

NOMINATIONS

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 5, 2021 (a.m.)

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:17 a.m., in Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, Kaine, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, Young, Cruz, and Hagerty.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

The CHAIRMAN. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.

We are here to consider the nominations for three important positions: Ms. Mallory Stewart to be the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Verification and Compliance, Ms. Lisa Carty to be the U.S. Representative on the U.N. Economic and Social Council and an alternative representative to the U.N. General Assembly, and Mr. Steve Bondy to be the Ambassador to Bahrain.

Congratulations on your nominations. We appreciate your willingness and also those of your families to serve. Your families are, certainly, part of the sacrifice on behalf of the nation, so we appreciate them as well.

Ms. Stewart, the AVC Bureau is critical in the State Department and to our national security, leading U.S. diplomatic efforts to confront our adversaries about their most dangerous weapons.

I am pleased to see you bring a wealth of experience to this important role, including from your current service on the National Security Council as the Senior Director for Arms Control and Non-proliferation and your years in the State Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the AVC Bureau working on these issues.

If confirmed, you will have to address a series of challenges from the very start, including a weakened AVC Bureau, the result of years of neglect under the previous administration, at the exact moment that we are entering a more dangerous world.

The head of our nuclear forces, Navy Admiral Charles Richard, recently called China's explosive growth and modernization of its nuclear and conventional forces breathtaking.

Russia continues to modernize its shorter-range nonstrategic weapons and has shown a willingness to use chemical weapons against its own citizens.

Iran is moving closer to having enough material for a nuclear weapon. I am concerned that the Bureau is unprepared for this more dangerous world and that it lacks the resources and staff it needs to effectively negotiate with our strategic rivals.

I trust that, if confirmed, you will use your knowledge and skills to prioritize strengthening AVC, and I look forward to hearing your thoughts on how to address the challenges ahead.

Ms. Carty, congratulations on your nomination. It is reassuring that President Biden has nominated you, a consummate professional with decades of experience working with the United Nations and the Department of State to this role to help address the economic, humanitarian, and social challenges facing the globe.

Under President Trump, the United States, largely, abdicated a leadership role at the United Nations. From attempting to pull out of the World Health Organization in the middle of a global pandemic to undermining international protections for women, girls, and LGBTI individuals, to defunding or cutting funding to key agencies, we sent the signal that the United States would no longer lead, I should say, ceding space and influence to China and Russia.

If confirmed, you will join a new team committed to repair what has been undermined, including support for human rights, democracy, and addressing the metastasizing humanitarian crisis around the world, including the most recent one in Afghanistan after the rapid collapse of the Ghani Government and Taliban takeover.

I look forward to hearing your thoughts on how critical the agency's initiatives like those promoting the equal rights of women and girls can continue in Afghanistan. And, if confirmed, I trust that you will draw on your decades of relevant experience to effectively engage within and work to strengthen the U.N. system.

Mr. Bondy, welcome to the committee. I am pleased to see such an experienced diplomat and Livingston, New Jersey, native nominated for a critical Gulf post.

I am not surprised that someone from the Garden State has merited a dozen State Department awards, a Service Commendation award from the Department of Defense, and a Presidential Rank Award, and speaks five languages.

I would also like to note that I am not the only one to praise your service. Retired General Votel, former commander of CENTCOM who served with you, has noted that you are, quote, "extraordinarily well qualified for this position," and called you, quote, "an effective collaborator who is deeply respected across the military and within the interagency."

I also have a statement from Ambassador Hugo Llorens praising your service and record and, without objection, I move to enter those statements into the record.

[The information referred to above is located at the end of this hearing transcript.]

The CHAIRMAN. U.S.-Bahrain ties are long-standing. As the host of the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the Navy's Fifth Fleet, Bahrain is an essential U.S. partner in our shared efforts to maintain stability and security in the Arabian Gulf.

As the region continues to face instability of threats, most concerning from Iran, it is critical that we have a skilled diplomat in place to strengthen and maintain our partnership.

Bahrain has also led the change for more regional diplomacy as an original signatory to the Abraham Accords, and I have full confidence you will work to further their political, economic, and cultural normalization with Israel.

Your extensive experience in the Middle East, including time spent as the Counselor for Political and Economic Affairs in Bahrain and more recently as the Deputy Chief of Mission and charge d'affaires in Abu Dhabi, will certainly serve you well and the country well in navigating our Embassy in Manama.

I look forward to each of your testimonies. And with that, let me turn to the ranking member for his opening remarks.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO**

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning. Welcome to our nominees.

On the nomination of Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Verification and Compliance, I want to make clear that a sole-purpose nuclear declaratory policy or any perceived weakening of the U.S. nuclear deterrent will be a betrayal of our allies and will embolden China and Russia. It will also cause allies to lose confidence in the Biden administration's commitment to NATO's Article 5 commitments and to Asia security.

The position you have been nominated to is incredibly important to not only the United States but also our allies and, for that matter, our enemies.

For decades, U.S. administrations have embraced the long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity regarding the use of nuclear weapons. While administrations have thought about changing to a no-first-use policy, they realized international security was more important than ideology.

Indeed, the Obama administration itself studied this closely and rejected such a policy change twice. Earlier this year, our British allies also rejected this change.

The Biden administration says it wants to strengthen U.S. alliances. U.S. allies have told me and have told us that they strongly object to a change to a no-first-use or sole-purpose, which is nothing more than a no-first-use in disguise policy. This administration should listen to them.

On the nomination of Ambassador to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, the United States remains the largest donor to the United Nations.

In recent years, the Chinese Communist Party has used its minimal donations to leverage a large-scale malign influence campaign affecting, in particular, the NGO committee in order to block NGOs critical of China, and they support NGOs that are actually run by the Chinese Communist Party. More must be done to stop this harmful practice.

The Biden administration has also decided to run for a seat on the Human Rights Council. The Council is known for its anti-Israel

bias and troubling countries, including the worst human rights offenders on the planet like China, Cuba, Russia, and Venezuela.

I strongly oppose any attempt by the United States to rejoin this sham group until reforms have been achieved.

On the nomination of Ambassador to Bahrain, United States and the Kingdom of Bahrain have enjoyed a close relationship since the 1940s.

Home to the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet and the International Maritime Security Construct, Bahrain is a lynchpin for regional stability and serves as a critical front against Iran's regional aggression.

I remain concerned that Iran continues its efforts to destabilize Bahrain and arm the terrorist groups that operate there.

On the human rights front, Bahrain has come a long way since the Arab Spring. While there is more work to be done, certainly, the Kingdom has made strides in effective policing, advancing human rights, and curbing trafficking in persons. It is vital that we continue this important work.

Finally, I applaud Bahrain's growing relationship with Israel with its signing of the Abraham Accords. These agreements finally offer a path forward for peace in a troubled region, and the recent visit of the Israeli foreign minister and Embassy opening were encouraging steps.

Should you be confirmed, it is critical that you work to encourage Bahrain and Israel to deepen their diplomatic, economic, and security relationship. This is a priority effort.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Risch.

All right. We will turn to our nominees. We ask you to summarize your statements in about five minutes or so so we can have an opportunity for robust questions.

Your full statements will be included in the record, without objection, and we will start with Ms. Stewart and work our way down the aisle.

STATEMENT OF MALLORY A. STEWART OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, NOMINATED TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE [VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE]

Ms. STEWART. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of this committee for the opportunity to appear before you today.

It is my distinct honor and pleasure to be President Biden's nominee for the role of Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance at the Department of State.

I want to thank the President and Secretary Blinken for their confidence in me and for the opportunity, if confirmed, to help advance and protect American national security.

I would also like to thank my colleagues and friends who have supported me throughout this process, and I would especially like to thank my parents, my husband, and our three children. I could not have achieved anything without their encouragement, their guidance, their patience, and their endless love and support.

The Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Bureau, AVC, is at the forefront of some of the most challenging and pressing na-

tional security priorities. I know firsthand just how important, complex, and challenging AVC's work is because, if confirmed, this would be a return to the Bureau in which I proudly served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary.

I also had the privilege of working on the AVC portfolio prior to that during my time in the State Department's Legal Adviser's Office, and I continue to work many of these issues in my current role at the National Security Council.

I joined the State Department's Legal Adviser's Office in 2002. I was inspired to leave my law firm job in part by the events of 9/11 amidst the swirl of international outreach, coordination, and concern.

Throughout my time working on arms control and treaty issues, I have personally witnessed the value of international cooperation, engagement, and dialogue, even and sometimes especially with nontraditional partners and potential competitors.

In order to most effectively achieve the Bureau's mission, AVC must continue its work to reestablish U.S. leadership in multilateral institutions and reengage with allies and partners.

The Biden-Harris administration recognizes that the challenges we face are not ours alone and cannot be solved by any one nation. That is why it has placed a great deal of importance on engagement and has begun the work to revitalize and strengthen our alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific to better deter and defend against growing threats.

But engagement with allies is only one piece of the diplomacy puzzle. We must also engage with our main competitors, like Russia and China, and attempt to keep an open dialogue.

It is important to be able to engage on security even at times of bilateral tension and disagreement. That is why this administration is engaged in a strategic stability dialogue with Russia and why we seek to engage in meaningful dialogue on nuclear and other strategic stability threats with China.

From an administrative perspective, I am specifically interested in expanding AVC's capacity to work on the challenges posed by these countries' increasingly aggressive behaviors.

If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to lead this important Bureau, together with the many dedicated professional public servants that uphold the Bureau's national security mission every day.

AVC's work to address the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons, deter the use of all weapons of mass destruction, and contend with emerging technology security challenges in a rapidly evolving security environment is critical to American security.

If confirmed, I would hope to partner with the Hill and with other departments and agencies to make sure the Bureau has the necessary support and resources to fulfill its important mission.

Working together, we need to make sure AVC has the best tools and analytical capabilities available now and in the future to provide robust verification of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments, as well as rigorous assessments of compliance with those agreements and commitments, including in order to provide Congress with a complete and accurate

accounting of the arms control landscape through the Annual Compliance Report.

I was personally involved with the Compliance Report when I was a DAS in AVC, and I think it is critically important and it needs to be thorough, clear, and credible. If confirmed, I will make its timely delivery to Congress a priority.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of this committee, you have my commitment that, if confirmed, I will work in close coordination with you and deeply respect your role in the formation of foreign policy.

There are a great number of challenges we face, but we face them together and we must resolve them together.

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Stewart follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MALLORY A. STEWART

Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of this committee for the opportunity to appear before you today. It is my distinct honor and pleasure to be President Biden's nominee for the role of Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) at the Department of State. I want to thank the President and Secretary Blinken for their confidence in me and for the opportunity, if confirmed, to help advance and protect America's national security.

I would also like to thank my colleagues and friends who have supported me throughout this process. And I would especially like to thank my parents, my husband, and our three children. I could not have achieved anything without their encouragement, their guidance, their patience, and their endless love and support.

The Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Bureau (AVC) is at the forefront of some of the most challenging and pressing national security priorities. I know firsthand just how important, complex, and challenging AVC's work is because, if confirmed, this would be a return to the Bureau in which I proudly served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary during the Obama administration. I also had the privilege of working on the AVC portfolio prior to that during my time in the State Department's Legal Adviser's Office, and I continue to work many of these issues in my current role at the National Security Council.

I joined the State Department's Legal Adviser's Office in 2002. I was inspired to leave my law firm job in part by the events of 9/11, amidst the swirl of international outreach, coordination, and concern. Throughout my time working on arms control and treaty issues, I have personally witnessed the value of international cooperation, engagement, and dialogue, even—and sometimes especially with—non-traditional partners and potential competitors.

In order to most effectively achieve the bureau's mission, AVC must continue its work to re-establish U.S. leadership in multilateral institutions and re-engage with allies and partners. The Biden-Harris administration recognizes that the challenges we face are not ours alone and cannot be solved by any one nation. That is why it has placed a great deal of importance on engagement and has begun the work to revitalize and strengthen our alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific to better deter and defend against growing threats.

But engagement with allies is only one piece of the diplomacy puzzle. We must also engage with our main competitors, like Russia and China, and attempt to keep an open dialogue. It is important to be able to engage on security even at times of bilateral tension and disagreement. That is why this administration is engaged in a strategic stability dialogue with Russia, and why we seek to engage in meaningful dialogue on nuclear and other strategic stability threats with China. From an administrative perspective, I am specifically interested in expanding AVC's capacity to work on the challenges posed by these countries' increasingly aggressive behaviors.

If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to lead this important Bureau together with the many dedicated professional public servants that uphold the bureau's national security mission every day. AVC's work to address the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons, deter the use of all weapons of mass destruction, and contend with emerging technology security challenges and a rapidly evolving security environment is critical to American security. If confirmed, I would hope to

partner with the Hill and with other Departments and Agencies to make sure the Bureau has the necessary support and resources to fulfill its important mission.

Working together, we need to make sure AVC has the best tools and analytical capabilities available, now and in the future, to provide robust verification of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments, as well as rigorous assessments of compliance with those agreements and commitments, including in order to provide Congress with a complete and accurate accounting of the arms control landscape through the annual Compliance Report. I was personally involved with the Compliance Report when I was a DAS in AVC. I think it is a critically important product that needs to be thorough, clear, and credible. If confirmed, I will make its timely delivery to Congress a priority.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of this committee. You have my commitment that, if confirmed, I will work in close coordination with you and respect your role in the formation of foreign policy. There are a great number of challenges we face—but we face them together, and we must resolve them together.

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today, and I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Forty-seven seconds to spare. That is pretty good.

Mr. Bondy?

STATEMENT OF STEVEN C. BONDY OF NEW JERSEY, A CAREER MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN

Mr. BONDY. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of this committee, thank you for your warm welcome and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee to be the United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Bahrain.

I am extremely grateful to the President, a fellow Fightin' Blue Hen of the University of Delaware, and to Secretary Blinken for the confidence they have shown in me with this nomination.

It is the thrill of a lifetime to be in this position and, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this committee and the Congress on the important foreign policy interests of the United States in Bahrain.

I would like to start by recognizing and thanking my wife, Meghan, who has been a steadfast supporter and source of inspiration through thick and thin, including the two years I served in war zones.

Our daughter, Rachel, is here today and our son, Drew, is tuning in from Brooklyn. Rachel and Drew traveled the world with us and enrich our lives with their love and global perspective. My parents, George and Enid Bondy, are also watching today's proceedings from Daytona Beach. I owe them all more than I can say.

Mr. Chairman, I am excited at the prospect, if confirmed, of returning to a country where my family and I spent three wonderful years. Bahrain was a key part of the recent Operation Allies Refuge, facilitating and supporting over 7,000 Americans and others transiting the country on their way to the United States. Bahrain once again demonstrated it is not just a partner or an ally, it is a real friend.

The foundation of that friendship begins with our shared national security interests. The United States Navy has had an enduring presence in Bahrain since the 1940s and it has been home

to the U.S. Navy Central Command and Fifth Fleet since the Gulf War.

Bahrain is a safe, secure, and welcoming home to the 8,500 U.S. military members and their families who are in country.

The United States works collaboratively with the Bahraini Government to address threats to the internal security of the Kingdom and the region, particularly from Iran.

This joint security work helps keep safe American citizens, investments, and interests in the country, and if confirmed, I will have no higher priority than protecting the safety and security of Americans in Bahrain.

Mr. Chairman, a year ago, Bahrain and Israel signed the Abraham Accords agreement, shepherded by the United States. This bold act represents a change in the strategic orientation of the Kingdom, and it opened the door to Bahrain and Israel developing their relationship across a wide spectrum of shared interests.

If confirmed, I will devote my energy and creativity to expanding and strengthening this relationship. The President and the Secretary have been clear that human rights are at the center of our foreign policy.

If confirmed, a primary focus of our bilateral engagement will be to advance respect for human rights and political participation, particularly as the 2022 parliamentary elections approach.

We will continue to have open and honest exchanges with Bahrain on these important matters, recognizing both where more progress needs to be made as well as where and when Bahrain has made meaningful progress.

Mr. Chairman, I was fortunate to be serving in Bahrain when our bilateral free trade agreement entered into force in 2006. That agreement established a solid basis for our commercial relations, and American companies can play an important role as the Bahraini economy emerges from the COVID pandemic. If confirmed, I will advocate on behalf of American companies pursuing opportunities in Bahrain.

Mr. Chairman, the United States and Bahrain have a friendship that goes back almost 120 years when intrepid Americans established the American Mission Hospital and related school in Manama.

It will be my distinct honor, if confirmed, to build upon this legacy as the United States Ambassador to Bahrain.

I welcome any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bondy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT FOR STEVEN C. BONDY

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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Carty?

STATEMENT OF LISA A. CARTY OF MARYLAND, TO BE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR, AND TO BE AN ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DURING HER TENURE OF SERVICE AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Ms. CARTY. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of the committee, it is truly an honor to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee to become the U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

I am grateful to the President, to Secretary Blinken, and to Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield for their confidence in me. If con-

firmed, I will do my best to live up to their trust and to work closely with all of you on the committee.

I would like to begin by expressing my deep appreciation to my family, to my husband, Bill Burns, an exceptionally dedicated public servant who has inspired and supported me since we first met as Junior Foreign Service officers nearly 40 years ago, and to our daughters, Lizzy and Sarah, who from infancy through college shared our Foreign Service journey and the many moves that that entailed.

I wish that my parents and my in-laws, each models of exemplary service, could see this moment. My father was a proud graduate of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and a Korean War veteran, my mother, a public school special education teacher.

My father-in-law served in the U.S. Army for 34 years with my mother-in-law, his full partner in all the sacrifices that required. Their example and the love and support of my family are a very large part of why I am here today.

I approach this new challenge with considerable humility, with an abiding commitment to public service, with faith in the power of clear-eyed diplomacy in the pursuit of American interests and human rights, and with a well-grounded sense of both the possibilities and the limitations of the United Nations, and with few illusions about the complicated world around us.

It is a world in which the U.N. has a crucial role, especially in tackling the humanitarian, development, human rights, and social issues to which I have devoted nearly four decades as a career diplomat and then as an official of the United Nations.

It is a world in which the COVID pandemic and a changing climate have worsened problems of poverty, instability, and health insecurity, especially for women and girls, and where the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council can play a key role in mounting a global response consistent with U.S. interests.

It is a world in which authoritarian rivals like China and Russia and others seek advantage in the U.N. system and where active and energetic American diplomacy is required to counter them.

And it is a world in which the capabilities of the United Nations matter enormously, but also require relentless U.S. insistence on transparency, accountability, and reform as well as unwavering resistance to anti-Israel bias.

My professional background provides a unique combination of skills to help the United States take on these challenges. I spent 25 years as a Foreign Service officer working extensively on humanitarian, health, gender, and development issues, with field experience in Asia, Russia, and the Middle East.

I served as a Pearson Congressional Fellow working for Senator Nancy Kassebaum on the Africa Subcommittee, I worked for USAID on health programs in Russia, and served as the State Department's regional refugee coordinator based in Amman, Jordan.

I have decades of experience in multilateral diplomacy and a strong sense of how to navigate the U.N. system shaped by 10 years of work in U.N. entities, first, with the joint United Nations program on HIV/AIDS working hand in hand with PEPFAR, and most recently with the U.N.'s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs where, through the combined efforts of U.S.

Government counterparts and courageous and committed U.N. colleagues, we helped alleviate suffering in some of the world's worst crises.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to working hard to put that background to good use in support of American interests. I will work hard to ensure that U.N. efforts across the responsibilities of the Economic and Social Council are effective, well run, and consistent with U.S. goals.

I will work hard with allies and partners to mobilize coalitions and achieve practical outcomes and I will work hard with all of you to ensure the closest possible collaboration with Congress.

Thank you very much again, Mr. Chairman, for your consideration. This is truly the honor of a lifetime, and if confirmed, I will devote the full measure of my skill and experience to serve the best interests of the American people. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Carty follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LISA A. CARTY

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, it is truly an honor to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee to become the U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. I am grateful to the President, Secretary Blinken and Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield for their confidence in me. If confirmed, I will do my best to live up to their trust and to work closely with all of you on this committee.

I would like to begin by expressing my deep appreciation to my family—to my husband, Bill, an exceptionally talented public servant, and accomplished diplomat, and to our daughters, Lizzy and Sarah, who from infancy through college, shared our Foreign Service journey and the many moves that entailed. Serving overseas, particularly at challenging posts, asks a lot of family members, and I will be forever grateful that they so readily embraced the demands of Foreign Service life. I wish that my parents, and my in-laws—each models of exemplary service—could see this moment. My father was a proud graduate of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and a veteran of the Korean War, my mother, a public-school special education teacher, my father-in-law served in the U.S. Army for 34 years with my mother-in-law his full partner in all the sacrifices that entailed. Their example, and the love and support of my family, are a very large part of why I am here today.

I approach this new challenge with considerable humility; with an abiding commitment to public service; with faith in the power of clear-eyed diplomacy in the pursuit of American interests and human rights; with a well-grounded sense of both the possibilities and limitations of the United Nations; and with few illusions about the complicated world around us.

It is a world in which the U.N. has a crucial role, especially in tackling the humanitarian, development, human rights, and social issues to which I have devoted nearly four decades as a career diplomat and then as an official of the United Nations. It is a world in which a changing climate and the COVID pandemic have worsened problems of poverty, economic development, instability, and health insecurity, especially among women and girls, and where the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council can play a key role in boosting a global response and recovery consistent with U.S. interests. It is a world in which authoritarian rivals like China, Russia, and others seek advantage in the U.N. system, demanding active and energetic American diplomacy to counter them. And it is a world in which the capabilities of the United Nations matter enormously—but also require relentless U.S. insistence on transparency, accountability and reform, as well as unwavering resistance to anti-Israel bias.

