

**NOMINATIONS OF THE 113TH  
CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION**

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**HEARINGS**

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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MAY 7 THROUGH DECEMBER 17, 2013  
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



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## NOMINATION OF DANIEL R. RUSSEL

THURSDAY, JUNE 20, 2013

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

Daniel R. Russel, of New York, to be Assistant Secretary of State  
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:24 p.m., in room  
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin,  
presiding.

Present: Senators Cardin and Murphy.

### OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

Senator CARDIN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come  
to order.

I want to thank Chairman Menendez for allowing me to chair to-  
day's hearing in which we will consider Mr. Daniel R. Russel of  
New York to be Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pa-  
cific Affairs.

Today I am pleased to welcome Mr. Russel, the nominee for the  
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs to  
our committee. I had a chance to be with Mr. Russel before my re-  
cent trip to Asia, and I want to thank him personally for the brief-  
ing that I received. And I know that he is well qualified to be the  
Assistant Secretary.

I first want to thank Mr. Russel for your willingness to continue  
to serve the public. I know that your family is here, and we want  
to thank your family as well because we know public service is a  
family sacrifice and we thank the members of your family for being  
willing to put up with your desire to serve your country.

Mr. Russel is a career diplomat since 1985; he was a major archi-  
tect of the administration's rebalance to Asia policy as a member  
of the White House National Security staff since 2009.

As chair of the Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs,  
I have been holding a series of hearings examining the rebalance  
to Asia policy. So I welcome the opportunity to discuss Mr. Russel's  
plans for the rebalance. Asia is tremendously important for Amer-  
ica's economic growth. Yet, it faces serious challenges from nuclear  
proliferation to cyber attacks to climate change. I look forward to

hearing from Mr. Russel as to how he will tackle these challenges in his new position.

America's economic and national security interests are inextricably tied to East Asia's strength, stability, and security. The rebalance is a statement of our intent to more fully invest in the region, to support our allies and partners, and to contribute to the economic prosperity and stability of the region. I look forward to hearing what Mr. Russel's priorities will be for the rebalance in the coming years.

As we rebalance to Asia, we must emphasize how critical the universal values of human rights and good governance are for security and prosperity. I held my first hearing on what the rebalance policy means for democracy, good governance, and human rights to illustrate this point. These values should be integral to every element of our rebalance policy.

For instance, in my second hearing on security cooperation, we made it clear that our military engagement should support human rights, civilian control of the military, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. On economics, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the centerpiece of our regional economic engagement, can move forward only if progress is made on labor rights and basic human freedoms. Good governance also recognizes the strains we put on our environment that threaten food, water, and energy security.

I welcome Mr. Russel's thoughts on how to undertake the rebalance not only through military and economic strategies, but by expanding human rights and good governance.

I can see opportunities for progress on many fronts. Closer engagement with our allies and partners and active partnership with multilateral organizations such as ASEAN are key to a successful rebalance. ASEAN and China are working toward a binding code of conduct to resolve the South China Sea conflicts, which is encouraging.

Myanmar's emerging democracy is also a bright spot. I have met with Myanmar's President and speaker and am impressed by their commitment to continue democratic progress. Cautious engagement has worked. I want to see it continued and reforms to succeed on all fronts, especially human rights.

There have been signs of movement on North Korea as recently as today with some reports. I welcome Mr. Russel's views on how we should proceed for security on the Korean Peninsula. During my visit to the Republic of Korea, I encouraged the Republic of Korea's President Park to pursue her vision of a Helsinki-like process to realize her goal of a Northeast Asia confidence-building dialogue and to continue her humanitarian approach to help starving North Koreans. I welcome your ideas, Mr. Russel, as to how to engage that separated families of two nations to move toward reconciliation, including through closer cooperation with China.

And that brings me to China and the stumbling block to our relations, human rights. During my visit to Beijing, I learned how extensively the government suppresses human rights. It is still not healthy to disagree with the government or you can end up in labor camps without trials for years. We must continue to have an honest, constructive dialogue with China on human rights, cyber security, and intellectual property. We want them to stop stealing our

ideas and come up with their own to become an innovative society that is a true partner.

We can partner with China in many areas, such as military-to-military relations and climate change. I was encouraged by President Obama's informal meeting with President Xi, which symbolized the kind of relationship building necessary to increase mutual trust. And with their agreement to reduce hydrofluorocarbons, climate change is a promising area for cooperation.

We must get our relations with China right in order to contribute to peace and stability in the region as two great Pacific powers.

As you can see, Mr. Russel, you have a full plate ahead of you, and you will not be bored in your new position.

And we look forward to your testimony. And with that, I will turn to Mr. Russel and just acknowledge that your full statement will be made part of our record. You may proceed as you wish and then we will engage in questions.

**STATEMENT OF DANIEL R. RUSSEL, OF NEW YORK, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS**

Mr. RUSSEL. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing today, and thank you very much for your comments and thank you also for the leadership that you have shown since taking over the chairmanship of this committee on the Asia-Pacific account.

With your permission, I would like to begin by introducing—  
Senator CARDIN. Please do.

Mr. RUSSEL [continuing]. My wife Keiko, my wife of 31 years, who has stood by me and sacrificed so much for me and for my career, but also for my country. I would also like to introduce my two sons, Byron and Kevin. They, like their sister Emily, who is mercifully gainfully employed and therefore could not join us today, are what is called "Foreign Service brats." They have grown up bouncing around the world, changing countries, changing schools, changing houses, changing languages every 3 years, and that has represented a great sacrifice, as has their waiting for me late into the night and missing me on weekends. So it is something that I am very grateful to them for.

I appreciate your comments about families in the Foreign Service, Mr. Chairman. I think that my own family exemplifies a truth about the entire Foreign Service which is that the spouse and the children are really the unsung heroes. And I cannot thank them enough.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Murphy, I am really honored to appear before the committee today and grateful to President Obama and to Secretary Kerry for their confidence in nominating me for the responsibility of serving as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, which is a region vital to our national interests.

As a career member of the Foreign Service, I have devoted 28 years to serving America's interests abroad, largely in Asia. In 1985, my first assignment was to serve as the staff aid to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan who, at the time, was the former Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, and he took me under his wing. He and his wife became mentors to me and to my wife. He became a

lifelong friend, and to this day, he remains my hero, my role model, and my inspiration. His life exemplified honor, honesty, hard work, loyalty, modesty, respect for others. It is from him that I acquired a deep respect for this institution, and there is hardly a day that goes by where I do not think of him and miss him.

My public service also taught me the value of the State Department's greatest asset, which is the wonderful and talented and dedicated men and women who serve in Washington and who serve abroad. In my career, I have been entrusted with assignments that carried responsibility for management, for security, and for the welfare of American citizens, and if confirmed, I pledge to maintain high ethical and managerial standards. I will insist on the best possible security for our personnel, rigorous safeguarding of our national security information, clear and straightforward communications, including with this committee and with your staff.

Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, President Obama has made a strategic commitment to rebalance our policy toward the Asia-Pacific region because America's prosperity and security are inextricably linked to that region. I have had the privilege of serving as the President's special assistant for Asia, and I know that his objective in the region is to create and ensure a stable security environment and advance a regional order rooted in economic openness, a peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal rights and freedoms. Secretary Kerry has affirmed his strong commitment to this strategy, and if confirmed, I will vigorously pursue this approach, which is yielding important benefits to the American people and to the region.

I firmly believe that America's treaty alliances underpin our strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region and are a unique attribute of American strength.

More broadly, I believe the United States has a strong interest in inclusive and transparent regional institutions, as you alluded to, where countries work together to confront common challenges. We want these institutions to help ensure a stable, rules-based environment for economic growth, to promote respect for international law, and to encourage the resolution of disputes.

I also recognize the importance of opening markets, of leveling the playing field, and deepening America's economic ties to Asia, and if confirmed, I will work closely with Congress and other stakeholders to promote U.S. exports and job creation, to advocate for U.S. firms, and to foster economic integration, and work to advance the administration's initiatives on energy, on the environment, and on climate change.

Similarly, with respect to China, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will work to encourage China to resolve key bilateral issues, to cooperate on regional challenges, such as North Korea and maritime security, and to play a constructive and responsible role in addressing global challenges. I will seek to impress on the Chinese Government that protecting universal human rights is in China's own interest, and I will press China to take steps to stop this cyber theft of American companies' intellectual property.

If confirmed, I will implement President Obama's policy of promoting a rules-based system in the Asia-Pacific, respectful of universal values, human rights, good governance, and democracy.

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned North Korea's situation. North Korea presents, through its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, a serious threat to the United States, to our allies, and to the global nonproliferation regime. If confirmed, I would actively pursue the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and work to block North Korea's efforts to proliferate or to blackmail its neighbors. I am also concerned about the well-being of the North Korean people, including those who have fled tyranny there.

In addition, the United States has a profound interest in the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in the South and the East China Seas. It is essential that we uphold freedom of navigation and commerce, and if confirmed, I will support the U.S. policy of opposing coercion or the threat or the use of force, of reinforcing stability and adherence to international law, rules, and norms, and of preventing escalation or conflict.

I would like to close, Mr. Chairman, by reiterating my commitment to do everything in my power to advance American security, to advance American interests. And I am firmly committed to good coordination with the legislative branch, and if confirmed, I look forward to close cooperation with you and your colleagues and your staff.

So I thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the committee and for your consideration. I look forward to hearing your views and answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Russel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL R. RUSSEL

Chairman Cardin, Senator Rubio, and distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as President Obama's nominee to be the next Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. I am deeply grateful to President Obama and to Secretary Kerry for placing their confidence in me with this nomination to serve the United States of America in the capacity of Assistant Secretary for a region that is so vital to our national interests.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank and introduce to the committee my wife of 31 years, Keiko, who has stood by me and sacrificed so much for me and for this country over the years. I would also like to introduce my sons Byron and Kevin who, like their sister Emily (who is gainfully employed and could not attend today), grew up as "Foreign Service Brats" moving from country to country, school to school. They, too, have made many sacrifices for me and tolerated my long hours at work and frequent travel. My family exemplifies a truth about the Foreign Service—the spouse and the children are the unsung heroes—and I can't thank them enough.

Mr. Chairman, this nomination is deeply meaningful to me because, as a career member of the Foreign Service, I have devoted 28 years of service to promoting America's interests abroad, largely in East Asia. After traveling to Asia as a 22-year-old and studying martial arts in Japan for 3 years, I returned home to New York and used my Japanese language ability in a multinational company. Over time, I recognized that whereas businesses throughout Asia were intensely interested in learning about the United States, back home too few Americans gave much thought to foreign affairs or to the necessity of defending our interests overseas. This concern motivated me to pursue a career of public service, and in 1985 I left the private sector, and proudly accepted an appointment as a United States Foreign Service officer. It is a decision I have never regretted. As my first assignment, I was posted to our Embassy in Tokyo, where I had the honor to work as the staff aide to former Senate majority leader and Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, Ambassador Mike Mansfield. Mike Mansfield took me under his wing, served as my mentor, and to this day is my role model and inspiration. His life exemplified

honor, honesty, hard work, loyalty, modesty and respect for others. As a former Senator he taught me the importance of teamwork between the executive and legislative branches. And as an ambassador who represented the United States under both President Carter and President Reagan, he taught me the value of bipartisan cooperation.

I have worked for other exceptional American diplomats and been given extraordinary opportunities to contribute to important foreign policy priorities. As Political Advisor for Asia under Ambassador Tom Pickering at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations from 1989 to 1992, I traveled widely in Asia and to the Pacific Island nations, I participated in the Cambodia peace talks, played a small role in the restart of our relations with Vietnam, and coordinated our successful efforts to bring the Republic of Korea into the United Nations as a full member state. As Political Unit Chief at our Embassy in Seoul, Republic of Korea, I participated in nuclear negotiations with North Korea and helped to negotiate the 1994 Agreed Framework. In later positions in the State Department, including as Chief of Staff to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and during my service at the National Security Council over the past 4½ years, I have been granted the opportunity to contribute to the formulation of America's foreign policy and to work on some of the most pressing challenges facing our country. I very much hope for the opportunity to continue that work as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific.

Mr. Chairman, almost three decades of government service have taught me to value the State Department's greatest asset—its talented and dedicated employees. The women and men of the State Department represent the best this country has to offer, and I am humbled to be considered for this position of leadership. If confirmed, I will take every opportunity to promote their role and skills, while relying heavily on their expertise, enthusiasm, and deep sense of loyalty to the United States. I care deeply about the State Department and will do my utmost to strengthen it as an institution. This includes pursuing resource requests for operations commensurate with the Department's mission and national interests and for foreign assistance funding that represents sound investments by the American people to promote our prosperity and security, as well as our values as a democratic nation.

Over the years I have been entrusted with responsibility for managing two of our embassies in Europe—in Cyprus and in The Hague—as Deputy Chief and Mission and Chargé d'Affaires. Those positions, as well as my service as Principal Officer in Osaka, one of our largest consulates in Asia, carried significant responsibility for management, security, and the welfare of American citizens. I have always placed a high premium on management excellence. If confirmed, I will emphasize proper and responsive management within the Bureau and at our posts abroad. I pledge to maintain high ethical standards, careful stewardship of resources, the best possible security for our personnel, rigorous safeguarding of information relating to national security, and clear and straightforward communications, including with this committee and its members.

Mr. Chairman, this is an extraordinary time of opportunities and challenges for East Asian and Pacific countries and for the United States. With the recognition that America's future prosperity and security are very much intertwined with the Asia-Pacific region, President Obama made a strategic commitment to rebalance our interests and investments in Asia. The President set out a clear, overarching objective for the United States in the region to sustain a stable security environment and advance a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal rights and freedoms. As underscored by Secretary Kerry during his trip to the region in April, the State Department remains committed to this U.S. strategic objective by building an increasingly active and enduring presence in the region. As Senior Director for Asian Affairs on the National Security Staff, I have worked to promote the United States increased focus on the Asia-Pacific in line with the President's strategic priorities and the national interest. I wholeheartedly believe that as a Pacific country with profound interests in the region, America should engage deeply throughout the region and provide inspiration, security, and leadership. If confirmed, I will sustain a "whole-of-government approach" ensuring that the efforts of the State Department are closely coordinated with USAID, the Defense Department, and other agencies. I will work with Congress, the business community, and nongovernmental organizations to build on and shape the important partnerships that promote our prosperity and security.

Over the past 4 years, our robust engagement with the Asia-Pacific through governments, institutions, and people-to-people programs has yielded positive returns politically, socially, economically, and militarily. I intend to sustain this focus and continue the Department's efforts to strengthen and modernize our alliances, en-



hance our partnerships with regional powers, support regional multilateral institutions, boost trade and investment, advance democracy and the respect for human rights, and strengthen ties between Americans and the people of the region. Mr. Chairman, I will touch briefly on some of these aspects.

First, I firmly believe our treaty alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand remain the bedrock for our strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. These enduring relationships represent a unique asset for the United States and an important multiplier of our influence in the region. Our alliances are grounded in history, shared values, and our common commitment to democracy, free markets, rule of law, and human rights. They provide the foundation for close cooperation that ensures regional stability and reassures our friends and regional partners of U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. I believe that our ties with our East Asian and Pacific allies are stronger than ever. If confirmed, I will work closely with colleagues at the Defense Department to ensure that our alliances are maintained and modernized in a way that promotes operational needs and our shared strategic goals, including new cooperative efforts in cyber security, space, counterpiracy, and counterterrorism.

Second, Mr. Chairman, beyond our bilateral relationships, I believe the United States has a strong interest in the further development of an inclusive and transparent regional architecture of multilateral institutions. The Asia-Pacific region is increasingly seized with the need to develop rules-based frameworks for dialogue and cooperation that will help maintain stability, resolve disputes through diplomacy, and ensure that countries can rise peacefully. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen regional structures, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum and the East Asia summit, so that these bodies effectively ensure countries work together to confront common challenges, provide a stable environment for economic growth, and act with respect for international law and rules.

Many of these forums are built on the underlying platform of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN. For decades, ASEAN has embodied a framework for regional cooperation based on mutual respect and the renunciation of force. Not only does ASEAN provide a platform on which to build a regional architecture, but the countries of Southeast Asia are becoming increasingly important as their economic, political, and social dynamism grows. The increased U.S. focus on ASEAN in recent years mirrors our enhanced engagement with Southeast Asia as a whole, representing a "rebalance within the rebalance." Southeast Asia's strategic geography, population of over 600 million, economic growth, and its rapidly expanding middle class underscore its significance. If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to bolster our ties with Southeast Asia, including with emerging centers of influence, such as Indonesia, where we are strengthening our relationship through the Comprehensive Partnership. This engagement includes strengthening efforts like the Lower Mekong Initiative, which supports narrowing the development gap in Southeast Asia, and regional mechanisms to improve human rights and the rule of law.

