Secretary Raimondo and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Kerry, and do not have the context of their statements.

Question. How do you think a change in Taiwan's status quo would affect the U.S. relationship with Japan?

Answer. In their joint statement in April of this year, President Biden and former Prime Minister Suga underscored the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. The United States' commitment to Taiwan is rock-solid and contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and within the region. The administration has stated that United States will continue to support a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues, consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan, and has urged Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic, and economic pressure against Taiwan and instead engage in meaningful dialogue with Taiwan.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is critical to broader regional peace, stability, and prosperity. We have no more important ally than Japan. If confirmed, I would continue to work closely with Japanese leaders to ensure we remain well aligned across the full range of policy priorities, including on shared security interests such as maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Question. What are your views on comments by Japanese leaders regarding Taiwan?

Answer. The United States and our allies and partners must work together to support Taiwan and preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. I understand that the United States welcomes comments by Japanese leaders, including former Prime Minister Suga and President Biden's Joint Leaders' statement from April of this year which underscored the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.

Question. Do you support pushing for more U.S.-Japan-Taiwan cooperation, including defense cooperation?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would encourage our allies and partners to continue to work together to advance our shared prosperity, security, and values in the Indo-Pacific region.

Question. Do you support working with Japan on preparing for potential diplomatic or intervention scenarios involving Taiwan?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed I will work to ensure that the United States and our allies and partners pool our collective strength to advance shared interests and deter common threats. We will underscore the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Question. How would you describe the role of the Quad in the region?

Answer. The Quad is an essential multilateral grouping that convenes four like-minded democracies—the United States, Australia, Japan, and India—to coordinate in the Indo-Pacific, reflecting our collective commitment to peace, security, and prosperity in the region. The United States and our partners strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion. Engagement through the Quad is one of the many ways we support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity.

Question. In your opinion, what areas are ripe for more Quad cooperation?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with Quad partners to advance coordination on issues such as COVID vaccine assistance, post-pandemic economic recovery, climate change, humanitarian assistance, maritime security, supply chain resilience, critical and emerging technologies, counter-terrorism, infrastructure cooperation, and countering foreign disinformation, among others.

Question. Do you support cooperating with European allies in the Indo-Pacific? If so, how? Please be specific.

Answer. Yes. The United States should cooperate with European allies in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific. We should also welcome support from all who believe in a rules-based system, and not arbitrary decisions made by one nation for

its own benefit. President Biden has identified the invigoration and modernization of U.S. alliances and partnership as a central pillar of his administration's foreign policy and effort to reinforce the rules-based international order. An important aspect of that overall effort is breaking down the silos between U.S. alliances. NATO's partnerships with U.S. allies such as Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand represent an important avenue for increasing strategic alignment on transnational threats and geo-strategic challenges. Such engagement helps to support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity. If confirmed, I would continue to coordinate and encourage cooperation with our European allies on shared lines of effort in the Indo-Pacific region.

Question. Do you agree with Secretary Austin's comments about the United Kingdom: "If for example, we focus a bit more here [in Asia], are there areas that the UK can be more helpful in other parts of the world"?

Answer. Secretary Austin noted in his remarks that "[a]s we look to balance our efforts in various parts of the world, we are not only looking to help each other in the Indo-Pacific but we are looking to ensure that we help each other in other parts of the world as well." I believe that it is that balance that is vital, as the United States and our allies and partners combine our respective strengths to pursue prosperity, security, and freedom not only in the Indo-Pacific, but worldwide.

Question. Would you like to see the United Kingdom be more involved in the Indo-Pacific specifically?

Answer. The United Kingdom has longstanding interests in the Indo-Pacific. As a likeminded, key ally and friend to the United States, I would welcome their involvement in areas of mutual concern.

Question. Do you support Japan undertaking more extensive security cooperation in Southeast Asia?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Japanese leaders to advance our shared interests and values in Southeast Asia. Enhancing security cooperation, in particular in the realm of maritime domain awareness, is essential to preserving a rules-based order that fosters free, open, inclusive, and healthy societies that are anchored by democratic values and unconstrained by coercion. As a capable, thoughtful, and dynamic partner that is widely admired throughout the region, Japan remains well positioned to help secure our common interests and values more effectively than we could do alone.

Question. How do you see the future of Japan-ROK relations?

Answer. Japan and the ROK are both key allies, and I am confident that even while they continue to address sensitive historical issues, we will continue moving forward to embrace opportunities to advance our common regional and international priorities, with a focus on the future. The future of the 21st century offers tremendous opportunities for both Japan and ROK. A robust and effective trilateral relationship between and among the United States, the ROK, and Japan is critical for our shared security and common interests. They include defending freedom and democracy, upholding human rights, championing women's empowerment, combating climate change, building secure and resilient supply chains, promoting regional and global peace and economic security, and bolstering the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region and across the globe.

Question. What role should the United States play in managing this relationship?

Answer. I understand that the United States does not take sides in bilateral tensions between allies. We have long encouraged the ROK and Japan to work together on history-related issues in a way that promotes healing and reconciliation. Even while addressing sensitive historical issues, cooperation on our common regional and international priorities must proceed so that we can together make the most of the 21st century opportunities.

Question. What challenges does it present to the trilateral relationship?

Answer. The United States is more secure when our key allies, particularly neighboring allies, have good relations. If confirmed as Ambassador, there would be no greater priority for me than to support closer relations and cooperation among and between the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

Question. Growing our economic relationship with Japan and throughout the Indo-Pacific region is critically important. If confirmed, how would you go about increasing trade and investment with Japan and in the Indo-Pacific?

Answer. The United States has the largest economy in the world. Japan's is number three. When our two countries are aligned, it is a powerful force to set standards for the Indo-Pacific region and the globe. With more than \$250 billion worth of goods and services exchanged each year, the United States and Japan are top trading partners, and the U.S.-Japan bilateral economic relationship is one of the strongest in the world. If confirmed, I would work closely with my colleagues in USTR and other relevant agencies to promote the administration trade policy that benefits American workers and U.S. competitiveness in our economic relationship with Japan, as well as throughout the Indo-Pacific.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. Under my leadership, Chicago was the number one American destination for Foreign Direct Investment for seven straight years. My team accomplished this by prioritizing trade and investment, and relentlessly helping businesses close deals. If confirmed, as Ambassador, I will prioritize and support the trade and investment efforts of the Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) and Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) in Japan.

Question. Do you believe the United States should have a robust trade agenda in the Indo-Pacific region? If so, how?

Answer. The United States should focus on working with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region to shape the rules for fair trade in the 21st century and facilitate a race to the top for market economies and democracies. If confirmed, I would work to ensure our trade agenda protects workers, transparency, and the environment.

Question. What do you think the United States should focus on in its trade and economic relationship with Japan going forward, following the U.S.-Japan trade agreement completed under the Trump administration?

Answer. Japan-affiliated firms employ or support more than 973,800 jobs in the United States. The United States is Japan's top source of direct investment, and Japan is the top investor in the United States, with cumulative Japanese direct investment totaling \$648 billion across all 50 states. If confirmed, I will work to expand our economic relationship as well as realize the full potential of the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement. We also share interests in the region and globally. If confirmed, I would work to deepen our cooperation in the areas identified in the U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership announced by President Biden and then Prime Minister Suga in April, including strengthening competitiveness and innovation, responding to COVID-19 and increasing global health security, addressing the climate crisis

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. Added the word "and" as well as a period above. Both were missing in the original submission.

Question. What is your view on the United States joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)?

Answer. I understand the administration is looking at a range of options to forge stronger economic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific that promote shared goals of cooperation and inclusive prosperity. We must be committed to strengthening trade and investment in the region in a manner that promotes good paying American jobs, high standards, and supply chain resiliency and offer the same benefits for our Indo-Pacific partners.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. The administration's approach to trade is focused on supporting American working families, defending our values, and protecting the long-term prosperity and security of the United States. The United States is focused on making investments in U.S. workers and U.S. competitiveness before he signs new trade agreements, including in the Indo-Pacific. Improvements in CPTPP are needed for the United States to join. If confirmed, I will support the administration's trade policy.

Question. If the United States does not join the CPTPP, what should we do instead on trade and economic engagement?

Answer. If confirmed, I would not only continue our strong economic engagement with Japan bilaterally, but also work to deepen regional and global economic relations by promoting an international rules-based order and collaborating with regional partners on issues such as infrastructure, supply chains, clean energy, and technology in the areas of AI and 6G.

Question. How can we advance U.S.-Japan infrastructure cooperation and financing in the region, particularly Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, going forward?

Answer. I understand that through the Build Back Better World partnership, the Blue Dot Network, and other initiatives, the administration aims to provide high-standard, climate-aligned, and transparently financed infrastructure to Indo-Pacific economies.

Question. What are some of the ways you think Japan and the United States can work on technology cooperation?

Answer. Japan is one of our closest partners on technology development and deployment. Joint initiatives have produced results in such fields as clean energy, infectious diseases, particle physics, advanced computing, fusion plasma, materials discovery, natural resources, neuroscience, space, cancer biology, and natural disaster resiliency. Our two countries have ongoing cooperation and hold regular bilateral meetings on a full range of the most challenging and relevant science and technology issues, including cyber security, AI, quantum computing, and “beyond 5G” telecommunications networks. If confirmed, I would work to deepen these ties with Japan to help ensure we are working effectively with them and all of our regional partners to advance technology and innovation, and address collaboration on critical supplies, including rare earth elements and other materials.

Question. TSMC is building a factory in Japan. Do you think there are opportunities to involve Japanese companies in efforts to get high tech manufacturing out of China and into the U.S. and allied countries?

Answer. Japan shares our views on the need to diversify technology manufacturing to likeminded nations and is implementing policies designed to encourage private industry to invest in Japan, the United States, and other partners. If confirmed, I would work with the Japanese Government and private sector to build on our countries’ longstanding ties to ensure the security of advanced technology manufacturing, which is vital to both of our economies.

Question. If confirmed, what will be your priorities for getting high tech manufacturing out of China and into allied countries?

Answer. I understand the United States and Japan have already had multiple high-level meetings on supply chain issues and U.S. agencies are now working directly with their Japanese counterparts to address shared supply chain challenges, such as the global semiconductor chip shortage, which has harmed both U.S. and Japanese companies. I understand this work has already made major strides in improving the security of our advanced manufacturing capacity and—if confirmed—I would make every effort to drive this initiative forward.

Question. Two major challenges to more cooperation with Japan regarding sensitive and emerging technologies are 1) the gaps in our two classification systems, and 2) the different approaches to military- and commercial-application research. Do you think the United States should explore opportunities to broaden the bilateral defense trade and exchanges with Japan?