My professional background provides a unique combination of skills to help the United States take on these challenges. I spent a quarter-century as a Foreign Service Officer, working extensively on humanitarian, health, gender and development issues, with field experience in Asia, Russia and the Middle East. I served as a Pearson Congressional Fellow working for Senator Nancy Kassebaum on the Africa Sub-committee and with Congressman Tony Hall on the Select Committee on Hunger. I worked for USAID on health programs in Russia; and served as the Regional Refugee Coordinator for the State Department, based in Amman, Jordan. I have decades of experience in multilateral diplomacy, and a strong sense of how to navi-

gate the U.N. system shaped by ten years of work in U.N. entities—first with the United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS where I served as the principal U.N. focal point for the PEPFAR program and most recently with the U.N.'s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, where I worked with U.S. Government counterparts and courageous and committed U.N. colleagues to help alleviate suffering in some of the world's worst crises.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to working hard to put that background to good use in support of American interests at the United Nations. I will work hard to ensure that U.N. efforts across the responsibilities of the Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies are effective, well-run, and consistent with U.S. goals. I will work hard with allies and partners at the U.N. to mobilize coalitions and achieve practical outcomes. And I will work hard with all of you to ensure the closest possible cooperation with Congress.

Thank you very much again, Mr. Chairman, for your consideration. This is the honor of a lifetime, and if confirmed, I will devote the full measure of my skill and experience to serve the best interests of the American people. I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all very much. We will go through a series of five-minute rounds. But before we do that, I have a series of questions on behalf of the committee as a whole that I would like to ask each nominee.

They speak to the importance that this committee places on responsiveness by all officials in the executive branch and that we expect and will be seeking from you.

I would ask each of you to provide just a simple yes or no answer to the following questions.

Do you agree to appear before this committee and make officials from your office available to the committee and designated staff when invited?

Mr. BONDY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If you can give me a verbal response, please.

Ms. STEWART. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. I cannot hear you. Sorry. Your microphone is not on.

Do you commit to keep the committee fully and currently informed about the activities under your purview?

Ms. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. BONDY. Yes.

Ms. CARTY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you commit to engaging in meaningful consultation while policies are being developed, not just providing notification after the fact?

Ms. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. BONDY. Yes.

Ms. CARTY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you commit to promptly responding to requests for briefings and information requested by the committee and its designated staff?

Ms. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. BONDY. Yes.

Ms. CARTY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. All of the witnesses—I mean, the nominees have answered yes to those questions. I will—the chair will reserve his time and I will turn to the ranking member.

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Stewart, I want to start, first of all, on the very important role you have on—that you are seeking here with the Bureau. And

as I said to you in my opening statement that the Biden administration wants to strengthen U.S. allies, and we all do, the alliances that we have and the agreements we have.

The U.S. allies, however, have told us that they strongly object to a change to a no-first-use or sole-purpose policy for reasons I have previously stated.

Are you aware of their objections?

Ms. STEWART. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I share your concern about allies and partners understanding U.S. deterrence.

Senator RISCH. That was not the question. The question was are you aware that they have strenuous objections to what the administration is proposing?

Ms. STEWART. I have seen some traffic and assessments of engagements, and there has been numerous engagements with allies and partners.

Senator RISCH. You are aware that our partners and our allies have strenuous objection to what is being considered here. Is that a fair statement or not?

Ms. STEWART. I think I am not sure if I understand the term "strenuous objection." I think they are concerned about what we are—

Senator RISCH. Will you go so far as to say they have an objection?

Ms. STEWART [continuing]. I do not even know if it is an objection. But, perhaps, the point is that I think through our engagement we hope to explain and understand and really hear from them further as to their—

Senator RISCH. You are telling me, as you sit here today, you do not understand that our allies have strong objections to what the administration is considering? Is that what you are telling me?

Ms. STEWART. I would definitely agree that there are certain concerns about what is possibly in the consideration process. But I think the effort that we are undergoing to engage with them is to really understand what those concerns are and to, hopefully, address those concerns through part of the engagement process.

Senator RISCH. You will not go to where I need you to be and that is to get a good clear understanding. If we, on the committee, on Republican side of the committee, have an understanding that our allies have strong, strong objections to what you are considering, how is it that you cannot concede that?

I understand you are saying they have concerns. Would you agree with me that they are stronger than concerns?

Ms. STEWART. I guess—and I definitely appreciate what you are trying to sort of get at here. My concern to completely satisfy your question is that we are still very much in the process.

We do not know the result of the Nuclear Posture Review that the Department of Defense is leading, and so it is very hard to say that allies and partners can have objections to a process that has not sort of played out and we have not had a chance to engage more fulsomely with them as to where the direction is going, and there is a lot of considerations in the process.

If they object, it seems like they are prematurely objecting to something that we have not established.

Senator RISCH. You have already said if they object. You do not know that they are objecting. Is that correct?

Ms. STEWART. I think the concern is what would they be objecting to at this point, without the actual report.

Senator RISCH. I am not going to get you there, so I am not going to pursue that any further. But let us—let me say I am disappointed in your answers.

We are acutely aware of objections. Strong objections have been raised by our allies. If you are not, you need to get on board before I am going to be able to vote for your confirmation.

You were in the same Bureau in the Obama administration. You are aware that twice they considered adopting a no-first-use or sole-purpose policy. You are aware that you, are you not? Once early on in their administration and then again during the time you were there between 2015 and 2017. Is that correct?

Ms. STEWART. Yeah.

Senator RISCH. Would you tell this committee why the Obama administration decided not to adopt the no-first-use or sole-purpose policy?

Ms. STEWART. My understanding is that they had a lot of effort to engage and understand partners' perceptions. And I am sorry that you take issue with my statement. I think the concern is that we really need to allow the process to play out and we need to understand the best advice from the Department of Defense leading this process and how that can be implemented through policy, that we work with partners and allies to explain and understand.

But to your question—sorry—the approach in the Obama administration to get to fundamental purpose of deterrence, was really to accommodate many of the challenges we faced with our deterrence efforts and to understand integrated deterrence issues within the report, and to address some of the existential threats that we faced at that time.

Senator RISCH. But you agree with me they specifically rejected adopting a no-first-use or sole-purpose policy? Do you agree with that?

Ms. STEWART. I was not part of the NPR process during that time.

Senator RISCH. Did not they or did not they?

Ms. STEWART. They did not have sole-purpose or no-first-use in the Obama—

Senator RISCH. And they specifically rejected it after considering it and studying it. Is that correct?

Ms. STEWART [continuing]. I assume that they looked at it closely, but I was not part of that process yet.

Senator RISCH. And I agree with you, we need to let the thing play out. But if we are going to let the—if we are going to let the process play out, we need to have at least a clear understanding of what our allies are telling us and it looks to me like you got a long ways to go to get there.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen?

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations to each of our nominees today. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you.

I would like to begin, excuse me, with you, Ms. Carty, and as the representative to the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council, I wanted to assess your feeling about the Commission on the status of women, which is the only global body dedicated to the promotion of women and girls empowerment and equality and aids to mainstream women's equality in U.N. activities.

[Clears throat.]

Senator SHAHEEN. Excuse me.

As you look at the role that you can play within ECOSOC and with the Commission, how do you think efforts to improve women's empowerment could be bolstered by the work of the Commission and do you see specific changes that you can be engaged in that will help with that?

Ms. CARTY. Senator Shaheen, thank you so much for that question. I have spent a fair part of my career working on issues related to women and girls and gender, and it is an issue that is very near and dear to my heart.

I see multiple opportunities, Senator, across the U.N. system where I could help through a position in ECOSOC advance U.S. goals regarding the well being of women and girls if I was confirmed for this position.

I think CSW offers particular opportunities. I think the important thing is to be very strategic and forward thinking in how we engage there and to make sure that we approach each CSW session with a very clear sense of what we want to try to achieve and we work very deliberately with CSW and other missions in New York, other governments, to try to make sure of one mind about the objectives we will pursue during those sessions.

Senator SHAHEEN. Can you give me an example of a priority that you would have as you are looking at a first place to focus?

Ms. CARTY. One issue, Senator, I feel is terribly important is the issue of education for women and girls. It is something, unfortunately, where there have been huge and significant setbacks in the context of the COVID epidemic.

We know that there are tens of thousands, millions, of girls out of school at this point who may never get back into school, and I think that would be a really important area, actually, across the U.N. system for specific focus, because we know that without that kind of access to education that it really imperils a young girl's future.

I would encourage CSW to look at that set of issues.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. And we know that empowering women and girls also adds to the stability in communities and countries, the potential opportunities and prosperity and economic opportunities in countries as well.

Ms. Stewart, I was really pleased to see the Biden administration extend the New START treaty, something that I worked on 10 years ago when it was before this body.

But as we think about how we continue to engage with the Russians, where do you think we should be thinking and how can we build on that to cover tactical weapons, emerging nuclear technologies, other efforts that we really need to address?

Ms. STEWART. Thank you, Senator.

I share your concerns with respect to the Russian challenges that we are facing right now. Russia's new nuclear weapons and its diversification in dual-use delivery platforms represent a threat to strategic stability.

The strategic stability dialogue is an interagency process to seek risk reduction and greater understanding of the policies and actions of the two nations.

In the plenary led by Deputy Secretary Sherman, we have agreed to two working groups for experts. First, in principles and objectives for the future of arms control, and second, the capabilities and actions with strategic effect.

We have made clear that we want to address all of Russia's nuclear weapons, including nonstrategic nuclear weapons and novel delivery systems.

Our driving principles in this process will be increasing U.S. and allied security, ensuring effective verification and faithful compliance for legally binding measures, and avoiding future miscalculation or misunderstanding.

We are only at the beginning of our conversations, and so I agree with you we need to be careful to understand the full range of challenges and misunderstanding potentials that we face.

No determinations about specific approaches have been made. But the strategic stability dialogue is a very good first step to try to engage and understand where we have overlapping concerns and where we can make progress towards stabilizing our relationship.

If confirmed, I hope to consult closely with this Congress to address this process further and to truly understand how we can best evaluate and consider this threat.

Senator SHAHEEN. And so are you optimistic? You said you think it is a good first step. Are you optimistic that we may be able to make some progress?

Ms. STEWART. I am cautiously optimistic that, in certain arenas, there is some progress we can make that we can understand where our collective advantage for both the U.S. and Russia and, hopefully, the global community can be satisfied by taking important actions to address destabilizing behavior and to lead to the best norms of responsible behavior.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I understand the next colleague who is available is Senator Van Hollen virtually.

Senator Van Hollen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all the witnesses for your service. Congratulations on your nominations.

Ms. Carty, a question regarding the Sustainable Development Goals at the United Nations. We have gotten a recent report indicating that since the onset of COVID-19 we have seen an increase in extreme poverty, declines in educational achievement, increased violence against women and girls, and other trends that threaten to reverse some of the positive development gains that we have made in recent decades.

The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations has the main responsibility for integrating—addressing these issues across different U.N. agencies.

What goals you think we need to be most focused on when it comes to regaining lost ground? Where have we lost the most ground and what role can you play and the United States play in trying to catch up?

Ms. CARTY. Senator, thank you very much for that question and for flagging what really is an ancillary impact of the COVID epidemic that we all need to keep very much within our lines of sight.

The truth is the U.S. has driven so much of that global development progress over many decades and it is now all at risk. I do think, Senator, the SDGs present a very important roadmap for how to bring the global community together in a common effort to ensure that we are trying to regain ground on all those issues that you just mentioned, whether it is food insecurity, increasing rates of poverty, or you mentioned with Senator Shaheen children out of school.

The list is quite long, and many of the SDGs directly address those risk areas, Senator. There are ones focused on health, on education, on economic well being, on the climate. I think we actually have to be very strategic, look where the needs are right now most acute, and then try to prioritize action around those SDGs first.

But I would just be clear, Senator, in saying I know Secretary Blinken has embraced the SDGs as a roadmap for development, and I think one of the real values that they bring is they do provide a path, a common path, and set benchmarks for progress.

If confirmed for the position, Senator, I would very much look forward to focusing on the SDGs as a key component of my work. Thank you.

Senator Van Hollen: Thank you. Maybe you can follow up with respect to which areas you think are in most need of focused attention right now.

Mr. Chairman, can you still hear me?

The CHAIRMAN. I can, Senator.

Senator Van Hollen: I think—so I do not know if—Ms. Carty, just a follow-up question for you. According to a July report by the International Service for Human Rights, China has repeatedly used its seat on ECOSOC to block applications from NGOs working on human rights issues, and not only blocking NGOs working in China but China has, essentially, acted as a shield for other authoritarian regimes.

Are you familiar with this situation and what would you do about it, if confirmed?

Ms. CARTY. Senator, thanks very much. I am not familiar with that specific report. But I am, certainly, familiar with the broad issue at stake here. And just I would say to start that we have to be very clear we can leave no space for China to try to undermine the fundamental values and principles of the U.N. system.

We have seen this play out very specifically in the NGO committee, which is the committee that accredits NGOs for U.N. representation.

I have worked at many points over my career, Senator, with non-governmental organizations and I fully understand the importance of the perspective they can bring to the table. They must be there, but it must be legitimate credible NGOs that are there.

If confirmed for this position, I would work across the NGO committee to ensure that entities that should be at the table are, particularly those that China might seek to deny a place to, perhaps NGOs working on human rights or press freedoms or other broad democracy and governance issues, and I would ensure that those that do not belong at the table do not have a place.

Thanks, Senator.

Senator Van Hollen: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of you. I have some questions to submit for the record, but congratulations to all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Kaine?

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and congratulations to all the witnesses.

Mr. Bondy, I think I will spend my five minutes with you. You have significant experience in a really important region of the world and I want to ask you about a couple of issues dealing with the U.S.-Bahrain relationship.

First, Bahrain has been a good partner in the United States in our evacuation of Afghans. They have been very helpful in being the home of our Fifth Fleet.

Bahrain has also had some serious concerns about human rights issues, mass arrests in 2011, and it is a country where the leadership is kind of a minority Sunni population that is in leadership, but about 70 percent of the population is Shi'a.

Talk about what you could do, should you be confirmed, to promote more attention to human rights in Bahrain.

Mr. BONDY. Senator, thank you very much for the question.

Indeed, as you say, there has been traditionally a fair bit of friction and tension within the Kingdom of Bahrain between the various communities. If we were to rewind 10 years ago, as you said, when there was quite a bit of strife in the country, we would have to say that the trend lines since then have been exceedingly positive.

Indeed, the Government of Bahrain has used a new legislative mechanism called the alternative sentencing law to release over 3,500 convicts who were in prison and they have now been able to depart the prison and find other ways to sort of get on with their lives.

Additionally, Senator, there is a new juvenile justice law which elevates the age from 15 to 18 of who can be tried as a majority age individual and that has resulted, in fact, in some people between the ages of 15 and 18 really serving kind of very shortened sentences in juvenile detention centers rather than as full-blown prisoners.

But, Senator, you absolutely have hit the nail on the head. Promoting human rights is absolutely an essential tenet of the administration's foreign policy, and if confirmed, I will seek to use several fora that we already have established either through the strategic dialogue or in regular quarterly meetings between the Embassy and an inter-ministerial grouping in Manama to continue to promote the values and the interests that we have with regard to human rights.

Senator KAINE. Mr. Bondy, thank you for that.

Switching to another topic, in the last couple days something positive happened. Foreign Minister Lapid of Israel visited Bahrain to open the Israeli Embassy there. Very, very positive.

I was a supporter of the Abraham Accords when they were announced for a couple of reasons. I feel like the normalization of relations between nations in the region and Israel was actually a public expression of what was already sort of going on sub rosa, and rather than have it be sub rosa why not put it on the table that we are now going to work together on issues of common cause?

A normalized diplomatic relationship is not a Good Housekeeping seal of approval but it is just a way of having channels of dialogue and communication and normal relations, which are beneficial.

But the other reason I strongly support the Abraham Accords is I have been just so discouraged about the absence of progress toward a two-state solution in Israel. I visited Israel for the first time in 1998. I went to the West Bank as well.

And, frankly, in the 23 years since then the situation has moved farther away from the peace between an Israel and Palestine living side by side that we contemplated when we recognized the State of Israel at its foundation during the Truman presidency.

I view the Abraham Accords as giving nations in the region kind of skin in the game. Their populations want them to do things to promote a successful resolution and a Palestinian nation that lives peacefully side by side with Israel.

You were the charge at the UAE. The UAE was one of the other nations that normalized relations with Israel in this way. What do you see as prospects of building upon the Abraham Accords to break the stalemate that has existed for so long and find a path forward to the peace that we have longed for for decades?

Mr. BONDY. Thank you, Senator, for that very important question and for your comments on the situation.

Indeed, the Abraham Accords are—they represent a strategic change for the region and, in fact, in my career I also served in Jordan when Jordan made peace with Israel. I view strengthening and expanding the relationship of two very good friends and allies, Bahrain and Israel, as a very important book end to my own career with the Foreign Service.

But I believe there is great potential for those two friends to build their relationship all the way across the spectrum, and I will devote my energy and creativity, if confirmed, to helping them to do exactly that, Senator.

Senator KAINE. Mr. Chair, I yield back.

Senator CARDIN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Kaine.

I understand we have next by WebEx Senator Young.

[No response.]

Senator CARDIN. Senator Young, are you there?

[No response.]

Senator CARDIN. I will pursue my questioning and then we will come back to Senator Young if he is available.

First off, let me thank all of our nominees for their public service and they are willing to continue in public service. These are difficult times.

We thank you and your families. Each of the positions that you have been nominated to are extremely important to our national security and to America's interests.

Ms. Carty, I am going to follow up on the Sustainable Development Goals. I was listening to your response to Senator Van Hollen. But I want to concentrate on one that was not mentioned during that exchange and that is Sustainable Goal Number 16.

It is the one that the United States was the initiator of to include it among the SDGs. It is a new one so, therefore, it is going to be more challenging to implement accountability standards.

And it is a little bit more difficult to establish accountability standards for SDG 16 as compared to others that we have established ways of evaluating how well we are doing in meeting the SDG goals.

Will you tell me your strategy on dealing with SDG 16, which deals with good governance, so that I can have your assurances that this will be a very high priority if you are confirmed to this position?

Ms. CARTY. Thank you very much, Senator.

And I think it is so important that the U.S. did insist on adding that as one of the core SDGs because it is fundamental to everything else that needs to happen. It is fundamental to how the U.N. system needs to work.

If confirmed, Senator, I would work very aggressively with other like-minded governments to ensure that we did have the clearest possible benchmarks and indicators, meaningful benchmarks and indicators, practical benchmarks and indicators, to track progress on SDG 16 and also to ensure that where we saw backtracking we had effective means of calling that out.

I think it comports very well, Senator, with broader U.S. development policy and, if confirmed, I look forward to paying sustained attention and working with you and your staff on that.

Senator CARDIN. I appreciate that. We are going to try to help you by establishing a rating system for how well countries are doing on fighting corruption, which is one of the key ingredients—anti-corruption—to have good governance.

We are going to try to help you, but I can assure you I will be sending you information and expecting responses in regards to carrying out President Biden's acknowledgement that corruption is a national security core concern so you have a chance to do something about that with the SDG 16.

And speaking about backtracking on good governance, Mr. Bondy, Senator Kaine already covered this point but I just want to cover it from a little bit different angle, and that is that, yes, Bahrain is an important ally of the United States in so many different areas, including our strategies against Iran as well as the Abraham Accords and moving forward with normalization with relations with Israel.

During Arab Spring, Bahrain was one of the most aggressive countries in dealing with removing the rights of the citizens of their own country and abuses that occurred. We saw some reforms, but it appears now they have backtracked on many of those issues.

I appreciate your comments about some of the issues concerning youthful offenders. But my information shows they are still using

the arrest powers indiscriminately to crack down on any opposition to the Government at all, including peaceful demonstrations.

I just really want to stress the point that with a country that we have a strategic partnership with that is backtracking on their commitments on human rights, we have to be very clear that that is a major concern to us and it affects our ability to strengthen the ties between our two countries.

Mr. BONDY. Senator, I am very grateful for your comments on this important matter. It is difficult for me to comment on whether there is backtracking or forward movement as you know, obviously, I am not serving in the capacity.

However, I can assure you, Senator that raising the broad swath of human rights issues would be something that I would eagerly do if confirmed as ambassador, and we do have several mechanisms where we can raise kind of the broad policy issues as well as specific cases.

And I will say that my understanding is that our Bahraini partners have been very open to having that free and frank dialogue and, if confirmed, I would welcome the role of this committee and the Congress to play in this extremely important set of human rights issues.

Senator CARDIN. And let me mention one other part that our missions play in countries where NGOs or advocates have a challenging time in exercising their rights, their basic human rights, where the U.S. mission becomes a safe place for them to be able to get support for being heard.

Do you commit, if confirmed, that our mission in country will always be a safe haven for those trying to exercise their basic human rights?

Mr. BONDY. Yes, Senator, I do. Those activities go on already where we have a broad swath of outreach to human rights defenders and human rights organizations, and if confirmed, I absolutely want to continue that outreach.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. I believe Senator Young is now available vis-a-vis WebEx.

Senator Young?

Senator YOUNG. Thank you so much, Mr. Cardin.

Mr. Bondy, very good to see you, sir. Congratulations to you on your nomination and to all the other panelists on your nominations.

Mr. Bondy, Bahrain recently committed to partner with Task Force 59 and will be the first nation to partner with that group. According to NAVCENT, they agreed to collaborate in October on manned/unmanned teaming exercise to evaluate advanced unmanned surface vessels.

Will you commit to support Bahrain's partnership with the Fifth Fleet's recently created unmanned systems task force, Task Force 59, and will you work to promote other Gulf States joining this important initiative?

Mr. BONDY. Senator, I absolutely can support that. I think it is a very important initiative in order to continue to promote freedom of navigation and safe transport in the—on the high seas.

Senator YOUNG. Very good.

Sir, in light of the Abraham Accords and Israel's entry into CENTCOM, will you commit to push as hard as possible to get the Israeli military as integrated as possible in the multilateral activities at CENTCOM and the Fifth Fleet lead out of Bahrain, including maritime security efforts in the Gulf and Red Sea and regional efforts on missile defense and counter drone efforts?

Mr. BONDY. Senator, I believe that moving forward on building the relationship between Israel and Bahrain in a broad spectrum of areas all the way, starting with military and security as you are describing and then moving all the way across to economy, trade, education, technology, and people-to-people ties, is incredibly important.

And certainly, if confirmed, I would like to find a way to use the convening power of the United States in order to involve Israel more closely in planning and discussions related to preserving security in Bahrain and the Gulf region.