The United States has historic ties to the Pacific Island nations, our neighbors on our farthest, westernmost maritime boundaries and home to vast marine resources. As such, the Pacific Islands have an important role to play in our rebalance, and if confirmed, I will help to deepen and institutionalize our ties with these partner nations and with regional bodies such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community. This includes working with the committee and others in Congress to implement the Palau Compact Review.

Third, Mr. Chairman, millions of U.S. jobs are tied to exports to the Asia-Pacific region, and that should increase through sustained U.S. economic statecraft with the growing economies of the region. Having seen the benefits of such high-quality agreements such as the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement and our free trade agreements with Australia and Singapore, I recognize the importance of trade liberalization and deepening our economic relations with the Asia-Pacific.

If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress, USTR, U.S. stakeholders, and partner countries to advance an agenda that promotes U.S. exports and job creation, advocates for U.S. firms, fosters regional economic integration, and lays the foundation for robust, sustained growth at home and throughout the Asia-Pacific.

We are now committed to an even more ambitious project in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade negotiations. If confirmed, I will work in support of the successful conclusion this year of the TPP negotiations to develop a next-generation regional trade and investment agreement, which also promotes internationally recognized labor rights, environmental protection, and transparency.

In an effort to sustain momentum for achieving free, fair, open, and transparent trade throughout the region, if confirmed, I will ensure continued strong U.S. leadership in the 21-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, a key

organization for addressing practical issues affecting U.S. consumers and businesses and establishing policies and standards that facilitate trade and investment in the region. Additionally, I will continue to advance Presidential initiatives on Expanded Economic Engagement with ASEAN and the U.S.-Asia-Pacific Comprehensive Energy Partnership, and examine new opportunities to work with the region on environmental protection and climate change issues.

Fourth, Mr. Chairman, over the last 4 years the Obama administration has placed great importance on the U.S.-China relationship and has made substantial progress in building a relationship that can address the challenges of the 21st century. As President Obama has made very clear, including at his recent summit in California with President Xi, the United States welcomes a stable, prosperous, and successful China that takes responsibility on the global stage commensurate with its stature. If confirmed, I will continue to build on the progress that has been made and further encourage China to take a constructive role in addressing global challenges.

Two themes have guided the U.S. approach to China. First is the recognition that the U.S.-China relationship will continue to have elements of both cooperation and competition. To prevent the emergence of old-style strategic rivalry, we must continue to reject the premise that a rising power and an established power are somehow destined for conflict. Instead, the United States and China must focus on fostering new patterns of practical cooperation on issues that matter to both countries. Second, the administration has stressed the importance of sustained and substantive dialogue across the range of issues in the relationship, including stronger U.S.-China military-to-military ties. Only by pursuing a whole-of-government approach in our dialogues can the United States and China create consensus around rules and norms while we remain committed to our values and interests. If confirmed, I will continue to impress upon the Chinese Government that protecting human rights is not only about China's adherence to international norms governing the protection of universal values, but it is also intrinsically in China's interest. This is because greater respect for fundamental freedoms will ultimately strengthen the U.S.-China bilateral relationship and contribute to China's continued peace, prosperity, and stability. On cyber-enabled theft, the U.S. has made clear that we need China to recognize the urgency and scope of this problem and the risk it poses—to international trade, to the reputation of Chinese industry, and to our overall relations. Beijing should take serious steps to investigate and put a stop to these activities. Finally, we need China to engage with us in a constructive discussion on acceptable norms of behavior in cyber space within the recently announced U.S.-China cyber security working group.

Regarding our friendship with Taiwan, the United States remains firmly committed to our one China policy based on the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. Under our one China policy, the United States maintains close unofficial relations with Taiwan, which is a thriving democracy and an important trading partner. Our friendship and robust commercial, cultural, and people-to-people exchanges with Taiwan have never been stronger.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will continue to promote and support a rules-based system respectful of universal values, human rights, and democracy in the Asia-Pacific. It is not a coincidence that virtually every country that threatens peace is a place where human rights are in peril. It is also not a coincidence that many of our closest allies are countries that embrace pluralism, tolerance, equal rights and equal opportunities. In short, there is a strong link between standing up for human dignity abroad and the national interests of the United States. As such, I will ensure our diplomats continue to monitor and promote the respect for human rights in bilateral and multilateral settings, and support the region's own efforts to foster vibrant, democratic civil societies.

Mr. Chairman, I want to make note of the historic reforms in Burma over the past few years. Burma, a country impoverished by decades of authoritarian military rule and self-imposed isolation, is undergoing an unprecedented political transition marked by a rapid expansion of civil liberties and human rights. These reforms have allowed us to open a new chapter in bilateral relations and expand our channels for assistance. We recognize that much more remains to be done. To ensure that this extraordinary transformation succeeds, I will push for continued reform, including advancing democracy and respect for human rights of all citizens, protection of ethnic and religious minorities, increased efforts toward national reconciliation, advancing economic development, and cooperation on nonproliferation. Burma remains important to U.S. interests as a demonstration of the benefits that can accrue to a nation that pursues a progressive path to change.

Having served extensively overseas, I believe passionately in the power of people-to-people ties and in the importance of our public diplomacy initiatives. Our public diplomacy programs introduce foreign audiences to the diversity of American culture

and society, showcase the role that civil society plays in the United States, and create the long-term foundation for understanding and collaboration. If confirmed, I will fully support expanding innovative educational and cultural endeavors. We will also continue to increase our bilateral dialogues and create multilateral dialogues on educational and cultural issues such as the U.S.-China Consultation on People-to-People Exchange. I will give priority to conveying American ideals through social media platforms in tech-savvy East Asia to connect us with young and diverse audiences.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will strongly encourage building greater inter-parliamentary connections, and toward that end I encourage Members of Congress and congressional staff to travel to the region and engage with the region's leaders and people. I will pledge the warm welcome and full support of our Embassies.

The Asia Pacific security landscape continues to evolve, and I am committed to ensuring that we are responsive to longstanding challenges as well as changing demands. North Korea's illicit nuclear and ballistic missile programs, proliferation activities, and flagrant violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions constitute a serious threat to the United States and its allies, the region, and the global non-proliferation regime. The United States remains steadfast in its commitment to the defense of our allies, and to maintaining peace and security in the region. If confirmed, I will work with absolute determination to pursue the full and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to block North Korea's efforts to engage in proliferation and blackmail of its neighbors. We remain deeply concerned about the well-being and human rights of the North Korean people and join the international community in urging the DPRK to cooperate with the U.N. Commission of Inquiry regarding the widespread violations of human rights in the DPRK.

Territorial and maritime disputes have resurfaced as key challenges to peace and stability. Although the United States is not a party to the underlying sovereignty disputes, we have a profound interest in seeing that these disputes are managed and resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law and that freedom of navigation and commerce are upheld. If confirmed, I will fully support a U.S. diplomatic and security role that reinforces stability and discourages escalation of tensions.

Cyber space also poses unique and compelling challenges to our prosperity and security and that of the region. If confirmed, I will work hard to safeguard the intellectual property of our highly innovative companies and institutions from cyber theft and malicious cyber actors, as well as protect our critical infrastructure. We will work actively with both interagency and foreign counterparts to step up our efforts on this front, which includes sustaining our engagement with China.

Mr. Chairman, let me close by reiterating my fundamental commitment, if confirmed, to do all in my power to ensure that the United States shapes trends in this dynamic region in ways that benefit both our own interests and those of the region as a whole. I strongly believe that close coordination between the executive and the legislative branches will be crucial to this endeavor, and, if confirmed, I look forward to close cooperation with you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues.

Thank you, again, for this opportunity to appear before you. I am happy to respond to any questions you may have.

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you very much for your testimony. You have already answered one of my questions about your cooperation with this committee and Congress I think three or four times during your opening statement. You reinforced your willingness to work closely with our committee, and you have already demonstrated that in your other capacities. So I thank you for that.

I am going to let Senator Murphy inquire first.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome. Congratulations on this step forward. We hope to be able to move your nomination forward expeditiously.

I wanted to explore the interplay of our rebalance to Asia, both with respect to what is happening at the State Department through diplomatic channels, but also how that works together with our military rebalance. And I wanted to ask you to talk about this in the context of the maritime territorial disputes in the region. They greatly worry me. I know we have, in part, dedicated

more military resources and more ships to the region to make it clear that we are going to continue our historic commitment to maintaining open seas, but I also know that we have been encouraging for some of the regional forums to be used as a dispute settlement mechanism with great resistance from China.

And so I would love to hear your thoughts about the path forward and how the United States interplays with some of these maritime disputes but also how you see the interplay between the tools that we have on the diplomatic side and tools that we have on the military side specifically with respect to this question.

Mr. RUSSEL. Thank you very much, Senator, for that question. I think the juxtaposition of the two issues that you identify, which is the coordination of roles and resources between the security and diplomatic tracks and the challenge in the maritime space, is really a central challenge that faces the United States at the moment and in the years to come.

The essence of the President's rebalancing strategy has been to create a stable environment in a region that is critical to America's future prosperity and interests that is built on an existing investment by the United States in security arrangements that have allowed for the development and, frankly, the prosperity that the region has seen, but also to help overlay that with a structure and system of rules and norms that are respectful of and consistent with international law. Nowhere is it more evident or more important to us and to our friends and partners for the approach to territorial and sovereignty disputes in the Asia-Pacific region to be addressed in a peaceful and diplomatic manner in ways that are consistent with international law.

The United States is itself not a claimant. We have no interest in the territory itself, but we have a profound interest in the conduct of the claimants and other parties, including and particularly that of China. We firmly oppose coercion whether it is military coercion or economic coercion and the threat and the use of force.

As a key element of rebalancing, as you alluded to, the President has made clear to his military establishment that security in the Asia-Pacific region is a strategic priority for the United States, and I know that my colleagues in the Pentagon have planned and operated on the basis of that strategic guidance.

At the same time, the President has also made clear that there is an important role for the State Department on the diplomatic side in helping to build up the relationships between the United States and our allies. The rebalancing strategy has begun with modernizing our alliances. We have invested heavily in the development of the institutions in the region that are built around ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. And that, most importantly, includes the decision by President Obama to begin participating personally in the annual East Asia summit, which we see emerging as the premier forum for leaders to discuss security and political strategic issues, something that frankly they cannot do in any other forum because the only other major regional institution, APEC, is an economic cooperation organization. And I think that the President feels that we have made some headway on that front.

Senator MURPHY. But talk to me about China's interest in—if China wants to become a true superpower standing next to the United States, then they have to accept that they need to play by international norms and that they have to be a player in some of these regional dispute settlement forums. And thus far, we have not seen a lot of interest in them to do that.

Tell me about what pressure the Chinese feel to join in on some of these efforts and what we can do to try to encourage them to get there rather than continuing to sort of be a diplomatic rogue.

Mr. RUSSEL. Senator, the issue of China's engagement with ASEAN and with the other claimant countries diplomatically, as well as China's particular behavior on the seas, whether it is in Scarborough Shoal or the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratlys and the Paracels in the South China Sea as well as in the East China Sea, is an issue that the President and top officials, including Secretary Kerry, have in fact raised very directly and very consistently with the Chinese, as well as in the fora with the ASEAN, such as the East Asia summit, where China is very much present and accounted for. We have had this discussion directly in bilateral and in multilateral fora with the Chinese.

And I think the Chinese similarly are in no doubt that America stands by our allies and that the existence of the Philippines, a treaty ally, as a competing claimant, our relationship with Japan, with whom China has a sovereignty dispute over the Senkakus in the East China Sea—these are issues that the Chinese understand directly implicate United States interests and will have an effect on the prospects for a United States-China relationship.

So I believe, Senator, that we have delivered this message consistently and clearly. I think we have reinforced the confidence of our partners and allies and given a constructive boost to ASEAN's effort to begin negotiations directly with China on a code of conduct. I think we have supported other diplomatic and recourse to international law on the part of some of the claimants, and if confirmed, Senator, I certainly will do everything in my power to try to lower the temperature, push claimants including China into a diplomatic track, and continue to warn them that the region in which China will flourish is a region of law, a region of order, and a region of respect for neighbors, not one in which there is space for coercion and bullying.

Senator MURPHY. I think the administration has been very clear on this point. I certainly did not mean to suggest that it has not been.

I am certainly very pleased at your nomination and look forward to working with you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CARDIN. Let me follow up on the maritime security issues because I think Senator Murphy is right on target here. As you point out, we have treaty responsibilities with several of the countries that are involved in maritime disputes. There are also the shipping lanes that are important for commerce. When I was in Northeast Asia, the East China Sea disputes were mentioned by just about every public official I met with as being a major area of concern. Of course, in the South China Sea, there are very, very

serious issues that have already in some cases mushroomed into violence and could become more widespread.

Recently Vietnam and China agreed on a hotline to deal with fishing incidents. One could look at that as a very positive sign. After all, they now have a way of communicating if something develops, trying to cool it down rather than escalating it. But it is also of concern as to whether China is trying to circumvent ASEAN and other international forums where these issues need to be developed, particularly with a code of conduct.

What is your prognosis on how we can cool down the maritime issues and get the parties directly negotiating rather than seeing the loss of life and violence?

Mr. RUSSEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before I begin, let me say that I think that your visit to Northeast Asia was very productive, and I thank you for taking the time to go there. And I will put in a plug. If confirmed, I am a great believer in the tremendous value of congressional delegations, and I can promise you that the East Asia-Pacific Bureau and posts will roll out the red carpet and open their doors not only to you, Senator, but any Member of Congress or any staff member who is willing to take the time to go because I think it is very important.

With respect to the claimants to the disputed territories in the South China Sea, it is our view that there should be a consensual, inclusive, collaborative process among the claimants, that it is unacceptable for any party, including China, to demand that only bilateral negotiations are possible or allowable. By the same token, we, not being a claimant, are entirely comfortable with bilateral discussions and negotiations being part of the mechanisms for addressing both some of these disputes and the question of how to appropriately share and manage the maritime resources, which are really a treasure that belong to the people.

Specifically, we think that the negotiations among the claimants should not only be friendly and diplomatic but should be undertaken on the basis of international law. And we have called on the claimants to clarify their claims in ways that are consistent with the Law of the Sea, specifically to base them on recognized land features. We, at the same time, think that a broader diplomatic process that gets at not the question of who owns what and whose border begins and ends where, but the issue of how nations behave in the South China Sea, in the common area, and particularly in areas of dispute is critically important and is urgent. And we have given ASEAN our full backing in their efforts to go beyond the declaration of conduct that they had agreed to in 2002, which is somewhat theoretical, to a practical code of conduct.

Now, China and ASEAN have held informal discussions. I understand that there are plans for meetings later in the summer at the ministerial level. Secretary Kerry will travel to Brunei at the end of this month to attend the ASEAN regional forum. And these are places where there is both an opportunity for China to make progress with ASEAN, but also in the case of the ASEAN regional forum and then in October the East Asia summit where President Obama will attend, an opportunity for senior U.S. officials to speak out clearly and constructively to urge not only adherence to the principles that I have mentioned but also to try to galvanize the

kind of diplomatic process that will address both the need for responsible conduct and the desirability of actual negotiations.

Senator CARDIN. And I think the United States has been very clear about our commitments on the maritime issues. I do not think we could leave any doubt because it is a matter of major security concerns to our partners in Asia.

When President Park was here, she mentioned developing a security dialogue organization for Northeast Asia. When I was in the Republic of Korea and also, by the way, in Japan and China, I talked about a regional security dialogue. And it was favorably thought about by all the parties.

One of the things that I think surprises most Americans is that we usually think of the Republic of Korea and Japan as being our two strongest allies in that region, and the relationship between those two countries could certainly use some improvement. They certainly have areas that still remain unresolved. A regional dialogue organization may help resolve some of these issues. And of course, dealing with China, dealing with North Korea—and they would also want to see the participation of Russia and the United States. I think there is a lot of promise to that type of organization to be patterned sort of after the Helsinki process.

Do you have a view as to whether a separate organization in Northeast Asia could be helpful?

Mr. RUSSEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I am very familiar both with the Helsinki Commission and also with your role as the cochair here. I served for 6 years in Europe, and I saw firsthand the progress that the Helsinki Commission was able to galvanize and to drive on the European side. And I think that you are asking a question that is worth seriously looking into. And if confirmed, it is something that I would like to continue to discuss and to probe.

I also noticed and I saw, in fact, Mr. Chairman, in your remarks on the Senate floor earlier this month, your reference to this, that there are real analogies between the Helsinki process and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative that President Park Geun Hye has put forward. I think it is worth looking and thinking at quite carefully. There are parallels.

There are likely to be some differences in Asia, and one outstanding question would be whether there is a role for the Helsinki Commission itself to help and to cooperate in the region or whether there should be a regional institution developed along those lines.

