

NOMINATIONS

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2021—p.m.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., via video-conference, Senator Coons, presiding.

Present: Senators Coons [presiding], Cardin, Kaine, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen, Young, and Hagerty.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Senator COONS. Good afternoon. It is my honor to call this hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to order.

I welcome the chance to serve as chair of this hearing and appreciate Chairman Menendez asking me to take this on as we consider five highly qualified nominees, and I welcome, as ranking member for this hearing, Senator Hagerty and the five nominees who are before us.

Let me briefly introduce them, and I will make a very brief statement and then invite Senator Hagerty to make whatever opening statement he may care to.

Our five nominees for this afternoon's hearing are Dr. C.S. Eliot Kang, to be Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation; Adam Scheinman, to be Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation; Marcia Stephens Bloom Bernicat, to be Director General of the Foreign Service; Bathsheba Nell Crocker, to be U.S. Representative to the Office of the United Nations and other International Organizations in Geneva; and Dr. Michael Carpenter, to be U.S. Representative to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Let me begin by thanking all five of you, thanking you for your willingness to continue your service to this Nation. And let me extend my thanks to your families, who normally, if we were in person, would, many of them, be physically with us, and so I would have a chance to greet them. I do not know if any of them are hovering just off the screen, but please convey to them my gratitude for their support for your career and service.

Before we proceed into the substance of your opening statements, our colleague from New Jersey Senator Booker will introduce Ambassador Bernicat. Let me also, before we proceed to that, do two more things. I am going to ask all of our nominees today to please keep your statements to roughly 5 minutes in length. The com-

mittee will accept your written testimonies in full and submit them for the record.

And I also want to note for all members and staff who may be listening that questions for the record for this confirmation hearing will be due by the close of business this Thursday, September 16th.

With that, let me invite Senator Hagerty to make any opening comment he would like to. Then we will proceed to an introduction by Senator Booker.

Senator Hagerty?

**STATEMENT OF HON. BILL HAGERTY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE**

Senator HAGERTY. Chairman Coons, thank you very much. And I want to thank Senator Risch for inviting me to serve as the ranking member today. And I also want to thank the nominees for appearing before our committee today. I appreciate your willingness to serve our great Nation. I am looking forward to hearing from each of you.

I would like to start with the nomination to the Director General of the Foreign Service. This position has the unique responsibility of recruiting, retaining, and sustaining the Foreign Service and the civil service workforce of the State Department.

As a former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, I recognize that the people of the State Department are critical to the success of American diplomacy. For the United States to tackle the growing number of complex global challenges, we should seek to build the finest diplomatic corps in the world. I look forward to hearing from the nominee about how we will achieve this goal.

Next I would like to turn to the nomination to be Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation. As strategic adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea continue to expand their arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, the world is becoming more dangerous each day.

The United States should look for opportunities to expand counterproliferation efforts in ways to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. I am particularly interested to hear from the nominee about his views on the increasing WMD threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea and what the United States should be doing.

I would like to turn next to the nominee to be the Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation. There are a growing number of countries, such as China and Iran, that pose significant challenges with respect to nuclear energy and nonproliferation norms. I look forward to hearing from the nominee about ways to update the NPT for the 21st century.

Now I would like to turn to the nominee to be the U.S. Representative to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. I just returned from NATO, and it is clear that following the withdrawal from Afghanistan, we are at a critical juncture with many of our European allies and partners, and they need to know that the United States can and will be a reliable partner. This is even more important, considering Russia's efforts to spread malign influence throughout Europe. I look forward to hearing from the nominee about these issues.

And now I want to turn my attention to the nominee to be the Representative of the United States to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva. As the lead U.S. official representing over 100 U.N. bodies in Geneva, you will be responsible for advancing U.S. interests in many multilateral organizations. As we all know, China and other strategic adversaries are looking to expand their influence by remaking global institutions in their image. I look forward to hearing from the nominee about what steps she intends to take to fight for America.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. Thank you.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Hagerty.

Let me now invite Senator Booker of New Jersey to offer an introduction of Ambassador Bernicat.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CORY A. BOOKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY**

Senator BOOKER. Well, this is an extraordinary honor, Senator Coons. Thank you very much.

I am really elated, frankly, to be able to introduce President Biden's nominee to serve as Director General of the Foreign Service, Ambassador Marcia Bernicat. We are currently, as you know, facing tremendous challenges all across the globe that will not only define the history of the world but will most certainly define the history of our Nation. Challenges like the global crisis of climate change to taking on the COVID-19 pandemic, which continues to cause such tragedy around the world.

And we know this, for all of us Senators who have been traveling, America's diplomatic leadership is now needed more than ever. And that is why we need this great Jersian Ambassador Bernicat leading the diplomatic corps responsible for representing the United States of America and advancing our interests around the world.

I can think of no one more qualified for this extraordinarily important position. She has served as a Foreign Service officer for three decades starting, I think, when she was 2 or 3 years old. Ambassador Bernicat has had a career that is not just impressive, but impactful.

She most recently served as senior official for economic growth, energy, and the environment at the State Department and prior to that served as the Ambassador to Bangladesh and previously concurrently as the Ambassador to Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.

Over the course of her diplomatic career, she has received extraordinary honors and respect from those who she served with. She is somebody that is both well respected and looked up to, but also someone in which folks have great confidence in.

She has served in Barbados, Malawi, Morocco, India, Nepal, France, and Mali. All across the world she has made an impact and left a lasting legacy. She represents the best of the United States of America, and I would say, coming from the great State of New Jersey, she represents the best of New Jersians. Born in the wonderful Red Bank, New Jersey.

Ambassador Bernicat probably has many, many accolades, but perhaps her two best living legacy examples of her success is her two sons, who she has raised while serving in the Foreign Service.

As we Senators in a bipartisan effort work to reinvest in the diplomatic efforts to keep America safe, rebuild our alliances and partnerships, and live up to our collective values here at home and abroad, Ambassador Bernicat is exactly the kind of leader that we need.

I urge my colleagues not because of fealty to New Jersey, I urge my colleagues because of fealty to the United States of America to support her nomination.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Booker. I appreciate that introduction.

We are now going to proceed to hear opening statements from each of our five nominees in the order in which they were noticed for this hearing by the committee.

So no disrespect, Senator Booker, we are going to begin with Dr. C.S. Eliot Kang, and then we will proceed through the five nominees in the order that they were noticed.

Senator BOOKER. No disrespect taken, but go ahead.

Senator COONS. It is just part of the traditions of this committee. So, if I might, Dr. Kang, your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF DR. C.S. ELIOT KANG OF NEW JERSEY, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION)

Dr. KANG. Yes, sir. Thank you very much.

Senator Booker, I am also from New Jersey. Ocean County, Lakewood, New Jersey.

Senator BOOKER. Yes.

[Laughter.]

Dr. KANG. Yes. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Hagerty, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

I am grateful to President Biden for nominating me to be the Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Non-proliferation.

I am also grateful to Secretary Blinken for his trust and faith in supporting my nomination.

Crossing the Pacific as a 9-year-old immigrant almost half a century ago, my only ambition was to taste a real hamburger. No doubt my mother and father, who made the fateful decision for my family to start a new life in the United States, had more lofty hopes for me and my sister, Myung. However, I am sure they never imagined the honor of me appearing before this august body to be examined for my worthiness to serve this great Nation as an Assistant Secretary of State.

If confirmed, I pledge to continue working tirelessly for the American people. Indeed, public service is in my DNA. I have been following the footsteps of my late father, a decorated combat pilot and a Government official. And my mother, a lifelong educator and recipient of New Jersey Governor's award for outstanding teaching.

I started my career in my mother's profession, but the events of September 11, 2001, led me to my father's path of Government service. It has not been an easy path to tread, but unwavering support from my wife, Michelle, and the understanding of my two sons, Gregory and Wesley, have strengthened my steps and resolve.

In 2003, I first joined the State Department's Bureau of Political and Military Affairs and then Bureau of Arms Control as a William C. Foster Fellow, which was a congressionally established program for bringing academics into the Government's—into the Department's arms control and nonproliferation work.

I became a career civil servant in 2005, and since 2006, I have held various leadership positions in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, working to protect the American people from dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

As a career officer, I have endeavored across four presidential administrations to minimize the threat of nuclear, chemical, biological, and advanced conventional weapons and the destabilization these weapons can cause.

However, despite tremendous bipartisan efforts and the steadfast leadership of this committee to stem the tide of the most destructive and horrible weapons, the challenges only appears to be growing. Indeed, the explosion of technology seems to create as many problems for our security as it solves for our society.

In the late hours of the evening, I reflect upon the increasing challenges we face, and I arrive to work every morning resolved and determined to do something about them. In this commitment, I am not alone.

I am privileged to serve the American people alongside a remarkable group of colleagues who share my dedication, the men and women serving in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation who frustrate our adversaries and are respected by allies and friends throughout the world. I am inspired by these public servants who gladly accept personal sacrifices to serve our Nation.

The President's confidence in me, a career officer, is an honor for me and my family, but it is also a testament to the expertise and ability of the remarkable professionals in the Bureau. Indeed, the Bureau is an extraordinary collection of civil servants, Foreign Service officers, and contractors with expertise in the physical sciences, engineering, intelligence, military sciences, communications, and program administration. Many are leading subject matter experts with international reputations. I am in awe of the tremendous skill and knowledge and dedication they bring to tackle some of the most pressing security problems facing the world and the Nation.

If confirmed, I will work even harder to empower my colleagues to tackle the challenges this committee expects us to meet.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, the ranking member, and the members of the committee for your time and attention today and for your consideration of my nomination. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kang follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. C.S. ELIOT KANG

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the committee; thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

I am grateful to President Biden for nominating me to be the Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation. I am also grateful to Secretary Blinken for his trust and faith in supporting my nomination.

Crossing the Pacific as a nine-year-old immigrant almost a half-century ago, my only ambition was to taste a real hamburger. No doubt, my mother and father who made the fateful decision for our family to start a new life in the United States had more lofty hopes for me and my sister, Myung. However, I'm sure they never imagined the honor of me appearing before this august body to be examined for my worthiness to serve this great nation as an Assistant Secretary of State. If confirmed, I pledge to continue working tirelessly for the American people.

Indeed, public service is in my DNA. I have been following the footsteps of my late father, a decorated combat pilot and government official, and my mother, a lifelong educator and recipient of New Jersey Governor's Award for Outstanding Teaching. I started my career in my mother's profession, but the events of September 11th, 2001 led me to my father's path of government service. It has not been an easy path to tread but unwavering support from my wife, Michelle, and the understanding of my two sons, Gregory and Wesley, have strengthened my steps and resolve.

In 2003, I first joined the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and then Bureau of Arms Control as a William C. Foster Fellow, which was a congressionally established program for bringing academics into the Department's arms control and nonproliferation work. I became a career civil servant in 2005, and since 2006, I have held various leadership positions in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation working to protect the American people from the dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. As a career officer, I have endeavored across four presidential administrations to minimize the threat of nuclear, chemical, biological, and advanced conventional weapons and the destabilization these weapons can cause. However, despite tremendous bipartisan efforts and the steadfast leadership of this committee to stem the tide of these most destructive and horrible weapons, the challenges only appear to be growing. Indeed, the explosion of technology seems to create as many problems for our security as it solves for our society. In the late hours of the evening, I reflect upon the increasing challenges we face; and I arrive to work every morning resolved and determined to do something about them.