Senator YOUNG. Thank you.

And lastly, sir, will you commit to work with CENTCOM and the Fifth Fleet to get an Israeli naval liaison officer assigned to NAVCENT in Manama?

Mr. BONDY. Senator, I admit that I am unaware of that specific initiative. But, if confirmed, I absolutely would want to consult with the Department of Defense, with NAVCENT, assist in any way that I could play a useful role.

Senator YOUNG. That makes sense, Mr. Bondy. I will look forward to, should you be confirmed, following up with you and your consultation with DOD, and if there is any way I could be of assistance in furtherance of that effort I will be happy to do so.

Ms. Stewart, congratulations to you as well. We continue to see the foundation of strategic arms control crumble away. Years ago, I spent a brief stint of time working on the staff of former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Dick Lugar. I feel especially responsible to ensure the legacy of arms control is protected and renewed.

To do that, we must have partners and processes that we can trust. At the same time, we want to ensure that we do not erode our defensive capabilities by entering into an agreement that is one sided.

What are the core areas of New START, Ms. Stewart, that need to be updated in order for the U.S. and Russia to have confidence in the agreement?

Ms. STEWART. Thank you, Senator, for that question. I definitely appreciate your background in this issue and I am very glad to hear that you are concerned about the future in this arena, as I am as well.

Because of the downturn in relations with the Russian Federation, effective arms control is more valuable now than it was in 2010, and it is important to maintain the boundaries on nuclear competition even as we hold the Russian Federation to account for its reckless and aggressive actions.

I think the verifiable limits on Russian intercontinental range nuclear forces allow us to make better informed judgments about the sufficiency of U.S. nuclear forces and help diminish the possibility of a costly and dangerous nuclear arms race.

As you know, New START also provides a forum for ongoing dialogue on strategic stability in nuclear weapons at a time when tensions between our countries are elevated and bilateral relations are increasingly challenged.

As to your specific question, it would be useful in the next steps beyond the New START treaty to address the nonstrategic nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation to understand their limitations, numbers, and parameters in a way that could comprehensively address our concerns with respect to a lack of strategic stability by their increasing presence.

As for the specifics of a next step agreement beyond New START, I think we definitely have to consider, as many administrations have, how to bring in the nonstrategic nuclear weapons and the novel delivery systems, including the unmanned delivery platforms, to address their concerns from a strategic stability vantage.

Senator YOUNG. Thank you. I think my time is about to end. I am curious whether there is any interest in Russia for a revised INF after the Trump administration pulled out on account of the fact that it had essentially become a unilateral agreement.

Unless you have a yes or no answer on that, which I would welcome, maybe we can talk about that later.

Ms. STEWART. Thank you. I look forward to discussing this with you, if confirmed.

Senator YOUNG. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you.

Senator Cruz?

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to the nominees.

Ms. Stewart, the post that you would hold, if you are confirmed, is one that is critically important to the national security of the United States. Among other things, the bureau you would be heading is responsible for the annual report mandated by Congress on international adherence to arms control treaties.

This report serves both as a proxy and a litmus test for the seriousness with which presidential administrations approach dangerous proliferation.

During the Trump administration, I repeatedly urged the president to untangle the United States from Cold War style treaties that only constrained us, both because Russia cheated on them and China was not even bound by them.

President Trump rightly extracted us from treaties like the INF and Open Skies. The annual compliance report, which documented Russian and Chinese proliferation, was a crucial part of the case I made and the decisions that President Trump took.

I want to discuss with you how you would approach these issues, if confirmed. Let us start with China. China is engaged right now in a nuclear buildup that likely puts them in violation of their obligations under Article 6 of the NPT. The U.S. has limited leverage to stop this buildup, though.

I have previously introduced legislation that would impose sanctions on parts of the Chinese military sector unless they come into compliance with their already existing NPT Article 6 obligations for good faith negotiations.

Do you agree that China is in violation of its Article 6 obligations?

Ms. STEWART. Thank you, Senator. I share your concern about China's growing nuclear arsenal, and it does pose a security threat to the United States and our allies.

That said, I intend to, if confirmed, work closely with the lawyers and the experts in the Arms Control Bureau to understand more fully the exact development and capacity enhancement that China is engaging in and to understand how that implicates their Article 6 obligations under the NPT.

Senator CRUZ. Does that mean you do not have an opinion right now about whether China is in violation of their Article 6 obligations?

Ms. STEWART. I think I need to understand better exactly the parameters of their development and what they intend to do. I understand there is future plans and, certainly, rapid expansion in the future, and I need to understand exactly where that is going to be implicated with respect to their nuclear capacities.

Senator CRUZ. All right. Let us turn to Russia.

You have been a noted advocate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. As you know, the United States Senate has pointedly refused to ratify the CTBT, in part because of Russian behavior.

In its 2021 Compliance Report, the Trump administration rightly called out this behavior. I would like to quote from that report.

Quote, "The United States finds that since declaring its testing moratorium Russia has conducted nuclear weapons experiments that have created nuclear yield and are not consistent with the U.S. zero yield standard."

Do you agree with that assessment?

Ms. STEWART. I agree with the assessment in the Compliance Report, yes.

Senator CRUZ. Do you commit to ensuring, if you are confirmed, that you would continue to document such noncompliance?

Ms. STEWART. Absolutely.

Senator CRUZ. Okay. Let us shift then to Iran.

Since 2007, it has nearly always been the position of the United States that Iran is not a member in good standing within the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT.

We know the Iranian regime kept nuclear weapons blueprints on the shelf even while they were still pretending to comply with the Iran deal.

In April 2019, then nominee to be Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Jeffrey Eberhardt, confirmed in writing to this committee that, quote, "Iran's standing as a nonnuclear weapons state party to the NPT cannot be described as good."

Do you agree with Mr. Eberhardt's assessment?

Ms. STEWART. Thank you for the question. I do.

Senator CRUZ. Do you consider Iran's past possession of the nuclear archives seized by Israel, including materials in the archives relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute non-compliance by Iran of its obligation under the NPT?

Ms. STEWART. We, certainly, share the concern that this is a serious issue we need to look into. But I think we need more under-

standing and information regarding that background file to assess whether that constitutes a violation of the NPT.

Senator CRUZ. Okay. And final question. I am concerned about the possibility of the Biden administration adopting a, quote, “no-first-use” nuclear policy. China has formally declared a no-first-use policy, but the Chinese Communist Party has proven itself willing to break such promises after we agree to them.

Do you personally support a no-first-use policy for the United States?

Ms. STEWART. Thank you.

With respect to that question I would, certainly, defer to the Department of Defense process that is presently undergoing to understand what exact policy is being included in a statement of no-first-use.

That said, I appreciate that we need to ensure our extended deterrence commitments to our allies and partners remain strong and credible, as the President has stated that we would do in our Interim National Security Strategic guidance.

And it is important to make sure allies and partners understand that whatever steps we take our commitment to their defense is unshakable.

Senator CRUZ. You do not have any personal views on this topic, though?

Ms. STEWART. I have a lot of personal views with respect to the underlying policies being considered in the Nuclear Posture Review. But I am certainly—I am certainly welcoming the—

Senator CRUZ. What are those views? That is the question is what are those views?

Ms. STEWART. I think we have to—we have to really consider how we can take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our deterrence. But we have to do so in a way that ensures our extended deterrence commitments to our allies and partners remain strong and credible.

And I think, regardless of the policy language, the words will be informed by the concerns that the Senator raised earlier. They will be informed by our engagement with the allies and partners to ensure them of our unshakeable commitment.

And so if the policy is no-first-use, if it is sole-purpose, if it is fundamental purpose or if it goes back to the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, it has to be done with a good sense of understanding of our commitments.

And we need to make sure that our commitments to our allies are strong and unshakable, and we need to understand their concerns and address them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator CRUZ. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. There are no other members before the committee, as I understand it. I will ask questions myself.

Before I do, I want to wish Senator Cardin a very happy, joyous, and healthy birthday and many more, one of our key members of the committee.

[Singing.]

Senator CARDIN. We now understand that Senator Menendez's Senate career is his second career. His first career is as a singer and a performer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not giving up my day job. I like to eat. But happy birthday. This is what happens when you sing—I sang to Jeanne Shaheen. Now he wants to be sung to. I made that mistake of doing that in public. In any event, happy birthday, Ben.

And I understand—I do not know if he is here anymore, but a former member of the staff, John Ryan, who is at the State Department, shares an illustrious birthday with Senator Cardin. Happy birthday to him as well.

Let me, on a serious note, turn to our nominees.

Ms. Stewart, you may have heard my opening comments and I am wondering, do you believe that the department as it is presently configured, as it is presently staffed, is up to the challenge ahead?

Ms. STEWART. Thank you, Senator.

I share your concerns that the Bureau of Arms Control has been challenged through the previous administration—losing resources, losing supporting staff—and I agree that bringing on a new generation of experts and enabling the good transfer of institutional knowledge will be a priority as will expanding our ability to confront and contend with an increasingly aggressive China and new and emerging technological challenges.

I agree with you we also need to expand and enhance our work to create a new generation of tools and technologies that will enhance verification and allow us to better monitor compliance.

We need to position ourselves to work closely with the intelligence community and the U.S. interagency to explain the basis for the U.S. Government's compliance concerns to the international community in an effort to shine a light and, hopefully, resolve those concerns.

And finally, we need to work to rebuild an understanding of the importance of arms control measures in coordination with deterrence to achieve a lasting and sustainable strategic stability.

If confirmed, all of these are issues that I hope to work on in close cooperation with you to expand and enhance the capacity of the Bureau to address the numerous challenges that face us.

The CHAIRMAN. We have an extraordinary array of issues that your department would have responsibility for and for which I think we face some major challenges.

Let me ask you specifically, it appears that we have reached a critical juncture in our diplomatic efforts to contain Iran's nuclear program. It continues to stonewall the IAEA's investigation into undeclared nuclear materials and activities that were uncovered in 2018 and is refusing to allow the IAEA to assess critical monitoring equipment.

I do not even understand quite the much ballyhooed agreement that was reached by the IAEA. All they did is they took out the components that were previously being used for monitoring but which they cannot see and put in the new chips to continue to monitor but which they cannot see.

We do not have any eyes on site during this period of time to understand how far they have advanced, and Tehran is pressing for-

ward with their nuclear program with a current breakout time to produce the necessary material for a weapon near where it was before the JCPOA was signed.

What impact is Iran's refusal to cooperate with the IAEA having on compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and do you think that Iran has really walked away without very much consequence, that other states will follow Iran's lead and refuse to fully cooperate with the IAEA?

Ms. STEWART. Thank you, Senator. I completely share your concerns on this issue. This administration remains committed to ensuring Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon and we continue to believe diplomacy, in coordination with our allies and regional partners, is the best path to achieve that goal.

We, clearly, have a series of fundamental disagreements on a wide range of issues. Iran's lack of cooperation on safeguards in the JCPOA, its support for terrorism, its ballistic missile programs, destabilizing actions throughout the region, and its abhorrent practice of using wrongfully detained U.S. citizens and foreign nationals as political tools are all issues of grave concern.

But with respect to your specific point, if we do not address the numerous challenges that Iran poses, we will risk other countries following Iran's lead and we will risk the diminishment of the IAEA and the NPT itself.

This administration is very focused on understanding what we can do to address all of these challenges while supporting the IAEA.

AVC's sister bureau, the ISN Bureau, is the lead in the T family on this issue. If confirmed, I will work to make sure AVC is ably assisting the department in its efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and to ensure support for the IAEA in all of its efforts.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I have questions for you on China but I will submit them for the record. I would like a full answer when you receive them.

Let me turn to Mr. Bondy. We, obviously, you, obviously, support the continued partnership with Bahrain to address counterterrorism needs in the region. Is that correct?

Mr. BONDY. Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. And as well as maintaining the close security partnership that we have between the United States and Bahrain?

Mr. BONDY. Yes, I do, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. We applaud that Bahrain and the UAE became countries that normalized relations with Israel. But, if confirmed, what steps can you take as ambassador to preserve the space for a continued dialogue on normalization, how we could help foster Israel's growing ties with Bahrain?

Mr. BONDY. Yes, Senator. Thank you very much for the question.

This is an issue set that, if confirmed, I would want to devote all of my creativity and energy in order to expand the relationship between two of our close friends and allies in the Middle East region.

Indeed, I believe there is quite a bit of progress that can be made. At least at this stage both sides have taken the fundamentally important step to complete and sign and promote the Abra-

ham Accords, and now comes the time where it needs to be operationalized.

As we heard earlier, the Israeli Foreign Minister did visit Bahrain just a few days ago. Bahrain does have an ambassador now in Israel and my understanding is Israel shortly will have an ambassador in Bahrain.

I would, certainly, want to, if confirmed, consult with the Israeli Embassy, the Israeli ambassador. But I do believe, Senator, that there is a great amount of room for joint cooperation be it in the military and security realm, all the way across to people-to-people contact, and I would want to look for opportunities in order to enhance that relationship.

The CHAIRMAN. I have said to several of our nominees going to some of these countries is that it is great that the Abraham Accords were signed. It is great that there is normalizing.

But normalizing has to go a step beyond. If you are allies you are allies. That means you stand up for Israel at institutions like the United Nations. It means you engage within the region to engage other countries within the region.

As you say, it has to become operational. Otherwise, it is just a piece of paper for which there is a recognition of a relationship. But what that relationship is is really, ultimately, embodied by the actions of both countries, bilaterally, in each case. I hope to see that in the case of Bahrain.

I do have questions about our—the human rights, and I will submit those for the record that I would like to see you respond to.

Finally, Ms. Carty, I look at what some people say about ECOSOC and there are some who say that ECOSOC lacks any real authority and that it works—overlaps with the activities of the U.N. General Assembly.

It has been suggested that the Council could play a greater role in global economic and development policy. The U.N. has passed several reforms over the years, including as recently as this year, to strengthen ECOSOC's policy guidance role and to improve collaboration between ECOSOC, its subsidiary councils, and other U.N. entities.

What is your assessment of the most recent ECOSOC reforms? Do you believe that ECOSOC should have a greater policy-setting role?

Ms. CARTY. Senator, thanks for the question.

I think it is still a work in motion, Senator, as best I understand the situation. ECOSOC does play an important role in framing the conversation that then goes on to the General Assembly in creating reports, resolutions, documents. It can set the context for how key issues are discussed, key issues that matter substantially to the United States.

If confirmed for this position, Senator, I would always keep that in mind, how do we work effectively across the ECOSOC body to ensure that their operations are effectively supporting important U.S. goals that are within the purview of the committee.

I am a firm believer, Senator that the U.N. functions best when the U.S. is in a leadership role and is, clearly, at the table and I would hope, if confirmed, to bring that to the ECOSOC discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. One last question for you. I am concerned about China's increasing influence and role in U.N. bodies. ECOSOC consults with more than 5,100 registered nongovernmental organizations to inform its work.

I am deeply concerned that within ECOSOC China has used its seat on the Council's committee on NGOs to block applications from NGOs working on human rights issues.

I know you are not there yet but you have been involved in this field in general. How do you assess China's efforts to use its increased influence at ECOSOC and elsewhere in the U.N. system to undermine civil society and silence the voices of those who champion human rights?

Ms. CARTY. Senator, I think this absolutely is a problem and it needs to be a top priority. We know that there is a broader effort undertaken by China across the U.N. system to try to insert its authoritarian values in place of core U.N. principles.

We cannot allow that to happen. There are particular risks in the ECOSOC space and, in particular, in the NGO committee where I understand China has acted to ensure that NGOs that represent Tibet or the Uighurs are not allowed to participate.

If confirmed for this position, Senator, I share fully with you the view that NGOs and civil society provide an absolute critical perspective. Credible organizations need to be at the table and I would devote the full measure of my energies to ensure that was, in fact, the case.

The CHAIRMAN. We look forward to that. This committee as well as the Senate has spoken with one voice on China and, therefore, whether it be on arms control issues or whether it be about its nefarious activities at the U.N. that I have just described, we look forward to a forceful response.

Senator Hagerty has made it under the wire. He is now recognized.

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you, Senator Menendez. It was my honor to follow you in the Banking Committee meeting just a few minutes ago and thank you for your comments there and your leadership there.

Ms. Stewart, I would like to turn a question to you. The United States has a long history of using nuclear deterrent to prevent not only nuclear aggression but nonnuclear forms of aggression that either threaten us or our allies.

Jim Baker, who served as President George H. W. Bush's Secretary of State, wrote about the use of calculated ambiguity. Using calculated ambiguity in America's policy to deter and prevent Saddam Hussein, I think, had a real effect, looking at the possible use of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction during the 1991 Gulf War.

We use calculated ambiguity to make an enemy think really hard about the possible consequences before they might launch chemical or biological weapons against the United States, knowing that the response could include a full range of options, including nuclear.

In 2020, presidential candidate Biden argued that, and I am going to quote, "The sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be deterring and, if necessary, retaliating against a nuclear attack," the end of his quote.

From my perspective as a businessman, I always think it is a bad option to take tools and options off the table, particularly with dealing in situations where the United States or our allies might be in danger.

I want to ask you, Ms. Stewart, do you support adopting a sole-purpose policy?

Ms. STEWART. Thank you so much for that question. I agree, this is a really difficult area and it is a very complicated analysis that, right now is being led by the Department of Defense to really have a whole-of-government review of our deterrence posture, our Missile Defense Review, our nuclear policy, and our broader national defense guidance. I think this is a hard issue.

With respect to sole-purpose, with respect to no-first-use, with respect to sort of the policy formulations, ultimately, United States declaratory nuclear policy will be a decision for the President, and the particular language chosen for this policy will be fully informed by the perspectives of our allies and partners.

And as I mentioned before, we will engage allies and partners. We will continue—and we have been engaging with them—to assure them that the United States commitment to their defense is unshakable and to explain how our rationale for the declaratory policy is chosen by the President in the best national security interests and how we intend to assure our allies' and partners' security consistent with that policy.

To your specific question, the policy formulations that the Department of Defense right now is coming up with will fully take into account the strategic threat environment we face and will certainly lay out the concerns and the challenges with respect to any option on the table.

I do not want to get ahead of where the department is on this. But I understand that all different formulations of what that policy could be are on the table. The concern I have is when we say sole-purpose, what sort of formulation of that are we discussing? Or if we say no-first-use, what formulation?

There are several different, I guess, semantic conversations we could have about what you are looking at and what you are considering in the NPR process and what the Department of Defense is putting on the table, again, fully informed by their threat assessment.

There are certain sole-purpose formulations that may make more or less sense, depending on what we are trying to address throughout the NPR, and looking at the integrated deterrence considerations.

But I think these will all be very carefully observed and studied and presented to the President.

Senator HAGERTY. I can confidently say this, that anything we do in an environment like we have right now where the threat is escalating, anything that we might do that would limit our options would weaken the United States. It would embolden our adversaries and it will cause our allies to question us.

I encourage you strongly as you look at this policy, as you contemplate the responsibilities that you are facing, that you take every effort to broaden our options and not restrict them in any manner.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. That concludes our hearing.

The record for this hearing will remain open until the close of business on Wednesday, October 6th, 2021. I ask colleagues to ensure that questions for the record are submitted no later than tomorrow, on Wednesday.

I would say to the nominees inevitably there will be questions that will be directed to you. I would urge you to answer them fully as well as expeditiously as possible so that your nominations can be considered before the committee at a business hearing.

And with thanks to the committee, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

Additional Material Submitted for the Record

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO MALLORY A. STEWART BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Photos from commercial satellites have revealed three new fields of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The size and scope of these missile fields indicate China is abandoning its previous nuclear strategy based upon minimal deterrence and instead is moving toward a strategy of assured retaliation against the United States, which is similar to Russia's nuclear strategy. This committee began to address this issue in the bipartisan "Strategic Competition Act," which lays out the need for effective arms control in the face of China's military modernization and expansion. What are your thoughts about when and how the United States should approach China to begin talks on strategic stability or arms control?

Answer. I believe the United States must pursue arms control measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's (PRC) growing nuclear arsenal. These efforts will go together with ones designed to bolster deterrence in the region. The administration hopes that Beijing will come to see that arms control is in its own security interest and is a mechanism to reduce the risk of military crises and manage the threat of destabilizing arms races. U.S. allies and partners will be key to success here and the administration will work with them to regularly urge the PRC to engage meaningfully with the United States on arms control. If confirmed, I commit to consult Congress at an appropriate time on potential measures to be pursued with China.

Question. What issues do you believe the United States should focus on?

Answer. The best way to address emerging nuclear threats to the United States and our allies and partners is to ensure our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and pursue arms control that enhances U.S., allied, and partner security. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) growing nuclear arsenal represents one such threat that the United States must address over the coming years. If confirmed, one of my focus areas will be on how best the State Department can expand the expertise and resources needed to contend with arms control challenges posed by the PRC.

Question. Do you believe the AVC Bureau has the resources and staff necessary to effectively negotiate with China?

Answer. If confirmed, one of my top priorities is ensuring the Bureau has the appropriate resources to pursue the administration's arms control objectives, including potential engagement with the People's Republic of China. I would be grateful for Congressional support in this effort.

Question. I supported the extension of the New START Treaty for a full five years. I agreed with the Biden administration that a full extension would allow the United States to retain the benefits of New START while we address the many, many areas of concern we have with Russia. The United States and Russia just completed their second Strategic Stability Dialogue but it is still unclear to me what exactly we are seeking to accomplish in our discussions with Russia. Should the United States and Russia seek to build on New START with a new treaty that imposes deeper reductions in both sides' strategic nuclear forces?

Answer. The Biden-Harris administration will use the five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons. It would be premature to speculate about U.S. nuclear force levels and potential limits in future arms control before the Nuclear Posture Review is complete and President Biden sets U.S. nuclear strategy.

Question. Should we seek a new type of agreement that incorporates shorter-range nuclear weapons, not currently covered by New START?

Answer. The United States will use the time provided by the five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons, including novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Incorporating Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons into arms control is a longstanding and bipartisan U.S. objective.

Question. What impact will China's nuclear buildup have on our ability to reach future arms control agreements with Russia?