An associated question would be the balance between engaging on some of the softer issues that help build confidence, that help build trust. As I have heard President Park speak about her initiative, she has tended to favor that approach, starting more softly, so to speak. I know that the key six parties in Northeast Asia have come together repeatedly both in the six-party talks itself and in other subformats over the years in an effort to deal directly with security.

I think at its heart, the security challenge that faces all of us in the East Asia and Pacific region is manifested most vividly in the threat from North Korea.

Senator CARDIN. Of course, we have the six-party talks dealing with North Korea, and there have been some encouraging signs

just very recently that there may be a desire for North Korea to engage in discussions under the framework of complying with their agreements on a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

The interesting part about a Helsinki-type process as it relates to North Korea is that we are all focused on their nuclear ambition and their military prowess. But as we heard over and over again from President Park and other South Koreans, that in order to have a stable Korean Peninsula, it is not just getting rid of the nukes. It is also dealing with the human rights conditions of the people that are living up in the North and economic opportunities for the people who are living in the North. So it is really a more comprehensive approach. And what the South Koreans seem to want is for North Korea to comply with their commitments for a nuclear-free peninsula but then to engage on ways in which there could be cooperation for the economic development and the basic respect for the rights by the government of the people of North Korea.

Mr. RUSSEL. I agree, Mr. Chairman. And in fact, at the risk of quoting you back to yourself, I remember watching your speech at CSIS earlier this spring, and you used a formula that really made an impression on me. You said governments need to understand that they will never achieve economic security or political security without respect for good governance and human rights. I think that is a critically important principle that applies, I am sure, globally but certainly in the East Asia region and nowhere more so than to North Korea.

President Obama has said very clearly that North Korea can never achieve the security, the respect, or the economic prosperity that it says it wants through its pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that the two issues you have identified, North Korea's egregious pattern of human rights abuses and its failure to feed its own people and its headlong pursuit of nuclear and nuclear missile capability that is highly destabilizing and threatening to the region—these are in a way two sides of the same coin. North Korea is choosing not to feed its people. North Korea is prioritizing, frankly useless—pursuit of a useless military capability against an imaginary threat at the expense of the kind of growth and economic development that it claims to want and that its people deserve.

I am deeply concerned about the plight of the North Korean people, as well as those who have managed to escape from tyranny, and I am particularly concerned about North Korea's continuing efforts to proliferate and to further develop nuclear and missile capabilities that we find so threatening. I have dealt directly with the North Koreans and the North Korean issue for more than 20 years in my position in the National Security Council. I have traveled to North Korea. I know these guys. If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will make the effort to accelerate the achievement of denuclearization, not just the theory, to actually help bring about a halt, a rollback, and an elimination of North Korea's nuclear program a top priority, and I believe in that effort, we stand a much greater chance of being able to address the human rights problems in that country.



Senator CARDIN. And a country that could help us achieve change in North Korea is China. I was very impressed by my meetings with the Chinese as to how sincere I believe they are in trying to have a change in direction in North Korea as it relates to nuclear weapons, as well as opening up their economy as China has opened up its economy.

You cannot help but notice tremendous change in China. You see entrepreneurs on the streets. You see more freedom than has been enjoyed in past generations, and you see a country that is clearly moving in a more aggressive way economically.

Having said that, as I said in my opening statement, the one-party, Communist-ruled country violates the basic human rights of its citizens. It is not good to disagree with the government too loudly in China. They still have these reeducation labor camps where you could be detained for an extended period of time because you disagree with the government. I was absolutely so disappointed talking to religious leaders as to how the government stops just about any organized religion from being able to carry out its normal assemblies. And then most of the people in the country are locked into where they are born. They do not have a chance to really benefit from the economic advancements of the country. You have the "have and have-nots."

So I guess my question to you is we need to develop a stronger relationship with China. We need their help on many issues, including North Korea, including the environment, including the fact that they are a member of the permanent council of the United Nations Security Council.

So how do we handle China, recognizing its strategic importance to the United States, but also our concern for basic good governance and human rights?

Mr. RUSSEL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Clearly, China is a hugely important and hugely consequential country and relationship for the United States. Before I turn to China, let me say that I entirely agree that China has an important role to play in our efforts to deal with North Korea.

I believe also, Mr. Chairman, that Burma does as well. I think that the model, the example of Burma, an authoritarian leadership that made an affirmative decision to pursue a peaceful path to democracy and economic reform, stands as a tremendous role model for what North Korea should and can do. And I think that the strong support from the United States and from the rest of the international community in backing Burma's reform efforts answers the question that the North Koreans ask, which is how can we trust that if we make the right decision and take this path that you actually will support us.

With respect to China, Mr. Chairman—and again, thank you for expressing your views in advance of the meeting that President Obama and President Xi had at Sunnylands. I know that reached the President, and he appreciated it, as well as your other comments, including today.

The President has invested, since the day he took office, in attempting to build a balanced relationship with China. He has made clear that our interest is in seeing the peaceful rise of a China that is stable, that is prosperous, and that rises in a way that is con-

sistent with and reinforcing of the international and the regional rules and norms that are important to all of us.

So there is a lot of balance required in the Asia-Pacific more broadly but within the United States-China relationship specifically. There is a need for balance between the cooperative elements of our relationship and the competitive aspects of our relationship. And if confirmed, Mr. Chairman, one of my challenges will be to try to ensure that we are cooperating more, cooperating in a way that returns benefits to the American people and that in our competition, that we are sure that the competition is a healthy one.

We are looking for a model of practical cooperation with China that delivers benefits to both people and to the region in areas like climate change. And as you alluded to, President Xi and President Obama reached an important agreement on the hydrofluorocarbons, HFCs, and the Montreal Protocol, which will pay dividends down the road. And as you alluded to, North Korea is the other area where I think our positive cooperation is not only possible but essential, and both President Obama and President Xi committed to deepening both our dialogue and our cooperation in the effort to denuclearize North Korea.

Human rights is not a stand-alone issue, either in the region or in the United States-China relationship. It is something that we raise always at every level in virtually every meeting for several reasons, both of which you alluded to. First, these are universal values, not boutique American preferences. Second, although they are universal, they are deeply embedded in the DNA of Americans. This is who we are. These are our values. But third, as you pointed out, the economic prosperity, the creativity, the ability for China to continue to satisfy the demands of its citizens requires good governance. It requires a willingness to build and abide by rules and law. It requires a judiciary. It requires a thriving and a vigorous civil society, and it requires a respect for human rights.

We talk directly to the Chinese in various fora about the general principle. As I said in my statement, I genuinely believe that it is in China's interest to demonstrate their respect for human rights that is enshrined in its own constitution. We also raise individual cases. We raise problems such as the inability of the New York Times or Bloomberg to maintain Web sites that Chinese citizens can access. And we do this wanting a stable China. We do this respecting China's choices, but we do it in a conviction that not only are these universal principles, but that they are central to the prospects for a successful and enduring U.S.-China cooperative partnership.

Senator CARDIN. Well, you can add to the New York Times and Bloomberg that our U.S. consulate office was also blocked in China. So the cyber issues are real, and the access to the Internet, as well as cyber threats that we know we are moving forward on.

There was just reported today that in Singapore there is a haze over the entire area because of forest fires in Indonesia. And when I was in Beijing, I never saw the sun, and that was not because of clouds. There is a huge environmental challenge in Asia today.

The good news for dealing with it is that it is so visible; it is a problem that the government officials have to deal with because the public sees it every day. And it gives us a chance to really

make progress. As you pointed out, President Xi and President Obama did make significant progress during their meeting in California. There appears to be a real opportunity for countries that were not as engaged a couple years ago in international leadership, that they could very well provide the type of impetus necessary to move forward globally on climate change initiatives.

How do you see your role in regards to promoting that type of leadership?

Mr. RUSSEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I could not agree with you more that this is a principle concern and a priority not only for the United States, but for all the countries in the region. As you alluded to, the problem is forcing itself onto the top of the agenda of leaders who might prefer to turn a blind eye to them.

If I am confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I would like to pursue a number of the initiatives that are already underway that I think are extremely important in helping to address the challenge of climate and environmental degradation as partnerships, not just as rhetorical talking points.

One of them is an initiative that President Obama launched last year at the East Asia summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, the Comprehensive Energy Partnership, in tandem with President Yudhoyono of Indonesia and the Sultan of Brunei. This is an effort to promote renewable energy, green growth, low-emission energy sources, as well as to facilitate rural electrification that will be critical to the responsible growth of the Southeast Asian region.

Another is the Lower Mekong Initiative, which is a collective of the five major Mekong Southeast Asian nations with the United States and along with some other partners, where they are working to preserve forests, to preserve access to water and the riparian challenges given the many borders and the importance of water to the livelihood and to the ecological system there.

Another, Mr. Chairman, is the Extraction Industry Transparency Initiative. I am very proud that I have been able to help in a small way, including in cooperation with our USAID mission in Burma, with an effort to bring the Burmese up to the standards that would allow them to accede to this EITI because Burma, like its poor neighbors, Cambodia and Laos, along with Vietnam and Thailand, have phenomenal environmental resources to protect.

There is also, Mr. Chairman, in the South China Sea, as we discussed, a treasure trove of undersea and maritime wealth in the form of fish and coral, as well as hydrocarbons. Responsible management of those resources is a priority not only for the owners but for the people and for the region.

So on those issues, as well as on other environmental challenges like wildlife where there is a nexus between poaching of elephants in Africa, including by terrorist-related groups, and consumption of ivory in East Asia, if confirmed, this is an area where I think that the State Department, the Bureau, and I can make a difference. And I would like to work closely with the relevant posts with our ambassadors and our missions to promote coordination, communication, and partnerships to try to make some real and measurable progress on this issue.

Senator CARDIN. I want to mention one other area in regards to China that has recently come to light, and that is, China was downgraded in the State Department's Trafficking in Persons Report from a Tier 2 Watch List to the lowest rung, Tier 3, after 2 years on the Watch List. So this is moving in the wrong direction, and trafficking is one of our highest priorities.

Will you commit to making this a top priority, if confirmed, and work with the Chinese? This is an area where I think most countries really want to do the right thing. So it seems to me there is a way that we should be able to help China in dealing with this modern day type of slavery.

Mr. RUSSEL. Mr. Chairman, the short answer is yes. This is an issue that is important in its own right. It is important for moral reasons. It is important for development reasons regionwide but also in China.

I am aware of the fact that yesterday the trafficking in persons report was unveiled by Secretary Kerry and that I think as part of the automaticity in the Tier 2 Watch List system, that China was downgraded. My understanding is that there has been progress in certain areas by China with regard to the development of an action plan, that in the past year, there have been some favorable signs with regard to extradition or prosecution. But there is no question that the problem of trafficking in China and in some of China's neighbors is a very serious one, one in which the United States can be helpful and one in which, if confirmed, I would make best efforts to support.

Senator CARDIN. The administration's top priority economic initiative is the Trans-Pacific Partnership. That includes a variety of nations in our hemisphere and in the Asian region. It was mentioned a couple times in my visit to China they are not exactly sure what the TPP means as far as China is concerned. There is some concern that it is being used to try to contain China.

Could you just briefly review with the committee the priority placed on TPP and why?

Mr. RUSSEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes.

The President has directed many of my colleagues, including the recently confirmed U.S. Trade Representative, Mike Froman, to spare no effort to work toward the completion of negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership by the end of this year. The President believes that this is a high-quality, high-benefit trade arrangement that has immense economic as well as strategic value. And I know that our negotiators are hard at work on this. And if confirmed, I would like to contribute and participate in the effort to try to bring it to closure.

The TPP, as it is called, is not an exclusive arrangement. It is an inclusive arrangement. We foresee in the first instance that ultimately 11 members will accede, that if in fact Japan does join TPP, it will represent 40 percent of the world's GDP among its membership.

What I mean, Mr. Chairman, by saying it is not an exclusive economic and trade agreement is not only that the door is not closed eventually to additional countries joining it. Although our strategy is first things first. This is an ambitious undertaking and we want to do it and we want to do it right and in a timely manner. But

I mean not exclusive in the sense that it is perfectly consistent with the important work that we are doing elsewhere and through APEC or, for that matter, the other trade discussions that are occurring on bilateral or multilateral bases.

What we are looking for, though, Mr. Chairman, is a trade arrangement that will lower barriers to trade, that will increase access by American companies and exporters to foreign markets, that will support good labor practices and standards, that will have good environmental standards to it. We would like TPP to be the highest quality, most inclusive and transparent trade arrangement ever, and in doing so, we think we will engineer an outcome that will pay huge dividends to American companies, to American citizens, to promote jobs, and lend a real boost to the entire region.

Senator CARDIN. When we are talking trade, we always have a country's attention, and we have made tremendous progress with Vietnam. Yet, Vietnam still has significant improvements that need to be made on labor, on human rights, good governance, et cetera. We have the opportunity to make those advancements as we have their attention at the bargaining table. So I would hope that you in your new position would remind our negotiators that we will be expecting progress made on each of these fronts.

And it is not just the countries in transition. We also have problems with some of our close allies. Japan just recently joined the International Treaty on Child Abduction, but there are a lot of pending cases and their law, as I understand it, does not deal with already existing cases of child abduction. So will you help us and help the Embassy try to close and deal with as many of those open cases as we can to try to end this chapter in our relationship with Japan on child abductions?

Mr. RUSSEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, with respect to Vietnam, I could not agree with you more. I think that the political security and economic relationship that we have with Vietnam is an important one, and certainly we are in the midst of negotiations with Vietnam over the TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership, issues. But human rights is a hugely important dimension of our relationship and, frankly, a problem area. We are not satisfied and, in fact, unhappy about some degree of backsliding in Vietnam on human rights. And we believe that the TPP is one vehicle among many that we can use to help to address issues of labor, issues of the environment, promote economic and political reforms and respect for intellectual property. And if confirmed, that is something I will work on.

You alluded, Mr. Chairman, to the issue of Japan's belated accession to the Hague Convention on Parental Child Abduction. This is an issue that I have followed extremely closely, and I can attest that it is an issue that President Obama has raised directly with his Japanese counterpart. If confirmed, at the State Department this is an issue that I too will work on. The story has not ended for the parents of children who were taken back to Japan who will not be covered under the provisions of the treaty that Japan has just acceded to.

I am a parent, as you see. I am deeply, deeply sympathetic to the plight of these families. I know that the State Department has an important role in looking after the welfare of America's most vul-

nerable citizens, its children. And I know that the State Department is committed to working to ensure their welfare and to try to facilitate access by parents to children who are overseas, including in Japan. And it is a long way of saying, Mr. Chairman, yes, I will do what I can, should I be confirmed, in a new position to be supportive of them in this effort.

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you for that response. These are difficult issues, and we appreciate you making them a priority.

I just want to observe that in my visits to Japan, the Republic of Korea, and China, I raised the Iranian sanction compliance in all those countries. The countries under your portfolio play a critical role in enforcing sanctions against Iran to prevent them from becoming a nuclear weapons state. And I know that President Obama has made that a top priority. And I just wanted you to know that we should use every opportunity we can, particularly with countries that we have very close relationships with, for example, the Republic of Korea. If they do not want to see a nuclear power on their peninsula, they could use less Iranian oil. They are doing a good job, but they could do a better job. So I think that needs to be something that we focus on; reducing the amount of oil purchased in Asia.

I know you agree on that, but I just thought I would put it into the record.

Mr. RUSSEL. Thank you, Senator.

Senator CARDIN. One last question. We have talked a lot about the rebalance. If you had to just quickly summarize what you would hope you would see during the next 3 years as far as what the rebalance would mean as far as U.S. relationships and participation in Asia, what would you like to see accomplished in the next 3 years?

Mr. RUSSEL. Thank you for the opportunity to address that question, Mr. Chairman, which is really close to my heart. I certainly am committed to sustaining the rebalance and to moving it to the next level, so to speak.

I would say that the three areas that I would propose to focus on with regard to rebalance, if confirmed, would be, first and foremost, the diversification of rebalance. The security element and the security underpinning of our Asia-Pacific strategy in our rebalance is hugely important. It will not go away. It must not go away. We must strengthen that. But there is more to America than hard power, and in fact, it is the economic agenda, the energy agenda, the education agenda, the values agenda, the people-to-people connection, the public diplomacy that I think, in the long run, will have the most significant and enduring impact in this young, thriving, and dynamic region.

I think also, Mr. Chairman, second, that I would pursue what I would call a rebalance within the rebalance. I think that our relationships in Northeast Asia are very mature and well developed. Of course, they will take a great deal of our attention, but I think that the Southeast Asia and Pacific areas are ripe for intensification of American engagement and involvement. I think the return on investment for the United States and the U.S. taxpayer in our programs, both operationally and in terms of foreign assistance, in Southeast Asia is absolutely huge. It is a region with a GDP in the

order of \$2.2-plus billion, 600 million—trillion dollars—600 million people within a few years, at least half of whom will meet the World Bank definition of middle class, a large proportion and growing proportion of which are young, under 30. This is an area where the United States can make great friends and great strides, including through educational and other forms of exchange. Already the educational exchange programs that we have bring huge benefits. I am told that the students who come to the United States from the Asia-Pacific region, including to your State and my residence State of Maryland, bring a value in the order of \$9 billion a year to the U.S. economy.