In this commitment, I am not alone. I am privileged to serve the American people alongside a remarkable group of colleagues who share my dedication: the men and women serving in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, who frustrate our adversaries and are respected by our allies and friends throughout the world. I am inspired by these public servants who gladly accept personal sacrifices to serve our nation. The President's confidence in me, a career officer, is an honor for me and my family, but it is also a testament to the expertise and ability of the remarkable professionals in the Bureau. Indeed, the Bureau is an extraordinary collection of civil servants, foreign service officers, and contractors with expertise in the physical sciences, engineering, intelligence, military sciences, communications, and program administration. Many are leading subject matter experts with international reputations. I am in awe of the tremendous skills and knowledge and dedication they bring to tackle some of the most pressing security problems facing the nation and the world. If confirmed, I will work even harder to empower my colleagues to tackle the challenges this committee expects us to meet.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, the Ranking Member, and members of the committee for your time and attention today and for your consideration of my nomination. I look forward to answering your questions.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Dr. Kang.
Mr. Scheinman?

**STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SCHEINMAN OF VIRGINIA, TO BE
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT FOR NU-
CLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, WITH THE RANK OF AMBAS-
SADOR**

Ambassador SCHEINMAN. Thank you, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Hagerty, and all other members of the committee present today. It is really an honor to appear today as President Biden's nominee for Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation.

I am grateful to the President and Secretary Blinken for the confidence placed in me, and I am very pleased to be here today with my old friend Eliot Kang and all other nominees here today.

Mr. Chairman, this is my second time nominated to serve in this position. The first followed more than two decades in the Federal civil service working on issues related to nuclear weapons proliferation and related nuclear risks. And for the last 4 years, I served on the faculty of the National War College which, among other benefits, was a welcome opportunity to step back and view nuclear matters through a wider lens.

At the War College, we teach that major U.S. national security challenges are best met using all instruments of power—diplomatic, military, economic, and informational. And in partnership with friends and allies and, on occasion, our competitors. A perfect illustration is nuclear proliferation. It is a challenge to our vital interests and one for which there are no purely military or political solutions.

There is no doubt that the international system is in transition. It is increasingly competitive. It is less predictable, and in a time of turbulence, some would ask whether the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or the NPT—an agreement conceived in the Cold War period—was still fit for purpose. To my mind, the answer is a resounding “yes.” There is no nuclear weapons challenge facing the United States for which the NPT limits our strategic options or for which better options would be available in the treaty’s absence.

On the contrary, the NPT is a force multiplier and extends the range and reach of our nuclear diplomacy and global confidence in nonproliferation norms and all the supporting institutions. This, I think, explains the continuity of U.S. bipartisan support for the NPT, support that spans 12 presidencies—6 Democratic and 6 Republican administrations from President Kennedy to President Biden.

As in prior decades, it certainly remains true that nuclear proliferation dangers are best tackled not alone, but through collective action, and the NPT anchors that action. It is the basis for assembling diplomatic coalitions to confront countries like Iran and North Korea. Its wide, robust international safeguards came into being, and we continue to strengthen them. And it provides a framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation and restraint on transfers of the most sensitive nuclear technologies.

It also permeates U.S. alliances that are themselves potent instruments of nonproliferation policy. Same time we have to acknowledge that the NPT is not immune from pressures that could erode its appeal. Regional grievances, rising frustration of parties over the slow pace on nuclear disarmament actions are really serious problems for the NPT’s political process. And no one here needs any imagination to guess at the consequences for the treaty and for international security if Iran were to take the path of North Korea and withdraw from the treaty to develop nuclear weapons.

If confirmed, I look forward to doing my part to advance a broad U.S. strategy to strengthen the NPT in all aspects. There is much work to do, from strengthening the institutional machinery for nonproliferation to reassuring allies that they can depend on the United States for defense and deterrence and providing the arms control enterprise that President Biden has started with the agreement with Russia on a 5-year extension of the New START Treaty.

These are important steps, and I hope they lay the groundwork for additional measures.

Most significantly, our NPT agenda requires steady U.S. leadership. We were present at the creation of the nonproliferation regime. No other state has our reach or our influence to sustain it. And if confirmed, I pledge to do my part to carry forward the legacy of U.S. leadership, working closely with Congress, with my interagency colleagues and our foreign partners to preserve and strengthen this vital instrument.

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome any questions you or members of the committee may have.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Scheinman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM M. SCHEINMAN

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

It is an honor to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee for Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation. I am grateful to the President and Secretary Blinken for the confidence they have placed in me. I am also very pleased to be here today with my fellow nominees.

Mr. Chairman, this is my second time being nominated for this position. The first time capped more than two decades in the federal civil service dedicated to preventing nuclear weapons proliferation and related nuclear risks. More recently, I served on the faculty of the National War College, which was a welcome break from the day-to-day rhythms of government work but also an opportunity to step back and view nuclear matters through a wider lens.

At the war college, we teach that major U.S. national security challenges are best met using all instruments of power—diplomatic, military, economic and informational—and in partnership with friends, allies, and on occasion our competitors. A perfect illustration is nuclear proliferation, a challenge to our vital interests and for which there are no purely military or political solutions.

There can be no doubt that the international system is in transition, increasingly competitive and less predictable. In a time of such turbulence, some ask whether the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—or NPT, an agreement conceived in the Cold War era—is “fit for purpose.”

To my mind, this question answers itself resoundingly in the affirmative. There is no realistic nuclear weapons challenge facing the United States for which the NPT limits our strategic options or for which better options would be available in the treaty's absence. To the contrary, the NPT is a force multiplier, extending the range and reach of U.S. nuclear diplomacy and global confidence in nonproliferation norms, rules and supporting institutions. This explains the continuity of U.S. bipartisan support for this treaty, support that spans twelve presidencies, from President Kennedy to President Biden—that's six Democratic and six Republican administrations.

As in prior decades, we recognize today that nuclear proliferation dangers are best tackled not alone but through collective action. The NPT anchors such action. It is the basis for assembling diplomatic coalitions to confront Iran and North Korea. It is why robust international nuclear safeguards came into being and continue to strengthen. It provides a framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation and restraint on transfers of sensitive nuclear technologies. And it permeates U.S. alliances that are themselves potent instruments of nonproliferation policy.

At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the NPT is not immune to pressures that over time may erode its appeal. Regional grievances and rising frustration of many parties over the slow pace of nuclear disarmament actions are serious problems that roil the NPT's political process. And one needs little imagination to guess at the consequences for the treaty and international security if Iran were to take the path of North Korea by seeking to withdraw from the treaty to develop nuclear weapons.

If confirmed, I look forward to doing my part to advance a broad U.S. strategy to strengthen the NPT in all its aspects. There is much work to do, from strengthening international safeguards, to expanding peaceful nuclear cooperation without adding to proliferation dangers, to enhancing the security incentives of states to support the NPT. Reassuring allies that rely on the United States for defense and deterrence is one such measure. Another is reviving the nuclear arms control enterprise, as the Biden administration has advanced by reaching agreement with Russia

on a five-year extension of the New START Treaty. The agreement to resume a high-level dialogue on strategic stability is another welcome development, one that can lay the groundwork for additional measures.

Most significantly, our NPT agenda requires steady U.S. leadership. We were present at the creation of the nonproliferation regime and no other state has our reach or influence to sustain it. If confirmed, I pledge to do my part to carry forward the legacy of U.S. leadership, working closely with Congress, my interagency colleagues, and our foreign partners to preserve and strengthen a treaty system that contributes so much to the nation's security.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I welcome any questions you or other members of the committee may have.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Scheinman.

We will now turn to Ambassador Bernicat.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARCIA STEPHENS BLOOM BERNICAT OF NEW JERSEY, A CAREER MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF THE MINISTER-COUNSELOR, TO BE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Ambassador BERNICAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Coons, Ranking Member Senator Hagerty, distinguished members of the committee. I am honored to appear before you today.

I sincerely thank President Biden and Secretary Blinken for the confidence they have placed in me as their nominee for Director General of the Foreign Service and to serve as Director of Global Talent Management. If confirmed, I will work with the members of this committee to build a workforce better able to confront the breadth and depth of challenges we face in the 21st century.

Supporting the more than 76,000 women and men who make up our diverse global team would be the highest privilege of my four-decade career. I am inspired by my colleagues who so dutifully serve our Nation, too often in harm's way. They deserve our full support, and their welfare will be my north star.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to acknowledge my aunt and uncle, Blanche and Robert Stephens; my sister and brother-in-law, Kathryn and Luther White; and brother and sister-in-law, Rodney and Cindy Bloom. I would also like to thank my sons, Sumit Nicolaus and Sunil Christopher, and their father, Olivier, who hold a special place in my heart in no small part for having shared this Foreign Service journey with me across the globe.

As Secretary Blinken noted when he came before this committee, when America does not lead on the global stage, others who do not necessarily have our best interests at heart and mind fill the void, or the challenges simply go unaddressed. In order to lead with diplomacy, we need a strong State Department.

Our team has been tested in unprecedented ways over the last 20 months. Most recently mobilizing to evacuate more than 123,000 people, including 6,000 U.S. citizens, 2,800 locally employed staff from Afghanistan, one of the largest noncombatant evacuations in U.S. history. And this effort was preceded in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic by our coordinating the repatriation of over 100,000 Americans from 136 different countries and territories in less than 6 months.

A 21st century workforce must reflect our diverse Nation. If confirmed, I will prioritize diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility so the Department is fully representative of the American people and is a workplace where every employee is treated with dignity

and respect and has an equal opportunity for professional development and promotion. I will work with Ambassador Winstanley, the Department's first Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, to ensure the initiatives she leads are embedded at every level of our organization.

Mr. Chairman, over the past 20 months we have adapted to unprecedented circumstances. At State, we are building on that experience to invest in a workforce that is more mobile, agile, and expeditionary, especially one that gets outside capitals more often to directly engage local communities.

The virtual world provides new tools and expanded outreach, for example [inaudible]. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we are prepared to return to the workplace while taking full advantage of a more hybrid workforce and environment.

We will also need to build a broader knowledge set to meet the challenges our Nation faces—from preventing the next pandemic, harnessing the full potential of emerging technologies, and addressing climate change, to strengthening our alliances and countering our adversaries.

Our diversity as a nation gives us strategic advantage. By seeking the best talent, most creative minds, and our fellow citizens' varied experiences and backgrounds, State is better equipped to advance America's security, its other interests, our values, and commitment to democracy. In our diversity, we embody the values to which our Nation aspires, and we also inspire Americans to pursue a life of service and give young people across the globe hope for a better future.