Answer. President Biden and former Prime Minister Suga highlighted in their Joint Leaders’ Statement the importance of “strengthening bilateral cybersecurity and information security,” which they described as a “foundational component of closer defense cooperation, and of safeguarding our technological advantages.” I understand the United States and Japan continue the important work of securing our information security systems, including through government-wide standards and programs and enhanced counter-intelligence measures. I understand the administration has welcomed Japan’s efforts to strengthen industrial security, cybersecurity, and its overall legal framework for information security, and expects such efforts will contribute to our ability to broaden bilateral defense trade and exchanges.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. Yes, I believe the United States and Japan should expand bilateral cooperation and trade on commercial and military technologies wherever and whenever appropriate opportunities arise. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the you and other members of the committee to broaden our defense trade and exchanges with Japan.

Question. To the best of your understanding, does Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Kerry have authority on any issues related to the U.S. relationship with Japan other than climate change cooperation?

Answer. As Special Presidential Envoy for Climate (SPEC), my understanding is that former Secretary of State John Kerry’s role is to lead U.S. diplomatic efforts to reassert U.S. climate leadership and raise global ambition to meet the daunting climate challenge. His climate diplomacy work is closely coordinated with other U.S. diplomatic efforts.

Question. If Mr. Kerry begins playing a major role in non-climate aspects of the U.S.-Japan relationship, what would be your response?

Answer. I understand that Special Presidential Envoy Kerry's role is to lead the U.S. diplomatic efforts to reassert U.S. climate leadership and raise global ambition to meet the challenge. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with SPEC Kerry on our cooperation with Japan on those issues.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. SPEC Kerry has engaged governments around the world with a singular focus on increasing global ambition to act against the climate crisis. That effort is a full-time assignment, and he has not become involved in non-climate issues in his engagement with Japan or other foreign governments. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with SPEC Kerry on our cooperation with Japan on climate issues. His climate diplomacy work is closely coordinated with other U.S. diplomatic efforts.

Question. Do you believe that the United States should encourage the growth of a stronger Japan-European Union relationship? If so, in what areas would a stronger Japan-European Union relationship benefit the United States?

Answer. While if confirmed I would work tirelessly to ensure U.S. businesses are on a footing to outcompete any challengers, I welcome Japan developing stronger ties with our allies and likeminded partners. U.S.-Japan-EU coordination has the potential to make all our people more secure and prosperous, with promising areas of cooperation ranging from climate to supply chains to cybersecurity.

Question. Please describe your understanding of how Russia economically, geopolitically, and diplomatically views Japan.

Answer. Economically, Russia hopes to use Japan to revitalize the underdeveloped Russian Far East and to maintain some semblance of diversification as Russia becomes more dependent on China. Geopolitically and diplomatically, it aims to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States to weaken our alliance. I do not believe Japan will be tempted by the latter strategy, and if confirmed I would do my best to ensure that Russia does not succeed.

Question. Do you believe that there is any prospect of a resolution to the issue of the Northern Territories/Kuril Islands?

Answer. Nothing in the Kremlin's public comments indicates to me that Russia is interested in any resolution to the issue that does not result in its permanent control of the Northern Territories. I understand that the United States recognizes Japanese sovereignty over the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai Islets, known in Japan as the "Northern Territories."

Question. What is Russia's policy towards the Northeast Asian region broadly and how do these actions affect Japan?

Answer. Russia's interests, particularly regarding the United States, increasingly align with the PRC's, and Russia seeks to capitalize on its proximity to more prosperous neighbors such as Japan and the ROK. It also continues engagement with the DPRK. Thus, Russia's actions have the potential to better or worsen the security situation in the Indo-Pacific, directly affecting Japan.

Question. In your opinion, does Japan have any specific concerns regarding Russia's relationship with China?

Answer. I believe the prospect of two autocratic neighbors becoming increasingly aligned and conducting joint military exercises nearby would concern any of our allies and partners.

Question. Earlier this week, Russia joined China in conducting a joint anti-submarine drill and a joint passage through the Tsugaru Strait. This is the first time they have conducted a passage through the Strait together.

- What message do you believe Russia and China were trying to send to Japan?

Answer. I am concerned that Russia and China were attempting to intimidate the Japanese people and to constrain Tokyo's actions by implying that its alliance with the United States puts it at odds with Moscow and Beijing. I do not believe these efforts will succeed because the U.S.-Japan Alliance has served as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific for more than six decades, and it has never been stronger.

Question. What message do you believe Russia and China were trying to send to the United States?

Answer. As with their other joint maneuvers, I believe Russia and China were trying to send a message that they aim to push the US out of the region. It will

not work. Our friends in the region want a robust U.S. presence to counter both PRC and Russian malign behavior and any system built solely on their interests.

Question. After the annexation of Crimea, Japan chose to stand with the United States and Europe and implemented sanctions on Russia despite a significant blow to its economic and diplomatic engagements with Russia. This sacrifice has garnered little attention in the West.

- Please detail your understanding of Japan's concerns with the United States' sanctions policies and actions towards Russia.

Answer. I understand that Japan has often shied away from sanctions out of concern that such a course would foreclose channels of dialogue and opportunities to positively influence behavior. If confirmed, I look forward to exploring this difference of opinion with Japanese policymakers.

Question. Do you believe the United States should continue to undertake sanctions against Russia even though those actions may harm an ally like Japan?

Answer. While U.S. interests and values must always remain paramount, I believe our sanctions should be strategically developed.

Question. Earlier this year, Russian Railways opened an office in Tokyo. There are also several other burgeoning business connections between Russia and Japan. Do you believe the United States should actively lobby Japan to end, disengage from, or refrain from seeking these kinds of business deals with Russia?

Answer. Regarding non-sanctioned sectors, I believe our focus should be on demonstrating to Japanese businesses the advantage of partnering with U.S. businesses and ensuring that U.S. businesses can outcompete any challenger in a free market.

Question. Japan has burgeoning economic relationships with the five Central Asian (C5) nations, which have benefited from Japan's ability to stay outside of the political competition that often pushes and pulls the C5 between Western, Middle Eastern, Russian, and Chinese interests.

- Given recent paradigm shifts in the region due to the fall of Afghanistan and increased influence from China and Russia, how can Japan's involvement help the C5 maintain balance in their international relationships?

Answer. I welcome Japan's growing role as a leader not just in the Indo-Pacific, but globally. In my view, the engagement of a strong, likeminded democracy such as Japan in Central Asia aligns with U.S. interests.

Question. As a global leader in the technology industry, how can Japan compete with Chinese tech trade and investment in Central Asia, and help them resist developing an unhealthy dependence on the Chinese Government for the modernization of their technological infrastructure?

Answer. Japan's competitiveness in this regard lies not only in the quality of its technology, but also in the ability to demonstrate the advantages of dealing with a reliable business partner willing to treat Central Asian partners on fair and equal terms. With proper messaging, I believe Central Asian nations will see the long-term benefit of economic cooperation with a partner that believes in transparent, free competition over one that offers short-sighted deals with opaque strings attached.

Question. How can we assist Japan in increasing its economic involvement in the C5, in a way that would maintain Japan's relative neutrality in the region and be amenable to Japanese national and economic interests?

Answer. I understand the administration sees the United States' primary strategic interest in this region is to build a more stable and prosperous Central Asia that is free to pursue political, economic, and security interests with a variety of partners on its own terms; is connected to global markets and open to international investment; and has strong, democratic institutions, rule of law, and respect for human rights. If confirmed, I would consult and coordinate with like-minded partners where appropriate, to advance these objectives.

Question. According to the State Department's 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report, Japan is ranked as Tier 2 due to a lack of government will to adequately prevent further trafficking victims, protect existing victims, and increase prosecutions and consequences for those accused of human trafficking. If confirmed, please outline your strategy for underscoring the importance of Japan's increased political will to end the scourge that is human trafficking.

Answer. Trafficking in persons is a matter of deep concern for me, and if confirmed I would actively engage the Government of Japan to address this issue, in-

cluding by sharing best practices from the United States and other likeminded partners.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. If confirmed, I would engage the Government of Japan on this critical issue, to reinforce the need especially to vigorously investigate and prosecute sex and labor trafficking cases, and hold convicted traffickers accountable. Specifically, authorities must work to improve victim identification efforts, particularly among child sex trafficking victims and among foreign nationals subjected to forced labor within Japan's Technical Intern Training Program, and convicted traffickers should face stricter sentencing. If confirmed, I would direct my team to encourage Japan to adopt the prioritized recommendations in the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Person's Report.

Question. The State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report indicated that Japan has no incidents of human rights abuses, but there is always work to be done in civil society. How can you, if confirmed, bolster civil society alongside your officers at Mission Tokyo?

Answer. There is a need to address necessary improvements in civil society frankly with a partner like Japan, and that also means admitting our own imperfections openly. If confirmed, I would work to demonstrate the ways we are attempting to address the deficiencies in our own society and direct Mission Japan to promote those actions to benefit Japan, and to explore ways our own civil society groups can engage with Japanese civil society as we pursue common aims.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. Engaging civil society and fostering people to people ties with Japan will be one of my key priorities as Ambassador, if confirmed, and I see significant opportunities to deepen engagements between U.S. and Japanese civil society groups. If confirmed, I would work with my team to prioritize engagement across the spectrum of Japanese society, but especially with groups looking to address issues such as human rights. Gender equality is a key area where we could work with civil society groups to advance efforts in Japan to improve opportunities for women both economically and socially.

Question. In the State Department's 2020 International Religious Freedom report, it was reported that Uyghur Muslims continue to have difficulty applying for refugee status in government centers, as well as general feelings of animosity between Uyghurs and other members of the population. How can you, if confirmed, continue to work with the Japanese Government to protect Uyghur Muslims in Japan and around the world?

Answer. If confirmed, I would emphasize the plight of Uyghur Muslims today, and offer to share our experience of welcoming and integrating refugees into the United States.

[Additional Info—11/8/2021]. Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups face ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang. In the U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders' Statement from April of this year, the United States and Japan noted their "serious concerns regarding the human rights situations in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region," and I've seen more recent public statements in which Japan has reiterated these concerns about the situation Uyghur Muslims face in the PRC. If confirmed, I would encourage the Government of Japan to explore ways to protect Uyghur asylum seekers and members of other vulnerable groups in Japan, as well as to identify opportunities to jointly engage on and advocate for their human rights in the PRC.

Question. Japan is not a party to the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Hague Adoption Convention or Convention), making intercountry adoption particularly difficult for American families. How can you, if confirmed, work with Japanese officials on making this process more efficient for American families and their children?

Answer. While Japan is not a party to the Hague Convention with respect to Intercountry Adoption, I understand that Japan has processes in place (called Special Adoption) that allow for adoption. However, the requirements have more narrow guidelines than American prospective parents are accustomed to. There are limits on the age of children that may be adopted as well as requirements relating to the age and marital status of prospective parents as well as time living with the child in Japan. The requirement to have lived with the child in Japan for six months makes it difficult for American prospective parents to meet this requirement. If confirmed, I would work with Japanese officials to make the process more feasible for prospective American families.