The third area, speaking of money, Mr. Chairman, is on resources sustainability and outreach. Typically the East Asia-Pacific Bureau within the State Department has been the least best funded of the regional bureaus. Now, by dint of hard effort by a number of people under the direction of the President, and in an era of fiscal austerity, we have seen in the fiscal year 2014 budget a 7-percent increase. I think that is important, and I pledge, Mr. Chairman, that I will fight for the right tools and the resources to allow the wonderful men and women working in the area and in the East Asian and Pacific Bureau to do their job and to earn the benefits for the American people that are there for us.

Senator CARDIN. I really do appreciate that answer. I agree with you. I think people-to-people ties are a critical part of our success in Asia, as well as business-to-business and military-to-military ties. I think a better understanding among our partners will be critically important, particularly as we develop stronger ties.

Your answers were complete. I thank you very much. And as I said in the beginning, you have been incredibly generous of your talent in serving our country, and we very much appreciate that and your willingness to continue to serve. The post that you have been nominated to is one of the most important posts in this country and will, I am sure, keep you very much engaged in some long hours and some restless nights. And we thank you for your willingness to continue to serve your country.

With that, the hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:29 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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#### ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

##### RESPONSES OF DANIEL R. RUSSEL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENDENDEZ

*Question.* What is your understanding of the “new model” or “new type” of U.S.-China relations that President Obama and President Xi discussed at their recent summit at Sunnylands? What are the constituent elements of this “new model” relationship? Can it lead to more productive interaction, or is it largely an attempt by China to gain concessions or deferential treatment from the United States?

*Answer.* Developing deeper ties between the United States and China is in the national interest of the United States and is important to safeguarding U.S. interests in the region and around the world. Earlier this month in California, President Obama and President Xi agreed to continue exploring ways to strengthen our overall political, economic, cultural, and military ties to develop a “new type” relations that are marked by practical cooperation, not strategic rivalry.

There are few diplomatic, economic, or security challenges that can be addressed without China at the table and without a broad, productive, and constructive relationship between our countries. If confirmed, I will use the diplomatic tools at my

disposal to advance the U.S.-China relationship and our cooperation on issues of importance to the American people at the same time as I work to strengthen our alliances and relations with countries throughout the region.

*Question.* Recently, the United States and China worked together to make a public pledge about the phase-out of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). What work is being done to work with China to phase out other short-lived climate pollutants such as soot and methane? What more could be done to foster cooperation with China to reduce these short-lived climate pollutants?

*Answer.* On June 8, the United States and China announced an agreement to work together to use the expertise and institutions of the Montreal Protocol to phase down the consumption and production of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). The administration is encouraged by China's efforts to address environmental issues and looks forward to working together with China's new leadership in bilateral and multilateral fora, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), the Ten-Year Framework for Energy and Environment Cooperation, and the Major Economies Forum. The upcoming S&ED in July provides opportunities for bilateral discussions on environmental issues, including climate pollutants.

*Question.* The United States, China, Japan, and many other countries in the region are deeply committed to developing and further commercializing renewable energy technologies. How can we work cooperatively with these nations to provide greater access to renewable energy in the developing world?

*Answer.* At last year's East Asia summit meeting, President Obama announced the formation of the U.S.-Asia-Pacific Comprehensive Energy Partnership (U.S.-ACEP) to address energy issues across the entire Asia-Pacific region. The Partnership is designed to bring cleaner and more reliable sources of energy, as well as greater access, to the people of the Asia-Pacific region. The Department of State, Department of Energy, and other U.S. agencies are leading training and capacity-building efforts to address technical and policy constraints in order to promote U.S. energy investments and exports in the region. The United States has identified up to \$6 billion in U.S. export financing and investment credits for the Partnership, led by the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, to support sustainable power and energy infrastructure projects over 4 years.

The Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency are supporting capacity-building programs through APEC and ASEAN as well as with our bilateral partners in the priority areas of markets and interconnectivity, natural gas, renewable and clean energy, and sustainable development. Successful implementation of these projects will improve the region's ability to be able to provide energy for its citizens and drive U.S. exports.

In 2012, the United States began work to establish a new energy security pillar within the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI). The United States and its LMI partners are negotiating the final language of the pillar plan of action, which will be finalized at the LMI ministerial meeting July 1, and proposes work in regional power market development, power interconnection, energy efficiency and conservation, transparency and good governance, and energy research and development. Once the plan of action is approved, the United States will begin real, tangible projects that will create opportunities for U.S. businesses.

Bilaterally, the United States and China have worked together under the bilateral Ten-Year Framework (TYF) since its launch in 2008 to facilitate the exchange of information and best practices to foster innovation and develop solutions to the pressing environment and energy challenges both countries face. Agencies in each country implement the TYF, which consists of seven action plans, including electricity and energy efficiency. Specific to clean energy, the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC) facilitates joint research and development on clean energy technology by teams of scientists and engineers from the United States and China. It is a flagship initiative with broad participation from universities, research institutions, and industry.

The United States cooperates closely with Japan on a range of energy issues, including the development of clean and renewable energy sources, energy security, and the peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy. In 2011, U.S. agencies, including the Department of Energy, Department of State, Department of Commerce, and our national laboratories, established the U.S.-Japan Clean Energy Policy Dialogue, a forum for regular exchange among U.S. and Japanese experts. Through the Tohoku Green Communities Alliance, the United States and Japan have also collaborated to develop and deploy clean energy technologies in areas affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake.

If confirmed, I will continue the State Department's work on these endeavors.



*Question.* The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances of 1982 have contributed to the peace and stability of Asia-Pacific region for the past three decades. With the military balance gradually shifting in China's favor, what are your plans to implement the security commitment the United States has for Taiwan under this framework? As Taiwan is likely to retire some of its older fighter aircraft in the next 5 to 10 years, do you believe that sales of advanced aircraft are an important, next step in this commitment?

*Answer.* Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and the United States one-China policy, the United States makes available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense. If confirmed, I will continue to support steps the administration has taken to fulfill its commitments to Taiwan.

With U.S. assistance, Taiwan is currently undergoing an extensive modernization of its F-16 A/B fleet, and we are aware of Taiwan's desire to replace older F-5, and perhaps Mirage 2000-5 fighters, with additional F-16 aircraft. No decision has been made about possible future sales of military aircraft to Taiwan.

If confirmed, I will continue to support U.S. policy to meet our commitments to Taiwan and assist Taiwan's maintenance of a sufficient self-defense capability. Doing so increases stability both across the Taiwan Strait and within the region.

*Question.* As you know, no Cabinet-level official has visited Taiwan in 13 years. During the 1990s, officials of Cabinet-rank visited Taipei virtually every 2 years of that decade. Given the fact that Taiwan is a partner of 23 million people, who contribute greatly to the global economy, and enjoy a healthy democracy, aren't visits from U.S. Cabinet officials overdue? Can we expect such visits to resume in the near future?

*Answer.* As an important economic and security partner of the United States, Taiwan has hosted many senior Obama administration officials in recent years. Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman visited Taiwan in December 2011 to promote greater cooperation on energy issues. Under Secretary of Commerce Francisco Sanchez visited Taiwan in November 2012 to celebrate Taiwan's designation into the U.S. Visa Waiver Program. Most recently, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Demetrios Marantis traveled to Taiwan in March of this year to participate in Trade and Investment Framework Agreement meetings. In addition, in September 2012, on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders' Meeting, Secretary Clinton met with Taiwan's APEC representative Lien Chan. If confirmed, I will continue to promote such senior-level engagement by U.S. government officials and will encourage the travel of senior administration officials to Taiwan.

*Question.* The administration is on the record as having stated that "the United States is a strong, consistent supporter of Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations." Additionally, the administration is on the record as having stated that "Taiwan should be able to participate in organizations where it cannot be a member, such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and other important international bodies whose activities have a direct impact on the people of Taiwan." As you know, my bill, S. 579, recently passed by the Senate, would direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the triennial ICAO Assembly, the next meeting of which will take place this fall in Montreal.

- What specific steps has the administration taken—or is undertaking—to make Taiwan's participation a reality in time for this fall's meetings?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will continue U.S. policy to support Taiwan membership in international organizations where statehood is not a requirement and encourage Taiwan's meaningful participation, as appropriate, in organizations where its membership is not possible.

U.S. goals for supporting Taiwan's participation include: enabling the people on Taiwan to comply with international regulations and safety guidelines, addressing transborder health issues, facilitating international travel, giving and receiving appropriate international assistance and advice, and assisting in regional capacity-building.

I support Taiwan's goal to cooperate with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). If confirmed, I will continue the State Department's work with the international community to promote Taiwan's meaningful participation in ICAO.

If confirmed, I will also ensure the State Department continues to instruct U.S. missions to encourage the U.N., its agencies, and other international organizations to increase Taiwan participation in technical or expert meetings.

*Question.* While the breadth of the relationship between the United States and China is impressive, I remain concerned regarding the Chinese Government's apparent lack of respect for universal human rights. Several recent cases, including that of Liu Xia, Gao Zhisheng, the treatment of the family of Chen Guangcheng, and the treatment of Falun Gong adherents, speak to both specific cases but also larger structural challenges.

- What is your thinking about how the United States can effectively increase attention and make clear to China's leaders that human rights cannot be pushed aside by security and economic concerns, but must be addressed through genuine change and support for the rule of law?

*Answer.* I believe the promotion of human rights is a crucial element of American diplomacy. If confirmed, I will work to promote universal values, such as transparency, rule of law, human rights, and good governance. Promoting the protection of human rights in countries around the world, including in China, is central to who we are as a nation. If confirmed, I will ensure that human rights will remain a central part of U.S.-China relations.

The U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue is an important channel to discuss our key human rights concerns. If confirmed, I would strongly support the Dialogue and raise our human rights concerns directly with Chinese counterparts. I strongly believe respect for the rule of law and protection of universal human rights are critical to China's long-term prosperity and stability. If confirmed, I would raise cases of concern directly with the Chinese authorities, including the cases of Liu Xia, Gao Zhisheng, and the family of Chen Guangcheng, as well as issues of religious freedom and the treatment of Tibetans and Uighurs.

*Question.* What are your plans, if confirmed, for further developing dialogue between the United States and China on cyber security issues, and to address China's theft of U.S. intellectual property through cyber espionage, specifically?

*Answer.* Cyber security is one of the administration's top priorities. Cyber-enabled theft, emanating from China, of intellectual property, trade secrets and confidential business information is of paramount concern and has been discussed with China at senior levels, including by the President. If confirmed, I plan to ensure that the State Department continues to engage the Chinese on the cyber-enabled theft of U.S. intellectual property, including in fora such as the U.S.-China Cyber Working Group, which Secretary Kerry announced in April.

If confirmed, I will ensure that the State Department takes an active role in the development of the working group as a venue in which the U.S. Government can address U.S. concerns and have a constructive dialogue with China on cyber issues. The United States and China are among the world's largest cyber actors, and it is vital that our countries continue a sustained, meaningful dialogue and work together to develop an understanding of acceptable behavior in cyber space.

*Question.* The Asia-Pacific region has made considerable progress in recent years in developing functional problem solving architecture, including the EAS as well as through a deepening and thickening of ASEAN, ARF, and the ADMM, among other institutions.

- If confirmed as Assistant Secretary, what is your vision for how the United States can work to effectively further continued development of Asian architecture and institutions?
- What are your views on if and how the United States can support ASEAN centrality and unity through these efforts?

*Answer.* The United States firmly believes that regional institutions such as ASEAN, the East Asia summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) have a leading role to play in shaping the future prosperity and stability of the Asia-Pacific. As the only ASEAN-driven institution that includes all key regional players and meets at the Leaders level, the administration supports the EAS as the region's premier forum for addressing political and strategic issues. As President Obama made clear at last year's EAS, these institutions are most effective when they produce concrete results for the people of the region. The United States is already helping the region manage three pressing challenges for the region: maritime security, disaster relief, and the linked challenges of protecting the environment and energy security. The United States is working with our regional partners to develop the Rapid Disaster Response Agreement concept, which would expedite the delivery of supplies, services, and personnel in the event of a natural disaster. The United States is also investing over \$60 million annually to support programs across the Asia-Pacific that combat climate change, as well as promoting a sustainable energy future through the U.S. Asia-Pacific Comprehensive Energy Partnership

(USACEP). We are supporting ASEAN's economic integration and trade liberalization efforts through the U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) initiative. We are also sponsoring joint capacity-building between ASEAN and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum on topics such as food security and business ethics.

If confirmed, I will continue to expand U.S. efforts in support of regional institutions that manage these and other pressing challenges.

*Question.* What are your priorities for regional partner capacity-building, including in areas such as maritime domain awareness as well as new and nontraditional security issues such as global climate change?

*Answer.* The Department of State is actively engaged in capacity-building and the sharing and dissemination of information to meet traditional security challenges, such as terrorism and transnational crime, and nontraditional security issues, such as food insecurity, pandemic disease, and global climate change. The administration seeks an Asia-Pacific region in which countries are equipped with military and law enforcement capabilities that are aligned with U.S. interests and that enable them to adequately defend themselves from external threats, address territorial disputes peacefully, and deter provocation from a diverse array of state and nonstate actors. Our strategy emphasizes that countries adopt internationally recognized, U.S.-aligned best practices, standards and norms, particularly in the areas of maritime security, counterterrorism and law enforcement. If confirmed, I will support State Department's continued engagement on this strategy.

Maritime security capacity-building measures that support these goals include working with maritime police from Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Malaysia in the Gulf of Thailand to establish mutual objectives, common coordination mechanisms, operating procedures, and maritime domain awareness. The United States also support robust land-based and maritime police training programs in Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as an International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok which fosters transnational cooperation and multilateral training on countering wildlife trafficking and corruption.

Counterterrorism capacity-building is another example where the United States works with Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, and Indonesia to strengthen their abilities to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist actions. The United States also works across the region to improve law enforcement's capabilities to investigate and prosecute complex transnational threats such as organized crime, terrorism, wildlife trafficking, trafficking in persons and illicit drugs.

The countries of the Asia-Pacific region also contend with a range of nontraditional security issues, such food security and health, which threaten regional stability and security. To respond to these emerging threats, the administration supports efforts to deepen partnerships and private sector engagement in regional agriculture to encourage and increase investments in regional agricultural development. We also support programs to develop strong democratic institutions that provide the framework for improved health outcomes, greater food security, and stronger livelihoods overall. We are tackling global climate change through reinforced disaster risk reduction efforts to mitigate its impact through integrated natural resource management, including biodiversity conservation, which provides climate cobenefits.

Addressing climate change at home and abroad is a priority for President Obama and for Secretary Kerry. The innovative programs the United States is making substantial progress in forging low-emission development pathways and strengthening resilience to climate change impacts, including through reinforced disaster risk reduction efforts and integrated natural resource management, including biodiversity conservation.

A key administration priority is achieving and maintaining a geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable military force posture to meet challenges such as territorial and maritime disputes, threats to freedom of navigation, and the heightened impact of natural disasters. We are pursuing this priority by deepening our ability to train and operate together with militaries in the region and improving our ability to respond collectively to a wide range of contingencies in the region.

If confirmed, I will continue U.S. efforts to support capacity-building measures that enhance both traditional and nontraditional security priorities as discussed above.

*Question.* As you know, over the last 4 years, the administration and members of the U.S. Congress have made the issue of international child abductions to Japan a priority. Yet to date, there has not been even one single criminally kidnapped child returned to their lawful home here in the United States, with the assistance of the Japanese Government.

- Should you be confirmed, what specific action can you take to create a more balanced level of reciprocity on this issue? Would you be willing to press forward on criminal extraditions? Can you promise an action plan for remedying these cases, if confirmed in this job?

Answer. I am grateful to the U.S. Congress for its consistent engagement on this issue. The administration welcomed the recent Japanese Diet ratification of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, as well as the subsequent action to ratify and implement the Convention. Once fully implemented, this will give parents a civil legal mechanism for resolving abduction cases. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the treaty serves as the legal framework within which we can address these issues.

Specifically, I will encourage the Japanese Government to use the Hague Convention to make necessary changes to domestic custody laws to help parents with existing cases to attain better access to their children.

The administration is committed to resolving all outstanding cases. The Department of State regularly updates "left behind parents" through a Japan-specific e-mail distribution list, global open houses, and in-person meetings, informing parents of media reports and public statements by government officials on abduction issues.

The Japanese Government has established a legal hotline to provide information about the Japanese legal system for "left-behind parents," and it has set up a mediation program to assist efforts to arrive at an agreement between the estranged parents regarding access to their children. If confirmed, I will take steps to expand on these efforts.