Finally, if confirmed, I will work to strengthen accountability, empowering our employees to take risks, learn from their mistakes, and assume greater responsibility for their decisions. And I will endeavor to make healing central to all my efforts—from a pandemic that robbed us of too many colleagues and family members, from the withdrawal from Afghanistan where so many of our employees served over the past two decades, and from the racial and social strife that has rocked our country and our workforce.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today. I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bernicat follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARCIA STEPHENS BLOOM BERNICAT

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today. I sincerely thank President Biden and Secretary Blinken for the confidence they have placed in me as their nominee for Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Global Talent Management.

If confirmed, I will work with the members of this committee to build a workforce better able to confront the breadth and depth of challenges we face in the 21st century. Supporting the more than 76,000 women and men who make up our diverse, global team will be the highest privilege of my four-decade career. I am inspired by the women and men who so dutifully serve our nation, too often in harm's way. They deserve our full support and their welfare will be my north star.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to acknowledge my Aunt and Uncle Blanche and Robert Stephens, the matriarch and patriarch of our family, my sister and brother-in-law Kathryn and Luther White and brother and sister-in-law Rodney and Cindy Bloom. I'd also like to thank my sons, Sumit Nicolaus and Sunil Christopher, and their father Olivier, who hold a special place in my heart in no small part for having shared this Foreign Service journey with me across the globe.

As Secretary Blinken noted when he came before this committee, when America does not lead on the global stage others who do not necessarily have our best interests in mind fill the void, or the challenges simply go unaddressed. In order to lead with diplomacy, we need a strong State Department.

Our team has been tested in unprecedented ways over the last 20 months, most recently mobilizing to evacuate more than 123,000 people, including 6,000 U.S. citizens and 2,800 Locally Employed Staff from Afghanistan, one of the largest non-combatant evacuations in U.S. history. This effort was preceded, in the wake of the COVID pandemic, by coordinating the repatriation of 101,386 Americans from 136 countries and territories in less than six months.

A 21st century workforce must reflect our diverse nation. If confirmed, I will prioritize diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility so the Department is fully representative of the American people and is a workplace where every employee is treated with dignity and respect and has an equal opportunity for professional development and promotion. I look forward to working with Ambassador Abercrombie-Winstanley, the Department's first Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, to ensure the initiatives she leads are embedded at every level of the organization.

Mr. Chairman, over the past 20 months we have adapted to unprecedented circumstances. At State we are building on that experience to invest in a workforce that is more mobile, agile and expeditionary; especially one that gets outside capitals more often to directly engage local communities. The virtual world also provides new tools for outreach. Our national network successfully recruited record numbers of outstanding, diverse candidates for the Pickering, Rangel, and Foreign Affairs IT Fellowships, and pursued ambitious efforts focused on diversity for career candidates. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management to ensure we are prepared to return to the workplace while taking full advantage of a more hybrid workforce and environment.

We will also need to build a broader knowledge set to meet the challenges and benefits from the opportunities our nation faces—from preventing the next pandemic, harnessing the full potential of emerging technologies and addressing climate change, to strengthening our alliances and countering our adversaries. Our diversity as a nation gives us strategic advantages. By seeking the best talent, most creative minds, and our fellow citizens' rich and varied experiences and backgrounds, State is better able to advance America's security, interests, values, and commitment to democracy. In our diversity we embody the values to which our nation aspires, inspire Americans to pursue a life of service and give young people across the globe hope for a better future.

Finally, if confirmed, I will work to strengthen accountability, empowering employees to take risks, learn from their mistakes, and assume responsibility for their decisions. And I will endeavor to make healing central to all my efforts—from a pandemic that robbed us of too many colleagues and family members; from the withdrawal from Afghanistan, where so many of our employees served over the past two decades; and from the racial and social strife that has rocked our country and our workforce.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today. I look forward to your questions.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ambassador.

Next we will turn to Ms. Crocker.

STATEMENT OF HON. BATHSHEBA NELL CROCKER OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO BE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GENEVA, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR

Ms. CROCKER. Thank you, Senator Coons, Ranking Member Hagerty, and distinguished members of this committee.

I am honored to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee to be the Representative of the United States to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva. I am grateful to President Biden and Secretary of State Blinken for this opportunity to again serve my country.

I am so grateful for the love and support of my husband, Milan Vaishnav, our daughters, Asha and Farrin, and for their sacrifice, should I be confirmed to take on this important role. I am also thankful for the support of my father, Chester Crocker, and my sisters and their families, and I am thinking today of my mom, who would have so proud to witness me appearing before this committee again.

My parents instilled in me a deep commitment to public service. I have had no greater honor than serving my country, side by side with our career diplomatic corps. And I am especially proud that my father and I are the only father-daughter Assistant Secretaries of State in State Department history.

My previous roles as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs at the United Nations and overseeing CARE USA's humanitarian work have shown me that the United Nations works most effectively when the United States leads and leverages all of the tools at our disposal to advance U.S. national security interests across and through the United Nations system.

My previous experiences position me well to represent the United States across the many different organizations in Geneva and ensure sound oversight of the U.S. contributions to those organizations. I am committed to advancing reforms to make those organizations more efficient and effective and to ensuring the United States is best positioned to lead, to collaborate, and, where necessary, to outcompete, so that the United Nations system remains grounded on its foundational values of advancing human rights, democracy, economic opportunity, and international peace and security.

China, Russia, Cuba, and others are threatening those values, seeking to co-opt multilateral institutions, including Geneva-based organizations, to impose their national agendas and reshape the rules-based international organizations. For example, at the International Telecommunications Union, the People's Republic of China and Russia aimed to undercut U.S. efforts to protect the open Internet. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the United States and our like-minded partners can drive the discussion and the rules of the road, at the ITU and other standard-setting bodies, and support strong candidates for leadership in the Geneva-based organizations.

The Biden-Harris administration decided that the United States should run for re-election to the U.N. Human Rights Council to ensure that body focuses on the world's worst human rights violators. The Geneva-based organizations are critical to U.S. efforts to address the COVID-19 pandemic, strengthen global health security, and support effective and efficient provision of humanitarian assistance in crisis and conflict situations around the world. The World Health Organization is a central pillar of the global health security architecture.

If confirmed, I will prioritize U.S. leadership in the efforts to strengthen the WHO through reforms that promote transparency, accountability, cost effectiveness, sustainability, and equity across the agency and its programs. I am committed to ensuring that the organization can more effectively and transparently tackle COVID-

19 and future emerging global health threats in collaboration with other U.N. and international partners.

During my time at CARE USA, I saw firsthand the key role, the vital role that the United States plays in leading and supporting humanitarian efforts around the globe. In Geneva, the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization on Migration, the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, and the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent are key partners in those efforts. And if confirmed, I will ensure robust U.S. leadership and oversight at those agencies and look to leverage U.S. contributions to drive needed reforms and ensure other countries step up.

At their best, Geneva-based organizations are valuable partners across an array of U.S. priorities, including global health security, human rights, humanitarian assistance, technology, and other standard-setting efforts, climate change, intellectual property, trade disarmament, and more.

If confirmed, I will aim to reestablish U.S. relationships and leadership so that we can effectively leverage the unique multilateral platform Geneva offers to work with allies and partners, the private sector, and civil society to advance U.S. goals and push back on PRC and others' efforts to undermine those organizations.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee today. I look forward to your questions and, if confirmed, to working with this committee to ensure that USUN Geneva effectively meets the challenges of today's strategic landscape.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Crocker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. BATHSHEBA NELL CROCKER

Thank you, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of this committee.

I am honored to appear before you as President Biden's nominee to be the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva. I am grateful to President Biden and Secretary of State Blinken for this opportunity to again serve my country.

I am so grateful for the love and support of my husband, Milan Vaishnav, and our daughters, Asha and Farrin—and for their sacrifice should I be confirmed to take on this important role. I am also thankful for the support of my father, Chester Crocker and my sisters and their families, and am thinking today of my mom, who would have been so proud to witness me appearing before this committee again.

My parents instilled in me a deep commitment to public service. I have had no greater honor than serving my country side-by-side with our career diplomatic corps, and I am especially proud that my father and I are the only father-daughter Assistant Secretaries of State in State Department history.

My previous roles as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, at the United Nations, and overseeing CARE USA's humanitarian work have shown me that the United Nations works most effectively when the United States leads and leverages all the tools at our disposal to advance U.S. national security interests across and through the United Nations system.

My previous experiences position me well to represent the United States across the different organizations in Geneva and ensure sound oversight of the U.S. contributions to those organizations. I am committed to advancing reforms to make those organizations more efficient and effective and to ensuring the United States is best positioned to lead, to collaborate, and, where necessary, to out-compete—so that the United Nations system remains grounded on its foundational values of advancing human rights, democracy, economic opportunity, and international peace and security.

China, Russia, Cuba, and others are threatening those values, seeking to co-opt multilateral institutions, including Geneva-based organizations, to impose their national agendas and reshape the rules-based international order.

At the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the PRC and Russia aim to undercut U.S. efforts to protect the open internet. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the United States and our like-minded partners can drive the discussion and the rules of the road—at the ITU and other standard-setting bodies—and support strong candidates for leadership in the Geneva-based organizations.

The Biden-Harris administration decided that the United States should run for re-election to the U.N. Human Rights Council to ensure that body focuses on shining a spotlight on the world's worst human rights violators.

The Geneva-based organizations are critical to U.S. efforts to address the COVID-19 pandemic, strengthen global health security, and support effective and efficient provision of humanitarian assistance in crisis and conflict situations.

The World Health Organization is a central pillar of the global health security architecture. If confirmed, I will prioritize U.S. leadership in the efforts to strengthen the WHO through reforms that promote transparency, accountability, sustainability, cost effectiveness, and equity across the agency and its programs. I am committed to ensuring that the organization can more effectively and transparently tackle COVID-19 and future emerging global health threats in collaboration with other U.N. and international partners.

During my time at CARE USA, I saw firsthand the critical role the U.S. plays in leading and supporting humanitarian efforts around the globe. In Geneva, the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization on Migration, the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, and the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent are key partners in those efforts, and, if confirmed, I will ensure robust U.S. leadership and oversight at those agencies and look to leverage U.S. contributions to drive needed reforms and ensure other countries step up.

At their best, the Geneva-based organizations are valuable partners across an array of U.S. priorities, including global health security, human rights, humanitarian assistance, technology and other standard setting efforts, climate change, intellectual property, trade, disarmament, and more. If confirmed, I will aim to re-establish U.S. relationships and leadership so that we can effectively leverage the unique multilateral platform Geneva offers to work with allies and partners, the private sector, and civil society to advance U.S. goals and pushback on PRC and others' efforts to undermine those organizations.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee today. I look forward to your questions and, if confirmed, to working with this committee to ensure that USUN Geneva effectively meets the challenges of today's strategic landscape.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Crocker.

Dr. Carpenter, you are our last of our five nominees today. We look forward to your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL CARPENTER OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR

Dr. CARPENTER. Thank you, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Hagerty, and members of the committee for this opportunity to appear before you today as the President's nominee for Permanent Representative to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

It is a tremendous honor to be nominated for this position, and I am grateful to President Biden and Secretary Blinken for the confidence they have placed in me.

