

**PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND GREAT LAKES REGION**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2014

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:21 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Menendez, Boxer, Coons, Markey, Corker, Risch, Johnson, Flake, McCain, and Barrasso.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY**

The CHAIRMAN. Good afternoon. This hearing will come to order.

We want to welcome our panelists, and our distinguished colleague who is doing an incredible job as special envoy. We welcome him back not only to the Senate, but to this committee, where he served with such distinction and had a passion for Africa that is still evident today. And welcome to all of our distinguished panelists and guests, and to Mr. Affleck for clearly drawing so much attention to this important international issue. [Laughter.]

Now, I say that on a serious note. Mr. Affleck has pursued his interests in the eastern Congo with thoughtfulness and seriousness of purpose, over nine trips, and so we appreciate him in that context.

We are here to shed light on the best way forward to end the horrific violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Over the last two decades, over 5 million people have been killed, hundreds of thousands more displaced. There have been brutal killings, continued recruitment and conscription of child soldiers, and horrendous acts of sexual violence against women and girls.

The M23 rebellion was just the latest iteration of a long conflict that has stalled economic development and destroyed the social fabric of communities in eastern Congo. I commend the work of the international group of envoys, including our own special envoy, as I said, a good friend and former colleague, Senator Feingold, as well as regional players like Uganda for their efforts to promote political reconciliation in the DRC.

But the apparent end of the M23 rebellion has not ended the violence. The latest U.N. group of experts report documented evidence of continued recruitment by the M23 and the regional threat posed

by the FDLR, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, by Kata Katanga, by various Mai-Mai militias and by dozens of other groups.

At the end of the day, the international community must send a clear and forceful message that the era of impunity for those who commit human rights violations is over. I commend the Congolese Government for taking the first important step with the passage of a new amnesty law that seeks to hold those who have committed acts of genocide fully accountable. There is, however, much more to do.

Before I turn to our distinguished ranking member, I am pleased that we are joined today by Dr. Denis Mukwege, founder of the Panzi Hospital in Bukavu. Dr. Mukwege has been a tireless advocate for human rights and the rights of women. Both he and the Panzi Hospital are internationally known for being there 24/7 for survivors of sexual violence. So, Doctor, I would ask you to stand and be recognized. We do not do that often, but this is an extraordinary feat. Thank you very much.

[Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you, Doctor, for being with us today. I ask unanimous consent that the Doctor's prepared statement be submitted for the record. Without objection, so ordered.

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—Dr. Mukwege's prepared statement can be found in the "Additional Material Submitted for the Record" section at the end of this hearing.]

His statement and our panelists' testimony will help to answer the questions before us. What is their assessment of the security situation in the east since the end of the M23 rebellion? Do other armed groups pose a threat to the Congolese Government and civilian populations? What are the economic and political dimensions of the conflict? What is the current status of political reconciliation under the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process? And what role will other regional actors play? And how can the United States Government best continue to support regional and international efforts toward peace and stability in the African Great Lakes Region?

So again, with our thanks to all of our panelists, let me turn to the distinguished ranking Republican, Senator Corker.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE**

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much you having this hearing today.

And I want to thank Senator Feingold for coming back. We talked in the back room about his passion for this issue and his interest. I appreciate you being here with much lesser known witnesses behind you. And I do thank them, by the way, all of them, for their input later. But it is great for our Nation that we have people, because of who they are, able to generate so much interest in an issue.

So, again, I thank you for this hearing.

For about 14 years now, the international community has sought, without much success, to bring some resolution to the conflict that has extracted such a terrible toll on the people of DRC. Since 2000, the United States has devoted about \$10 billion to the DRC in humanitarian assistance, development assistance, and peacekeeping contributions. Additional U.S. assistance is contributed through multilateral contributions of the World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank. The peacekeeping mission is the largest and most expensive in the world at over \$1 billion a year.

Yet, I am concerned that we have not seen the progress to show for all of these investments. Rebel groups continue to terrorize civilians, the governments, and the armies of the region—including that of the DRC—continue to act as criminal syndicates plundering the country and causing needless human suffering.

While we have seen glimmers of hope in this past year with the signing of the 2013 framework agreement—and we thank you for your efforts in that regard—and the M23’s announcement that it was ending its rebellion, this is a fragile accord, as we all know, and one that is being implemented very slowly. The framework agreement is an opportunity that I know the administration has worked hard to make real and one that we do not want to slip away.

I am also aware that this is not something over which the United States has full control by any stretch of the imagination. Yet, as we look ahead, I want to know that we are doing all that we can to make sure that the next 13 years in the DRC are not like the last 13. And I thank all of you for your efforts in that regard.

So I look forward to exploring these issues with you more in depth. I want to thank all the distinguished witnesses for being here today and look forward to your testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me, before I turn to Senator Feingold, recognize someone who has done incredible work for us as the full committee, the chairman of the Africa Subcommittee, Senator Coons. I appreciate your very significant, thoughtful work on the committee, joined by Senator Flake in a bipartisan spirit, and we look forward to hearing your insights during the course of this hearing.

With that, let me turn to our first witness. During 18 distinguished years in the Senate, he served on, and led, the African Affairs Subcommittee, and we look forward to his perspective as the special envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa and the DRC. Senator Feingold, as you know, your full statement will be included in the record, and we ask you to summarize it in 5 minutes or so. But, you know, we certainly want to hear from you so that we can enter into a dialogue and get some questions and perspectives from you on the ground. And with that, we welcome you back to the committee and are looking forward to hearing your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE GREAT LAKES REGION AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. It is good to be back, and thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members

of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to testify today on the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes region.

As you know, the security and humanitarian situation in the DRC has long been one of the most volatile in Africa.

I do want to say, though, looking at the region today, I am cautiously optimistic about the road ahead. The highest levels of the U.S. Government are now committed to helping the DRC and the Great Lakes region realize peace and development. President Obama's and Secretary Kerry's decision to appoint a full-time special envoy to the Great Lakes is just one testament to their commitment to maintaining high-level, sustained attention to the region.

And I want to say that the support of the State Department in my efforts has been tremendous. I was on the other side of this for many years, and it is something to be on the inside and see the incredibly hard-working and talented people you have to support you in a complicated task like this.

Since early September of last year, I have made seven trips to the region to try to bring sustained attention and a comprehensive approach to resolving the crisis in the Great Lakes. Today we are seeing progress in addressing the threat from armed groups and also in furthering a regionally led peace process. We are also, I think, seeing the region's attitude toward the United States improve in recognition of our consistent high-level engagement.

The last time the State Department testified on the DRC in December 2012, the Congo was actually consumed by the M23 rebellion. Since then, there has been significant international focus on the Great Lakes, including the signature of the 13 countries to the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Great Lakes, which you mentioned, and also the appointment of U.N. Special Envoy Mary Robinson.

I can thankfully report that in response to combined military and political pressures, the M23 ended its rebellion on November 5 of last year. This important outcome was a result of military pressure on the M23, diplomatic pressure in the region, but also the successful conclusion of the Kampala Dialogue between the M23 and the DRC Government. After months of stalemate between the parties, I joined my fellow envoys from the U.N., the AU, and the EU in traveling to Kampala last September to try to get this impasse out of the way. We subsequently made repeated trips to engage directly with the parties over the contents of what became known as the Nairobi Declarations, which the M23 and the DRC Government signed on December 12, 2013, and which set out the conditions for the demobilization of the M23.

Now, having said that, there are three key steps to building on this recent progress in the DRC: implementing those Nairobi Declarations, furthering the framework peace process, and also undertaking domestic reforms within the DRC. And I list these not in any particular order of priority. They are all three equally important and must be pursued simultaneously.

First, on the Nairobi Declarations, the DRC Government fulfilled one of its primary commitments just a few days ago by promulgating a law which grants amnesty for the act of insurrection to those individuals who actually renounce rebellion. But—and this is

critical—the law does not grant amnesty for war crimes or for crimes against humanity or other human rights abuses. And this is different from the other peace agreements in the past. The Nairobi Declarations call for accountability and leave no room for impunity, which in the past has just sown the seeds for future rebellions, as Senator Corker was alluding to in his remarks.

I was encouraged during my recent trip to the DRC to hear that the government also is very likely to support mixed chambers. These are hybrid courts that would be staffed and supported by both the DRC and also international personnel and which would significantly aid in the fight against impunity.

The next important step in implementing the declarations is ensuring that the hundreds of ex-M23 combatants who are currently in the DRC and Uganda and Rwanda actually complete the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process. It is known as DDR. We are actively engaging the DRC Government regarding the urgency of implementing an effective DDR plan for not only the M23 but also for the dozens of other armed groups that were still active in eastern Congo. The DRC has an unprecedented opportunity to capitalize on the willingness of thousands of combatants to demobilize. However, I will say this. If the government does not act soon, it risks having these ex-combatants regroup or join other armed groups.

The second point. Beyond the declarations in Nairobi, the Great Lakes region needs to continue robust implementation of the broader framework peace process. We commend U.N. Special Envoy Robinson's stewardship of the process and the substantial progress that has been made to date. We believe that fulfilling the framework's overarching objectives will also require key signatories to undertake a broader political dialogue aimed at identifying and resolving the regional root causes of this very complicated conflict.

And actually sort of a surprising but very promising thing happened just in January of this year, and that is the budding dialogue led by Angolan President dos Santos who assumed the chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes last month. I had a chance to witness in Rwanda during his first day as Chair that President dos Santos convened, after having no particular plan to do so in advance, the Presidents of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and South Africa to discuss the FDLR, which is an armed group led by the former Rwanda genocidaires which has plagued the eastern Congo and Rwanda for more than a decade. My fellow envoys and I, as well as regional leaders, were pleasantly pleased and saw in this meeting the potential start to the needed broader dialogue. We strongly support and encourage Angola's role in facilitating a regionally owned and initiated dialogue under the auspices of the framework and stand ready to support President dos Santos in furthering it.

Finally, the third issue. While ending the M23 rebellion was a critical step, the DRC still has much, much more it needs to do to stabilize and secure the country, including comprehensive security sector and governance reform. For starters, the DRC needs to immediately ramp up its preparations for upcoming elections if it is to avoid a repeat of the seriously flawed 2011 elections. It is critical for the trajectory and credibility of the country that these next elec-

tions, the local, provincial, and national elections, over the next few years be credible and meet international election standards. If we are serious about prioritizing democratization, we should also consider identifying additional funds to ensure adequate support for upcoming elections.

On security, the government has to do more to ensure members of the security forces are professionally trained, adequately paid, and respectful of human rights. While the FARDC experienced a commendable victory against the M23, it continues to be hampered sometimes by ineffective command and control, limited resources, corruption, and poor military planning capability. The DRC Government and MONUSCO also need to follow up the defeat of the M23 by applying equal military pressure on other armed groups, starting with the FDLR and the ADF. Indeed, we are hopeful that the FARDC and MONUSCO will launch robust operations against the FDLR soon.

Despite these challenges, Mr. Chairman, I reiterate my previous assertion that I am cautiously optimistic about the road ahead for the DRC and the Great Lakes. The DRC is at a crossroads but has a real opportunity to realize the peace and prosperity that has evaded it for far too long.

So thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to testify today on the recent progress in and continuing challenges facing the African Great Lakes Region and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and our comprehensive efforts to support the region in resolving the root causes of conflict and instability.

As you know, the security and humanitarian situation in the DRC has long been one of the most volatile in Africa. An estimated 5 million people have lost their lives since 1998, millions more have been displaced, and billions of dollars have been spent trying to stabilize the region. Looking at the region today, however, I am cautiously optimistic about the road ahead, while recognizing that myriad challenges still stand in the way of lasting peace and stability.

The highest levels of the U.S. Government are committed to helping the DRC and the Great Lakes region permanently break the cycle of violence and realize its democratic and economic potential. President Obama's and Secretary Kerry's appointment of a full-time special envoy is a testament to their commitment to maintaining high-level attention on this region. On my own part, I have made seven trips to the region in 6 months, meeting repeatedly with heads of state, civil society, and our donor partners to bring sustained attention and a comprehensive approach to resolving the crisis in the Great Lakes. Today, we are seeing progress in addressing the threat from armed groups and in furthering the regionally led peace process. We are also seeing the region's attitude toward the United States improve in recognition of our consistent high-level engagement.

SITUATIONAL UPDATE

The last time the State Department testified on the DRC in December 2012, the country was consumed by the M23 rebellion and the capture of Goma had raised grave doubts about the ability of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the DRC, called MONUSCO, to protect civilians against the threat of armed groups. I can thankfully report that the outlook today is very different. In response to combined military and political pressures, the M23 was defeated and formally ended its rebellion last November.

Three key developments contributed to the military defeat of the M23. First, the DRC Government put in place more operationally effective and accountable military officers in the embattled region of North Kivu, helping to overcome previous reluctance by the DRC military, or FARDC, to pursue the M23. Second, last March, the

U.N. Security Council approved the establishment within MONUSCO of the first regionally led, 3,000-troop-strong Intervention Brigade, or IB, composed of troops from Tanzania, Malawi, and South Africa. We strongly supported this more explicit Chapter VII mandate in an effort to increase MONUSCO's capability to protect civilians by more robustly targeting armed groups. The IB provided critical support to the FARDC and helped to successfully protect civilians and defend Goma during the M23's attacks last year. Third, as the U.N. Group of Experts and other reporting indicates, outside support to the M23 decreased toward the end of the rebellion. We believe this was in part the result of sustained, high-level diplomatic and financial pressure on Rwanda to cease support for the M23.

The political resolution of the M23 rebellion, on the other hand, came via the Kampala Dialogue, successfully facilitated by Uganda in its role as chair of the regional organization the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, or the ICGLR. While the Kampala Dialogue started in December 2012, it lagged for months in large part because of the lack of sufficient military pressure on and continued external support to the M23. However, the talks gained traction last fall when the M23 was forced to drop its more unrealistic demands in the face of increased military pressure from the FARDC and MONUSCO. The Ugandan Government's continued engagement throughout this period also is commendable; had they given up when talks lagged, we might have seen a very different outcome.

I also believe the eventual success of the Kampala Dialogue was a result of the added participation of a set of five international envoys—U.N. Special Envoy Mary Robinson, the Special Representative of the Secretary General Martin Kobler, Special Representative for the African Union Boubacar Diarra, Senior Coordinator for the European Union Koen Vervaeke, and me. Prior to last September, the international community had not participated in the Kampala Dialogue, or even been allowed in the room during the substantive negotiations. This changed last September, when during the envoys' first joint trip to the region, we met with the DRC and the M23 delegations in an effort to overcome the stalemate in the talks and pressure the parties toward an internationally acceptable outcome. We subsequently made repeated trips to Kampala, engaging directly with the parties over the contents of an eventual peace arrangement. I believe the active participation of the envoys was a key turning point in the Kampala Dialogue.

The Kampala Dialogue concluded on December 12, 2013, with the M23s and the DRC Government's signing of their respective Nairobi Declarations, which among other things, set out the conditions for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the M23 into Congolese society, and called for those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity to be held accountable. Unlike previous agreements between the DRC Government and rebel groups that failed to hold up over time or achieve lasting stability, the Nairobi Declarations do not grant blanket amnesty to the M23 for mass atrocities and do not provide for the reintegration of the M23 as a group into the DRC military. The Declarations have yet to be fully implemented, however, and M23 fighters and leaders remain spread out in Uganda, Rwanda, and the DRC. Thus, while the official end of the M23 rebellion is promising, the long-term success of the declarations will be dependent on the parties' prompt and full implementation of their commitments, as well as the cooperation of neighboring countries in supporting the implementation of these commitments.

Similarly, the continuation of the positive momentum gained from the end of the M23 rebellion is dependent on the region's implementation of the broader Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework Agreement, signed a year ago by the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and an unprecedented 10 other countries in the region, and signed by the U.N., the AU, the ICGLR, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as guarantors. We believe the Framework, which sets out commitments by the DRC, the region, and the international community, provides the Great Lakes with the best opportunity to resolve the root causes of conflict, if participating governments maintain the political will necessary to implement their commitments.

NEXT STEPS

Looking forward, there are three key next steps to building on recent progress in the DRC and to preventing backsliding. I list these not in order of priority, as all three are equally important and must be pursued simultaneously. The first is following up on the Kampala Dialogue with the full implementation of the Nairobi Declarations. Second is the advancement of the Framework peace process, including through broader political dialogue between and among key signatory states. And third, and perhaps the most challenging, is undertaking domestic reforms within the DRC.

I. Followup to the Kampala Dialogue

On the Nairobi Declarations, the DRC Government has already fulfilled one of its primary commitments by promulgating the recent amnesty law, which grants amnesty for the act of insurrection on a case-by-case basis to those individuals who renounce rebellion. The law does not grant amnesty for war crimes, crimes against humanity, sexual violence, the recruitment of child soldiers, or other human rights abuses. The envoys played a key role during the Kampala Dialogue in ensuring that unlike previous peace arrangements, the Nairobi Declarations do not provide for impunity, which has in the past sown the seeds for future rebellions.

In this same vein, I was encouraged, during my trip to the DRC last month, to hear a variety of Congolese express support for mixed chambers—hybrid courts to be staffed by both Congolese and international jurists and support staff. I was told repeatedly that the necessary legislation is slated for the March session of Parliament, although it remains to be seen whether Parliament and the President will, indeed, exhibit the political will necessary to establish the courts. We believe that the international community could play an important role in assisting the Congolese to establish a mechanism with the requisite expertise and independence to investigate and bring to justice perpetrators of mass atrocities. In the meantime, we continue to urge the DRC Government to further reform its judicial sector to fight impunity, including increasing the capacity for fair and speedy trials, deploying additional trained jurists, and improving its prison and detention facilities and witness protection program.

The next important step in implementing the Nairobi Declarations is ensuring that the hundreds of Congolese ex-M23 combatants currently spread out across the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda, complete the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process, or DDR. We are actively engaging the highest levels of the DRC Government and MONUSCO regarding the urgency of implementing an effective DDR plan. We are concerned that, while the DRC Government passed a DDR plan in December 2013 and promulgated a budget for it on February 1, details on the operational plan and implementation are still lacking, particularly with regard to community reintegration programs, a critical component to end the cycle of violence. During my recent trip, I visited one of the identified DDR sites. While the buildings were more or less ready to house people, the processing procedures and the programs for those ex-combatants brought to the sites was unclear. The lack of funding and preparation by the DRC Government and the resulting concerns of the international community are also stalling MONUSCO's ability to provide logistical support for DDR. This is complicating and delaying the DDR process for not just the M23, but for the dozens of other armed groups in eastern DRC that have surrendered in the wake of the M23's defeat. Rwanda and Uganda, which combined are hosting and feeding upward of 2,000 ex-M23 combatants, are also unlikely to transfer these combatants back to the DRC in the absence of an established DDR program.

Particularly worrisome is how unclear the DDR process is to those ex-combatants who are to go through it. This lack of information and resulting skepticism is keeping some armed groups, who might otherwise demobilize, in the bush. Some armed groups are even sending low-level fighters to surrender in order to learn what is being offered through the DDR program. The DRC Government has an unprecedented opportunity to capitalize on the willingness of thousands of current and ex-combatants to demobilize; however, if the government does not act soon, it risks having these ex-combatants regroup or join other armed groups. On the flip side, were the DRC Government to institute an effective DDR program, it would be one of the best vehicles for drawing out defections from other armed groups and preventing the recycling of combatants.

While the DRC works to implement DDR, Rwanda, and Uganda still have a responsibility for maintaining effective control over the M23 ex-combatants, which they accepted onto their respective territories. They have a responsibility under the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework to not support armed groups, and in turn not to allow these ex-combatants to slip out of their containment camps and back into the DRC potentially to regroup or join other armed groups still operating in the DRC. This is especially the case for the M23's most notorious leaders, many of whom face arrest warrants in the DRC, are subject to a worldwide travel ban, and under U.S. and U.N. sanctions. It is critical that Uganda and Rwanda uphold their commitments to turn over the M23 leaders responsible for human rights violations to the DRC so that they can be held accountable for the international crimes they have committed.

Moving the hundreds of current and expected ex-combatants through the first stages of DDR will potentially take at least a year, with the reintegration phase taking considerably longer, all at considerable expense. It also will require the full

cooperation of the neighboring countries where the ex-combatants are currently quartered. While the onus is on the DRC Government to fund and implement DDR, donors should consider supporting DDR efforts as part of our broader efforts toward security sector reform and stabilization.

The final phase of DDR—reintegration—is arguably the most challenging as it requires extended efforts to help ex-combatants return to civilian life as well as help the communities to which they return. Within such communities during this period, there are serious risks of increases in domestic violence and trauma among those who suffered violence during the conflict. Restoring state authority, increasing employment opportunities, working to prevent gender-based violence, and building social cohesion in communities who are integrating ex-combatants is critical to the success of DDR.

II. Framework Peace Process

Beyond the Nairobi Declarations, the Great Lakes region needs to continue robust implementation of the broader Framework peace process. We commend U.N. Special Envoy Robinson's oversight of the process and are encouraged by the signatories' development of regional and international benchmarks and the establishment of a Women's Platform to support the Framework, recognizing that women's continued involvement in the peace process will be critical to its success. We believe, however, that fulfilling the Framework's overarching objectives will also require key signatories to undertake a broader political dialogue aimed at resolving the regional root causes of conflict.

While many of the challenges in the DRC are strictly domestic, there are regional root causes to the country's chronic instability. The DRC has experienced two devastating regional wars within the past 20 years, suffered from the region's use of proxy forces, and is losing substantial revenue in the illegal exploitation of its natural resources. The resulting refugee flows and ethnic tensions do not recognize borders. These complex regional factors necessitate a transparent and in-depth dialogue between and among the DRC and key neighbors, conducted under the auspices of the Framework.

With this in mind, I believe one of the most promising signs in the Great Lakes region is the budding dialogue taking place under the stewardship of Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos, who assumed the chair of the ICGLR on January 15 of this year. During his first day as the ICGLR chair, President dos Santos convened the Presidents of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and South Africa to discuss the FDLR, an armed group led by Rwandan genocidaires which has plagued eastern Congo and Rwanda for more than a decade. My fellow envoys and I, as well as regional leaders, saw in this meeting the potential start to the needed broader dialogue. Participating Presidents were particularly complimentary of dos Santos' role in the process. We strongly support and encourage Angola's role in facilitating a regionally owned and initiated dialogue within the context of the Framework and stand ready to support President dos Santos in furthering it. We hope the ICGLR mechanism under Angolan leadership will expand to cover issues such as the return of M23 combatants from Rwanda and Uganda, border security, ethnic tension, domestic challenges to the voluntary and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and regional economic cooperation. We welcomed Angola Foreign Minister Chicoti's recent trip through the Great Lakes region and Angola's pledge of financial support to the ICGLR Executive Secretariat to strengthen its technical and organizational capacity, as indicators of Angola's commitment to its new role as Chair of the organization.

The Framework peace process has the potential to not only resolve security matters but to also boost regional economic cooperation and development. We welcomed the World Bank's announcement last year of \$1 billion for Great Lakes projects that promote regional economic development and integration and contribute to peace-building, and support U.N. Special Envoy Robinson's efforts to boost private sector investment. We are hopeful that the budding ICGLR dialogue can further regional development and integration by building trust and helping to overcome trade barriers. Development supports stability by creating employment and improving livelihoods, which in turn provide incentives to discourage continued ethnic conflict and the rise of new armed groups. We are also encouraged by the array of initiatives underway to combat the illegal trade of natural resources. The combination of ending illegal and increasing the legitimate trade in natural resources will help restore government revenues and assist the DRC to assert authority over its borders, territory, and natural resources such as minerals, wildlife, and timber. These steps will help create a climate more conducive to investment and assist the DRC in working with its neighbors on longer term regional development and integration.

III. Domestic Challenges in the DRC

While the end of the M23 rebellion was a critical step, many challenges remain on the DRC domestic front. The government still has a long way to go to stabilize and secure its country, including improving governance and expanding state authority across the territory, increasing democratization, ensuring that upcoming elections are credible, and accelerating real security sector reform. A series of attacks around the country on December 30, 2013, including at the airport in Kinshasa, the increase in attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the east, and the recent violence in the Katanga province, underline the continued volatility inside the Congo.

As a first step, the DRC Government, with MONUSCO's support, needs to follow up its defeat of the M23 by applying equal military pressure on other armed groups, starting with the FDLR and the ADF. The M23 was the largest and most militarily capable armed group, so defeating it was no small feat and was understandably a priority for the DRC. However, there is a plethora of other armed groups that continue to prey upon the population, undermine state authority, complicate the DRC's relations with its neighbors, and illegally exploit the country's natural resources. The internal displacements and humanitarian consequences caused by these armed groups make sustainable development in the region virtually impossible.

I made clear during my recent trip, and I continue to emphasize, that it is essential that the FARDC and MONUSCO, conduct military operations against the FDLR and the ADF. Part of our success in ending outside support to the M23 last fall came from the U.N.'s and the international community's commitment to pursue the FDLR next. While it is understandable that going after an entrenched guerilla group like the FDLR, which is embedded within the population, is more complex and presents greater risks to civilians than fighting the more conventional M23, following through on this is important to building confidence within the region and maintaining MONUSCO's credibility as an impartial actor. We are encouraged by the DRC Government's recent month-long effort to pursue the ADF and initial efforts against the FDLR, and are hopeful that the FARDC and MONUSCO will launch robust operations against the FDLR soon.

These military efforts must also be combined with a comprehensive approach to resolving the threat of armed groups, including the promotion of defections and the demobilization and societal reintegration of those combatants who peacefully surrender through an effective DDR process. We encourage the governments of the DRC and Rwanda to work with MONUSCO to implement this comprehensive approach to ending the threat of the FDLR.

In addition to security, the DRC needs to immediately ramp up its preparations for upcoming elections. While many expect the DRC to hold local elections early next year, the government has yet to approve an elections calendar. Local elections, which have never been held in the country's five decades since independence, will be an extreme logistical challenge in this vast country with virtually no infrastructure. I have spoken with the head of the DRC's election commission on several occasions and am concerned by the commission's lack of urgency in planning and implementing an effective elections strategy.

It will be a steep uphill climb—for the DRC, the region, and the international community alike—to ensure that these next elections are credible and inclusive. With sufficient attention, coordination, and resources, and political commitment by the DRC Government, I believe this goal could be attained. However, the DRC Government and donors need to start planning now if we are to avoid a repeat of the seriously flawed 2011 elections, for which neither the DRC nor the international community were adequately prepared. And if we are serious about prioritizing democratization, we should consider identifying additional funds to ensure adequate support for the local, provincial, and national elections expected between now and 2016. We should also position MONUSCO with the mandate and capacity to provide logistical support to the DRC Government. These elections will be a critical test for the DRC's political system, in part because President Kabila will have served the maximum two terms permitted by the DRC's Constitution.

In addition to elections and DDR, there are many other challenges that the DRC must overcome. One is the ever-present need for security sector reform, or SSR. While the FARDC experienced a commendable victory over the M23, it did so with extensive and robust logistical and military support from MONUSCO. Overall, the FARDC continues to be hampered by ineffective command and control, inadequate leadership, logistical deficiencies, limited resources, corruption and poor military planning capability, in turn inhibiting the government's ability to fulfill its fundamental responsibility to protect its territory and all its citizens. In many instances, the FARDC is itself responsible for horrific human rights abuses against the vulnerable populations it should be protecting.

While we continue to support SSR efforts, the DRC Government needs to demonstrate better its own commitment to SSR by ensuring that members of the security forces are professionally trained, adequately paid and supported, respectful of international human rights norms, and held accountable when they commit human rights violations. The Congolese Military Reform budget must also be passed, and the Congolese leadership must finalize the assignments of recently promoted officers to key positions that allow for the military reform plan to be implemented. SSR must also go beyond the military to include police, judicial, and prison reform, and the increased participation of women in all security sectors. Furthermore, reform and stabilization efforts must include strengthening state institutions and establishing state authority throughout the country, particularly in the territories previously held by the M23 and other armed groups. We were encouraged by the government's initial efforts to restore state services to those areas, and hope to see the expansion of services and improved security conditions across greater swaths of the DRC.

Despite these challenges, I reiterate my previous assertion that I am cautiously optimistic about the road ahead for the DRC and the Great Lakes. As we move forward with the Framework peace process, the international community must not repeat its past mistake of abandoning the region at the first sign of progress or for the next, latest crisis elsewhere in the world. We must ensure sustained high-level attention on the region and be prepared to follow up our words with assistance, particularly with regard to elections, DDR, SSR, and restoring state authority in eastern DRC.

The DRC and the Great Lakes are at a crossroads and the decisions that the Congo, the region, and the international community take now will set the trajectory of the next several years in terms of security, good governance, and development. With the Framework peace process, the ICGLR dialogue, and the end of the M23 rebellion, the DRC has a real opportunity to realize the peace and prosperity that has evaded the Congolese people for too long. We urge the international community, the Great Lakes region, and the DRC Government to demonstrate the resolve to see the peace process through to the prosperity that we know lies ahead for the Congo.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Senator Feingold.

We will start off. You mentioned the M23, and there are reports that they are still being recruited in Rwanda after the official end of the rebellion in November. What are we doing to ensure that the M23 does not reconstitute itself? And in the current status of former combatants, how do you evaluate the Congolese Government's plan for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, and what are regional leaders' commitments to such a progress?

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, Mr. Chairman, the first thing is to recognize that if there is any evidence of this M23 rebellion reconstituting itself in a way that actually makes itself present in the Democratic Republic of Congo, I support Martin Kobler, the special representative of the Secretary General's statement, that it will be met very directly and with force. That is clear. Simply because this happened and was taken care of once does not mean it will never be done again.

But we are hoping that that is not necessary. And you alluded to the reasons or ways in which we can avoid that being necessary. There are substantial numbers, members of the group, ex-combatants both in Rwanda and Uganda, and we need to make sure that those individuals are transferred appropriately to the Democratic Republic of Congo. And to make that possible, what you said is the key. That is, there has to be a credible and effective DDR program within the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Now, they have started with a plan. I had the opportunity on an extensive visit during January to visit some of the DDR facilities. Some aspects of it heartened me. In the Katanga province, I had a chance to see that a facility was being prepared with appropriate

cots and food and opportunities for work, in other words, for the first part of the process, disarmament and the demobilization part.

What I am less sure about is whether the reintegration part is properly planned. That is a very tricky part. This means what is the plan for allowing people to return to their communities. What is the plan for people to be reunited with their communities? Where is the clarity of a plan to provide some kind of training or opportunity so people who have only known basically working in some kind of an armed group have some other training or ability to do something peaceful? I believe that the Democratic Republic of Congo, with our help and the help of other donors, have to significantly and quickly accelerate this so that the kinds of consequence that you described does not occur. Once that is done, of course, we can ask Uganda and Rwanda to, as expeditiously as possible, make sure those people are transferred rather than allowing other problems to brew.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in that respect, an adequate DDR, particularly reintegration of combatants, is essential to ensure sustained security because otherwise combatants may very well take up arms again.