Question. Because Japan is not a part to the Hague Convention, there are few enforcement mechanisms to bring parentally abducted American children home to the United States. What steps can and would you take to bring hope to American parents who have not seen their children because of a parental abduction?

Answer. These cases of family separation are painful and tragic. While it has been a long time coming, my understanding is that there has been improvement in terms of Japan's record in these IPCA cases over the last four to five years. We cannot undo the pain of the past, but I believe Japan's acceding to the Hague Convention on Abductions in 2014 was an important step forward in recognizing that responsibility for making custodial determinations should lie solely with the court of competent jurisdiction in the child's place of habitual residence, and not necessarily where the child is currently residing. If confirmed as Ambassador, I look forward to working with our Consular officials in resolving these cases and advocating for the parental rights of American citizen parents.

Question. U.S. missions across the globe have been under enormous strain over the past few years due to COVID.

- What is your understanding of morale throughout Mission Japan?

Answer. I have not yet been to the mission, so I do not know the state of morale at the mission. An Ambassador is only as effective as the members of the Foreign Service, Civil Service employees, eligible family members (EFMs), local staff and U.S. Armed Forces who surround them. In Japan, Mission community members have advanced our nation's ideals without an appointed ambassador for more than two years. I would like to thank them for their professionalism and dedication to our Mission in Japan, and I hope to soon serve our country alongside them.

Question. How do you intend to improve morale across all of Mission Japan?

Answer. I have not yet been to the mission, so I do not know the state of morale at the mission. As in all missions, morale always needs attention and strengthening. If confirmed, morale at Mission Japan would be my priority. Throughout my career, whether as Mayor of Chicago or Chief of Staff to the President, I tried to build a mentality that everything is a team effort and a team success. As I said in remarks at the hearing, I'm eager to work alongside members of the diplomatic mission and of the armed services in Japan. If confirmed, I would be committed to creating a strong team across the embassy and all consulates and military institutions in Japan.

Question. How do you intend to create a unified mission and vision across Mission Japan?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the entire mission is unified under one vision, to ensure our more than 60-year alliance remains strong and continues to be the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in a free and open Indo-Pacific. Our alliance advances our shared interests, shared values, and shared goals. If confirmed as Ambassador, my top priority would be to unite all members of the mission behind our common goal of deepening these ties while we confront our common challenges. Everyone in our Embassy and five consulates will play a role in contributing to our mission.

Question. Management is a key responsibility for chiefs of mission.

- How would you describe your management style?

Answer. I believe every success is a team effort and a collaborative process. I ensure that everyone has a chance to have their voice heard and a seat at the table. I listen and analyze all opinions and views offered, and ask for others to help weigh the equities, which makes my decisions better. Once a decision is made, we move forward in a unified fashion, together as a team.

Question. If confirmed, how do you believe your management style will translate to an embassy setting, where resources may not be readily available and your diplomatic workforce consists of career employees?

Answer. I have always found that it is important to lead by example. As mayor, in a time of tight budgets, I led by example. If I asked other departments to make changes, I would tighten my budget as well. I would not require others to make sacrifices or changes if I was not going to make them as well. As I said in the hearing, I will only be as strong as my team in the Mission, and I would like to thank them for their professionalism and dedication over the past two years without an Ambassador.

Question. As a political appointee rather than career diplomat, do you believe it is incumbent upon new chiefs of mission to integrate themselves into embassy operations and culture? If yes, how do you intend to do so?

Answer. Yes. I believe in a culture of mutual respect. Every member of the mission has a role that is important to the future of our alliance with Japan. As stated above, I believe every success is a team effort and a collaborative process. If confirmed, I would ensure that everyone has a chance to have their voice heard. I would ensure that the Ambassador is accessible and does not stand apart from the embassy staffing. I would plan to eat in the embassy cafeteria, join embassy cycling groups and other community activities to build a stronger sense of team. It is my practice to listen and analyze diverse options and opinions, which make my decisions better. Once a decision is made, the team must move forward together in a unified fashion to achieve our goals.

Question. Do you believe it is ever acceptable or constructive to berate subordinates, either in public or private?

Answer. No. Never. In my career, I have found it important to create a culture of loyalty which requires mutual respect and teamwork. I believe mutual respect and loyalty elicits the very best from people. My teams have worked hard and achieved great results. As I stated in the committee hearing, how I was profiled when I was 27 and 30 is not who I am today. For example, I am the only mayor of Chicago who never lost a single vote. When I was mayor of Chicago, I led the country in foreign direct investment (FDI) over seven years. I believe that reflects that I have more than one tool in my toolbox. Each job is different, and we change as we grow and learn from our experiences. If confirmed, I would employ all of the tools in my toolbox to strengthen our relationship with Japan.

Question. How do you envision your relationship with your deputy chief of mission?

Answer. I see it as a close partnership. Ray Greene has had a long and successful career as a diplomat in Japan and in the region that is invaluable. I would plan to rely on that relationship as ambassador. I would be fortunate as an Ambassador to have a DCM like Ray Greene.

Question. If confirmed, what leadership responsibilities do you intend to entrust to your deputy chief of mission?

Answer. I respect the DCM's 25 years of experience and his deep knowledge, not only of Japan but of the region, which is invaluable to me and to the United States. For example, every former Ambassador notes the sensitivity of issues in Okinawa and Ray Greene was Consul General in Okinawa. If confirmed, I would rely on every aspect of his experience and knowledge for our success.

Question. It is imperative that U.S. diplomats get outside of posts abroad to meet with local actors, including host government officials, non-government organizations, and everyday citizens.

- If confirmed, will you encourage Mission Japan diplomats to engage in-person with the Japanese people outside of U.S. embassies and consulates?

Answer. Yes, of course. If confirmed, I plan to lead by example and look forward to engaging directly with the Japanese people throughout the country, as conditions permit. Face-to-face contact and meetings in local settings where Japanese people engage and work are important to understanding our partners, and also key to visibly showing our commitment to Japan is rock-solid.

Question. What is the public diplomacy environment like in Japan? What public diplomacy challenges do U.S. diplomats face?

Answer. The U.S.-Japan Alliance has been the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond for over six decades, and the American and Japanese people share an unbreakable bond and an unwavering friendship as evidenced by the grassroots efforts to support each other in times of need, including during the aftermath of both Hurricane Katrina and the Great East Japan Earthquake. Public opinion polling confirms that a strong majority of the Japanese people support the Alliance, but our challenge is to ensure that Japan's younger generations continue to view the United States as their first partner of choice on security, economic, and educational/cultural issues. Like many diplomatic posts around the world, the Embassy and Consulates in Tokyo have had to shift to all virtual programming due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As public health conditions permit, the Public Affairs team and others will be able to restart in-person engagement on everything from encouraging youth and mid-career professionals to con-

sider study in the United States, to fighting climate change, and identifying ways to promote our shared values across the Indo-Pacific region.

Question. How do you balance the importance of Main State versus the in-country mission when it comes to tailoring public diplomacy messages for foreign audiences?

Answer. Our public diplomacy professionals in Washington and in the field work closely together, and we rely on that close cooperation to ensure that content and messages developed for a global audience are relevant and effectively localized for audiences at post.

Question. “Anomalous health incidents,” commonly referred to as “Havana Syndrome,” have been debilitating and sidelining U.S. diplomats around the world for years. They have caused serious, negative consequences for U.S. diplomacy, yet many believe that the Department is not doing enough to care for, protect, and communicate to its personnel.

- If confirmed, do you commit to taking this threat seriously?

Answer. As the Department does, I consider the safety and health of our employees and their family members my top priority. If confirmed, I will energetically support the Department’s established reporting and care protocols for anomalous health incidents.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to talking as openly as you can to Mission Japan personnel?

Answer. Communication that is clear, complete, concise, and timely is a central part of effective leadership and management. I believe that a well-informed workforce is a more effective one. If confirmed, I will use the Mission’s weekly Country Team meetings, regular meetings with top managers, established procedures for notices and policies, and town hall meetings to convey our mission and vision and to give all information needed to enable our success.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO HON. RAHM EMANUEL BY SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY

Question. According to a scientific public opinion poll conducted in August 2019, included in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 75 percent percent of Japanese respondents favored Japan signing the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)—a Treaty that prohibits the use of and possession of nuclear weapons. If confirmed as Ambassador, how will you reflect this overwhelming attitude towards nuclear weapons in Japan, a close ally, as the interagency completes its Nuclear Posture Review as part of the Defense led Integrated National Defense Strategy?

Answer. While I understand and share the desire to make progress toward a world without nuclear weapons, the TPNW is not the right way to achieve that goal. The TPNW risks undermining U.S. deterrence relationships that are still necessary for international peace and security and may reinforce divisions that hinder our ability to work together to address pressing proliferation and security challenges. U.S. allies covered by extended nuclear deterrence (which includes all NATO Allies, plus Australia, Japan, and South Korea) share our view that the TPNW is incompatible with our extended nuclear deterrence arrangements. The best way to achieve a world without nuclear weapons is through a process that takes into account the international security environment and seeks effective, verifiable arms control and disarmament measures.

Question. Then-Vice President, Joseph R. Biden, stated on January 11, 2017 that: “it is hard to envision a plausible scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary. Or make sense.” Do you personally agree with that opinion?

Answer. I understand that various declaratory policy options will be reviewed as part of the Department of Defense-led Nuclear Posture Review, based on ongoing analysis and continuing allied and partner consultations. It would be premature to adopt a position on U.S. declaratory policy prior to the completion of the NPR process. At the same time, I understand the concerns expressed among some allies and partners, members of Congress, and experts regarding U.S. adoption of a no-first-use or sole purpose policy. Those concerns will inform the review process. In our last review, there was no country with greater participation or consultation than Japan. I anticipate the same level of engagement for the next review.

Question. The United States has several Intra-Parliamentary Working Groups that allow for active U.S. participation of Members of Congress and staff with other governments. How can an Intra-Parliamentary Working Group, such as that is included in the Innovation and Competition Act (S.1260), advance common interests and values of the Quad nations?

Answer. Quad cooperation supports the United States' goal of realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific, and our vision for this partnership is ambitious and far-reaching. As a former Congressman, I look forward to engaging with members of Congress on how best to support that goal and advance the work of the Quad, including through intra-parliamentary working groups.

Question. How can the United States work with Japan to lessen its reliance on nuclear power and coal and increase its renewable energy infrastructure?