Answer. The United States should pursue arms control measures with Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) that advance the security of the United States, U.S. allies, and partners. The PRC's rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal presages a more dangerous future, with a considerably larger number of sophisticated nuclear delivery systems capable of targeting a multitude of actors in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. This larger nuclear arsenal will buttress a broader PRC military build-up and contribute to arms racing dynamics that will complicate how we approach arms control challenges in the future.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO MALLORY A. STEWART BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Duties and Qualifications

Question. What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform the duties of Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance (AVC)?

Answer. In 2004, I joined the Office of Treaty Affairs in the Department of State's Legal Adviser's office and focused on the Arms Control and Nonproliferation treaties portfolio. I have been working on these issues ever since, as a lawyer for the AVC Bureau and as a policy maker in the Bureau. I was a principal member of the technical staff and senior manager at Sandia National Laboratories, where I worked on arms control and nonproliferation policy support. Most recently, I have served as Senior Director at the National Security Council for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation. Before I started as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in AVC, I was closely involved with many of the significant issues confronting the Bureau. For example, I was the lead lawyer for the delegations that negotiated our missile defense agreements with Poland and Romania. I also provided legal support for the New START negotiations and effort to develop rules of responsible behavior in emerging technology domains. I was also involved in the negotiations of the 2013 U.S.-Russian Framework for the Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons and the subsequent international architecture erected at the United Nations and in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to implement that Framework. After becoming the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Emerging Security Challenges and Defense Policy in the AVC bureau, I led numerous space security dialogues with partners and allies, and I was able to support Assistant Secretary Frank Rose in the Space Security Dialogue with China. In that role, I also led the Bureau's efforts to produce the Annual Compliance Report, and then was responsible for briefing that report to the Hill, as well as foreign governments interested in its conclusions. During my time at Sandia National Labs, I learned more about the technical side of verification and compliance. I supported numerous projects on behalf of the State Department or the Department of Defense to further our arms control and nonproliferation policies and objectives, and gained a much deeper understanding of the crucial role of the national labs in so many of our deterrence, strategic stability, and arms control and verification capacities. Finally, as a Special Assistant to the President and the Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation, I have been leading the interagency policy processes on these issues for over 8 months. This has provided me with a clear view of how the entire nuclear policy arena operates and interacts (both domestically and internationally)

and the challenges, stovepipes, and perspectives that exist. If confirmed, my experience and interagency connections in this field will serve me well in the role of AVC Assistant Secretary.

Question. If confirmed, do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance?

Answer. Given the numerous challenges posed by weapons of mass destruction and emerging technologies, it is important that everyone working to mitigate these challenges continually enhance and expand our personal knowledge and understanding. If confirmed, I will continue my own efforts to understand the scope of both the challenges facing the Bureau and the varying perspectives—both international and domestic—on how to address them. This includes listening to and working with Congress, the interagency, as well as international allies and partners to maximize our collective efforts to improve international security.

Major Challenges and Priorities

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance?

Answer. There are numerous challenges facing AVC as a whole, some of which I outlined in my opening statement. If confirmed, I look forward to tackling all of them with the help of the experts in the Bureau, at State and around the Government. A top priority would be to enable and empower the Bureau to bring in and retain the necessary expertise to effectively address the growing threats to strategic stability, including China, emerging technologies, and attribution and accountability challenges in the face of mis- and disinformation. Impending retirements and staff attrition must also be addressed. The institutional transfer of knowledge from key experts and opportunities for growth and career development would also be a major focus of mine.

Question. If confirmed, how would you address these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I would make it a priority to enhance bipartisan focus on the Bureau's crucial work on global strategic stability. I would also work to expand AVC's ability to work hand in hand with the U.S. interagency focused on nuclear policy, through more dialogues, detail opportunities, and other exchanges, so that the Bureau's tool set can be used to continue to strengthen national security and reduce risks internationally. In particular, I would want to focus on working with the interagency to better integrate deterrence and arms control policies, so they can be mutually reinforcing. Working together with the Hill, I would make the case that AVC needs the best tools and analytical capabilities available, now and in the future, to provide accurate, credible, and robust verification of arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments, as well as rigorous assessments of compliance with those agreements and commitments, including in order to provide Congress and our partners and allies with a complete and accurate accounting of the arms control landscape through the annual Compliance Report.

Question. If confirmed, what would be your main priorities?

Answer. Longstanding top priorities for the AVC Bureau continue to include reducing the risk of nuclear and conventional war through effective arms control mechanisms such as: risk reduction, transparency, prevention of unintended escalation, negotiation of effectively verifiable international agreements, and bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to prevent miscalculation and misunderstanding. The Bureau has also long sought to limit vertical nuclear proliferation, and to pursue accountability for and deter the use of chemical, biological, and all weapons of mass destruction. Rapid advances in science and technology require that the Bureau continue its work to tackle new challenges: from creating norms of responsible behavior in space, to addressing security challenges underseas and in the Polar regions, to grappling with advancements in cyber capabilities and other emerging technologies that can threaten strategic stability. Finally reinvigorating and reemphasizing the mission of the Bureau, and supporting the international organizations who support attribution and accountability in our arena, needs to be at the forefront of our efforts. Our ability to hold bad actors accountable under the arms control architectures requires unassailable credibility on our part. That means AVC must be at the forefront of fulfilling U.S. commitments to that architecture.

Question. The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance includes a diverse set of portfolios and issues. What criteria would you apply and what processes would you follow to establish priorities and evaluate tradeoffs in time and resources between the various AVC commitments?

Answer. If confirmed, I would strive to align the use of AVC's staff, time, funding, and other resources with priorities identified by the President and Secretary of State and articulated in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and other relevant administration documents, as well as by Congressional mandate. In general, and in conformity with these aforementioned sources of strategic guidance, I would also seek to devote resources to issues based on the magnitude of their potential impact on national security and potential benefit for U.S. efforts to enhance arms control, disarmament, and international security cooperation. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that AVC's Bureau Strategic Plan and Bureau Resource Request reflect full alignment with these criteria for prioritizing the use of resources to fulfill the Bureau's critical national security mission.

Question. What resources does AVC have to call upon within its own bureau, and that it has contracted, to verify, and make compliance determinations with respect to other nations' adherence to their NPT obligations, U.S. nuclear cooperative agreements, and the military diversion of civilian nuclear facilities in violations of existing IAEA safeguards agreements?

Answer. It is my understanding that AVC employs 1.25 FTEs engaged in assessing compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which includes compliance with required IAEA safeguards agreements, but does not assess compliance with U.S. nuclear cooperative agreements. There are no contracts supporting verification of compliance with the NPT at present. The U.S. Government conducts its own analysis of Iran's compliance with the NPT and makes its own findings, drawing on the IAEA's reports, and extensive reporting by the U.S. Intelligence Community. The principal analysis for the annual Compliance Report is drafted by AVC and coordinated within the Department of State. This draft analysis and findings are then sent to the interagency and a thorough, government-wide vetting and clearance process takes place. When the interagency review is completed, State finalizes the analysis and findings as part of the annual Compliance Report.

Question. How do these resources compare with those AVC has on tap to make determinations regarding possible violations of the Outer Space Treaty, the CTBT, the BWC, and CWC? Please give specific staffing numbers in full-time staffer equivalents and in dollars contracted out for relevant outside analysis.

Answer. I understand that AVC's full-time staff equivalents devoted to verifying compliance with the specified treaties at present are as follows: zero FTEs for the Outer Space Treaty, zero FTEs for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 3.5 FTEs for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and 10.5 FTEs for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Should compliance issues arise related to the Outer Space Treaty, AVC staff who cover Outer Space security issues could be allocated to assess such concerns. As the CTBT is not in force yet, no FTEs are dedicated to assessing compliance with it; however, two FTEs work on issues related to CTBT and work to assess compliance with the LTBT and TTBT, as well as states' adherence to their respective voluntary testing moratoria. There are no contracts supporting verification of compliance with the Outer Space Treaty at present. There are no contracts for monitoring compliance with the CTBT, since it is not in force, but ongoing projects relevant to monitoring compliance with the LTBT, TTBT, and states' adherence to voluntary nuclear explosive testing moratoria amount to \$1,310,324 at present. Currently, there are three projects supporting BWC compliance and strengthening attribution measures for biological weapons investigations totaling \$976,000. AVC also has two current projects related to supporting CWC compliance verification totaling \$350,075 at present.

Question. What percentage of verification and compliance analysis does AVC simply delegate to the Intelligence Community and State's Intelligence and Research Bureau?

Answer. As required by statute, the Department of State, led by AVC, prepares compliance analysis as part of the annual Compliance Report, in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Energy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As also required by statute, the report is submitted with the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence. Thus, the Intelligence Community, including the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, reviews and concurs with the annual Reports. The AVC Bureau is uniquely positioned to employ a cadre of WMD technical and arms control policy experts who are involved in the rigorous compliance assessment process. Compliance assessments are informed by all-source intelligence products, comprising both finished analysis and raw reporting, relevant to verification of foreign states' compliance with their obligations. For nearly all agreements, AVC convenes Verification and Compliance Analysis Working Groups at which interagency partners, especially those identified by statute as participants in

the annual compliance report process, participate in reviewing activities of concern and making recommendations on a compliance determination for respective Compliance Reports.

Question. What are your views on the relationship between the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in particular, and with Congress in general?

Answer. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Congress have an important role in the formation of foreign policy. You have my commitment that, if confirmed, I will work in close coordination with the committee and Congress.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance?

Answer. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Congress have an important role in the formation of foreign policy. My goal, if confirmed, is to work with Congress on resolving a number of challenges that we face as a nation. You have my commitment that, if confirmed, I will work in close coordination with the committee and Congress to achieve our shared objectives.

Question. U.S. Strategic Command leader Admiral Richard says China's "breath-taking" nuclear buildup is the final piece of capability to build a military able to coerce and confront the U.S. and our allies to change the world order. Do you agree with this assessment? Why or why not? What are your views on the causes of China's nuclear expansion? What are the implications?

Answer. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) ongoing rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal presages a more dangerous future, with a considerably larger number of sophisticated nuclear delivery systems able to reach the United States and our allies and partners than in the past. This larger nuclear arsenal will buttress a broader PRC military build-up and its increasingly assertive and threatening behavior to U.S. allies and partners. Precisely because Beijing is the least transparent member of the P5 nuclear weapon states, accurate assessments of its nuclear trajectory and intentions are difficult. China's behavior, in addition to the concerns expressed by Admiral Richard and others, highlights why the United States must pursue arms control to reduce the dangers from the PRC's growing nuclear arsenal.

Question. Air Force Secretary Kendall recently referred to a potential Chinese fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS). What can you share about a possible Chinese FOBS capability? How would such a capability affect the credibility of China's no first use policy?

Answer. I defer to the Intelligence Community for a specific assessment. Overall, China's ongoing advances to its nuclear arsenal raise questions regarding its intent and undermine its claims to seek a minimum nuclear deterrent backed by a no-first use policy.

Question. Would an operational FOBS violate the Outer Space Treaty?

Answer. Consistent with longstanding U.S. policy, an object carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction that completes only a fraction of an orbit is not a violation of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. Longstanding U.S. and international views are that while the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of WMD in orbit, it does not prohibit nuclear weapons or other WMD transiting through space for part of their trajectory.

Question. We understand the prior administration AVC had found cause to find China in violation of the NPT Article VI. What is your view of Chinese refusal to engage in good faith negotiations as required by the NPT? Are they in compliance with article VI?

Answer. The PRC's nuclear weapons build-up risks undermining decades of international progress toward nuclear disarmament. The State Department's most recent Compliance Report did not find the PRC to be in violation of its obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If confirmed, I will consult with legal and policy experts at the Department of State on a variety of matters related to the PRC's behavior in the nuclear weapon arena, including its compliance with Article VI.

Question. China has resisted numerous attempts to engage in bilateral or multilateral engagement regarding arms control, and has instead embarked on a major expansion and improvement of its nuclear forces. How do we get China to the arms control table?

Answer. The administration will pursue arms control measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's (PRC) growing nuclear arsenal. These efforts will be paired with actions to bolster deterrence in the region. The administration is developing and evaluating specific proposals, and, if confirmed, I commit to consulting Congress at an appropriate time on potential measures to be pursued with the PRC and how best the State Department can develop and retain government expertise regarding arms control with the PRC.

Question. The New START Treaty excludes Russia's tactical nuclear weapons and so-called "exotic" strategic delivery systems. If Russia fields some of these exotic systems before the expiration of New START, how should the U.S. respond?

Answer. The New START Treaty limits Russia's Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle and will limit the Sarmat heavy ICBM at the appropriate point in its development cycle. Whether the two nuclear-powered novel systems announced by President Putin in March 2018 will be operational by New START's scheduled expiration in February 2026 remains to be seen. The United States will use the time provided by the extension of New START to pursue with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons, including novel strategic systems not subject to New START and non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Question. Which of Russia's so-called "exotic" systems do you believe are most concerning for U.S. security? Please explain the reasoning behind your answer.

Answer. Each of the novel systems poses unique challenges. Based on the unclassified information that is available, the nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile appears to be volatile, unreliable, and dangerous, posing a threat to the entire world, including Russia. If confirmed, I will consult with the U.S. Intelligence Community on Russia's "exotic" weapon systems, and I will engage with the Department of Defense on the military implications of these systems.

Question. What do you believe the Russian reaction will be, if any, to the recent U.S. declassification of nuclear stockpile numbers?

Answer. Declassifying U.S. nuclear stockpile numbers demonstrates the serious U.S. commitment to transparency and confidence-building measures that can enable further progress on reducing nuclear risks. We encourage Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) to do the same and act in a more transparent manner. The declassification of U.S. stockpile numbers has shown U.S. leadership in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Others have welcomed our transparency and joined us in calling on Russia or the PRC to declassify their nuclear stockpile numbers.

Question. What is your understanding of Russia's nuclear doctrine and how it views nuclear deterrence?

Answer. Russia publicly states it would only use nuclear weapons in two scenarios: in response to the use of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, or if the existence of the Russian state is threatened. Yet Russia conducts exercises with scenarios simulating limited nuclear first use and maintains an arsenal of 1,000 to 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons, which is projected to grow. Russia has developed a wide range of new dual-capable ground-, sea-, and air-based short- and intermediate-range missile systems. Such weapons range U.S. allies and partners in Europe and East Asia—as well as U.S. forces stationed there—and both our deterrence strategy and our approach to arms control must address these threats. If confirmed, I will consult with the U.S. Intelligence Community on Russian nuclear policy, strategy, doctrine, and forces.

Question. What are your views on what objectives the U.S. should have for the U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogues?

Answer. President Biden and President Putin agreed in June 2021 to pursue an integrated, robust, and deliberate Strategic Stability Dialogue. Through this dialogue, the Biden administration seeks to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures, while maintaining a consistent and iterative discussion on threats to strategic stability. While the administration seeks a more stable and predictable relationship with Russia through constructive engagement and aims to lessen the potential for miscalculations and misunderstandings, it will also hold Russia accountable when it disregards its international obligations and commitments. I agree with this approach.

Question. What is your understanding of Russia's objectives for the U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogues?

Answer. President Biden and President Putin agreed in June 2021 to pursue an integrated, robust, and deliberate Strategic Stability Dialogue. Through this dialogue, Russia has publicly stated it wants to raise U.S. capabilities and actions that it perceives as undermining strategic stability, such as U.S. missile defenses, U.S. precision-guided weapons, U.S.-NATO capabilities and exercises near Russian borders, and U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe.

Question. In a response to Congressional questioning in April 2021, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, stated that “Limited U.S. response options are intended to provide a more credible deterrent to limited attack against the U.S., Allies and partners rather than relying primarily on the threat of large-scale nuclear responses. Without this capability, Russia may perceive an advantage at lower levels of conflict that may encourage limited nuclear use.” Do you agree with Admiral Richard’s assessment? Does this capability enhance U.S. leverage in diplomatic engagement with the Russians over their own non-strategic nuclear arsenal?

Answer. I agree that limited U.S. response options are intended to provide a more credible deterrent to limited attack against the United States and our Allies and partners rather than relying primarily on the threat of large-scale nuclear responses. I believe the United States should have modern, credible, and effective nuclear forces that deter adversaries from nuclear use, no matter how limited. The ongoing Nuclear Posture Review process is analyzing how to accomplish this, and Admiral Richard’s expertise and views will factor into that analysis.

Question. Russia has violated previous arms control agreements like the INF Treaty and the BWC. It has repeatedly used banned chemical weapons against its own citizens and tolerated their use by its allies like the Assad regime. Since the fear of violating global norms and commitments does not appear to be a major constraint on Russia’s actions, what other strategies can we employ to actually enforce these norms and ensure Russian behavior does not deteriorate further?

Answer. The 2021 Compliance Report and the Condition 10(C) Report detail Russia’s violations of both the BWC and CWC. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the interagency, Allies, and partners to identify options to hold Russia accountable for its use of chemical weapons (CW) and identify measures to bring Russia back into compliance with its treaty obligations. The United States uses the full range of tools in its toolkit to respond to Russia’s CWC and BWC violations. For example, the United States added key Russian Ministry of Defense institutes to the Department of Commerce’s Entity List because the U.S. Government has reasonable cause to believe these facilities are associated with Russian biological weapons program. The United States also led efforts at the OPCW that resulted in the addition of two families of Novichoks to the CWC Annex on Chemicals. Further, the United States imposed sanctions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (“CBW Act”) on Russia for the use of a Novichok chemical weapon in the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny that included restrictions on exports and purchases of Russian sovereign debt to send a clear signal that Russia’s use of CW has severe consequences.

Most recently, the United States, along with 44 other countries, posed a series of questions to Russia regarding the poisoning of Mr. Navalny under Article IX at the OPCW Executive Council meeting that took place October 5–8, 2021.

The United States will continue to take steps to deter Russia’s use of chemical weapons. This will include engaging Russia bilaterally and multilaterally, as well working with allies and partners at the OPCW Executive Council and Conference of the States Parties and in U.N. fora, including the Security Council, and using public messaging to express our concerns. If confirmed, I will explore further measures to address Russian non-compliance with the CWC. There can be no impunity for the use of chemical weapons.

Question. It is our understanding that Russia has withdrawn its offer to freeze its warhead production that was offered under the Trump administration. What is the administration’s strategy to constrain Russian non-strategic nuclear forces? What technology does the United States possess that would allow it to verify a potential Russian declaration? Has the State Department/AVC invested any funds in developing technologies that could assist in the verification of Russian NSNW? If so, what is the status of those programs and how far along in the TRL process is the technology?

Answer. Russia never proposed to freeze nuclear warhead production. It said in October 2020 that it could accept a U.S. proposal to freeze the size of each side’s nuclear arsenal, in conjunction with a one-year extension of New START. An arrangement on these terms was not finalized, in part, because Russia deemed U.S.

efforts to define “warheads” and discuss verification of the freeze as unacceptable extra demands.

The Biden-Harris administration will use the five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons, including non-strategic nuclear weapons. Identifying and analyzing appropriate verification technologies, ranging from National Technical Means to on-site inspections, will be an important component of those efforts. If confirmed, this would be a priority for me and an issue on which I would consult with Congress, including ensuring sufficient funding to explore and develop new verification technologies.

Question. What do you view as the purpose of Iran’s nuclear program?

Answer. The United States has made clear its longstanding concerns with Iran’s nuclear program, in particular Iran’s pre-2004 efforts to develop nuclear weapons. As a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran is obligated not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran reaffirmed this commitment. If confirmed, I will strongly support the administration’s efforts to ensure that Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon.

Question. In your assessment, do Iran’s nuclear program and ballistic missile program indicate a desire by the Iranian Government to have a nuclear weapons capability?

Answer. The United States has assessed that Iran pursued nuclear weapons until late 2003. Iran’s long history of denial and concealment regarding its past nuclear weapons program, its continued escalation of nuclear activities beyond the limits in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and its ballistic missile development and proliferation all remain serious concerns today. Like President Biden, I am committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.

Question. Given Iranian advances in space-based delivery systems and ballistic missiles, does the Iranian regime remain in compliance with the NPT? Why or why not? Please provide a detailed answer.

Answer. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is solely focused on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and does not address missiles or any other potential delivery platform. Nonetheless, I have serious concerns about Iran’s compliance with the NPT independent of Iran’s ballistic-missile-related activities. If confirmed, I will work with legal and policy experts to monitor and assess Iran’s NPT compliance. President Biden has made clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.

Question. Does the United States conduct its own analysis of Iranian compliance with its safeguards and other NPT commitments or does it rely strictly on the IAEA process? If the former, please describe in detail who makes that determination and what process it entails.

Answer. The U.S. Government conducts its own analysis of Iran’s compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and makes its own findings. The IAEA’s reports inform that analysis. After consultations with the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), the principal analysis for the annual Compliance Report is drafted by the State Department. The Department’s draft analysis and findings are then sent to the interagency and a thorough, government-wide vetting and clearance process takes place. When the interagency review is completed, State finalizes the analysis and findings as part of the annual Compliance Report.

Question. Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the limitations on Iran’s uranium enrichment expire between 2026 and 2031. If the U.S. rejoins the JCPOA, do you assess that Iran will be legally able to increase its uranium enrichment after 2031?

Answer. As reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran is currently pursuing a uranium enrichment program far in excess of the limits under the JCPOA. A mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA would restore important restrictions on the size and scope of Iran’s nuclear activities, and its uranium enrichment-related activities in particular, as well as the strongest verification and monitoring measures ever negotiated. While Iran would be permitted to expand key uranium enrichment activities again in 2031 under the JCPOA, the Biden administration has made clear that a mutual return to compliance with the deal remains the best available option to restrict Iran’s nuclear program and provide a platform to address Iran’s destabilizing conduct moving forward.

Question. In 2018, Israel's Mossad released a series of Iranian nuclear files, which included information about at least three uranium enrichment facilities that Iran had hidden from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Do you agree that providing the IAEA access to those sites is essential to ensuring oversight of Iran's nuclear program?