So the question is, What external technical assistance is in the works to improve the quality of the program and to monitor its implementation? Specifically, what role might the United States play in assisting with the DDR process? And how will those activities be integrated with community reconciliation efforts and skills-building opportunities? Those, I think, are some important building blocks toward a more sustainable peace.

Senator FEINGOLD. They are. And this is where somehow, working with MONUSCO, working with the DRC, working with the various potential donor countries—we have got to get both sides to merge their plans, who will do what. We need more clarity from the Democratic Republic of Congo and not simply how much they intend to devote to this but also exactly the kinds of things you were describing.

On the other hand, I believe the donor community—and I will be urging our fellow donors in Europe next week to do this. I think maybe we should be a little more specific about what we can do best, whether it is the training part, whether it is the reconciliation part. There are many NGOs and as much expertise in different countries that are concerned about this who can come together. But we have to not just wait for the other one.

And here, I was pleased that Martin Kobler and also the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo are convening meetings in the near future to discuss who can do what best. And in this regard, we, here in the United States, will be able to contribute aspects of this as well. We already had efforts made by our AID people after the victory over the M23 in the Rutshuru area where the military group was gone, but what happens next? And they had to sort of cobble together help from different NGOs, but they at least showed a vision of what can happen if you are ready.

In order for that to work; in order for those places to be ready for people that have been brought out of the military, that has to happen as well. You cannot just say to somebody, well, go back to

your home place and the place is not a place where they could live in any event. So that is part of it as well.

The CHAIRMAN. In this context, what specific efforts are being made to benefit female combatants and women associated with armed groups and other vulnerable groups such as children and disabled ex-combatants?

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, this is, of course, one of the complicated aspects of these kinds of armed groups where often the families and the kids are with them in the camps. And this, of course, presents problems when you are trying to take actions to not harm civilians, but it also presents problems when you try to put a DDR process into effect.

When I was, a couple of weeks ago, in Goma, we had a chance to visit a MONUSCO facility and we got to talk to some of the young men, the M23, some of the FDLR, but I did not see the family members. I did not see the others. And that is a problem not only in terms of how they are being handled, but also how can the reunification occur? This is one where I think more clarity needs to come, and this is why I focused, when we talk about DDR, on the need for more clarity with regard to the reintegration part.

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, in all of these conflicts, in Africa and elsewhere, human rights violations are always the concern of the Chair. And the question is, What is being done to find, prosecute, and bring to justice those who have committed human rights abuses, both within rebel groups and within the FARDC?

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, Mr. Chairman, this is where the process that is a little more promising is the key, and that is that the justice system of the DRC has to move forward in an effective way to be able to prosecute these individuals. The first step has occurred. They passed an amnesty law that does not allow amnesty for those types of individuals. That had not happened before.

Now, how do you get these individuals to the right place where they can be prosecuted and where a fair trial can occur? They have to have credible courts, and this is where the idea of mixed chambers, which the United States has been trying to advocate for and tried to enlist other countries where you have—it is a Congolese court. It is part of the Congolese system, but it benefits from the addition of international jurists, often African jurists, who will help increase the credibility and expertise of the court so it is credible. Often they are dealing here with international law and international crimes.

And in addition to that, Mr. Chairman, in order to have these individuals extradited, whether they are being extradited from Uganda or Rwanda or from somewhere else in the world, the Congolese have to be able to demonstrate that they have proper prison conditions, that there is due process afforded these individuals, and that the dossiers prepared to ask for such extradition are proper. So that needs to be done as well. And we have been messaging the need for all of this.

But if all those steps are taken, the amnesty, the creation of mixed courts, the proper conditions, then we will certainly work very hard to ask the countries that know where these individuals are, extradite them so they can face justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I look forward to that moment because I personally believe that in conflicts such as these, for those who commit human rights abuses and feel they can get away with it—we send a message globally that impunity, in fact, is a reality and therefore, those who are inclined that way will not hesitate. So I know there is work to be done, but I do not want to lose sight of that at the end of the day.

Senator Corker.

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you for your testimony.

Over the last two decades, the DRC has had constant invasion, rebellion, counter-rebellion. It has outside actors playing a role. What is it that we have available, together with our diplomatic efforts, to put some teeth in what we are doing and to help deal with some of the spoilers that continue to reinsert themselves in this nation?

Senator FEINGOLD. Senator, this is where I think this framework agreement is fairly unique in this sad history. A year ago, it was not just the United Nations or the United States signing a series of provisions about what ought to be done in the DRC. It was these countries. Every country that has been involved in this signed on the dotted line. And in that document is a pledge to give no support whatsoever to illegal armed groups in the DRC. In that commitment is the support for the notion that there should not be impunity, that individuals who have constantly gotten away in the past cut a deal with the Democratic Republic of Congo, and said, all right, we will stop as long as you give us amnesty and let us take our whole units back into the military. This is not permitted under the Nairobi Declarations. So there are commitments that have been made. So the fair question is, Are the commitments being lived up to?

I would say that has been a rather positive development. It was not easy to confront some of these nations about support for these groups, but the record shows that we had an impact, that both the diplomacy and, of course, there is teeth in the military aspect. You mentioned MONUSCO in your remarks. Yes, there was legitimate criticism of MONUSCO and MONUC before it in the past. What is different is this intervention brigade that was created a year ago. It was the intervention brigade working with MONUSCO and the Armed Forces of Congo that conducted a successful—and most people were surprised by this—a very successful military operation that basically forced the M23 to surrender. Very few people thought that would happen.

Now, in order for this to be credible, in order for this to have the teeth you mentioned, it also has to be that they just do not go after one armed group that might be associated with one side, if you will. This is why it is critical that MONUSCO and the intervention brigade and the Congolese military pursue the FDLR and ADF, which is an extremist organization whose agenda is not so much about Congo but about Uganda, wanting to overthrow the government in Uganda. So in order for this IB organization to be a major, positive precedent for United Nations action, this kind of further activity has to happen and it has to happen soon.

But I would say in answer to your question that has got some teeth if it continues.

Senator CORKER. So we have a lot of national interests with Uganda and Rwanda, and yet there is no question they have played a role, a negative role, in the DRC. So I am just wondering whether the administration is willing to make difficult policy trade-offs relative to those two countries and the DRC, and ask you to talk about what some of those might be.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, that is precisely what we did in order to achieve what we have already achieved. We visited directly with each of the Presidents. We spoke directly about the fact that we believe that in some instances support was being given and that that was not tolerable. We also talked about the fact that this is a situation where all of the countries in the region have signed this agreement and that means also that the DRC cannot in any way be supporting any of the armed groups within its own midst, which is an accusation that has occurred in the past. So we have not been shy about this.

In addition, as you are probably aware, during the course of this period, the United States, following through on congressional action on child soldier legislation, did identify Rwanda as a country that was in violation of this, and that was made clear. And also the Democratic Republic of Congo—it got a partial waiver because it had made some improvements. These were not easy conversations, but they were direct and I think they were helpful in making it clear that the United States certainly does not overlook that sort of thing in this context and we cannot if we are going to have peace in the eastern Congo.

Senator CORKER. Since 2000, we have invested about \$10 billion in this country through our direct and multilateral efforts. We are spending about \$1 billion a year now. We have ramped up to that level. And yet, the country still is ranked at the lowest levels on the Human Development Index. I am just wondering what you see with our efforts—what you see changing relative to that low base and to the quality of life in the country and prospect for improvements. Or, is this just going to continue to be, 14 years from now the same type of hearing with the same type of misery inside the country?

Senator FEINGOLD. Senator, I certainly would not have taken this assignment if I thought there was no way to change it. I felt that there was a combination of things happening, both within the region and internationally, that suggested a far more serious and sustained attitude. I mentioned the framework agreement, the fact that the nations signed it, the fact that we had this rather unusual intervention brigade, the fact that the World Bank said that if we could make some progress here, they pledged \$1 billion to try to help for economic integration and progress in the region, the appointment of a group of special envoys who work all the time and every day to try to encourage and help in this regard. So these were reasons why I think it could change.

But in order for it to change, there has to be, in effect, a synergy between regional noninterference and cooperation and domestic reform. And in order for that amount of money to not have to be spent in the future, in order for MONUSCO not to have to be there

in the future, this is the moment when the Democratic Republic of Congo has to show it can have credible elections. This is the moment when the Democratic Republic of Congo has to show it can legitimately reform its military, including logistics and how people are paid in the military, as well as justice within the military. And we have to show that this DDR program that we have been talking about actually is effective so that ex-combatants are not just shuffled around and go to some other armed group because that is all they know how to do.

I believe these things can happen. It is not easy, but it is something that I think there is sufficient attention not only from the international community but, as I mentioned, from a country like Angola which one might not have expected to be involved in this as deeply. They are showing a renewed and intense commitment to it. So I think it is well worth taking the chance of trying to resolve this, and frankly, what we are going to be doing to try to resolve it costs infinitely less than the kinds of figures you are talking about.

Senator CORKER. And just briefly. I am out of time. But all of us have been frustrated watching peacekeeping missions in Darfur and other places just be totally feckless. And we have this intervention brigade now. Is this something that you see being utilized in other places on the continent?

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, not necessarily just on the continent. This is a real test. I will tell you—as you all know, I am not a military man, but I have had the opportunity to spend a lot of time with Santos Cruz, the commander there, as well as Martin Kobler. I have traveled through the region. I have seen where the armed groups are. We have had extensive briefings on the strategies. My sense is this is a very effective group; a very effective group of international participants. Some are the ones just in the intervention brigade, but they are integrated with the countries that are involved with the broader MONUSCO group.

So, yes, of course. I hope, first of all, that we do not have to do things like this, but I am not naive. There will be other conflicts in the world. If this model works of creating an intervention brigade that has the ability to protect civilians by, frankly, taking stronger action with armed groups, it could be a model, and frankly from my point of view as an American, a model of where these things can be maybe handled not just by the United States, not by always asking the United States to have to do these things. So it is an experiment, but what I like to say is the first couple chapters were good. We will see about the third chapter. We are in the middle of it. But at the outset, it is promising and certainly should be renewed in March.

Senator CORKER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. I want to thank my chairman and ranking member for having this important hearing.

Senator Feingold, once a Senator, always a Senator. So I will call you “Senator.” It is so great to see you and in such great form continuing the work that you were always pressing forward on when you were right here.

Walking down the memory lane just a little bit, you and I have long been concerned about the dire situation for women and girls in the DRC, and tragically hundreds of thousands of women have been victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence, earning the country the tragic distinction of being called the “rape capital of the world.”

And, Dr. Mukwege, I am so honored to be in the same room with you again, and thank you for your work. I know you risk your own safety every time you come out. So I am just thrilled that you are here and that you are continuing your work to help the survivors.

So when we had started, thanks to Senator Kerry, our first Subcommittee on Global Women’s Issues, you and I got together and we held the first hearing ever on the use of violence against women as a tool of war in Sudan and in the DRC. I am sure you remember it. It just seems like it was yesterday.

And shortly after that hearing, then-Secretary of State Clinton made a historic visit to the DRC and she unveiled a \$17 million plan to combat violence against women in the country. And those funds were used for a number of critical initiatives, including care and support for survivors of sexual violence such as treating traumatic fistula, building community awareness and education about violence against women, and enhancing their protection.

So how is the State Department now building on Secretary Clinton’s efforts to address violence against women in the DRC, and do you think, we, right here in this committee and in the Senate and in the House, could do more to help in that area?

Senator FEINGOLD. Senator Boxer, first, I have many memories of this place, and the one you are describing is a strong one. I remember you coming to me and talking to me about this unbelievably tragic treatment of women. I had gotten some sense of it in 2007 when I first visited the eastern Congo. I happened to have my daughter with me, and I remember we were asked to come into a private place and just meet with the women who had been so brutally treated. And I remember they looked a little uncomfortable to see me but when I said this was my daughter, they relaxed a little bit and told their stories.

So when you came to me and said you wanted to take the lead on this, which you did, and hold this critical hearing, it was a real turning point. And, yes, what Secretary Clinton did by looking at this issue and sticking with it and initiating a lot of the programs was a very important step in the right direction that has led to, for example, support for the Panzi Hospital, which is the heroic achievement of Dr. Mukwege.

This has been continued under Secretary Kerry who has strongly encouraged me to continue this. And when I was at the hospital and getting briefed in Bukavu, I asked whether this level of violence had significantly been reduced, and sadly the answer was no, maybe some downturn in some places but this is still going on. We still have a place where hundreds of thousands of women have been raped and gotten HIV because of this. So that is the history.

And what are we going to do now? Well, there are at least three levels to this: treatment, the kind of thing—and the first thing the doctor always says is there are others doing this as well. He has done an enormous amount. There is North Kivu. There is South

Kivu. There are all kinds of places where this has occurred and we have been able to support programs for treatment. Treatment is not just the medical side. It is also the psychological side and all the other familial and societal consequences of this kind of monstrous use of rape as a mechanism of war, as an instrument of war. So that continues. And, frankly, yes, we will want to see even more support in this regard and guarding against any reduction.

The second, which we often hear about when you visit there, is also prevention, trying to prevent these attacks from occurring. The story you often hear is that there may be people in an IDP camp. There are huge numbers of people in these IDP camps. And the women are there with their kids. And if they do not have food or they do not have a way to cook food, what do they do? Well, they have to go out in a field or somewhere where outside of the camp to get some wood. That is where they are usually attacked. And if they had the proper cook stove or some kind of a thing so that they did not have to do that, there is an element and programming that, frankly, the World Bank discussed with me where that can help.

Finally, Senator, I think the most important thing we can do, although that programming is critical, is fundamentally creating a justice and accountability element to this. And this was what was alluded with regard to making sure wrongdoers are brought to justice. The people of eastern Congo, particularly the women of eastern Congo, have to believe that the military is there for them, not to be an opportunity for abusing them. The same with the police. It means that the rule of law has to exist in the Democratic Republic of Congo. All of the people of the eastern Congo are entitled to that. And that means that those who have committed these heinous crimes have to be held accountable. People have to see them prosecuted. People have to see them convicted and punished or, of course, as some have said here already today, this sort of impunity will continue. So this is part of the framework effort.

Senator BOXER. Well, I am glad that you are continuing this work, and I would love to be able to talk to you more about it to see if there is something else we can do here because this committee in a bipartisan way really started that whole movement to address the rapes. And it is not just rapes. It is just beyond the pale what happens over there. I do not want to go into it at this point.

But my last question is one that Senator Durbin had asked me to ask you because he is off at a funeral today, unfortunately. As a Senator, you were instrumental in crafting legislation to improve transparency and accountability in the trade of minerals from the DRC, which was signed into law by President Obama in 2010. As a result of this law, U.S. companies must now disclose the origin of minerals purchased from the DRC. This is critical because the mining and trading of conflict minerals by armed groups in the DRC has helped finance ongoing violence.

As the U.S. special envoy to the DRC and an author of the conflict minerals law, you certainly have a unique perspective on this issue. In your opinion, what has been the impact of this law on stemming the flow of conflict minerals into the United States? We know that last month Intel became the first major U.S. tech company to declare the microprocessors it manufactures are now free

of conflict minerals. But can you give us a feeling about the European Union? Are they working on this? Are we keeping our eye on this?

Senator FEINGOLD. We are. And I want you to know and I hope you will convey to Senator Durbin that my conclusion after 7 months is that this law has had a dramatic impact. The impact, of course, is specific under section 1502 of helping to end the trade in conflict minerals. In particular, it has been effective on tin, tantalum, and tungsten, which are easier to track than, let us say, gold. So the specific provisions are important. They are, of course, binding with regard to companies that deal with us, but they are also a model. And I am pleased to report to you that the European Union is considering a similar law. We were the first. We took the lead.

Now, sometimes when you talk to companies—I was out in Palo Alto teaching, and some of the people representing those companies said, you know, this is going to be tricky. This is going to be difficult. But the feedback I get now is we want to comply. We want to figure out how to comply. And in fact, I had a long conference call with a coalition of advocacy groups and representatives of some of those biggest companies a couple weeks ago. And they said, well, we understand these are the rules, but also what kind of incentives can be created to have us do more. And I think that is a fair question from the business community. They understand that the regulatory piece is there and has to continue, but what are the positive incentives?

In addition, of course, we have to ask the countries in the region to play the lead role in making sure that they do everything they can to prevent this.

Now, this organization, the ICGLR, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, is beginning the process of creating a certification system. We need to encourage that. We need to help that so that we can have the kind of legitimate operations and legitimate mining that I actually saw on my trip. I was in Katanga and got to visit the American company there. There are two Senators from Arizona on this committee. This is an Arizona company, Freeport-McMoRan. They have hired thousands of people, mostly Congolese people. Some of them work at the mine. They also support the community with their agriculture. They are respectful of the cultural issues there. Tremendous health facilities, in a lot of ways environmentally sound. It is a model of how things could be done.

Now, just down the road, they will show you people that are illegally mining, artisanal mining, and that has to be made an unattractive alternative, something that cannot be sold very easily while this kind of legitimate work is done.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Johnson.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Feingold, welcome. It is nice to see you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Good to see you.

Senator JOHNSON. I appreciate your testimony. I certainly appreciate your hard efforts and your good work in this troubled region of the country.

Both in your written testimony and in your verbal testimony, you mentioned the word “root cause.” As a manufacturer, I am always interested in really digging down to the root cause. Can you just describe to me your evaluation? What is the root cause in not only DRC but also regionally?

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, this is one of the most important phrases in this whole discussion. Sometimes it means different things to different people. But what it means to me is just coming up with another agreement, signing a piece of paper, and saying, okay, now everybody is going to behave, that is not going to do it. We have to get at why it is that in this, frankly, beautiful place with enormous resources that this would happen. What are the root causes?

Well, one of them is the presence of dozens of armed groups who keep regenerating themselves.

Another is the lack of border security, the fact that there is not a credible border guard from the DRC to make sure that those intrusions do not happen.

Even deeper is the historical tensions, sometimes tensions between ethnic groups of different backgrounds in the eastern Congo. Some of these groups, known as the Rwandaphone groups, feel that they have been discriminated against and feel sometimes that their land rights and other opportunities have been taken away over the years. This is part of the tension, and taking away these kinds of difficulties within the community is part of it.

And then, of course, the up side, in terms of root causes, is the failure to be able to use the resources of that region for the people of the region. This region has been brutally exploited by colonial powers and by other countries in a way that is shameful and has denied the birthright of the Congolese people. And so we have to get at that as well. And, of course, the mining issues, illegal mining, and others—we have to do that as well.

So these are all part of it. It is not just a political solution. It is a complex relationship between the peoples in that region. And that is why this broader dialogue that I have been advocating with Angola in the lead can have people at the very highest level, even the Presidents of the countries, sit down and talk about this instead of talking around the edges.

Senator JOHNSON. Let us drill down a little bit further. You mentioned the first thing, armed groups. Are those all ethnic? I mean, have they all been formed because of ethnicity? Why are these groups formed and why are they armed? What is the specific conflict between the groups?

Senator FEINGOLD. Different stories. They are not all the same. This M23 group was an outgrowth of frustration of some of the individuals from the east who felt that they were being discriminated against and were not treated according to previous agreements, and this has happened several times.

On the other hand, the FDLR is a completely different story. The FDLR is a remnant of those that committed the enormous atrocities in Rwanda in 1994. Two million people came as refugees, but included in the group were these so-called genocidaires, these people that committed these crimes, and many of them have never

been brought to justice. They continue to operate as an armed group.

Another group, completely different profile, so-called ADF. The ADF has very little to do traditionally with Congo or with Rwanda. It has to do with Uganda and their desire to topple the Ugandan regime. After being pushed by the Ugandan military out, they are operating, frankly, sometimes in an incredibly brutal way in that region.

Then you have Mai-Mai groups. This is a group of sort of disparate organizations who go back a fair ways in Congolese history who notice that when you have no sort of control, you can do whatever you want. You can go and destroy communities, rape women, take everything people have. Sort of that is your job. You just go in, take what you need, and continue your group. It is a way of life.

And so to unravel all this, you have to knock off the big operators, the ones that have the most military capacity. And then I think most experts believe it is much easier to cause people in some of these Mai-Mai groups and others to surrender because they realize they will not have the cover of these other sort of regional issues. You noticed all the first three I mentioned had a regional character to them.

Senator JOHNSON. You had mentioned that outside countries are supporting some of these groups. Can you describe some of those situations?

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, of course, we had concerns about support for the M23. We raised this issue with the Rwandan Government that we had seen a credible body of reporting that that was happening, and we made it very clear to them that we thought that was a violation of the framework and something that should not happen. And we believe that it was greatly reduced, and we think that had a lot to do with this.

Support for other organizations sometimes comes from within the DRC. Sometimes it comes from diaspora groups around the world who happen to maybe associate with a group like the FDLR. So the sources of support can be many, but we have seen with the M23 it is possible, with a combination of military and diplomatic pressure, to persuade people maybe it is a good idea for them to abandon these people who are forcing them to live out in the bush and have this awful life and to come in and have a different life.

Senator JOHNSON. You talked about domestic challenges. Other than the minerals, what else does DRC have going economically? What are the most promising prospects?

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, they have enormous potential in the mining area, but also agriculture. When you talk to the governors of South and North Kivu and Katanga, they like to talk about agriculture, which you and I can certainly relate to. So that has great potential. Also something you and I can relate to, they have some of the greatest forests in the world. And in our State, that was not always handled well back in the 19th century. This could be handled in a responsible way that could provide timber but regeneration of forests.

And I do want you to know that despite the fact the DRC is very low on all those indicators, they have had positive economic growth in the last few years. Their Prime Minister Matata is a very capa-

ble individual, a very serious man with a business attitude about taking care of these issues, and they want to build on that growth rate. I think the last piece I saw yesterday was 8 percent. Now, it is a low base, but it is possible that a country with those kinds of resources could make great strides. And some of those statistics have to do with greater results in the mining area, in particular, in copper.

Senator JOHNSON. Have you witnessed or have you seen any unintended consequences, any problems with the conflict minerals provision? I certainly hear from different businesses, and that it is here. But I mean, what about in terms of the DRC? Have there been unintended consequences in terms of the loss of livelihood, those types of things?

Senator FEINGOLD. I think there has been some of that, but I think, based on my actual observation of what is happening over there, less than I would have expected based on those comments.

Senator JOHNSON. Any modifications you would want to consider to address those?

Senator FEINGOLD. I think we ought to look at any modifications where people give specific problems with the mechanism. I have not heard anything yet that says change this piece of it and it would work better. But I think we should be open to that. We all know if you pass legislation, it may not be perfect. But, in fact, I asked on this conference call with the leaders of these companies tell me exactly what it is that would help them comply, you know, remove anything that may seem unreasonable or that is not working right.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coons.

Senator COONS. Thank you so much, Chairman Menendez, for convening this hearing.

I want to join my colleagues in warmly welcoming back Senator Feingold, now in his role as our special envoy to the Great Lakes. It is in my view a great gift that you and all of the other witnesses here today and our distinguished visitors bring to this issue. Your efforts to bring sustained and meaningful and thoughtful attention to the real challenges of the eastern DRC and of the whole region and to focus us on this moment of hope and real opportunity for peace in the eastern DRC is a great gift.

It was roughly a year ago this week that I traveled to the capital of the DRC to express support for this regional framework agreement, which formalized the multilateral support that you spoke to to tackle the root causes of conflict that have plagued the DRC now for many, many years. Since that time, I have been really encouraged by the progress of the intervention brigade, as you have spoken about, in taking down M23, as well as the reduction of outside support for the M23 from Rwanda and Uganda which I think were the direct result of international engagement and effort.

Despite this, as we have heard from you and we will hear from other testimony today, there are many remaining challenges: ongoing violence by the FDLR and by the ADF, impunity for perpetrators of war crimes, and the very real challenges of electoral reform and court reform within the DRC, and persistent humanitarian

issues, sexual violence, violation of human rights. So let us turn to those for a few minutes, if we might.

First, on electoral reform, as the DRC approaches national elections in 2016, we had a huge missed opportunity I think in the last elections to not just provide some support but to insist on credible and accountable elections. What sorts of technical assistance do you think we can meaningfully provide? What do you think are the prospects for real elections? I want to specifically thank Cindy McCain for her passionate advocacy for bringing electoral and democratic reform to the DRC. But as our special envoy, Senator Feingold, what might be the impact of a third-term bid by President Kabila and what can and should we, as a country, do to ensure some progress toward transparent and effective elections in this coming year in the DRC?

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, first, Senator Coons, just let me take the liberty of thanking you for taking such a great role. I was so heartened that you took over the subcommittee, immediately talked to me about it, and have taken this role. You know, it has been a model of cooperation between the branches that I have experienced with Senator Coons.

Now, this, of course, is a subject I can get excited about, having been a political guy for 28 years. Elections. So it is something that I find very easy to motivate myself on and I find it very important to understand the guts of the difference between what happened in 2006 and 2011. People say, well, it has always been the same. Things never work out in the DRC. That was not true in 2006. It was not perfect. But I remember being very surprised at how well it went, and they had an opportunity to show that they could create an electoral system that would have credibility over time.

That is the opposite of what happened. In 2011, it was a failure and it caused great loss to the credibility of President Kabila who had made significant progress after 2006 in his credibility as a president. He had not been elected. He came in, as we know, after the assassination of his father. And this was the first real election in the Democratic Republic of Congo since Lumumba in 1960.

So what can be done? Well, we need to dig into the specifics here. What happened in 2011 was things like the ballots were not properly transported and preserved. When it was time to convey the election results—we have had some issues here in our country on this, but they do not have the technology and the ability to convey those results quickly for credibility. We can help with that. We can provide at relatively low cost the kind of computer assistance where those results could be conveyed.

Now, that is the kind of technical assistance that I think we should be looking at, but that is not enough. There has to be public information, public conveying of the fact that all Congolese are welcome and invited to be part of this process. And that means public messaging through the various media techniques they have. I think that is something the United States might be good at helping with. So I am not suggesting it by any sense that we go this alone, but the truth is we are only putting \$3.7 million so far into elections there, which frankly is a paltry sum compared to what needs to be done in that country. They need to step up to the plate, but the

other donor countries have to as well. But I think this is something we should be heavily engaged in.

Now, as to the question of Presidential succession, I was asked this question in Kinshasa, which is a tougher place to be asked than here. [Laughter.]

And I said what I believe to be our policy and certainly my view, and that is, our experience is it is better to follow your constitution than change it for somebody who is already in office. I even said that Bill Clinton might still be President if we did not have that sort of rule here.

And what is different about their constitution is that somebody who has done the two terms is not prohibited for life from coming back and running again. We are somewhat unusual in that regard. So I simply indicated—and I believe this is the view of most of the Congolese people—that it would be best for them, for their future—it is their country. It is their decision. But it would be best for their future that the constitution be respected in this regard.

Senator COONS. Well, thank you. And I look forward to hearing more from you and working with you because we have a number of critical elections coming up in Nigeria and many other places on the continent, and there are other countries where there are efforts underway or may be efforts underway to amend constitutions to allow for extensions of terms. This is a place I think in a bipartisan way we really can be leaders in supporting positive efforts on the continent.

The intervention brigade, as you have mentioned, has been particularly effective, and it is my hope that they will continue to pursue the FDLR, which I think would have real regional positive impacts, and the ADF and the Mai-Mai and others.

What sort of a model do you think we can draw from this? You mentioned that in conflicts in other regions we are grateful the United States is not being called on to intervene, but frankly, without the French, things in Mali and the Central African Republic might have turned out differently. I am very encouraged by your positive suggestion—your characterization of the intervention brigade as being militarily effective, respectful of human rights, appropriately governed and managed.

We have got a challenge, though, with the United States not meeting the financial commitments for peacekeeping operations. If you would just speak briefly to whether you think the IB is a positive role model for the continent and whether you think the United States needs to continue to provide sufficient support for peacekeeping.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I think we need to continue to support an extension which will be decided in March. I think it is a good opportunity to do something very different that is effective. I simply will not say that it is fine, it is great until the job is done. The first step was incredibly impressive, but it has to be balanced. The FDLR, the ADF, and others have to proceed.

And we have to also remember this is not a military force that operates on its own. Not only is it part and parcel of MONUSCO, it is supposed to support the Democratic Republic of Congo's military. It is not supposed to be off doing these things on their own.

But what is different and what can be replicated in other similar situations is where you have a conflict and there is not a sophisticated or effective military, that it may be necessary to have an intervention brigade like this that is skilled at taking tough action but protecting civilians at the same time. That is the difficult balance.

And I am enormously impressed, as we fly over in the helicopter the region, being shown exactly where they think these groups might be embedded with civilians, where they might not be, and how careful they are trying to be in getting that right.

Having said that, action against the FDLR and the ADF has to happen I think relatively soon to make sure that the diplomatic commitments that we made are fulfilled. When we met with President Kagame, we did suggest to him that any support for armed groups—and we said this to all the leaders in the region—is unacceptable. On the other hand, he said to us, well, what about which armed groups are you going to go after. Are you going to go after the FDLR? And we all indicated, yes, but the M23 was the first priority but that the FDLR had to follow. And so that commitment is a legitimate commitment, a legitimate request by Rwanda and the world community, and I believe that they are working to make that happen.

Senator COONS. Well, thank you so much for your testimony, for your service. I look forward to staying in close contact with you and appreciate your real leadership in holding the best of America's values in terms of advocating for human rights and for civil liberties, for progress toward democracy, but also engaging this whole region in a way that brings some hope of peace after so many years of war. Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you so much, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Your insights and performance here today remind us of why, one, we miss you and, two, why we know that we are in good hands in terms of our interests on behalf of the people of the DRC and the Great Lakes region. So you have our gratitude.

I agree with you on Presidential succession. I know that there are some in our own country—it might be that Hillary Clinton would not agree with Presidential succession beyond the Constitution. So there are many examples of that.

But really, thank you very much for your service, and we look forward to continuing to engage with you as we move forward.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you so much.

The CHAIRMAN. With that, the Senator is excused.

Let me bring up our second panel this afternoon. We have a very distinguished panel. Ambassador Roger Meece served as the U.S. Ambassador—and I will ask you to come up as I introduce you—to the Democratic Republic of Congo from 2004 to 2007 and most recently, he has served as the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General for the DRC and head of the U.N. stabilization mission in the DRC. Ambassador Meece was a Career Foreign Service officer who served as Ambassador to Malawi and as interim Ambassador to Nigeria, and he has graciously taken time out of his retirement to give us his insights here today, and we appreciate it.

Dr. Raymond Gilpin is the academic dean at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Prior to

joining the Africa Center, he served as the director of the U.S. Institute for Peace's Center for Sustainable Economies, director of International Programs at Intellibridge Corporation, senior economist at the African Development Bank Group, research director at the Central Bank of Sierra Leone, and an economist at the World Bank. And his research focuses on the economics of conflict. We welcome you.

And last, but certainly not least, we are pleased to welcome Ben Affleck, who many of us in Washington remember as Tony Mendez in *Argo*. But today, Mr. Affleck—close—Mendez, Menendez, but in any event. Today Mr. Affleck is here in his real-life role for which he will, I believe, be long remembered as a serious, thoughtful activist committed to helping end violence in Africa. The Eastern Congo Initiative he founded provides funding and advocates for organizations that are finding local solutions for vulnerable populations, particularly women and children, and through the Eastern Congo Initiative, he is helping Congolese civilians overcome barriers to good governance and move toward sustained development.