I would also like to thank my parents, my spouse, and our two children for their endless love and support.

My mother immigrated to this country from Poland. She was born during World War II while my grandparents, both physicians, were fighting the Nazi occupation as clandestine officers in the underground Home Army. After the war, the Communist dictatorship rewarded their heroism by confiscating their property and torturing my grandfather to divulge the names of his fellow officers. He re-

fused, even when it cost him his job at the local hospital. Over four decades later, though, he lived to see the Solidarity movement sweep aside the oppressive Communist regime.

My family's struggles against totalitarianism instilled in me an appreciation for the democratic freedoms we enjoy as Americans and a conviction that they must never be taken for granted. I graduated from high school in 1989, the very year that communism was defeated in Central Europe. After earning a doctorate studying democratic movements, I joined the Foreign Service.

I was working on the South Caucasus when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, and I was serving as NSC Director for Russia when it invaded Ukraine in 2014. Later, at the Pentagon, I led efforts to strengthen and support the sovereignty and territorial integrity and Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the countries between NATO and Russia.

Today, the optimism of 1989 seems distant. Democratic institutions are under assault, and increasingly aggressive authoritarian regimes seem to weaken and divide democratic states against one another. A Communist dictatorship in China is trampling human rights and using economic coercion against other states.

A revanchist Russia is repressing civil society and using active measures to disrupt and weaken democratic rivals. In many countries within the OSCE space, anti-Semitism, racism, and intolerance are gaining ground. Judicial independence is eroding. Journalists are harassed. And ruling parties with no interest in fair electoral competition are capturing state institutions.

Recognizing the enormous challenges that lie ahead, I would highlight the following three vital areas, where, if confirmed, I would seek to partner with the members of this committee as well as with the Helsinki Commission.

First, to promote comprehensive security across all three OSCE dimensions—politico-military, economic and environmental, and human rights. Participating states must address not just conventional military threats, but also hybrid threats, such as election interference, energy coercion, disinformation, dark money, cyber operations, and transnational repression. We need to find ways not only to shine a light on these malign activities, but also to defend ourselves and our democratic partners against them.

Second, to promote prosperity and rule of law, participating states must establish stronger anti-corruption measures, both east and west of Vienna. Corruption erodes economic growth, it undermines security, and it enables state capture. Like-minded states must work together to fight kleptocracy, using tools like criminal statutes against bribery, Global Magnitsky-style sanctions, and collective action against offshore secrecy.

Third, our allies and partners must work together to strength the resilience of frontline democracies. In Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and many Balkan countries, OSCE institutions offer a range of tools for strengthening democratic resilience. Supporting religious freedom, media pluralism, electoral reform, and judicial independence all fall into this basket, as do efforts to bridge societal divides and resolve longstanding conflicts.

Lastly, I want to acknowledge the instrumental role that Congress plays in achieving these goals. Whenever Members of this

body observe an election, condemn human rights abuses, or demand push back against foreign coercion, you serve as a force multiplier. If confirmed, it will be an honor to work the members of this committee, the Helsinki commissioners, and other Members of Congress to advance our shared interest in democracy, transparency, prosperity, and security for the American people.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Carpenter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL CARPENTER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and members of the committee for this opportunity to appear before you as the President's nominee for Permanent Representative to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. It is a tremendous honor to be nominated for this position and I am grateful to President Biden and Secretary Blinken for the confidence they have placed in me.

I would also like to thank my parents, my spouse, and our two children for their endless love and support.

My mother immigrated to this country from Poland. She was born during World War II while my grandparents, both physicians, were fighting the Nazi occupation as clandestine officers in the underground Home Army. After the war, the Communist dictatorship rewarded their heroism by confiscating their property and torturing my grandfather to divulge the names of his fellow officers. He refused, even when it cost him his job at the local hospital. Over four decades later, though, he lived to see the Solidarity movement sweep aside the oppressive Communist regime.

My family's struggles against totalitarianism instilled in me an appreciation for the democratic freedoms we enjoy as Americans and a conviction that they must never be taken for granted. I graduated from high school in 1989, the very year Communism was defeated in Central Europe. After earning a doctorate studying democratic movements, I joined the Foreign Service. I was working on the South Caucasus region when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and was serving as NSC Director for Russia when it invaded Ukraine in 2014. Later, at the Pentagon, I led efforts to strengthen and support the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the countries between NATO and Russia.

Today, the optimism of 1989 admittedly seems distant. Democratic institutions are under assault and increasingly aggressive authoritarian regimes seek to weaken and divide democratic states against one other. A Communist dictatorship in China is trampling human rights and using economic coercion against other states. A revanchist Russia is repressing civil society and using "active measures" to disrupt and weaken democratic rivals. In many countries within the OSCE space, anti-Semitism, racism, and intolerance are gaining ground. Judicial independence is eroding, journalists are harassed, and ruling parties with no interest in fair electoral competition are capturing state institutions.

Fortunately, the OSCE is uniquely suited to addressing these challenges. The Helsinki Final Act's linkages between security, economic relations, and human rights and its insistence that the latter are not an internal matter but a legitimate concern for all members of the international community have been transformational. Today, all participating States are held to account for their adherence to OSCE principles and commitments. If confirmed, I will continue speaking up for human dignity, freedom, and justice wherever they are challenged in the OSCE region. There are also bright spots and positive changes occurring. Though often less visible, OSCE field missions in Central Asia, the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe do highly impactful work to promote security, human rights, and rule of law at the local level.

Recognizing the enormous challenges that lie ahead, I would highlight the following three vital areas where, if confirmed, I would seek to partner with the members of this committee as well as the Helsinki Commission:

First, to promote comprehensive security across all three OSCE dimensions—political-military, economic and environmental, and human rights—participating States must address not just conventional military threats but also "hybrid" threats such as election interference, energy coercion, disinformation, dark money, cyber operations, and transnational repression. We need to find ways not only to shine a light on these malign activities but also to defend ourselves and our democratic partners against them.

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states must work together to fight kleptocracy, using tools like criminal statutes against bribery, Global Magnitsky-style sanctions, and collective action against off-shore secrecy.

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Lastly, I want to acknowledge the instrumental role that Congress plays in achieving these goals. Whenever members of this body observe an election, condemn human rights abuses, or demand pushback against foreign coercion, you serve as a force multiplier. If confirmed, it will be an honor to work with the members of this committee, the Helsinki Commissioners, and other members of Congress to advance our shared interest in democracy, transparency, prosperity, and security for the American people.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Senator COONS. Thank you.

And now I am going to begin an initial round of 5 minutes. We have a robust participation in this virtual hearing, and I will ask just a few brief questions. I will try to direct one to each of the nominees, and then we will proceed to a first round. And if members are interested in a second round, if you please convey that to my team while we are doing these questions, that would be quite helpful.

Dr. Kang, if you would just briefly describe to me what would the ISN Bureau's highest priorities be under your leadership?

Dr. KANG. Thank you for that question, Senator Coons.

I have—my career has been focused on nuclear matters, whether it be related to nuclear security, nuclear safeguards, even nuclear safety. But my biggest fear has always been a biological weapon that is unleashed on the world. And the COVID-19 pandemic right now is a wake-up call, and this is an area I have been very concerned about for many, many years.

Four years ago, when I was Acting Assistant Secretary during the transition between President Obama and President Trump, I tried very much to increase our capability in this area in the Bureau. We have a very small staff even now, less than a half a dozen. Most of them, fellows, are from elsewhere. But when I consider that I had led diplomacy and engagement with our foreign partners and elsewhere to make everyone cognizant of a danger a radiological device could create, the mayhem that it could create and wreak on our economy and the casualties it could cause, just imagine what if COVID-19 was a purposely designed biological weapon.

Now, state parties would be hesitant to use such a weapon. But I could clearly see a nihilistic group of terrorists and the threshold for creating something like this is not as high as creating a nuclear weapon without apparatus of a state with its engineering and manufacturing capabilities.

So that is my greatest fear. Yet at the same time, the international instrument that at least my Bureau is responsible for, the Biological Weapons Convention, is the least institutionalized, least developed, and in many ways least significant of the many non-proliferation regime out there. So, sir, this is one area where I will be focused like a laser beam and trying to make some advances.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Dr. Kang. I will ask one more question, and then I will be asking in a second round.

Mr. Scheinman, if I could? The NPT tries to balance peaceful use of nuclear energy with the goals of preventing the proliferation of sensitive fuel cycle nuclear technologies in enrichment and reprocessing and reducing the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. How should the United States balance those two goals, and what would you do to help improve the effectiveness of the NPT?

Ambassador SCHEINMAN. Thank you very much for the question, Senator Coons. It is really a critical issue for the long-term success of the nonproliferation system because if we do not adequate controls over peaceful use of nuclear technology, we are very likely to see additional proliferation down the road.

There are two areas where I think we need to spend a lot of time and energy. One is ensuring that the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency's verification system is as strong and robust as possible, that we have agreements among states to make it as strong and robust as possible, so that we have a very clear firebreak between a country's peaceful nuclear program and any potential that that program might be put to weapons.

The system has worked pretty well, but it could certainly be improved. And one area in particular that we hope to see improvement on is gaining global support for the additional protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement, which is essential if we are going to ferret out undeclared nuclear programs. Absolutely essential.

The other area is perhaps a bit outside of the NPT, but it deals with supplier policies. I worry about the spread of the most sensitive nuclear fuel production technologies, enrichment and reprocessing, because if that spreads to additional countries, it would be very, very challenging to prevent countries from not using that for military purposes down the road. So we have to work with the export control supply regime, the nuclear suppliers group to encourage the highest level of restraint in those transfers.

We need to work with other nuclear suppliers so that we have understandings that when we sign contracts, it is not going to include enrichment and reprocessing technology. And we should acknowledge in the NPT itself that certain technologies are more dangerous than others, and we ought to erect the highest possible barriers. So that is some of the ways I think we can look at that.

Senator COONS. Okay, thank you, Mr. Scheinman. I look forward to a next round where I will try to question our three other nominees.

Senator Hagerty? Senator Hagerty, you are muted.

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Bernicat, I would like to start with you. I would like to begin with a quote from Ambassadors Bill Burns and Linda Thomas-Greenfield, and this is the quote. "The personnel evaluation process consumes 3 months of an officer's time, with no commensurate accountability for, let alone improvement in, individual or collective performance."

As U.S. Ambassador to Japan, I worked with some very talented colleagues in the State Department, but I can certainly sympathize with that statement, given the amount of time that people spent

on performance evaluations. And I recall a saying that if one wants to offer criticism at the Department of State that one does it by damning someone by faint praise, as they say. I cannot tell you how many 5s I saw on personnel evaluation forms. And I strongly advocate for having a more rigorous evaluation process to ensure that accountability is at the center of the State Department's personnel process.

So my first question is do you agree with the characterization of the State Department's personnel evaluation process as described by Ambassadors Burns and Thomas-Greenfield?

Ambassador BERNICAT. Senator, thank you very much for that question, and you know from your own experience how time-consuming our performance evaluation process is.