Answer. The administration takes Iran's full implementation of its legally binding obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA very seriously. Iran must provide the IAEA with requested information and access in response to any question or concern related to potential undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran. If confirmed, I will strongly support the IAEA's monitoring and verification mandate in Iran.

Question. In 2018, Israel's Mossad released a series of Iranian nuclear files, which included information about at least three uranium enrichment facilities that Iran had hidden from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Answer. My understanding is that the Biden administration will not take Iran at its word regarding assertions about its nuclear program. The JCPOA provided the strongest verification and monitoring measures ever negotiated to help ensure Iran's nuclear activities are exclusively peaceful. Resumption of mutual compliance with the deal would ensure the renewed implementation of these important measures, as well as restrictions on the size and scope of Iran's nuclear activities. Like President Biden, I am committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.

Question. What are your views on how to define "integrated deterrence"?

Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense for a specific definition of integrated deterrence. The administration believes the security challenges faced by the United States and our allies and partners require a reliance on all elements of national power, not just military tools. As such, there is a strong role for diplomacy to play in strengthening the alliances, institutions, agreements, and norms that underwrite international security. If confirmed, I will engage with the Department of Defense and Congress on how arms control can be used to strengthen deterrence.

Question. How would unilateral U.S. reductions in the nuclear triad and the nuclear weapons complex enable the United States to negotiate with Russia and China from a position of strength?

Answer. Whether unilateral or reciprocal, any potential reductions would need to be carried out in a manner consistent with the objective of ensuring the United States sustains a modern, credible, and effective deterrent so long as nuclear weapons exist. I would never support unilateral reductions that endanger U.S. security or weaken U.S. negotiating leverage.

Question. Which emerging technologies most threaten strategic stability, and why? How can we best address these technologies through existing structures?

Answer. Emerging technologies offer challenges and opportunities to strategic stability. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Quantum technologies have the potential to provide significant benefits to U.S. national security. AI, for example, could enhance deterrent capabilities and provide tools that improve situational awareness and decision-making capabilities, therefore, avoiding an unintended escalation during a crisis. However, it is important to consider the potential risks from such systems as well. If confirmed, we need to determine whether there are norms of responsible behavior that can be developed around the use of these systems. If confirmed, I look forward to addressing these challenges with Russia and the People's Republic of China.

Question. In your view, would allowing Russian or Chinese inspectors to visit U.S. missile defense sites be an acceptable measure to build trust and transparency? If so, should we insist on reciprocal inspection rights? How would such measures comply with the prohibitions of 10 USC § 130h?

Answer. No decision has been made on whether to seek agreement with Russia or China on transparency measures related to U.S. missile defense programs, including missile defense site inspections. The United States would condition any agreement on receiving reciprocal rights from the Russian Federation and/or the People's Republic of China (PRC). Also, to the extent any agreement would include inspections at U.S. missile defense sites on the territory of allied or partner nations, the United States has committed to approach each Host Nation, prior to any discussion with Russia, to obtain Host Nation approval and conditions for permitting such inspections, and their conduct, on their sovereign territory. I fully recognize that any agreement with the Russian Federation must comply with the prohibitions of 10 USC § 130h.

Question. Does the Biden administration support the development and deployment of INF non-compliant systems such as GLCM to Eastern Europe and Asia?

Answer. The U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty due to Russia's material breach and failure to return to compliance resulted in that treaty's termination. As such, there are no longer "INF non-compliant" missiles. The Department of Defense (DoD) continues work on capabilities that would previously have been prohibited under the INF Treaty. I defer to DoD for further program details, but the United States would consult with allies, partners, and Congress prior to any foreign deployments.

Question. What is the difference between a "no first use," "sole purpose," or "fundamental purpose" policy?

Answer. Various declaratory policy options will be reviewed as part of the Department of Defense-led Nuclear Posture Review. That ongoing analysis and the continuing allied and partner consultations will inform my own view on declaratory policy. It would be premature to define these terms before the NPR process has begun a detailed discussion on the matter. At the same time, I understand the concerns expressed among some allies and partners, members of Congress, and experts regarding U.S. adoption of a "no-first-use" or "sole purpose" policy. Those concerns will inform the review process.

Answer [revised]. Among "no first use," "sole purpose," and "fundamental purpose," most commentators assess "no first use" to be more restrictive than the other two. More exacting distinctions will vary depending on how each is defined. The DoD-led Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is developing and evaluating different declaratory policy options and their implications. The NPR process will seek to clarify exactly what the formulations mean and avoid potential misunderstandings regarding the implications of the various policies. It would be inappropriate to speculate on specific definitions or differences with the NPR work still ongoing.

Question. What are your views on the United Kingdom's declaratory policy? Was the UK wrong to maintain its long-standing policy of ambiguity in its latest integrated review?

Answer. The administration supports the UK's efforts to ensure its defense and commend the UK for its openness on its nuclear policy and posture. Such transparency reduces the risks of misunderstanding and promotes stability. We call on Russia and the People's Republic of China to adopt a similar level of transparency about their nuclear policies.

Answer [revised]. I agree with the administration's view of UK declaratory policy, and the United States commends the UK for its openness on its nuclear policy and posture. The administration further supports the United Kingdom's efforts to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. The United States calls on Russia and the People's Republic of China to adopt a similar level of transparency.

Question. We understand our allies have messaged strongly to the Biden administration against weakening the U.S. nuclear deterrent through adoption of a No First Use/Sole Purpose policy. The administration has previously ignored allied concerns on NordStream2, Afghanistan, and AUKUS. Given widespread allied concerns over a shift in declaratory policy, how would a major shift in this policy be consistent with the President's pledge to "rebuild," U.S. alliances? What concrete steps are you prepared to take to assure allies that the Biden Admin ensure their security?

Answer. The Biden administration is working to reinvigorate and modernize our alliances and partnerships around the world. They are a tremendous source of strength and a unique American advantage. We are working to reaffirm, invest in, and modernize NATO and our alliances with Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea—which, along with our other global alliances and partnerships, are America's greatest strategic assist. I understand the concerns expressed among some allies and partners, members of Congress, and experts regarding potential U.S. adoption of a no-first-use or sole purpose declaratory policy. These two options do not reflect a binary choice. They are among various declaratory policy options being reviewed as part of the Department of Defense-led Nuclear Posture Review. That ongoing analysis and the continuing allied and partner consultations will inform my own view. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the President is aware of allied and partner views to inform his decisions on U.S. nuclear posture and policies.

Answer [revised]. Under the Biden-Harris administration, the United States is working to modernize its military capabilities and ensure the U.S. armed forces are equipped to deter adversaries, defend the U.S. people, interests, and allies, and defeat a variety of threats that emerge. As part of our overarching integrated deterrence, the United States will retain a strategic deterrent that remains safe, secure, and effective

so that U.S. extended deterrence commitments to its allies remain strong and credible for the purposes of assurance.

Question. We understand the State Department recently surveyed over 30 countries asking for their views on U.S. nuclear policy and any potential shifts in our declaratory policy. In addition to the responses to this outreach, we also understand there is at least one cable from this summer that codifies this feedback from a meeting between administration officials and their counterparts in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany in a cable. Do you commit to providing the committee with the details of allied feedback to the State Department, including the cable referenced previously?

Answer. As announced, the administration is implementing a robust engagement plan with allies and partners as part of the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Those consultations are classified diplomatic exchanges and part of a current and ongoing process. I will note that allies and partners have provided a broad range of views that are being fed into the NPR process. If confirmed, I commit to work with Congress, through the Department's Bureau of Legislative affairs, to accommodate the vital oversight needs of this committee.

Answer [revised]. *Congressional oversight is a recognized and critical authority of Congress and of this committee. Taking into account the possible need for use of secure facilities and secure means of communication for classified information, and the potential for damage to diplomatic relations with our allies if confidential diplomatic communications are unduly disclosed publicly, I commit, if confirmed, to work with the Department to accommodate the oversight needs of this committee, including as to the matters you reference.*

Question. In your testimony, you reference varying definitions of "Sole Purpose". How is this not an obfuscation and how would such a nuanced approach be a legitimate diplomatic response to our allies' and partners' grave concerns?

Answer. Allies and partners have provided a broad range of views that are informing the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The administration continues to factor those views into its deliberations, including of various declaratory policies. My point was that as the NPR evaluates various policies, how they affect allied and partner perceptions of the strength and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments needs to both be understood within the U.S. Government and explainable to foreign governments.

Question. The Obama administration twice considered changing declaratory policy, and decided against changes both times. Why?

Answer. The Obama administration explained in its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review that it did not adopt a sole purpose declaratory policy because "there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or chemical and biological weapon attack against the United States or its allies and partners."

Answer [revised]. *I was not part of the 2010 NPR process and have no firsthand knowledge into the decision-making process from 2010. Whether nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or chemical and biological weapon attack against the United States or its allies and partners is among the contingencies being evaluated as part of the ongoing DoD-led Nuclear Posture Review. It would be premature to comment prior to that analysis being completed.*

Question. In what ways do you see the United States exercising its global leadership on arms control issues, and if confirmed, what would you do to advance and balance both U.S. interests and arms control efforts?

Answer. Some examples of current efforts that demonstrate U.S. leadership on arms control include the Strategic Stability Dialogue with Russia, support for disarmament and nonproliferation progress at the U.N. First Committee and in other multilateral institutions, efforts to modernize the Vienna Document and consider proposals for future conventional arms control architecture that enhances international security, continued efforts to marshal international support for holding countries like Russia and Syria accountable for their use of chemical weapons, and dialogue with our allies and partners to support action in concert toward these ends. We also strive to lead by example by ensuring that U.S. nuclear policy and doctrine are consistent with the President's guidance to find ways to reduce the role that nuclear weapons play in our national security posture while taking into account security conditions and ensuring that our deterrence capabilities, and extended deterrence for our allies, remain safe, secure, strong, and credible. If confirmed, I intend to continue these efforts to protect our national security and ensure that the United States remains a leader in arms control by pursuing arms control dialogues, risk

reduction best practices, and transparency and confidence-building measures that enhance strategic stability and reduce the risks of conflict escalation and miscalculation.

Question. The USG has once again released numbers on the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, and called on other states with nuclear weapons to do the same. Russia and China refused to reciprocate when the Obama administration first tried this. Do you believe they will reciprocate this time?

Answer. Declassifying U.S. nuclear stockpile numbers demonstrates the serious U.S. commitment to transparency and confidence building measures that can enable further progress on reducing nuclear risks. While we would encourage Russia and the PRC to be more transparent, the declassification of U.S. stockpile numbers has not harmed U.S. national security and has shown U.S. leadership in nuclear non-proliferation fora. Others have welcomed our transparency and joined us in calling on Russia and the PRC to do the same.

Question. Should the State Department present data on its own estimates for China and Russia record of progress toward the achievement of the goals of the NPT?

Answer. We assess a variety of information in evaluating progress toward the achievement of the goals of the NPT. I defer to the Intelligence Community on sharing sensitive information publicly. We are concerned about Russian and PRC weapons development and modernization. The Strategic Stability Dialogue with Russia, part of which will discuss next steps in nuclear arms control, is designed to address such concerns. If confirmed, I will consult with legal and policy experts at the Department of State on matters related to the PRC's behavior in the nuclear weapon arena, including its progress toward the achievement of NPT goals.

Question. What are your views with respect to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)?

Answer. The TPNW risks undermining U.S. deterrence relationships that are still necessary for international peace and security and may reinforce divisions that hinder our ability to work together to address pressing proliferation and security challenges. All NATO Allies remain opposed to the TPNW, as repeatedly stated by the North Atlantic Council, most recently in June of 2021. Any disarmament effort must take into account the international security environment, and legally-binding measures must include effective verification.

Question. Should the United States actively dissuade other States from joining the TPNW, or from participating in TPNW-related events and initiatives?

Answer. The United States has expressed, and will continue to express, our views on what we believe to be the significant defects of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and discouraged other states from becoming Parties to the TPNW. We have also shared our intentions not to participate in the first meeting of TPNW States Parties in March of 2022 in any capacity as such participation could be seen as giving the treaty unwarranted credibility. We also have encouraged our allies and partners not to participate.

Question. Should the United States deny assistance to allies or partners who join the TPNW?

Answer. Allies that benefit from extended nuclear deterrence have declined to join the TPNW. The United States continues to share our views on what we believe to be the significant defects of this treaty with our Allies and partners. We also have encouraged Allies and partners to conduct their own independent analysis of the potential impacts of the TPNW on national interests, legal commitments, and policy. It remains to be seen how TPNW states parties will interpret and implement many of the treaty's provisions, how this might impact their security relationships, and how the United States would react to specific situations.

Question. Do you believe that membership in the TPNW would preclude a country from being a member of NATO, a nuclear alliance? Would TPNW membership preclude a nation from partaking in NATO or U.S.-led exercises?

Answer. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is incompatible with U.S. extended deterrence relationships that are still necessary for international peace and security and may reinforce divisions that hinder the international community's ability to work together to address pressing proliferation and security challenges. U.S. allies covered by extended nuclear deterrence (which includes all NATO Allies, plus Australia, Japan, and South Korea) share our view that the TPNW is incompatible with our extended nuclear deterrence arrangements.

Answer [revised]. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is incompatible with U.S. extended deterrence relationships that are still necessary for international peace and security, and U.S. allies covered by extended nuclear deterrence share this view. While it remains to be seen how TPNW States Parties will interpret and implement the treaty's provisions, the text of the TPNW could have significant negative consequences for States Parties' ability to cooperate with nuclear-weapon States such as the United States, including in the context of a nuclear alliance like NATO. In particular, the TPNW's prohibition on assisting, encouraging, or inducing conduct otherwise prohibited by the treaty, which includes the possession of nuclear weapons, is vague and, depending on how broadly the treaty's obligations are interpreted, could have potentially sweeping implications for a TPNW State Party's ability to participate in NATO, as well as its ability to join in U.S.-led military exercises.

Question. What do you see as your role, if confirmed, in strengthening support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as compared to the tenets of the TPNW?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) to strengthen political support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to achieve a positive outcome at the upcoming NPT Review Conference. I would support and contribute to efforts, led by the President's nominee for Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Adam Scheinman, to explain the U.S. record on arms control and our demonstrated commitment to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament in accordance with NPT Article VI. I would continue to oppose the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which ignores the security environment, undercuts deterrence, and does not offer a practical path toward that goal.

Question. What are your views on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?

Answer. A global, legally-binding ban on nuclear explosive testing in all environments is in the national security interest of the United States. Entry into force of the CTBT would enhance our efforts to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Question. What do you think the United States' role should be in continuing to work with the CTBTO?

Answer. I believe it is important for the United States to display leadership and remain fully engaged with the work of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission to ensure its capabilities are as robust as possible.

Question. Does U.S. annual support to CTBTO require any metric or reporting on how the funds are spent? How does the United States ensure the funds are strictly for the IMS not operations of the CTBTO or general expenses?

Answer. Through exchanges of letters in 2018 and again in 2021, the United States has conveyed all applicable U.S. funding restrictions on the funds it provides to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission. In response, the Preparatory Commission's Executive Secretary has acknowledged those restrictions and confirmed that U.S. funds will be used consistent with them.

Expenditures on the International Monitoring System (IMS) and International Data Centre (IDC) comprise more than 80 percent of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission's annual budget, while the U.S. assessed contribution provides 22.5 percent of the funds available to the Commission for all its activities.

Question. What are your views on the zero yield standard to which the United States adheres, as compared to the interpretation by other CTBT signatories such as Russia and China?

Answer. Once in force, the CTBT would ban nuclear explosive tests of any yield. The treaty's negotiating record and public statements by leaders and/or senior officials from every P5 state at the time the treaty was negotiated, signed, and presented for domestic approval make clear that the CTBT is a "zero-yield" treaty. Russian and PRC officials have since stated that their respective countries continue to have the same understanding of the CTBT scope that was discussed when the treaty was negotiated.

Question. For the past several years, the Intelligence Community and the Department of State have highlighted U.S. concerns that Russia, and especially China, are conducting nuclear tests that may be inconsistent with this standard. In your view, should countries that conduct tests producing nuclear yield face repercussions? If so, what actions would you recommend the international community take in response to these alleged activities on the part of China and Russia?

Answer. The State Department’s most recent Compliance Report outlines the findings and concerns the U.S. Government has regarding Russian and Chinese activities related to nuclear testing. Specifically, the Compliance Report analyzes adherence to each country’s unilaterally declared nuclear explosive testing moratorium. Nuclear testing is a threat to international security and highlights the need for an in-force ban that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and its associated verification mechanisms can help provide. In the meantime, if confirmed, I pledge to work with allies and partners to highlight and confront nuclear testing wherever it occurs.

Question. The Obama administration considered supporting ratification of the CTBT through a resolution in the U.N. Security Council and a “political statement expressing the view that a nuclear test would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT” that would be referenced in the U.N. resolution. Regardless of one’s view about the necessity of nuclear testing, do you agree that seeking U.S. ratification of CTBT through customary international law mechanisms or any method outside Senate’s advice and consent role is unconstitutional?

Answer. As I understand it, the Obama administration never sought to ratify the CTBT other than through the normal constitutional process. There is no mechanism for U.S. ratification of a treaty outside of such a process. The P5 statement in 2016 indicated that a nuclear explosive test would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT, and a U.N. Security Council resolution then took note of that statement. This did not constitute U.S. ratification of the CTBT. The United States has not ratified the treaty and would require Senate advice and consent or statutory authorization under our domestic law before it could do so.

Question. To be clear, do you believe the President can circumvent the Senate’s constitutional role regarding the ratification of treaties in any way?

Answer. No. Senate advice and consent or statutory authorization would be required in order for the United States to ratify the CTBT. Neither may be achieved without the Senate’s approval.

Question. Please describe the main challenges you believe the United States faces when it comes to biological threats.

Answer. The biological threat landscape is broad, encompassing naturally occurring, accidental, and intentional incidents with potential impacts to humans, animals, agriculture, materiel, and the environment. Pathogenic biological threats do not respect national borders and create unique challenges to fully assessing, preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from biological incidents. If confirmed, I would work to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention so it is an improved resource for the international community to protect against the threat landscape, dissuade and deter BW development, and raise the costs of starting or maintaining a BW program, especially including State or non-state actor biological threats.

Question. Please describe your understanding of how advancements in biotechnology, including the emergence of synthetic biology, change the biological threat picture and create new challenges in assessing compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention. Is the Biological Weapons Convention fit for purpose in contending with emerging biotechnology that pose dual-use concerns?

Answer. The BWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, or transfer of biological weapons. It underscores the overarching global norm that the weaponization of disease is repulsive and unacceptable. Even as advancements in biotechnology broaden the spectrum of threats, this ban applies to all biological weapons—regardless of any new technological advances. The BWC also provides a unique international forum where States Parties can come together to share information and agree to take certain actions—like developing relevant national oversight or participating in transparency activities. There is an ongoing administration effort to strengthen the BWC. The BWC Review Conference planned for August 2022 will be a key opportunity. One of the United States’ priorities will be to set up a systematic process to inform States Parties about science and technological advances, including synthetic biology, in part to support effective biological risk assessment and management.

Question. What is the United States doing to strengthen the BWC? Is the BWC verifiable? If not what are we doing to address U.S. understanding and knowledge of Chinese BW programs?

Answer. The COVID-19 pandemic underscores the need to prevent future outbreaks—whether natural, accidental, or deliberate in origin. To that end, there is

more that BWC States Parties can do. If confirmed, I will work to break the two-decade deadlock over strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention and bring the Convention into the 21st century. In particular, I would lead the AVC Bureau's portion of efforts to strengthen the BWC at the upcoming Review Conference and take steps to intensively explore measures to strengthen implementation and promote compliance and transparency.

As noted in the 2021 Compliance Report, the People's Republic of China engaged in dual-use applications, which raises concerns regarding its compliance with Article I of the BWC. In addition, the United States does not have sufficient information to determine whether China eliminated its assessed historical biological weapons (BW) program, as required under Article II of the Convention. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Intelligence Community and interagency partners to improve the United States' understanding of Chinese efforts in this field and to clarify our concerns related to Chinese compliance with the BWC.

Question. Please describe your views on China's national strategy of military-civil fusion and the challenges it poses to the United States. How should military-civil fusion inform U.S. cooperation with China on biotechnology and other related sectors?

Answer. Through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy, the PRC pursues collaboration with foreign research institutions, academia, and private firms to acquire the key technologies needed for the People's Liberation Army's future war fighting capabilities, often without those institutions' knowledge of the intended end-use/user or in contravention of existing export license conditions. As a result, its MCF strategy threatens the trust, transparency, reciprocity, and shared values that underpin international science and technology collaboration. It undercuts fair global business practices and is a direct challenge to the international rules-based order and the end-use assurance mechanisms by which we traditionally safeguard technology from military diversion.

Across all sectors, the U.S. continues to strengthen our investment review process, bolster export controls, secure supply chains, and prioritize cases involving the PRC's intellectual property theft. The administration is encouraging our allies and partners in government and industry to implement similar measures. As the PRC has explicitly highlighted the importance of international collaboration at the university level to drive this strategy, the United States issued Presidential Proclamation 10043 to restrict visas for some Ph.D. and post-doctoral researchers seeking to undertake studies in the United States. The United States should continue to raise awareness within the academic and business communities about the risks of collaborating with PRC-based and state-linked entities to protect intellectual property and prevent the misuse of technology—including biotechnology—to drive PRC military modernization. We should also encourage adoption of appropriate risk mitigation measures that include technology transfer and data protection controls, transparency of beneficial ownership, and ability to screen foreign investments against national security risks.

Question. Do you think the United States should cooperate with countries where we have concerns about compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention on biotechnology, pathogen research, and other categories of biological research that could be weaponized or serve a dual-use function?

Answer. It is my view that the United States should not cooperate with countries of compliance concern on specific research where we believe there is significant potential that information, technology, or material we provide could be used for nefarious purposes. In this vein, I strongly support oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern. It is important, however, to continue dialogue with those countries to clarify and resolve compliance concerns and to promote strong biosafety and biosecurity practices and governance. Further, if some countries have the only access to certain pathogens, the United States must find a way to ensure that public health experts can continue their necessary collaborative work to be able to protect us from naturally occurring outbreaks, while minimizing our national security risks.