Answer. I welcome Prime Minister Kishida's affirmation of Japan's pledge to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 46-50 percent by 2030 as part of its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement. Implementation of Japan's NDC will require significant transformations toward a cleaner energy future. The United States is committed to be a partner with Japan in this effort. At their April 16 summit, President Biden and then-Prime Minister Suga launched the U.S.-Japan Climate Partnership on Ambition, Decarbonization, and Clean Energy to advance cooperation on climate ambition, climate and clean energy technology, and decarbonization. In order to expand renewable energy infrastructure—both in Japan and in third countries—the United States and Japan are enhancing cooperation on innovation, including in such areas as renewable energy, energy storage (such as batteries and long-duration energy storage technologies), smart grid, energy efficiency, low carbon hydrogen, and Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage/Carbon Recycling. If confirmed, I would continue and expand opportunities for U.S.-Japan cooperation to address the climate crisis.

Question. Japan is currently completing construction on the Rokkasho spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facility which may open as early as next year. Experts estimate this plant could produce up to eight tons of separated plutonium on an annual basis, which would be an unwelcome addition to the 8.9 tons it currently hosts at homes and the 36.6 tons currently being held in France. If confirmed, will you commit to working with Japan to find ways to dispose of its plutonium surplus, both domestically and abroad?

Answer. The United States has a long history of productive cooperation with Japan on nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation. Japan has committed that it will not maintain plutonium reserves for which utilization is unspecified, a commitment which Japan has consistently honored.

In July 2018, the Government of Japan released new policy guidelines stating that Japan intends to keep its plutonium stockpile at current levels and reduce from there. Our decades of close cooperation with Japan, as well as our ongoing dialogue across a wide range of nuclear nonproliferation, safety, and security issues give me confidence that Japan will continue to move forward in ways that are fully consistent with its international obligations and its reputation as a leader in global nuclear nonproliferation. If confirmed, I would work closely with Japan to ensure that it continues to meet its commitments.

Question. Japanese automobile companies such as Toyota have engaged in intense lobbying against U.S. efforts to transition to electric vehicles. How can you address this issue with the Japanese Government?

Answer. President Biden's Build Back Better Agenda and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal invest in the infrastructure, manufacturing, and incentives that we need to grow good-paying, union jobs at home, lead on electric vehicles around the world, and save American consumers money. The Japanese Government has committed to a clean energy strategy and a 46-50 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. They too, are working toward cleaner vehicles and have set a target toward phasing out the sale of gas and diesel-engine cars by 2035. The United States and Japan are committed to advancing shared interests, including addressing climate change. If confirmed, I would prioritize engagement on climate change and clean energy, and good paying jobs that assist the middle class while supporting robust mutually-beneficial trade between the United States and Japan.

Question. If confirmed, what will you do to ensure Japan's concerns about the Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea as well as concerns about Japan's own security are fully represented in any engagements or negotiations between the United States and North Korea?

Answer. The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea continue to deepen trilateral cooperation towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. I understand that Prime Minister Kishida is prepared to meet with the DPRK leader Kim Jong Un without preconditions and remains committed to the immediate resolution of the abductions issue. I hope the DPRK will respond positively. As President Biden and former Prime Minister Suga reaffirmed in their April 2021 Joint Leaders' statement, the United States is committed to the immediate resolution of the abductions issues. Our treaty commitments to Japan's security are rock-solid and inform our bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Japan.

Question. If provided additional resources by Congress, in what ways would you expand the U.S.-Japan-Taiwan Global Cooperation Training Framework (GCTF)?

Answer. The GCTF is an essential tool for building support for Taiwan around the world and demonstrating the value of Taiwan's participation on the global stage. Since its inception in 2015, the GCTF has featured dozens of workshops that have provided training to over two thousand participants, either virtually or in Taipei. The State Department recently launched a major expansion of the GCTF that will allow the hosting of GCTF workshops around the world, reaching new audiences with regionally focused content.

Question. Recent media reports suggest that while Laquan McDonald's great uncle, Pastor Marvin Hunter, has offered support for your nomination, there is not agreement amongst the family on their support. Have you engaged with other members of the family about your nomination?

Answer. As Pastor Hunter describes in his letter to the Chairman, our conversation and relationship predates and is unrelated to any nomination. He reached out to me to begin a dialogue about police accountability and the tragic murder of his great nephew. I was honored to be approached by the pastor and have found great meaning and hope in our conversations since then. Out of respect for the family, I have expressed an openness to engaging with any of them who are interested but have deferred to their wishes on when or if they would like to engage in a dialogue.

Question. Why did you initially oppose a federal civil rights pattern-and-practice investigation into the systematic issues within Chicago's police department?

Answer. In December 2015, I announced the formation of an independent Police Accountability Task Force (PATF) to conduct a comprehensive review of Chicago's system of police accountability, oversight, and training. The PATF was made up of well-respected experts in police accountability and reform, including the former Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division and former Governor of Massachusetts Deval Patrick, the then-Inspector General of Chicago Joe Ferguson, and the then-President of the Chicago Police Board and now Mayor of Chicago Lori Lightfoot. Their mandate was extremely broad—to recommend reforms to improve independent oversight of police misconduct, ensure officers with repeated complaints are identified and evaluated appropriately, and to establish best practices for the release of videos of police-involved incidents—and their timeline for delivering recommendations was an aggressive four months. As former Inspector General Ferguson wrote recently in a letter to the Chair of the Committee on Foreign Relations (see full letter attached), the PATF's work was done “without constraint or filter,” it was “independent and unconstrained,” and I asked “the truth be found and reported, with the chips to fall where they may.” In addition, at this time there was still an ongoing federal investigation by the United States Attorney's Office and the FBI into the shooting of Laquan McDonald. Under those circumstances, I believed that another investigation into Chicago's police practices was unnecessary and risked duplicating or possibly interfering with the work of the PATF. However, recognizing that the problems of police oversight and accountability and the well-deserved community distrust of the police were so widespread and deep-seated, a federal civil rights pattern-and-practice investigation was not only appropriate but necessary to address the issues in the police department. The federal pattern and practice investigation built on the work done by the PATF. As former Inspector General Ferguson writes: “The work of the PATF was conducted separately but coordinately to the pattern and practice investigation of the Civil Rights Section of the United States Department of Justice, whose findings were consistent with and as it related specifically to use of force, complementary to and a further expansion of those of the PATF.”

Question. When and from whom did you learn about the shooting and when and from whom did you learn about the dashcam video? Have you ever viewed the dashcam video? What did you do in response upon learning of the dashcam video and its contents?

Answer. I do not recall who first informed me about the shooting or when that information was provided to me. As I stated during my testimony before the committee, almost immediately after the shooting the independent agency tasked with reviewing police use of force incidents, IPRA, and the Cook County State's Attorney's Office began investigations into the shooting, and soon thereafter the United States Attorney's Office launched its own investigation into the shooting. All three of these independent investigative agencies had access to all available video at the time. The longstanding practice and protocol at that time was to not release video footage of the police-involved incident while the investigations were ongoing out of concern that release of the video could interfere with the investigation, influence witness statements, and jeopardize a future prosecution, and my office followed that longstanding practice in this case. As the former Inspector General for the City of Chicago Joe Ferguson recently wrote to this committee, "[d]ecisions made about the non- or delayed-disclosure of the body-worn camera videos at that time were in fact the longstanding policy and practice of the City of Chicago and its Law Department." Further, the first time I viewed the dashcam video was when it was eventually released to the public. Ferguson, who's office conducted a "comprehensive investigation" into my administration's handling of the aftermath of the shooting, goes on to write, "there is a complete absence of factual basis to support the claim that Mayor Emanuel was involved directly or indirectly in a 'cover-up' of the McDonald shooting videos." Indeed, the former Inspector General goes on to write: "my office's comprehensive investigation did not reveal any evidence that would support the lingering surmises and accusations of a 'cover-up' orchestrated out of City Hall. None."

Question. Why did you not implement all the reforms the Task Force on Police Accountability recommended? Of the reforms you did commit to implement, which were implemented (either partially or fully) before you left office? Which were not, and why not?

Answer. The Police Accountability Task Force, which I convened and tasked with conducting a comprehensive, independent review of police oversight and accountability practices in Chicago, issued its report in April 2016. The report was a thorough assessment of the systemic problems throughout Chicago policing and police accountability system, and it included numerous recommendations across a wide array of areas for reform. As former-Inspector General (and PATF member) Ferguson wrote to the committee, "The PATF's findings and recommendations were reported out nationally and to much acclaim for their candor in pulling back the cover on the lived experience of those who have directly and indirectly, over generations, experienced the consequences of aggressive and oppressive historical policing practices and culture. The work of the Emanuel-appointed and charged Task Force was independent and unconstrained." My administration moved quickly to act on the recommendations of the PATF and implemented reforms guided by their recommendations to the Chicago Police Department's use of force policies, de-escalation training, body-worn cameras, and a groundbreaking video release policy. As Mr. Ferguson goes on to explain in his letter, the longstanding practice of not releasing video footage during ongoing investigations, "was the subject of a near unprecedented video release policy implemented in February 2016 by Mayor Emanuel, acting immediately in response to the first-issued recommendation of the PATF." As we made progress on implementing the recommendations of the PATF, that process was eventually incorporated into the police consent decree which my administration entered into with the Illinois Attorney General's office. That consent decree, which I was proud to finalize and sign before leaving office, builds on the excellent work of the PATF, and finally puts the Chicago Police Department on a sustainable path toward true reform.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO HON. RAHM EMANUEL BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. How do you believe the U.S. should react to China's application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)?

Answer. We would expect that China's non-market trade practices, extensive market-distorting support of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and use of economic coercion against other countries would factor into CPTPP parties' evaluation of China as a potential candidate for accession. If confirmed, I would work to uphold our commitment to international rules and standards and work with partners in the region to maintain high standards I would defend our interests and work alongside our

partners and allies to ensure fairness-in competition, practices, and trade-and to ensure that the PRC is not permitted to dictate the rules of the road and undermine a free and fair Indo-Pacific.

Question. How do you believe the U.S. can leverage its relationships with Japan to build legitimacy for issue-based coalitions to address China's unfair trade practices?

Answer. The U.S.-Japan Alliance has served as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific for more than six decades, and it has never been stronger. The American and Japanese people share deeply rooted values of defending freedom, championing economic and social opportunity and inclusion, and respecting human rights and the rule of law. Japan has joined the United States and our allies and partners to express our joint concerns about the PRC's unfair trade practices including preferential treatment for state owned enterprises, data restrictions, inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights, and forced technology transfer. Additionally, the United States and Japan and our other partners are concerned by the PRC's failure to respect International Labor Standards and non-compliance with applicable ILO Conventions. If confirmed, I will work with Japan to uphold freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, and the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor.

Question. China is an important trading partner as well as a security threat for both the U.S. and Japan. Could you please share your view of China and whether you see the country as more of a partner or as a threat?

Answer. The PRC has adopted an increasingly provocative foreign policy. It is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system. As Secretary Blinken has said, our relationship with the PRC will be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be. The common denominator is the need to work alongside our allies and partners to engage China. Japan will obviously be a key partner in this challenge, and if confirmed I will prioritize working with Japan on our shared security priorities.