I have to say, having served with Linda Thomas-Greenfield when she was Director General and being a colleague of Bill Burns over the years, I know that Linda in particular worked very hard to reform the EER process, which we did. I can tell you, if confirmed, I will rededicate my efforts to further reforms, which I understand are already being considered.

The evaluation process is the sole means by which we promote people, but it is really the penultimate activity in what should be a year's worth of performance evaluation. And as a supervisor, I have always—and a leader, I have always encouraged my team, if you are a supervisor, to provide honesty feedback throughout the year and with the notion of improving performance because no one is perfect. And then as to my employees to seek that kind of critical feedback because it is very hard to see our blind spots, and our performance in those blind spots change from time to time. So I assure you that we have improvements we can make, and we should make them.

Senator HAGERTY. I am glad to hear it and look forward to working with you to talk through metrics. And again, I do not mean critical in a bad sense, but as I said, the performance evaluations seem so inflated to me as a business person that it is hard, it is hard for a person to see how they might improve when anyone—when everybody gets such high scores in the system.

One more place I want to turn is the issue of promotion in the State Department, Ambassador. Again, I am going to come back to Bill Burns and Linda Thomas-Greenfield. They also said this, that opportunities for mid-career graduate or professional education are scarce—and here is what gets me—and they carry little weight with promotion panels.

The effect is often to penalize employees who receive extra training or undertake assignments to other agencies, or they work in Congress because they have gone outside of the State Department system and spent time there. And if what they say is true, it really seems counterproductive to me to building a diplomatic corps, that we want to have the type of breadth of experience and preparation for the 21st century. And if confirmed, I would love to hear how you would ensure that professional education, experiences like working on the Hill, are something that actually inures to the credit of our State Department employees.

Ambassador BERNICAT. Yes, well, thank you. I would say three things on this issue.

One is that expanding your skill set as a Foreign Service officer at whatever point in your career is considered a valuable and credible reason to promote someone. In and of itself, the training is not a promotable function, if you will, but have you applied the skills that you learned in that additional training or time off?

Secondly, the promotion boards. Again, my experience as an employee and as a supervisor, promotion boards have been instructed to in recent years to give added weight to those experiences.

And thirdly, and this is a real key, Senator, we have had a roller-coaster experience with hiring, both in terms of budget and in terms of hiring freezes over the course of my career. It is really difficult to allow people the time that they need to take to get training when we are short on personnel. And so, I know that our budget requests are looking to once again build in the kind of cushion where we can let people take time off without harming the core mission.

And Senator, if I can just add parenthetically, I had a year of university training at Berkeley before going to India, and I believe it directly helped lead to my promotion after that. So I would say when we use those training opportunities, build in those exchange opportunities, then they strengthen a person's promotability.

Senator HAGERTY. I am glad to hear you say that, and that is your perspective. I know talking with my employees at the Embassy in Japan, there was a perception that it may—you know, it may actually be a disadvantage to take that time off, and I understand the resource constraints that make it difficult and challenging. But I look forward to working with you because I do think those sort of broadening experiences make a real difference.

Mr. Chairman, I will yield my time back. Look forward to a second round.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Cardin?

Senator CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And first, let me thank all of our nominees for their willingness to continue to serve our country. We thank you. We thank your families.

Dr. Carpenter, I first want to appreciate the meeting that we had and your statements today about working with the members of the Senate and the Helsinki Commission members and the Helsinki Commission itself. I think we share the same objectives. I was very pleased to hear your three priorities.

In regards to the hybrid threat, you are exactly right. I call your attention to a report I authored when I was ranking on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about Mr. Putin's use of an asymmetric arsenal to bring down democratic states. I think you will find a lot of the issues you talk about. We document Russia's specific use of these tools to compromise democracies.

And that is why resiliency of frontline democracies so much needs to be a priority. We have seen a decline of democracies globally, and certainly within the OSCE region, there has been a significant decline of democratic states.

And then, lastly, the corruption issue. You and I have talked about this. The corruption is the fuel that allows the autocratic regimes to stay in power. So I am going to ask your help in three bills that are moving through the Congress because sometimes we

do not get the full cooperation of the executive branch and the missions within the State Department.

One would set up a tier rating system for how well every state in country—every country in the world is dealing with corruption. The other makes the Global Magnitsky statute permanent and strengthens some of the provisions within it. And the third establishes a fund that we can use when an opportunity presents itself to deal with—dealing with corruption in countries.

All three are bipartisan, and all three are very strongly supported. There has been positive action in our committee. But I would ask your support for these initiatives because I think it very much will help you in regards to your mission.

So I look forward to working with you, and I will be glad to hear a response.

Dr. CARPENTER. Thank you, Senator Cardin, for your incredible leadership on these issues. And it has been so heartening to see the Helsinki Commission, and you in particular, leading the effort on anti-kleptocracy. And I would note that the anti-kleptocracy act now has, I believe, seven different bills attached to it, all of which strike at key elements of global corruption.

This is a problem, as you just noted, Senator, that is inextricably linked to the growth of authoritarianism around the world. Often we see regimes that consolidate political power that start out by using corrupt means, whether it is doling out procurement contracts or using other forms of graft and bribery, to be able to accumulate economic power.

So those two things, sort of the oligarchization of politics around the world and the growing authoritarianism of politics around the world, go together. And of course, some of our biggest competitors, both Russian and China, are experts at weaponizing corruption against democratic states.

So I value these efforts, the incredible number of ideas and bills that have come out of the Helsinki Commission, many of which you have cosponsored, and look forward to advancing this agenda, if confirmed.

Senator CARDIN. I look forward to working with you.

Dr. Kang and Ambassador Scheinman, I would like to ask you about probably the greatest the threat we have on nuclear proliferation, and that is Iran. We are in a somewhat difficult decision right now not to be part of the JCPOA. Which we have seen Iran violate the JCPOA, and yet we are, it looks like, supporting a path that will not allow for international sanctions. I want to know your strategies for how you will advise President Biden and the administration on what can work in making sure Iran does not have nuclear weapons.

Dr. KANG. Perhaps I should start, sir? Absolutely Iran should never obtain a nuclear weapon. The President is absolutely committed to that, and that is consistent passed over a number of administrations. But return to the JCPOA advances our national security interest. And it is the intention of the President to build a longer and stronger deal, which encompasses regional destabilization that Iran is responsible for, but also the ballistic missile development they have, which could threaten certainly the regional neighbors but perhaps, over time, ultimately the United States.

So, yes, there has been a break in conversations and negotiations between our lead negotiator, Rob Malley, who is charge of this, since June, but there also has been an election in Tehran. Now the Supreme Leader makes the ultimate call, but nonetheless, it is left to the presidential administration to implement and negotiate their position with us. So we are still waiting for a positive response from Iran, but nonetheless as, Senator Cardin, you point out, the Iranians are creating plants underground, which has nothing to do with peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Enrichment up to 60 percent for uranium, also producing uranium metal of 20 percent, these are dangerous moves. So while we have not imposed a deadline for these negotiations, I think Secretary Blinken made it clear and stated that we are very conscious that as time proceeds, Iran's nuclear advances will have a bearing in its view, our view of returning to the JCPOA. And President also said the process will not be open indefinitely.

And sir, as someone who had pioneered in many ways and also been at the front edge of many nonproliferation and counterproliferation sanctions targeting, whether it be DPRK, Syria, or Iran, all those machineries and authorities—and thanks for tools that Congress has armed us with—we are ready to make sure that Iran makes the right decision not just for, well, for itself, for the sake for the Iranian people.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COONS. We are next going to hear from Senator Young.

Senator YOUNG. Thank you, Chairman. I will stick with the topic of Iran for starters here. Since both Dr. Kang and Mr. Scheinman are up for related and somewhat overlapping positions, I would like you each to speak to your views on the following questions.

Just to lay the foundation here, at the last moment, the IAEA struck a deal with Iranian officials on September 12th to continue nuclear monitoring. However, in that deal, the storage cards for the monitoring cameras are sealed and cannot be viewed until the United States and Iran resume JCPOA talks. But this, of course, is a critical time when Iran is actively moving towards having enough material for a bomb.

I would like to know what each of you believes is a realistic time-frame before Iran has enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. How much time are we dealing with here?

Dr. KANG. Ambassador Scheinman, are you comfortable dealing with it? Perhaps as a sitting official—

Senator YOUNG. Dr. Kang, go ahead, please.

Dr. KANG. Yes, perhaps I am in a better position because I do not believe Mr. Scheinman is privy to some of the latest information and assessment.

Senator YOUNG. Yes, go ahead, sir.

Dr. KANG. Yes, sir. So the platform, of course, this particular platform is not ideal for transmitting the most accurate and precise information to you, sir. So, if confirmed, I certainly will be happy to brief you on this matter.

Senator YOUNG. Okay, okay.

Dr. KANG. But it is true, I mean, they have, as when they were complying with JCPOA, they were about a year away from producing enough fissile material for a viable weapon.

Senator YOUNG. Sure. Well, there has been——

Dr. KANG. Now they are months away. Yes?

Senator YOUNG. I understand, if you are read into this, you, of course, would not want to provide any classified estimates, which is good. You passed that test. But open source, you know, materials indicate that a couple of months is some of the latest estimates that may or may not be accurate.

I will ask each of you to answer the following. What alternatives is the Biden administration considering if the resumption of talks fails? Dr. Kang?

Dr. KANG. Yes, sir. So, ultimately, that would be up to the President and the Secretary and others at a much higher pay scale than myself. But it is clear that what my mission would be, and our Bureau is very well equipped to apply those necessary sanctions, interdiction, and other measures to make sure that there is sufficient incentive for Iran to reconsider its position.

Senator YOUNG. Okay, so your job would not be to offer counsel on such matters?

Dr. KANG. Well, I would definitely voice my opinion, sir, and I will be part of the interagency process. But I have been dealing with proliferators all my career here at State Department.

Senator YOUNG. Yeah.

Dr. KANG. DPRK, Syria.

Senator YOUNG. You mention sanctions, Dr. Kang. We had sanctions before this administration came in. So what other options might you recommend?

Dr. KANG. Well, certainly there are other things that once again I cannot fully discuss with you in this platform. But as a general matter, interdiction is something we are very good at. There are varied export control measures that we lead, and we will turn those on, right back on.

Senator YOUNG. Yes, sir.

Mr. Scheinman, will you be involved consultatively with the administration in your role on such matters?

Ambassador SCHEINMAN. Yes.

Senator YOUNG. And if so, if you would kindly indicate what alternatives the administration should consider if these talks fail.

Ambassador SCHEINMAN. Thank you, Senator. I would note that my responsibilities will not include our direct negotiations with Iran. That is handled by others in the administration. I will probably look at the issue through the lens of the Nonproliferation Treaty and what do we do if Iran were to break out of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Senator YOUNG. Okay. Well, my time is winding down. I would just note I also had question for Ms. Crocker pertaining to an unrelated matter. It relates to the Human Rights Council and——

Senator COONS. Just be briefly, if you might, Senator Young.

Senator YOUNG. Yes, I will, indeed. The step they took of establishing a permanent commission of inquiry to investigate Israel, the only such permanent agenda item on the council. We will ask you about that in writing. Perhaps you could offer your views on the propriety of that matter.