Question. Do you commit to prioritizing engagement with industry, academia, the health research community, and other stakeholders outside traditional national security circles on the United States' compliance concerns with respect to the Biological Weapons Convention? If so, what three steps will you take to make good on this commitment, should you be confirmed?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit that the AVC Bureau will engage those outside traditional national security circles (e.g., industry, academia, the health research community) and with international counterparts about the United States' compliance concerns with respect to the Biological Weapons Convention. The AVC

Bureau plans to engage those outside (and inside) traditional national security circles in the run-up to the BWC Review Conference and during the BWC Review Conference itself through bilateral engagements and briefings, NGO roundtables, and public outreach events.

Question. Is there currently a review process within the United States Government for approving or disapproving life sciences or biological research collaboration with other countries that could pose dual-use concerns, including research on pathogens, viruses, and toxins? What role, if any, does the Department of State play in this review process? Within the Department of State, what role does AVC play in this process? If such a process exists, what type of evidentiary information must be included to determine whether such research collaboration is appropriate?

Answer. When researchers apply for federal funds to be used in a collaborative research project, a number of oversight mechanisms or other review processes may be triggered. For example, research projects funded by Federal agencies are subject to a variety of oversight policies implemented by the respective funding agency, including policies regarding Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) and high-risk experiments involving pathogens of pandemic potential. Where collaborations involve the transfer of U.S.-origin materials, equipment, or intangible technology, such transfers may be subject to license requirements under relevant export laws and regulations. If such collaborations involve individuals from certain countries traveling to the U.S. for research-related purposes, those individuals may be subject to visa vetting procedures. The AVC Bureau would be consulted if the proposed cooperation raised any potential issues related to compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

Question. What role does the Department of State play in formulating and implementing the following guidance?

- UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN, available at <https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/documents/us-policy-durc-032812.pdf>;
- NATIONAL SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY, PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF DUAL USE LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH: STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING THE POTENTIAL MISUSE OF RESEARCH INFORMATION (2007), available at <https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/Proposed-Oversight-Framework-for-Dual-Use-Research.pdf>
- NATIONAL SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EVALUATION AND OVERSIGHT OF PROPOSED GAIN-OF-FUNCTION RESEARCH (2016), <https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/NSABB-Final-Report-Recommendations-Evaluation-Oversight-Proposed-Gain-of-Function-Research.pdf>
- Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreement and Commitments (Compliance Report)

Answer. The Department of State participates in formulating U.S. Government policy guidance through interagency processes coordinated by the National Security Council, including the U.S. Government Policy for Oversight of Life Science Dual Use Research of Concern (the other two documents are not policies but reports that informed U.S. Government policy deliberations). As such, if confirmed, I would take part in the review of implementation of such U.S. Government policies. The Department of State is not involved in review processes that are established internal to other government agencies, unless that Department or Agency identifies a concern that would affect a Department of State equity, such as treaty compliance. If confirmed, I would strive to improve collaboration and transparency amongst interagency members on these issues.

Question. If confirmed, what standard will you use in deciding how much unclassified information is required to make an unclassified finding in the Compliance Report?

Answer. If confirmed, I will apply the same rigorous standard the United States has used since the report's inception to determine how much unclassified information is required to make an unclassified finding in the Compliance Report. It is important to be able to corroborate unclassified findings with supporting information, so the public and country in question understands what led the United States to make the determination. The Department works closely with the Intelligence Community and interagency to determine what information can be included in the unclassified report. The classified annex provides additional substantiating information for Congress.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit not to conceal or obfuscate evidence of violations of arms control treaties or agreements just because they cannot be entirely proven in the unclassified domain?

Answer. If confirmed, I pledge to safeguard classified information in accordance with law, regulation, and policy. At every level of classification, I would seek to substantiate conclusions with material evidence at the appropriate level of classification and would consider advocating for declassification and public release of information where it is in the U.S. national security interest to do so.

Question. Do you disagree with any of the findings of the 2021 Compliance Report?

Answer. No, I do not disagree with any of the findings in the 2021 Compliance Report.

Question. Would you have disclosed the fact of Russia's violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2014, even though this violation could not be conclusively proven in the unclassified domain?

Answer. U.S. compliance determinations are made stronger by how much evidence can be publicly shared. Sometimes there are legitimate reasons for limiting publicly available information. In 2014, the United States made public its determination of Russia's INF Treaty violation. That action was justified by years of accumulating and evaluating information, compliance analysis, and diplomacy with Russia.

Question. What role should concerns about Russian or Chinese diplomatic blowback play in determining whether to include an unclassified finding in the report?

Answer. It is my view that the report should provide as much detail as can be included in the unclassified Compliance Report regarding questions and concerns with countries' compliance with and adherence to arms control agreements and commitments to which they are party. If there is sufficient information to support making an unclassified finding in the Compliance Report, concerns regarding diplomatic blowback from Russia and China should not affect the inclusion of that finding. The AVC Bureau engages in bilateral dialogues with countries identified as having compliance concerns and that includes Russia and China. Including unclassified supporting information to corroborate the report's findings helps facilitate such bilateral dialogue.

Question. Do you believe that you, if confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for the AVC Bureau, would need the approval of State Legal to offer policy assessments regarding any country's possible violation of existing arms control agreements, including, but not limited to the NPT?

Answer. If confirmed, I pledge to offer Secretary Blinken, President Biden, and all other senior U.S. Government officials my best possible policy advice, seeking legal advice, including from the Department's Office of the Legal Adviser, as appropriate. Any assessment of a country's compliance with its legal obligations under an international agreement will necessarily entail legal analysis as to the parameters of those obligations, as well as intelligence and other reporting furnishing the best available evidence of states parties' compliance or non-compliance with their binding obligations as the United States understands them.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. I commit to work to accommodate the vital oversight needs of Congress.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staff apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. I commit to work to accommodate the vital oversight needs of the committee.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any AVC employee, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed, do you agree to provide to this committee relevant information within the jurisdictional oversight of the committee when requested by the committee, even in the absence of the formality of a letter from the Chairman?

Answer. I commit to work to accommodate the important oversight needs of the committee in coordination with the Bureau of Legislative Affairs.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO MALLORY A. STEWART BY SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY

Question. The number of full time equivalents (FTEs) decreased for the Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance Bureau (AVC) during the Trump administration, which compounded a demographic problem where approximately half of the Bureau is eligible to retire. What is the current number of FTEs in the Bureau? And what additional hiring authorities from Congress would help recapitalize the AVC workforce to aid it in the robust bilateral strategic dialogue with Russia, efforts to engage China on meaningful arms control measures, and the host of other challenges that the Bureau is responsible for addressing?

Answer. If confirmed, rebuilding the workforce of the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) would be my top management priority. The total number of Washington, DC-based full-time equivalent staff in AVC as of October 2021 is 87, which is 23 percent lower than the total as of January 2017. AVC needs a reinvigorated workforce that can help address the dangers posed by chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, and their delivery systems, as well as the emerging threats of the 21st century. It is my understanding that the Department would appreciate Congressional support to increase its capacity to address these critical issues of national security. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary's intention to recruit a diverse cadre of additional arms control experts. I also commit to uphold and fully implement the Department's leadership and management tenets, including support for diversity and inclusion, to strengthen the Bureau.

Question. Is the State Department concerned that the addition of two new nuclear weapon capabilities in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the deployed low-yield W76(2) warhead and the planned sea-launched nuclear cruise missile, risk leading to inadvertent escalation in a conflict with an adversary? Would continuing to field these new roles for U.S. nuclear weapons be consistent with the President's Interim National Security Guidance to "take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in [U.S.] national security strategy?"

Answer. The W76-2 and the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile were directed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. The ongoing NPR process is reviewing U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities, including the W76-2 and the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, to assess whether and how they fit into the administration's overarching objectives of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible.

Question. How has the United States recently worked through the Extended Deterrence Dialogues with Japan and South Korea, as well as other bilateral consultations related to the Nuclear Posture Review process, to reaffirm our commitment to our allies' defense irrespective of any possible changes to U.S. nuclear weapons declaratory policy or force structure?

Answer. Extended deterrence plays a foundational role in advancing U.S. national security objectives. In the Nuclear Posture Review process, the administration is consulting with U.S. allies and partners, including those in the Indo-Pacific, through a variety of standing deterrence dialogues and ad-hoc consultations. The Administration has conveyed to allies and partners the United States' commitment to ensuring U.S. extended deterrence remains strong and credible.

Question. China has reportedly recently constructed over 250 intercontinental ballistic missile silos as part of a plan to possibly expand its strategic forces in addition to plans to construct fast breeder reactors that could expand its stockpile of plutonium for nuclear weapons. At what level has the Department (or the White House) conveyed its concerns about any future effort to fill those newly discovered silos? In order to better understand the intent behind these developments, does the United States intend to invite China to a bilateral strategic dialogue or make it an agenda item of the P5 process?

Answer. Many U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Blinken at the ASEAN Regional Forum in August, have noted deep concern with the rapid growth of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) nuclear arsenal. Beijing has clearly and sharply deviated from its decades-old nuclear strategy based on minimum deterrence. In consultation with U.S. allies and partners, the administration will pursue arms control measures to address the PRC's growing nuclear arsenal. The administration is developing and evaluating specific proposals, and, if confirmed, I commit to consulting Congress at an appropriate time on potential measures and how best the State Department can develop and retain government expertise regarding arms control with the PRC.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO MALLORY A. STEWART BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. We have multiple open-source reports about China's increased nuclear posture. This clearly indicates that China must be incorporated into strategic arms discussions, and the longer they refuse the harder that conversation will be. I also recognize that China is coming from a different place than the United States and Russia which will require a different approach. If confirmed, how would you seek to contain China's growing nuclear weapons arsenal?

Answer. We must pursue arms control measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's (PRC) growing nuclear arsenal. These efforts will be pursued in coordination with actions to bolster deterrence in the region. The Administration will work with allies and partners to regularly urge the PRC to engage meaningfully on arms control. The Administration is developing and evaluating specific proposals, and, if confirmed, I commit to consulting Congress at an appropriate time on potential measures to be pursued with China.

Question. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has publicly confirmed that it found particles of processed uranium at three undeclared facilities in Iran. Are you aware of that?

Answer. As reported by the IAEA Director General, the IAEA continues to investigate questions related to four undeclared locations in Iran, including three where the IAEA has detected the presence of nuclear material. Iran's failure to provide the IAEA with the necessary information and cooperation to resolve these questions is deeply troubling. The administration takes Iran's full implementation of its legally binding obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its comprehensive safe-

guards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) very seriously. Iran must provide the required cooperation with the IAEA without delay. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation to ensure that the IAEA has our continued full support in urgently resolving safeguards problems with Iran.

Question. Commercial satellite imagery analyzed by independent researchers at the Institute for Science and International Security demonstrated that at one facility in Iran, there was a steady progression of containers being removed followed by sanitization work. The IAEA found uranium at that site. Do you agree with that assessment?

Answer. In a September report to the IAEA Board, the Director General reiterated his deep concern that the IAEA had found indications that nuclear material had been present at three locations in Iran, that Iran had yet to provide the necessary explanation for the presence of such nuclear material at those locations, and that the current locations of the nuclear material were not known to the IAEA. We have made clear our serious concerns that Iran has failed to respond to the IAEA on these matters. It is essential that Iran fully comply with its legally binding obligations under its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA without further delay, and if confirmed, I will work closely with the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation to ensure that the IAEA has our continued full support in urgently resolving these safeguards problems with Iran.

Question. Do you agree that it is an obligation under Article III of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to declare all nuclear material to the IAEA?

Answer. Article III requires each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to accept safeguards on all of its source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA's comprehensive safeguards agreement enables NPT non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to implement this obligation and requires those states to declare to the IAEA all nuclear material that is required to be safeguarded under the NPT.

Question. Is Iran a party to the NPT with a signed Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA?

Answer. Yes. Iran ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970 and remains a State Party to the Treaty. Iran's NPT-required Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA came into force in 1974 and remains in force.

Question. Do you agree that Iran is in non-compliance with the NPT?

Answer. I have serious concerns about Iran's compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and if confirmed, I will help implement U.S. policy to support the IAEA's work to monitor and assess Iran's compliance with its NPT-required safeguards agreement. Iran must cooperate fully with the IAEA to address the serious, outstanding issues related to potential undeclared nuclear material in Iran. As a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT, Iran is obligated not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO MALLORY A. STEWART BY SENATOR TED CRUZ

Question. Since 2007, it has nearly always been the position of the United States that Iran is not a member in good standing within the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Even pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran would not have returned to being a member in good standing until the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reached a "Broader Conclusion" verifying the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. In April 2019, then-nominee to be Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation Jeffrey L. Eberhardt confirmed in writing to this committee that "given Iran's past noncompliance with both its safeguards agreement and its NPT obligations, its failure to fully address IAEA questions related to past activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device, and the emergence of new questions surrounding Iran's motives for retaining and concealing documents, equipment, and personnel related to its past nuclear weapons program, Iran's standing as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT cannot be described as 'good.'"

- Do you agree with Mr. Eberhardt's assessment?

Answer. Yes. Given Iran's past non-compliance with its obligations under the NPT and Iran's NPT-required safeguards agreement and its present failure to fully address the IAEA's current questions related to implementation of that safeguards agreement, Iran's standing as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT cannot be described as "good." The United States has thoroughly detailed the concern with Iran's compliance with Article III of the NPT, including in the 2021 Compliance Report.

Question. Do you consider Iran's past possession of the Nuclear Archive seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute non-compliance by Iran of its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)?

Answer. I have serious concerns about Iran's compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and if confirmed, I will work with legal and policy experts to monitor and assess Iran's NPT compliance. Iran must cooperate fully with the IAEA to address the serious, outstanding issues related to potential undeclared nuclear material in Iran. As a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT, Iran is obligated not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

Question. Do you consider Iran's past concealment of the Nuclear Archive seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute non-compliance by Iran of its obligations under the NPT?

Answer. Iran's long history of denial and concealment regarding its past nuclear weapons program is of serious concern. The Biden-Harris administration will not take Iran at its word regarding assertions about its nuclear program and fully supports the IAEA as it uses its safeguards authorities to investigate any indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in Iran. Like President Biden, I am committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.

Question. Do you believe that Iran should be entitled to the use of civilian nuclear technology even if they are not a member in good standing of the NPT?

Answer. Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all the Parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Iran must, however, comply with its international obligations when undertaking nuclear activities, including its obligations under Article II of the NPT and its NPT-required safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Question. Do you consider Iran to be entitled to benefit from nuclear technology pursuant to Article IV the NPT?

Answer. Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all the Parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Iran must, however, comply with its international obligations when undertaking nuclear activities, including its obligation under Article II of the NPT not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

Question. Do you consider Iran to be specifically entitled to benefit from nuclear technology pursuant to Article IV the NPT?

Answer. Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all the Parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Iran must, however, comply with its international obligations when undertaking nuclear activities, including its obligation under Article II of the NPT not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

Question. Do you assess that China is in violation of its Article VI obligations?

Answer. China's nuclear weapons build-up risks undermining decades of international progress toward nuclear disarmament. If confirmed, I will consult with legal and policy experts at the Department of State on a variety of matters related to China's behavior in the nuclear weapon arena, including its compliance with Article VI.

Question. What leverage does the United States currently possess to dampen China's nuclear buildup?

Answer. U.S. allies and partners in Asia will be key to success in the administration's efforts to bring the People's Republic of China (PRC) into any arms control measures, and the administration will work with them to regularly urge the PRC

to engage meaningfully with the United States on arms control. The administration will pursue arms control measures to reduce the dangers from the PRC's growing nuclear arsenal and will make the case to Beijing that arms control is in its security interest. Arms control is not a trap designed to weaken China's defenses, but a mechanism to reduce the risk of military crises and manage the threat of destabilizing arms races, something that is in the interest of all countries.

Question. For decades, China claimed that all it needed was a "minimum deterrent," but the CCP seems to be pursuing a capability far beyond that threshold. Why now? And how should the U.S. respond to China's nuclear modernization?

Answer. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) apparent build-up of nuclear capabilities is cause for concern and may signal a departure from its decades-long nuclear strategy based on minimum deterrence. I defer to the Intelligence Community for a specific assessment on the timing of this build-up. In parallel to the PRC's nuclear build-up, its broader geopolitical goals appear to be shifting as well. The PRC's military activities highlight Beijing's increasing comfort with the employment of military forces to achieve its foreign policy objectives. As the administration pursues arms control measures to reduce the dangers from the PRC's growing nuclear arsenal, the administration will simultaneously maintain the capabilities to defend against a range of PRC military threats to the United States and our allies and partners.

Question. Turning now to Russia. You have been a noted advocate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. As you know, the United States Senate has pointedly refused to ratify the CTBT, in part because of Russian behavior. In its 2021 compliance report, the Trump administration rightly called out this behavior. I'd like to quote from that report: "The United States finds that, since declaring its testing moratorium, Russia has conducted nuclear weapons experiments that have created nuclear yield and are not consistent with the U.S. 'zero-yield' standard." Do you agree with that assessment?

Answer. Yes. I agree that since declaring its testing moratorium, Russia has at times conducted nuclear weapons tests or experiments that have created nuclear yield, which is not consistent with the zero-yield standard.

Question. Do you commit to ensuring, if you are confirmed, that you would continue to document such non-compliance?

Answer. Yes. I commit that, if confirmed, I will continue to document non-compliance and inconsistencies with arms control obligations and commitments in the annual Compliance Report.

Question. I am concerned about the possibility of the Biden administration adopting a misguided "no-first-use" nuclear policy. Russia used to have a no-first-use policy, but formally scrapped it years ago when the Kremlin feared its conventional forces were insufficient. Our principal adversary, China, has formally declared a no first-use policy, but the Chinese Communist Party has proven itself willing to break any promise that suits its ambitions.

- Do you believe China's commitment to not use nuclear weapons first in a conflict?

Answer. I doubt the People's Republic of China's (PRC) commitment to a no-first-use policy. There is ambiguity over the conditions under which Beijing would act outside of its professed no-first-use policy. Some People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers have written publicly of the need to spell out conditions under which China might need to use nuclear weapons first. There has been no indication that national leaders are willing to address such nuances and caveats publicly. However, ongoing PRC advances in its nuclear arsenal, such as an exploration of low-yield warheads, raise questions regarding PRC intent and undermine its claims to maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent backed by a no-first-use policy.

Question. Do you personally support a no-first-use policy for the United States?

Answer. No.

Question. Do you believe we have transparency into Iran's nuclear program?

Answer. While the IAEA maintains near daily access at key nuclear facilities in Iran under Iran's IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the IAEA has reported that its verification and monitoring activities have been seriously undermined as a result of Iran's decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol. A return to mutual implementation of the JCPOA would restore the JCPOA's transparency measures, which are the strongest verification and monitoring provisions ever negotiated.

Question. Given we do not have a comprehensive accounting of Iran's PMD program, and taking into consideration Iran's decades of deception to the IAEA on its nuclear program, how is it possible to have an accurate appraisal of Iran's activities as they evolve, when the international community lacks a baseline for verification efforts?

Answer. The IAEA has reported significant concerns regarding potential undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and we have full confidence in the Agency to pursue its critical verification and monitoring responsibilities there. It is essential that Iran fully comply with its legally binding obligations under the NPT and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to resolve these important matters without further delay. The JCPOA provided the strongest verification and monitoring measures ever negotiated. Resumption of mutual compliance with the deal would ensure the renewed implementation of these measures, as well as its restrictions on the size and scope of Iran's nuclear activities.

Question. Despite the Board of Governor's December 2015 Final Assessment, which closed the chapter on PMDs in order to move forward with implementation of the JCPOA, the issue of Iran's possible military dimension remains outstanding. If confirmed, do you plan to reopen the PMD file? If not, why not?

Answer. President Biden has made clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. If confirmed, I will strongly support the Department's efforts, as they relate to my position as AVC Assistant Secretary, to bolster the IAEA's monitoring and verification activities in Iran so that the IAEA can provide the strongest possible assurance that Iran is not undertaking any undeclared nuclear activities. A return to mutual implementation of the JCPOA would restore the JCPOA's transparency measures, which are the strongest verification and monitoring provisions ever negotiated.

Question. On April, 1, 2018, Tiangong-1, China's prototype space station, re-entered the earth's atmosphere after an uncontrolled re-entry. On May 11, 2020, the Chinese Long March 5B rocket, re-entered the earth's atmosphere after an uncontrolled re-entry. On May 8, 2021, another Chinese Long March 5B core stage re-entered the earth's atmosphere after making an uncontrolled re-entry. In response to the most recent uncontrolled entry, NASA Administrator, Bill Nelson, said that "It is clear that China is failing to meet responsible standards regarding their space debris."

- Do you agree with the assessment that China is currently violating the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty?

Answer. Along with the United States and over 90 other members of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the PRC joined consensus in June 2019 on 21 voluntary, non-legally binding guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. One of these guidelines calls for states to "[t]ake measures to address risks associated with the uncontrolled re-entry of space objects." We urge all nations, including the PRC, to abide by their commitments and implement these guidelines, encouraging transparency and information sharing with other nations. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues within State and at NASA to highlight the long-standing U.S. space policy principle that responsible space actors operate with openness, transparency, and predictability to maintain the benefits of space for all humanity.

Question. Do you agree that in the case that space debris causes damage in the United States or in other nations party to the Outer Space Treaty from a Chinese Government launched space vehicle, that China would accept liability for damages under Section VII of the Outer Space Treaty? If not, please list what specific actions the Peoples Republic of China has taken to assure the United States that it would comply with Section VII of the Outer Space Treaty?

Answer. In addition to its obligations under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the PRC is a party to the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. The Liability Convention provides that a launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight and has fault-based liability for damage caused to objects in space. The Liability Convention also provides for procedures for the settlement of claims for damages. These two treaties, along with 1968 Astronaut Rescue and Return Agreement and the 1976 Registration Convention, provide a basic legal framework within which interested States can work to protect their interests. The PRC has also stated in the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space that "wide adherence to the United Nations treaties

contributes to creating a safe, secure and sustainable atmosphere for the development of outer space activities.”