Question. With the recent security agreement between the U.S., UK, and Australia, and in light of the existing Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) between the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia, what is your view of the role Japan can and should play in efforts to counter Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region?

Answer. I would like to reiterate that the U.S.-Japan Alliance has served as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and across the world for more than six decades, and it has never been stronger. The American and Japanese people share deeply rooted values of defending freedom, championing economic and social opportunity and inclusion, and respecting human rights, and the rule of law. This has led us to share some of the same concerns regarding the PRC's actions. We welcome Japan's expanding position as a leader not just in the Indo-Pacific but globally. Its founding role in creating the Quad was an example of this leadership. If confirmed, I will work with Japan to support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Question. Do you think there are opportunities for cooperation on technology issues for members of the QUAD? In the future, what kind of cooperation do you think is necessary with Japan, a partner with high technological capabilities, in order to maintain U.S. technological superiority in critical technologies such as AI, cybersecurity, beyond 5G, and quantum computing?

Answer. Members of the Quad actively cooperate on a broad range of technology issues. Moreover, Japan is one of our closest partners on technology development and deployment. Joint initiatives have produced results in such fields as infectious diseases, particle physics, advanced computing, fusion plasma, materials discovery, natural resources, neuroscience, space, cancer biology, and natural disaster resiliency. Our two countries have ongoing cooperation and hold regular bilateral meetings on a full range of the most challenging and relevant science and technology issues, including cyber security, AI, quantum computing, and "beyond 5G" telecommunications networks. If confirmed, I would work to deepen these ties with Japan to help ensure our continued technology leadership.

Question. As Ambassador, would you propose encouraging the Japanese Government to expand its security role in the Indo-Pacific region?

Answer. In an increasingly challenging security environment, the United States and Japan will continue to closely coordinate on how to effectively deter and, if necessary, respond to growing threats to the U.S.-Japan Alliance and regional security in the Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I would work with Japan to promote greater mutual investment in defense and improve our forces' interoperability to ensure our alliance is able to adapt quickly to a changing security landscape with the necessary capabilities and military readiness. Japan is in the position to play an even greater role on regional security issues by supporting and encouraging closer cooperation with other like-minded partners.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO JONATHAN ERIC KAPLAN BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

ASEAN

Question. Enduring support for ASEAN is critical to the United States' posture in the Indo-Pacific and central to that engagement is our partnership with Singapore.

- If confirmed, what steps will you take to help Singapore in bolstering ASEAN's centrality in the Asia-Pacific region? What is your assessment of how ASEAN can improve its functions to more fully establish itself as an important, and problem-solving, regional player?

Answer. We value Singapore's role as one of the founding members of ASEAN, alongside Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and its advocacy for ASEAN centrality and unity. If confirmed, I look forward to future discussions with Singapore that advance the U.S.-ASEAN strategic partnership and highlight ASEAN at the heart of our shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Economic and Trade Opportunities

Question. Singapore is the United States' largest trading partner in Southeast Asia, and the 18th largest trading partner overall.

- How can the United States continue to improve our economic relationship with Singapore? If confirmed, what economic initiatives would you pursue in light of the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP?

Answer. Singapore is one of the United States' strongest economic partners in the region, surpassing \$93 billion in bilateral trade in 2020. If confirmed, I commit to working closely with Singapore bilaterally and through regional fora, including APEC and ASEAN, to promote trade and encourage private-sector investment in the region. I will also continue to make the case with Singapore and others in the region to uphold high standards and adhere to global rules and norms for trade.

Vice President Harris' Recent Visit

Question. As you know, Vice President Harris recently visited Singapore and announced agreements to address climate change, cybersecurity, and supply chain resilience.

- What are your primary goals in executing these agreements and what potential do you see for U.S.-Singapore collaboration on technology and innovation?

Answer. Following Vice President Harris' visit in August, Singapore's Ministry of Trade and Industry and the U.S. Department of Commerce launched on October 7 a new "Partnership for Growth and Innovation" to address immediate- and longer-term challenges that face both of our economies, including the need to enhance supply chain resilience. This partnership is designed to promote inclusive economic growth, innovation and entrepreneurship, and shared prosperity in the United States and Singapore and throughout the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I plan to work with U.S. businesses and the Singaporean government to strengthen our trade and investment relations.

Security Cooperation

Question. Mutual security interests are a critical element of the U.S.-Singapore bilateral relationship, which includes the important defense cooperation agreements we have concluded over the past decade.

- How can the United States bolster its security relationship with Singapore? If confirmed, how would you encourage and assist Singapore in addressing maritime tensions in the South China Sea?

Answer. Singapore is an important security partner and provides the U.S. military with access to its bases, ports, and runways. Both the United States and Singapore have a clear national interest in promoting respect for international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, unimpeded lawful commerce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea (SCS). If confirmed, I intend to work with Singapore to deepen our close military cooperation on shared priority areas such as maritime security and cybersecurity, and I will continue to discuss with Singapore how we can uphold rights and freedoms that are reflected in international law in the SCS and around the world.

Question. How do you plan to respond to Singapore's increasing defense cooperation with China?

Answer. Singapore maintains robust relationships with both the United States and the People's Republic of China. Singapore is a reliable partner that welcomes cooperation with the United States and increased U.S. security and economic engagement in the region. If confirmed, I intend to work with Singapore to deepen our close military cooperation.

China

Question. Singapore, along with other countries in the region, face a time of increasing geopolitical uncertainty with China's growing assertiveness in the Pacific.

- What is your assessment of how Singapore's thinking on China has evolved in recent years? And what should the United States be doing to influence Singapore's approach towards confronting and competing with China?

Answer. As Secretary Blinken stated in his March foreign policy speech, our relationship with the PRC will be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be. We seek to cooperate with Beijing where our interests align. In other areas, we will compete vigorously. The common denominator is the need to work alongside our allies and partners to engage the PRC from a position of collective strength. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Singapore to ensure that it is a reliable partner that welcomes U.S. security and economic engagement in the region.

Burma

Question. Singapore plays an important role in diplomacy surrounding the political and humanitarian crisis in Burma.

- If confirmed, what will you do to encourage Singapore to place pressure on Burma's military leaders to cease ongoing violence against protestors and to release political prisoners?

Answer. If confirmed, I will urge Singapore and other ASEAN members to hold the Burmese regime accountable to the Five-Point Consensus and urge the military to immediately cease the violence, release all those unjustly detained, and restore Burma's path to inclusive democracy. If confirmed, I will continue to urge all countries to review their economic leverage and ties to Burma to ensure they benefit only the people of Burma and not the military regime.

Anomalous Health Incidents

Question. I am very concerned about directed energy attacks on U.S. government personnel (so-called Anomalous Health Incidents). Ensuring the safety and security of our personnel abroad falls largely on individual Chiefs of Mission and the response of officers at post. It is imperative that any individual who reports a suspected incident be responded to promptly, equitably, and compassionately.

- Do you agree these incidents must be taken seriously, and pose a threat to the health of U.S. personnel?

Answer. I am also deeply troubled by potential anomalous health incidents that have affected U.S. Government personnel and their family members. Serving one's country overseas should not come at the cost of one's health. I agree that such incidents may pose a threat to the wellbeing of U.S. personnel, and must be taken extremely seriously. If confirmed, the health, safety, and security of Embassy Singapore staff, their family members, and all those supporting the Mission will be my highest priority.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that any reported incident is treated seriously and reported quickly through the appropriate channels, and that any affected individuals receive prompt access to medical care?

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that that all reported potential anomalous health incidents are given serious attention and reported swiftly through the

appropriate channels. I will also ensure that staff who are affected by these incidents receive prompt access to the treatment, support, and medical care that they need.

Question. Do you commit to meeting with medical staff and the RSO at post to discuss any past reported incidents and ensure that all protocols are being followed?

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to meeting with medical staff and the RSO at Embassy Singapore to discuss any reported anomalous health incidents so that I am most prepared to protect the safety of Embassy Singapore staff and ensure that all protocols regarding anomalous health incidents are being followed appropriately.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO JONATHAN ERIC KAPLAN BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. What are your top 2-3 priorities for the U.S.-Singapore relationship?

Answer. If confirmed, my highest priority would be ensuring the safety and security of the mission and our men and women serving abroad, along with the safety and security of U.S. citizens in Singapore. I am also committed to ensuring that our robust security, economic, and enduring people-to-people ties remain the pillars of our expansive and enduring bilateral partnership and allows us to cooperate as close partners in support of the rules-based economic and security order in the Indo-Pacific.

Question. How would you evaluate Singapore as a defense partner overall? Where are they helpful, and where do they need to do more?

Answer. Singapore is a critically important security partner that enables a strong U.S. military presence in the region by providing access to bases, ports, and runways, and allowing for the rotational deployment of U.S. littoral combat ships and Navy P-8s. Singapore maintains a training force of close to 1,000 members in the United States and is also the largest purchaser of U.S. military equipment in Southeast Asia, and has agreed to purchase the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter. If confirmed, I intend to work with Singapore to deepen our close military cooperation. I will work with my colleagues across the interagency to expand our cooperation in our shared priority areas such as maritime security and cybersecurity.

Question. Do you agree that extended deterrence is the foundation of the U.S. security apparatus in the Indo-Pacific?

Answer. Yes. Extended deterrence plays a foundational role in advancing U.S. national security objectives in the Indo-Pacific, and U.S. nuclear forces, underpin extended deterrence. The administration is committed to reinvigorating and modernizing alliances and partnerships around the world; this includes ensuring U.S. extended deterrence commitments to U.S. allies and partners remain strong and credible.

Question. Do you commit to not advocating for policies that would dilute or erode U.S. extended deterrence commitments?

Answer. I understand the administration is undertaking a review of various national security policies, including nuclear deterrence issues through the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will contribute to those processes as they relate to Singapore and the Indo-Pacific Region. I also understand that the administration is committed to reinvigorating and modernizing alliances and partnerships around the world; this includes ensuring U.S. extended deterrence commitments in the region remain strong and credible.

Question. How do you think our Indo-Pacific allies and partners would respond to adopting a 'sole purpose doctrine' as our declaratory policy?

Answer. I understand that the administration is working to reinvigorate and modernize U.S. alliances and partnerships around the world and has highlighted the need to ensure extended deterrence commitments to U.S. allies remain strong and credible. If confirmed, I will do my part to reaffirm, invest in, and modernize our global alliances and partnerships, which are America's greatest strategic asset. It is my understanding that various declaratory policy options are being reviewed as part of the Department of Defense-led Nuclear Posture Review.

Question. At the VP's trip to Singapore in August, the U.S. and Singapore finalized three agreements to expand cybersecurity, including military to military en-

agement. What should our next steps be in cybersecurity cooperation with Singapore, and what challenges do we still face?