So we thank you all for coming today.

Before I turn to Ambassador Meece first, I also want to mention Cindy McCain who is with us here today. She has been very active on the issue of DRC and has traveled to the country various times and has encouraged a comprehensive response to the conflict that includes investments and economic assistance. So thank you very much. We occasionally hear from your spouse here on the committee. [Laughter.]

With that, your full statements will be included in the record, without objection. I would ask you to summarize around 5 minutes or so, so that we can enter into a dialogue, as we just did with Senator Feingold. And, Ambassador, you are first.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER MEECE, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, FORMER UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, SEATTLE, WA

Ambassador MEECE. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee, thank you very much for this opportunity and for holding this hearing.

I find myself echoing and endorsing many of the comments already made by Special Envoy Feingold. Having had the opportunity to work in and around the region for many years, I am well aware that there has been significant progress achieved over time, but this progress has obviously been incomplete. Recent developments offer considerable promise to move further, and this includes the deployment of the intervention brigade and operations that has already been referenced in MONUSCO, the appointment and work of Special Envoy Mary Robinson, Special Envoy Feingold, and other special envoys and representatives working together and I think already showing great results, building on the potential and provisions of the framework accord that was signed last year. All of this offers a basis for optimism, and I am in that camp. But clearly, there remain enormous challenges.

Clearly, establishing basic conditions of security particularly in eastern Congo is an essential prerequisite for progress in a broad

array of things, particularly in the eastern zone where conflict has been going on for so long. There are still four foreign armed groups operating in the Congo: two from Uganda; one, Rwanda; and a smaller group from Burundi. All of them, to varying degrees, retain considerable potential and threats to stability, as well as the local population. The FDLR, which has been discussed, has had its capacity reduced over the years but clearly remains a force and a problem and a threat that needs to be dealt with.

There are, as well, an array of domestic militias and armed groups, none of these having the same kinds of capabilities, subject to shifting alliances and coalitions, but all are problematic. Most tend to more resemble groups of armed gangs rather than militaries as such, but must be dealt with as well.

Beyond basic security, in my view there are four areas that need to be the key areas of focus.

One is what I would call a full normalization of regional relations, as has already been discussed, and by that, of course, I mean going beyond simply formal diplomatic relations or the signature of peace accords. As has been referenced, there is a long history of peace accords which have failed demonstrating that this is not enough. I mean a full engagement of the governments, particularly Congo, Uganda, and Rwanda, in a positive and constructive manner in political, economic, and other areas.

The Congolese reform agenda, which Special Envoy Feingold discussed at length, clearly needs to move forward.

And conflict resolution of generally localized conflicts I believe merits much more attention. These include land issues, return of displaced populations, ethnic tensions, access to economic resources, and political issues, and other factors depending upon the situation. It is an area that has not received enough attention that I believe is also essential, and I think we are seeing in the deteriorating or growing problem in Katanga province some of the reflections of these kinds of problems.

Economic and social development in a third area needs to advance to provide economic opportunities for young people in particular to provide for an increasing standard of living for the population. This is easier said than done but remains tightly tied and directly related to the overall security environment and possibility or potential for future problems down the road.

And finally, also an area that has been discussed, democratic governance. Not only is democracy in the Congo problematic, particularly following the 2011 elections, but those in neighboring countries as well, notably Uganda and Rwanda, which are far from perfect and all bear the seeds of future instability and security problems.

There is a vital role for the international community up to now in all of this, and there continues to be particularly, in my view, of the U.S. conveying support or, as needed, criticism publicly and privately of actions by governments and groups consistent with the principles established by the framework accord. Reference to the treatment of the M23 combatants, including those for whom there is substantial evidence of responsibility for war crimes, is an important issue and an indicator. And reports from the U.N. panel of

experts, the U.N. mission, government sources, NGOs, and others can help inform as well.

Progress on the reform agenda in Congo is also critical. The amnesty law is promising. The DDR program has been already talked about but is critical as a part of many other reforms. Maximum coordination among the donors and the partners is critical. The special envoys have already demonstrated effective close collaboration, and that needs to include not only governments but regional organizations such as SADC and the African Union, multilateral institutions including the international financial institutions and the United Nations.

And finally for the U.N., I would mention continued strong support from the United States for the mission in Congo and others. Financial but political and diplomatic is also essential for its success.

I share the feeling that we have in the current circumstances the best opportunity that has existed for many years, if not ever, to achieve durable peace and stability in the region, and I think it is important to take advantage of it.

I thank you again for this opportunity.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Meece follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER MEECE

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, I am honored to testify today regarding one of Africa's longest running areas of conflict and large-scale humanitarian crises, and I thank you for this opportunity. Too often this area is in my view erroneously viewed as condemned to permanent instability, not susceptible to resolution. I am therefore particularly appreciative of this committee's focus on prospects for peace in the region.

Having had the opportunity to work in the region over the span of many years, I can affirm that significant progress has been achieved in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Great Lakes region in many key aspects, putting in place essential elements to provide for long-term stability and development. I am also well aware, however, of continuing major problems, and resultant enormous human suffering marked by widespread ongoing violence, large population displacements, and appalling levels of sexual-based violence. Members of this committee are well aware that this is in the context of ongoing conflict, especially in eastern Congo, dating from the 1990s. The conflict has been catalyzed by weak government authority and institutions in the Congo and external involvement in the Congo, at one point involving at least eight national armies operating in Congolese territory. The legacy of this terrible history has left four foreign armed groups from Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi still operating in the DRC, and a large number of domestic Congolese armed groups or militias of varying capabilities. The latter are marked by shifting alliances and ties, and overall have a character more of criminal gangs than ideologically based groups. All the armed groups, foreign and domestic, prey on the civilian populations in areas where they operate.

Against this backdrop, there are positive elements on which to build a stable and successful future, albeit all requiring further development. First, despite years of conflict, foreign occupation, division of the Congo into zones controlled by competing armies, and ongoing conflict, there is a sense of Congolese national self-identity that crosses political, ethnic, and political boundaries—an essential prerequisite for future stability. This national self-identity, however, is tempered with national cohesion threatened by underlying tensions driven by regional, ethnic, political, and other divisions fed by a competition for resources in a country desperately in need of economic opportunity for its population. In another important area, in recent years the Democratic Republic of Congo has achieved impressive improvements in its macroeconomic performance marked by good GDP growth rates, stable exchange rates, low inflation, and improving foreign exchange reserves. This has been particularly true during the tenure of Prime Minister Matata with his focus on economic reforms. These achievements, however, have not yet resulted in general broad benefits for average Congolese, with investment and commercial activity hampered by a continuing lack of transparency in key areas of economic activity, corruption, and

an overall very difficult environment for business operations. On a regional level, critically important relations, especially between Kinshasa, Kigali, and Kampala, have progressed from open warfare to the reestablishment of formal diplomatic relations and ongoing contacts at multiple levels, albeit all continuing to be marked by deep mutual mistrust and accusations of cross-border misconduct. Finally, a promising start to democratic government has been made in the Congo, with the 2006 elections the first legitimate democratic exercise in the country since independence. Free and fully participatory government, however, clearly remains an incomplete and threatened process in the Congo, as well as in several of its neighbors. Within these threats lie the seeds of potential future further domestic and regional instability.

In all these and other problem areas, the size of the Congo, the large population involved, and the relative lack of infrastructure contribute to the difficulty of putting solutions in place. Projects, initiatives, and development programs must often confront dimensions of scale that render implementation difficult, or in some cases producing incomplete results.

These circumstances suggest to me the outlines for a path forward to peace, stability, and improved prospects for development, and appropriate roles for the international community to facilitate solutions. I strongly believe such solutions for the region are not only achievable, and are of key importance for not just Central Africa, but a significant portion of the continent. Full international community engagement and support is essential for these solutions to be achieved.

First, the key priority must be to establish basic security and order, particularly in eastern Congo. Very promising progress has been made recently in this regard, with the Congolese M23 armed movement in the Kivus defeated by the Congolese Army (FARDC) bolstered by a strengthened U.N. peacekeeping force (MONUSCO), including the operations of the newly established Force Intervention Brigade. While this brigade is quite properly fully integrated into the mission structure and command, I believe its mandate providing for a strengthened peace enforcement role and specialized capabilities have provided a critical new element, and opened the door for progress after too many years of ongoing conflict. With the end of the M23's military operations, primary attention has turned to other major foreign groups. These include the Rwandan FDLR and Ugandan ADF, both representing major ongoing threats to civilians and regional stability, albeit with the FDLR's capability significantly reduced from what it was several years ago. As well, domestic militias cannot be neglected, and are responsible for many massacres, extensive violence, and large-scale human suffering. Broadly speaking, however, their force and military capabilities in no way compares to those of the foreign armed groups.

It is important to emphasize that the FARDC and MONUSCO recent successes do not mean that a military solution to the issues of eastern Congo and Great Lakes region represents the answer to the problems of the region. Rather the increased capability and authority to operate preemptively against those committed to armed action provides an essential tool to help establish the conditions that permit comprehensive strategies and programs to be put in place. Beneficial effects of these military operations include the prospect of significantly increased flows of foreign and Congolese combatants seeking voluntary disarmament and reintegration into their home communities, increased prospects for needed political agreements to be achieved within the Congo and between Congo and its neighbors, and realization of the conditions necessary to establish and extend needed state authority throughout the Congo, clearly a prerequisite for long-term stability and development.

These military operations are and must be a part of a comprehensive strategy for the region which includes a number of elements. In my view, I would identify four areas of particular importance.

1. Political and economic normalization of regional relations, especially between the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda

While formal reestablishment of diplomatic relations, and especially last year's achievement of a regional Framework Accord, have been very important steps, a sad history of failed accords and peace agreements is testimony to the fact that these agreements by themselves are not enough. The aspirations represented by the goals of the Framework Accord must be realized through commitments and actions by the respective parties, and such commitments have not necessarily been evident. Strong positions taken by the United States and other countries have been essential to a major change in cross-border actions by neighboring states contributing to instability. It is not clear, however, that such cross-border support has ended fully, and it is important for international attention to continue. Treatment of M23 leaders who have fled to Uganda and Rwanda, including some for whom substantial evidence exists of responsibility for war crimes, will be an important indicator of poli-

cies consistent with Framework Accord principles. Reports from the U.N. Panel of Experts, the U.N. missions and agencies in the region, nongovernment organizations, and other sources will also be very useful to a full understanding of conditions throughout the region.

2. Congolese institutional reforms and conflict resolution

It is of obvious importance to accelerate Congolese reform programs of key institutions, including the police, judiciary, and perhaps most importantly the military, which for long was essentially stalled. These reform objectives certainly include improved performance, for example through appropriate training programs, but must also address organizational structural changes to facilitate full deployments of necessary civilian and uniformed personnel, necessary physical infrastructure development, needed and appropriate oversight mechanisms, and well qualified and trained personnel at all management levels. There is also a pressing need for effective disarmament, demobilization, and civilian reintegration programs (DDR), avoiding past mistakes that failed to provide for successful long-term civilian integration of militia and other armed combatants, lacked accountability standards for egregious abuses of human rights or other serious crimes, and too often provided the wrong incentives, including essential wholesale integration of people into the FARDC. The latter not only propagated the cycle of militia activity and a general sense of impunity, but also degraded overall FARDC standards of performance and behavior. In this regard, the recently enacted amnesty law in the Congo provides an encouraging step, incorporating lessons learned. There is much more to be done, however, to develop comprehensive and effective DDR and military reform programs.

It is also important that that there be increased attention to conflict resolution essentially addressing localized issues. In various areas, these include difficult land issues, return of displaced populations, ethnic and community tensions, and other social and political issues. Strong involvement by local leaders, including clergy, traditional leaders, and others of influence in the respective areas is key to this effort, as underlying cultural and social aspects are complex. Progress is, however, essential to achieve durable security, not only in eastern Congo, but in other regions, for example in Katanga province where growing violence is creating very significant new security and humanitarian concerns.

3. Economic and social development

In addition to the obvious need for development for a large population long struggling to achieve an acceptable standard of living, there is a direct linkage between economic conditions and security. The attractiveness of local militias to young people would be greatly reduced by increased prospects of a productive livelihood through legitimate means. As well, existing large-scale illicit mining and trade of Congo's minerals involving both Congolese and foreign interests, provide an important source of support for many armed groups, and does little to promote the general well-being of the local population. Congolese economic potential, in eastern Congo and across the country, is well recognized. Realization of this potential requires simplification of the maze of regulations, taxes, and other burdens imposed by a large number of poorly coordinated and financed government agencies, greatly increased transparency regarding mining concessions and contracts and general commercial activities, and major improvements in judicial operations to provide for increased business confidence. None of this is easy to achieve, and it will require difficult decisions, including likely unpopular civil service reforms. Essential improvements, however, will not only increase prospects for legitimate investment and commercial activities, including employment levels, but as well an expanded tax base for essential government operations now hobbled by completely inadequate government budgets at both the national and provincial level.

4. Democratic governance

Free and unhindered popular participation in an open political system clearly can contribute to long-term stability in the region. While the 2006 Congolese elections represented a very promising major step forward, subsequent developments, including the flawed 2011 elections, underscore that a stable and successful democratic future for the country is far from assured. Very important provincial elections which should have been held as a part of the 2011 election cycle have not yet been held, resulting in the coexistence of 2006 produced legislative bodies at the provincial level and national Senate, with a 2011 elected National Assembly and executive president. Local elections provided for in the 2006 constitution have not been held to-date at all. Very difficult and contentious issues associated with prospective decentralization measures also contained in the new constitution pose further risks at both the provincial and national levels. It is my understanding that planning is

underway to hold the delayed provincial and local elections, although I would note that time is growing short before the next scheduled general national elections expected in 2016. All of these will require substantial domestic efforts, and I hope that the reformed Independent National Election Commission will be equal to the task. I have little doubt, however, considerable continuing external support will be required as well. A fractious national political structure, with hundreds of parties and political figures largely based on narrow regional, community, and ethnic interests obviously adds to this challenge.

I must also note that problems of open, free, and fair democratic government are not limited to the Congo. Political systems in most of Congo's neighbors, notably to include neighbors Rwanda and Uganda, are far from free and well-functioning democratic models. Recent major security problems in the Central African Republic (C.A.R.) and South Sudan underscore the threats to domestic and regional stability that can arise from elsewhere in the region. All contain the seeds of potential cross-border violence and wider conflict, and all should be a focus of international concern.

The agenda outlined obviously is not a simple one, nor is it susceptible to quick or short-term solutions. It is, however, achievable. When the situation of present-day Congo and Great Lakes region is contrasted with that of 5, 10, or 15 years ago, the progress already made is dramatic, and provides a good foundation to move forward. Clearly, the leaders, governments, and people of the region bear the primary responsibility to build their own future and achieve the security, economic, and social success needed and deserved by all the people of the region. I firmly believe continued international community engagement and support, however, is important and necessary.

The United States has played a key role for many years through bilateral programs, in coordination with other partners, and through multilateral institutions including the U.N. and international finance institutions. I strongly urge that such engagement continue. United States bilateral diplomatic and assistance programs well targeted toward priority objectives are key, including support for positive developments, and as needed frank criticism of negative or unhelpful policies and actions. Obviously, close coordination with other partners including traditional donors such as various European governments, the European Union and Japan is essential to maximize effectiveness. Close cooperation with African institutions and governments including the African Union, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and its member states, and other governments in the region is also of critical importance. The fact that those contributing troops to the MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade consist exclusively of SADC member states is no accident, and reflects the interest attached to the region by these governments, and the important role those countries play. Close consultation and collaboration with other key partners, including fellow Security Council permanent member China and Russia, have also been important and helped the international community to speak and act in a unified manner on issues of the region. Strong U.S. support to the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Congo, as well as other missions in the region, for example through the Security Council and American financial support, has been of critical importance to avoid on many occasions general collapse and for key initiatives such as the F.I.B. and deployment of reconnaissance UAVs, and the overall effectiveness of the U.N. mission's work.

The appointment of Special Envoy Feingold has in my view been a key action to bolster effectiveness of international community action. The close collaboration achieved with U.N. Special Envoy Mary Robinson, and other special envoys of the African Union, European Union, and various governments, and the U.N. Special Representative in the Congo, has I think already demonstrated the utility and effectiveness of this work. I believe this is particularly important as the Framework Accord and other agreements largely set out desired goals and objectives, but the Framework Accord lacks effective oversight or enforcement mechanisms, and it is certainly not at all clear that all signatories had a real commitment to realize its provisions. The burden of ensuring success of this initiative, therefore, has largely fallen on the team of special envoys. Their strong engagement is likely to continue to be needed I believe for some time given the scale and complexity of the issues involved.

I must also note, however, that we should not overestimate our powers to control events or achieve desired results. Many of the issues in the Congo and region involve complex social, cultural, ethnic, and other issues with long and deep roots, often difficult to understand fully. Solutions, including viable structures, institutions, and relationships must in any case be built on indigenous foundations. Sensitivity not simply to sovereignty concerns, but to the views and expertise of regional, national, and local leaders, and related cultural, social and other factors is essential, and will often dictate the shape and nature of actions, development, and solutions.

We neglect such considerations only with considerable peril to the very objectives we seek to realize.

I have no illusions of the difficulty and scope of the continuing remaining challenges. I am convinced, however, that building on the work already done solutions are achievable. Further, I am convinced that current prospects are better than they have ever been to achieve real and durable peace and security in eastern Congo and Great Lakes region. I am also convinced this result will require substantial engagement and support from the international community, and specifically from the United States, likely for some time. I believe, however, the importance of putting an end to the long-running humanitarian disaster and violence of the region provides a strong rationale for this engagement. It is important that we are not locked into a quasi-permanent cycle requiring international community ongoing engagement without end in Great Lakes conflict resolution and related large-scale humanitarian relief and other actions, with attendant risks to even broader conflict in Africa. Peace can be achieved, and I believe current policies and actions provide a good basis to be optimistic of progress.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Dr. Gilpin.

**STATEMENT OF DR. RAYMOND GILPIN, ACADEMIC DEAN,
AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL
DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC**

Dr. GILPIN. Thank you very much. I would like to start by thanking Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and the members of this committee for inviting me to speak here today.

I would also like to state that my testimony does not represent the position of the Africa Center, the National Defense University, or the Department of Defense. The views I will express here are solely mine, and I will focus almost exclusively on the economic dimensions of conflict and economic levers that could be used to address the persistent violence in the DRC.

Many had hoped that the reversal suffered by the M23 rebel group late last year, the reduction in the scale of conflict minerals being traded, and the pervasive war fatigue within and outside the DRC would contribute to an easing of tensions and help lay the foundation for sustained peace in this troubled region.

However, shortly after the December communique was signed, we have had reports of regrouping and recruitment by rebel groups, instability persists, and the lives and livelihoods of millions of Congolese remain both stark and dire.

Progress in the DRC has been plagued by what can only be described as a complex emergency, one characterized by collectively reinforcing factors, which have already been discussed. As we have already mentioned, over the past decade, the DRC has received significant humanitarian and development assistance. There is no denying that more could have been done to help accomplish some of the goals that the assistance was intended to achieve.

It must be noted, however, that this is not just a matter of corruption, weak capacity, or waste. It is a function of poorly coordinated efforts within and outside the DRC. The vast majority of development-focused initiatives emphasized either a specific security or societal threat such as defeating a certain rebel group, diminishing trade in certain minerals, and reducing specific types of violence. There is an urgent need for the DRC to shift away from a threat-centric to a more population-centric approach to stability and sustainability.

I would submit that economic development is a viable point of entry when we are seeking a solution. There are a number of reasons for this.

First, economic development is focused on the welfare of the individual, and it helps dismantle a very complex political economy and also stabilizes communities by creating opportunity and institutions that are more resilient; thereby creating a more viable constituency for peace. In my view, it is about time that the 76 million inhabitants of the DRC believe that the peace process is about them and not just about threat reduction or a string of development projects.

In 2009, I led a research team to both Bukavu and Lumumbashi and we interviewed over 1,000 small- and medium-scale businesses. And what we found was a resilient, adaptable business sector who had learned how to survive through the worst of the conflict. They were not looking for handouts. They had already internalized the costs of conflicts in their business models and were broadly optimistic about the future. I believe that this is still the case. Received wisdom usually suggests that peace-building and stability are essentially military, political, or diplomatic endeavors with economic development initiatives relegated to the second phase. This is not necessarily true. There is an urgent need to integrate them very early on in the process, and that time is now.

The DRC also needs to ensure that its vast mineral wealth benefits the vast majority of its people. At the heart of this conundrum is the efficiency, efficacy, and honesty with which the country's natural resources are managed. The United States has taken the lead in garnering international support for responsible mining in the DRC via the Dodd-Frank Act.

However, the introduction of verification mechanisms has had a mixed socioeconomic impact. We recognize that there has been a reduction in the trade in conflict minerals. Conflict-free mines are emerging all over the DRC, and a number of local and international companies have included livelihood projects in their portfolios.

On the other hand, many analysts question the assumption that denying armed groups access to funds from the mineral trade will be an effective deterrent. They point to the fact that the M23 raised the seed capital for its infamous 2012 offensive by robbing banks and taxing people as they traded.

Looking ahead, I think there are three "D's" that should be borne in mind: duration—having a long-term view; diversification—not focusing on a single issue; and dialogue—ensuring that engagement does not start and stop around the peace deals.

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member, and members of this committee, there are three things I believe the United States can do to enhance prospects for sustainable peace, shared prosperity, and effective democratic governance in the DRC.

First relates to the trade in conflict minerals. I think that the next step should be the United States working more closely with development organizations such as USAID, the World Bank, the African Development Bank to put structures in place that would facilitate the use of DRC's mineral wealth for the benefit of all its people.

Secondly, we could help sustain interest and engagement in the great opportunities that the DRC presents for national and sub-regional stability. I think episodic interventions tend to be wasteful and could be counterproductive.

The third thing relates to funding. It is true that the DRC is home to vast natural resources. However, for those natural resources to become true national resources, the country requires significant upfront investment and particularly in the social sectors and infrastructure. I think the creative use of partnerships—the public-private partnership alliance is an example of this—could achieve a lot in this regard.

It is also important to advocate a more balanced approach of financial assistance with economic and governance portfolios receiving as much attention as security.

Thank you very much for your kind attention and thank you for inviting me to testify.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilpin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RAYMOND GILPIN

I wish to start by thanking Chairman Robert Menendez, Ranking Member Bob Corker and members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for inviting me to speak at this important hearing. I am Raymond Gilpin, currently the Academic Dean at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, which is part of the Defense Department's regional center enterprise. Kindly note, however, that my testimony does not in any way reflect or represent the position of the Department of Defense, the Africa Center or the National Defense University (with which the Africa Center is affiliated). My testimony represents my personal views, based on almost three decades of experience working on African issues, as well as: my experience working on economic development in the Democratic Republic of Congo; field research on business and peace in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and Bukavu; coordinating the DRC diaspora dialogues at the United States Institute of Peace (2008–2012); and managing the web-based International Network on Economics and Conflict (2009–2013). My testimony will focus on economic development strategies to enhance peace-building in the DRC.

The 12 December 2013 communique on prospects for peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo was significant for four important reasons: first, it purportedly heralded the end of the M23 crisis; second, it highlighted the subregional nature of the conflict by focusing on issues beyond the Congolese border; third, it reflected the growing level of international concern, having been initiated at the behest of the United Nations and the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR); and, fourth, it emphasized the multifaceted nature of the DRC conflict and included language that covered demobilization, resettlement, economic development and social justice.¹ Many had hoped that the reversals suffered by the M23 rebel group, reductions in the scale of war minerals being traded and pervasive war fatigue would contribute to an easing of tensions that would help lay the foundation for sustained peace in this troubled region. Shortly after this communique was signed, it was clear that it was destined to go the way of its predecessors. There were reports of regrouping and recruitment by rebel groups, instability persisted and the lives/living standards of millions of Congolese remain both stark and dire. A couple of weeks ago, Congolese President Joseph Kabila announced an amnesty for M23 members covering the period up to 20 December 2013,² recapitulating on what had been a nonnegotiable 2 months ago. The possibility of the peace deal unravelling is one of many indicators that the situation in the DRC requires significantly more attention and support.

Progress in the DRC has been plagued by what can be described as a persistently complex emergency. One characterized by collectively reinforcing factors like: a perverse political economy; extremely weak governance at all levels; transnational political, financial and intergroup dynamics; and a persistent war economy. It is crucial to understand that addressing these factors in isolation is unlikely to have the desired impact, because they are collectively reinforcing. For example, attempting to address the nefarious impacts of the trade in conflict minerals without concomitant efforts to improve governance is unlikely to succeed. Likewise, signing a peace deal with a rebel group without bolstering the capacity to deliver transitional justice

could be futile. Over the past decade, the DRC has received over \$5 billion in humanitarian assistance and almost \$20 billion in official development assistance.³ Over the same period, almost \$10 billion has been spent to support the mission of some 20,000 personnel and troops who constitute the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the DRC, known by its French acronym—MONUSCO.⁴ USAID's economic development projects in the DRC amounted to \$983 million between 2004 and 2014, while the World Bank spent \$3.7 billion in the DRC over the same period.⁵

While some would point to the uncertainties created by tardy disbursements and the requirement—pledge gap (the DRC received consistently less in pledges that was required), and others might quibble with the adequacy of the assistance received (relative to the population and size of the country), there is no denying that much more could have been accomplished with the support received to date.⁶ This is not just a matter of corruption, weak capacity, or waste. It is also a function of poorly coordinated efforts by national officials (at all levels) and the DRC's bilateral, multilateral and nongovernmental partners.

Like all fragile states affected by conflict, the DRC crisis would only be resolved if a consistent and coordinated strategy is designed and successfully implemented to ensure a shift from a threat-centric to a population-centric approach to stability and sustainability. The vast majority of existing initiatives emphasize specific security or societal threats, such as: defeating certain rebel groups, diminishing trade in specific minerals, reducing particular types of violence and addressing myriad factors that keep millions of Congolese in grinding, intergenerational poverty. However, as explained earlier, this approach fails to account for the collectively reinforcing nature of instability in the DRC. While there might be individual successes in some areas, they are neither lasting, nor do they further human security for the vast majority of Congolese. What is required is a carefully nuanced strategy with coordinated interventions that reinforce humanitarian efforts, promote equitable economic recovery and establish the conditions for rules-based governance across the country.

Economic development is a viable entry point for such a strategy. This is because it is focused on the welfare of the individual citizen, it helps dismantle the political economy, and it stabilizes communities by creating opportunities and institutions that establish a more resilient constituency for peace. It is about time that the 76 million inhabitants of the DRC feel that the peace process is about them, and not just about threat reduction or a string of development projects. Adopting a more population-centric approach requires engaging communities more meaningfully and ensuring that processes are accountable to the people. Here, the role of community leaders, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and elected leaders must be emphasized. A population-centric approach also entails making the DRC's vast wealth (mineral resources, agriculture, and forestry) less regime focused and more attuned to the needs of each citizen. This might seem counterintuitive to many who are only accustomed to thinking about the DRC as a problem that needs to be fixed. With the right approach, the DRC could be an opportunity for substantial gains not only in that country, but across the subregion.

In 2008/09 I led a research team to Bukavu in the North East and Lubumbashi in the South.⁷ We interviewed over 500 small- and medium-sized businesses in both locations and found a very resilient and adaptable cohort of business professionals who had learned how to survive throughout the worst of the conflict. They were not looking for handouts. Their main challenges related to weak government institutions, stifling government policy/regulations, poor or nonexistent infrastructure, and corruption. Businesses in the northeast were much less concerned about the violent conflict that was being waged all around them, especially since most had already internalized those costs in their business models. Respondents were broadly optimistic about the future and their economic prospects, and believed that they should play a greater role in helping to shape their communities. Received wisdom usually suggests that peace-building and stability are essentially military, political and diplomatic endeavors, with economic development initiatives generally viewed as a second phase.⁸ There is ample evidence that the business community could play a more active role in promoting peace and could be solid anchors for stability, not least because they will have a direct stake in the process.

Equitable and broad-based economic progress in the DRC could also help dismantle the DRC's perverse political economy. In recent decades, nonformal economic actors, relationships, and institutions have emerged that are more focused on group agendas, rather than community or national development. You will notice that I used the term "non-formal" rather than the more commonly used "informal." This is because the DRC economy operates in a very broad grey space where formal and nonformal are often practically indistinguishable. Strategies based on providing contracts and opportunities to those at the helm of the DRC's perverse political econ-

omy crowd out, and further alienate, what could be a budding middle-class.⁹ Anthropological research examines how some ethnic groups in the DRC have thrived in the midst of instability and violent conflict by negotiating a practical solution, based largely on the economic muscle of a mining-based middle class.¹⁰ Institutional relationships and incentive structures within the existing political economy are difficult to address if there are no alternatives. Existing programs and projects in the DRC could be reoriented to ensure that small- and medium-scaled enterprises receive the support, structure and security they deserve. It must, however, be noted that this is a longer term proposition.¹¹ Hence, the emphasis should shift from quick gains to sustained progress.

Projects and programs that adhere to a population-centric philosophy are necessary, but by no means sufficient. The DRC also needs its vast wealth to benefit its people. At the heart of this conundrum is the efficacy and honesty with which the country's natural resources are managed. The DRC fared very poorly in the recent Resource Governance Index, particularly as it relates to government regulations, nontransparent institutional frameworks, unaccountable officials and corruption.¹² Improved management of the DRC's natural resources is attainable. Success in this area will help diminish the scope and impact of a persistent war economy, and also create opportunities for existing private sector operators and emerging entrepreneurs. It will also create a multiplier effect as activity increases along the value-chains of natural resource production. For example, it would generate private sector jobs and opportunities that lie outside the natural resource industries (like mining and agriculture). Support services, infrastructure, transportation, and marketing activity related to production and export could become instrumental at various stages of the value chain. Although field research in 2009 noted this phenomenon in the DRC's mining industry, the same is true in other sectors of the economy. Innovation (both process and product) is showing signs of life in the DRC. Young entrepreneurs are finding creative solutions to old challenges and are looking to be connected to markets and capital in their country. Entrepreneurship is an often neglected, but crucial, component of economic reform.

In order for economic actors to play a more active role in the stability of the DRC, significant investment must be directed to improving political and economic governance, addressing impunity, reducing the infrastructure deficit and augmenting human capacity—particularly in vulnerable areas. The vastness of the DRC and its large population compounds the task at hand. In many cases, the required investment will have to start from scratch. Existing programs to improve social outcomes in health and education should be realigned. More realism should be introduced in the area of infrastructure investment, with consortia and partnerships being emphasized. International investors should be more active partners via public-private partnerships.¹³ National and international legislative frameworks should be strengthened.