Question. Do you agree that China’s continued use of uncontrolled re-entries constitute a national security threat? If not, then why?

Answer. As NASA Administrator Nelson noted in May 2021, spacefaring nations must minimize the risks to people and property on Earth of re-entries of space objects and maximize transparency regarding those operations. The PRC has yet to implement responsible standards regarding some of their space debris, which results in uncontrolled re-entries. It is critical that the PRC act responsibly and transparently in space to ensure the safety, stability, security, and long-term sustainability of outer space activities as well as human life.

Question. On July 31, 2019[,] at a Brookings Institution event titled “Assessing Space Security: threat and response,” you stated that “the legal framework for both the commercial side and the military engagements and the evolution of the players in space has to catch up and it hasn’t caught up.” Please elaborate on your statement.

- Please list all aspects of the legal framework for “military engagements” that need to be updated and how would you, in your potential role at the Department of State, update them?

Answer. As the Biden-Harris administration’s Space Priorities Framework notes, “[as] space activities evolve, the norms, rules, and principles that guide outer space activities also must evolve.” In this regard, I believe that it is essential for the United States to continue to lead in strengthening global governance of space activities to uphold and strengthen a rules-based international order for space.

The principles of 1967 Outer Space Treaty remain the indispensable foundation for these efforts. In this regard, I fully support the Biden-Harris administration’s focus on developing legally non-binding approaches to reduce threats to space systems through the further development and implementation of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors. There are advantages to focusing on voluntary, legally non-binding norms of responsible behavior, such as the ability to adapt quickly to changing circumstances or technologies, allowing new and novel uses of space to be explored rather than restricted, and to allow civil and commercial operators to have more of a voice in their development.

Question. Please list all aspects of the legal framework for “commercial side” need to be updated and how would you, in your potential role at the Department of State, update them?

Answer. It is essential for the United States Government to work closely and collaboratively with U.S. commercial industry and allies to promote the implementation of existing measures and lead in the development of new measures that contribute to the safety, stability, security, and long-term sustainability of space activities. The United States also must demonstrate how the full range of its governmental and private sector space activities can be conducted in a responsible, peaceful, and sustainable manner.

Question. Will updating the legal frameworks for military or commercial engagements require updating or amending the Outer Space Treaty, if so how, if not, why not? Please describe any risks or potential disadvantages to updating or amending the Outer Space Treaty?

Answer. As the Biden-Harris administration’s Space Priorities Framework notes, “[as] space activities evolve, the norms, rules, and principles that guide outer space activities also must evolve.” In this regard, I believe that it is essential for the United States to continue to lead in strengthening global governance of space activities to uphold and strengthen a rules-based international order for space.

The principles of 1967 Outer Space Treaty remain the indispensable foundation for these efforts. In addition to the Outer Space Treaty, I fully support the Biden-Harris administration’s focus on developing legally non-binding approaches to reduce threats to space systems through the further development and implementation of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors. There are advantages to focusing on voluntary, legally non-binding norms of responsible behavior, such as the ability to adapt quickly to changing circumstances or technologies, allowing new and novel uses of space to be explored rather than restricted, and to allow civil and commercial operators to have more of a voice in their development.

Question. Please describe how updating “legal frameworks” would impact the commercialization of space and why?

Answer. U.S. commercial space activities are on the cutting edge of space technology, space applications, and space-enabled services. As a result, I believe that the existing international legal framework provides a solid foundation upon which commercial space activities and interests of the U.S. private sectors can thrive. Based upon this framework, domestic U.S. law and regulations must provide clarity and certainty for the authorization and continuing supervision of non-governmental space activities, including for novel activities such as on-orbit servicing and orbital debris removal.

Question. On January 11, 2007, China launched a ballistic missile from Xichang Space Launch Center that aimed at a nonoperative Chinese weather satellite, the Fengyun 1C, completely destroying the satellite. The destruction of the satellite created more than 3,000 pieces of space debris, the largest ever tracked, and much of it is expected to remain in orbit for decades.

- Please describe how China's actions, as described above, violate the Article IV and Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty? If not then, why not?

Answer. It is my understanding that the administration of President George W. Bush did not make a determination of Chinese compliance with the Outer Space treaty following China's 2007 ASAT test. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on enhancing countries' compliance with their Outer Space Treaty commitments.

Following Russia's reckless November 2021 destructive anti-satellite weapon test, Secretary Blinken stated, "We call upon all responsible spacefaring nations to join us in efforts to develop norms of responsible behavior and to refrain from conducting dangerous and irresponsible destructive tests like those carried out by Russia." In addition, Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks called on all nations to refrain from recklessly conducting destructive anti-satellite testing, which significantly increases the risk to human spaceflight and other satellites, and to foster a safe, sustainable space environment.

China's ASAT test in January 2007 was inconsistent with the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, which was endorsed by the China National Space Administration.

Question. Please describe the threat on space exploration and the commercialization of space from space debris, and further specifically describe the threat from space debris created as a result of Chinese, Russian, and North Korean actions.

Answer. Both China's ASAT test in January 2007 and Russia's in November 2021 were inconsistent with the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, which were endorsed by Roscosmos and the China National Space Administration. Russia's November 2021 test also was inconsistent with the [voluntary, legally non-binding] Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in June 2007, which were endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly in December 2007. As NASA Administrator Nelson noted in May 2021, spacefaring nations must minimize the risks to people and property on Earth of re-entries of space objects and maximize transparency regarding those operations.

Question. Do you agree that China's actions threaten the United States' national security? If not, then why?

Answer. I am very concerned that the PRC has developed counterspace weapons capabilities intended to target U.S. and allied satellites and that both China and Russia believe that counterspace operations will be integral to potential military campaigns against the U.S. and its allies. If confirmed, I plan to work with the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community to use those tools available to the Department of State to address these threats as part of a whole of government response.

Question. On December 13, 2001, President George W. Bush announced the United States' withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which took effect on June 13, 2002.

- Do you agree that the United States should attempt to re-enter the ABM treaty? If so, please describe why?

Answer. The ABM Treaty terminated upon the United States' withdrawal, and thus cannot be rejoined.

Question. On December 13, 2001, President George W. Bush announced the United States' withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which took effect on June 13, 2002.

- Please list what potential national security implications rejoining the ABM treaty would have on the United States?

Answer. The ABM Treaty terminated upon the United States' withdrawal, and thus cannot be rejoined. If the United States were still a party to the 1972 ABM Treaty, it would prohibit or constrain the United States from continuing to develop and deploy strategic and theater ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems in terms of, for example, capability, geographic location, numbers, and basing modes.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO STEVEN C. BONDY BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Trafficking in Persons

Question. In the 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report, Bahrain was identified as Tier 1 but still has room for improvement, especially on adequately identifying trafficking victims as compared to labor law violations.

- How will you work with Bahrain to address these issues if you are confirmed as Ambassador?

Answer. Human trafficking is an issue of serious concern to the U.S. Government. While Bahrain has made strides to reform its labor sponsorship system in recent years, even as many of those reforms were politically sensitive within the country, I agree there is more that needs to be done. Bahrain is a regional leader on labor issues, and Bahrain's engagement with its neighbors on the subject has led to important reforms elsewhere. The annual State Department TIP report documents areas of concern and recommendations for further improvement. If confirmed, I intend to work with Bahraini officials to further improve efforts to address forced labor vulnerabilities inherent in the sponsorship system and safeguard workers against abuses.

Question. What is your assessment of this particular issue and if confirmed, how will you work with the Ambassador At Large to bolster religious freedom in-country?

Answer. Bahrain has been a regional leader in religious freedom for minority religious groups represented by Bahraini citizens as well as expatriates resident in the country. In that regard, following the signing of the 2020 Abraham Accords, Jewish life is reviving in Bahrain with a historical synagogue now being operational. Bahrain is the only Gulf Arab country that recognizes Ashura, the most significant time of the Shia religious calendar, as an official holiday. However, the International Religious Freedom Report documents continued discrimination against and marginalization of its Shia citizen population. If confirmed, I will urge Bahrain to continue to expand respect for freedom of religion or belief and to promote an inclusive society that upholds religious freedom for the members of all religions and religious sects. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the State Department's Ambassador at Large for Religious Freedom on this issue.

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to address these instances with the host government?

Answer. Human rights are at the forefront of the administration's foreign policy, as they have been for me throughout my career. If confirmed, I intend to lead several established channels for human rights dialogue with Bahrain, including through our annual Strategic Dialogue and other high-level engagements, as well as to engage on specific cases as needed. Our partnership with Bahrain is strongest when based on shared values and frank and honest engagement. I appreciate Congress's focus and engagement on this important topic, and if confirmed, I look forward to working with members to continue to advance human rights in Bahrain.

Question. How will you direct your Embassy to work with civil society organizations to improve the human rights situation on the ground?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the U.S. Embassy in Manama continues to engage a wide range of civil society, including activists both inside and outside of Bahrain and those associated with Bahraini citizens imprisoned for exercising their rights. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing this important work and will look for opportunities to build upon it.

Question. If confirmed, what steps do you plan on taking to further implementation of the Abraham Accords?

Answer. The Abraham Accords agreement between Israel and Bahrain represents a change in the strategic orientation of the Kingdom, and it has already made an important contribution to regional security and economic development. While the two countries have already opened embassies in each other's countries, launched direct air connections, and signed a number of MOUs, if confirmed, I would work to strengthen relations between these two important friends and allies across a wide spectrum of areas, from military to economic to trade to education. Building people-to-people ties is a particular area of interest that would yield long-term dividends. I would want to consult with the Bahraini Government and the Israeli Embassy in Bahrain to see where they felt the greatest opportunities lie.

Question. How would you propose strengthening the Bahraini public's support for normalization between Bahrain and Israel?

Answer. It is essential for both U.S. and regional security interests that Israel is further integrated into the region. To further demonstrate for the Bahraini public the benefits of normalization, relations and linkages must grow organically, particularly between the peoples of the two countries. Direct Gulf Air flights servicing travelers between Bahrain and Israel represent a big step in this regard and facilitate ties in a number of areas such as commerce, technology, medicine, education, and tourism. If confirmed, I would support building economic and trade partnerships between the two countries, or in a trilateral forum involving the United States, so that the Bahraini public can see and feel the benefits of normalization.

Question. In light of the Abraham Accords and Israel's entry into CENTCOM, if confirmed, will you commit to advocating for Israel's full integration into the multilateral activities that CENTCOM and the Fifth Fleet lead out of Bahrain, including maritime security efforts in the Gulf and Red Sea, and regional efforts on missile defense and counter-drone efforts?

Answer. Integrating Israel into Gulf security planning and operations represents one of the most significant potential benefits of the Abraham Accords. If confirmed, I will engage Bahraini and United States military leaders to promote integrating Israel into regional operations, including maritime and other security efforts commanded from Bahrain.

Question. In your view, what benefits would this have for regional stability?

Answer. Bahrain's leaders have been clear that their relationship with Israel and decision to normalize is in the country's strategic interest. Indeed, the two countries have many common security interests. Further cooperation and interoperability between the two countries can only strengthen their ties and security and improve regional and United States security.

Question. If confirmed, will you commit to work with CENTCOM and the Fifth Fleet to get an Israeli naval liaison officer assigned to NAVCENT in Manama? Please provide your assessment of the obstacles and challenges to doing so.

Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to work with CENTCOM and the Fifth Fleet to get an Israeli naval liaison assigned to NAVCENT in Manama. Enhanced Israeli participation in Gulf security planning and operations will improve regional and United States national security.

Question. What role should Bahrain play in efforts to counter Iranian regional aggression?

Answer. Bahrain is a steadfast U.S. ally and, as such, has consistently supported U.S. efforts to counter Iran's regional aggression. The threat posed by Iran and its proxies is very real to Bahrain and U.S. interests in Bahrain. If confirmed, I plan to work closely with our Bahraini partners to help bolster their security while supporting a comprehensive approach towards addressing Iran's destabilizing behavior.

Question. If confirmed, what steps do you plan on taking to build upon, and expand, the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) established in 2019 in response to growing Iranian threats to freedom of navigation in the Gulf?

Answer. Bahrain's hosting of the IMSC to ensure safe transit in the Gulf is an important example of its commitment to maritime security and freedom of navigation at a time when Iran continues to threaten commercial shipping in the Gulf. If confirmed, I will work with CENTCOM, NAVCENT, and the Bahrain Defense Force to ensure that their response to Iran in the region remains robust and forceful and facilitates the smooth flow of transport through open sea lanes.

Question. If confirmed, will you commit to support Bahrain's partnership with the Fifth Fleet's Task Force 59?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will work with CENTCOM, NAVCENT, and Bahrain Defense Force leaders on Bahrain joining the Fifth Fleet's Task Force 59.

Question. How can the US leverage this partnership with Bahrain to encourage other Gulf states to join Task Force 59?

Answer. Task Force 59 is an innovative and unique initiative in the Gulf. If confirmed, I would work with CENTCOM and United States diplomatic missions in the region to encourage other Gulf states to join. Success in its mission would be the best advertisement for others to join.

Question. What is your assessment of Iranian efforts to destabilize Bahrain politically and militarily?

Answer. Iran directs, trains, supplies, and funds militia groups across the region to advance its interests, undermine regional stability, and threaten U.S. partners, including Bahrain. Iran has a long history of cultivating, advising, and training armed Shia militant groups in Bahrain. The threat from Iranian-backed militants and other destabilizing actors is real; Bahraini and U.S. authorities have worked closely together to counter it for years and continue to do so on an ongoing basis. If confirmed, I intend to coordinate closely with the Bahraini Government to ensure our joint interests are adequately protected from threats of all kinds. We will continue to use a comprehensive approach using a variety of tools to counter the full range of Iran's destabilizing behavior. Working with Bahrain to promote internal security protects American citizens, investments, and interests in the Kingdom.

Question. How can the United States, Bahrain, and potentially other regional partners strengthen cooperation to counter these efforts by Tehran?

Answer. The United States and Bahrain can continue to strengthen cooperation to counter Iran's destabilizing behavior through exercises and increased interoperability. Task Force 59 is a great example of a new initiative to counter evolving threats. Targeted United States training of vetted Bahraini internal security units and enhancing counter-terrorism financing/anti-money laundering activities all contribute to safety and security inside Bahrain. If confirmed, I would work to continue these efforts.

Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to work to ensure Bahrain's concerns are addressed in a future agreement with Iran?

Answer. The administration continues to consult closely with Bahrain and all of its regional partners on U.S. engagement with Iran. Commitment to Bahrain, a Major Non-NATO Ally, is strong and will remain so. If confirmed, I would work with the Government of Bahrain to keep them apprised of developments in U.S. engagement with Iran to further strengthen our partnership.

Question. Where should Iran's malign proxy activity fall in terms of the priorities in the context of negotiations with Tehran?

Answer. The President and the Secretary have been clear that the administration has fundamental problems with Iran's actions across a series of issues, including its support for terrorism, its ballistic missile program, its destabilizing actions throughout the region, and its abhorrent practice of using wrongfully detained U.S. citizens and foreign nationals as political tools. An Iran with a nuclear weapon would be likely to act even more provocatively when it comes to these issues, so the Biden-Harris administration has been clear that Iran will not be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon. If confirmed, I will ensure continued support to a comprehensive approach using a variety of tools to counter the full range of Iran's destabilizing behavior, which includes its proxy activity in Bahrain.

Question. If nuclear talks between the U.S. and Iran fail to yield results, what steps should the U.S. be prepared to take to address Iran's malign proxy activity which pose a serious threat to partners like Bahrain?

Answer. The U.S. Government will continue to rely on a comprehensive approach using a variety of tools to counter the full range of Iran's destabilizing behavior and stand steadfast with our partners in the region in support of their security. If confirmed, I will work closely with Bahraini partners on ways and means to counter malign Iranian activity in the Kingdom.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO STEVEN C. BONDY BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. How, if at all, do you expect U.S.-Bahrain relations to change in light of Bahrain's 2020 normalization agreement with Israel?

Answer. Bahrain signing the 2020 Abraham Accords agreement with Israel represents a historic opportunity to deepen our relationship with Bahrain, which was already strong, and to assist our two regional friends and allies to broaden and strengthen their bilateral relationship. Bahrain's leaders have been clear that their relationship with Israel and decision to normalize is in their country's strategic interest. If confirmed, I intend to work to deepen not only the U.S.-Bahrain bilateral relationship and the Bahrain-Israel bilateral relationship, but also explore opportunities to promote the Bahrain-Israel-U.S. trilateral relationship.

Question. What can the U.S. Embassy in Bahrain do to elevate and enhance Bahrain's relationship with Israel?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to devoting my time and energy to operationalizing the Bahrain-Israel Abraham Accords agreement. While a number of MOUs have already been signed, I would work to broaden and strengthen relations between these two important friends and allies across the broad spectrum of topics, from military to economic to trade to education, and particularly on people-to-people ties, which provide benefits for the long term. I would also want to consult with the Bahraini Government and the Israeli Embassy in Bahrain to see where they felt the greatest opportunities lie.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO STEVEN C. BONDY BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER MURPHY

Question. Can you please clarify your answer as to the status of human rights in Bahrain and how you will promote human rights if confirmed as Ambassador?

Answer. The United States is encouraged by steps the Bahraini Government has taken in recent years to improve its human rights record in the past decade. If confirmed, I will work to promote continued positive momentum. The Biden-Harris administration has been clear that there are continued concerns about the human rights situation in Bahrain, as detailed in the State Department's annual Human Rights Report and discussed often with Bahraini interlocutors. If confirmed, human rights will be a priority for me, and I intend to lead engagement in several established channels for human rights dialogue with Bahrain, including our annual Strategic Dialogue and other high-level engagements. I will engage on specific cases as these arise, including regarding those individuals imprisoned for exercising their rights. I appreciate Congress's focus and engagement on this important topic, and if confirmed, I look forward to working with members to continue to advance human rights in Bahrain.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO LISA A. CARTY BY SENATOR ROBERT MENEDEZ

Question. How can the United States work within ECOSOC to effectively push for consistent and high level U.N. engagement to address the undermining of humanitarian assistance and access? Does ECOSOC have a strong role to play here? How has ECOSOC's Humanitarian Affairs Segment (HAS) improved the U.N. response to the humanitarian crises and how can it be improved?

Answer. The U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) provides a multilateral platform for Member States to discuss ways to meet growing humanitarian needs and improve the humanitarian system to reach the most vulnerable communities. In 2021, the United States' ECOSOC engagement prioritized the coordination and provision of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations impacted by conflict, COVID-19, and natural disasters, as well as the importance of humanitarian access and the protection and safety of United Nations and humanitarian personnel. If confirmed, I will ensure the United States continues working within ECOSOC to act ambitiously in addressing the compounded risks of conflict, climate and the COVID-19 pandemic while protecting and advancing principled humanitarian assistance.

The HAS provides an important platform for the international community to strategically engage on the most pressing humanitarian issues. If confirmed, I will seek to further improve the HAS by ensuring that its discussions are focused on the most urgent priorities aligned to U.S. humanitarian concerns, as well as issues related to advancing inclusion, including with respect to sex and gender, innovation and partnership, greater respect for international law, and accountability for those actors who obstruct humanitarian assistance.

ECOSOC Reform

Question. There are some who say ECOSOC lacks any real authority and that its work overlaps with the activities of the U.N. General Assembly. It has been suggested that the Council could play a greater role in global economic and development policy. The U.N. has passed several reforms over the years, including as recently as this year, to strengthen ECOSOC's policy guidance role and to improve collaboration between ECOSOC, its subsidiary councils, and other U.N. entities

- What is your assessment of the most recent ECOSOC reforms? Do you believe that ECOSOC should have a greater policy-setting role?

Answer. The reform of ECOSOC is an ongoing process. Sustained efforts by the United States have successfully influenced ECOSOC to implement reforms to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. For example, ECOSOC's ongoing revitalization work has reduced the number of days of ECOSOC activities by eliminating and/or shortening duplicative and lengthy segments and meetings, restructured the ECOSOC calendar into more streamlined groups, and required subsidiary bodies to assess whether they need annual negotiated outcomes. There has also been progress aligning the agendas of the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and ECOSOC's subsidiary bodies to eliminate duplicative segments. If confirmed, I will continue to urge ECOSOC to eliminate duplicative sessions, segments, and activities to allow ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies to focus on core tasks.

Question. How, if at all, will these ECOSOC reforms contribute to U.N. efforts to more effectively respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and related humanitarian crises?

Answer. ECOSOC plays a pivotal role in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, economic recovery, and humanitarian crises. If confirmed, I will work with ECOSOC and likeminded partners to press to make ECOSOC more relevant, effective, and accountable to its Member States. ECOSOC reforms will allow the organization to better rationalize and prioritize its work to successfully address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and make progress towards achieving the 2030 agenda.

Question. China's Role in ECOSOC, Targeting NGOs: I am concerned about China's increasing influence and role in U.N. bodies. ECOSOC consults with more than 5,100 registered non-governmental organizations to inform its work. I am deeply concerned that within ECOSOC, China has used its seat on the Council's committee on NGOs to block applications from NGOs working on human rights issues.

- How do you assess China's efforts to use its increased influence at ECOSOC and elsewhere in the U.N. system to undermine civil society and silence the voices of those who champion human rights? Are we doing enough to push back against this?

Answer. There is no doubt that China is seeking to advance its interests across the U.N. system. Countering malign Chinese action requires vigilant and energetic U.S. engagement. Chinese influence in ECOSOC has been a particular issue. Preserving space for credible NGO voices, on human rights or other key issues, must be a top priority. The United States has serious concerns about any ECOSOC NGO committee member insisting NGOs align with particular political positions as a condition for the committee to grant U.N. consultative status. The United States has had success, including at ECOSOC, coordinating with allies and partners to push back against PRC attempts to undermine core U.N. principles. If confirmed, I will work with allies and partners to continue to object to the PRC's practice of demanding NGOs use so-called "correct U.N. terminology" in their applications, websites, and documents when referring to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, or Tibet, which has the effect of censoring organizations' online presence, unduly restricting freedom of expression of their members, and stifling dissenting voices. If confirmed, I will work diligently to counter unhelpful Chinese actions, in particular with NGO committee members, and to ensure representation of credible civil society groups.