Answer. Technological advancement continues to create a more inter-connected world that is increasingly vulnerable to cyber threats. Singapore is an important bilateral partner and regional leader on cybersecurity issues. If confirmed, I will work closely with Singapore to expand information sharing, increase cyber capacity building, and improve incident response coordination. These efforts will deepen our cybersecurity cooperation and build on the three recently signed cyber-MOUs related to the financial sector, military-to-military engagement, and regional capacity-building.

Question. Singapore has historically taken on a non-alignment policy, in which it hopes to balance its relationship with the U.S. and China. What are your views on this policy and what challenges does it present to the U.S.-Singapore relationship?

Answer. Singapore maintains robust relationships with both the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC is Singapore's top trade partner in goods, while the United States remains Singapore's largest investor; largest trading partner in services; and security partner of choice. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that Singapore remains one of the United States' strongest security, economic, and trade partners in the region.

Question. Do you commit to keeping Congress informed of any Singapore-Chinese military engagement?

Answer. Yes, I commit to monitoring Singapore's bilateral relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and providing assessments on the relationship to enable awareness throughout the U.S. Government.

Question. What opportunities are there for more U.S.-Singapore economic engagement given efforts to diversify supply chains from China?

Answer. The COVID-19 crisis has significantly slowed down global trade and supply chains, including for both Singaporean and U.S. businesses. During Vice President Harris' visit in August, the United States and Singapore committed to holding a high-level dialogue with industry and government representatives to discuss supply chain resilience. The United States and Singapore will also work to address shortages caused by global supply chain disruptions, including identifying ways to remove choke points in the semiconductor supply chain. If confirmed, I plan to work with U.S. businesses and the Singapore government to facilitate travel and strengthen our trade and investment relations.

Question. What do you think needs to happen to build more resilient supply chains in the Indo-Pacific?

Answer. Stronger industry relationships and increased economic partnerships will ensure a more resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains. The administration's focus centers around four critical product areas: computer chips; electric vehicle batteries; pharmaceuticals; and strategic and critical materials. In coordination with our partners and allies, and if confirmed, I will work with business, the Singapore leadership, and the administration to secure supply chain competitiveness and national security.

Question. China has been increasingly exerting its economic, diplomatic, and military pressure against Taiwan in the past few years. How do you think a change in Taiwan's status quo will affect our relationship with Singapore, and regional stability more generally?

Answer. The United States remains committed to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and within the Indo-Pacific Region and we continue to support a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues, consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people on Taiwan. Singapore likewise sees the maintenance of peace and security across the Taiwan Strait as crucial to the entire region. If confirmed, I will work with Singapore to ensure it is a close partner in support of the rules-based economic and security order in the Indo-Pacific.

Question. China has a long history of economic and political coercion in Singapore. This includes tactics like arresting Singaporean shipping vessels that sail through contested waters, engaging in information campaigns to pressure Singapore to adopt China's nine dash line, conducting cyberattacks against Singapore's health system, and make Singaporean business in China difficult when Singapore speaks publicly about foreign policy views not consistent with the CCP.

- What are your concerns with Chinese political influence in Singapore? Where are the greatest inroads for China in Singapore?

Answer. Singapore has extensive economic ties to the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the PRC is Singapore's top trade partner in goods. As a small nation dependent on trade, Singapore shares our concern in some instances about economic coercion by the PRC. If confirmed, I will continue to make the case with Singapore and other countries in the region to uphold high standards and adhere to global rules and norms for trade. I will continue to advocate for U.S. businesses and ensure that the United States remains competitive in trade with Singapore and in the region.

Question. How should the U.S. respond or support allies and partners when they face political and economic coercion from China?

Answer. The United States must continue to push back on corrupt or coercive political and economic practices that damage our interests and those of our partners. The PRC has a history of manipulating its economic power to advance its strategic and political objectives by intimidating other countries, territories, and companies. If confirmed, I will support efforts to build resilience in the face of such coercion and—where necessary—coordinate a collective response with partners and allies. Also, if confirmed, I will work to reestablish the United States as a regional diplomatic leader, and will strongly support U.S. efforts to rally partners around international law.

Question. What will you emphasize to Singapore when it comes to the South China Sea?

Answer. The PRC's increased assertiveness in the South China Sea presents a major challenge for all countries' security. Both the United States and Singapore have a national interest in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce in the South China Sea. If confirmed, I will encourage Singapore to continue to be a leading advocate in ASEAN for a meaningful Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China in the South China Sea that reinforces international law and does not seek to undermine the rights of claimants or third-party states.

Question. Where can the U.S. be more active in economic engagement in ASEAN member nations? Where can the U.S. cooperate with Singapore on this activity?

Answer. ASEAN's outlook on the Indo-Pacific closely aligns with our own. ASEAN is looking to increase U.S. support for trade and economic development to help its member states recover from COVID-19. During Vice President Harris's visit, she announced plans to join Singapore in expanding mutual efforts to promote smart, sustainable cities through the ASEAN Smart Cities Network and the U.S.-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership. This partnership will promote business-to-business cooperation and is a key component of demonstrating our commitment to ASEAN and its role at the heart of the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I will continue to support the United States' positive involvement in economic engagement through initiatives such as USAID's IGNITE program, which focuses on inclusive growth in ASEAN through innovation, trade, and e-commerce.

Question. Do you believe the United States should have a robust trade agenda in the Indo-Pacific?

Answer. Trade policy in the Indo-Pacific is a key part of the Biden-Harris administration's effort to Build Back Better. The administration's approach to trade is focused on supporting American working families, defending our values, and protecting the long-term prosperity and security of the United States. As President Biden has said, the United States is focused on making investments in U.S. workers and U.S. competitiveness before he signs new trade agreements, including in the Indo-Pacific.

Question. The VP launched a U.S.-Singapore Partnership for Growth and Innovation during her trip to the region in August. What do you think this partnership should look like, and what concrete steps can the U.S. take to deepen trade with Singapore?

Answer. The goal of the U.S.-Singapore "Partnership for Growth and Innovation" is to strengthen U.S.-Singapore trade and investment collaboration. It establishes a vehicle for deepening economic integration through government and private sector collaboration under four pillars: digital economy, energy and environmental technologies, advanced manufacturing, and healthcare. If confirmed, I will work with U.S. businesses and the Singaporean government to strengthen our trade and investment relations and take steps to promote inclusive economic growth, innovation and entrepreneurship, and shared prosperity in the United States and Singapore and throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Question. What are the opportunities for more technology cooperation with Singapore? Where do we still face major obstacles?

Answer. Under the “Partnership for Growth and Innovation,” the United States is committed to cooperating with Singapore in areas such as financial technology, cybersecurity, clean energy and climate change solutions, medical technologies, and artificial intelligence, and to discuss immediate and long-term challenges that face both of our economies, such as supply chain resilience. The United States and Singapore are also working together to promote smart, sustainable cities through the ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN) by promoting green building standards and co-funding a professional exchange program to share expertise with ASCN officials on water, energy, transportation, cybersecurity, and new technologies.

Question. How will you encourage Singapore to address the crisis in Burma? And ASEAN more broadly?

Answer. The United States values Singapore’s role as one of the founding members of ASEAN, and its advocacy for ASEAN centrality and unity. If confirmed, I will urge Singapore and other ASEAN members to hold the Burmese regime accountable to the Five-Point Consensus and urge the military to immediately cease the violence, release all those unjustly detained, and restore Burma’s path to inclusive democracy.

Question. The State Department has been asking Singapore to assess the Burmese military’s financial and other ties to Singapore. Burmese military officials have money in Singapore. They and their families travel there for education, medical treatment, business, and recreation. Do you commit to pressing Singapore on this issue?

Answer. The United States encourages all international partners, including Singapore, to review their financial ties to the Burmese military regime and ensure they are not directly or indirectly supporting the regime’s ability to rule through fear and violence. If confirmed, I will continue to urge all countries to review their economic leverage and ties to Burma to ensure they benefit only the people of Burma and not the military regime. I look forward to working with Singapore to achieve these goals.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO JONATHAN ERIC KAPLAN BY SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY

Question. If confirmed as Ambassador, will you commit to working with Singapore to put pressure on ASEAN to hold the military junta in Burma accountable for the coup and the violence that has ensued.

Answer. If confirmed, I will urge Singapore and other ASEAN members to hold the Burmese regime accountable to the Five-Point Consensus and urge the military to immediately cease the violence, release all those unjustly detained, and restore Burma’s path to inclusive democracy. If confirmed, I will continue to urge all countries to review their economic leverage and ties to Burma to ensure they benefit only the people of Burma and not the military regime.

Question. How can the United States and Singapore work together to assist other Southeast Asian nations in efforts to equitably transition to clean energy?

Answer. During Vice President Harris’ visit to Singapore in August 2021, the United States and Singapore launched a U.S.-Singapore Climate Partnership, through which both countries intend to work together to develop high-quality climate standards and increase regional ambition on sustainable finance, collaborate on financial sector climate and environmental risk management, support regional clean energy infrastructure development, improve sustainability of ports and shipping, and mobilize climate capital for climate mitigation and adaptation. The United States and Singapore can work together through this and other initiatives to prioritize this transition to clean energy to other counties in Southeast Asia.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO JONATHAN ERIC KAPLAN BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. The Strait of Malacca is the second busiest naval route in the world, and Singapore sits at the most strategic point within the strait. It would be considered by any navy the gateway to the South China Sea and therefore it is important that this area be open to international shipping and freedom of navigation. What is your assessment of Singapore's commitment to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea?

Answer. Singapore has a steadfast commitment to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. The United States and Singapore see eye-to-eye on the importance of compliance with the international law of the sea, including freedoms of navigation, overflight, and other lawful uses of the sea, and on the resolution of disputes in accordance with international law.

Question. How has Beijing tried to influence or bully Singapore to accept Chinese claims on the South China Sea?

Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has tried to coerce Singapore and other countries within the region to accept its claims in the South China Sea. Singapore is a strong supporter of international law and speaks broadly in support of the rules-based order. Singapore largely focuses its diplomatic efforts on buttressing ASEAN unity while pushing for quick progress in negotiations on a Code of Conduct between ASEAN and the PRC. While Singapore is not a claimant country in South China Sea territorial disputes, it regularly emphasizes the need for freedom of the seas and insists on the resolution of disputes in accordance with international law.

CORRESPONDENCE SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEE SUPPORTING
RAHM EMANUEL'S NOMINATION TO BE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN



TOM SCHIEFFER

October 1, 2021

Senator Robert Menendez
Senator James E. Risch
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Risch,

Please allow me to add my name to the many who are supporting President Biden's nomination of Rahm Emanuel to be the United States Ambassador to Japan.

As a Democrat who served in a Republican Administration and was twice unanimously confirmed by the Foreign Relations Committee first as Ambassador to Australia when Democrats were in the majority and second to Japan when Republicans were in the majority, I believe Rahm Emanuel understands the importance of keeping American foreign policy above politics.