The United States took the lead in garnering international support for responsible mining in the DRC via specific legislation (i.e., sections 1502 and 1504 of the “Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” of December 2010, introduced in the House of Representatives by Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank, and in the Senate Banking Committee by Chairman Chris Dodd (also known as the Dodd-Frank Act). Since then, the Securities and Exchange Commission has issued rules for the implementation and in January 2014, Intel, the global computer chip manufacturer, became the first major company to declare its supply-chain “conflict free.”¹⁴ While these are laudable developments, much more work needs to be done. The introduction of verification mechanisms has had a mixed socioeconomic impact. It is much more difficult to trade in conflict minerals, but in some cases it has led to the development of smuggling routes, with an attendant rise in corruption. Some researchers have pointed to the negative impact on artisanal miners who either have to accept lower prices or abandon their mines altogether. Others question the assumption that denying the armed groups access to funds from the mineral trade would be an effective deterrent. They point out that the M23 raised the funds it needed for its infamous 2012 offensive by allegedly robbing banks and extortion (taxation) at numerous check points.¹⁵ Thus, while the Dodd-Frank Act has clearly made a difference in the purchase and sale of minerals from the DRC's conflict zones, much more needs to be done to understand/address the root causes and channels of conflict in the DRC. More also needs to be done to mitigate potentially negative impacts across the value chain.

Looking ahead, three important “Ds” should be borne in mind. The first is duration. Engagement strategies in the DRC must be conceptualized from a long-term perspective. Rather than focusing on putting out the existing fires, strategic responses should have a long-term end-state in sight. This calls for sustained engagements, and not sporadic encounters. Linkages among the various interven-

tions (economic, social, security, and diplomatic) must be clear, with in-built flexibility to ensure the inevitable course correction. The second is diversification. Our approach to the DRC's complex emergency should not be predicated on a single issue, be it conflict minerals, sexual violence, ethnic cleavages, governance challenges or humanitarian interventions. The international community must go beyond peacekeeping and humanitarianism in the DRC. More robust economic engagements and investments in the rule of law are more likely to yield the desired longer term outcomes, sustainably. The third is dialogue. Engagement must not start and stop around peace deals. Measures should be taken to more effectively institutionalize consultation and communication at all levels. Institutions charged with these responsibilities should be strengthened. This is an effective way to promote accountability, foster responsible governance, and establish a productive (and symbiotic) relationship between national/local governments and the people.

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of this committee, there are a number of things the United States can do to enhance the prospects for sustainable peace, shared prosperity, and effective democratic governance that is inclusive, accountable and just in the DRC. The first is an extension of sections 1502 and 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act. With your help, the United States has led the way in diminishing the odious trade in minerals from the DRC's conflict zones around the world. The next step should be working with development institutions (like USAID, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank) to put structures in place that would facilitate the use of the DRC's mineral wealth for the benefit of all its people, and not just a select few. It may be recalled that the significant increase in social investments across the African Continent (which has recently begun to bear fruit) was initiated as part of an external debt relief initiative that was supported by the United States. Second, the United States could help sustain interest and engagement in the great opportunities the DRC presents for economic progress and subregional stability. Episodic interventions tend to be wasteful and could be counterproductive. To this end, some consideration could be given to the clear articulation of interconnected long-range plans for stability and progress, as well as the institutionalization of regular updates. Given its size, location, and potential, the DRC is of immense strategic value in the Great Lakes region and beyond. It must not only be viewed as a problem that needs to be fixed. The third thing the United States can do relates to funding. It is true that the DRC is home to vast natural resources. However, for those natural resources to become true national resources, the country requires substantial upfront investments, particularly in the social sector and infrastructure. The creative use of partnerships (bilateral, multilateral, and commercial) could enable the United States to leverage its support in the DRC, while working with partners to put the country on the path toward self-sustained democratic progress. It is also important to advocate a more balanced approach to financial assistance, with the economic and governance portfolios receiving as much as security. Furthermore, aligning United States support more closely with a longer term plan that is country-owned (as opposed to "pet projects") could also ensure that we realize a bigger bang for our buck.

End Notes

¹ December 2013 communique <http://www.scribd.com/doc/191157617/Joint-ICGLR-SADC-Final-Communique-on-Kampala-Dialogue> (accessed 22 February 2014).

² See <http://www.independent.co.ug/news/regional-news/8729-drc-president-declares-amnesty-for-former-m23-rebels> (accessed 21 February 2014).

³ Humanitarian Assistance: <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/democratic-republic-of-congo> (accessed 21 February 2014).

⁴ MONUC <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monuc/facts.shtml> (accessed 21 February 2014).

⁵ USAID work in the DRC <http://www.usaid.gov/crisis/democratic-republic-of-the-congo> (accessed 21 February 2014).

⁶ Date showing need vs. pledges for humanitarian assistance to the DRC <http://www.unocha.org/drc/about-us/ocha-funding> (accessed 21 February 2014).

⁷ Report on "Conflict-Business Dynamics in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Conflict-Business_Dynamics_in_RDC.pdf (accessed 21 February 2014).

⁸ I make the case for the role of economic development as a catalyst for peace in "How Business can Foster Peace," <http://www.usip.org/publications/how-business-can-foster-peace> and "Using Entrepreneurship to Promote Fragility in Fragile Regions," <http://www.usip.org/publications/using-entrepreneurship-promote-stability-in-fragile-regions> (both accessed 23 February 2014).

⁹ Nancy Birdsall discusses the socioeconomic importance of Africa's middle class in fragile regions in <http://www.cgdev.org/publication/do-no-harm-aid-weak-institutions-and-missing-middle-africa-working-paper-113> (accessed 21 February 2014).

¹⁰ See “In and Out of the State: Working the Boundaries of Power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” by Patience Kabamba, <http://openanthcoop.net/press/http://openanthcoop.net/press/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Kabamba-OACP-Working-Paper-151.pdf> (accessed 21 February 2014).

¹¹ Background papers for the 2011 World Development Report on the theme: “Conflict, Security and Development” provide empirical evidence that economic reconstruction initiatives in conflict affected economies (like DRC) need at least a decade to take effect. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/0,,contentMDK:23252415~pagePK:478093~piPK:477627~theSitePK:477624,00.html> (accessed 21 February 2014).

¹² Resource Governance Index <http://www.revenuewatch.org/countries/africa/drc/overview> (accessed 21 February 2014)

¹³ USAID launched an alliance with mining companies and manufacturers in October 2011 to combat conflict mining. See <http://blog.usaid.gov/2011/11/joining-together-to-combat-conflict-minerals/> (accessed 22 February 2014).

¹⁴ Intel’s White paper on conflict mining <http://www.intel.com/content/dam/doc/policy/policy-conflict-minerals.pdf> (accessed 21 February 2014).

¹⁵ Reports include <http://christophvogel.net/2012/12/15/kampala-sets-up-kabila-wakes-up-m23-makes-up-masisi-flares-up/and> <http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-30-00-m23-puts-pressure-on-kabila> (both accessed 21 February 2014).

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Affleck.

STATEMENT OF BEN AFFLECK, DIRECTOR, ACTOR, WRITER, PRODUCER; FOUNDER, EASTERN CONGO INITIATIVE, LOS ANGELES, CA

Mr. AFFLECK. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, distinguished members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for inviting me here today. My name is Ben Affleck. I am an actor and a director and the founder of the Eastern Congo Initiative, a grantmaking and advocacy organization investing in and working with the people of eastern Congo. I am, to state the obvious, not a Congo expert. I am an American working to do my part for a country and a people I believe in and care deeply about.

I want to take a moment to acknowledge one of the people who inspired me to create ECI. He just left because he had to make his plane. But the legendary Dr. Denis Mukwege. He is a two-time Nobel Peace Prize nominee and one of the bravest people I have ever known. His Panzi Hospital has provided critical care to more than 30,000 women who have been raped and brutalized, and even in the face of persistent death threats, he remains a tireless advocate for women’s rights. So I want to thank him even in his absence.

I would also like to acknowledge my friend and fellow ECI board member, Cindy McCain, for being an extraordinary person and a valuable partner and champion for the Congolese people. Thank you, Cindy.

Fourteen months ago, I was invited to testify before the House Armed Services Committee on this very topic. At the time of my previous testimony, an armed militia known as M23 had just taken over Goma, which is the capital of the North Kivu province. They subjected women to deplorable forms of sexual violence, including rape, and forcibly recruited children to fight or be killed.

As a result of the prolonged conflict, this year the U.N. reported an estimated 2.9 million Congolese had been displaced internally and another 428,000 have sought refuge in neighboring countries.

Today, I am thankful that I can tell a more hopeful story, one of small but powerful victories.

In November, through the combined efforts of the Congolese Army and a special African-led U.N. peacekeeping force known as

the Intervention Brigade, which the Senator and others discussed earlier, M23 surrendered and signed a peace agreement. This force is comprised of troops from Tanzania, Malawi, and South Africa. Their success, combined with high-level and focused diplomacy, reinforces our belief that when the international community acts and the Congolese Government rises to its moment, these challenges are, in fact, solvable.

If it were not for bold leadership by you, the U.S. Congress, together with the Obama administration, Congo would not be at this important turning point. So on behalf of our team in Goma and all our Congolese partners, thank you for your commitment and for your bipartisan leadership.

Without overstating what has taken place since December 2012, I can say unequivocally that the situation in eastern Congo has improved. Last year, both the U.N. and the Obama administration appointed high-level special envoys to the region. In July, Secretary Kerry presided over a high-level U.N. Security Council meeting focused on security challenges in the Great Lakes region. And on November 7, M23 was forced to surrender.

I am also here today with an urgent message. Our work in DRC is not done. We cannot risk diminished U.S. leadership at a time when lasting stability and peace are within reach.

In the last year, many of your colleagues visited Congo. In August, Senator Lindsey Graham led a Senate delegation to eastern Congo, joined by Senators Chambliss, Blunt, Thune, Johanns, and Barrasso, alongside Cindy McCain. Senator Coons also traveled to Congo and has been a champion for increased United States engagement. In December, Congressman Adam Smith traveled with ECI to meet with U.N. leadership and some of ECI's remarkable Congolese grantees.

The accomplishments over the last year were hard fought. They are fragile and they are reversible. Sadly, we have seen this before. Over the past decade, the international community has focused more on signing peace deals than on implementing the mandates found within those deals. Failed cycles of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, which again has been discussed here already at some length, of combatants have resulted in enormous suffering for the people of eastern Congo and severely slowed existing efforts toward military reform.

I would like to share with you five specific actions that the U.S. Congress can take to help to ensure that we remain on a path to peace while saving U.S. tax dollars over the long term.

First, urge Secretary Kerry to ensure Special Envoy Feingold has the support needed to successfully achieve his mission. And we commend President Obama and Secretary Kerry for selecting your former colleague, someone who brings extensive experience and credibility to the position.

Second, call on U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Power to support extending the Intervention Brigade past its March 31 expiration. We also recommend that this committee hold an oversight hearing to consider a sunset to MONUSCO that compels DRC to follow through and fully reform its security sector. After nearly 15 years and billions of dollars in appropriated funds, an endless MONUSCO mandate disincentivizes reform.

Third, we request that Congress call on President Obama to directly engage with President Kabila to encourage him to make good on his critical commitment of long overdue security sector reforms by establishing a clearly defined roadmap.

Fourth, the United States must play a pivotal role and robustly participate in multilateral efforts to ensure that the Congolese Government holds free, fair, and timely local and national elections that respect the Congolese Constitution, including strict observance of term limits.

And finally, call upon USAID to scale up its economic development initiatives in eastern Congo. DRC's agriculture sector has massive potential, and ECI has trained cocoa farmers to increase the quality and quantity of their production so it can be sold for a fair price on the global market. USAID should be encouraged to invest in more programs like these. Targeted investment in promising Congolese-driven solutions can and will drive economic growth and will create jobs.

Let me share with you a final example of the extraordinary opportunity that exists in Congo. One of ECI's partners in our work with Congolese cocoa farmers is Theo Chocolate, the fastest-growing organic, fair-trade chocolate company in the United States. Today, Theo sources more than 50 percent of its cocoa from DRC. This year alone, more than 640 tons of cocoa will be purchased from the smallholder farmers ECI supports, which would be enough to make 9 million chocolate bars. This is neither charity nor aid. It is good business for the Congolese and is paying off for this American company.

Our partner, Theo's Joe Whinney, joins us here today. And Joe saw the potential of this country and its people, and it is now yielding extraordinary results for his business. Just imagine what can be achieved for both the Congolese people and the American businesses with increased peace, stability, and additional investments in this sector.

There is a Congolese proverb that says no matter how many times you strike a boulder with a knife, it will never turn to dust.

The Congolese people have been struck time and time again by conflict, poverty, and disease, and by an international community who looked upon Congo and called it hopeless. I hope you can see that it is not, and I hope you will commit again to the focused leadership that you have shown these past 14 months.

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Affleck follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BEN AFFLECK

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, distinguished members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for inviting me here today. My name is Ben Affleck. I am an actor and director and the founder of Eastern Congo Initiative, a grant-making and advocacy organization investing in and working with the people of eastern Congo. I am, to state the obvious, not a Congo expert. I am an American working to do my part for a country and a people I believe in and care deeply about.

I want to take a moment to acknowledge one of the people who inspired me to create ECI, the legendary Dr. Denis Mukwege. He is a two-time Nobel Peace Prize nominee, and one of the bravest people I have ever known. His Panzi hospital has provided critical care to more than 30,000 women who have been raped and brutalized, and even in the face of persistent death threats, he remains a tireless advocate

for women's rights. Although he is not testifying today, he has asked me to submit a statement for the record, on his behalf.

I would also like to acknowledge my friend and fellow ECI Board Member, Cindy McCain, for being an invaluable partner and champion for the Congolese people.

Fourteen months ago I was invited to testify before the House Armed Services Committee on this very topic.

At the time of my previous testimony, an armed militia known as the M23 had just taken over Goma, the capital of the North Kivu province. They subjected women to deplorable forms of sexual violence including rape, and forcibly recruited more than 120 children to fight or be killed. As a result of prolonged conflict, this year the U.N. reported that an estimated 2.9 million Congolese had been displaced internally and another 428,000 have sought refuge in neighboring countries.

Today, I'm thankful that I can tell a more hopeful story—one of small but powerful victories and cautious optimism. In November, through the combined efforts of the Congolese army and a special African-led U.N. peacekeeping force known as the Intervention Brigade, M23 surrendered and signed a peace agreement. This force is comprised of troops from Tanzania, Malawi, and South Africa. Their success combined with high-level and focused diplomacy reinforces our belief that when the international community acts, and the Congolese Government rises to the moment, these challenges are in fact solvable.

If it were not for bold leadership by you, the U.S. Congress, together with the Obama administration, Congo would not be at this important turning point.

So, on behalf of our team in Goma and all of our Congolese partners, thank you for your commitment and your bipartisan leadership.

Without overstating what has taken place since December 2012, I can say, unequivocally, that the situation in eastern Congo has improved:

1. Last year, both the U.N. and the Obama administration appointed high-profile special envoys to the region.
2. In July, Secretary Kerry presided over a high-level U.N. Security Council meeting focused on security challenges in the Great Lakes region.
3. And on November 7, M23 was forced to surrender.

I am also here today with an urgent message: Our work in DRC is not finished. We cannot risk diminished U.S. leadership at a time when lasting peace and stability are within reach.

In the last year, many of your colleagues visited Congo. In August, Senator Lindsey Graham led a Senate delegation to eastern Congo joined by Senators Chambliss, Blunt, Thune, Johanns, and Barrasso alongside Cindy McCain. Senator Coons also traveled to Congo and has been a champion for increased U.S. engagement. And in December, Congressman Adam Smith traveled with ECI to meet with U.N. leadership and some of ECI's remarkable Congolese grantees.

The accomplishments over the last year were hard fought, but they are fragile and they are reversible.

Sadly, we've seen this before. Over the past decade, the international community has focused more on signing peace deals than on implementing the mandates found within those deals. Failed cycles of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants have resulted in enormous suffering for the people of eastern Congo and severely slowed existing efforts toward military reform.

I would like to share with you five specific actions the U.S. Congress can take to help ensure we remain on a path to peace while saving U.S. tax dollars over the long term:

- First, urge Secretary Kerry to ensure Special Envoy Feingold has the personnel and support needed to successfully achieve his mission. And we commend President Obama and Secretary Kerry for selecting your former colleague, someone who brings extensive experience and credibility to the position.
- Second, call on U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Samantha Power, to support extending the Intervention Brigade past its March 31 expiration. We also recommend that this committee hold an oversight hearing to consider a sunset to MONUSCO that compels DRC to follow through and fully reform its security sector. After nearly 15 years and billions of dollars in appropriated funds, an endless MONUSCO mandate disincentivizes reform.
- Third, we request that Congress call on President Obama to directly engage with President Kabila to encourage him to make good on his critical commitment of long-overdue security sector reforms by establishing a clearly defined roadmap.
- Fourth, the United States must play a pivotal role and robustly participate in multilateral efforts to ensure that the Congolese Government holds free, fair,

and timely local and national elections that respect the Congolese Constitution, including strict observance of term limits.

- And finally, call upon USAID to scale up its economic development initiatives in eastern Congo. DRC's agriculture sector has massive potential, and ECI has trained cocoa farmers to increase the quality and quantity of their production so it can be sold for a fair price on the global market. USAID should be encouraged to invest in more programs like these. Targeted investment in promising Congolese-driven solutions can and will drive economic growth and create jobs.

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Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all for your testimony.

Let me start with you, Ambassador Meece. You and other witnesses have stressed the need for the security sector reform in your testimonies. What steps has the Congolese Government made regarding that reform, and what assistance, technical or otherwise, should the United States provide in helping the Congolese Government to meet its responsibilities in this regard?

Ambassador MEECE. Mr. Chairman, I think that is, indeed, a key area of reform. I would note that I disaggregate that normally into three different areas, each of which is substantial in terms of the security sector, starting with the police where, in fact, there has been notable action already, and the scope of the programs in terms of training, in terms of professionalization, various other things has shown results but is limited largely by resource constraints. As the Special Representative of the Secretary General, I was engaged often in trying to obtain greater donor support in the area with limited results. The Japanese Government has been the largest single contributor and reliable source in that. But that is one set of things for the police. Clearly, the police are vital to long-term security.

The judicial sector, justice systems, clearly vital not only in terms of overall security, but things like putting it into impunity, sexual violence, a rule of law generally that is essential for long-term success of the Congo and stability and security, economic development as well. But the institutions are very weak, and it needs a great deal more work.

The United States has been active in various ways, but it is an area that I think could use more attention on a bilateral basis, through multilaterals, whatever seems to be the most appropriate or effective in partnership with other donors.

And finally, we get to the military, which is in many ways the most problematic and has lagged the most in terms of any signifi-

cant progress going forward. The military reform programs have been a problem. It is something that we worked hard to try to advance with very limited results—I think probably because of fear of the Congolese Government of having too much external involvement or potential control over what is obviously a key strategic sector—but it is, nonetheless, vital both in terms of improving overall performance as well as rules of conduct and putting an end to improper behavior. This includes a number of things, including the command structure, including training, including construction of barracks. They do not exist. As referenced earlier, families have to move at this point with army units who are traveling. It includes military justice, continued development of military justice and other factors.

There has been some progress, agreement, and a strong commitment to put an end to any involvement with children, minors being involved in the military. There have been some other structural things but much more to be done.

And finally, as has already been referenced, demobilization and integration programs which are essential.

I would just build on Senator Feingold's earlier statement in saying that in my own view one of the missing components of the failure of past DDR programs has been a sufficient emphasis on community involvement for a reintegrated or demobilized combatant, as opposed to exclusively on the combatant. And this community approach to reintegration, I believe, is an essential element that offers promise for greater success than has been achieved in the past as well. All of those are essential.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you—in your testimony, you talk about economic reforms as well as some institutional reforms. And Mr. Affleck suggested that President Obama directly engage with President Kabila on these issues. How do you assess his ability and willingness to make those tough reforms?

Ambassador MEECE. As was mentioned earlier, there has been substantial progress in terms of macroeconomic governance. If you look at the macroeconomic indices, inflation, GDP growth, other factors, it has been pretty good in recent years, and Prime Minister Matata is, I think, key to helping continue those efforts.

What I think is still a significant problem is in two major areas.

One is a lack of transparency particularly in the extractive industries in terms of contracts, concessions, overall commercial dealings that needs much broader openness in terms of what is going on.

Second is a simplification of the maze of complex and uncoordinated regulations, rules, taxes imposed by a weak government infrastructure. That too requires considerable effort. There are many vested interests that would resist in both areas. It will probably involve serious civil service reform, which is also difficult and politically unpopular. But these are all things to get to a business and investment climate that, one, provides benefit for the people of Congo, provides the revenues to the government that it should have out of commercial operations and promote investment in the kinds of economic activity that is needed and opportunity for the average Congolese.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Affleck, one final question before I turn to Senator Boxer—I understand Senator Barrasso has yielded to her.

Your organization, the Eastern Congo Initiative, supports local solutions for development challenges. You talked about the one experience. It seems very successful.

Sometimes in the midst of such conflict, one wonders whether local solutions can actually be driven. You seem to feel, evidently through the work of your foundation, that, in fact, they can. Can you give the committee a sense of what you have found in terms of the Congolese people's willingness to engage in a way that creates that locally driven solution?

Mr. AFFLECK. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, when I first looked for something to do around this issue, I did a lot of traveling and a lot of meeting of folks. And one of the things that struck me in the most profound way was that in the midst of—and this was in the heat of war and violence and a lot of misery and death—the need, the ability, the capacity that the Congolese had to repair their own country, the drive they had to make things work for themselves. And I anticipated finding people who were just blown apart and were sort of—I suppose I subscribed to that stereotype of Africans who are sort of lying around waiting for someone to show up and help them when, in fact, these are folks who were really trying their very best to help themselves.

And what I saw, when I looked at the range of organizations working there from the largest foreign NGOs from North America and Europe and on down the scale, was that the Congolese-based community organizations were the ones who best understood the culture, the values, the mores of the place. And as a consequence, they really had a better ability to work in these cities and in the countryside for various reasons, but it made logical sense to me once I saw those figures. You know, the guys that I grew up with would know how best to work in the part of Boston I grew up with as opposed to somebody sort of parachuting in from, say, New Jersey. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. When we parachute in, we make a real difference. [Laughter.]

Mr. AFFLECK. So I was impressed by that, and I thought this is what I want to do and enable these organizations, support them, help build their capacity, and so on. And people said you will not find enough of them, and that just has not been true. We found so many astounding folks and great organizations. We can furnish the committee a list of those. It is almost long to go into from bringing child soldiers out of the bush, to maternal health, to radio and politics and justice. We have a legal clinic at Dr. Mukwege's hospital. And in all of those various ways, all the various areas, it is Congolese folks who are making the real difference, and it is those people who continue to inspire me to do this work.

The CHAIRMAN. That is great. Thank you.

Senator Barrasso yielded to Senator Boxer, and we appreciate that.

Senator BOXER. I thank that spirit of cooperation. I have to go to a meeting of the WRDA conference, and you know how we are trying to get that done.

Can I just say thank you to everybody here for all you are doing, including the private citizens.

Mr. Affleck, through your organization you have strongly advocated for strengthening and supporting civil society organizations in the DRC. And as you pointed out, “the people of eastern Congo remain committed to helping their neighbors and rebuilding their communities.”

So as I look at the amount of money we have been spending there, it is a lot of money. It is a lot of dollars, and it is probably going to be cut in half this year, just given all the problems. So we have to be very wise about how we spend those dollars.

So I would ask you are we doing enough to assist Congolese civil society organizations? Because I have found in so many parts of the world that we often overlook those organizations and we just go to the big players, but we do not go to the people on the ground. So is there room for improvement there that you could work with Senator Feingold on?

Mr. AFFLECK. First of all, the amount of money that—people have been talking about a billion dollars. It is slightly misleading. At least half of that, \$500 million, goes to MONUSCO, which is neither really humanitarian nor developmental aid. It is a peace-keeping bureaucracy and organization and so on, which we call for a sunset on. So in fact we are calling for reduced aid, technically speaking, to the region.

We believe that a little bit goes a very long way. And this is a discussion that I was having with Senator Graham and others earlier that targeted investment and the way that we have done our chocolate bar, you know, places where you are spending a little bit of money to help people grow a lot and where they can then function in the marketplace on their own is really smart.

And one other ask we have is that USAID who does a lot of humanitarian aid particularly in the West and some in the East refocus on development because we believe that economic development is the key for sustainable growth in DRC.

If you take away military aid and you take away what was MONUC and is now MONUSCO, it is actually not a gigantic amount of money at all going to a country of 70 million people where 5 million died in the last 15 years. We are talking about \$250 million. I mean, I am not the expert. Do not quote me on those numbers. There are people much more expert than I. But very broadly speaking, I am not wrong. And when you think of it that way, I think we are not properly serving the people of Congo.

Senator BOXER. Well, I appreciate it. And you did hit the nail on the head in terms of what the administration requested, which was half, I think, of the \$400 million provided last year. But the point is we can do better. I believe that, not just here, but in so many other places. So I look forward to working with your organization, with Senator Feingold, with all my colleagues here.

And let me again say to everyone thank you for your concern and interest, it is so critical. I think when people have no sense of a future, they act out in many ways, and one of the ways in the DRC is definitely going after the women and it is just a horror story. And getting back to Senator Johnson’s question to Senator Feingold about the root causes. What are the root causes of people

treating women this way? We could spend a long time on it. But the fact is it has to stop.

So let us work better, Mr. Chairman and all my colleagues, with some of these organizations on the ground where, as you point out, they can do a lot with a little. And I think we can keep the progress going. I really do believe it. And it is really because of all of you.

And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to Senator Barrasso.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Flake? Senator McCain?

Senator MCCAIN. I always like to defer to my colleague who is 50 years junior. [Laughter.]

I thank all three of the witnesses here today, and I thank them for their expertise. And I especially again want to thank my friend, my dear, dear friend, Russ Feingold, for his continued efforts to serve not only this country but a lot of people in this world who I am sure will benefit from his dedicated work.

Let me just ask all three witnesses, maybe beginning with you, Ambassador. Compare the situation in the Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes region 10 years ago with now, and what it will look like, if nothing changes, 10 years from now, and how we can change it from 10 years from now. Maybe I could begin with you, Ambassador.

Ambassador MEECE. Senator, thank you for the question.

I was in the Congo 10 years ago and have direct memory of it. Without thinking of the specifics of 10, as opposed to 11 or 12 years, I would note that at one point we had, during the height of war, eight different national armies operating in Congolese territory, all with varying interests, a horribly complex and difficult domestic situation. Frankly, it was a mess. And it was difficult to identify a way out of it.

To compare that to where we are today, without minimizing in any way, shape, or form the magnitude of the problems or the suffering of the people in the Congo, there has been an enormous progression, putting an end to the formal war, getting the foreign armies formally out of the Congo, setting up the transition which led to the successful 2006 elections and the conduct of those elections.

This has not been a straight line. Things have moved back. There has been backsliding. There have been problems, and clearly as the hearing has indicated, there are enormous problems that remain.

But as I stated earlier, I believe that the conditions that we have now are the best that have existed for a very long time, if ever, to get beyond what has been the cycle of continued violence in eastern Congo that we have seen for the past many years and start to put in place those things needed for a durable security, durable order and stability not only for eastern Congo but for the region, and obviously within that, provide for the betterment of the people which is the real focus of this activity, whether that is regarding sexual violence, killings, conflict, and the whole range of things.

So, yes, there has been, in my view, solid progress. I think there are grounds for more progress, and it is important to do that to put an end to the violence.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

Dr. Gilpin.

Dr. GILPIN. Thank you very much, Senator.

I would echo the Ambassador's point that 10 years ago the DRC was in a very dire place. We had, from an economic perspective, a mass hemorrhaging of the DRC's resources. We had a very complex political economy, one in which both institutions and incentive structures were geared toward numerous fiefdoms that preyed on communities, that destroyed livelihoods, and practically obliterated the future for millions in the DRC. We were also in a place in which human security was particularly tenuous. Most Congolese in the communities had very little hope for a bright and prosperous future.

Where we are today is at a very critical juncture, one in which the reduction in the amount of conflict minerals being traded has done three important things. First, it has shone the spotlight on that political economy, and so the people who were benefiting and reinforcing the negativity—not just in the communities but also in the economy—are less likely to do so because of the constraints placed upon them by the act and the enforcement regime that has now become international, having been led by the United States.

The second thing that it has done is to bring the business sector fair and square into the stability business. We now have companies like Intel saying they have a conflict-free supply chain. We have Apple announcing that its tungsten is conflict-free. But they are not stopping there. They are also including livelihood programs in their portfolios. Senator, that is important because one of the things that we saw in the initial months of the act was a lot of concern that livelihoods might be lost, investments in the social indicators would diminish, and the artisanal miners and the millions more who provide services to the mining industry will be out of jobs. That is no longer the case because companies are now partnering, and that is very important.

The third thing that it has done, it has led to a lot more leveraging. Because the Congo is vast, a lot of people, and the need is great, no one partner can do it all. But we are seeing a lot more leveraging. USAID might build the roads and an NGO help create income-generating opportunities. This is not only expanding employment and income opportunities, it is also giving millions hope for a brighter future.

Senator, what should we do so 10 years from now we would not be here talking about intervention brigades and foreign assistance and humanitarian assistance? I think there are three things.

First, we need to focus on ensuring that opportunity counts, not violence. To ensure that we are able to do that, we have to make sure that the legislative framework is in place. The most important constraint we found when we interviewed over 1,000 small businesses in the DRC, was not the war or corrupt officials. It was the regulatory system. There are hundreds of regulations and taxes that are imposed upon businesses in the DRC. This needs to change.

The second thing that has to happen is that we have to be able to connect the local economy more directly into the supply and value chain of economic activities like forestry and mining, because

there are a lot of enterprising Congolese who could step up to the plate and provide the services and products that support industry in the DRC. The need for humanitarian assistance and foreign aid will be greatly diminished if we could address that critical aspect.

And the third thing that needs to be done now, as has been echoed by all the panelists, is the governance equation. The upcoming elections are critical not just at the national level, but at the local level as well. We need to ensure that the elections reflect the will of the Congolese people and provide both the freedom and opportunity that they so richly deserve.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

Mr. AFFLECK. Well, the doctor and the Ambassador have answered the question quite expertly and quite well.

I can only add my personal experience. The first time I went to the Congo was in 2006 or 2007 or something like that. But I can tell you then from just a first-person perspective there was more fighting. There was more dying. There was more chaos. There were fewer people that even believed it was possible to get involved in DRC. I mean, even the NGO's did not really want to show up. I remember saying what about Gates. They said Gates will not come here. I said Gates will not come here? He has all the money. It was like there was no—

Senator MCCAIN. You got some of it. [Laughter.]

Mr. AFFLECK. Thank you, Senator. I am glad you asked me that question, Senator.

Anyway, the people were understandably quite cautious about getting involved, and that has changed incrementally. People are now getting more and more involved.

I think the story of the elections I believe mirrors the point that we are at now. In 2006, they were coming out of the war. It was a rather desperate situation. Everyone in the international community understood how important the elections were. And the American Government worked hand in glove with the international community to embed themselves largely in the elections in 2006, and while there were problems, they were largely viewed as legitimate, and we had a legitimately elected Congolese President. And then there was the attitude that, okay, that is done. We know how to do that. The Congolese know how to do it.