Question. The rapid collapse of the Ghani Government and Taliban takeover exacerbated a large-scale humanitarian and forced migration crisis. Fragile financial conditions and the Taliban's sidelining of women and girls are among the broader

challenges facing the country. I am concerned about the hundreds of U.N. Afghan staff, many women and ethnic minorities, whose lives are at great risk right now. The U.N. has reported dozens of incidences of looting of U.N. offices, threats and beatings of U.N. staff throughout the country. What more can be done to assist U.N. Afghan staff who are in great peril right now?

Answer. The United States, along with our partners, continues to engage diplomatically to press the Taliban to allow safe, unfettered access for all humanitarian actors, including female aid workers. We also strongly support the efforts of the U.N. security system, including the U.N. Department of Safety and Security, to advise U.N. personnel and NGO aid providers in the field on security risks and security measures. If confirmed, I will continue to press for the safety of all humanitarian workers and U.N. personnel and their unfettered access to deliver needed services to the Afghan people.

Question. What role should the Humanitarian Affairs Segment of ECOSOC play in bringing together actors from the U.N., private sector, and populations in need to meet the dire humanitarian needs within Afghanistan, particularly in light of the complex-and evolving-sanctions regime in place against the Taliban?

Answer. The ECOSOC Humanitarian Affairs Segment (HAS) has furthered efforts by the United States and our partners to ensure that humanitarian aid in Afghanistan adheres to humanitarian principles, reaches those most in need, is robustly funded, and leverages partnerships, including with the private sector, to maximize innovation and effectiveness in humanitarian response. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure the United States and our partners continue to support the HAS's important and growing role in bringing together stakeholders to address humanitarian needs and ensure unfettered access by and safety of U.N. and humanitarian partners.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO LISA A. CARTY BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. Are you familiar with S. 2297, the International Pandemic Preparedness and COVID-19 response Act?

Answer. I have read the legislation you reference and agree that sustained attention to the question of World Health Organization (WHO) reform is an urgent priority. If confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris administration's active engagement in the WHO's Member State Working Group on Strengthening WHO Preparedness for and Response to Health Emergencies (WGPR). Through this mechanism, the United States is advancing its interests and demonstrating its commitment to strengthening and reforming the WHO to ensure it can deliver on its vital global mission to advance health, health security, and the prevention of and response to future biological catastrophes.

Question. If confirmed, will you commit to advancing the core principles of this Act through ECOSOC, including by elevating the importance of SDG #3 targets 3C and 3D?

Answer. I understand that the United States is already working to advance multi-pronged efforts that are consistent with the core principles of the draft International Pandemic Preparedness and COVID-19 Response Act.

The Biden-Harris administration is fully committed to supporting equity in global health emergencies in ways that are consistent with the Act and Targets 3C and 3D of the Sustainable Development Goals. This means ensuring that developing countries have access to vaccines, oxygen, and therapeutics, and investing in capacity building to equip developing and developed countries with tools for early warning and risk reduction as pandemic and other health threats emerge. If confirmed, I will work with allies and partners to advance these priorities, which were also reflected in the President's Global COVID-19 Summit on September 22.

Sustainable Development Goal #5

Question. Through its various bodies, specialized agencies, programs, funds, resolutions, and summits, the United Nations seeks to advance the status of women internationally, including through Sustainable Development Goal #5, relating to gender equality. Often times, this has included advocacy for "the reproductive health rights of women."

- In your view, does the term "reproductive health" include access to abortion?

Answer. My understanding is that the United States has a long history of joining consensus on the use of the term “reproductive health” in global multilateral forums as part of its commitment to gender equality and the empowerment and protection of women and girls. Since the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) defined the term in its Programme of Action as adopted by 187 governments, references to reproductive health have been included in scores of U.N. resolutions and included in the Sustainable Development Goals. The ICPD defined reproductive health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and processes.” The ICPD Declaration definition does not include a direct reference to abortion. If confirmed, I will continue to support efforts to promote women’s physical, mental and social well-being and their comprehensive inclusion in all appropriate U.N. agencies, programs, funds, and resolutions.

Question. Is a woman’s access to abortion a “right” protected under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, an indicator of gender equality under SDG #5, or a target under SDG #3.7 (ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services)?

Answer. My understanding is that the term ‘abortion’ is not in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The SDG 5.6 indicators are: “proportion of women aged 15-19 years who make their own informed decisions regarding sexual relations, contraceptive use and reproductive health care” and “number of countries with laws and regulations that guarantee full and equal access to women and men aged 15 years and older to sexual and reproductive health care, information, and education.” Target 3.7 is “By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes.” If confirmed, I will continue to support efforts to promote women’s physical, mental and social well-being.

Question. If confirmed, will you commit to fully complying with current laws prohibiting the use of U.S. foreign assistance to perform or promote abortion as a method of family planning, to support involuntary sterilizations, or to lobby for or against the legalization of abortion overseas?

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to upholding the law, including all laws related to our foreign assistance.

Question. If confirmed, will you also commit to ensuring full compliance with the U.N.’s “zero tolerance” policy with regard to sexual exploitation and abuse, whether such acts are committed by U.N. personnel themselves or partners implementing U.N. humanitarian and development assistance programs?

Answer. The United States will absolutely not tolerate sexual misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), in any of its forms and at any level across the multilateral system. Such acts are a scourge that undermines the very foundation of foreign assistance. The United States has been a leader, including through pushing through a landmark U.N. Security Council resolution in 2016 and urging the U.N. system at the highest levels and throughout the organization to adopt detailed and robust policies to prevent and respond to sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), including to ensure that the U.N. takes a survivor-centered response to any such allegation, strengthens and improves its reporting and response mechanisms, and holds all perpetrators accountable. If confirmed, I will support the administration’s push to fully enforce Secretary-General Guterres’s “zero tolerance” policy, including through the Office of the Special Coordinator on Improving the United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and the Office of the Victims’ Rights Advocate for the United Nations.

Sustainable Development Goal #16

Question. While the Sustainable Development Goals failed to prioritize democracy and good governance as the foundation upon which all stable, healthy, and prosperous societies are built, SDG #16 may serve as a building block for future negotiations. Targets relating to the rule of law, government transparency and accountability, and combatting corruption are particularly relevant in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.

- If confirmed, how will you advance the principles of democracy and good governance as foundational to advancement to each of the SDGs?

Answer. The United States has consistently stressed that the fundamental values articulated in SDG 16 must form the basis for the achievement of the 2030 Agenda

as a whole, and it has noted the importance of the cross-cutting and foundational values that drive progress on sustainable development, including transparency, good governance and the rule of law, and promoting equality and human rights. It is critically important for the United States to push for the recognition of the Agenda's underlying values across the U.N. system. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that these values feature prominently in U.N. resolutions and other negotiated documents and work closely with U.N. organizations to ensure that their policies and practices reflect those values.

Energy Security and Climate Action

Question. Expanding access to reliable and affordable energy will be key to the advancement of nearly all of the SDGs, particularly for SDG #1 (to end poverty in all its forms everywhere). Yet, many of the proposals coming out of the Biden administration appear to be prioritizing green energy options that are impractical and out of reach for the poorest of the poor and may exacerbate, rather than eliminate, energy poverty.

Moreover, there are serious concerns about the potential for China to manipulate commitments under the SDGs and the upcoming U.N. Climate Change Conference (COP26), such that the Chinese Government and its state-owned enterprises profit through the sale of “green” technologies to low carbon emitters in the developing world in order to meet U.N.-imposed policies and requirements while failing to take meaningful action to reduce its own consumption.

- If confirmed, how will you balance SDGs #7 (clean energy) and #13 (climate action) against each of the other SDGs?

Answer. It should be possible to advance progress on energy security and climate action without compromising progress across other SDGs. Renewables—specifically wind and solar—are the cheapest form of new electricity in most of the world today. The cost for many key clean energy technologies has continued to decline, additionally, they can be deployed cost-effectively at varying scales, making them increasingly essential to expanding energy access. Importantly, developing countries and major emitters, such as India, recognize these complementarities and have incorporated massive renewables deployment in their economic development agendas. It will be important as climate negotiations continue to ensure that China is not seeking unfair advantage or exploiting international agreements for its own gain. If confirmed, I would work to guard against unfair Chinese actions and develop complementarities across the energy, climate and other SDGs.

Question. How will you ensure that low carbon emitters in the developing world are not penalized by energy development and consumption policies and requirements imposed by the U.N.?

Answer. The Paris Agreement does not impose any “energy development and consumption policies or requirements” on emerging economies, and instead allows all parties to set nationally determined climate goals that reflect their unique national circumstances. The United States understands that every country, from high carbon emitters to low carbon emitters, faces a unique set of climate and energy-related challenges. As such, each country will follow a different path to successfully transition to a clean energy future. If confirmed, I would work to aim to encourage and support those transitions through both bilateral and multilateral engagements.

Question. The People's Republic of China (PRC) Government is actively trying to reshape international institutions to advance its malign development model, including the United Nations.

- If confirmed, how will you work with our democratic allies and partners to build resiliency to attempts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to undermine the integrity of multilateral institutions and longstanding, widely held democratic values, including with regard to the important work of ECOSOC to advance the Sustainable Development Goals?

Answer. There is no doubt that China is seeking to advance its interests across the U.N. system. Countering malign Chinese action requires vigilant and energetic U.S. engagement. If confirmed, I would make this a top priority. The United States has had success coordinating with allies to push back against PRC attempts to undermine core U.N. principles, including at ECOSOC. The committee's report, *The United States and Europe: A Concrete Agenda for Transatlantic Cooperation on China*, provides an important roadmap to help pursue this goal. The United States shares many priorities with countries around the world, including developing countries, yet too often in multilateral fora, and particularly at ECOSOC, votes do not align. If confirmed, I will work with colleagues across the Department to strengthen current alliances and partnerships as well as improve outreach to a broader group

of countries based on shared priorities, both in New York and through bilateral channels.

Question. Will you commit to monitoring such attempts and taking appropriate actions?

Answer. The United States is best able to address these attempts when we are engaged and leading at the U.N., the General Assembly, and its subsidiary bodies including ECOSOC. If confirmed, I will use our re-engagement with the U.N. system to reassert U.S. leadership and work with our partners and allies to push back against the PRC's attempts to reshape the U.N. and international rules, standards, and values. If confirmed, I will seek to improve the U.N.'s effectiveness, transparency, and impartiality, support qualified and independent candidates for key positions, and ensure that we advance our priorities on issues ranging from human rights to emerging technologies to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Question. China has focused intensely on securing leadership roles in various U.N. agencies, particularly those overseeing technical standards that will shape the future. In many cases, these leaders have overtly advanced CCP goals, instead of acting independently to advance the global good. It is clear the United States has had mixed success with elections for heads of International Organizations in the past, and is taking more robust and coordinated steps to advocate for qualified and independent candidates in U.N. bodies.

- If confirmed, will you prioritize robust strategies to secure the election of qualified and independent candidates to lead ECOSOC?

Answer. If confirmed, one of my highest priorities will be the appointment and election of qualified, independent candidates to leadership positions in the U.N. system. I would hope to draw on my extensive experience in the U.N. system to help advance this goal. Such personnel are critical to ensuring the U.N. operates effectively and in line with its foundational principles and values, and they bring strong technical and policy skills that enhance the performance and outcomes within the U.N. system, which, in turn, bolster our efforts on U.N. reform and good governance. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs has established a new office focused in part on managing, supporting, and coordinating elections and appointments for qualified U.S. and likeminded candidates for leadership roles in the U.N. system. That office works closely with our multilateral missions, including in New York and Geneva, to ensure the United States identifies and advocates on behalf of interested candidates for key positions across U.N. organizations and agencies

Question. My report last year on U.S.-Europe cooperation on China notes that China abuses its seat on the U.N.'s NGO committee to block legitimate NGOs who would be critical of China's horrible human rights record, particularly against the Uyghurs and Tibetans.

- If confirmed, how would you ensure that China does not block legitimate NGOs from joining the committee?

Answer. PRC efforts to block legitimate NGOs from participating in the U.N. prevent the valuable contributions of civil society and other important non-state stakeholders. The United States has serious concerns about any ECOSOC NGO committee member insisting NGOs align with particular political positions as a condition for the committee to grant U.N. consultative status. The United States has had success, including at ECOSOC, coordinating with allies to push back against PRC attempts to undermine core U.N. principles. We will work with our allies and partners to continue to object to the PRC's practice of demanding NGOs use so-called "correct U.N. terminology" in their applications, websites, and documents when referring to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, or Tibet, which has the effect of censoring organizations' online presence, unduly restricting freedom of expression of their members, and stifling dissenting voices. If confirmed, I will work with NGO committee members and allies to continue to push back against these efforts and ensure the committee's work is open, transparent, and accessible to civil society around the globe.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
 SUBMITTED TO LISA A. CARTY BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

SDG

Question. As Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on State Department and USAID Management, International Operations, and Bilateral Development, my subcommittee has responsibility for reviewing the budget and operations of the State Department and USAID. SDG 16, in my view is the key to achieving all the other sustainable development goals, as it seeks to develop “peaceful and inclusive societies . . . provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.”

- Should you be confirmed, how do you plan on ensuring that SDG16 will remain central to the UN’s approach to implementing the SDGs and keep adversaries from advancing an alternative view on democracy and human rights?

Answer. The United States has consistently stressed that the fundamental values articulated in SDG 16 must form the basis for the achievement of the 2030 Agenda as a whole, and it has noted the importance of the cross-cutting and foundational values that drive progress on sustainable development, including transparency, good governance and the rule of law, and promoting equality and human rights. It is critically important for the United States to push for the recognition of the Agenda’s underlying values across the U.N. system. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that these values feature prominently in U.N. resolutions and other negotiated documents and work closely with U.N. organizations to ensure that their policies and practices reflect those values.

Question. Unfortunately, the President’s budget omitted specific support for the U.N. Joint SDG Fund. In your capacity, will you recommend that the U.S. become a lead donor that will attract additional investment from like-minded countries, multiplying the Fund’s impact? How do you plan on engaging partners to encourage them to prioritize the Joint SDG Fund?

Answer. A key aspect of the 2030 Agenda was the recognition that countries are primarily responsible for their own achievement of the SDGs, using funding from all sources, including domestic resource mobilization, domestic and international public finance, private sector investment, and civil society. Initiatives like the Joint SDG Fund, which seeks to leverage contributions to catalyze larger financial flows, are an important U.N. contribution to that funding. If confirmed, I will carefully consider how U.S. assistance can best support U.S. policy goals and whether the U.S. should contribute to the Joint SDG Fund.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
 SUBMITTED TO LISA A. CARTY BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. The biggest issue that I, and many others have with the U.N. is that it allows any nation to participate as an equal member no matter what the nation’s current practices are.

ECOSOC is responsible for many committees’ councils and commissions including the Commission on the Status of Women. If ECOSOC is to be taken as a serious organization that promotes human dignity, then it can’t allow nations to make a mockery of basic principles at home while purporting to investigate similar abuses elsewhere.

- If confirmed, would you oppose the Taliban from occupying the Afghanistan seat on the Commission on the Status of Women?

Answer. Per longstanding practice, the United States will only support countries with a commitment to the full equality of women in law and practice for election to the Commission on the Status of Women. If confirmed, I will continue this practice.

Question. If confirmed, can you commit to opposing the Taliban from serving on any council or committee that is under ECOSOC?

Answer. As a general practice, U.N. subsidiary bodies such as those under ECOSOC defer questions on credentialing to the U.N. General Assembly and its Credentials committee. I understand the administration is working closely with like-minded governments and others in the international community to hold the Taliban to account for the statements and commitments it has made to responsible governance, including respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Taliban’s actions will matter more than its words. If confirmed, I will closely coordinate with

colleagues across the U.S. Government and U.N. system to support the administration's objectives to hold the Taliban to account.

Question. Across a variety of international organizations, China is attempting to place its candidates as leaders or manipulate international standards and avoid shining the spotlight on its country's authoritarian practices. Within ECOSOC, China has reportedly used its seat on the Council's committee on NGOs to block applications from NGOs working on human rights issues. What is your assessment of China's efforts to increase its influence in U.N. bodies, particularly ECOSOC?

Answer. There is no doubt that China is seeking to advance its interests across the U.N. system. Countering malign Chinese action requires vigilant and energetic U.S. engagement. Chinese influence in ECOSOC has been a particular issue. The United States has serious concerns about any ECOSOC NGO committee member insisting NGOs align with particular political positions as a condition for the committee to grant U.N. consultative status. The United States has had success, including at ECOSOC, coordinating with allies and partners to push back against PRC attempts to undermine core U.N. principles. The United States works with our allies to object to the PRC's practice of demanding NGOs use so-called "correct U.N. terminology" in their applications, websites, and documents when referring to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, or Tibet, which has the effect of censoring organizations' online presence, unduly restricting freedom of expression of their members, and stifling dissenting voices. If confirmed, I will work diligently to counter unhelpful Chinese actions, in particular with NGO committee members and allies, to continue to push back against these efforts and ensure the committee's work is open, transparent, and accessible to civil society around the globe.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to highlight China's manipulative practices and counter its efforts to control ECOSOC and related committees?

Answer. The United States is best able to address these attempts when we are engaged and leading at the U.N., including the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies including ECOSOC. If confirmed, I will work with our partners and allies and strengthen partnerships to push back against the PRC's attempts to reshape the U.N. system and undermine the international rules-based order upon which it is based. If confirmed, I will also take targeted actions to oppose harmful PRC efforts that include its attempts to exploit the U.N. system and other international organizations to promote its "One Belt, One Road" Initiative as a way to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals or its efforts to introduce PRC ideology into negotiated U.N. products.

**Communications Received Supporting the Nomination of
Steven C. Bondy to be U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of
Bahrain**

LETTER SUBMITTED BY AMB. HUGO LLORENS (RET.)
IN SUPPORT OF STEVEN C. BONDY

The Office of Ambassador Hugo Llorens (ret.)

October 4, 2021

Dear Senator Menendez:

Steve Bondy is excited about his Senate Confirmation hearing this coming Thursday, October 7. As a long-time mentor, but also a friend, I have heard some say Steve may not be as sensitive about inter-agency cohesion. I wanted to convey that nothing could be further from the truth.

Steve worked for me as a member of my leadership team at the time I led the U.S. Embassy in Kabul in the period 2016-17. Steve was my Assistant Chief of Mission. In that position he served as the Chief Operating Office of the largest Embassy in history with a staff 8,500 representing 22 U.S. government agencies. Steve and I worked together on a daily basis, seven days a week and 12 or more hours per day. We managed some of the most challenging diplomatic and security issues on America's national security portfolio.

As the Assistant Chief of Mission, Steve's responsibilities were immense and the range of issues he managed were expansive, from oversight of security of thousands of Embassy staff in a war zone, to strengthening the physical plant of our perimeter and building, to combatting opium and heroin drug trafficking. Steve directly led the largest U.S. law enforcement team deployed overseas, including huge FBI and DEA contingents. In all of these roles Steve was a superb leader and manager. In all my dealings with him, I found him to be extraordinarily inclusive, collaborative, and supportive, engaging the range of section and agency heads under him to ensure they were closely synchronized and carrying out their operations in support of US national interests.

In my 36-year State Department career, with 20 years of senior leadership experience as a two-time Ambassador, two-

time DCM, and two-time Principal Officer, I have never worked with an officer who was as closely aligned with our military counterparts as Steve. He had a close, cooperative relationship with the commander of the Resolute Support Mission, General Mick Nicholson, and all of his senior staff officers. Through his experience working at JSOC for three years, Steve was intimately familiar with Special Operations and collaborated with the senior special operations officer in country, then-Major General Scott Howell, who Steve knew well from JSOC days. Steve also maintained extremely close and collaborative ties with the general officer responsible for intelligence and his team. Throughout, all of our military officer counterparts had the utmost respect for Steve. They respected his total dedication, his competence, and his talents as a team player.

Steve is an honorable and patriotic American. He is more than ready to be an outstanding US Ambassador to Bahrain. I have full confidence that he will develop a unified, cohesive Country Team and collaborate closely with the three-star commander of US Navy Central Command. We can rest assured that with Steve as a leader, our national security and foreign policy are in the very best hands.

Sincerely,


Ambassador Hugo Llorens (ret.)

LETTER SUBMITTED BY GEN. JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA (RET.), PRESIDENT AND CEO, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, IN SUPPORT OF STEVEN C. BONDY

**Business Executives
for National Security**

General Joseph L. Votel, USA (Ret.)
President and CEO

Applying best business practices to address the nation's most pressing security challenges

October 4, 2021

Senator Robert Menendez
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Hart Senate Office Building
SH-528
Washington, DC 20510


Mr. Chairman,

I am retired General Joe Votel, former JSOC, SOCOM and CENTCOM Commander, and I am writing to offer my very strongest endorsement for confirmation of Mr. Steve Bondy as our Ambassador to Bahrain.

I have known Steve since 2013 when I selected him from a group of senior Diplomatic Corps officers to be my Policy Advisor at the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). As such, he was my principal advisor on interagency communication, coordination and collaboration. In a word - he was excellent and I implicitly trusted his counsel on a variety of sensitive and high risk activities that we conducted pursuant to our assigned missions. When I departed JSOC in 2014 and moved to US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and then subsequently to US Central Command (CENTCOM), I continued to interact regularly with Steve, who was then serving in key positions in Embassies across the Middle East. Again, he was a trusted voice whose input I personally sought and valued. As a Charge d'Affaires, his Country Teams were excellent and always well-coordinated. Steve always demonstrated, in abundance, the skills and attributes required for senior government leadership overseas and especially within the interagency. He is a skilled communicator and an effective collaborator who is deeply respected across the military and within the interagency.

I am confident that the Committee will find him an extraordinarily well qualified nominee for this position and one who will represent our President and our Nation with distinction, integrity and honor.

Very respectfully,



General Joseph L. Votel, USA (Ret.)
President & CEO