North East Asia can be a dangerous place. It is absolutely critical to the future security and economic well-being of the United States. The rise of China, the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait all present challenges that must be managed with a sober, reasoned diplomacy. Rahm Emanuel has the capacity to play a central role in keeping the peace in that part of the world.

Rahm Emanuel is also uniquely qualified to become our Ambassador to Japan. He understands that the US-Japan Alliance is the keystone to America's foreign policy in the Pacific and the stability of Asia. His experience as a leader in Congress and White House Chief of Staff will be invaluable to his success. He will know how to get things done in Washington for the Alliance and our country.

It is with great confidence that I believe Rahm Emanuel's intellect, knowledge and work ethic will make him a successful advocate for America in Japan as our nation's Ambassador. My hope is that the Senate will soon confirm him so that he can begin his vital work for our country. Thank you for your consideration.

With respect,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Tom Schieffer".

Tom Schieffer

Senator Bob Menendez
Chair
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
423 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

October 11, 2021

Dear Senator Menendez,

I am writing to provide a statement of support for the appointment of former Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel to be United States Ambassador to Japan. Mayor Emanuel is an outstanding choice for United States Ambassador to Japan for many reasons. I have had the opportunity to work with him in a wide variety of settings over the course of a decade: as President and CEO of the Chicago Urban League, where I served for 5 years following a five year term on the board of the National Urban League; as a member of the Chicago Board of Education; as member of the Chicago Police Board; as Deputy Mayor and Chief Neighborhood Development Officer and as CEO of World Business Chicago, the city's economic development organization.

I have worked with Mayor Emanuel on the development and implementation of policies and strategies aimed at improving the quality of life and access to opportunity for all Chicagoans and I know from first-hand experience that he is fully aligned with the Biden/Harris administration's commitment to diversity, equity, inclusion, and access. Let me provide just one example from the many I have observed. When I was CEO of the Chicago Urban League, I had the opportunity to partner with the Emanuel administration on the reconstruction of the Red Line South. At Mayor Emanuel's direction, the Chicago Transit Authority worked with the Urban League to create a model for minority inclusion. We doubled the MWBE contracting requirement on the \$425 Million infrastructure investment, set a new standard for community-based minority hiring, and neighborhoods on the South Side were first in line for modernized mass transit.

Mayor Emanuel also has had substantial prior experience that makes him particularly well suited for this appointment. Again, just one example of many I could give. During my time as President and CEO of World Business Chicago, I travelled with former Mayor Emanuel to Japan on an economic development mission where he signed an economic development agreement between Chicago and Japan, the country's first ever with a city. During that trip former Mayor Emanuel had positive interactions with government, business and civic leaders in Japan and developed relationships that will serve him well as he steps into the role of US Ambassador.

Finally, I have seen Mayor Emanuel effectively work, meet, connect and engage with people from every conceivable background and walk of life. From residents in some of Chicago's most challenged communities, to local, state, national and international government officials, to CEO's of some of our region's and country's largest companies. His ability to listen and identify areas of common ground is a tremendous asset that he will bring to the role.

For these reasons and more, I wholeheartedly endorse Mayor Emanuel's appointment as United States Ambassador to Japan and urge you to confirm him for the role.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Andrea L. Zopp". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Andrea" being the most prominent part.

Andrea L. Zopp

October 8, 2021

The Honorable Bob Menendez
Chair
Foreign Relations Committee
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable James Risch
Ranking Member
Foreign Relations Committee
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

RE: Supporting President Joseph R. Biden's Nomination of Rahm Emanuel for
United States Ambassador to Japan

Dear Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Risch:

We write today in support of President Joseph R. Biden's nomination of former Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel for Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Japan.

As leaders of the Chicago City Council, having worked alongside Mayor Rahm Emanuel during his eight years of service to the City of Chicago—a city with its own spot on the international stage—we are certain that his service as Ambassador to Japan will provide America with a committed and loyal ally. We have seen firsthand his passion for all people of Chicago and his dedication to public service.

As Mayor, Rahm Emanuel was committed to every community in Chicago—especially those that lacked representation. He created the Neighborhood Opportunity Fund (NOF), which leveraged downtown growth to make direct investments in commercial corridors across the city's South, West and Southwest Side neighborhoods—a fund that lifted up entrepreneurs of color, who make up 75 percent of the recipients. He worked to bring the first Whole Foods grocery store to the South Side community of Englewood, eliminating a food desert that deprived families of fresh produce and healthy foods.

Mayor Emanuel supported numerous other projects that provided economic support and employment opportunities to Chicago's South and West Side communities. One such project, the \$9 million Carter G. Woodson Regional Library renovation, not only served as a community hub for South Side residents but is also home to one of the largest collections of African American historical documents in the country. On the West Side in Addams/Merrill Park, he led the development of the Exelon Student Recreation Center. He also spearheaded the creation of The Hatchery, a food incubator that helps Chicago entrepreneurs build and grow their businesses.


Mayor Emanuel's efforts to create a longer school day and school year added up to four more years of valuable class time for Chicago's students. He achieved record investments in Chicago

Public Schools (CPS) and fought for free universal full-day pre-kindergarten and free community college for hardworking CPS graduates.


Prior to Mayor Emanuel's election, Chicago's infrastructure suffered from years of neglect. He approached the problem innovatively, saving \$75 million dollars in costs when rebuilding the south branch of the Chicago Transit Authority Red Line and investing those savings into enhancing stations along the line, turning many into places where communities could find inspiration in art and togetherness. He also invested \$35 billion dollars in construction and renovation plans for schools, parks, transit and water/sewer main replacement, creating an estimated 150,000 jobs—many of which were good-paying union jobs.

Mayor Emanuel's decades of public service, as well as his energy and tenacity for tirelessly representing the interests of his constituents, have prepared him well for this important mission on behalf of the United States. There are few nominees more qualified or committed to the President's goal of returning America to the world stage in a position of strength and moral leadership. We urge the Senate to approve his nomination and give our country a dedicated leader who will serve us all in our strategically important ally of Japan.

Sincerely,




Jason C. Ervin
Chairman, Chicago Aldermanic Black Caucus
Alderman, 28th Ward



Michael Scott, Jr.
Secretary, Chicago Aldermanic Black Caucus
Alderman, 24th Ward



Greg Mitchell
Treasurer, Chicago Aldermanic Black Caucus
Alderman, 7th Ward



Howard Brookins, Jr.
Former Chairman Chicago Aldermanic Black Caucus
Alderman, 21st Ward



Michelle Harris
Executive Committee, Chicago Aldermanic Black Caucus
Alderman, 8th Ward



Stephanie Coleman
Executive Committee, Chicago Aldermanic Black Caucus
Alderman, 16th Ward



Walter Burnett, Jr.
Alderman, 27th Ward



Emma Mitts
Alderman, 37th Ward



Anthony Beale
Alderman, 9th Ward



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LONNIE R. STEPHENSON
International President

KENNETH W. COOPER
International
Secretary-Treasurer

October 12, 2021

VIA EMAIL

The Honorable Robert Menendez
Chairman
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
423 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable James Risch
Ranking Member
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
423 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Risch:

On behalf of the more than 775,000 active and retired members of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), I write to express the IBEW's support for the confirmation of Rahm Emanuel to serve as the United States Ambassador to Japan.

In a wide-ranging career spanning government service as well as private industry, Rahm Emanuel has always focused his considerable energy and skills on finding common ground. As mayor of Chicago from 2011 to 2019, his policies supported critical job growth for IBEW members and other skilled workers, resulting in more project labor agreements than any other city in the United States. His instrumental leadership succeeded in bringing new manufacturing jobs to Chicago's underserved communities.

From the helm of one of America's most storied towns to the halls of the West Wing for two presidents, Mayor Emanuel has proven his ability to accommodate unique and sometimes competing perspectives. Indeed, Mayor Emanuel's experience dealing with multiple and oftentimes conflicting parties will serve America's interest well in Japan and Northeast Asia, which are critical for American trade and national security.

On behalf of the IBEW and its members, I ask the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to confirm Mayor Emanuel as U.S. Ambassador to Japan, where he can further our nation's goal of emphasizing common interests and a commitment to freedom, democracy, and a fair economic order for this essential Pacific partnership.

Sincerely yours,

Lonnie R. Stephenson
International President

LRS:jl



From: [Nye, Joseph S.](#)
To: [Ryan, John L.](#)
Subject: Confirmation of Rahm Emanuel
Date: Friday, October 1, 2021 7:28:15 AM

Dear Mr. Ryan,

I am writing in support of the nomination of Rahm Emanuel to be ambassador to Japan. I hope you will convey my letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Dear Senators,

I am writing in support of the nomination of Rahm Emanuel to be ambassador to Japan. I regard this as a very strong appointment which will be of great importance for our country.

As Senator (and later Ambassador) Mike Mansfield once said, there is no more important relationship for our country than our alliance with Japan. When I was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Clinton administration, I repeated the senator's wisdom in our *East Asia Strategy Report*. I also helped to prepare the Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration of 1996 which stated that the US-Japan alliance was the basis for stability in post Cold War Asia. What was true then is more true than ever today as we cope with the rise of Chinese power.

The most important skill of an ambassador is knowledge of the people and politics of our own country, and in this domain, Rahm is unsurpassed. This skill is more important to the relationship than regional expertise. Rahm is a quick study and has already begun his homework in that domain, but no regional expert could ever equal the knowledge he has accumulated through his extensive experience in Washington and Chicago. That is why I regard this as such a distinguished and important appointment. He will be taken very seriously in Tokyo and the United States will be strongly represented.

I have devoted a good deal of my professional career to thinking about the balance of power in Asia and to nurturing the US-Japan alliance. As a frequent visitor to Japan, I am familiar with Japanese views of the United States

and of China. That is why I was so delighted when I learned of President Biden's nomination of Rahm Emanuel, and why I hope you will confirm him. We need him in Tokyo.

Sincerely,

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
University Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus
Harvard Kennedy School of Government
Cambridge, MA

(312) 454-1340
FAX (312) 454-1528

MEETS 1st THURSDAY NIGHT OF EACH MONTH

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

LOCAL NUMBER 134
2722 SOUTH DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. DRIVE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60616



October 1, 2021

Dear Chairman Menendez,

We write with enthusiastic support of the nomination of Rahm Emanuel as Ambassador to Japan.

As Mayor of Chicago, Rahm Emanuel worked hard every day to bring jobs to Chicago's neighborhoods. His administration's commitment to growth and jobs resulted in Chicago leading the nation in direct foreign investment for seven years in a row.

This hard work and dedication led to critical jobs for our members. During his tenure, Chicago had more project labor agreements than any other city in the United States. The impact can be further felt in the number of new and expanded training facilities that our organization built during this era of growth. We are all proud to say that most of these facilities are located in neighborhoods most in need of investment and jobs.