One of the State Department's highest priorities is the welfare of U.S. citizens overseas, particularly children, who are our most vulnerable citizens. If confirmed, I will fully support efforts to resolve these difficult cases.

*Question.* Maritime and territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas continue to cause friction and uncertainty in the Pacific. How, and if, these disputes are managed will serve as an important litmus test for the emergence of a peaceful, cooperative, and rules-based order in Asia. Given the enduring U.S. interest and commitment to the maritime domains of the Asia-Pacific, what are your views on the most effective policy tools available to the United States to assure the development of guidelines for the peaceful settlement of disputes through diplomatic and collaborative mechanisms, including the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct; to make clear our view that any disputed claims must be fairly arbitrated under international law, without coercion—and that the United States will stand by our treaty commitments?

Answer. The United States has a national interest in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, lawful unimpeded commerce and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and East China Sea. If confirmed, I will support these principles.

I believe that the nations of the region should work collaboratively and diplomatically to resolve the various disputes without coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force.

With respect to the South China Sea, the United States does not take a position on competing sovereignty claims over land features. However, the administration will continue to voice strong support for both ASEAN and China to make meaningful progress toward finalizing a comprehensive Code of Conduct to establish rules of the road and clear procedures for addressing disagreements.

The administration has clearly expressed support for the use of diplomatic and other peaceful means to manage and resolve disagreements in the South China Sea, including the use of arbitration or other legal mechanisms, and that, in a rules-based system, states should be able to seek peaceful means of dispute resolution without fear of coercion or retaliation.

Through the ASEAN Regional Forum and other related forums, the United States will continue to advance norms of safe maritime behavior as well. Ensuring operational safety at sea for all vessels and the free, safe flow of commerce is vital for the entire international community.

Our alliance commitments are the cornerstone of our strategic rebalance. If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue our efforts to work with allies and partners around the region to ensure peace and stability on the seas.

*Question.* Senior administration officials have indicated in recent weeks that the United States would be willing to engage in discussions with North Korea, but that the administration is not interested in discussions for the sake of discussions, and

that for these discussions to happen North Korea needs to take concrete steps to demonstrate they are serious in meeting their commitments to denuclearization.

- What concrete measures does North Korea have to undertake to demonstrate their seriousness and commitment to denuclearization and to make it “worth-while” for the United States to consider reengaging in the six-party or other diplomatic process? What is the level of coordination with the Republic of Korea and Japan as we consider how, when and if the United States engages with North Korea?

Answer. North Korea committed on numerous occasions, including in the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. The United States and the international community must continue to hold North Korea to those commitments and to its international obligations under all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions. To be authentic and credible, North Korea must demonstrate it is prepared to halt and ultimately abandon all of its nuclear weapons and programs. This means taking steps to come into compliance with its international obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions and its own commitments.

The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have regular consultations to exchange views on a wide range of issues related to North Korea. If confirmed I would remain committed to maintaining close bilateral and trilateral coordination with the ROK and Japan, and continue to coordinate closely with its other allies and partners to press North Korea to choose a path leading to peaceful denuclearization.

*Question.* Can you comment on why the United States has chosen not to participate in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)? What is your vision of how the Trans-Pacific Partnership and RCEP fit together in an open and inclusive regional economic and trade architecture?

Answer. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a key element of President Obama’s agenda for deepening U.S. economic engagement in the Asia Pacific. TPP is designed to address the concerns that our trade and investment stakeholders—businesses, workers, other groups—see as impeding regional trade and investment in the 21st century. TPP will make the regulatory systems of TPP countries more transparent and compatible, so companies can operate more seamlessly in TPP markets. The TPP will also include strong protections for workers, the environment, intellectual property, and innovation.

Research shows that an ambitious agreement like TPP will generate significantly higher benefits than a less ambitious agreement that excludes sensitive products and issues. The rapid expansion of TPP membership since the negotiation’s launch suggests the broad appeal of this high standard approach within the region. The TPP will be a living agreement and can serve as a platform for broader, high-standard regional integration and an eventual Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific.

We recognize there are a number of different initiatives for liberalizing trade in the region and advancing regional economic integration, including the recently launched Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) involving members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its six Free Trade Agreement (FTA) partners. We don’t view initiatives such as the TPP and RCEP as mutually exclusive. However, we believe the high-standard approach embodied by the TPP is the most effective way to open new markets and deepen regional economic integration.

*Question.* The Tibetan people continue to face challenges to their traditions, religion and culture through environmental destruction, the influx of domestic immigrants, and other causes. This seems likely to increase as Beijing develops infrastructure links to and within the Tibetan plateau.

- What can the administration do to advance protections for Tibetans in their homeland? Do you believe the Chinese Government has engaged in its discussions with representatives of the Dalai Lama in a good-faith manner?

Answer. I am concerned about the deteriorating human rights situation in Tibetan areas and, if confirmed, will raise U.S. concerns with Chinese officials. This includes our concerns over the increasingly severe government controls on Tibetan Buddhist religious practice, and the government policies that undermine the preservation of Tibetan language and that target Tibetan youth and intellectual and cultural leaders. If confirmed, I will ensure the State Department continues to encourage the Chinese Government to engage with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, without preconditions, as the best means to address Tibetan concerns and relieve tensions. I will also consistently raise concerns about Tibetan self-immolations and continue to urge the Chinese Government to address the underlying problems in

Tibetan areas and reexamine existing, counterproductive policies that exacerbate rather than resolve existing tensions. I will also continue to press the Chinese Government to allow journalists, diplomats and other observers unrestricted access to China's Tibetan areas.

*Question.* China has recently been named a Tier 3 nation under the State Department's International Trafficking in Persons Report. Will the administration place sanctions on China as provided for in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act?

*Answer.* I am concerned about human trafficking in China and, if confirmed, I will carefully review all our efforts to combat trafficking in persons in the region to ensure that we are taking all appropriate steps to address this issue. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), as amended, authorizes restrictions on assistance for countries ranked Tier 3 in the Trafficking in Persons Report, but the President may waive some or all restrictions if he determines that the affected assistance "would promote the purposes of [the TVPA] or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States."

*Question.* Cambodia will hold national elections on July 28, and the government there shows no sign of having this vote measure up to basic standards of legitimacy. Assuming nothing changes before then, will the administration adopt a "business as usual" approach to the Hun Sen regime that has run the country since 1985, or will there be significant changes in our engagement and efforts to achieve democracy in that country?

*Answer.* The United States has consistently and frankly raised our concerns about human rights and democracy at all levels in the Government of Cambodia. The United States has also emphasized that the lack of progress on these issues would be an impediment to deeper relations between our two countries. The upcoming Cambodian national elections will be a critical test of the government's commitment to strengthening the nation's democracy. The United States has urged the Cambodian Government to consider seriously the recommendations by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Cambodia. We are monitoring the situation closely and will reassess as appropriate our assistance and/or engagement with the Government of Cambodia in light of how the election is conducted. If confirmed, I will continue to promote improvements in human rights and a credible, free, and fair electoral process that allows for the full and unfettered participation of all political parties and their leaders and the Cambodian people.

*Question.* The United States has committed to engage Vietnam in an annual Political, Security, and Defense Dialogue, and in recent years both sides have steadily increased the breadth of bilateral defense cooperation. Concurrently, Vietnam has increased its crackdown of freedom of expression, convicting 46 bloggers and pro-democracy activists so far this year.

- Why is the administration warming relations with a country that has so reprehensible human rights record? Why is the administration not adopting a "whole of government approach" to furthering human rights concerns in Vietnam?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will ensure that advocating for respect for human rights continues to factor into our policy with Vietnam. The administration has conveyed to the Vietnamese leadership that the American people will not support a significant upgrading of our bilateral ties without demonstrable progress in human rights. Greater respect for human rights, including labor rights, will help ensure Vietnam's future economic, social, and political development, which is consistent with our forward-looking vision for the bilateral relationship.

The administration has made clear to Vietnam's defense and civilian leaders that for the United States to consider lifting the remaining restrictions on defense equipment exports, including on lethal weapons, there would need to be demonstrable, sustained improvement in the human rights situation.

In the April 2013 U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue, the U.S. delegation raised the full range of our concerns about Vietnam's deteriorating human rights record and pressed for the release of political prisoners, including bloggers imprisoned for expressing their views online. The United States has also raised human rights concerns with the Vietnamese Government within the context of our overall defense relationship during the Political, Security, and Defense Dialogue, as well as through our normal diplomatic engagement.

*Question.* Can you please describe efforts to advance the political transition in Burma? How are you ensuring that the economic and political benefits of liberalization are not disproportionately benefiting retired generals and their cronies? Do you

believe that Burma's 2015 Presidential election would be legitimate if Aung San Suu Kyi is not able to take part?

Answer. The United States recognizes the important ongoing reform efforts underway by President Thein Sein, his government, Parliament, and key stakeholders among civil society to build a modern, peaceful, and democratic country. Building on a long legacy of support for the democratic aspirations of the Burmese people, the United States is providing assistance to strengthen and accelerate the political, economic, and social transition; promote and strengthen respect for human rights; deliver the benefits of reform to the country's people; and support the development of a stable society that reflects the diversity of all its people. If confirmed, I will continue to support these efforts.

The United States support for the reform efforts by the Government of Burma and for the people of Burma in numerous ways:

- The U.S. Government is assisting in improving electoral administration to ensure free, fair, and credible elections in 2015 and is promoting voter education, strengthening Parliament, supporting political party development, and promoting legal reform.
- U.S. assistance aims to address the root causes of long-running conflicts and ethnic tensions as well as provide substantial humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected and vulnerable populations in border areas, the interior of the country, and in the region.
- The United States encourages U.S. businesses to bring responsible investment to Burma to extend the benefits of economic reform to all of the country's people. The United States is supporting civil society and promoting programs to combat corruption and hold businesses accountable for respecting human rights in their operations, including labor rights.
- The United States recently announced a partnership with the Government of Burma to strengthen transparency and good governance in Burma's extractive industries sector. This initiative will provide technical assistance in support of the implementation of international best practices in oil and gas management and oversight, financial accountability, and safety and environmental stewardship.
- The American Center in Rangoon, which has the highest attendance of any American Center in the world, trains political, civil society and labor activists in democratic systems, and civic engagement.

The United States has carefully calibrated the easing of our sanctions in an effort to ensure that the benefits of economic engagement with the United States do not flow to bad actors. For example, the 2012 easing of the ban on new investment was structured to ensure that new investment with the Burmese military or with military-owned companies remains off limits for U.S. persons. Similarly, because of our continuing concerns about the military's human rights record, financial services transactions with the military for the provision of security services also remain off limits for U.S. persons.

To ensure U.S. companies undertake due diligence, the United States is requiring U.S. persons with more than \$500,000 of new investment in Burma to report on a range of policies and procedures with respect to their investments in Burma, including human rights, labor rights, land rights, community consultations and stakeholder engagement, environmental stewardship, anticorruption, arrangements with security service providers, risk and impact assessment and mitigation, payments to the government, any investments with the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), and contact with the military or nonstate armed groups. The information collected will be used as a basis to conduct informed consultations with U.S. businesses to encourage and assist them to develop robust policies and procedures to address a range of impacts resulting from their investments and operations in Burma. The United States seeks to empower civil society to take an active role in monitoring investment in Burma and to work with companies to promote investments that will enhance broad-based development and reinforce political and economic reform.

The Department of the Treasury maintains a Specially Designated Nationals list, which includes individual and company designations of "bad actors," including those who engage in practices that violate human rights or who seek to slow or hinder reform progress. U.S. persons are prohibited from transacting business with these individuals and entities. This list, which is regularly reviewed and updated, is another tool to help marginalize those who obstruct Burma's reform efforts. Many of the estimated 100 individuals and entities on the SDN list are economically significant "cronies." If confirmed, I will support these efforts to ensure that the people

of Burma, not the “cronies,” benefit from economic engagement with the United States.

The United States is actively supporting Burma’s efforts to achieve free and fair elections. Article 59 of Burma’s constitution currently disqualifies opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming President since her sons and late husband are foreign nationals; many have commented that this provision of the constitution appears specifically designed to block Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming President. The former military junta drafted the constitution of 2008, which reserves 25 percent of the seats in Parliament for uniformed military. The State Department has publicly and privately noted its concerns about these provisions and believes that reform of the 2008 constitution is essential to establishing a true democracy.

The Burmese Parliament, of which Aung San Suu Kyi is a member, has convened a constitutional review committee. That review may consider amendments that could potentially strengthen reform and democracy. If confirmed, I will continue to offer United States support and advocacy to help Burma successfully complete its democratic transition.

*Question.* The political changes in Burma also appear to have exacerbated some longstanding religious and ethnic disputes. Can you comment on the role of different branches of the Burmese Government in religious violence, including in Rakhine State, and in ethnic conflict, particularly with the Kachin minority. Does the Burmese Government have the ability and will to quell these clashes? What can the United States do to facilitate this?

*Answer.* Under President Thein Sein, the Burmese Government has entered into preliminary cease-fire agreements with 10 of 11 major armed ethnic groups. The Burmese Government engaged in constructive talks May 28–30 in Myitkyina, Kachin State with the remaining group that has not yet signed a cease-fire, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). These talks resulted in a seven-point joint agreement, which includes commitments to hold a political dialogue, undertake efforts to cease hostilities, and assist internally displaced persons. In addition, on June 20, the Burmese Government signed an eight-point agreement with the Karenni National Progressive Party in Kayah State, committing to a nationwide cease-fire accord. I am encouraged by the progress from those recent talks and look forward to continued progress in building trust and delivering lasting peace. As a fundamental matter, I support dialogue as the best and only way to address the root causes of longstanding conflict and to ultimately achieve lasting peace, justice, reconciliation, and equitable development throughout the country, including Kachin State.

I remain deeply concerned about the safety and well-being of internally displaced persons and other civilians in need in Kachin State and other conflict-affected areas. I am encouraged that on June 14, the government allowed a U.N.-led convoy aimed at providing humanitarian relief to access displaced persons in Kachin-controlled areas. This was the first time in nearly a year that the U.N. has been allowed to deliver food and household supplies to areas beyond government control, though local NGOs have been able to provide some assistance to these populations. If confirmed, I will continue to urge that all sides ensure unhindered humanitarian access to enable those in need to receive adequate food, shelter, and other urgent assistance.

I understand that the Burmese Parliament is also closely monitoring the peace process, and I encourage the Parliament to support efforts to ensure a sustainable peace. The Speaker of Burma’s lower House of Parliament, Thura Shwe Mann, visited Kachin State in February and met with internally displaced persons. I welcome the constructive efforts of all branches of the Burmese Government to work toward peace and reconciliation.

I am highly concerned about anti-Muslim violence, including in Rakhine State. Comments and actions by local authorities, including the “NASAKA” border force, have at times raised tensions and been deeply troubling. The Burmese Government must hold all perpetrators of violence accountable regardless of race, religion, or citizenship status. Senior Department officials, including Ambassador Derek Mitchell, have consistently raised U.S. concerns with officials at all levels of the Burmese Government about sectarian violence and the urgent need to end impunity by ensuring equitable accountability for those responsible.

I believe that the Burmese Government’s commitment to work toward a peaceful and prosperous future for the entire country is sincere. I welcome President Thein Sein’s public appeals for tolerance, religious freedom, and diversity. I encourage him and other national and local officials to actively promote tolerance and peaceful co-existence among all of Burma’s people. If confirmed, I will continue to work with



our interagency partners, Congress, and the international community to help support Burma's peaceful transition to democracy.

*Question.* On December 15, 2012, Lao civic activist Sombath Somphone was abducted at a police checkpoint in Vientiane. Since that time Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Members of Parliament within the region, and also this Congress have urged for an immediate, transparent investigation into his disappearance and whereabouts. The Department has also been engaged with Lao authorities to push for a resolution to this case.

- Can you provide an update on the investigation and whether the Lao authorities are fully committed to finding Mr. Sombath. In addition, have we offered any investigative assistance to the Lao authorities?

*Answer.* I am deeply concerned over the abduction of Sombath Somphone and Lao authorities' failure to share any meaningful details from their investigation into his disappearance. The Lao Government's June 7 press statement on Mr. Sombath added nothing of substance about his case. To date, Lao authorities have not offered members of Mr. Sombath's family or representatives from the international community an opportunity to review the government's surveillance camera footage that reportedly shows his abduction. The Department of State has repeatedly offered technical assistance to aid in the investigation, but the Government of Laos has not accepted our offer.

The refusal on the part of the Government of Laos to share meaningful details of its investigation into Sombath's case calls into question the Lao Government's commitment to uphold human rights and the rule of law and to engage responsibly with the international community.