And there was a little laissez-faire with the more recent elections, and what happened was they were not legitimate. And as the doctor said, they still have not had provincial or municipal elections following the largely illegitimate national Presidential election. And that lesson, I believe, applies to the moment that we are at now, which is people view the fire as having gone down a little bit. As these men have said, it was much worse then and it has gotten better now. And that is that critical juncture where we can sort of say, oh, it will be okay. You know, like those second elections, it will be fine. We are going to sort of walk away from this. It is starting to go on its own. And I think that would be a big mistake.

Rather, the opposite is true. This is the critical moment when things are starting to congeal and you are starting to see more functionality. You are starting to see investment from the outside. You are starting to see the intervention brigade and some of these

tactics finally getting traction after years and years of failed efforts in that regard. This is the time to focus on DRC so that the fire does not reignite.

ECI. We did a report on security reform, which we will submit for the record and make it available to the committee. We do believe that that is at the center of what needs to happen, a sort of coupling of security sector reform with electoral reform, which in concert will create an environment of opportunity for the Congolese people who I can assure you are more than ready to take advantage of it.

Senator McCAIN. Well, I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Could I just say from time to time we have people who have some celebrity status that come and testify here? You are eminently qualified to give us the benefit of your experience and knowledge. And I think that your credibility is really remarkable because of the depth of your commitment. I thank you.

Mr. AFFLECK. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barrasso.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Gilpin, you mentioned a couple of things. One is that opportunity counts, not violence. The importance of governance.

And when I was in Goma, what struck me was just the incredible mineral wealth as a source of both—on the balance, of financing the conflict versus the source for a possible tool for development. I am wondering if there is a way to get that done so that everyone can see the huge advantages of using this mineral wealth for the development and the advancement as opposed to a fight for power.

Dr. GILPIN. Thank you very much, Senator.

The mineral wealth of the DRC is only part of the equation. The DRC also has vast agricultural wealth and forest reserve. The challenge is that we have focused, almost exclusively, on the negative side of the trade in the DRC's minerals. We also need to talk a lot about financial sector reform because there are significant financial leakages in the DRC.

The tax effort is improving. A host of macroeconomic indicators are improving. But the tax effort, i.e., the amount of taxation that the government takes in relative to the amount that it could take in, is still very low. That has two key drivers: one, very weak institutions which become weaker the further you go away from the capital. And we know how far away the mines are from Kinshasa. But the second is the issue of corruption.

And as we focus on the conflict minerals issues, we should also focus a lot on the transparency issue. We have a lot of new investors that are demonstrating interest in the DRC's wealth, and I think one of the things that we can do is hold their feet to the fire as regards their participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative which requires the industry to be transparent and lets us know exactly what the contracts stipulate and what accrues to the government. Then it becomes much easier to hold the government to task. But now there is so much opaqueness in the whole contracting environment.

And one other thing. Senator McCain asked about over-the-horizon issues, 10 years hence, 10 years from now in the DRC. Another economic part of the equation will be the new discoveries

of oil and natural gas, which is becoming a big issue. And so if we do not have an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative working, if we do not have civil society participating in initiatives like Publish What You Pay, then we are going to witness hemorrhaging of significant resources, as we have seen in the past. But we are at a critical juncture where things like the conflict minerals certification process is introducing the concept of accountability in this particular sector, and we hope that it extends beyond mining to include agriculture, forestry, and even tourism.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you.

Mr. Affleck, following up on our earlier discussion today, Gates may have not been willing to go in but Cindy McCain was. [Laughter.]

Mr. AFFLECK. Cindy McCain was there in 1994. She was in Goma when the cholera epidemic was happening and the genocide. Cindy McCain is so much braver than I am. It is humbling at the very least.

Senator BARRASSO. Then I am just kind of thinking about following up on the visit to Goma, which is a long distance, as Dr. Gilpin said, from the capital, over 1,000 miles. That is where resources are, where the trauma is, the hospital, the atrocities that we are seeing there and the abuses and the effort, the commitment. It did seem that the most compelling part of our visit was visiting with the victims of all this that Cindy is so involved with. It did seem that there was, though, a ray of hope in talking with them for the future that may not have been there in the past. I do not know if you want to talk about that a little.

Mr. AFFLECK. Sure. Really for me, there are two sides to that. One is having that experience that you did and Ms. McCain had being involved well before we were, which is that you talk to a woman, you talk to a middle-aged woman who suffered horrendous abuse or attack, maybe lost children. You talk to a 9-year-old girl and hear what she has had to go through. It hits home particularly if you have a daughter or you have a wife or you have a mom or a woman in your life that you care about, and all of a sudden, you go this person's life is worth no less than any of the women in my family or the children in my family. And if this were my child who suffered this excruciating experience, even just being separated from their parents, so many orphans that you see, it would completely destroy my whole world. And once I started to really empathize with folks because I had met them and heard their stories firsthand, it kind awoke me to what I felt was a moral obligation.

And I think by extension, it really reflects the values of this country, that we care about others and that we care about the freedom of others and we care about the well-being of other folks. This is not diplomacy and freedom at the end of a gun. It is diplomacy and freedom at the end of a diplomat who is engaging with folks in Congo to try to use our considerable leverage as the United States of America to push them toward practices that are more democratic where they can reinforce the security sector and so on.

But to get back your original point, connecting with people one on one and hearing these stories from women and children is at once devastating, but also hopeful, hopeful because there is less of this happening now than there was, hopeful because you see

people's will and drive to survive and that people are not waiting for others to do it for them. They are pulling themselves up and doing as best they can. They cannot perform surgery on themselves, for example, which is why the doctor has been a miracle worker there. But people have the desire to live, to do better, to survive. Not just the empathy for what they have gone through, but their desire to reclaim themselves and their personal human dignity is what drove me to want to commit to working there more and more.

And I see that others have gotten involved. When we talk about comparing 10 years ago—now for me it is 8 or whatever—there were not nearly as many people who understood and identified with what was happening with women there in the United States and elsewhere. Their stories have gotten out, and they have started to galvanize folks, and those folks have started to act, and those actions are being felt. I think sometimes we have a tendency to want to look at things in a binary way: broken or fixed. This situation defies that kind of categorization. Rather, it is success in increments, and that is happening and it is enormously encouraging.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch.

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Meece, I have gone over your printed testimony, which is substantially lengthier than what you gave here. And I got to tell you I cannot tell you how impressed I am with your considered analysis based upon the time you spent in-country and your connection with the history. I have a specific question for you and I will get back to that in a minute.

Dr. Gilpin, likewise I have been through your testimony, and the thing I am so impressed with on that, is your focused specific recommendations for how we need to move forward. I am going to keep this close by because I think you have got some things in there that really need and deserve study and attention.

Mr. Affleck, I want to take up what John said a few minutes ago, and that is I have been here when you have been to this committee before, and you cannot ignore your celebrity status. And we see a lot of celebrities both in this committee and others. And you are certainly to be commended. So often we get from celebrities that it is as much about them as it is about the issue, and you have not shown one iota of that here.

Senator MCCAIN. I can assure you it is also partially about him. [Laughter.]

Mr. AFFLECK. That is funny. I have always considered Senator McCain the real celebrity. [Laughter.]

That is one thing he and I have in common.

The CHAIRMAN. So do we on the committee. [Laughter.]

Senator RISCH. John, I am working here. [Laughter.]

In any event, you are to be commended for that, and certainly Cindy is the same on that. You guys are really to be commended. This is very personal with you and we can see that you are focused on what is going on here.

The most profound thing that you said, I think, that impressed me was your laser focus really on this is not fixed, it is not broken, it is fragile. And I think that that is something we need to all focus

on here that moving forward, we do not slip back. We are always so glad to hear things are improving because there is a lot of testimony that comes from that table around the world where things are not moving forward. Indeed, they are going the wrong direction. So I think in that regard, that is deeply profound as far as how fragile this is.

And, Mr. Meece, that is where I want come back to you. Because of the history you have, because of the time in-country and because of your relationship with the Congo, what can you advise us? What would you say about how specifically we address the fragility of it and focus on it, as Mr. Affleck has suggested that we do, that we do not backslide here, that we go forward and that this thing does not come apart for us?

Ambassador MEECE. I wish I had a clear and simple answer to that question because I think it is one of the key questions in terms of how to keep a fragile—and certainly I strongly concur everything is reversible—to move forward, as is so badly needed by the people in the region and indeed for a significant part of the continent.

Senator RISCH. But surely you have some thoughts, I would hope.

Ambassador MEECE. Yes. And I have tried to suggest those in the written testimony that I submitted as well in terms of the key areas.

I think all of it requires a recognition that many of these issues are not short-term, quick fixes. Putting in place state authority, institutions that function, reform of the military and other kinds of reforms, democratic governance, these are things that will take a considerable amount of time and I think need to be approached with the thought that we are not simply achieving success, declaring victory, and withdrawing in 6 months or whatever the time frame may be, but that this will require a continued engagement over a period of time and building on whatever has already been done.

I think we need to approach our policy in the region relative to all of the countries with a frank and honest appraisal and not be shy from offering criticism, again whether that is public or private, depending on the circumstances, and pressure as needed, as well as support and endorsement for positive actions. We need to focus priorities within the resources that are available on what can be done.

And I get back to the point I was seeking to make about coordination with other partners. The country is simply too large. The scope of things is too big. You add a multiplication factor to virtually any problem there. We need to be working with the European Union, with other donors, with South Africa, with SADC, with the people in the region in terms of who can do what. What can you bring to the table and making sure everything is utilized as effectively as possible. And somewhat surprisingly perhaps, I think there is a broad area of agreement among the major partners and donors, at least in terms of key areas, although the specifics of it may vary.

And finally and certainly represented by Mr. Affleck, the role of the NGOs and various organizations which have been engaged in

the area for so long and indigenous NGOs as well, civil society in Congo. We need to make sure that that is engaged. I spoke of localized conflict resolution, something that I do not think we or much of anybody else has given sufficient attention to, but that involves engaging traditional leaders, whether those be religious leaders, traditional leaders, others of influence in the communities, NGOs, civil society working as well with the NGOs to try to bring this together in a comprehensive way that keeps it moving forward and with the recognition that there are things that will take a considerable length of time to put in place.

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Ambassador, and thank all of you for your efforts.

Ambassador MEECE. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coons.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Menendez.

And I would like to thank our second panel today for your testimony and for your service and leadership in this region.

Ambassador Meece, if I might just first to you. Due to the cap on peacekeeping contributions that is a part of U.S. appropriations, we have not paid our full assessed rate into peacekeeping operations for several years now. What do you think is the impact of our failing to fully fund missions for which we voted in the Security Council, and what is its specific impact for MONUSCO?

Ambassador MEECE. Senator, I cannot speak to the specifics of what may be underway or being looked at within the U.N. peacekeeping operations or the mission right now in terms of dealing with the budget resources that they have. But I can tell you that the budget of MONUSCO, while substantial—much of it is tied in to the nature of the mission, the size of the country, and what is needed. For example, a very large percentage of that budget ends up going toward the air operations of helicopters and civilian aircraft that are essential. There is no other way to get around, and indeed there are a lot of areas that can only be accessed by helicopter. But that consumes a lot of money.

If you have to scale back on that, as we have seen at different times, there are clearly negative effects. For example, MONUSCO, the peacekeeping operation, maintains at any given time or has in the past on the order of about 90 forward bases as a part of a strategy to extend its reach, provide maximum protections for civilians in those zones, deal with conflicts and so forth. If you have budget constraints, whether that is in air support, reduction in troops, or ability to support those bases, you are going to have to close bases. And we have seen example after example of where that has produced immediate and rather dramatic negative effects in those regions where those bases have been closed.

If you have to scale back on other programs beyond the core security mission of working in terms of sexual-based violence, whether that is aid to victims, prevention, education programs, impunity, justice, the range of things, that will have a serious impact. And I would make a similar statement about the involvement with children as well, which continues to be a serious problem with the armed groups.

If you are having to scale back what you are looking at in terms of conflict prevention and conflict resolution, this too will have an

immediate impact and, indeed, carry potential long-term consequences as well in terms of the positive agenda of which we have been speaking.

So these are serious problems. Clearly, the budget is large for a peacekeeping operation and it is incumbent upon all involved to be making maximum effective use and efficiencies, but at the same time significant cutbacks, particularly relatively abrupt ones, will have a significant and immediate dramatic effect as they work through the system.

Senator COONS. Well, thank you. I intend to work in the Appropriations Committee to support peacekeeping but also to provide support for Special Envoy Feingold, as well as for elections.

And, Mr. Affleck, I appreciate the very detailed list of actions that you suggested for the committee and things that we might be doing as the United States as one of the key regional players, in particular, that we continue to support Senator Feingold in his role as the special envoy.

You also mentioned—I thought this was intriguing—that the open-ended mandate for MONUSCO in some ways is undermining a core goal which we have for the DRC which is for them to have stronger security system reform, for them to have their own independent capacity, and that the longer MONUSCO goes on without any clear end, the longer it allows the Kabila government to fail to really stand up an effective military of their own that is accountable and that protects civilians and human rights. While I have been very encouraged by what we have heard today about the intervention brigade and what a difference it has made and what missions it might take on, I am also intrigued by your suggestion.

So how do you think we can most constructively support security sector reform, protection of civilians, while also not giving an open-ended blank check for MONUSCO going forward?

Mr. AFFLECK. Well, first I want to say I admire so much the work that the Ambassador has done and is known to have been so excellent in his tenure. So it has been really a great education for me to listen to him testify on this and other matters.

From my perspective, it has really been sort of on the ground talking to folks, getting a sense of what people's, in the country, perception of MONUSCO was and knowing that the U.S. taxpayer is paying in the neighborhood of \$400 million a year for this continuing mandate, and that there are budgetary pressures, and you know, we want to spend our money the right way. And I see a lot of developmental avenues and ways that I believe we could spend our money, and I think we need to have a hard look at that.

It allows Kabila right now to sort of have his cake and eat it too. He could say I do not MONUSCO. I did not want MONUC. I do not want this. Other armies in our country is never a solution. But also it sort of keeps him afloat in many ways. You know, you are at the mercy of the host country. There you are but you have got to work—which is why they sort of are embedded with the FARDC or are put in a morally tenuous position because now the FARDC commits abuses. What are you supposed to do? The population grew to resent ways in which MONUSCO—you know, when you say we are going to protect you from civilians, you may be doing

it 9 out of 10 times, but the time it does not happen, people become quite resentful, in particular, if they are not your countrymen.

I am not an expert on the U.N. and on MONUSCO, but I do know that without a clear set of goals, it feels like just a free-floating and very expensive proposition. It would be foolhardy, obviously, to just sort of wrench them out because they perform so many really vital services, as the Ambassador said, but I think it would also be smart to ask what are our long-term goals. How are we going to be able to accomplish them? What are our metrics? What does success mean? We need to be able to define those things to know where we are and at what point we want to withdraw ourselves in that particular way. Nobody believes that the goal of missions like MONUSCO is to stay in the country forever. That is not the idea. The idea is to go in, make change, protect people, and withdraw at the correct time. So we ought to figure out what that time is in concert with the thoughts of all the many experts who are involved in that.

Senator COONS. Well, thank you, Mr. Affleck, and thank you to this panel and in particular to Senator Feingold for your service and leadership.

I want to thank Chairman Menendez for holding this hearing today and in particular the Eastern Congo Initiative for your brave work on the ground and for what you do to help sustain focus and visibility on this important, fragile, and reversible opportunity here we have to secure real lasting peace for the people of DRC after so many years of suffering and conflict. Thank you for your work, and thank you to all of our witnesses today.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Flake.

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding the hearing.

Senator Coons and I are on the Africa Subcommittee. This is a great example of a bipartisan issue that we get behind. And I think the successes that we have seen owe some to that, that this is something that we all agree on. And I just want to pay tribute to the work that you all have done and those sitting behind you as well over this long haul.

Just one question. I am sorry I was not here to hear the testimony in person. But, Mr. Affleck, you mentioned the Congolese cocoa farmers, and that is a great example of what can happen if there is stability and just a little help. Is that something that can be replicated in other areas?

Mr. AFFLECK. I believe it can. We are trying to replicate it with coffee now. People know that they grow coffee in Rwanda, which is just across the border where you have the same climate and the same environment that is conducive to growing coffee there. But for various reasons, they have not had the security structure or the infrastructure or the access to the technology that is required to grow good coffee. And so we are working to cultivate that, and once again, we are going to try to bring that to market.

It is just another case of kind of looking at this country and finding that there are so many opportunities particularly in investment. People would rather be invested in than accept aid. They would rather have a job than sleep in a camp. They would rather live in a way that they are proud of. They are proud of themselves,

they are proud of their country, and they want an opportunity to show it, just like we are in our country. And to me, that has been the most satisfying thing is to enable that, to find people who are gifted at something, help them see the ways they can exploit that gift and capitalize on it and see a community grow and an economy grow as a result.

So I guess the answer is, yes, we see that there are other ways to do it. Yes, we are trying to do it, and yes, we believe that others should get themselves involved as well.

Senator FLAKE. Well, thank you. I know that all of you have sat here for a while, and I just want to thank you again for what you do and, Mr. Affleck, for your sustained involvement here.

Mr. AFFLECK. Thank you, Senator.

Senator FLAKE. You can tell that it is something that you care deeply about. So thank you all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Markey.

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Thank you for having this hearing.

Thank you, Senator Feingold, for all of your excellent work.

And we welcome a hometown hero.

Mr. AFFLECK. I am the Patriots fan. [Laughter.]

Senator MARKEY. And we are getting some wicked smart answers today, too, from that panel. [Laughter.]

We admire your acting, but we admire your activism even more, Ben. So we thank you for everything that you are doing.

You mentioned the success of public-private partnerships in the Congo. Can you give us an example or two that are concrete that you look to as good examples of how such partnerships can work?

Mr. AFFLECK. I am going to brag on ourselves a little bit more because the CEO is right behind me, Joe Whinney who has got Theo Chocolate, and if I did not highlight it enough before—I am sorry most of the photographers left because it is for sale. It is at Whole Foods. [Laughter.]

Mr. AFFLECK. This is a result of a public-private partnership that has worked really well where we have gone in and built the capacity of thousands of farmers in Congo who were not able to get their cocoa quite up to snuff because of a lack of resources and a lack of training, although they did not lack industriousness and grit. In doing that, we hooked them up with this incredible partner, and sort of through the magic of capitalism, they are selling their goods. Theo is buying it on the market. At first, they bought 40 tons. Now they are going to buy 640 tons of Congolese chocolate this year. And this is precisely the kind of thing that we think that is happening elsewhere, and this is the most specific one that I can speak to.

You know, I was speaking with Senator Graham earlier today talking about how specific smart investments, small-scale, actually in some ways better investments than big, massive ones because they can be monitored, they can be followed through on, and they can be given to folk dedicated, enthusiastic individuals or small businesses.

It is not easy. They are not as set up to take investment as somebody in Boston is, but it is possible and it is doable. And it is a model that I really believe in, which is not the traditional aid

model but investment. I think it is the kind of thing that could really enjoy and has enjoyed bipartisan support here and I know that it could be successful.

Senator MARKEY. Can you say a bit more about the root causes of the conflict, and can you talk about how empowering civil society in Congo can help to empower ordinary citizens?

Mr. AFFLECK. Yes. Again, these gentlemen could speak much more eloquently and well to the sociopolitical causes of where Congo is now. I can tell you just broadly it starts with somebody—you know, it was only country that was owned by an individual. It was owned by King Leopold and then he was forced to divest the country, interestingly enough, through a campaign of activism that was spearheaded by Mark Twain. So there is a history of Americans being active around this country. And he divested. It became the Congo Free State, and then the United States helped turn the country over to Mobutu after independence where you have this kleptocrat who kind of basically purloined the whole country in the course of his reign. And so you had sort of a very, very rough history, and then the Rwandan genocide kind of spilled over the border. And particularly in the east, I believe it sort of ruptured the fabric. You know, you had this mentality of genocide that came in with millions of people and with the EXFAR and with the Interahamwe who mass raped and murdered. This was not a part of Zairian culture or history. This happened after the Rwandan genocide and after so many wars were fought there.

So you have a fabric of society that has come undone that has dissolved. And part of it is injury and part of it is just presence of military of it is an absence of a presence of military. And part of it is a presence of FARDC military who in turn—you know, Mobutu's attitude was sort of I am not going to pay you, so you are going to go out and feed on the population. And that mentality, I think, was still present.

And what has happened since then is slow and incremental movements toward peace, spearheaded by the folks like the ones I am honored to sit at the table with today. And at the root of that, the only real change that has happened is when, as you say, people in civil society themselves have sort of taken responsibility for their four-by-four block area and committed to improving that. Now, they need the political space and they need the security space to do that, but when the brick and mortar work is getting done and rebuilding society, as you point out, that is who is doing it.

Senator MARKEY. And USAID. You talked about some programs that you would like to see enhanced. Can you just give us a couple of examples of—

Mr. AFFLECK. Well, I think broadly speaking right now they are not as present in the east. They are spending money in the east, but it is mostly humanitarian. And in my view—and I am sure there are many who would take exception. We took Raj Shah to Congo—was it a year ago December? And we are continuing to make the point that we believe that USAID should continue to invest in the east and should invest in development aid, not just or primarily humanitarian aid.

Senator MARKEY. Good. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it. Thank you. An excellent panel.

The CHAIRMAN. We agree.

You know, the world is a challenging place. Multilateral, bilateral, and regional conflicts could keep this committee in permanent session. But when the committee meets in full, it can be an extraordinary force to help change and mold the course of events. I have a feeling that today's 2½-hour hearing has riveted the attention on both sides of the aisle in a way that can only inure to the benefit of the special envoy, as well as to your collective vision. And I think we have seen the best of what this committee has exhibited over the last year—a spirit of bipartisanship as it relates to foreign policy, which is when we exert our best abilities abroad.

So with the thanks of all of the members of the committee to this panel, I will ask unanimous consent that the record be left open until the close of business Friday for any additional statements or submissions, as well as for any questions for the record. Without objection, so ordered.

And this hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:41 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DENIS MUKWEGE, FOUNDER AND DIRECTOR OF THE PANZI HOSPITAL IN THE DRC

We are delighted to have the opportunity to share to the U.S. Senate our thoughts and hopes for the future of Congo.

Many of you have struggled alongside us so that the cries of the women who are victims of sexual violence in eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are heard. The restoration of peace and security is what so many sexual violence survivors in the Congo highlight as their greatest need. As health professionals, we advocate for peace and justice because we cannot only treat the consequences of the violence, we must also tackle its root causes and prevent it.

WHAT HAS TRANSPIRED IN 2013

In 2013 we have seen renewed political and diplomatic commitment from the international community toward ending the violence in Eastern Congo and neutralizing rebel armed groups, and we are hopeful for more sustained action. Encouraging actions included the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the region, which was signed on Feb. 24, 2013, by 11 States and four intergovernmental organizations. I see this “framework for hope” as the first peace initiative truly aimed at addressing the causes of violence and recurring conflict in DRC.

We have also been encouraged by the adoption of Resolution 2098 of the United Nations Security Council that includes a robust mandate and deployment of an Intervention Brigade; the appointment of Mary Robinson as Special Envoy of the U.N. Secretary General; new strong leadership of the peacekeeping operations MONUSCO under the deeply committed Special Representative of the Secretary General Martin Kobler and Force Commander Santos Cruz.

In a crucial step, a package for peace and development was designed with the commitment of the World Bank. We are also enormously encouraged by the strong support of U.S. diplomacy. We recognize the firm determination and genuine political will of the Obama administration to put an end to the cycle of violence in eastern Congo. President Obama notably stated in 2013 that the Addis Ababa Agreement “cannot remain a mere sheet of paper,” and Secretary of State Kerry has affirmed that “the only one way to honor women of Congo is to give them peace.” President Obama’s appointment of former U.S. Senator Russell Feingold as Special Envoy to help coordinate efforts to resolve the instability and insecurity in Eastern Congo has sent a strong signal of the seriousness and level of the U.S. Government’s commitment to stability in our region.

Many communities in eastern DRC are keenly aware of the proactive U.S. regional diplomacy, notably through your cooperation with International Criminal Court for the surrender last year of Bosco Ntaganda, wanted by the Court for war

crimes and crimes against humanity and through the use of the 2008 Child Soldier Prevention Act to suspend U.S. military aid to Rwanda, an action that helped lead to the collapse of the M23 rebel movement.

The political will demonstrated by the U.S. that drives these developments encourages Congolese civil society and provides a unique momentum to address the root causes of violence that plagues my country and allows us to envisage sustainable peace and development.

There are significant challenges to this endeavor in a region that has now known violence and failed development for decades.

I believe that for the current peace process to advance successfully, we must prioritize several critical initiatives.

First, we must strengthen efforts to end impunity. I firmly believe that there will be no lasting peace without justice. The current Congolese judiciary is not able or willing to hold perpetrators of mass atrocities accountable. Therefore, we are urging the Congolese authorities and the neighboring countries to develop judicial cooperation, to continue their cooperation with the ICC and to implement the recommendations of the Mapping report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, including by establishing “Mixed Chambers,” to prosecute and hold to account those responsible of the most serious crimes committed in DRC since 1993. Civil society actors have been encouraged by the political announcement made by President Kabila in this regard and are awaiting concrete steps to be taken for the establishment of such a hybrid domestic/international court. Other rule of law tools are necessary to support transitional justice initiatives. These include reparation programs, truth and reconciliation mechanisms, and institutional reforms, notably a thorough vetting of security forces.

Second, we must continue to support regional dialogue. The surrender of the M23 marks the first step on the long road to sustainable peace. We believe the length of the Kampala talks have slowed momentum for the implementation of the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement. In future rounds of negotiations, regional leaders must be involved.

Third, the neutralization of other armed groups that remain active in the area is crucial to deliver a sense of security and recovery in the region. Most militias are driven by economic interests, not ideology. Mai Mai groups have begun to surrender after the fall of the M23, but there are no resources to support their reintegration into society and no visible incentives to other militias to surrender. A program of support, including the provision of basic needs, must be put in place. ADL–Nalu and FDLR are the current priorities for action and will require support of Ugandan and Rwandan leaders.

For those in the FDLR accused of perpetrating many of the most serious crimes—war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, they should face international or domestic justice and the military solution shall be used when the following possibilities have been exhausted:

- For those wishing to return to Rwanda: disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion, and repatriation in Rwanda must be facilitated;
- For those not willing or able to return to Rwanda, former insurgents must be given the choice of:
 - Relocation to different provinces in the Congo on an individual base;
 - Relocation in third countries by facilitating asylum procedures with the support of the High Commissioner for Refugees.

Most importantly, we need to prevent feelings of revenge and the stigmatization of any ethnic groups for crime that their parents are accused of. The danger of transferring guilt from generation to generation is real and should not be encouraged by leaders of the region.

Reshaping the design of DDR programs should include mental health and social support for former combatants as they reintegrate into society.

Fourth, security sector reform is vital and is at the heart of making the protection of civilians a reality. To date, the integration of militia and criminals in the security services has had disastrous consequences. For those entering public service, members of the security forces should go through a vetting process. Those trained to loot and rape cannot be assumed to be committed to protecting the population and the country. Such individuals could be deployed to “reconstruction brigades” deployed to rebuild the country—to develop our infrastructure, build and rehabilitate administrative buildings, install of water and electricity supply, and develop agriculture. By first becoming self-sufficient and then contributing to the productivity and the reconstruction of the nation, these former militia members and child soldiers would undergo “occupational therapy,” that will strengthen their potential and orient them towards carrying out work in the general interest of society.

Finally, we must support the role of civil society in the implementation of Addis Ababa Framework agreement. The recently adopted Plan of Action for the implementation of regional benchmarks under the commitments of the Framework Agreement stresses the need to “strengthen the involvement of civil society organizations and women’s groups in regional efforts aimed at addressing sources of instability,” notably through an inclusive monitoring of the commitments made by the 11 signatory States in Addis Ababa last year.

Civil society, and most specifically women’s rights organizations, should actively be engaged in the peace process and in the oversight mechanisms established to monitor the implementation of the Framework Agreement. Therefore, I humbly suggest that Radio Okapi and the MONUSCO Public Information Office play a leading role in disseminating extensively information about the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement in order to facilitate ownership at the grassroots level.

Congolese women are expecting more than a reaffirmation of commitments or a reiteration of deep concerns. Their voices need to be heard and they must participate if we want to benefit from the dividend of peace and development in the eastern Congo once and for all.

Today in the DRC, we are at a critical time. The ingredients for our future are in place. Now we must translate words into action and seize the current momentum to bring about a lasting peace, sustainable development, and justice, health and dignity for all.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK DWYER, COUNTRY DIRECTOR,
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, MERCY CORPS

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to submit written testimony regarding the challenges and prospects for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is now entering the 20th year of one of the gravest humanitarian emergencies the world has ever known. Armed conflicts, weak governance, epidemics, widespread violence against civilians and massive displacement have devastated the eastern part of the country. The number of people who have perished as a result has been estimated at 5.4 million, and the number who are currently displaced at 2.6 million.

Mercy Corps has worked in DRC since 2007. We have main offices in Kinshasa, Goma, and Dungu with more than 200 staff working in three different provinces. As an agency, Mercy Corps has worked at the nexus of crisis, conflict, and development for over 30 years in over 40 of the most challenging countries in the world. Often in collaboration with the U.S. Government, our work helps communities recover stronger from natural disasters and conflict by empowering them with the tools and resources that they need to build resilience against future shocks.

I have been the Country Director of our programs in the DRC for 3 years. Both my personal experience as Country Director and Mercy Corps’ unique purview into the opportunities and challenges for accomplishing systemic change in complex contexts informs the testimony below.

I will begin by speaking briefly on the current state of the crisis in the DRC, a reflection on how we got here, and then conclude by proposing four practical ideas for catalyzing a new way forward: investing in long-term solutions, promoting a culture of entrepreneurship and accountability, supporting community-based infrastructure programs, and unlocking barriers to regional trade.

THE CONTEXT FROM OUR VIEWPOINT

The DRC is a complicated country in which to operate. One must be constantly alert to endemic corruption, the many administrative road blocks, and dubious, mostly illegal, fees, taxes and penalties. Most days involve negotiating with government officials at some level to ensure our initiatives can move forward. Program implementation is made more challenging due to a lack of infrastructure and service provision, a volatile and dangerous security environment, weak law enforcement and judiciary (and in many areas in which we operate the complete absence of state), and low human capacity.

In fact, it takes a substantial amount of energy and personal commitment to manage, develop, and sustain a mission in the DRC. So much so that most counterparts from other agencies rarely make it beyond 18-months of service, barely enough time to grasp the context, which in itself, is a testimony of the problem we face in a coun-

try that desperately requires vision and long-term leadership, rather than short-term fixes.