Thank you.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Young.

Senator Schatz?

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Bernicat, to all of you, thank you for your willingness to serve. I understand that Special Envoy Kerry and his team are doing a lot of work in terms of how to make sure taking action on climate is a routine part of how our Foreign Service thinks about their mission on a day-to-day basis. Can you talk a little bit about where you see the opportunities to make climate action part of recruitment, training, and promoting Foreign Service officers so that it becomes a permanent part of the Foreign Service and the State Department and does not swing wildly depending on who the Secretary is and who the President is?

Ambassador BERNICAT. Thank you so much, Senator Schatz, for that question that has been teasing all of us and especially in my current role as Acting Assistant Secretary for Oceans, Environment, and Scientific Affairs. Our goal is to increase the literacy Department wide on [inaudible] environment—

Senator COONS. Ms. Ambassador Bernicat, in a demonstration of the need for greater investment in State Department IT, your signal is cutting out very, very badly.

[Crosstalk.]

Ambassador Bernicat:—and health issues, it begins with recruiting. But of course, the bulk of our corps is generalist, and so—I did improve the audio. Is that working?

Senator COONS. Sure. Why do we not try and continue now?

Ambassador BERNICAT. Can you hear me?

Senator SCHATZ. The audio seems to be working. Go ahead.

Ambassador BERNICAT. Okay. I have also changed location. So tell me if that helps.

[Inaudible.] Thank you, Senator Hagerty.

Recruiting more people with the STH skills as well as promoting stem education are part of the plan, but I can assure you, sir, if confirmed, that we will also look for ways to improve training for all officers and staff as well as to bring more people into the various bureaus who have specific responsibility for these issues. In no small part because they are tied not just to environment, but to energy, to increasing jobs, and to everything related to the environment, including health.

Senator SCHATZ. You know, I think that is a good start, but I want to be really crisp with what I am asking. I am looking for the kinds of changes that are institutionally difficult to reverse and do not depend on who the President is. And just an emphasis on who you hire is not an unreasonable start, but I am looking for processes, training manuals, curricula, and all of that to change because climate is not going to go away as a threat multiplier and as a diplomatic challenge. So I look forward to working with you on that.

Ambassador, as you know, we pass a defense authorization every year, and we sometimes pass a Coast Guard authorization every year, and I am wondering if you can talk about in your mind's eye what it would be like if the Congress passed an annual State Department reauthorization, as we do for the Department of Defense, and how that might help to address the challenges that you see with the Foreign Service.

Ambassador BERNICAT. Well, sir, thank you for that question, and let me just say, thank you, I look forward to working with this committee and with Congress on a whole host of issues related to the health and function of our staffs and the State Department in general.

I would say that, you know, in general, our greatest resource is our people. And so, the ability—as you say, recruiting is a good start, but we also need to make sure that we are retaining and developing that talent pool all along the way in their career, and to be able to do that in a steady funding, to be able to plan workforces out over a period of time is really important.

We are, parenthetically, right now the youngest Foreign—excuse me, State Department in terms of seniority that we have been years, and that has a lot to do with the hiring surges that took place under Secretary Powell and Secretary Clinton, as well as a good number of retirements, especially in our civil service corps.

In terms of processes related to the environment, there are a whole host of things from legislation that requires specific actions. We are—we are leading again from the front on environmental issues, and we are committing ourselves to a number of actions that have multiple-year execution in order to make them happen. And so we are looking to build in ways to make sure that we are supporting not only our commitments, but the countries that we are asking to make those commitments.

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, can I have another minute?

Senator COONS. One question, if you would, Senator Schatz.

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you.

Just, Dr. Kang, the Biden administration is continuing the previous administration's proposals to expand U.S. nuclear capabilities, including a new low-yield nuclear sea-launched cruise missile that many of us believe is dangerous and unnecessary. I understand that some of the true bad actors are not persuaded by anything or by much, and that sort of calls of hypocrisy are not particularly compelling. But I am also wondering about the rational countries that we are trying to persuade not to pursue their own nuclear ambitions and how we square our pursuing of these low-yield nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with our desire to stop proliferation among some of our allies and adversaries who are considering whether they want to go down the wrong path.

Dr. KANG. Thank you for that question, Senator.

I will try my best to answer that question because that would not be in the area of responsibility for the Bureau of ISN. It will be for the companion bureau, AVC, Arms Control and Verification and, of course, Under Secretary Bonnie Jenkins, who has the Department lead on this. But having said that—

Senator SCHATZ. In the interest of time, in the interest of time and clarity, do you see that as a challenge for the United States?

Dr. KANG. Oh, yes, sir. I mean, there is intimate link between arms control and nonproliferation. Those who have—possess nuclear weapons in the context of the NPT, a nuclear weapons state, they have an obligation to reduce and ultimately seek disarmament. So it would set a bad example. For example, China mas-

sively expanding its nuclear strategic capability is counter-productive, and it runs counter to nonproliferation.

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you very much.

Senator COONS. Senator Van Hollen?

Senator Van Hollen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Hagerty, and congratulations to all of you on your nominations. It is great to see a panel of such experience.

And Ambassador Bernicat, congratulations on the nomination to be the Director General of the Foreign Service. I am thrilled with the appointment. As you may know, I come from a Foreign Service family and very interested and focused on ensuring the strong morale and support for the Foreign Service.

And Senator Dan Sullivan, Republican from Alaska, and myself formed the Foreign Service Caucus a number of years ago, when we introduced legislation called the Foreign Service Families Act. And that act would extend different benefits to Foreign Service families to try to bring them up on a par with the benefits that are extended to military families serving overseas. And I know that the most recent Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review found, and I am quoting, "Ensuring opportunities for spousal employment should be an integral part of plans to retain and motivate staff."

Do you agree with that?

Ambassador BERNICAT. Oh, my goodness, Senator Van Hollen, I have to just express enormous gratitude for the work that you, Senator Sullivan, and others have done particularly on behalf of our families. We have almost 2,000 family members now working overseas. They bring—and back here in Washington. They bring amazing talents to augment our often barebones operations. And so, looking for ways to ensure that we can take advantage, but also that makes it easier to serve as families.

You know, Senator, I cannot help but—I cannot resist when you mention Foreign Service families, I do not think Bathsheba knows this, but I studied under her father at Georgetown University. And so in the spirit of being mentored, I do not think I would be here today if it were not in part for Chet Crocker. So, Bathsheba, I am also part of the family.

Senator Van Hollen: Well, thank you, Madam Ambassador, for mentioning that as well about Chet Crocker, and it is great to see Bathsheba here and others. Let me—and just on the Foreign Service Families Act, we have asked the chairman of the full committee to put it on the next markup calendar, and we are waiting for a green light from the ranking member of the full committee, and I see no reason for opposition, but we are continuing to push.

So, Dr. Kang, thank you for your current service in the acting position, and I look forward to supporting you in this confirmation process.

On the issue of nuclear nonproliferation, Saudi Arabia, as you know, has been engaged with successive administrations with nuclear cooperation talks but continues to have in place—Saudi Arabia, that is—the lowest standard of safeguards with the IAEA. And again, they say they want at least two nuclear power plants as part of a program going forward, and they seem intent on mastering the

front end of a nuclear fuel cycle and developing enrichment capabilities.

So my question to you is, has the administration, has the Biden administration made any attempt in either bilateral or multilateral settings to push Saudi Arabia to sign and implement the additional protocol with the IAEA?

Dr. KANG. Senator, thank you for that question.

We have been in negotiation with Saudi Arabia since 2012. I think that says something. And of course, President Biden has made it clear that he will recalibrate our relationship with Saudi Arabia in human rights and other matters that complicate the relationship.

Now in terms of having the lowest standard, well, Saudi Arabia is party to the NPT, and it has in force a comprehensive safeguard agreement. And that in terms of their ambitions are very high, and certainly, they have the financial resources to make it happen, just as we have seen what UAE has done. But having said that, they have not made significant moves in actually gaining capability.

The United States has supported the universalization of additional protocol, and that is policy. And also we discourage enrichment and reprocessing where these capabilities do not already exist.

And so, we are pursuing a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia because precisely because 123 agreement is a nonproliferation tool. So we are, of course, briefing members, as well as staff, as if there are any movement on this, and of course, it will always be a pleasure to brief you on this matter.

Senator Van Hollen: Well, I appreciate that. I see the time is expired, but we will follow up with you on that, and I will be submitting a question for the record on the administration's full compliance with the BRINK Act, which was to ensure we plug a lot of the loopholes in the sanction regime against North Korea. We saw the recent reports about their firing missiles, and so I will put that in the record. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen.

And I do not believe Senator Kaine is still with us. Is that correct? So I believe every member who is participating has had a chance at a first round. Senator Hagerty, I know you have got additional questions you would like to ask, and I have a few more I will ask, but let me defer to you to begin the second round, Senator Hagerty.

Senator HAGERTY. That is very kind of you, Chairman Coons. I appreciate it.

I would first like to turn to Dr. Carpenter, talk about Nord Stream 2.

Dr. Carpenter, you previously said, and I want to quote this, "To make sanctions against Russia work, the United States and its allies need to dispense with symbolic gestures and impose stronger sanctions that will have an immediate economic impact." Dr. Carpenter, I just want to say that I wholeheartedly agree with that statement.

And in 2019, you stated the following. "The European Union has, unfortunately, lacked the political will to implement its own anti-

monopoly rules and stop Nord Stream 2 from coming to fruition, which means the U.S. Congress is now the only body that can prevent the pipeline from being built.”

Dr. Carpenter, I wholeheartedly agree with that statement, too. Yet, in May, the Biden administration waived U.S. sanctions against Nord Stream 2 AG and sanctions against its chief executive. And last week, Gazprom announced that it has now completed the pipeline.

So, Dr. Carpenter, my question is this. With the pipeline now complete, what do you feel will be the impact on energy security in Europe?

Dr. CARPENTER. Well, thank you for the question, Senator. I am very concerned by the geopolitical consequences of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. This is a project by the Kremlin that brings no new gas molecules from Russia to Europe but merely bypasses Ukraine and the Central European countries and delivers that very same gas directly to Germany, thereby giving the Kremlin enormous leverage over Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, and other countries in Central Europe.

Going forward, if I am confirmed, I will work to reinvigorate the second dimension of the OSCE, the economic and environmental dimension that deals with energy security, and I will seek to work very closely with my friend Amos Hochstein, who is the senior adviser to the Secretary on Energy Security, to build resilience for our partners, and particularly Ukraine, in terms of energy supply, so that Russia cannot continue to use energy supplies as a form of political weaponization of energy and energy coercion.

And last thing I will say on this, Senator, I think it is very important that the United States continue to have a—continue to be ready to use all of the authorities contained within PEESA and CAATSA, which are the laws of the land when it comes to this.

Senator HAGERTY. Well, I know the OSCE will have many divergent opinion in terms of Nord Stream 2, and I wish you the best with that, Dr. Carpenter.