*Question.* How do you plan to further develop and implement the Department's approach to "economic statecraft" in the Asia-Pacific region, including: promoting and supporting U.S. businesses abroad to expand exports; attracting foreign direct investment to the United States; establishing a level playing field for U.S. firms everywhere through regional and global trade agreements and institutions; preserving global monetary and financial stability; economic assistance to developing countries, opening markets, improving governance, increasing consumption of high-quality U.S. products, services, and know-how?

*Answer.* Through its economic statecraft initiative, the Department has prioritized moving economics to the center of our overall foreign policy agenda. Nowhere has this focus been more evident than in the Asia-Pacific. The United States is working hard with our partners in the region to spur closer economic integration, to increase trade and investment, and to advance our major goal of greater shared prosperity. This approach reflects an understanding that the prosperity of the United States is inextricably linked to the prosperity and growth of the very dynamic Asia-Pacific. Our bilateral and multilateral economic and commercial relations have comprised a central pillar of our overall effort to rebalance our policies in the direction of Asia.

The United States has established its economic leadership in the region by accomplishing ambitious, trade-oriented goals, including: the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, launching and maintaining strong momentum behind the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), expanding economic engagement with ASEAN, and building on the success of our 2011 host year of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.

If confirmed, I will work to enhance the Department's already substantial contributions to key U.S. regional economic/commercial initiatives as well as to encourage the continued efforts of our missions in the region to assist U.S. companies in the field, and to promote inward investment into the United States.

If confirmed, I will work in concert with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department's Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs to bring the TPP trade negotiations to a successful conclusion this year. The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP) will also continue to advance economic statecraft objectives through support of regional economic initiatives, such as the President's Enhanced Economic Engagement (E3) initiative, which aims to expand trade and investment ties with ASEAN members and help those not in TPP to prepare for future membership in high-standard trade agreements. As part of the U.S.-Asia Pacific Comprehensive Energy Partnership (U.S.-ACEP), the EAP Bureau will continue to work with the Department's Bureau of Energy Resources and interagency colleagues, including the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), to encourage private sector involvement in energy development in the region. I will also ensure that we retain a leadership position in APEC for advancing trade and investment liberalization throughout the Asia-Pacific.

Equally important to these policy initiatives, if confirmed, I will work with our missions in the region to expand the already extensive assistance they give to U.S. companies on a daily basis in identifying new business opportunities and advocating on their behalf, whether to win bids for government contracts or press host governments to revise policies impede trade and investment. As part of these efforts I will work to ensure continued focus on deepening our economic engagement with China with the aim of promoting an economic relationship in which China demonstrates a commitment to the global rules-based trading system.

*Question.* What have been the main results to date of the rebalancing initiative? What parts of the initiative can be improved or modified? Are you comfortable that you and Secretary Kerry are on the same page in your conception of how the rebalancing strategy should be implemented going forward?

*Answer.* The administration's rebalance, which covers diplomatic, economic, development, security, and cultural initiatives, is rooted in the recognition that America's prosperity and security are very much intertwined with the Asia-Pacific region. As underscored by Secretary Kerry during his trip to the region in April, the State Department is working hard to implement this U.S. strategic objective by building an increasingly active and enduring presence in the region. I wholeheartedly support the Secretary and President's shared vision for the Asia-Pacific in which the United States engages deeply throughout the region and advances our values and national interests, security, and leadership. The State Department and the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP) have already taken tangible actions in support of that commitment. For example, the United States is providing new resources for regional efforts such as the Lower Mekong Initiative, which helps improve water management, disaster resilience, and public health. EAP is deeply involved with implementation of the U.S.-Asia Pacific Comprehensive Energy Partnership and the U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) initiative announced by President Obama last November in Cambodia. EAP leads U.S. participation in APEC, the premier forum for U.S. economic engagement with the Asia Pacific.

If confirmed, I will continue these programs and support the early conclusion of negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which will deepen U.S. trade and investment ties in the Asia Pacific.

*Question.* Have the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the National Security Staff put out a budget data request asking agencies for more detailed information about their activities in and associated budgetary resources devoted to Asia? Has the administration circulated a priorities memo as part of the FY 2015 budget process that directs agencies to assign greater importance to Asia? How important is an integrated whole-of-government approach to the region to achieving U.S. objectives?

*Answer.* The Department of State works very closely with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the National Security Staff (NSS), and other key interagency partners such as Department of Defense and USAID, in preparing an integrated budget that supports whole-of-government strategy for the rebalance in the Asia-Pacific. The administration routinely provides whole-of-government budget guidance to agencies that include a strong focus on the Asia-Pacific region given the administration's rebalance policy. I firmly believe we need to lock in and sustain resources from around the U.S. Government, both in the short- and long-term, in order to advance the administration's ambitious rebalance agenda.

If confirmed, I look forward to participating in important interagency deliberations on the FY 2015 budget and other planning efforts to ensure that our resources are aligned with the administration's policy priorities.

*Question.* More than 2 years after the administration launched its rebalancing initiative, staffing in and funding for the State Department's East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) Bureau continue to rank among the lowest among the Department's six regional bureaus. Since the premise of the rebalancing is that Asia has become more important to U.S. national interests, is the EAP Bureau being given sufficient priority to carry out its mission?

*Answer.* As underscored by Secretary Kerry during his trip to the region in April, the State Department remains committed to building an increasingly active and enduring presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite an overall decrease in the State Department and USAID's budget, the overall FY 2014 budget request provides \$1.2 billion in funding for East Asia and the Pacific, which reflects a 7.1-percent increase from FY 2012 in support of the East Asia rebalance—the largest growth rate of any region. The FY 2014 budget is but one aspect of building our longer term budgetary efforts to advance the rebalance, which also include advancing our public diplomacy agenda and political dialogue.

If confirmed, I will advocate for staffing and funding levels appropriate to the important missions of the EAP bureau.

*Question.* President Park has called for creating a “new era” on the Korean Peninsula by building trust between North and South Korea. Despite the North’s recent behavior, she has indicated she wants to go forward with modest, incremental initiatives, including providing some humanitarian aid.

- Does the Obama administration support such moves? Would it consider also providing humanitarian assistance, including food aid? What, if any conditions, would the administration insist upon to ensure humanitarian aid is not diverted to the military? Are there any additional efforts to strengthen the U.S.–ROK alliance that you think are important and necessary to undertake in parallel with any efforts at North-South reconciliation?

*Answer.* The Obama administration is committed to working closely with the Republic of Korea (ROK) on the North Korea issue. This includes close coordination to press Pyongyang to demonstrate seriousness of purpose by taking meaningful steps to abide by its international obligations and its commitment made in the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, to pursue the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This also involves coordination on ways to engage with North Korea diplomatically and, over time, build trust in its willingness to cooperate in the pursuit of denuclearization and inter-Korean reconciliation.

The longstanding policy of the United States is that humanitarian assistance, including food aid, should not be linked to political or security issues. Decisions on U.S. humanitarian assistance are based on three factors: (1) the level of need in a given country; (2) competing needs in other countries; and (3) the ability to ensure that aid reliably reaches the vulnerable populations for which it is intended. If confirmed, I will continue to implement the Obama administration’s policy, including the prevention of diversion of food or other assistance.

On the 60th anniversary of the U.S.–ROK alliance, our partnership has never been stronger. The United States and the ROK maintain a comprehensive strategic alliance with longstanding mechanisms for cooperation on security issues. The United States is working to enhance our combined capabilities to deter North Korea, including for extended deterrence, and, if confirmed, I will support this effort. The United States continues to hold regular and close consultations with the ROK on North Korea issues, as illustrated by ROK Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Cho Tae-yong’s June visit to the United States.

*Question.* China’s assertive behavior toward the Senkakus has grown increasingly heated since summer 2012. U.S. officials have consistently stated that while the United States takes no position on the question of sovereignty, it is the U.S. position that Japan administers the Senkakus and that they are covered by the U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty.

- In the face of rising tensions and increasing Chinese activity in the area, has the United States taken the proper stance in the situation? How might the United States help Japan to resolve this dispute?

*Answer.* The consistent U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands is that while we do not take a position on the question of ultimate sovereignty over the islands, we call on all parties to manage their differences through peaceful means.

Japanese administration of the islands places them within the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Our alliances are the cornerstones of our Asia policy, and we take our commitments under them very seriously.

The United States has a strong interest in ensuring the stability of a region that is an engine of global economic growth. To this end, the administration has engaged in sustained, intensive, and high-level diplomacy on this issue to encourage all parties to exercise restraint, avoid coercive or unilateral actions, and pursue dialogue to lower tensions and resolve differences.

We urge all parties to avoid actions that could raise tensions or result in miscalculations or incidents that would undermine peace, security, and economic growth. If confirmed, I will work to promote the reduction of tensions and risk, appropriate diplomatic dialogue among the concerned parties, and will firmly oppose coercive or destabilizing behavior.

*Question.* Japanese Prime Minister Abe has called for revising and/or reinterpreting Japan’s Constitution to allow Tokyo to participate in “collective self-defense,” moves that have been welcomed by U.S. defense officials in the past. Abe also has embarked on an ambitious economic agenda to revitalize the Japanese economy, including entering TPP negotiations.

- What position do you think the United States should take on Abe's proposals? What opportunities do you see for strengthening and deepening the U.S.-Japan alliance and economic partnership? How might Abe's initiatives, should he take them, hurt or help the rebalancing strategy?

Answer. The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of peace and security in the region. We work in a partnership around the world to advance common values and shared interests. The United States and Japan are currently working together to strengthen the already excellent quality and capabilities of the alliance to ensure that it remains prepared to respond to the evolving security environment of the 21st century. If confirmed, I will be deeply involved in and supportive of our efforts to strengthen and deepen our alliance with Japan.

The administration believes it is for the Japanese people and their elected representatives to decide whether, when, and in what manner to revise or reinterpret their constitution. We are following developments closely as Japan considers a potential relaxation of its self-imposed restrictions on collective self-defense in order to assess the potential impact on our alliance and its roles, missions, and capabilities.

On the economic front, Prime Minister Abe's policies appear to be helping to revitalize the Japanese economy, and a healthy Japanese economy is good for both Japan and the United States. The TransPacific Partnership (TPP) is a key piece of the Japanese Government's reform efforts, as well as the economic centerpiece of our rebalance toward Asia.

If confirmed, I will urge the Abe government to follow through on its economic reform proposals, and will work closely with the United States Trade Representative and other U.S. Government agencies to pursue productive trade negotiations with Japan both within TPP and in parallel bilateral talks.

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RESPONSES OF DANIEL R. RUSSEL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY  
SENATOR BOB CORKER

*Question.* Despite our continuing efforts to increase "mutual understanding," the United States and China have very different views on a wide range of economic, security and human-rights-related issues.

- How best can the United States pursue deeper engagement with China while simultaneously articulating, clearly and publicly, an overall foreign policy strategy that advances America's core interests and values?

Answer. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a key role in world affairs and adheres to international standards. The administration is committed to pursuing a positive, comprehensive, and cooperative relationship with China. The United States advances our national interests and values and encourages China to adhere to international standards on human rights, trade, and other issues by clearly articulating U.S. principles and by promoting high-level, consistent, and constructive dialogue between the United States and China.

Key elements of the U.S. approach to economic relations with China have been to encourage China's integration into the global, rules-based economic and trading systems and to expand U.S. exporters' and investors' access to the Chinese market. Human rights issues also continue to be a central element of U.S. foreign policy and the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. The administration is committed to raising human rights issues directly with Chinese counterparts and to urging China to respect the rule of law and protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all its citizens.

Additionally, working with China on cyber security is one of the administration's top priorities. The U.S. Government is actively addressing cyber issues, including the growing concern about the threat to economic and national security posed by cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property and business and trade secrets. As Secretary Kerry announced in April, the U.S. Government established a Cyber Working Group with the Chinese to facilitate sustained and meaningful diplomatic discussions regarding cyber.

*Question.* In April 2013, Secretary Kerry stated that the United States wants "a strong, normal, but special relationship with China." Traditionally, the United States has reserved the term "Special Relationship" to describe ties with the United Kingdom.

- Do you agree with the Secretary's call for a new "special relationship" with China?

Answer. Developing deeper ties between the United States and China is in the national interest of the United States and is important to safeguarding U.S. interests in the region and around the world. I believe the importance we place on U.S.-China ties is consistent with, and in no way detracts from, the continued importance and strengthening of our existing partnerships and alliances.

There are few diplomatic, economic, or security challenges that can be addressed without China at the table and without cooperation between our countries. Earlier this month in California, President Obama and President Xi agreed to continue exploring ways to strengthen our overall political, economic, cultural, and military ties. If confirmed, I will use the diplomatic tools at my disposal to advance the U.S.-China relationship and our cooperation on a range of issues at the same time as we work to strengthen our relations with countries throughout the region.

*Question.* How can the United States more effectively press China to enforce international rules regarding intellectual property, which continue to negatively impact and undermine key sectors of the U.S. economy?

Answer. Despite greater protections being incorporated into the Chinese legal system, American and other companies lose billions of dollars each year due to intellectual property (IP) theft in China. Piracy and counterfeiting levels in China remain unacceptably high, harming U.S. and Chinese consumers and enterprises. Stronger enforcement mechanisms and efforts are still needed.

I believe the United States must urge China to: (1) continue the work of the permanent State Council-level leadership structure to focus IP enforcement efforts at all levels of government on IP theft, including the growing problem of theft over the Internet; (2) recognize the importance of trade secrets protection to the health of China's overall IPR regime, which is essential to promoting innovation and economic growth; (3) achieve measurable results on software legalization, both in government and in enterprises; and (4) make intermediaries such as online content hosts liable for the infringement that their sites facilitate.

If confirmed, I will ensure that the protection of intellectual property rights through robust laws and enforcement remains a top priority in our engagement with China. Copyrights, trademarks, patents, and trade secrets must have adequate safeguards in China to protect the ideas of American entrepreneurs and the jobs of American workers.

*Question.* If confirmed, what role do you envision for the EAP Bureau in the recently established U.S.-China cyber working group?

Answer. Cyber security is one of the administration's top priorities, and cyber-enabled theft of trade secrets and confidential business information emanating from China is of particular concern and has been discussed with China at all levels of government, including by the President. The State Department, including the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP) and the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Affairs (S/CCI), plays a key role in these discussions, and, if confirmed, I envision this role continuing for EAP.

To have a meaningful, and constructive dialogue with China on this issue, Secretary Kerry announced the establishment of the U.S.-China Cyber Working Group in April. The State Department will lead the working group, and if confirmed I will ensure that the EAP Bureau, in close cooperation with S/CCI, will continue to play a central role in shaping the development of the working group.

*Question.* During the recent Obama-Xi summit in California, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon said that "President Xi indicat[ed] that China was interested in having information on the [Trans-Pacific Partnership] process as it went forward and being briefed on the process and maybe setting up a more formal mechanism for the Chinese to get information on the process and the progress that we're making with respect to the TPP negotiation."

- What is the administration's position on sharing such information with a country that is not a party to the TPP?
- Do our TPP allies support China's request?
- Do you view China's request to be informed on TPP's progress as a sign Beijing is interested in joining the regional free-trade agreement?
- What steps would China need to take in order to obtain approval to eventually join TPP discussions or a finalized agreement?

Answer. The United States is working hard with our TPP partners to conclude the TPP negotiation as expeditiously as possible. We and our partners believe our work in TPP will be important not just for current and future TPP members, but for the trade and investment environment throughout the Asia-Pacific. The adminis-

tration welcomes China's interest and that of others in the region in learning more about TPP.

The United States and its TPP negotiating partners have stated that TPP is open to Asia-Pacific economies that are prepared to adopt its ambitious commitments and eliminate trade and investment barriers. Economies that are interested in pursuing this path initiate a process of bilateral consultation with each of the TPP members to demonstrate their readiness, and the consensus of all current TPP members is necessary for new parties to join. That is the process that Mexico and Canada successfully completed in 2012, and is the process that Japan is currently engaged in.

In the past, we have offered briefings at a general level on the broad outlines and principles behind the agreement to interested countries in the region that are not presently a party to the TPP, and have done so in coordination with our current TPP partners. We would respond to expressions of interest by China with this type of general briefing, and I would refer you to USTR for details of what information we would be able to provide in such a briefing. It is difficult to assess at present the significance of China's request. Many non-TPP countries have sought information to understand the development of the regional trade and investment context, even if they have no specific interest at present in joining the negotiations. Clearly, China would need to take many steps to open its economy, promote transparent regulatory practices, and address a range of specific issues to be able to demonstrate its readiness for the TPP.

*Question.* Some in the U.S. business community believe that the 2012 Revised Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) does not sufficiently cover issues related to China's state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) and have called for the BIT with China to include appropriate disciplines to ensure that China's SOEs do not enjoy preferential advantages over their foreign competitors.

- With respect to talks with China on a BIT, does the administration support an ambitious agreement that includes appropriate disciplines on China's SOEs?
- Does the administration believe that the provisions of the 2012 revised model BIT sufficiently cover SOE issues that have been raised by U.S. businesses?