Just as important, Mayor Emanuel was always an honest broker and trusted partner with us. Even on issues where we may have disagreed, he always gave us a chance and a seat at the table. He took the time to hear our concerns and consider our side of the discussion. He always had an open door when working with us.

We believe that Rahm Emanuel is an excellent choice for Ambassador to Japan and commend President Joe Biden on this choice.

Sincerely

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Donald Finn".

Donald Finn
Business Manager/Financial Secretary
IBEW Local 134

<http://www.lu134.org>



OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS SECRETARY OF STATE
JESSE WHITE • Illinois Secretary of State

September 29, 2021

The Honorable Robert Menendez
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
528 Hart Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Menendez:

I am writing to voice my support for Rahm Emanuel's nomination as ambassador to Japan. I have worked with him and know him to be an effective leader who gets things done.

As the former mayor of Chicago and the former White House Chief of Staff to President Barack Obama, Mayor Emanuel brings a wealth of experience and leadership skills that will allow him to thrive in such a prominent diplomatic role.

In Rahm Emanuel, President Biden has nominated a tested and an adept public servant who will represent the United States with dignity and diplomacy. I wholeheartedly support his nomination.

Thank you for your time, and please accept my best wishes as you continue to serve our country.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jesse White".

Jesse White
Illinois Secretary of State

Pastor Marvin Hunter
P. O. Box 23344
Chicago, IL 60623
(773) 816-4952
pastormarvinhunter133@msn.com
Walterhunter133@gmail.com

September 11, 2021

To: THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.

My name is Reverend Marvin Hunter, Senior Pastor of the Grace Memorial Baptist Church in Chicago Illinois. I'm also the great uncle of Laquan McDonald, a young man who at the age of 17 years old was slain by ex-Chicago Police Officer, Jason Van Dyke.

I am writing this letter in support of Rahm Emanuel, former Mayor of the City of Chicago and current Nominee of President Joe Biden as Ambassador to Japan.

From my pulpit in the North Lawndale neighborhood of Chicago I preach the teachings of the prophets. My parishioners and I hearken back to the words of Amos, who called for "justice to roll down like waters, and righteousness like a mighty stream." Justice is what I have sought for the murder of my nephew, Laquan McDonald, and a measure of justice is being served as the former Chicago police officer convicted of Laquan's murder sits in prison for his heinous crime.

In addition to justice, my faith is based on redemption and forgiveness and I have always believed in the power of turning misery into meaning. That is why, through an intermediary, I reached out to the former Mayor. I wanted to share with him the depths of the wounds of my family's pain and trauma and discuss police reform and the racial reckoning we are witnessing in America. His response was immediate, open and genuinely engaging. During our many conversations, we listened to each other, we prayed together and I believe we begin the process of healing. There is more to this individual than the caricature that is presented in the public. I felt what is in his heart and I know him to be a decent and honorable man who is willing to listen, eager to learn and show a deep level of compassion.

As Mayor, Rahm Emanuel inherited a deeply flawed system and set of policies as it relates to police misconduct investigations. That system over the decades had become twisted in a way that kept an incidence buried. For decades, this was the case in Chicago and cities all across the country and in many ways exists today, certainly his administration could have acted more quickly to address these issues and rebuild trust in our communities. He has acknowledged as much and more in public as well as in our private conversations.

I stand in solidarity with those in the reform movement who carry the torch for Laquan's memory, and the blessed memories of George Floyd, Ahmad Aubrey, Brianna Taylor, and countless other black lives that have been taken too soon by those who were sworn to serve and protect them. However, I draw the line when it is clear that certain elected officials are using the sacred memory of my nephew to settle political scores or use his name as a weapon to fight intra-party battles. Most of the "outrage" and the perpetuation of conspiracy theories comes from elected officials who have never contacted my family to offer even the simplest condolences or learn about the events surrounding this tragic incident.

I realize that my position on this nomination might come as a surprise to some. I may even be attacked for speaking up. However, I am a man of faith. I believe in what the scripture says about righteous judgment and looking into a person's heart. I have taken the time to get to know Rahm Emanuel. We have listened to each other, truly heard each other. I understand the character of the man and that is why I support this nomination.
I thank you for your consideration of this letter.

Rev. M. G. Hunter.


Great Uncle of Laquan McDonald.



October 21, 2021

The Honorable Bob Menendez
Chair
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington D.C.
20510

Chairman Menendez:

The murder of teenager Laquan McDonald by a Chicago Police Officer in October 2014 continues to have raw immediacy for those who have borne the brunt of generations of the misuse of police authority in Chicago and the United States. The shooting and its aftermath prompted a long past due local and national reckoning respecting the overwhelmingly disproportionate, and in too many contexts, targeted use of officially sanctioned force against Black and brown people. That reckoning has come this time with a consciousness raising about the centrality of officially sanctioned use of force as dating to the formative stages of our country and the original sin of slavery, which was institutionalized in the Founder's Constitution, and whose legacy resides in institutionalized racism and implicit bias in our society today, with continuing tragic consequence reflected in the wrongful taking of the lives of Black and brown Americans by police officers in this nation. One aspect of the reckoning following the release of the video of Laquan McDonald's murder is that our history has fostered a profound mistrust not only of police, but of elected officials, and particularly the elected leaders of our cities under whose stewardship police departments operate.

The Senate confirmation process for the nomination of former Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel to be U.S. Ambassador to Japan has resurrected questions that are still actively debated in Chicago regarding his responsibility for the state of the Chicago Police Department during his tenure as Mayor, and most significantly, whether he engaged in a "cover-up" of the shooting by keeping the police body-worn camera videos from the public. As a matter of fact, and given the state of the public record, the questions are appropriate. However, as a matter of premise and accusation by those inveighing against his nomination because of a surmised role in a suspected "cover-up," they are not fair, because they are not grounded in fact, because the facts simply do not exist. I know. I was the Inspector General for the City of Chicago leading the office which investigated the City's handling of the aftermath of the McDonald murder. Inspectors General have as one of their core charges,

the responsibility of investigating and reporting out findings of misconduct, whether of a criminal or administrative nature. What they do not, in general practice, do is report out what they do not find. As a result, the context of existing public record should be understood as much for its negative space, as it is for its affirmatively declared space. I write to address, as a matter of fact, and for the record, the negative space within which factually unsubstantiated surmise, suspicion and narrative has been forged.

In the immediate aftermath of the release of the McDonald videos, then-Mayor Emanuel did three things of particular note. First, he formed and charged the Chicago Police Accountability Task Force (PATF) to independently conduct a full inquiry into and publicly report out its findings on the practices and culture of the Chicago Police Department and their implications in the communities it serves, foremost the impact on Black and brown communities. Which is precisely what the PATF did, without constraint or filter, and as led, at Emanuel's request, by one of his more trenchant critics -- who would eventually succeed him as Mayor. The PATF's findings and recommendations were reported out nationally and to much acclaim for their candor in pulling back the cover on the lived experience of those who have directly and indirectly, over generations, experienced the consequences of aggressive and oppressive historical policing practice and culture. The work of the Emanuel-appointed and charged Task Force was independent and unconstrained. Then-Mayor Emanuel, to his eventual discomfort, asked that the truth be found and reported, with the chips to fall where they may. I know this as affirmative fact, as I too -- an Inspector General with whom he was, in the ordinary course of business, at occasional, and respectful, if at times vociferous and heated odds over findings and recommendations of my office's independently conducted investigations and audits -- was a member of the PATF, along with notable others that included, in advisory capacity, former head of the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Section and ex-Massachusetts Governor, and Chicago native Deval Patrick. The work of the PATF was conducted separately but coordinately to the pattern and practice investigation of the Civil Rights Section of the United States Department of Justice, whose findings were consistent with and as it related specifically to use of force, complementary to and a further expansion of those of the PATF.

Second, he declared, decried and demanded an end to something few if any elected leaders in the United States had previously acknowledged -- the operation of a so-called "code of silence in the Chicago Police Department (and many law enforcement agencies) in which by culture and practice, often as much through acquiescent inaction as action, sworn personnel close ranks and protect their colleagues who they know to have engaged in misconduct. While some were skeptical of Mayor Emanuel's naming of that pernicious acculturated phenomenon as wrought only of political crisis, what was little acknowledged was that in

doing so, he exposed the City to litigative complication (and, with it, potential financial consequence). Stated another way, he chose a principled over a transactional path. I know. As a former federal prosecutor and as Inspector General with investigative and program audit oversight of the Chicago Police Department, I know from experience the effect the acknowledgement of this pernicious cultural practice has on the litigation of Section 1983 and Monell civil rights claims against a city and its employees and officials.

Third, and most critical to the question of the moment, Mayor Emanuel encouraged and supported a thoroughgoing independent investigation of the conduct of CPD, its sworn personnel and, to the extent indicated, other City officials, respecting the handling of the aftermath of the McDonald shooting by the Office of Inspector General. That investigation, which I led, proceeded without interference, and yielded findings and recommendations of the firing of 11 Chicago police officers and lesser sanctions for 6 others. That investigation and outcome, in addition to the unprecedented successful prosecution and conviction of the shooter, former Officer Jason Van Dyke, constitutes one of the largest scandals in the scandal-ridden history of CPD, which is now going through the wrenching, long-term process of reform under the terms of a federal consent decree. In all of these respects, Mayor Emanuel was fully supportive of a comprehensive inquiry resulting in full accountability, again, letting the chips fall where the evidence indicated. In fact, the investigation revealed the subtle tacit ways in which a “code of silence” operates.

To my earlier point about the need to address the negative space, my office’s comprehensive investigation did not reveal any evidence that would support the lingering surmises and accusations of a “cover-up” orchestrated out of City Hall. None. Decisions made about the non- or delayed- disclosure of the body-worn camera videos at that time were in fact the longstanding policy and practice of the City of Chicago and its Law Department. That policy and practice as it existed then may fairly be questioned, and, indeed, was the subject of a near unprecedented video release policy implemented in February 2016 by Mayor Emanuel, acting immediately in response to the first-issued recommendation of the PATF. That said, there is a complete absence of factual basis to support the claim that Mayor Emanuel was involved directly or indirectly in a “cover-up” of the McDonald shooting videos.

I offer this statement strictly to assure a complete and accurate factual record for the Committee on a very important question that remains open because it resides as a matter of record to this point, in negative, i.e., undeclared, space. The conjecture drawn from that negative space is not supported by any evidence and, as such, may best be understood as a symptom of the very mistrust the public has of police, policing and government that are at

the core of so many of our present societal ills and challenges. I therefore hope my offering clarifies the factual public record and as such is of service to the Committee in these important deliberations.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, consisting of a stylized 'J' followed by a horizontal line that extends to the right and then curves slightly upwards.

Joseph M. Ferguson
Inspector General (2009-2021)
City of Chicago