Dr. Kang, can I turn with you now to focus on North Korea. You know, we worked enormously hard with Japan, with the U.N. Security Council, to impose three different, three successively more abiding sets of economic sanctions on North Korea. They had an immediate and very, very important effect on North Korea’s economy. Yet China has continued to undercut our position there.

And at the same time, North Korea has persisted in working in secret on their nuclear program, and there is an example I would like to highlight. And that is according to nongovernmental experts, North Korea is producing uranium at a covert facility, covert uranium enrichment facility, known by the U.S. intelligence community as the Kangson enrichment site.

It is not surprising that North Korea would build secret facilities to produce fissile material, but it poses significant proliferation challenges, especially considering Pyongyang’s previous efforts to provide Syria with a nuclear reactor. If confirmed, you are going to be responsible for spearheading the State Department’s efforts to reduce WMD-related threats by promoting bilateral and multi-lateral initiatives to prevent proliferation.

So, my question is, Dr. Kang, if confirmed, will you commit to providing regular updates to the committee about the administration's efforts to address North Korea's declared and undeclared nuclear and missile facilities and programs?

Dr. KANG. Absolutely, Senator. I have a long relationship with our lead on re-engagement with North Korea, Ambassador Sung Kim. I have extensive relationship in the Government talking with Korea, as well as Japan. This will be a top priority.

As you know, North Korea is an awfully hardened state, and as you rightly point out, there is always this escape valve of China. China made a decision some time ago that it is tolerable for North Korea to have nuclear weapons as long as it is a buffer state. So it is difficult proposition, but I believe the President is on a right path. We have got to calibrate a practical approach, and this is something Ambassador Sung Kim and myself during the Bush administration have some practical experience in.

Senator HAGERTY. I have had the privilege of working with Ambassador Sung Kim as well, and I look forward to continue to working with both of you as we address this challenge.

Mr. Chairman, if you would permit me, I have just a follow-on question, if I might, for Assistant Secretary Crocker?

Senator COONS. Of course. Please.

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you so much.

Assistant Secretary Crocker, I want to focus on China's growing influence among international organizations. You mentioned this in your opening remarks. And while you served as the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations during the Obama administration, China took over leadership of multiple international organizations and staffed them with Chinese nationals.

But in 2017, our posture towards China's malign behavior changed. And if confirmed, I hope that you will continue that posture developed during the previous administration to continue to counter China's influence in global institutions. And further, I fully expect you to fight for American influence by supporting qualified candidates in leadership positions and look to increase positions for Americans, such as greater positions in the Junior Professional Officers Program at the U.N. and, as you mentioned, representation like at the ITU. But I hope to see much more participation there.

And so, my question is, if confirmed, what actions will you take to make certain that qualified United States candidates are in leadership positions at U.N. bodies in Geneva?

Ms. CROCKER. Thank you for that question, Senator, and I think, as you noted, this is a strategic priority for China, and it needs to be a strategic priority for the United States. And indeed, the State Department and the administration are making a concerted effort working with like-minded partners and allies to ensure that we are able to both identify and then robustly support qualified, viable, independent candidates for leadership positions in international organizations, be they American candidates or other like-minded candidates.

And if confirmed, this will be a top priority for me. It is an effort that I fully support, and I would look to use my role and the role and the resources of the U.S. mission in Geneva, working closely with the State Department and across the interagency, to ensure

that we are best positioned diplomatically and—and in terms of resources to support the candidacies.

You mentioned the ITU, where, of course, there is an American candidate up for Secretary General, for an election that will take place in September of 2022. And if confirmed, I would consider this to be one of my highest priorities on getting out to Geneva to support that candidacy and ensure that the mission is doing everything it can to support the candidacy.

And I think, again, looking at both election for leadership positions but also, as you mentioned, making sure that we are strategically focused on ensuring that we are looking also at staffing up and down the system. The Chinese are doing that, as you note, from the junior political officer level all the way up, and we need to do that. And if confirmed, I would look forward to working with Congress to make sure—and this committee to make sure—that we have appropriate resources to do that.

Senator HAGERTY. Well, I am very pleased to hear that, Assistant Secretary Crocker. Thank you.

And I will be submitting a question for the record for Mr. Scheinman about China and the NPT. I am very concerned their obligations as signatory to that treaty and the fact that they are not living up to those obligations. That will be in the QFRs coming forward, Mr. Scheinman.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me with some extra time.

Senator COONS. Of course. Thank you, Senator Hagerty, and thank you for a series of, I think, reasonable and balanced questions. Ironically, the last question you asked of Assistant Secretary Crocker was the question I was going to ask.

Senator HAGERTY. I am sorry.

Senator COONS. And I will add—no, no, I think it is well worth focusing on for a moment. One of the things that I was most enthusiastic about in terms of actions of a member of the previous administration, there was a heated contest for leadership of the World Intellectual Property Organization. And Andrei Iancu, the former PTO Director, successfully mobilized an effort amongst all of our allies to ensure that the successful nominee was from a country and a person with experience that would suggest a commitment to protecting IP rather than someone who might be more questionable in terms of their commitment to IP.

There are so many organizations that you will have some role in that I just want to emphasize, and I agree with Senator Hagerty that it is important that we, the United States and our partners, pay attention to the ways in which China is expanding its influence throughout the U.N. system.

Let me ask one last question then, if I might, Ms. Crocker. There is a number of entities of the United Nations, the Human Rights Council, for example—UNESCO is another—where we have withdrawn, either because of previous conduct, I think it was Senator Van Hollen who referenced the sort of permanent agenda item on the Human Rights Council questioning Israel that we had found objectionable, or whether it is some of the ways in which UNESCO, by admitting Palestine, has run afoul of our priorities and views.

We are now in significant arrearages both with the U.N. as a whole and with some of the specialized agencies or entities.

In your view, just speaking broadly, are we better off being at the table and current in our payments and pushing back on adversaries who have competing perspectives on entities, whether it is the WHO or the ITU or otherwise, or are there certain circumstances where we need to withdraw from U.N. entities because of the ways in which they have conducted themselves?

Ms. CROCKER. Thank you for that question, Chairman Coons.

It is my view, and agree very much with the position and approach of the Biden-Harris administration on this, that we are far better served to be at the table and in good standing in terms of our financial payments to the organization in order to be able to effectively drive the kinds of reforms that we want to see across the system around accountability, efficiency, effectiveness. And also dealing with some of the credibility issues that, frankly, exist in different parts of the system, whether that is the anti-Israel bias at the Human Rights Council that you and Senator Young also raised earlier or some of the issues—or some of the issues at UNESCO.

So I think for sure it is better for us to be in good standing from a financial perspective. But also I think it is just important to recognize, and this gets also to Senator Hagerty's questions earlier, that it is important for us to be able to be at the table with the full weight of United States from a diplomatic perspective backing us.

And I certainly saw firsthand when I was Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, the important role that our bilateral and multilateral missions faced—they play and the importance of making sure that they are well resourced. And that we have strong people across the board able to raise these issues and raise them at the right levels in countries around the world because when we are operating at full strength diplomatically as the United States, there is no one that can really go to bat with us.

So if we want to go whether it is toe to toe with the Chinese or with the full strength that we need to be at to push the reforms we want to see across the system, I fully agree that we need to both be in good financial standing and also in our strongest position possible from a diplomatic perspective.

Senator COONS. Well, thank you. Thank you both for that answer and to all five of our nominees today for your willingness to continue your service to the United States and for your dedication to taking on these important posts and positions.

As I referenced at the beginning of this hearing, questions for the record are due by the close of business this Thursday the 16th. A number of members who have participated today have indicated they intend to submit QFRs. So please do so respond promptly so that we can conclude the hearing process and hopefully move forward with your confirmation votes.

Thank you, Senator Hagerty, for serving as the ranking member of this confirmation hearing.

And to the five of you, congratulations, good luck. I personally look forward to supporting your nominations and hope to stay in regular touch with you as we go forth to serve the people of the

United States, depending on the action of the Senate in the coming weeks and months.

So, with that, this hearing is concluded. Thank you all very much.

[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

Additional Material Submitted for the Record

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO DR. C.S. ELIOT KANG BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. As you noted during your hearing and in your meeting with SFRC minority staff, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is the least developed of the nonproliferation regimes. What practical steps must we take to strengthen the BWC?

Answer. There are a range of practical steps that can be taken to strengthen implementation, increase transparency, and promote the safe and secure use of the life sciences for peaceful purposes - but only if its members can find the political will. If confirmed, I will work to break the longstanding political deadlock in the BWC and advance such practical steps.

Question. Given the limitations of the BWC, what new actions must the U.S. take outside the convention to address biological threats?

Answer. The BWC reflects the global norm against biological weapons and provides international legal underpinning for measures taken by responsible countries to prohibit and prevent BW, but complementary U.S. efforts are essential. New efforts to raise the bar for international biosafety and biosecurity are needed. International capabilities to detect, respond to, and attribute BW use need to be strengthened as well - and because such use could mimic a natural outbreak, this means that the links between international public health and international security institutions must be reinforced.

Question. According to 1 FAM 457.3, the Biological Policy Staff is charged with “developing and promoting measures to prevent misuse of advances in the life sciences, to include participation in U.S. Government and international groups on health security issues; outreach to the scientific community and private industry; and promoting international standards and norms.” During your tenures in ISN, what specific initiatives or steps have you spearheaded or participated in to fulfill that mandate? Please provide examples. What would you like to do more of to meet this challenge?

Answer. Although the Biological Policy Staff is constrained by its small size, it has taken a number of steps in this area, including briefing on U.S. experiences and advocating that other countries develop oversight mechanisms for potentially high-risk research; organizing and participating in workshops to assess, test, and refine qualitative frameworks for assessing risks and benefits; establishing ties between the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity and its French equivalent; and a G7 Experts’ Meeting on Strengthening Laboratory Biorisk Management last year. More work in all these areas is needed.

Question. According to the Department of State website, the Biological Policy Staff works with foreign partners on the oversight of emerging technologies such as synthetic biology. What specific initiatives and steps have you spearheaded or participated in to address the challenges posed by synthetic biology?

Answer. A number of offices in ISN work to address issues posed by synthetic biology and other emerging technologies. This has included promotion of voluntary screening guidelines for providers of synthetic DNA; collaboration with iGEM international on outreach regarding dual-use awareness and risk assessment; work in the BWC and elsewhere to evaluate and promote risk assessment frameworks, including the approach set out by the National Academies recently in Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology; and promoting new export controls on desktop DNA synthesizers and related technology.

Question. Does ISN have the authorities, personnel, and resources it needs to address the proliferation of biological weapons?

Answer. ISN has significant authorities to address BW proliferation, highly qualified and motivated personnel, and an important suite of threat reduction programs. However, biological weapons proliferation is an enormous challenge both politically and technically. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to identify and address specific needs and opportunities to ensure our effectiveness in this important mission.

Question. Does ISN play any role in approving or disapproving life sciences or biological research collaboration with other countries that could pose dual-use concerns, including research on pathogens, viruses, and toxins, even if such collaboration is funded by another federal agency? If so, please describe ISN's involvement.