*Answer.* The United States seeks to reach agreement on a bilateral investment treaty that sets high standards, including on openness, nondiscrimination, and transparency for American investors and investments. We are taking an ambitious approach in our bilateral investment treaty negotiations with China, and one of our top priorities is to seek disciplines to help level the playing field between American companies and their Chinese competitors, including SOEs and national champions. The 2012 U.S. Model BIT provides a number of tools to address this issue, including the comprehensive approach that it takes to the national treatment nondiscrimination obligation and the application of all BIT obligations to SOEs exercising delegated government authority. Negotiations are at an early stage, and we will continue to address the U.S. business community's concerns as we move forward. We are also seeking to address other top-priority concerns in the China market, including protecting trade secrets from forced transfer and enhancing transparency and the rule of law.

*Question.* Given that SOEs are an important component of the TPP trade negotiations, how does the administration intend to coordinate negotiations on the SOE provisions in the TPP with the negotiations on the China BIT and the SOE issues that have been raised with respect to China?

*Answer.* Leveling the playing field for U.S. businesses and workers that compete with foreign state-owned enterprises is a priority for this administration. The United States is seeking to address this issue through coordinated efforts in a range of bilateral and multilateral forums, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations and our ongoing work in the OECD. A top priority in the bilateral investment treaty negotiations with China is to level the playing field for U.S. firms that face unfair competition from Chinese state-owned enterprises or national champions. We have also been using results-oriented, high-level dialogues like the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue to address trade distortions and discriminatory treatment resulting from China's heavy reliance on state-owned enterprises.

*Question.* The United States and Republic of Korea are presently engaged in negotiations on a new nuclear cooperation agreement or 123 Agreement. The U.S. negotiating team is led by the Department of State's International Security and Non-proliferation (ISN) Assistant Secretary, Thomas Countryman.

- If confirmed, will you commit to maintain the EAP Bureau's supporting role in 123 negotiations led by A/S Countryman and his team of nuclear experts?

*Answer.* Yes. If confirmed, I can reassure you that the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs will remain committed to supporting ISN Assistant Secretary Countryman and the interagency team of nuclear experts to conclude a successor civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the Republic of Korea.

*Question.* Please state your views on U.S. engagement with North Korea. Should the United States pursue bilateral talks with North Korea or should the six-party talks framework remain the forum for engagement between Washington and Pyongyang?

*Answer.* The United States remains committed to seeking a negotiated solution to the North Korea nuclear issue, which will require multilateral diplomacy. North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile program, proliferation activities, and provocative behavior are a threat to the entire international community. The United States maintains channels for bilateral contact with North Korea and coordinates closely with its allies and partners to press North Korea to choose the path of peaceful denuclearization.

North Korea committed on numerous occasions, including in the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. The United States and the international community must continue to hold North Korea to those commitments and its international obligations. The United States seeks authentic and credible negotiations to implement the September 2005 joint statement and bring North Korea into compliance with all applicable Security Council resolutions through irreversible steps leading to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The onus is on North Korea to take meaningful actions toward denuclearization and refrain from provocations.

*Question.* Please state your views on the provision of humanitarian assistance to North Korea, including food aid.

*Answer.* I am deeply concerned about the well-being of the North Korean people. The United States has a longstanding policy that decisions on humanitarian assistance, including food aid, are based on three factors: (1) the level of need in a given country; (2) competing needs in other countries; and (3) the ability to ensure that aid reliably reaches the vulnerable populations for which it is intended. If confirmed, I will continue to implement this longstanding U.S. policy on humanitarian assistance.

*Question.* How would you assess China's willingness to use its leverage to alter North Korea's behavior? Are there still limits to how much pressure Beijing will apply to Pyongyang?

*Answer.* China has stated that it shares the concerns of the international community regarding North Korea's destabilizing and provocative behavior and agrees that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is of critical importance. If confirmed, I will continue to concentrate U.S. diplomatic energy and efforts on deepening dialogue and cooperation on North Korea with China. I will also encourage China to more effectively leverage its unique relationship with North Korea to achieve our shared goal: the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

China has cooperated in a number of significant and constructive ways to address North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs and provocations. For example, China played a critical role in crafting U.N. Security Council Resolution 2094, which imposed new sanctions on North Korea. If confirmed, I will continue to press China to enforce all provisions of the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea, including tough new sanctions, and to address North Korea's threats to regional peace and security and the global nonproliferation regime.

*Question.* Last year, the United States and Japan announced that our governments will review the Guidelines of Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, which are intended to provide a framework for bilateral roles and missions in response to military contingencies. Please outline the objectives of the United States for this review, including our position on engaging Japan on collective self-defense.

*Answer.* The U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines are the framework upon which our bilateral defense cooperation rests. The present version of the Guidelines dates back to 1997, and in the intervening years Japan has expanded the Self Defense Forces role, including by dispatching them to Indian Ocean to support Operation Enduring Freedom, to Iraq, and to Djibouti in support of antipiracy efforts. Our security relationship has naturally evolved since 1997 and the United States and Japan have agreed that the time is right to review the Guidelines and discuss the future of the Alliance. At the conclusion of the review, if a mutual decision is made to revise the Defense Guidelines, we will engage in a deliberate process to reach a consensus out-

come that is firmly supported by fiscal resources on both sides. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department of Defense to use the Guidelines review to establish a joint vision for the shape of our Alliance over the next 15–20 years. How Japan addresses its self-imposed restriction on collective self-defense will be a subject of Japanese domestic debate and will help shape the future of the Alliance, and we will engage with Japan on this matter closely.

*Question.* Under current law, U.S. companies can export liquefied natural gas (LNG) if the Department of Energy deems it to be in the public interest. If the United States has a free-trade agreement with the importing country, the public interest determination is automatically satisfied. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz recently said he would review LNG export applications “on a case-by-case basis expeditiously,” but to date, only two export facilities have been approved by the Obama administration.

- Does the administration believe that expediting natural gas exports to formal allies and emerging partners will strengthen strategic ties and contribute to the administration’s rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific? If so, what steps is the administration planning to take to expedite pending applications for natural gas exports?

*Answer.* I recognize the importance of energy security for ourselves and our allies. The administration has had a number of discussions with allies and partners interested in importing U.S. LNG. The projects that have been approved, so far, include potential sales to Japan and India, as well as to companies that intend to market gas into global markets.

The Department of Energy has the statutory responsibility to review export license applications, and is therefore best placed to answer specifics about the application review process. I would note, however, that the public interest determination is not a simple question. The various applications for LNG exports total almost 40 percent of U.S. gas production, and the applicants are considering multibillion dollar investments and seeking approval for long-term (typically 20-year) sales commitments. It is important that we get this right, and that the process reflects careful consideration of all the factors.

If confirmed, I will work with the State Department’s Bureau of Energy Resources and the Department of Energy to ensure that this issue is given the attention it requires.

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RESPONSES OF DANIEL R. RUSSEL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY  
SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

*Question.* We welcome the administration’s rebalance to Asia. While the rebalance has a strategic basis, I have stressed that we need to make sure that the promotion of human rights is not forgotten. The situation in Tibet is both a strategic matter and a human rights problem.

- Could you speak to how the administration plans, first, to improve the human rights situation in Tibet, and second, to engage on the strategic aspects of the Tibetan issue, including India-China relations and tensions over the sharing of water flowing off the Tibetan plateau?

*Answer.* I am concerned about the deteriorating human rights situation in Tibetan areas and, if confirmed, I will raise U.S. concerns with my Chinese counterparts. We will continue to call on the Chinese Government to engage with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, without preconditions, as the best means to address Tibetan concerns and relieve tensions. We will consistently raise concerns about Tibetan self-immolations and continue to urge the Chinese Government to address the underlying problems in Tibetan areas and reexamine existing, counterproductive policies that exacerbate rather than resolve existing tensions. I will also continue to press the Chinese Government to allow journalists, diplomats, and other observers unrestricted access to China’s Tibetan areas. We will continue to work broadly across the Himalayan region to encourage countries to work together cooperatively to manage their shared water resources.

*Question.* For over 30 years, the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances have governed United States policy toward Taiwan, and have contributed to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

- As the United States undertakes plans to expand and intensify the already significant U.S. role in the region, how does it plan to continue to implement the security commitment the United States has for Taiwan under this framework?



Answer. Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and the United States one-China policy, the United States makes available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense. The administration approved nearly several billion in new defense sales to Taiwan, as notified to Congress in 2012. If confirmed, I will continue to support the sale of defense articles to Taiwan. Such sales help meet our commitments to Taiwan and at the same time help maintain stability both across the Taiwan Strait and within the region.

*Question.* Discrimination against minorities in Myanmar remains a serious problem. For example, discriminatory local orders in Rakhine State which require members of the minority Rohingya community to seek government permission to travel, marry, have more than two children per household, and repair their houses and places of worship are sources of severe persecution and undermine any prospect of regional economic development.

- What policy option does the U.S. Government have to urge the Government of Myanmar to create and implement a plan to eliminate discrimination toward religious and ethnic minorities, end ethnic segregation; and engage in voluntary resettlement of displaced persons?

Answer. I am deeply concerned about recent religious conflict in Burma and urge all parties to refrain from violence and the government to end impunity by holding all perpetrators accountable for criminal acts of violence regardless of race, religion, or citizenship status. Ambassador Mitchell and Embassy Rangoon officers continue to travel throughout Burma to engage and petition government, religious, political, and community leaders to advocate restraint, tolerance, and reconciliation.

Tensions remain high in Rakhine State since outbreaks of violence in June and October 2012 left over 200 people dead and at least 140,000 displaced. Most victims were Muslim Rohingya. Reports in May that local Rakhine State officials planned to enforce a two-child limit for Rohingya in two townships are also worrying. Senior Department of State officials, including Ambassador Mitchell in Rangoon, continue to encourage the Government of Burma to develop a long-term solution to the crisis that addresses humanitarian needs of all Rakhine State's residents in a manner consistent with international norms and principles, including implementing the constructive recommendations included in the recent report by the government's Rakhine Investigation Commission. Our officials have stressed to the government, local authorities, religious leaders, and representatives of civil society that respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, along with reintegration, redress, and reconciliation are the path toward lasting peace.

The administration led coordination efforts with the international community to mobilize a response ahead of this year's rainy season to meet the needs of communities affected by the conflict, and we will continue to underline the urgency of that response in the coming months. The United States has provided more than \$7 million in humanitarian assistance since June 2012 to address the shelter, food, nutrition, and water and sanitation needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

I also remain very concerned about anti-Muslim violence that erupted on March 21 in Meiktila Town, central Burma, and spread to several neighboring townships displacing nearly 13,000 people, killing an estimated 100, and destroying homes, mosques, and other buildings. In April, the State Department received disconcerting reports of anti-Muslim violence in Lashio in Burma's Shan State that led to burning of Muslim shops and religious buildings. The State Department recently provided \$100,000 for humanitarian assistance to aid the victims of violence. Although the Government of Burma has reported that authorities detained a number of alleged Buddhist perpetrators in the wake of anti-Muslim violence, the State Department is aware of none that have been publicly sentenced. In contrast, authorities have prosecuted Muslims following these outbreaks, including, for example, two Muslim women who received sentences of 2 years hard labor for bumping into a young monk and allegedly sparking an outbreak of mob violence on April 30. If confirmed, I will continue to strongly urge the Government of Burma to hold accountable all individuals responsible for the March and April anti-Muslim violence in central Burma in a nondiscriminatory manner. I remain deeply concerned by the lack of equitable justice and accountability to date.

The administration is committed to working with other donor governments, affected countries in the region, and the international community to meet critical humanitarian protection and assistance needs and develop comprehensive durable solutions for Burmese IDPs, refugees, asylum seekers and vulnerable migrants in Burma and the region. The United States and international community support voluntary returns in safety and dignity. The U.S. Government continues to express to affected countries in the region our commitment to provide assistance to improve

conditions in ethnic minority areas inside the country that will allow for the safe return of displaced persons.

*Question.* If current Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen secures a new term in July through an election process which is not free and fair, how should the U.S. Government respond?

*Answer.* The United States has conveyed to Cambodia at high levels that the lack of progress on democracy and human rights is an impediment to deeper relations between our two countries. The upcoming national elections will be a critical test of the Cambodian Government's commitment to strengthening the nation's democracy. We are monitoring the situation closely and will reassess as appropriate our assistance and/or engagement with the Government of Cambodia in light of how the election is conducted. If confirmed, I will continue to press for improvements in human rights and a credible, free, and fair electoral process that allows for the full and unfettered participation of all political parties and their leaders.

*Question.* The rebalance to Asia policy aims to use military, diplomatic, and economic tools of power and influence in a more coherent and deliberate fashion. Will these policy pronouncements be translated into an across-the-government plan to implement new elements of the strategy? What are our current skills and abilities in terms of language and area studies outside the State Department, in Energy, Commerce and other agencies?

*Answer.* The administration's rebalance, which covers diplomatic, economic, development, security, and cultural initiatives, is rooted in the recognition that America's prosperity and security are very much intertwined with the Asia-Pacific region. As underscored by Secretary Kerry during his trip to the region in April, the State Department is working hard to implement this U.S. strategic objective by building an increasingly active and enduring presence in the region. I wholeheartedly support the Secretary and President's shared vision for the Asia-Pacific in which the United States engages deeply throughout the region and advances our values and national interests, security, and leadership.

I believe that our policy and resource planning must be fully integrated and closely coordinated with our interagency partners in order to advance our shared military, diplomatic, development, and economic objectives in the Asia-Pacific. I personally participated in interagency planning sessions on our Asia rebalance during my tenure as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asian Affairs in the National Security Council. For example, the Department of State works very closely with the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Staff, the Department of Defense, and USAID in preparing an integrated budget that supports our whole of government strategy for the Asia-Pacific. If confirmed, I will look at additional ways to coordinate our planning and, just as importantly, to communicate our strategy and thinking to the American public.

I believe that efforts within the State Department, and with our interagency partners, to strengthen language and areas studies skills of our overseas and domestic staff will become increasingly vital as we rebalance our U.S. engagement to a region with over half of the global population, 10 languages designated as either hard or super hard, and a tremendously diverse range of cultures and ethnicities. The administration has consistently placed a high value on ensuring our diplomats and interagency officials obtain the right skills and expertise to advance our foreign policy.

The Foreign Service Institute (FSI), the government's premier training institution for officers and support personnel of the U.S. foreign affairs communities, continues to be an especially valuable asset in our support for other agencies, particularly those in need for knowledge of foreign language, cultures, and international affairs. FSI provides training for some 47 U.S. Government agencies. Training offered to our interagency partners includes language training and country-specific and regional area studies courses including on East Asia, China; South Asia, Southeast Asia, Japan, Korea, Maritime Southeast Asia, and Mainland Southeast Asia. My own view is that we could do more to train U.S. officials in the region and at home—for State as well as officials in our sister agencies. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our State and interagency partners to enhance the relevant skills and knowledge to advance our core policy objectives for the Asia-Pacific.

*Question.* President Park has called for creating a "new era" on the Korean Peninsula by building trust between North and South Korea. Despite the North's recent behavior, she has indicated she wants to go forward with modest, incremental initiatives, including providing some humanitarian aid. Should the United States consider also providing humanitarian assistance again?

Answer. The longstanding policy of the United States is that humanitarian assistance, including food aid, should not be linked to political and security issues. Decisions on U.S. humanitarian assistance anywhere are based on three factors: (1) the level of need in a given country; (2) competing needs in other countries; and (3) the ability to ensure that aid reliably reaches the vulnerable populations for which it is intended. If confirmed, I will continue to implement this longstanding U.S. policy on humanitarian assistance.

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RESPONSES OF DANIEL R. RUSSEL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY  
SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

*Question.* Can you explain how, in pursuing the Asia pivot/realignment, the United States will deal with countries like Vietnam and Cambodia, which have highly problematic human rights records?

Answer. Promoting human rights is an essential element of the administration's rebalance strategy. If confirmed, I will conduct candid and constructive human rights discussions with Asian governments in bilateral and multilateral settings. In close consultation with Congress, I will also work with my colleagues in the State Department and USAID to ensure that foreign assistance programs for East Asia and the Pacific reflect our commitment to bolster civil society, support human rights, and promote democracy throughout the region. The administration has been disappointed by the deterioration in human rights conditions over the last several years in Vietnam, particularly by the ongoing crackdown on bloggers and restrictions on Internet and media. If confirmed, I will urge Vietnam to respect human rights and emphasize that advancing the relationship with the United States is contingent on improving its human rights performance. Although Vietnam's record is of significant concern, there were some positive developments earlier this year, including Vietnam's decision to release lawyer Le Cong Dinh for humanitarian reasons and to host a high-level visit by Amnesty International.