Short-term emergency programs have been renewed time after time to address the immediate needs of the population, while few funding mechanisms (available to Non-Governmental Organizations) exist to address the root causes of the humanitarian crisis. I do not wish to understate the need for humanitarian assistance in the DRC; indeed, Mercy Corps has its own humanitarian division. If not managed carefully, however, the provision of long-term emergency assistance is not only expensive, but it can lead to community dependence and be counterproductive to longer term development goals.

Since the invasion of Goma by the armed group M23 in November 2012, the U.N. peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, has been given a stronger mandate, along with an Intervention Brigade (IB) 3,000 troop-strong, to rid the eastern DRC of rebel groups. The M23, perhaps the strongest group in the Kivu regions, was recently defeated, with the help of much foreign diplomatic pressure in Kigali and Kampala, and the FDLR (an armed group led by Rwandan genocidaires) is next on the IB's list.

There is broad consensus that armed groups cannot be part of the landscape if the DRC is to progress and regional stability prevail, and we welcome efforts made through the Kampala Dialogue of 2013 and Nairobi Declarations toward this end.

REMEMBER THE ROOT CAUSES

The predation, corruption, and conflict that led to the collapse of the Zairian state destroyed public infrastructure, undermined citizens' access to basic services, and encouraged misrule at every level. Insecurity, social divisions, fragile democracy, and the inability of the government to deliver basic public services have compromised the legitimacy of public institutions.

Many of the armed groups operating throughout the DRC have their roots in wartime social divisions and exist as a result of the shadow economy. The absence of the state enables these groups to control territories, tax its peoples, and exploit natural resources through illegal trade. Some groups have and still receive murky state support, domestically and regionally, and part of the crisis in the east of the country results from longstanding ethnic tension—following the Rwandan genocide more than 20 years ago—due to genocidaires finding refuge in the Congo.

Rebuilding a Congolese state that can respond to the needs of its people and encourage long-term growth will require strategic commitments by actors in every sector to undertake institutional reform as well as building capacity within the national government (including State owned companies), local governments, civil society, and the private sector. However, ultimate stability can only be achieved through a commitment to regional peace and development. The Regional Peace Process and ICGLR dialogue seem to be heading in the right direction.

As the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide approaches, it is important that the international community reflect on the connection between the two crises, as many of today's crises in the region such as the Central African Republic and South Sudan pose similar regionally destabilizing threats.

A NEW WAY FORWARD

Billions of dollars have been spent to try to address the humanitarian crisis in DRC over the past 20 years, and yet, it persists. This begs the question: is the humanitarian response to massive and protracted displacements in the DRC adapting to the needs of the populations and accountable to the communities it seeks to serve?

Mercy Corps has joined in coalition with World Vision, Search for Common Ground, and the Congolese Government to identify a way forward. We believe a paradigm shift away from a risk mitigating "Do No Harm" approach to engagement toward a proactive "Do More Good" approach is necessary. Do More Good seeks to identify how to best connect emergency assistance to longer term recovery and development interventions; to promote self-sustaining, resilient, locally owned and community/market-driven outcomes that will catalyze sustainable change for the Congolese people. Our experience lends us to believe that this type of integrated programming is the best approach for preventing mass violence and rebuilding sustainable, inclusive, and effective governance structures.

Mercy Corps would like to put forward the following recommendations gleaned from our work on "Do More Good" and our years of experience in the DRC and other protracted crises:

1. Be dissatisfied with easy fixes; invest in long term solutions

Effectively addressing the interconnected development and security challenges in a chronically insecure context such as DRC requires long-term investments. The systemic changes that the DRC needs will not be reached through short-term projects measured by quantitative outputs, but rather, through dynamic, impact-driven initiatives that integrate the needs and desires of local communities from the onset and adjust flexibly to changing demands on the ground. Assistance frameworks must better integrate emergency assistance with long-term development interventions, and focus on strategic interventions at all levels of society with the aim of transforming both behaviors and systems.

For much of the last 20 years, humanitarian organizations have been tasked to facilitate the transportation of water from a lake in order to reach communities in areas not served by the aging infrastructure and to internally displaced people (IDP) on the outskirts of town. A similar short-term approach is still applied to many IDP camps in North Kivu. This approach makes sense to solve temporary needs but is wasteful if used over a long-term horizon as it does not solve systemic problems of resource scarcity, aid dependency, and a chronic lack of water utility provision.

Importantly for Congress to recognize: from our experience, long-term, cross-sectoral gains are most achievable when funding mechanisms allow for long-term planning.

2. Support and scale-up community based infrastructure programs

One primary example of the above-described challenge is with infrastructure. The influx of people fleeing the conflict to cities in eastern Congo has overwhelmed a taxed urban infrastructure. In Goma, the largest city in North Kivu province, up to a million people depend on an aging water system that was originally constructed to serve a population of fewer than 100,000 people—and which was largely destroyed by volcanic lava flows in 2002.

Mercy Corps has excavated 1 million cubic feet of lava rock to install 25 kilometers of pipelines and constructed a 700,000-liter water storage tank, as part of a USAID Food for Peace funded program in Goma that is addressing water sanitation, hygiene and food security. These improvements will provide clean drinking water for 200,000 people, many of whom live directly on top of the hardened lava flows from the 2002 eruption. We are also constructing latrines and rainwater capture systems and promoting good hygiene practice. The program has been extended—as a result of multidonor funding—with the aim of covering the whole of Goma as well as in two other cities.

However, the key to the success of the program lies in the sustainable management of the systems that are being put in place. Mercy Corps is working in collaboration with the state water board (Regideso), the World Bank, the KfW, and local communities to ensure that we reform the Regideso at Provincial level to ensure that the system can be managed professionally and sustainably. This involves studying which business models and regulatory frameworks would work best to ensure effective and transparent management of the system, and then piloting interventions accordingly.

We believe greater investment should be targeted toward community-based governance programs. The absence of water and energy make it almost impossible to develop modern agriculture and processing. Strengthening and diversifying livelihoods also requires water and energy, let alone to improve the daily lives of the people. Given the rapid rate of urbanization, low levels of utility provision, yet high potential for hydroelectric and agricultural production, prioritizing urban/peri-urban water/sanitation and energy infrastructure is key, and will prove catalytic.

3. Promote a culture of entrepreneurship and accountability

We believe that promoting a culture of entrepreneurship and development of pro-poor market systems is vital to prevent cycles of dependence, corruption, and conflict. For the past 2 years, Mercy Corps has been running a USAID Food for Peace Program that builds a culture of entrepreneurship by engaging communities in agriculture value-chain and market development activities, alongside behavioral change campaigns aimed at improving nutrition and promotion of good governance at all levels. Outcomes are achieved by building the capacity of groups and individuals to develop sustainable agri-businesses and related enterprises, developing community-based common interest groups and capitalizing on opportunities.

In a region divided for decades by conflict, we believe it is still possible to show the potential of “shared value and opportunities” created by developing solutions that are economically and socially beneficial to all key members of society—civilians, private sector, and government—while engaging the private sector in entrepreneur-

ship and development. Increasingly in our initiatives, Mercy Corps plays a facilitative role to ensure win-win scenarios for the communities and the private sector.

Entrepreneurship and market development are therefore not only sustainable and cost-effective, but are more attuned to community development compared to relief assistance or conventional economic development programs. Private sector investment can be increased through this approach. However, to effectively engage the private sector, we are actively developing common understanding of shared value, shared opportunities and the need for shared partnerships with private sector actors.

4. Prioritize domestic reforms that unlock barriers to regional trade

Promoting cross-border trade and economic development between DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda is critical. We welcome efforts by U.N. Special Envoy Mary Robinson and the U.S. administration to invest efforts in boosting private sector investment. To achieve this in practice, however, we believe more support is needed to enable the environment and help offset risks. Innovative, accountable financing mechanisms and models will be necessary to realize this ambition.

INGOs are frequently subjected to harassment by government officials and those in positions of power. INGOs have been particularly outraged and have advocated for change on many occasions, including during the U.S. Special Envoy Russell Feingold's recent visit to the DRC. We believe that more emphasis should be placed on ensuring that bilateral and multilateral agreements that have been signed with the Congolese Government are fully enforced. This would not only ensure that tax payers' money is spent according to agreements in place, but also to promote good governance. Although some efforts have been made by the international community in this area, much needs to be done so as to increase the credibility of implementing partners and reduce considerable resource wastage.

The private sector suffers similar challenges, including trade barriers, unrealistic taxation, unreliable administration, poor governance, and a corrupt judiciary, are all areas that deter investment and paralyze exports. A potential investor recently told me that the DRC was one of only two countries in which venture capital would not be considered. If we are to make progress in this area, improve the enabling environment, and inverse the trends, tremendous domestic reform efforts are needed along with real regional commitment to resolving resource, ethnic tensions, and cross-border trade and administrative barriers.

Prioritizing local ownership of natural resources, improved governance around resources, accountable and inclusive revenue flows from them and accountable cross-border trade is critical. In pursuit of such efforts, it seems wise that the international community seriously consider how and under which conditions aid is granted in the future.

CONCLUSION

I am tremendously optimistic about the prospects for the DRC and its people. The country has abundant resources and there are numerous opportunities to meet peoples' basic needs, create employment, and improve lives. The Congolese people are earnest, sharp, and good willed.

Ultimately, the most important way to achieve systemic and sustainable change in the DRC and the Great Lakes region will be by giving communities a greater voice, considering them as agents of change, and as the primary humanitarian and development actors. Effective engagement and assistance requires an approach that is Congolese-led and inclusive, and which clearly identifies needs and opportunities, while building on existing capacities, and innovating and learning from best practices.

In our programs, we are engaging communities to develop Community Development Plans at the local level, and facilitating linkages with government structures through which they can voice their concerns and contribute to discussions on issues affecting them. As a result, communities are better able to engage with the government, market sector players, INGOs, local NGOs and other civil society actors. This, in our experience, is the most sustainable way to prevent conflict, advance prosperity, and promote resilient, accountable, and just societies.

Thank you again for the opportunity to submit testimony and for your continued support to the people of the DRC.

RESPONSES OF HON. RUSSELL FEINGOLD TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Security sector reform (SSR) is a recurring theme in all of the witness testimonies today. Human rights advocates have long encouraged the Congolese Government to establish a vetting mechanism to weed out of the security forces perpetrators of war crimes.

Question. Has the Congolese Government agreed to establish a vetting mechanism? If so, what, if anything, has been done to bring about its development?

Answer. We have assisted the Democratic Republic of the Congo's (DRC) military justice sector to establish a database that tracks past, ongoing and future human rights abuse cases. We are currently conducting training on the use and maintenance of the system, which provides a means for the Congolese to vet soldiers that were accused and/or convicted of a crime. The Congolese are also in the process of developing a new recruitment strategy to better vet new soldiers entering the military and to remove older or disabled soldiers from the military. We will continue to strongly advocate for the full establishment and operation of this individual vetting mechanism as a key part of DRC security sector reform efforts.

In addition, the DRC Government regularly vets individual members of armed groups during the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process (DDR), including removing child soldiers and turning them over to UNICEF. Regarding the ex-M23 combatants, the DRC Government has published a new DDR plan, but many details are still unclear, including specifics on how vetting will be conducted. We look forward to working with the DRC Government and the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to ensure that the vetting process is thorough and identifies those who may be subject to prosecution for war crimes or other human rights abuses pursuant to the Nairobi Declarations, which the DRC Government and the M23 signed in December 2013. The Declarations do not provide for group reintegration into the DRC military; instead, any individual who wishes to reenter the DRC military, must be vetted and meet the same requirements as a new recruit.

Question. Under what conditions would the administration consider training additional units of the FARDC?

Answer. We are reviewing the training we provided to the 391st battalion, as well as the performance following the training, in an effort to further improve our human rights training. Members of the 391st battalion are alleged to have committed rape during the M23's takeover of Goma in November 2012. We are awaiting the verdicts of the ongoing trials being conducted by the DRC Government to determine their involvement in this event. The administration would only consider training additional battalion units when we are more confident that the Congolese Government would provide the necessary support to sustain and discipline the unit during and following the training, keep the trained unit together for at least 2 years post-training, and better utilize the trained unit in the field.

While we are not currently training a battalion, we are providing the DRC military with specialized training on civilian-military relations, human rights, ethics, and basic intelligence collection. The military suffers from an overall lack of professionalism, which goes beyond the soldiers' performance in armed conflict. Any member of the military who receives training must first be vetted according to Leahy standards, which prohibit training and assistance to any recipient for which there is credible information that they have committed a gross violation of human rights.

Question. How is the U.S. Government coordinating with other donor governments to develop a unified proposal for reforms and demonstrate the international community's commitment to hold the Congolese Government accountable for the implementation of reforms?

Answer. There are multiple mechanisms for donor coordination and monitoring of the Congolese Government's implementation of reforms. We are a member of, and participate in, the Great Lakes Contact Group, a group of like-minded donors, including the United States, Belgium, the European Union, France, Germany, Netherlands, South Africa, Sweden, the United Nations, and the United Kingdom, that meet regularly to coordinate policy and programming. The Contact Group also strives to agree on the conditions the DRC Government should meet prior to receiving donor funding for specific areas. The envoys from the United States, United Nations, African Union, and European Union also correspond regularly in-between meetings of the Contact Group to ensure constant coordination on messaging and policy. Additionally, MONUSCO established a high level working group in Kinshasa

this month, comprised of donors and designed to coordinate donor support toward elections, security sector reform, stabilization and DDR. MONUSCO is also working to include the DRC Government in these working groups to better support coordination between the government and donors. Lastly, our Embassy in Kinshasa coordinates regularly with other embassies to ensure message consistency and program harmony.

The peace process underway to implement the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework Agreement also includes the establishment of benchmarks for the DRC's Framework commitments, including governance and security sector reform. While we are still waiting to see the DRC's draft benchmarks, once they are approved by the Framework's Regional Oversight Mechanism, these benchmarks will be used to hold the DRC accountable for fully implementing its commitments.

RESPONSES OF RAYMOND GILPIN TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR EX-COMBATANTS

Question. Since the end of the M23 rebellion, the Congolese Government has launched a plan for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Analysts and development organizations have expressed concerns about the design of the program and the lack of clarity in how it will be implemented. Past iterations of DDR have failed in the DRC and often, former combatants were brought into the FARDC rather than being prepared for life as civilians.

Answer. Thank you very much for these questions relating to the design and implementation of the DDR program unveiled by the Congolese Government in December 2013. This third iteration in recent years appears to have similar design flaws and implementation challenges as the previous two. One fundamental (and inadequately analyzed) aspect of these programs is the implicit assumption that we are dealing with a relatively homogenous group of ex-combatants. This is not accurate. There are three broad categories with varied interests, namely: the warlords, the mid-ranking commanders and the foot soldiers. Most DDRs are designed to impact the foot soldiers, and not the other two categories of combatants, who are more critical for both success and sustainability. This is partly why the incentives and opportunities offered in the past have not been very effective. The new DDR program promises to provide military and nonmilitary options for ex-combatants. However, the nonmilitary options (i.e., skills training) have not been closely linked to the real economy and the military options (i.e., joining the FARDC) may require more resources than have been allocated. Then there are the perennial questions surrounding oversight, transparency, and accountability. I provide these observations in order to preface my responses to the specific questions below.

Question. In your testimony, you state that the business community could play a more active role in promoting peace. To this end, how can the international community incentivize the private sector to incorporate ex-combatants into their operations?

Answer. The public sector is poorly equipped to address the needs of ex-combatants in the DRC. They lack the capacity, reach, and resources to effectively reintegrate these former fighters into communities. On the other hand, the private sector in the DRC has extensive reach (via an extensive supply chain) and could provide both direct and indirect opportunities to ex-combatants. The foot soldiers (who are generally unskilled) could become more relevant in the labor-intensive mining and agricultural sectors. Opportunities could also exist with infrastructure projects (given the DRC's deep infrastructure deficit). Mid-level commanders could be engaged as contracted service providers (e.g., transportation, hospitality, and supplies). The difference between the mid-level commanders would be the scale/scope of contracting. With some justification, DDR programs in the Congo aim to resettle all ex-combatants outside their areas of operation. This means requiring them to reestablish social, economic, and financial networks needed to guarantee success, post-reintegration. The private sector could partner with government agencies in order to facilitate a smooth transition.

The international community can do three things to incentivize the business sector to more fully integrate ex-combatants in their operations:

a. Steadfastly support international commitments/regulations—like the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Universal adherence to these programs helps reduce business costs, diminish risk, and create a level playing field. Such developments create an environment that allows

the private sector to become more engaged with the local economy . . . and ex-combatants.

b. Identify and establish enduring public-private partnerships. Businesses are more likely to integrate ex-combatants if the environments in which they live and work are more permissible. A number of bilateral, multilateral, and private organizations finance development projects in the DRC. A level of coordination and focus on reintegration/resettlement regions will provide the clean water, roads, clinics and training facilities that are needed. The current fragmented approach to the economic transformation of affected areas is unhelpful. Encouraging development projects to be colocated with DDR programs will bode well for both success and sustainability.

c. Consider rewarding "local content" contracts. Some consideration could be given to affording tax breaks to companies that purchase above a predetermined threshold of "local content" labor, goods, and services. Even notional inducements could make a big difference in what are highly competitive markets. Such an initiative would have the dual benefits of bolstering U.S. companies abroad and providing additional insights into the efficacy (and pace) of reintegration efforts.

Question. What economic opportunities exist for ex-combatants and how should international aid and programs target this population specifically?

Answer. There are relatively few economic opportunities in the DRC. Unemployment is high and the labor force is largely unskilled. The war economy introduces an added complication by raising the expectations of ex-combatants who earned much more from extortion and pillage than they could make via a regular job. Hence the dual challenge of creating jobs for this restive segment of the population and making such opportunities attractive enough to prevent recidivism.

International aid programs could target ex-combatants directly and indirectly. Directly by (a) providing training opportunities, (b) ensuring key social investments, (c) revising regulations to minimize barriers to entry for would-be private sector operators and entrepreneurs, and (d) facilitating market access both within and outside the DRC. Case studies abound of success with similar efforts. Indirectly, international aid programs could (a) prioritize governance and rule of law programs to curtail impunity, (b) invest in a proprivate sector judicial sector and (c) introduce/reinforce programs that enhance transparency and accountability in the economic and financial sectors.

RESPONSE OF AMBASSADOR ROGER MEECE TO QUESTION
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. In a response you provided committee members, in reference to the desired sunset of MONUSCO suggested by a fellow panelist from ECI, you indicated a deterioration in security in those areas that MONUSCO left.

♦ Would you kindly expand on your reservations regarding the MONUSCO sunset and provide any guidance on such a contraction in its size and mandate?

Answer. During my 3-year tenure as head of the U.N. Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, at any given time, we maintained on the order of roughly 90 forward bases (Temporary Operating Bases, or TOBs, and Company Operating Bases, or COBs) to increase the reach of our presence across the very large expanses of territory where armed groups operated. A significant number of these could be accessed and supported only by helicopter, as there were simply not viable roads. The same constraints, of course, apply to humanitarian agencies trying to access displaced civilians, often in large numbers, and other victims of violence, and they often depend on MONSUCO logistics help. The bases were more often than not very basic, but nonetheless relatively expensive to maintain by U.N. peacekeeping standards, especially related to helicopter or other required logistics support. It was often difficult to close TOBs, as these became perceived lifelines for villages and communities in those areas.

We were obliged on a number of occasions to close or relocate MONSUCO forward bases because of helicopter, troop or other resource constraints, redeploy peacekeeping troops from one area to another to counter new priority threats, or reduce other functions in some areas due to security risks or other factors. A scaling back of MONUSCO's presence in any area invariably provoked local unhappiness or opposition, fearing the consequences of the withdrawal. In areas of militia activity, including most of the Kivu provinces, Ituri District and parts of Bas Uele and Haut Uele Districts in Orientale province, in nearly all cases there would be an increase in militia activity in those areas following the pullback, with consequent increases in civilian displacements due to conflict and violence, apparent increases in violent crime including rape and other sexual-based crime, and a general deterioration in

security conditions. In addition, in virtually all areas of MONUSCO security presence, we confronted requests for security escorts beyond our capability to fulfill from local authorities (for example, market day patrols and escorts) and from U.N. agencies, other aid agencies, and a variety of NGOs to enable humanitarian access and assistance to civilian victims of violence. While some NGOs preferred to avoid any association with the U.N., much less national security forces, we not infrequently also were obliged to utilize our presence to help following attacks on unescorted civilians as well. Such escorts or assistance with attacks obviously became more problematic without a local presence.

A good example of this phenomenon was last year in the final months of my tenure, as after a good deal of study we were obliged to close some bases near Pinga, North Kivu, to enable formation and deployment of the newly authorized Intervention Brigade, and adjust deployments and logistic support given M23 operations in the province. Very soon after the closures, the Mai Mai “Sheka” and APCLS (“Janvier”) groups moved into the area, with consequent clashes between them and reported direct attacks on civilians. Pinga itself was overrun and overrun by militias at least once. We feared a potential eventual increase in FDLR and other groups’ activities in the territory as well. We sought to minimize the pullback, and we moved as quickly as possible to conduct patrols, helicopter operations, or conduct other mitigating activities as possible in the area; however, these operations did not and could not have the same deterrent and counterforce capability of the deployed presence. While the specifics of any given area vary, the general pattern was familiar.

Virtually all MONUSCO military troops are deployed to areas of eastern DRC where armed groups operate. There is a constant internal review process to determine threat levels, and the resultant closure of bases and redeployment of troops whenever possible as security conditions improve in any given area, or national forces seem capable of providing at least minimal security themselves. These actions can sometimes have longer term negative effects, for example in Katanga province, where MONSUCO has had little capacity to address growing conflict and violence after a drawdown of the MONUSCO presence over time, but they nonetheless reflect the ongoing effort to deploy troops and resources to the highest threat zones. In addition to the purely internal MONUSCO assessments, in 2010 a Joint Assessment Process was established by MONUSCO and the government to provide a mechanism to arrive at a common understanding and assessment of security conditions, and promote dialogue at multiple levels between government authorities and the U.N. mission to improve overall communication and planning. This Joint Assessment Process has proven to be very useful.

Regarding the proposal for a mission “sunset” date, it is my understanding that at least in part such a proposal has been advanced with the idea of increasing pressure on the Kinshasa government to move ahead with reforms and other measures. I would note that when I took up duties with the U.N. in July 2010, at the time DRC President Kabila was demanding the U.N. Peacekeeping Mission, MONUC at the time, be withdrawn entirely by mid-2011. This I believe was based on a perception that the mission was no longer providing a sufficiently robust security presence, and I think likely also reflected an underlying perception of an irritating international presence in the country infringing on national sovereignty. In my judgment, given the ongoing active conflict and the consequent ongoing major negative humanitarian effects, and the limited capacity of state institutions in eastern Congo at the time, such a withdrawal would have had disastrous effects. The key point, however, is that there is already substantial political and social pressure within government structures and a mind-set favoring a reduction and end to the U.N. peacekeeping mission. A specific sunset date set in advance by the Security Council could in fact reduce pressures in the DRC to effect reform programs, and impair a free and full conduct of elections, and thus be counterproductive. As well, such a set withdrawal date could potentially limit international community options in what has often in the past been a volatile and unpredictable region. Finally, such a signal could be very unhelpful in regard to neighboring countries where elements may seek to continue destabilizing activities in eastern Congo.

Since 2010, Security Council authorizing resolutions for MONUSCO have included specific criteria to determine a reduction or any “reconfiguration” of MONSUCO’s presence, specifically based on a reduction of the threat to civilians posed by armed groups, and stabilization through establishment of state security institutions in conflict areas and improvement in democratic space and human rights (Note: These are contained in operative paragraph 11 of the current resolution, S/RES/2098). These criteria were established in 2010 essentially to define standards, responding to the government’s unilateral demand at the time for the mission to be closed. I believe this approach, gauging the need and size of the MONUSCO force through an assess-

ment of the situation on the ground in conflict areas, is a correct one. MONUSCO's mandate has since 2010 been reviewed annually by the Security Council, permitting a periodic review of the overall situation and MONUSCO's size and presence. While it is important to work toward establishing the needed security conditions and reducing the peacekeeping presence as quickly as possible, it is also important not to reduce prematurely a key stabilizing force in conflict areas, and risk a reescalation of the violence and conflict which has for too long plagued the region. The recent progress realized against key armed groups offers renewed promise that progress toward durable security and stabilization is at last being realized.

There has always been a tendency to add to the peacekeeping mission's mandate, and I would very much support an effort to review the scope of the mandate, removing or at least scaling back responsibilities and tasking outside of core security functions. Some of these additional responsibilities, including dealing with the terrible effects of sexual-based violence, use of children, and other major problems, are of clear importance. In my view, however, there should always be an effort to focus peacekeeping missions on only the priority tasks that they are in a unique position to carry out.

RESPONSES OF DR. RAYMOND GILPIN TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. While the DRC's mineral wealth is a source of conflict, it also poses an opportunity for future regional economic integration.

- ◆ What steps toward greater economic integration in the Great Lakes are most feasible now and in the future?

Answer. Nonformal business in the Great Lakes region is already integrated. The markets are fraught with graft, the channels lack transparency and economic actors are linked to various parts of the war economy. This severely limits their welfare and nation-building potential. Building on the positive impacts of the recent mineral certification process, improving the regulatory/legislative structures and providing strategic investments in both labor force capacity and infrastructure could help establish the conditions necessary for more meaningful and equitable economic integration.

At the macrolevel, significant opportunities exist in both production and trade. Unfortunately, most existing integration (particularly those involving DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda). A combination of robust diplomacy and trade incentives could help delink such economic activity from the conflict economy. The extensive supply chain for most economic activity bodes well for meaningful and more broad-based economic integration if the following steps are taken:

- a. Liberalize and harmonize trade policies. Empirical evidence (e.g., documented in the annual "Doing Business Report") suggests that, this is the most significant barrier to progress.
- b. Invest in infrastructure—particularly transportation and marketing.
- c. Facilitate access to information on pricing and transactions.
- d. Create structures that promote transparent processes, predictable frameworks and accountable officials (public and private sector).

Question. Are there any measures the U.S. Government and other donors can take to facilitate this and what is the private sector role?

Answer. The United States has led the world in helping to reform the mining industry in the Great Lakes so that it benefits all Congolese, and not just a select few. There are three important things the United States could do to help further greater economic integration and shared economic prosperity in the DRC and Great Lakes region:

- a. The United States should consider rebalancing foreign assistance. Most current economic development support is earmarked for important social projects—particularly health and gender-related. While these projects are necessary, devoting a disproportional majority of available assistance to them means much less support for income generation and economic governance initiatives. The U.S. could also consider leveraging its social investments with support from other donors; thereby increasing the likelihood of a coordinated and reasonably comprehensive level of assistance.
- b. The United States could consider expanding market access initiatives for products from the Great Lakes region. Effective and sustainable stability will only be accomplished if the people are able to earn/trade their way out of poverty. Credible measures have been put in place to curtail/eliminate the trade in conflict minerals. Comparable steps should be taken to expand market access for nonconflict min-

erals—particularly in the nonmining sector. One approach would be to create special provisions in an existing program, like the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGO), that would provide incentives for exports from this region. Having a regional initiative could help galvanize myriad nonformal economic entities (and linkages) and encourage them to operate profitably in formal channels.

c. The United States should keep the crisis in the Great Lakes on the international agenda. Recent efforts to address impunity and corruption in the Great Lakes region could be reversed if global attention is diminished or diverted. Every effort must be expended to consolidate recent gains by fully supporting the work of the office of the U.S. Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region and coordinating international support over the medium to longer term.

When considering the role of the private sector, it is important to recognize the different categories of business entities operating in the Great Lakes region. Large international corporations (primarily in mining and forestry) are vested in the region by virtue of their significant upfront investments. Both corruption and instability affect their costs and (given a level playing field) they would be amenable to initiatives that more fully integrate the regional economy into their value chains. Local content requirements could encourage them to source more of their goods and services from the region. This could be accomplished within the context of existing transparency initiatives, like EITI. Regional/local small- and medium-scale enterprises could become more successful and integrated if steps are taken to enhance their skills, ensure standards and better identify value chain opportunities. Helping to ease nontariff barriers (e.g., punitive bureaucracy, security of tenure and access to affordable credit) and measures to harmonize trade regulations/standards regionally could also help. Most private sector actors in the DRC are in the vast subsistence-oriented, nonformal sector. Targeted social investments through development organizations (like the World Bank and USAID) would make them better prepared to benefit from regional opportunities.

RESPONSES OF HON. RUSSELL FEINGOLD TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. What is the total amount of U.S. Government bilateral spending in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from all USG accounts in 2000–2013? Please provide a table, including the years, accounts, and total amount of money spent each year by agency and purpose. Please do not wait for all agencies to report but as the consolidated State Department/USAID 150 Account and State Foreign Operations accounts are available please send that when complete.

Answer. The total amount of U.S. Government bilateral funding to the DRC from FY 2000 to FY 2013 is \$1,386,941,000. The attached table includes a break down by year and account.

Question. How much humanitarian assistance has the United States provided the DRC since 2000? Please provide a table, including years, accounts, and total amount of money spent each year.

Answer. The United States has provided \$1,366,818,000 in humanitarian assistance to the DRC since FY 2000. The attached table includes a break down by year and account.

Question. How much debt relief has the United States provided the DRC since 2000? Please provide a table, including years, accounts, and total amount of money spent each year.

Answer. The DRC received 100 percent debt reduction under the Paris Club Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program. The attached table includes the amount of debt relief provided by the United States from FY 2000 to the present. In the table, the “face value treated” represents the amount of debt forgiven. The “subsidy cost obligation” represents the cost of debt relief as obligated. Since FY 2000, the United States has provided approximately \$2.042 billion in debt relief to the DRC at a budget cost of \$170,096,973.

Question. What accounts and funding sources are included in the U.S. Government’s reporting to the OECD’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)?

Answer. Please see the attached table for a breakdown of the agencies and accounts that are included in the U.S. Government’s reporting to the OECD’s ODA.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The tables attachment can be found at the end of the hearing.]

Question. How many lives have been lost to the conflict in the DRC in the past 14 years?

Answer. The ongoing conflict in the DRC has been labeled the deadliest conflict since World War II; however, we are not certain of the total number of people killed. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) conducted a series of mortality studies between the years 1998 and 2007, estimating that 5.8 million people had died as result of conflict. Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors without Borders conducted a limited mortality study in selective parts of North Kivu province in 2009, and found that of overall mortality rates, 36 and 40 percent were related to conflict in Masisi and Kitchanga. Doubtless tens of thousands more have been killed since then, but the specific number is unknown and perhaps unknowable. Some of the most notable incidents include: 150 people massacred by CNDP rebels in the town of Kiwanja in 2008; 1,700 civilians killed, along with 1,100 Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), in 2009 as a result of fighting between the FDLR and the DRC army (FARDC) (mostly ex-CNDP units), and; 900 combatants estimated to have been killed during the height of the fighting between the M23, the FARDC, and the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) between May and November 2013. These are mere samplings and do not represent the breadth of violence that is sadly endemic in the DRC. Much of the killing in the DRC is unseen, including irregular fighting by Mai Mai groups, deaths that occur when civilians are forced into inhospitable terrain, and fighting that takes place in parts of the country with little international or media presence.