The Department of State has consistently and frankly raised our concerns about human rights with Cambodia. President Obama has emphasized that the lack of progress on human rights in Cambodia would be an impediment to deeper relations between our two countries. Challenges remain, such as land rights disputes and evictions without adequate compensation, judicial interference by the ruling political party to intimidate the opposition, and the infringement of the freedom of speech and press. However, Cambodia has taken some positive steps including the release of Mam Sonando in March. If confirmed, I will urge Cambodia to systemically improve its human rights record and to take measures to provide for a healthy democratic process, particularly in the runup to national elections in July.

*Question.* If confirmed, what will you do to address the issue of China's repeated repatriation of North Korean refugees back to a country where they face almost certain torture and imprisonment?

Answer. If confirmed, I will urge China to comply with its obligations as a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, including not to expel people protected under these treaties and to cooperate with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the exercise of its mandate.

*Question.* Should the President impose the sanctions on China called for in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, now that China has been lowered to Tier 3. If not, why?

Answer. I am concerned about human trafficking in China and, if confirmed, will carefully review all our efforts to combat trafficking in persons in the region to ensure that we are taking all appropriate steps to address this issue. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), as amended, authorizes restrictions on assistance for countries ranked Tier 3 in the Trafficking in Persons Report, but the President may waive some or all restrictions if he determines that the affected assistance "would promote the purposes of [the TVPA] or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States."

*Question.* If confirmed, would you commit to attend the Human Rights Dialogue to show the importance of this aspect of our discussions with China to our bilateral relationship?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to supporting the Dialogue and continuing to raise our human rights concerns directly with our Chinese counterparts. The promotion of human rights is a key tenet of U.S. foreign policy, and the U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue is an important channel to discuss our key human rights

concerns with China. I would welcome the opportunity to participate. I strongly believe respect for the rule of law and protection of universal human rights are critical to China's long-term prosperity and stability.

*Question.* What steps is the administration taking to support the work of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on North Korea, including its efforts to gain access to China to examine the conditions faced by those fleeing North Korea?

Answer. The United States remains deeply concerned about the human rights situation in North Korea, and cosponsored the annual resolution that established the U.N. Human Rights Council's Commission of Inquiry (COI) to investigate the grave, widespread, and systematic violations of human rights in North Korea.

If confirmed, I will continue U.S. efforts to urge North Korea to cooperate with the COI—including by granting COI members access to the country to evaluate human rights conditions on the ground—and actively work with our partners and international organizations to address and raise attention to the deplorable human rights conditions in North Korea.

I will also continue U.S. efforts to urge all countries in the region, including China, to cooperate in the protection of North Korean refugees and asylum seekers within their territories and to act in conformity with their obligations under the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, including (1) not to refoule North Koreans protected under these treaties, and (2) to cooperate with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

*Question.* As Taiwan is likely to retire some of its older fighter aircraft in the next 5 to 10 years, do you believe that sales of advanced aircraft and other weapons systems are an important, next step in this commitment?

Answer. Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and the United States one-China policy, the United States makes available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capability. With U.S. assistance, Taiwan is currently undergoing an extensive modernization of its F-16 A/B fleet, and we are aware of Taiwan's desire to replace older F-5, and perhaps Mirage 2000-5 fighters, with additional F-16 aircraft. No decisions have been made about possible future sales of military aircraft to Taiwan.

If confirmed, I will continue to support U.S. policy to meet our commitments to Taiwan and assist Taiwan's maintenance of a sufficient self-defense capability. Doing so increases stability both across the Taiwan Strait and within the region.

*Question.* What is the administration's position regarding the eventual participation of Taiwan in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations?

Answer. The United States and its Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiating partners have stated that the TPP is open to economies in the Asia-Pacific that can establish their readiness to meet the high standards of the agreement. The addition of new members into the TPP is based on the consensus of current members. The Ma administration has set a goal of joining the TPP within 8 years, indicating that Taiwan understands it will take time to prepare for possible future entry into the TPP. The State Department and other U.S. trade agencies welcome the liberalization of Taiwan's economy and have encouraged this in meetings under our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage Taiwan's liberalization efforts.

*Question.* If confirmed, will you personally commit to restate the administration's support for President Reagan's "Six Assurances" to Taiwan, as was done during the first term by Assistant Secretary Campbell?

Answer. The United States remains firmly committed to the U.S. one-China policy, the three joint communique, and our responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act. The "Six Assurances" indeed help form the foundation of our overall approach to Taiwan. If confirmed, I will uphold this approach.

The United States opposes attempts by either side to unilaterally alter the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. The United States does not support Taiwan independence.

The United States has long maintained that differences between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan are matters to be resolved peacefully.

*Question.* Knowing that the current Taiwan 123 Agreement will expire in March 2014, and knowing that the renewal will need 90 legislative days to sit with Congress before it comes into effect, when does State plan to send the negotiated renewal to Congress so as to avoid a situation where a legislative fix is needed?

Answer. For the Department of State, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) leads on negotiation of agreements regarding peaceful uses

of nuclear energy, often referred to as "123 Agreements." I understand that, through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), on the U.S. side, and Taiwan's Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO), negotiators are working hard to reach a new agreement at an early date. Their goal is to put a new AIT-TECRO 123 Agreement before Congress this autumn. If confirmed, I will support efforts to bring the negotiations to an early, successful conclusion with sufficient time to allow for the required congressional review period prior to entry into force.

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RESPONSES OF DANIEL R. RUSSEL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY  
SENATOR CHRISTOPHER A. COONS

*Question.* Under your leadership, how will the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs further advance economic opportunities for women in the region and expand programs such as the South Asia Women's Entrepreneurship Symposium?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will strongly support programs that create opportunities for and empower women and girls as a vital component of our economic engagement in the region. The United States currently works both bilaterally and through multi-lateral frameworks, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), and the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN), to support women's economic empowerment.

For example, under APEC, the State Department is focused on implementing the San Francisco Declaration, which calls on APEC members to take concrete actions to realize the full potential of women, integrate them more fully into APEC economies, and maximize their contributions toward economic growth. Within this framework, the United States is implementing capacity-building activities focused on women's access to markets and capital and is supporting a number of studies to identify specific, actionable barriers to women's participation in the economy in targeted APEC member economies.

The United States has also supported the efforts of the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children to strengthen economic rights and opportunity for women. The Department supports USAID's upcoming launch of the 5-year U.S.-ASEAN Partnership for Good Governance, Equitable and Sustainable Development, and Security (PROGRESS), which will include women's and children's rights as a key focus area. The Department will also soon announce open applications for the U.S.-ASEAN Science Prize For Women, which will be awarded to a promising, early-career woman scientist from the ASEAN region.

The Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), the Mekong Technology, Innovation Generation, and Entrepreneurship Resources (TIGERS) Project will facilitate access to economic opportunities for women entrepreneurs and support the development of an "innovation ecosystem" in the countries of the Lower Mekong subregion.

Bilaterally, the United States will bolster women's participation in the private sector in Papua New Guinea through training programs to support the development, sustainability, and advocacy skills of the nascent Papua New Guinea Women's Chamber of Commerce.

In December 2012, the State Department held a Women's Entrepreneurship Symposium to galvanize women's economic empowerment along the New Silk Road and the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor, which links India and Bangladesh with Southeast Asia. The Symposium brought together over 100 women entrepreneurs, government officials, private sector and civil society leaders from 11 South and Central Asian countries, including Burma, to identify opportunities and priorities for advancing women's entrepreneurship in South Asia.

*Question.* How will the Bureau address violence against women and girls in the region, including sexual- and gender-based violence, as recently highlighted by the gang rape and death of the 23-year-old woman on a Delhi bus in India?

*Answer.* The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP) is working closely with the Secretary's Office of Global Women's Issues (S/GWI), and Bureaus and Offices across the Department to comprehensively prevent and respond to gender-based violence in the Asia-Pacific. S/GWI's small grants programming around the world, including in the Asia-Pacific region, supports the advancement of respect for women's and girls' human rights, and will include targeted programs that address gender-based violence. These grants work to support and build the capacity of local, grassroots organizations, raise awareness of gender-based violence, legal rights, and strengthen community referral systems. Additionally, EAP supports S/GWI's efforts

to increase women's participation in peace negotiations, conflict prevention and response efforts, and peace-building processes.

Preventing and responding to gender-based violence is a critical step toward the U.S. Government's goal of supporting the emergence of stable, democratic countries that are at peace with their neighbors and provide for the basic needs of their citizens. If confirmed, I commit to continuing EAP's close cooperation with S/GWI and all other stakeholders to prevent violence against women and girls.

RESPONSES OF DANIEL R. RUSSEL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY  
SENATOR JOHN BARRASSO

*Question.* Like many U.S. industries, soda ash faces significant trade barriers around the world. It is a key manufacturing component of glass, detergents, soaps, and chemicals. Soda ash is also used in many other industrial processes.

U.S. "natural soda ash" is refined from the mineral trona. It has long been regarded as the standard for quality, purity, and energy efficiency in production. The Green River Basin in Wyoming is the world's largest area for naturally occurring trona.

- As part of your effort to promote U.S. industries in the East Asian and Pacific region, can you commit to me that you will be an advocate for eliminating trade barriers for soda ash and other important U.S. industries in the international marketplace?

*Answer.* If confirmed as Assistant Secretary, I will prioritize the East Asian and Pacific (EAP) Bureau's promotion of U.S. exports and the facilitation of U.S. industries' participation in international markets. I understand the Department is aware that some countries have pursued actions against the importation of soda ash, including barriers to trade in soda ash. I will ensure that EAP provides necessary support to the Department of Commerce and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to address this issue and other trade-distorting measures. I will also advocate strongly for U.S. firms and industries, encouraging our trading partners' adherence to their international trade obligations in providing nondiscriminatory market access for our exporters, including those in the soda ash industry.

*Question.* Last year, the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense initiated a process to remove a war memorial in Wyoming. It honors the lives of 48 soldiers who were massacred in their sleep by insurgents in the Philippines on September 28, 1901. The Department of State and Department of Defense intentionally withheld information about the commencement of its removal from Congress.

- Will you commit to me to not send our war memorials, which honor our fallen service men, women, and their families, to foreign lands?
- What is your position on providing Congress with information and notice about these types of actions?

*Answer.* I understand and appreciate the deep historical and emotional connections Americans have to the Bells of Balangiga, which represent the ultimate sacrifice of so many young Americans in the service of our Nation. If confirmed, I will continue to consult with Congress, the Department of Defense, and all other interested parties on this issue.

*Question.* As you know, the North Korean Government has appealed to the United States to open talks to ease the tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

- Do you believe the United States should reward the North Koreans by directly engaging with North Korea?
- Do you believe the North Koreans will dismantle their nuclear program as a precondition to hold talks with the United States?
- If you were in a position to set the preconditions for U.S.-Korean direct talks, can you please detail those preconditions?

*Answer.* I believe the United States should not seek talks for the sake of talks. Rather we should be open to authentic and credible negotiations to implement the September 2005 joint statement and bring North Korea into compliance with all applicable Security Council resolutions by ending its ballistic missile program and abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. For negotiations to be authentic and credible, North Korea must demonstrate it is prepared to halt and ultimately abandon all of its nuclear weapons and programs.

The onus is on North Korea to take meaningful actions toward denuclearization and refrain from provocations, and improve relations with South Korea. North

Korea committed on numerous occasions, including in the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. The United States and the international community must continue to hold North Korea to those commitments and its international obligations.

The United States remains committed to finding a diplomatic solution on North Korea, which will require multilateral action. North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile program, proliferation activities, and provocative behavior are not just bilateral issues between the United States and North Korea, but are of concern to the entire international community. If confirmed, I would continue to coordinate closely with allies and partners to press North Korea to choose a path different leading to peaceful denuclearization.

*Question.* Do you believe tougher sanctions should be imposed on North Korea for its continued violation of all its nonproliferation agreements?

*Answer.* I believe the United States should continue to work with the international community to ensure full enforcement of international and national sanctions as part of our effort to bring about denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The international community has posed strict measures in response to North Korea's defiance of its international obligations, and the United States continues to demand that North Korea fully comply with its international obligations.

In unanimously adopting U.N. Security Council Resolution 2094, which expanded sanctions on North Korea in response to the February 12, 2013, North Korean nuclear test, the U.N. Security Council expressed its determination to take further significant measures in the event of a future North Korean missile launch or nuclear test. The United States has also imposed—and as necessary will continue to impose—national measures on entities and individuals involved in proliferation-related activities proscribed by U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Sanctions on North Korea are aimed at impeding its ability to sustain and advance its proscribed nuclear, ballistic missile, and proliferation programs and activities. The international community's concerted efforts to implement these sanctions have demonstrated to North Korea the increasing costs of defying the international community.

If confirmed, I will strongly support full implementation of sanctions by our international partners and will work closely with the Department of the Treasury and other agencies to examine further unilateral or multilateral sanctions as appropriate.

*Question.* What additional unilateral sanctions are available to the United States to impose against the regime in North Korea?

*Answer.* The United States has a range of unilateral sanctions authorities available to address North Korea's proliferation activities and will continue to use them to expand sanctions on North Korea and target entities and individuals associated with North Korea's proscribed nuclear and ballistic missile programs and other illicit acts.

I believe that sanctions are a valuable and effective part of our overall strategy to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

If confirmed, I will cooperate with the Department of the Treasury and other agencies to consider all appropriate measures to impede North Korea's ability to sustain and advance its proscribed nuclear and missile programs and associated proliferation activities.

*Question.* What consequences have there been, if any, for North Korea's long-range missile test in February?

*Answer.* The February 12, 2013, North Korean nuclear test resulted in the unanimous adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2094, which significantly expanded an already strong set of sanctions on North Korea, as well as in broad international condemnation—from an unprecedented 80-plus countries and international organizations.

The measures contained in UNSCR 2094 are already being implemented and making it harder for North Korea to move the funds, equipment, and personnel needed to develop its prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The United States has worked closely with the international community to ensure that these measures are fully implemented.

On March 11, 2013, the United States designated the North Korea's Foreign Trade Bank, consistent with UNSCR 2094's obligation to prevent financial transactions that could contribute to North Korea's illicit programs. The United States also designated four senior North Korean officials for their role in activities explicitly proscribed by U.N. Security Council resolutions.

*Question.* What is the current relationship between Iran and North Korea? How much cooperation is there between the two countries on missile and nuclear development?

*Answer.* U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 prohibit the transfer to or from the DPRK of goods and technology related to nuclear, ballistic missile or other weapons of mass destruction-related programs. Likewise, any cooperation with Iran on prohibited, proliferation sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile activities could violate multiple U.N. resolutions on Iran.

If confirmed, I will strongly support U.S. efforts to prevent collusion and to press both the DPRK and Iran to comply fully and transparently with their international commitments and obligations and to refrain from any undertakings which would further threaten the global nonproliferation regime.

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RESPONSES OF DANIEL R. RUSSEL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY  
SENATOR RAND PAUL

*Question.* Over the past few years we've seen reduced tensions in the Taiwan Strait. How will you continue to encourage the development of cross-strait relations?

*Answer.* I applaud the cross-strait agreements signed by China and Taiwan over the past 5 years. Cultural exchange, direct transportation links, and investment promotion are just a few examples of these accomplishments.

For the past 34 years, the United States has pursued its one-China policy based on the three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. Regional stability and U.S. policy have provided Taiwan with the confidence and flexibility needed to improve cross-strait relations.

If confirmed, I will encourage both Taiwan and China to continue expanding cross-strait cooperation and oppose any attempts by either side to unilaterally alter the status quo.

*Question.* Would the United States support expanding the Trans-Pacific Partnership to include Taiwan?

*Answer.* The United States and its Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiating partners have stated that the TPP is open to economies in the Asia-Pacific that can establish their readiness to meet the high standards of the agreement. The addition of new members into the TPP is based on the consensus of current members. The Ma administration has set a goal of joining the TPP within 8 years, indicating that Taiwan understands it will take time to prepare for possible future entry into the TPP. The State Department and other U.S. trade agencies welcome steps Taiwan is taking to liberalize its economy, and have encouraged this in our discussions under our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage Taiwan's liberalization efforts.

*Question.* Do you see an enhanced role for Taiwan under the rebalance to Asia policy on economic and security fronts?

*Answer.* Taiwan is a vibrant democracy and a developed market economy. It is the United States 11th-largest trading partner, 7th-largest export market for American agricultural and food products, and the 6th-largest source of international students in the United States. If confirmed, I will ensure the United States expands its commercial, economic, and cultural engagement with Taiwan through our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), through economic integration initiatives in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and through greater people-to-people contacts, including student exchanges. Our people-to-people engagement has been further facilitated by Taiwan's entry into the Visa Waiver Program in 2012. If confirmed, I will also ensure the United States continues to build a robust unofficial relationship with Taiwan and fulfill its longstanding commitment to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, in accordance with the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.