Question. How many cases of sexual abuse and exploitation (SEA) by U.N. peacekeepers have been reported in the DRC since official U.N. reporting began in 2006 broken out by year?

Answer. There have been 274 cases of sexual abuse and exploitation by U.N. peacekeepers reported in the DRC since 2006. Broken out by year:
2007—59; 2008—40; 2009—59; 2010—36; 2011—31; 2012—25; 2013—23; 2014—1 (to date).

Question. Of the cases of SEA cases by U.N. peacekeepers that have been reported, how many peacekeepers have been prosecuted for their alleged crimes by their home countries' justice system?

Answer. We do not know. The U.N. conducts an initial investigation when it receives a report of misconduct by a peacekeeper, whether it is minor (such as patronizing an off-limits bar) or serious (rape, child molestation). In the case of a minor infraction, the soldier is usually punished by his national contingent commander and remains in place. For serious or multiple infractions, the U.N. sends individuals home, and relies on the governments of troop/police contributing countries to take the appropriate action. The U.N. requests that troop/police contributing countries report back on action taken, which they frequently do, but not always. The U.N. does not have the authority to force or require that TCC/PCC government take action or report back in response to reports of sexual abuse or exploitation.

Question. Where is U.S. development programming currently being conducted and what is the cost of each sector of programming? Please provide a map of the DRC and indicate what U.S. assistance programs are currently being conducted and where.

Answer. The attached map shows current U.S. development assistance programs in the DRC. The funding estimates reflected on the map are based on amounts obligated as stated in USAID's Operational Plans. These obligations were then divided between the number of provinces in which the mechanism operated. Actual development assistance programmed into these provinces varies. The Food for Peace funding is divided equally among all 11 provinces. These funds support the World Food Programme's (WFP) Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, which has operations in all provinces but adapts to varying needs. Embassy Kinshasa is working with WFP to obtain more accurate data.

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—The map attachment can be found at the end of the hearing.]

Question. The U.N. Group of Experts' final report and the State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, refer to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) having ties to terrorist networks.

♦ a. How many members does the ADF have?

Answer. We do not know for certain. The U.N. Group of Experts estimates ADF has between 800 and 1,200 soldiers. Other estimates suggest the number could be higher. We would be happy to provide a classified briefing in order to go into more detail on the ADF.

♦ b. What nationalities and ethnicities does ADF's membership comprise of?

Answer. ADF consists primarily of Ugandans and Congolese. It was formed as a marriage of convenience between Baganda ultramonarchists, Baganda Muslims, and Bakonjo (Nande living in Uganda) monarchists. The monarchist element has melted away as its demands were met, leaving an Islamic core. However, the commitment to Islam by the rank-and-file ADF is unclear, and the group has in the past partnered with Christian militias in the DRC.

MONUSCO estimates ADF is 40 percent Congolese today, with the rest being mostly Ugandan. There are also reports of some Tanzanian members. According to the Enough Project, the total membership is primarily of the Nande ethnic group. The leader, Jamil Makulu, is a Muganda. The Baganda also remain well-represented in ADF.

♦ c. What terrorist organizations is the ADF engaged with?

Answer. The Ugandan Government has long alleged ADF connections with al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda. While there is circumstantial evidence suggesting that the claims are plausible, these connections have not been proven.

♦ d. What are the nationalities of these terrorist entities that ADF is allegedly engaged with?

Answer. There are reports of Somalis and Arabic speakers providing training to the ADF in the DRC, but these cannot be confirmed. A Reuters report on a MONUSCO task force says the trainers are Sudanese and Somali. ADF was once supported by the Sudanese Government, but there is no evidence that such support is ongoing today.

♦ e. What offensive tactics like those used by terrorist organizations is ADF using?

Answer. According to the U.N. Group of Experts, “a former ADF soldier and Ugandan intelligence estimate that ADF’s arsenal consists of mortars, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). Former ADF soldiers told the Group that when foreign trainers visited ADF in the past, they instructed them on the assembly of improvised explosive devices.” In the 1990s, ADF was responsible for a series of bombings in Kampala.

♦ f. How should the U.S Government hold President Kabila accountable for holding fair and free elections in 2016?

Answer. We are using a variety of diplomatic tools to promote free and fair elections. We continue to message privately and publicly that, in the aftermath of the seriously flawed 2011 elections, it is critical that the DRC’s next elections meet international election standards for being credible, free, fair, and transparent. We have similarly made clear that we will work with President Kabila until the end of his current and constitutionally mandated final-term of office, which is slated to end in December 2016. Special Envoy Feingold has said publicly that constitutions should not be amended to benefit those currently in office.

The U.S. Government is also seeking to partner with and to supplement the work of other donors in assisting the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) to produce credible, free, and fair elections in the DRC, in particular working on election observation and voter education. In the end, the DRC is a sovereign country, and the quality of Congolese democracy is ultimately up to the political will and actions of the Congolese Government and people.

ATTACHMENTS

Table 1.—U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(In thousands of U.S. dollars)

Fiscal Year	Total	Food for Peace Title II	Migration and Refugee Assistance	Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance	Disaster Assistance
FY 2000	23,814	3,332	7,340	—	13,142
FY 2001	51,817	14,244	5,550	10,000	22,023
FY 2002	43,827	11,555	5,468	—	26,804
FY 2003	79,710	43,530	4,291	—	31,889
FY 2004	56,928	30,813	3,720	—	22,395
FY 2005	68,907	29,205	8,570	4,700	26,432

Table 1.—U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo—Continued
(In thousands of U.S. dollars)

Fiscal Year	Total	Food for Peace Title II	Migration and Refugee Assistance	Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance	Disaster Assistance
FY 2006	85,300	39,898	4,270	16,000	25,132
FY 2007	88,128	37,138	21,397	600	28,993
FY 2008	133,086	80,801	31,790	2,200	18,295
FY 2009	204,464	125,997	41,489	4,000	32,978
FY 2010	170,919	101,273	45,245	500	23,901
FY 2011	124,882	67,250	24,121	—	33,511
FY 2012	146,966	68,346	43,912	14	34,694
FY 2013					
653(a)	88,070	28,000	60,070	—	—

Table 2.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency and Appropriation
Bilateral and Multilateral Commitments (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
African Development Foundation.	11x0700	African Development Foundation	29
Department of Agriculture	11x0091	Debt Restructuring	2
Department of Agriculture	12x1106	National Forest System, Forest Service	1
Department of Agriculture	12x1400	Salaries and Expenses, Agricultural Research Service	
Department of Agriculture	12x1500	Research and Education Activities, Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service.	
Department of Agriculture	12x1600	Salaries and Expenses, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service	1
Department of Agriculture	12x2277	Public Law 480 Program Account, Title I	145
Department of Agriculture	12x2900	Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Agricultural Service	10
Department of Agriculture	12x2903	McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants.	163
Department of Agriculture	70x0800	Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations, Science and Technology, Homeland Security.	0
Department of Agriculture	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Department of Agriculture	80x0120	Science, National Aeronautics and Space Administration	0
Department of Agriculture	97x0134	Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, Defense	0
Department of Commerce	13x0500	Scientific & Technical Research & Services, NIST	0
Department of Commerce	13x1006	Patent and Trademark Office, Salaries and Expenses	2
Department of Commerce	13x1250	International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ...	6
Department of Commerce	13x1450	National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Research & Facilities.	0
Department of Commerce	72x1021	Development Assistance	3
Department of Commerce	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	
Department of Defense	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	1
Department of Defense	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	154
Department of Defense	21x2020	Operations and Maintenance, Army	103
Department of Defense	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	2
Department of Defense	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Department of Defense	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	
Department of Defense	97x0100	Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide	233
Department of Defense	97x0130	Defense Health Program	10
Department of Defense	97x0819	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Defense	106
Department of Energy	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	6

Table 2.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral and Multilateral Commitments (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of Energy	89x0309	Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy	71
Department of Health and Human Services.	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	11
Department of Health and Human Services.	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	1,385
Department of Health and Human Services.	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0140	Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund	45
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0885	National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health.	392
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0892	National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0943	Disease Control, Research, and Training, Centers for Disease Control.	156
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0949	Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0950	HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tuberculosis Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0951	Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	9
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0952	Injury Prevention and Control, Centers and Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0955	Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	157
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0956	Public Health Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0959	Public Health Scientific Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x1503	Refugee and Entrant Assistance, Administration for Children and Families.	587
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x8250	Gifts and Donations, Centers for Disease Control	0
Department of Homeland Security	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	0
Department of Homeland Security	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	4
Department of Homeland Security	19x1154	Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State	0
Department of Justice	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	0
Department of Justice	15x0128	Department of Justice, General Legal Activities	0
Department of Justice	15x0200	Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation	0
Department of Justice	15x1100	Salaries and Expenses, Drug Enforcement Administration	1
Department of Justice	15x5042	Assets Forfeiture Fund, Justice	0
Department of Justice	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	0
Department of Justice	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	0
Department of Labor	16x0165	Department of Labor, Departmental Management	68
Department of Labor	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	1
Department of Labor	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	0
Department of Labor	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	5
Department of State	11x0040	United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund	36
Department of State	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	309
Department of State	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	308
Department of State	12x3505	Food Stamp Program, Food and Nutrition Service	60

Table 2.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral and Multilateral Commitments (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of State	19x0113	Diplomatic and Consular Programs, Department of State	5
Department of State	19x0209	Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Department of State.	1
Department of State	19x0210	National Endowment for Democracy, Department of State	117
Department of State	19x1005	International Organizations and Programs, State	338
Department of State	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	13
Department of State	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	85
Department of State	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	76
Department of State	19x1124	Contributions to Peacekeeping Activities, Department of State	129
Department of State	19x1126	Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State	543
Department of State	19x1143	Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State	1,753
Department of State	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	1,597
Department of State	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	102
Department of Transportation	11x1001	Trade and Development Agency	0
Department of Transportation	69x1301	Federal Aviation Administration, Operations	0
Department of Transportation	72x1021	Development Assistance	7
Department of Transportation	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	0
Department of the Interior ...	14x0412	Assistance to Territories, Insular Affairs	3
Department of the Interior ...	14x0415	Compact of Free Association, Department of Interior	198
Department of the Interior ...	14x1611	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource Management	7
Department of the Interior ...	14x1652	Multinational Species Conservation Fund, United States Fish and Wildlife Service.	11
Department of the Interior ...	14x1696	Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.	3
Department of the Interior ...	14x5029	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration	1
Department of the Interior ...	14x5241	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, North American Wetlands Conservation Fund.	1
Department of the Interior ...	14x8216	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds	0
Department of the Treasury	11x0071	Contribution to the Strategic Climate Fund	75
Department of the Treasury	11x0072	Contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank	86
Department of the Treasury	11x0073	Contribution to the International Development Association	1,492
Department of the Treasury	11x0076	Contribution to the Asian Development Bank	207
Department of the Treasury	11x0077	Global Environment Facility	237
Department of the Treasury	11x0079	Contribution to the African Development Fund	231
Department of the Treasury	11x0080	Contribution to the Clean Technology Fund	230
Department of the Treasury	11x0082	Contribution to the African Development Bank	32
Department of the Treasury	11x0089	Contribution to the Enterprise for the Americas Multilateral Investment Fund.	25
Department of the Treasury	11x1039	Contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development.	30
Department of the Treasury	11x1045	International Affairs Technical Assistance	25
Department of the Treasury	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	
Department of the Treasury	11x1096	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the President.	
Department of the Treasury	11x1475	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (Fund)	160
Department of the Treasury	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	3
Department of the Treasury	72x1010	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States	0
Department of the Treasury	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	0
Environmental Protection Agency.	68x0107	Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology	0
Environmental Protection Agency.	68x0108	Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.	20
Export-Import Bank of the United States.	83x0100	Export-Import Bank Loans Program Account	14

Table 2.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral and Multilateral Commitments (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Federal Trade Commission ...	13x0120	Department of Commerce, Departmental Management	
Federal Trade Commission ...	13x1250	International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ...	
Federal Trade Commission ...	29x0100	Federal Trade Commission, Salaries and Expenses	0
Inter-American Foundation ...	11x3100	Inter-American Foundation	25
Millennium Challenge Corporation	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	230
Peace Corps	11x0100	Peace Corps	366
Peace Corps	11x0110	Salaries and Expenses, the White House	0
Peace Corps	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	0
Peace Corps	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	22
Peace Corps	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	1
Peace Corps	72x1021	Development Assistance	5
Peace Corps	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Peace Corps	75x0955	Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	0
Peace Corps	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	0
Trade and Development Agency.	11x1001	Trade and Development Agency	37
Trade and Development Agency.	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	6
U.S. Agency for International Development.	11x0091	Debt Restructuring	4
U.S. Agency for International Development.	11x1096	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the President.	
U.S. Agency for International Development.	12x2278	Public Law 480 Title II Grants	1,646
U.S. Agency for International Development.	12x4336	Commodity Credit Corporation Fund	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	-2
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	4,854
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	47
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1154	Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0300	Capital Investment Fund, United States	121
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0302	Capital Investment Fund of the USAID - Recovery Act	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0305	Civilian Stabilization Initiative	2
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	406
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1000	Operating Expenses of USAID	1,265
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1007	Operating Expenses of the USAID, Office of Inspector General	54
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1010	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States	2
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1012	Sahel Development Program	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1014	Sub-Saharan Africa, Development Assistance	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1015	Complex Crises Fund	30

Table 2.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral and Multilateral Commitments (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1021	Development Assistance	2,469
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1027	Transition Initiatives, International Assistance Program	57
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1029	Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1033	HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund, International Development	402
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1035	International Disaster and Famine Assistance	1,072
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1036	Payment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund	45
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	5,092
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	-1
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	4
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1096	Central America and the Caribbean Emergency Disaster Recovery Fund.	-1
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1264	Development Credit Authority, United States	40
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4103	Development Loan Fund, Executive	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4344	Housing and Other Credit Guaranty Programs, Guaranty Loan Financing Account.	18
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4513	Working Capital Fund, International Assistance Program	22
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x8342	Foreign National Employees Separation Liability Fund	2
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x8824	Gifts and Contributions, Inter-American Foundation	83
Total Gross Commitments			30,871

0's represent values less than \$500,000

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID's Foreign Assistance Database (FADB)

Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013

Table 3.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation
Bilateral Commitments (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
African Development Foundation	11x0700	African Development Foundation	29
Department of Agriculture	11x0091	Debt Restructuring	2
Department of Agriculture	12x1106	National Forest System, Forest Service	1
Department of Agriculture	12x1600	Salaries and Expenses, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service	1
Department of Agriculture	12x2277	Public Law 480 Program Account, Title I	145
Department of Agriculture	12x2900	Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Agricultural Service	10
Department of Agriculture	12x2903	McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants.	163
Department of Agriculture	70x0800	Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations, Science and Technology, Homeland Security.	0

Table 3.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral Commitments (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of Agriculture	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Department of Agriculture	80x0120	Science, National Aeronautics and Space Administration	0
Department of Agriculture	97x0134	Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, Defense	0
Department of Commerce	13x0500	Scientific & Technical Research & Services, NIST	0
Department of Commerce	13x1006	Patent and Trademark Office, Salaries and Expenses	2
Department of Commerce	13x1250	International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ...	6
Department of Commerce	13x1450	National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Re- search & Facilities.	0
Department of Commerce	72x1021	Development Assistance	3
Department of Defense	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	1
Department of Defense	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	154
Department of Defense	21x2020	Operations and Maintenance, Army	103
Department of Defense	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AECA)	2
Department of Defense	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Department of Defense	97x0100	Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide	233
Department of Defense	97x0130	Defense Health Program	10
Department of Defense	97x0819	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Defense	106
Department of Energy	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	6
Department of Energy	89x0309	Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy	71
Department of Health and Human Services.	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	11
Department of Health and Human Services.	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	1,385
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0140	Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund	45
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0885	National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National In- stitutes of Health.	392
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0892	National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0943	Disease Control, Research, and Training, Centers for Disease Con- trol.	156
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0949	Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0950	HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tu- berculosis Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Preven- tion.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0951	Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Con- trol and Prevention.	9
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0952	Injury Prevention and Control, Centers and Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0955	Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	157
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0956	Public Health Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0959	Public Health Scientific Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x1503	Refugee and Entrant Assistance, Administration for Children and Families.	587
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x8250	Gifts and Donations, Centers for Disease Control	0
Department of Homeland Security	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	0
Department of Homeland Security	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	4

Table 3.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral Commitments (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of Homeland Security	19x1154	Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State	0
Department of Justice	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	0
Department of Justice	15x0128	Department of Justice, General Legal Activities	0
Department of Justice	15x0200	Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation	0
Department of Justice	15x1100	Salaries and Expenses, Drug Enforcement Administration	1
Department of Justice	15x5042	Assets Forfeiture Fund, Justice	0
Department of Justice	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	0
Department of Justice	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	0
Department of Labor	16x0165	Department of Labor, Departmental Management	68
Department of Labor	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	1
Department of Labor	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	0
Department of Labor	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	5
Department of State	11x0040	United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund	36
Department of State	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	309
Department of State	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	230
Department of State	12x3505	Food Stamp Program, Food and Nutrition Service	60
Department of State	19x0113	Diplomatic and Consular Programs, Department of State	5
Department of State	19x0209	Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Department of State.	1
Department of State	19x0210	National Endowment for Democracy, Department of State	117
Department of State	19x1005	International Organizations and Programs, State	4
Department of State	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	13
Department of State	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	85
Department of State	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	76
Department of State	19x1126	Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State	28
Department of State	19x1143	Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State	1,743
Department of State	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AECCA)	1,597
Department of State	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	102
Department of Transportation	11x1001	Trade and Development Agency	0
Department of Transportation	69x1301	Federal Aviation Administration, Operations	0
Department of Transportation	72x1021	Development Assistance	7
Department of Transportation	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	0
Department of the Interior ...	14x0412	Assistance to Territories, Insular Affairs	3
Department of the Interior ...	14x0415	Compact of Free Association, Department of Interior	198
Department of the Interior ...	14x1611	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource Management	7
Department of the Interior ...	14x1652	Multinational Species Conservation Fund, United States Fish and Wildlife Service.	11
Department of the Interior ...	14x1696	Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.	3
Department of the Interior ...	14x5029	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration	1
Department of the Interior ...	14x5241	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, North American Wetlands Conservation Fund.	1
Department of the Interior ...	14x8216	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds	0
Department of the Treasury	11x1045	International Affairs Technical Assistance	25
Department of the Treasury	11x1475	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (Fund)	160
Department of the Treasury	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AECCA)	3
Department of the Treasury	72x1010	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States	0
Department of the Treasury	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	0
Environmental Protection Agency.	68x0107	Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology	0
Environmental Protection Agency.	68x0108	Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.	10

Table 3.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral Commitments (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Export-Import Bank of the United States.	83x0100	Export-Import Bank Loans Program Account	14
Federal Trade Commission ...	29x0100	Federal Trade Commission, Salaries and Expenses	0
Inter-American Foundation ...	11x3100	Inter-American Foundation	25
Millennium Challenge Corporation	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	230
Peace Corps	11x0100	Peace Corps	366
Peace Corps	11x0110	Salaries and Expenses, the White House	0
Peace Corps	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	0
Peace Corps	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	22
Peace Corps	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AECCA)	1
Peace Corps	72x1021	Development Assistance	5
Peace Corps	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Peace Corps	75x0955	Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	0
Peace Corps	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	0
Trade and Development Agency.	11x1001	Trade and Development Agency	37
Trade and Development Agency.	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	6
U.S. Agency for International Development.	11x0091	Debt Restructuring	4
U.S. Agency for International Development.	12x2278	Public Law 480 Title II Grants	1,646
U.S. Agency for International Development.	12x4336	Commodity Credit Corporation Fund	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	-2
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	3,469
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	47
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1154	Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0300	Capital Investment Fund, United States	121
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0302	Capital Investment Fund of the USAID - Recovery Act	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0305	Civilian Stabilization Initiative	2
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AECCA)	406
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1000	Operating Expenses of USAID	1,265
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1007	Operating Expenses of the USAID, Office of Inspector General	54
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1010	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States	2
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1012	Sahel Development Program	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1014	Sub-Saharan Africa, Development Assistance	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1015	Complex Crises Fund	30

Table 3.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral Commitments (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1021	Development Assistance	2,469
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1027	Transition Initiatives, International Assistance Program	57
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1029	Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1033	HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund, International Development	402
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1035	International Disaster and Famine Assistance	1,072
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1036	Payment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund	45
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	5,092
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	-1
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	4
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1096	Central America and the Caribbean Emergency Disaster Recovery Fund.	-1
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1264	Development Credit Authority, United States	40
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4103	Development Loan Fund, Executive	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4344	Housing and Other Credit Guaranty Programs, Guaranty Loan Financing Account.	18
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4513	Working Capital Fund, International Assistance Program	22
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x8342	Foreign National Employees Separation Liability Fund	2
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x8824	Gifts and Contributions, Inter-American Foundation	83
Total Bilateral Gross Commitments			25,766

0's represent values less than \$500,000

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID's Foreign Assistance Database (FADB)
Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013

Table 4.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation
Multilateral Commitments (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of State	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	78
Department of State	19x1005	International Organizations and Programs, State	335
Department of State	19x1124	Contributions to Peacekeeping Activities, Department of State	129
Department of State	19x1126	Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State	515
Department of State	19x1143	Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State	10
Department of the Treasury	11x0071	Contribution to the Strategic Climate Fund	75
Department of the Treasury	11x0072	Contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank	86
Department of the Treasury	11x0073	Contribution to the International Development Association	1,492
Department of the Treasury	11x0076	Contribution to the Asian Development Bank	207
Department of the Treasury	11x0077	Global Environment Facility	237

Table 4.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Multilateral Commitments (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of the Treasury	11x0079	Contribution to the African Development Fund	231
Department of the Treasury	11x0080	Contribution to the Clean Technology Fund	230
Department of the Treasury	11x0082	Contribution to the African Development Bank	32
Department of the Treasury	11x0089	Contribution to the Enterprise for the Americas Multilateral Investment Fund.	25
Department of the Treasury	11x1039	Contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development.	30
Environmental Protection Agency.	68x0108	Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.	9
U.S. Agency for International Development	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	1,385
Total Multilateral Gross Commitments			5,105

0's represent values less than \$500,000

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID's Foreign Assistance Database (FADB)

Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013

Table 5.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation
Bilateral and Multilateral Gross Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
African Development Foundation	11x0700	African Development Foundation	31
Department of Agriculture	11x0091	Debt Restructuring	5
Department of Agriculture	12x1106	National Forest System, Forest Service	1
Department of Agriculture	12x1400	Salaries and Expenses, Agricultural Research Service	0
Department of Agriculture	12x1500	Research and Education Activities, Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service.	1
Department of Agriculture	12x1600	Salaries and Expenses, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service	1
Department of Agriculture	12x2277	Public Law 480 Program Account, Title I	152
Department of Agriculture	12x2900	Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Agricultural Service	17
Department of Agriculture	12x2903	McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants.	163
Department of Agriculture	70x0800	Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations, Science and Technology, Homeland Security.	0
Department of Agriculture	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Department of Agriculture	80x0120	Science, National Aeronautics and Space Administration	0
Department of Agriculture	97x0134	Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, Defense	0
Department of Commerce	13x0500	Scientific & Technical Research & Services, NIST	0
Department of Commerce	13x1006	Patent and Trademark Office, Salaries and Expenses	2
Department of Commerce	13x1250	International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ...	2
Department of Commerce	13x1450	National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Research & Facilities.	1
Department of Commerce	72x1021	Development Assistance	4
Department of Commerce	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	0
Department of Defense	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	4
Department of Defense	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	72
Department of Defense	21x2020	Operations and Maintenance, Army	103

Table 5.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral and Multilateral Gross Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of Defense	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AECA)	3
Department of Defense	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Department of Defense	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	0
Department of Defense	97x0100	Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide	178
Department of Defense	97x0130	Defense Health Program	9
Department of Defense	97x0819	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Defense	121
Department of Energy	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	3
Department of Energy	89x0309	Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy	129
Department of Health and Human Services.	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	18
Department of Health and Human Services.	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	1,640
Department of Health and Human Services.	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	13
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0140	Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund	16
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0885	National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health.	392
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0892	National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0943	Disease Control, Research, and Training, Centers for Disease Control.	140
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0949	Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0950	HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tuberculosis Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0951	Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	3
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0952	Injury Prevention and Control, Centers and Disease Control and Prevention.
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0955	Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	75
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0956	Public Health Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0959	Public Health Scientific Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x1503	Refugee and Entrant Assistance, Administration for Children and Families.	631
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x8250	Gifts and Donations, Centers for Disease Control	0
Department of Homeland Security	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	0
Department of Homeland Security	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	3
Department of Homeland Security	19x1154	Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State	0
Department of Justice	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	2
Department of Justice	15x0128	Department of Justice, General Legal Activities	0
Department of Justice	15x0200	Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation	0
Department of Justice	15x1100	Salaries and Expenses, Drug Enforcement Administration	1
Department of Justice	15x5042	Assets Forfeiture Fund, Justice	0
Department of Justice	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	0
Department of Justice	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	1
Department of Labor	16x0165	Department of Labor, Departmental Management	68

Table 5.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral and Multilateral Gross Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of Labor	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	1
Department of Labor	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	0
Department of Labor	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	5
Department of State	11x0040	United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund	28
Department of State	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	322
Department of State	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	269
Department of State	12x3505	Food Stamp Program, Food and Nutrition Service	60
Department of State	19x0113	Diplomatic and Consular Programs, Department of State	5
Department of State	19x0209	Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Department of State.	1
Department of State	19x0210	National Endowment for Democracy, Department of State	117
Department of State	19x1005	International Organizations and Programs, State	338
Department of State	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	14
Department of State	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	63
Department of State	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	29
Department of State	19x1124	Contributions to Peacekeeping Activities, Department of State	129
Department of State	19x1126	Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State	543
Department of State	19x1143	Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State	1,795
Department of State	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	1,490
Department of State	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	64
Department of Transportation	11x1001	Trade and Development Agency	0
Department of Transportation	69x1301	Federal Aviation Administration, Operations	0
Department of Transportation	72x1021	Development Assistance	7
Department of Transportation	72x1037	Economic Support Fund
Department of the Interior	14x0412	Assistance to Territories, Insular Affairs	2
Department of the Interior	14x0415	Compact of Free Association, Department of Interior	206
Department of the Interior	14x1611	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource Management	5
Department of the Interior	14x1652	Multinational Species Conservation Fund, United States Fish and Wildlife Service.	7
Department of the Interior	14x1696	Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.	0
Department of the Interior	14x5029	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration	0
Department of the Interior	14x5241	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, North American Wetlands Conservation Fund.	0
Department of the Interior	14x8216	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds	0
Department of the Treasury	11x0071	Contribution to the Strategic Climate Fund	75
Department of the Treasury	11x0072	Contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank	86
Department of the Treasury	11x0073	Contribution to the International Development Association	1,492
Department of the Treasury	11x0076	Contribution to the Asian Development Bank	290
Department of the Treasury	11x0077	Global Environment Facility	237
Department of the Treasury	11x0079	Contribution to the African Development Fund	246
Department of the Treasury	11x0080	Contribution to the Clean Technology Fund	230
Department of the Treasury	11x0082	Contribution to the African Development Bank	32
Department of the Treasury	11x0089	Contribution to the Enterprise for the Americas Multilateral Investment Fund.	50
Department of the Treasury	11x1039	Contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development.	26
Department of the Treasury	11x1045	International Affairs Technical Assistance	20
Department of the Treasury	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	0
Department of the Treasury	11x1096	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the President.	0
Department of the Treasury	11x1475	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (Fund)	160
Department of the Treasury	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	4
Department of the Treasury	72x1010	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States	0
Department of the Treasury	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	0

Table 5.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral and Multilateral Gross Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Environmental Protection Agency.	68x0107	Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology	0
Environmental Protection Agency.	68x0108	Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.	13
Export-Import Bank of the United States.	83x0100	Export-Import Bank Loans Program Account	14
Federal Trade Commission ...	13x0120	Department of Commerce, Departmental Management	0
Federal Trade Commission ...	13x1250	International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ...	0
Federal Trade Commission ...	29x0100	Federal Trade Commission, Salaries and Expenses	0
Inter-American Foundation ...	11x3100	Inter-American Foundation	24
Millennium Challenge Corporation	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	1,355
Peace Corps	11x0100	Peace Corps	372
Peace Corps	11x0110	Salaries and Expenses, the White House	0
Peace Corps	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	0
Peace Corps	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	24
Peace Corps	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	2
Peace Corps	72x1021	Development Assistance	7
Peace Corps	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Peace Corps	75x0955	Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	0
Peace Corps	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	0
Trade and Development Agency.	11x1001	Trade and Development Agency	35
Trade and Development Agency.	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	4
U.S. Agency for International Development.	11x0091	Debt Restructuring	16
U.S. Agency for International Development.	11x1096	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the President.	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	12x2278	Public Law 480 Title II Grants	1,639
U.S. Agency for International Development.	12x4336	Commodity Credit Corporation Fund	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	13
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	5,018
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	40
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1154	Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State	3
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0300	Capital Investment Fund, United States	134
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0302	Capital Investment Fund of the USAID - Recovery Act	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0305	Civilian Stabilization Initiative	5
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	475
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1000	Operating Expenses of USAID	1,315
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1007	Operating Expenses of the USAID, Office of Inspector General	53

Table 5.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral and Multilateral Gross Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1010	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States	11
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1012	Sahel Development Program
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1014	Sub-Saharan Africa, Development Assistance	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1015	Complex Crises Fund	22
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1021	Development Assistance	1,932
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1027	Transition Initiatives, International Assistance Program	41
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1029	Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1033	HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund, International Development	454
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1035	International Disaster and Famine Assistance	992
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1036	Payment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund	45
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	4,538
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	29
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	40
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1096	Central America and the Caribbean Emergency Disaster Recovery Fund.
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1264	Development Credit Authority, United States	24
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4103	Development Loan Fund, Executive	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4344	Housing and Other Credit Guaranty Programs, Guaranty Loan Financing Account.	18
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4513	Working Capital Fund, International Assistance Program	20
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x8342	Foreign National Employees Separation Liability Fund	6
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x8824	Gifts and Contributions, Inter-American Foundation	76
Total Gross Disbursements			31,263

0's represent values less than \$500,000

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID's Foreign Assistance Database (FADB)

Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013

Table 6.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation
Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
African Development Foundation	11x0700	African Development Foundation	31
Department of Agriculture	11x0091	Debt Restructuring	5
Department of Agriculture	12x1106	National Forest System, Forest Service	1
Department of Agriculture	12x1400	Salaries and Expenses, Agricultural Research Service	0
Department of Agriculture	12x1500	Research and Education Activities, Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service.	1
Department of Agriculture	12x1600	Salaries and Expenses, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service	1
Department of Agriculture	12x2277	Public Law 480 Program Account, Title I	152
Department of Agriculture	12x2900	Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Agricultural Service	17
Department of Agriculture	12x2903	McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants.	163
Department of Agriculture	70x0800	Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations, Science and Technology, Homeland Security.	0
Department of Agriculture	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Department of Agriculture	80x0120	Science, National Aeronautics and Space Administration	0
Department of Agriculture	97x0134	Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, Defense	0
Department of Commerce	13x0500	Scientific & Technical Research & Services, NIST	0
Department of Commerce	13x1006	Patent and Trademark Office, Salaries and Expenses	2
Department of Commerce	13x1250	International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ...	2
Department of Commerce	13x1450	National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Research & Facilities.	1
Department of Commerce	72x1021	Development Assistance	4
Department of Commerce	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	0
Department of Defense	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	4
Department of Defense	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	72
Department of Defense	21x2020	Operations and Maintenance, Army	103
Department of Defense	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	3
Department of Defense	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Department of Defense	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	0
Department of Defense	97x0100	Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide	178
Department of Defense	97x0130	Defense Health Program	9
Department of Defense	97x0819	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Defense	121
Department of Energy	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	3
Department of Energy	89x0309	Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy	129
Department of Health and Human Services.	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	18
Department of Health and Human Services.	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	1,640
Department of Health and Human Services.	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	13
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0140	Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund	16
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0885	National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health.	392
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0892	National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0943	Disease Control, Research, and Training, Centers for Disease Control.	140
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0949	Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0950	HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tuberculosis Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0

Table 6.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0951	Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	3
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0955	Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	75
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0956	Public Health Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0959	Public Health Scientific Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x1503	Refugee and Entrant Assistance, Administration for Children and Families.	631
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x8250	Gifts and Donations, Centers for Disease Control	0
Department of Homeland Security	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	0
Department of Homeland Security	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	3
Department of Homeland Security	19x1154	Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State	0
Department of Justice	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	2
Department of Justice	15x0128	Department of Justice, General Legal Activities	0
Department of Justice	15x0200	Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation	0
Department of Justice	15x1100	Salaries and Expenses, Drug Enforcement Administration	1
Department of Justice	15x5042	Assets Forfeiture Fund, Justice	0
Department of Justice	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	0
Department of Justice	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	1
Department of Labor	16x0165	Department of Labor, Departmental Management	68
Department of Labor	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	1
Department of Labor	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	0
Department of Labor	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	5
Department of State	11x0040	United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund	28
Department of State	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	322
Department of State	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	191
Department of State	12x3505	Food Stamp Program, Food and Nutrition Service	60
Department of State	19x0113	Diplomatic and Consular Programs, Department of State	5
Department of State	19x0209	Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Department of State.	1
Department of State	19x0210	National Endowment for Democracy, Department of State	117
Department of State	19x1005	International Organizations and Programs, State	4
Department of State	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	14
Department of State	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	63
Department of State	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	29
Department of State	19x1126	Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State	28
Department of State	19x1143	Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State	1,784
Department of State	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	1,490
Department of State	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	64
Department of Transportation	11x1001	Trade and Development Agency	0
Department of Transportation	69x1301	Federal Aviation Administration, Operations	0
Department of Transportation	72x1021	Development Assistance	7
Department of the Interior ...	14x0412	Assistance to Territories, Insular Affairs	2
Department of the Interior ...	14x0415	Compact of Free Association, Department of Interior	206
Department of the Interior ...	14x1611	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource Management	5
Department of the Interior ...	14x1652	Multinational Species Conservation Fund, United States Fish and Wildlife Service.	7

Table 6.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of the Interior ...	14x1696	Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.	0
Department of the Interior ...	14x5029	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration	0
Department of the Interior ...	14x5241	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, North American Wetlands Conservation Fund.	0
Department of the Interior ...	14x8216	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds	0
Department of the Treasury	11x1045	International Affairs Technical Assistance	20
Department of the Treasury	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	0
Department of the Treasury	11x1096	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the President.	0
Department of the Treasury	11x1475	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (Fund)	160
Department of the Treasury	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	4
Department of the Treasury	72x1010	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States	0
Department of the Treasury	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	0
Environmental Protection Agency.	68x0107	Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology	0
Environmental Protection Agency.	68x0108	Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.	8
Export-Import Bank of the United States.	83x0100	Export-Import Bank Loans Program Account	14
Federal Trade Commission ...	13x0120	Department of Commerce, Departmental Management	0
Federal Trade Commission ...	13x1250	International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ...	0
Federal Trade Commission ...	29x0100	Federal Trade Commission, Salaries and Expenses	0
Inter-American Foundation ...	11x3100	Inter-American Foundation	24
Millennium Challenge Corporation	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	1,355
Peace Corps	11x0100	Peace Corps	372
Peace Corps	11x0110	Salaries and Expenses, the White House	0
Peace Corps	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	0
Peace Corps	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	24
Peace Corps	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	2
Peace Corps	72x1021	Development Assistance	7
Peace Corps	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Peace Corps	75x0955	Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	0
Peace Corps	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	0
Trade and Development Agency.	11x1001	Trade and Development Agency	35
Trade and Development Agency.	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	4
U.S. Agency for International Development.	11x0091	Debt Restructuring	16
U.S. Agency for International Development.	11x1096	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the President.	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	12x2278	Public Law 480 Title II Grants	1,639
U.S. Agency for International Development.	12x4336	Commodity Credit Corporation Fund	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	13
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	3,632

Table 6.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	40
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1154	Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State	3
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0300	Capital Investment Fund, United States	134
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0302	Capital Investment Fund of the USAID - Recovery Act	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0305	Civilian Stabilization Initiative	5
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	475
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1000	Operating Expenses of USAID	1,315
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1007	Operating Expenses of the USAID, Office of Inspector General	53
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1010	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States	11
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1014	Sub-Saharan Africa, Development Assistance	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1015	Complex Crises Fund	22
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1021	Development Assistance	1,932
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1027	Transition Initiatives, International Assistance Program	41
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1033	HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund, International Development	454
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1035	International Disaster and Famine Assistance	992
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1036	Payment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund	45
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	4,538
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	29
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	40
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1264	Development Credit Authority, United States	24
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4103	Development Loan Fund, Executive	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4344	Housing and Other Credit Guaranty Programs, Guaranty Loan Financing Account.	18
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4513	Working Capital Fund, International Assistance Program	20
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x8342	Foreign National Employees Separation Liability Fund	6
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x8824	Gifts and Contributions, Inter-American Foundation	76
Total Gross Disbursements			26,042

0's represent values less than \$500,000

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID's Foreign Assistance Database (FADB)

Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013

Table 7.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation
Multilateral Gross Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of State	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	78
Department of State	19x1005	International Organizations and Programs, State	335
Department of State	19x1124	Contributions to Peacekeeping Activities, Department of State	129
Department of State	19x1126	Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State	515
Department of State	19x1143	Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State	11
Department of the Treasury	11x0071	Contribution to the Strategic Climate Fund	75
Department of the Treasury	11x0072	Contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank	86
Department of the Treasury	11x0073	Contribution to the International Development Association	1,492
Department of the Treasury	11x0076	Contribution to the Asian Development Bank	290
Department of the Treasury	11x0077	Global Environment Facility	237
Department of the Treasury	11x0079	Contribution to the African Development Fund	246
Department of the Treasury	11x0080	Contribution to the Clean Technology Fund	230
Department of the Treasury	11x0082	Contribution to the African Development Bank	32
Department of the Treasury	11x0089	Contribution to the Enterprise for the Americas Multilateral Investment Fund.	50
Department of the Treasury	11x1039	Contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development.	26
Environmental Protection Agency.	68x0108	Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.	4
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	1,385
Total Multilateral Gross Disbursements			5,221

0's represent values less than \$500,000

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID's Foreign Assistance Database (FADB)
Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013

Table 8.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation
Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
African Development Foundation	11x0700	African Development Foundation	31
Department of Agriculture	11x0091	Debt Restructuring	5
Department of Agriculture	12x1106	National Forest System, Forest Service	1
Department of Agriculture	12x1400	Salaries and Expenses, Agricultural Research Service	0
Department of Agriculture	12x1500	Research and Education Activities, Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service.	1
Department of Agriculture	12x1600	Salaries and Expenses, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service	1
Department of Agriculture	12x2277	Public Law 480 Program Account, Title I	-178
Department of Agriculture	12x2900	Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Agricultural Service	17
Department of Agriculture	12x2903	McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants.	163
Department of Agriculture	70x0800	Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations, Science and Technology, Homeland Security.	0
Department of Agriculture	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Department of Agriculture	80x0120	Science, National Aeronautics and Space Administration	0
Department of Agriculture	97x0134	Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, Defense	0

Table 8.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of Commerce	13x0500	Scientific & Technical Research & Services, NIST	0
Department of Commerce	13x1006	Patent and Trademark Office, Salaries and Expenses	2
Department of Commerce	13x1250	International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ...	2
Department of Commerce	13x1450	National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Re- search & Facilities.	1
Department of Commerce	72x1021	Development Assistance	4
Department of Commerce	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	0
Department of Defense	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	4
Department of Defense	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	72
Department of Defense	21x2020	Operations and Maintenance, Army	103
Department of Defense	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AECCA)	3
Department of Defense	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Department of Defense	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	0
Department of Defense	97x0100	Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide	178
Department of Defense	97x0130	Defense Health Program	9
Department of Defense	97x0819	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Defense	121
Department of Energy	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	3
Department of Energy	89x0309	Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy	129
Department of Health and Human Services.	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	18
Department of Health and Human Services.	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	1,640
Department of Health and Human Services.	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	13
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0140	Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund	16
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0885	National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National In- stitutes of Health.	392
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0892	National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0943	Disease Control, Research, and Training, Centers for Disease Con- trol.	140
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0949	Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0950	HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tu- berculosis Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Preven- tion.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0951	Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Con- trol and Prevention.	3
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0952	Injury Prevention and Control, Centers and Disease Control and Prevention.
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0955	Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	75
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0956	Public Health Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0959	Public Health Scientific Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x1503	Refugee and Entrant Assistance, Administration for Children and Families.	631
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x8250	Gifts and Donations, Centers for Disease Control	0
Department of Homeland Security	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	0
Department of Homeland Security	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	3

Table 8.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of Homeland Security	19x1154	Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State	0
Department of Justice	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	2
Department of Justice	15x0128	Department of Justice, General Legal Activities	0
Department of Justice	15x0200	Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation	0
Department of Justice	15x1100	Salaries and Expenses, Drug Enforcement Administration	1
Department of Justice	15x5042	Assets Forfeiture Fund, Justice	0
Department of Justice	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	0
Department of Justice	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	1
Department of Labor	16x0165	Department of Labor, Departmental Management	68
Department of Labor	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	1
Department of Labor	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	0
Department of Labor	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	5
Department of State	11x0040	United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund	28
Department of State	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	322
Department of State	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	269
Department of State	12x3505	Food Stamp Program, Food and Nutrition Service	60
Department of State	19x0113	Diplomatic and Consular Programs, Department of State	5
Department of State	19x0209	Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Department of State	1
Department of State	19x0210	National Endowment for Democracy, Department of State	117
Department of State	19x1005	International Organizations and Programs, State	338
Department of State	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	14
Department of State	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	63
Department of State	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	29
Department of State	19x1124	Contributions to Peacekeeping Activities, Department of State	129
Department of State	19x1126	Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State	543
Department of State	19x1143	Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State	1,795
Department of State	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	1,490
Department of State	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	64
Department of Transportation	11x1001	Trade and Development Agency	0
Department of Transportation	69x1301	Federal Aviation Administration, Operations	0
Department of Transportation	72x1021	Development Assistance	7
Department of Transportation	72x1037	Economic Support Fund
Department of the Interior ...	14x0412	Assistance to Territories, Insular Affairs	2
Department of the Interior ...	14x0415	Compact of Free Association, Department of Interior	206
Department of the Interior ...	14x1611	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource Management	5
Department of the Interior ...	14x1652	Multinational Species Conservation Fund, United States Fish and Wildlife Service	7
Department of the Interior ...	14x1696	Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service	0
Department of the Interior ...	14x5029	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration	0
Department of the Interior ...	14x5241	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, North American Wetlands Conservation Fund	0
Department of the Interior ...	14x8216	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds	0
Department of the Treasury	11x0071	Contribution to the Strategic Climate Fund	75
Department of the Treasury	11x0072	Contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank	86
Department of the Treasury	11x0073	Contribution to the International Development Association	1,492
Department of the Treasury	11x0076	Contribution to the Asian Development Bank	290
Department of the Treasury	11x0077	Global Environment Facility	237
Department of the Treasury	11x0079	Contribution to the African Development Fund	246
Department of the Treasury	11x0080	Contribution to the Clean Technology Fund	230
Department of the Treasury	11x0082	Contribution to the African Development Bank	32

Table 8.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of the Treasury	11x0089	Contribution to the Enterprise for the Americas Multilateral Investment Fund.	50
Department of the Treasury	11x1039	Contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development.	26
Department of the Treasury	11x1045	International Affairs Technical Assistance	20
Department of the Treasury	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	0
Department of the Treasury	11x1096	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the President.	0
Department of the Treasury	11x1475	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (Fund)	160
Department of the Treasury	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AECCA)	4
Department of the Treasury	72x1010	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States	0
Department of the Treasury	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	0
Environmental Protection Agency.	68x0107	Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology	0
Environmental Protection Agency.	68x0108	Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.	13
Export-Import Bank of the United States.	83x0100	Export-Import Bank Loans Program Account	14
Federal Trade Commission ...	13x0120	Department of Commerce, Departmental Management	0
Federal Trade Commission ...	13x1250	International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ...	0
Federal Trade Commission ...	29x0100	Federal Trade Commission, Salaries and Expenses	0
Inter-American Foundation ...	11x3100	Inter-American Foundation	24
Millennium Challenge Corporation	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	1,355
Peace Corps	11x0100	Peace Corps	372
Peace Corps	11x0110	Salaries and Expenses, the White House	0
Peace Corps	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	0
Peace Corps	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	24
Peace Corps	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AECCA)	2
Peace Corps	72x1021	Development Assistance	7
Peace Corps	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Peace Corps	75x0955	Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	0
Peace Corps	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	0
Trade and Development Agency.	11x1001	Trade and Development Agency	35
Trade and Development Agency.	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	4
U.S. Agency for International Development.	11x0091	Debt Restructuring	9
U.S. Agency for International Development.	11x1096	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the President.	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	12x2278	Public Law 480 Title II Grants	1,639
U.S. Agency for International Development.	12x4336	Commodity Credit Corporation Fund	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	13
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	5,018
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	40

Table 8.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1154	Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State	3
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0300	Capital Investment Fund, United States	134
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0302	Capital Investment Fund of the USAID - Recovery Act	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0305	Civilian Stabilization Initiative	5
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	475
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1000	Operating Expenses of USAID	1,315
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1007	Operating Expenses of the USAID, Office of Inspector General	53
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1010	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States	11
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1012	Sahel Development Program
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1014	Sub-Saharan Africa, Development Assistance	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1015	Complex Crises Fund	22
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1021	Development Assistance	1,932
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1027	Transition Initiatives, International Assistance Program	41
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1029	Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1033	HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund, International Development	454
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1035	International Disaster and Famine Assistance	992
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1036	Payment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund	45
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	4,538
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	29
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	40
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1096	Central America and the Caribbean Emergency Disaster Recovery Fund.
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1264	Development Credit Authority, United States	24
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4103	Development Loan Fund, Executive	-238
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4344	Housing and Other Credit Guaranty Programs, Guaranty Loan Financing Account.	18
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4513	Working Capital Fund, International Assistance Program	20
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x8342	Foreign National Employees Separation Liability Fund	6
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x8824	Gifts and Contributions, Inter-American Foundation	76
Total Net Disbursements			30,687

0's represent values less than \$500,000

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID's Foreign Assistance Database (FADB)

Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013

Table 9.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation
Bilateral Net Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
African Development Foundation	11x0700	African Development Foundation	31
Department of Agriculture	11x0091	Debt Restructuring	5
Department of Agriculture	12x1106	National Forest System, Forest Service	1
Department of Agriculture	12x1400	Salaries and Expenses, Agricultural Research Service	0
Department of Agriculture	12x1500	Research and Education Activities, Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service.	1
Department of Agriculture	12x1600	Salaries and Expenses, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service	1
Department of Agriculture	12x2277	Public Law 480 Program Account, Title I	-178
Department of Agriculture	12x2900	Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Agricultural Service	17
Department of Agriculture	12x2903	McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants.	163
Department of Agriculture	70x0800	Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations, Science and Technology, Homeland Security.	0
Department of Agriculture	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Department of Agriculture	80x0120	Science, National Aeronautics and Space Administration	0
Department of Agriculture	97x0134	Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, Defense	0
Department of Commerce	13x0500	Scientific & Technical Research & Services, NIST	0
Department of Commerce	13x1006	Patent and Trademark Office, Salaries and Expenses	2
Department of Commerce	13x1250	International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ...	2
Department of Commerce	13x1450	National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Research & Facilities.	1
Department of Commerce	72x1021	Development Assistance	4
Department of Commerce	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	0
Department of Defense	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	4
Department of Defense	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	72
Department of Defense	21x2020	Operations and Maintenance, Army	103
Department of Defense	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	3
Department of Defense	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Department of Defense	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	0
Department of Defense	97x0100	Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide	178
Department of Defense	97x0130	Defense Health Program	9
Department of Defense	97x0819	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Defense	121
Department of Energy	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	3
Department of Energy	89x0309	Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy	129
Department of Health and Human Services.	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	18
Department of Health and Human Services.	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	1,640
Department of Health and Human Services.	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	13
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0140	Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund	16
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0885	National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health.	392
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0892	National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0943	Disease Control, Research, and Training, Centers for Disease Control.	140
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0949	Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0950	HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tuberculosis Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0

Table 9.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral Net Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0951	Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	3
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0955	Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	75
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0956	Public Health Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x0959	Public Health Scientific Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.	0
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x1503	Refugee and Entrant Assistance, Administration for Children and Families.	631
Department of Health and Human Services.	75x8250	Gifts and Donations, Centers for Disease Control	0
Department of Homeland Security	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	0
Department of Homeland Security	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	3
Department of Homeland Security	19x1154	Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State	0
Department of Justice	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	2
Department of Justice	15x0128	Department of Justice, General Legal Activities	0
Department of Justice	15x0200	Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation	0
Department of Justice	15x1100	Salaries and Expenses, Drug Enforcement Administration	1
Department of Justice	15x5042	Assets Forfeiture Fund, Justice	0
Department of Justice	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	0
Department of Justice	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	1
Department of Labor	16x0165	Department of Labor, Departmental Management	68
Department of Labor	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	1
Department of Labor	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	0
Department of Labor	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	5
Department of State	11x0040	United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund	28
Department of State	11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	322
Department of State	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	191
Department of State	12x3505	Food Stamp Program, Food and Nutrition Service	60
Department of State	19x0113	Diplomatic and Consular Programs, Department of State	5
Department of State	19x0209	Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Department of State.	1
Department of State	19x0210	National Endowment for Democracy, Department of State	117
Department of State	19x1005	International Organizations and Programs, State	4
Department of State	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	14
Department of State	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	63
Department of State	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	29
Department of State	19x1126	Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State	28
Department of State	19x1143	Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State	1,784
Department of State	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	1,490
Department of State	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	64
Department of Transportation	11x1001	Trade and Development Agency	0
Department of Transportation	69x1301	Federal Aviation Administration, Operations	0
Department of Transportation	72x1021	Development Assistance	7
Department of the Interior ...	14x0412	Assistance to Territories, Insular Affairs	2
Department of the Interior ...	14x0415	Compact of Free Association, Department of Interior	206
Department of the Interior ...	14x1611	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource Management	5
Department of the Interior ...	14x1652	Multinational Species Conservation Fund, United States Fish and Wildlife Service.	7

Table 9.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral Net Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of the Interior ...	14x1696	Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.	0
Department of the Interior ...	14x5029	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration	0
Department of the Interior ...	14x5241	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, North American Wetlands Conservation Fund.	0
Department of the Interior ...	14x8216	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds	0
Department of the Treasury	11x1045	International Affairs Technical Assistance	20
Department of the Treasury	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	0
Department of the Treasury	11x1096	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the President.	0
Department of the Treasury	11x1475	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (Fund)	160
Department of the Treasury	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	4
Department of the Treasury	72x1010	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States	0
Department of the Treasury	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	0
Environmental Protection Agency.	68x0107	Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology	0
Environmental Protection Agency.	68x0108	Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.	8
Export-Import Bank of the United States.	83x0100	Export-Import Bank Loans Program Account	14
Federal Trade Commission ...	13x0120	Department of Commerce, Departmental Management	0
Federal Trade Commission ...	13x1250	International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ...	0
Federal Trade Commission ...	29x0100	Federal Trade Commission, Salaries and Expenses	0
Inter-American Foundation ...	11x3100	Inter-American Foundation	24
Millennium Challenge Corporation	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	1,355
Peace Corps	11x0100	Peace Corps	372
Peace Corps	11x0110	Salaries and Expenses, the White House	0
Peace Corps	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	0
Peace Corps	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	24
Peace Corps	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	2
Peace Corps	72x1021	Development Assistance	7
Peace Corps	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	1
Peace Corps	75x0955	Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	0
Peace Corps	95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation	0
Trade and Development Agency.	11x1001	Trade and Development Agency	35
Trade and Development Agency.	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	4
U.S. Agency for International Development.	11x0091	Debt Restructuring	9
U.S. Agency for International Development.	11x1096	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the President.	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	12x2278	Public Law 480 Title II Grants	1,639
U.S. Agency for International Development.	12x4336	Commodity Credit Corporation Fund	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative	13
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	3,632

Table 9.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation—Continued
Bilateral Net Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State	40
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1154	Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State	3
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0300	Capital Investment Fund, United States	134
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0302	Capital Investment Fund of the USAID - Recovery Act	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0305	Civilian Stabilization Initiative	5
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	475
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1000	Operating Expenses of USAID	1,315
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1007	Operating Expenses of the USAID, Office of Inspector General	53
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1010	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States	11
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1014	Sub-Saharan Africa, Development Assistance	0
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1015	Complex Crises Fund	22
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1021	Development Assistance	1,932
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1027	Transition Initiatives, International Assistance Program	41
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1033	HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund, International Development	454
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1035	International Disaster and Famine Assistance	992
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1036	Payment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund	45
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1037	Economic Support Fund	4,538
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union	29
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States	40
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x1264	Development Credit Authority, United States	24
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4103	Development Loan Fund, Executive	-233
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4344	Housing and Other Credit Guaranty Programs, Guaranty Loan Financing Account.	18
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4513	Working Capital Fund, International Assistance Program	20
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x8342	Foreign National Employees Separation Liability Fund	6
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x8824	Gifts and Contributions, Inter-American Foundation	76
Total Bilateral Net Disbursements			25,471

0's represent values less than \$500,000

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID's Foreign Assistance Database (FADB)

Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013

Table 10.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency
and Appropriation
Multilateral Net Disbursements (in \$U.S., Millions)

Agency	Treasury Symbol	Appropriation	Amount
Department of State	11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs	78
Department of State	19x1005	International Organizations and Programs, State	335
Department of State	19x1124	Contributions to Peacekeeping Activities, Department of State	129
Department of State	19x1126	Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State	515
Department of State	19x1143	Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State	11
Department of the Treasury	11x0071	Contribution to the Strategic Climate Fund	75
Department of the Treasury	11x0072	Contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank	86
Department of the Treasury	11x0073	Contribution to the International Development Association	1,492
Department of the Treasury	11x0076	Contribution to the Asian Development Bank	290
Department of the Treasury	11x0077	Global Environment Facility	237
Department of the Treasury	11x0079	Contribution to the African Development Fund	246
Department of the Treasury	11x0080	Contribution to the Clean Technology Fund	230
Department of the Treasury	11x0082	Contribution to the African Development Bank	32
Department of the Treasury	11x0089	Contribution to the Enterprise for the Americas Multilateral Investment Fund.	50
Department of the Treasury	11x1039	Contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development.	26
Environmental Protection Agency.	68x0108	Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.	4
U.S. Agency for International Development.	19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival	1,385
U.S. Agency for International Development.	72x4103	Development Loan Fund, Executive	-5
Total Multilateral Net Disbursements			5,216

0's represent values less than \$500,000

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID's Foreign Assistance Database (FADB)
Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013

Table 11.—Agency List

Agency Acronym	Agency Name
ADF	African Development Foundation
AGR	Department of Agriculture
AID	U.S. Agency for International Development
COMMERCE	Department of Commerce
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOT	Department of Transportation
DTRE	Department of the Treasury
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EXIM	Export-Import Bank of the United States
FTC	Federal Trade Commission
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
IADF	Inter-American Foundation
INTERIOR	Department of the Interior
JUSTICE	Department of Justice
LABOR	Department of Labor
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation

Table 11.—Agency List—Continued

Agency Acronym	Agency Name
PEACE	Peace Corps
STATE	Department of State
TDA	Trade and Development Agency

Table 12.—Appropriation List

Treasury Symbol	Appropriation Name
11x0040	United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund
11x0071	Contribution to the Strategic Climate Fund
11x0072	Contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank
11x0073	Contribution to the International Development Association
11x0076	Contribution to the Asian Development Bank
11x0077	Global Environment Facility
11x0079	Contribution to the African Development Fund
11x0080	Contribution to the Clean Technology Fund
11x0082	Contribution to the African Development Bank
11x0089	Contribution to the Enterprise for the Americas Multilateral Investment Fund
11x0091	Debt Restructuring
11x0100	Peace Corps
11x0110	Salaries and Expenses, the White House
11x0700	African Development Foundation
11x1001	Trade and Development Agency
11x1022	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
11x1039	Contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development
11x1045	International Affairs Technical Assistance
11x1075	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs
11x1096	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the President
11x1475	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (Fund)
11x3100	Inter-American Foundation
12x1106	National Forest System, Forest Service
12x1400	Salaries and Expenses, Agricultural Research Service
12x1500	Research and Education Activities, Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service
12x1600	Salaries and Expenses, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service
12x2277	Public Law 480 Program Account, Title I
12x2278	Public Law 480 Title II Grants
12x2900	Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Agricultural Service
12x2903	McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants
12x3505	Food Stamp Program, Food and Nutrition Service
12x4336	Commodity Credit Corporation Fund
13x0120	Department of Commerce, Departmental Management
13x0500	Scientific & Technical Research & Services, NIST
13x1006	Patent and Trademark Office, Salaries and Expenses
13x1250	International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration
13x1450	National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Research & Facilities
14x0412	Assistance to Territories, Insular Affairs
14x0415	Compact of Free Association, Department of Interior
14x1611	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource Management
14x1652	Multinational Species Conservation Fund, United States Fish and Wildlife Service

Table 12.—Appropriation List—Continued

Treasury Symbol	Appropriation Name
14x1696	Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
14x5029	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration
14x5241	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, North American Wetlands Conservation Fund
14x8216	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds
15x0128	Department of Justice, General Legal Activities
15x0200	Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation
15x1100	Salaries and Expenses, Drug Enforcement Administration
15x5042	Assets Forfeiture Fund, Justice
16x0165	Department of Labor, Departmental Management
19x0113	Diplomatic and Consular Programs, Department of State
19x0209	Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Department of State
19x0210	National Endowment for Democracy, Department of State
19x1005	International Organizations and Programs, State
19x1030	Global HIV/AIDs Initiative
19x1031	Global Health and Child Survival
19x1121	Democracy Fund, Department of State
19x1124	Contributions to Peacekeeping Activities, Department of State
19x1126	Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State
19x1143	Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State
19x1154	Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State
21x2020	Operations and Maintenance, Army
29x0100	Federal Trade Commission, Salaries and Expenses
68x0107	Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology
68x0108	Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency
69x1301	Federal Aviation Administration, Operations
70x0800	Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations, Science and Technology, Homeland Security
72x0300	Capital Investment Fund, United States
72x0302	Capital Investment Fund of the USAID - Recovery Act
72x0305	Civilian Stabilization Initiative
72x0306	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)
72x1000	Operating Expenses of USAID
72x1007	Operating Expenses of the USAID, Office of Inspector General
72x1010	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States
72x1012	Sahel Development Program
72x1014	Sub-Saharan Africa, Development Assistance
72x1015	Complex Crises Fund
72x1021	Development Assistance
72x1027	Transition Initiatives, International Assistance Program
72x1029	Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund
72x1033	HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund, International Development
72x1035	International Disaster and Famine Assistance
72x1036	Payment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund
72x1037	Economic Support Fund
72x1093	Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union
72x1095	Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States
72x1096	Central America and the Caribbean Emergency Disaster Recovery Fund
72x1264	Development Credit Authority, United States
72x4103	Development Loan Fund, Executive
72x4344	Housing and Other Credit Guaranty Programs, Guaranty Loan Financing Account
72x4513	Working Capital Fund, International Assistance Program
72x8342	Foreign National Employees Separation Liability Fund
72x8824	Gifts and Contributions, Inter-American Foundation

Table 12.—Appropriation List—Continued

Treasury Symbol	Appropriation Name
75x0140	Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund
75x0885	National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health
75x0892	National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health
75x0943	Disease Control, Research, and Training, Centers for Disease Control
75x0949	Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
75x0950	HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tuberculosis Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
75x0951	Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
75x0952	Injury Prevention and Control, Centers and Disease Control and Prevention
75x0955	Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
75x0956	Public Health Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
75x0959	Public Health Scientific Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
75x1503	Refugee and Entrant Assistance, Administration for Children and Families
75x8250	Gifts and Donations, Centers for Disease Control
80x0120	Science, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
83x0100	Export-Import Bank Loans Program Account
89x0309	Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy
95x2750	Millennium Challenge Corporation
97x0100	Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide
97x0130	Defense Health Program
97x0134	Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, Defense
97x0819	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Defense

Table 13.—Democratic Republic of the Congo:
USG Debt Relief (Paris Club)
(U.S. dollars)

	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2010	Total
Total All Agencies					
Face Value Treated ¹	289,280,244	4,479,161	113,585,345	1,635,654,731	2,042,999,481
Subsidy Cost Obligation ¹ ..	60,930,045	947,107	21,120,031	87,099,790	170,096,973
USAID					
Face Value Treated	35,370,662	4,479,161	8,706,851	262,532,950	311,089,624
Subsidy Cost Obligation	7,561,087	947,107	1,618,950	12,180,370	22,307,514
USDA					
Face Value Treated	112,405,883		35,502,655	439,998,354	587,906,892
Subsidy Cost Obligation	23,751,492		6,601,355	20,675,351	51,028,198
EXIM Bank					
Face Value Treated	105,528,498		50,284,016	723,581,585	879,394,099
Subsidy Cost Obligation	22,129,029		9,349,797	42,504,343	73,983,169
DOD					
Face Value Treated	35,975,201		19,091,823	209,541,842	264,608,866
Subsidy Cost Obligation	7,488,437		3,549,929	11,739,726	22,778,092

Notes:

¹ "Face Value Treated" represents amount of debt treated (forgiven); "Subsidy Cost Obligation" is the cost of debt relief as obligated.

² There was an USAID action processed in FY 2003, but it was a rescheduling without subsidy cost.

³ FY 2006: this was a USAID-only adjustment.

⁴ All subsidy costs in this table were obligated in Treasury's Debt Restructuring program account (11 0091).