Answer. ISN does not fund nor directly approve any life sciences research. The United States has policies pertaining to Federally funded research on high consequence pathogens and dual-use research of concern, which are applicable regardless of where the research is conducted. These policies establish a high bar for funding based on a careful assessment of risks and benefits and require steps to mitigate any risks. ISN ensures that Federal policy development takes into account our international obligations and urges other countries to adopt similar policies that minimize the potential misuse of life sciences research.

Question. Do you agree that ISN must have a stronger role in decisions to share weaponizable biotechnology with China and other countries that may not be in compliance with BWC obligations?

Answer. ISN is the focal point within the State Department for policies to prevent the misuse of life sciences, and we participate in the interagency processes that establish the oversight policies for sharing research [and technology] that might pose concern. Our role ensures that the policy development considers both our international obligations from the BWC and the international implications of our policies. We believe this requires careful consideration of risks and benefits, and where appropriate, measures to mitigate the risks, including for sharing technology with those we have concerns regarding their compliance with the BWC.

Question. What is the U.S. doing to address Russia's offensive biological weapons program?

Answer. As the lead bureau on the BWC, ISN works closely with the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, as well as others within the Department and the interagency to address this and other threats. To counter Russia's offensive biological weapons program, the United States has engaged with allies and partners and imposed export restrictions on certain Russian organizations associated with Russia's BW program. If confirmed, I will continue these efforts through direct bilateral information exchanges with key allies and partners and consider a variety of export-control and sanctions related actions against Russia.

Question. Does the loss of Afghanistan to the Taliban increase the likelihood of terrorist bioweapons labs on Afghan territory? What must the U.S. do to address any such threats, or other terrorist BW capabilities?

Answer. The accessibility of weaponizable biological materials is of great concern to me. If confirmed, I will increase assistance to countries in South and Central Asia to reduce threats emanating both out of and into Afghanistan.

Question. China is growing its nuclear arsenal at an alarming rate. What impact will this have on the NPT? How should the U.S. address it, in the context of the NPT?

Answer. The PRC's nuclear weapons build-up risks undermining decades of international progress toward nuclear disarmament, one of the pillars of the NPT. It is urgent for China to take on greater responsibility, transparency, and restraint with respect to its nuclear weapons arsenal. The United States will pursue those objectives both in bilateral engagements with China and in multilateral fora such as the NPT Review Conference.

Question. Should the IAEA be subject to political considerations of any particular government and its negotiations on other matters, or should the IAEA only consider strict compliance issues?

Answer. The United States strongly supports the professional, technical, and independent work of the IAEA to verify States' compliance with their NPT-required safeguards agreements and to undertake additional monitoring and verification activities as requested by the IAEA Board of Governors. A strong, credible international safeguards regime is a core United States national security interest.

Question. At what point do the advances of the Iranian nuclear program make any return to the nuclear deal irrelevant?

Answer. I am carefully evaluating Iran's expansion of nuclear activities, as reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency. As Secretary Blinken has made clear, continued Iranian nuclear advances bring us closer to the point where a mutual return to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action would fail to reproduce the nonproliferation benefits the deal originally delivered. The administration remains committed to pursuing a diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear program. If confirmed, I will make clear the window of opportunity will not remain open indefinitely.

Question. Iran has successfully stymied the IAEA's investigation of Iran's past nuclear activities. How can the IAEA restart this investigation and keep it going effectively?

Answer. I am deeply concerned that Iran has yet to provide the IAEA with the information it needs to resolve questions regarding potential undeclared nuclear material. Iran must cooperate fully and substantively with the Agency without further delay in a way that leads to resolution of these issues. The U.S. is working with Allies and partners to reinforce support for the IAEA and the Director General (DG) as they pursue these serious issues. If confirmed, I will be watching closely whether Iran provides the necessary level of cooperation, starting with the DG's meetings with senior Iranian officials in Vienna this week and in Tehran in the near future.

Question. Considering the Iran nuclear archive and the findings in the 2021 Arms Control report, can the U.S. confirm today that Iran has solely peaceful intentions for its nuclear program?

Answer. I would refer you to the Intelligence Community regarding Iran's intentions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action provided the strongest verification and monitoring measures ever negotiated to help ensure Iran's nuclear activities are exclusively peaceful. Resumption of mutual compliance with the deal would ensure the renewed implementation of these important measures, as well as restrictions on the size and scope of Iran's nuclear activities.

Question. Do you believe that Iran engages in nuclear hedging? Why or why not? In that context, is it advisable in your view to lift nuclear and terrorism sanctions on Iran?

Answer. The administration is committed to ensuring that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon and to addressing the many other issues of concern related to Iran. If confirmed, I would remain committed to engaging in meaningful diplomacy to achieve a return to mutual compliance with JCPOA commitments, and would recommend against providing the sanctions relief described in the JCPOA unless there is a return to mutual compliance. Regardless of the status of the JCPOA, the administration will continue to utilize sanctions to respond to Iranian policies that are contrary to U.S. national security interests.

Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to work within the administration to encourage the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to investigate Iran's potentially ongoing nuclear weaponization work, which the nuclear archive indicates Tehran hid and dispersed at research institutes, universities, and military sites after 2003?

Answer. Iran's history of deception regarding its past nuclear weapons program is not new. Verifiably ensuring Iran never resumes such activities, despite Iran's past denials, is a core purpose of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which provides for the most intrusive verification and monitoring procedures ever negotiated. The administration will continue to seek a mutual return to compliance with JCPOA commitments, which would ensure that its critical verification and monitoring measures are restored.

Question. If confirmed, how can you assure Congress that political considerations or multilateral issues are not used to avoid holding Iran accountable for its non-compliance with safeguard agreements?

Answer. The United States has made clear our serious concerns regarding potential undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, as reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is essential that Iran fully comply with its legally binding obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA to resolve these important matters without further delay. The stability of any diplomatic outcome regarding Iran's nuclear program relies on the credible resolution of these serious issues and Iran's full compliance with its safeguards obligations.

Question. Do you support the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)? If confirmed, will you fully implement it?

Answer. Yes, I support and, should I be confirmed, am fully committed to implementing CAATSA, especially Section 231, for which the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation leads U.S. implementation. If confirmed, I will urge all our partners and allies to refrain from major new purchases of Russian military equipment that could risk mandatory sanctions under CAATSA Section 231.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO DR. C.S. ELIOT KANG BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. How do you envision the United States' role in bolstering the international nuclear nonproliferation regime?

Answer. The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance—issued less than two months after the President took office—noted that the threats posed by WMD proliferation, “cannot be effectively addressed by one nation acting alone. And none can be effectively addressed with the United States on the sidelines.” The United States led in the creation of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, such as the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it is vital that we continue to lead efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Question. Should the United States continue to work to prevent new states from possessing their own nuclear weapons?

Answer. Yes. The President's Interim National Security Guidance states that “as we re-engage the international system, we will address the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons.” The Guidance also states that nuclear proliferation poses an existential danger. Addressing these threats requires that we minimize the number of states possessing nuclear weapons, and the administration places a high priority on using the tools of national security to achieve this objective. Renewed American nonproliferation leadership will be essential to reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.

Question. Which new or expiring agreements require the bureau's near-term focus? How should the United States balance the goals of increasing states' access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the nonproliferation goals of preventing the further spread of sensitive fuel cycle nuclear technology?

Answer. The United States is in negotiations for peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Thailand. If confirmed, I would support the negotiation of additional peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements, which are needed for significant exports of U.S. nuclear material and equipment, to increase access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the highest standards of nuclear security and nonproliferation and continue the United States' longstanding policy of limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities around the world.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO DR. C.S. ELIOT KANG BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. What are your views on the threats posed by biological dual-use research of concern?

Answer. I take threats posed by dual-use research of concern (DURC) seriously. In fact, one of ISN's missions is to prevent the life sciences from being misused for biological weapons development. Dual-use research of concern warrants careful oversight and risk/benefit analysis. The ISN Bureau has advocated for thoughtful national oversight of such research in international forums, such as the Biological Weapons Convention, for almost a decade and, if confirmed, I will continue to do so.

Question. Would Chinese interest in dual-use research of concern be consistent with your understanding of the Chinese national strategy of military-civil fusion?

Answer. Military-Civil fusion seeks to develop a singular ecosystem within which all dual-use technology is simultaneously advancing military and civilian programs. Key to this is the removal of the traditional barriers between the national defense

and national economic systems. Whether specific types of dual-use research of concern might be exploited in this way would likely depend on the extent to which the research was specifically relevant to People's Republic of China military applications and objectives.

Question. Should the United States be involved in, or support, potential dual-use research of concern conducted in China?

Answer. The United States has federal funding and oversight policies for research that might pose particular concerns, including dual-use. These policies require careful consideration of risks and benefits, and where appropriate, measures to mitigate those risks. Policy development is led by the National Security Council and by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and decisions about the funding of specific research proposals are made by the responsible funding agency. The ISN Bureau ensures that policy development considers both our international obligations and the international implications of policy choices.

Question. Can you explain the ISN Bureau's international outreach related to dual-use research of concern in their role as ex-officio member of the Nation Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB)?

Answer. The ISN Bureau's international outreach on dual-use research of concern has consisted of a variety of advocacy and awareness-raising efforts, including participating in or organizing workshops and briefings and working to develop common understandings internationally. With the exception of efforts to facilitate collaboration between the NSABB and its French counterpart, this outreach is unrelated to the ex-officio role.

Question. Did the ISN Bureau, in their role on the NSABB, support lifting the moratorium on gain of function research with viruses in the United States in 2017?

Answer. The Department of State's role on the NSABB is a non-voting ex officio position. ISN neither advocated for lifting of the moratorium nor participated directly in the decision taken by the NSABB.

Question. Would Chinese military research into weaponizing pathogens such as coronaviruses be a concern under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)?

Answer. Research into the weaponization of any pathogen by any BWC State Party would be a matter of concern. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance to address any concerns regarding compliance with the Convention.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to undertake a full-scale investigation into the transfer of dual-use technology, know how, and money by the US government to Chinese research institutions engaged in synthetic biology and engineering chimeric pathogens through gain of function experiments?

Answer. A number of mechanisms exist to guard against the risk that transfers of U.S. technology will be misused. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that these mechanisms are effective and are fully utilized, taking into account lessons learned.

Question. At any time, were you instructed to shudder or stop the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance (AVC) investigation into the potential Chinese BWC concerns by Biden State Department appointees or other administrative staff?

Answer. No. As I understand it, the AVC Bureau, under the previous Administration, commissioned an internal inquiry into COVID origins. This ad hoc inquiry was conducted as part of a larger contract. I defer to the AVC Bureau about details of this contract. I understand the group briefed State Department staff during both the Trump and Biden administrations.

Question. What was your role as acting T Assistant Secretary in supporting the AVC Bureau's research into potential Biological Warfare links to the PLA's Academy of Military Medical Science, (AAMS) which was referenced in the January 15 Fact Sheet?

Answer. I had no role in relation to this research, nor in the development of the January 15 Fact Sheet.

Question. I understand the ISN and AVC office directors responsible for Biological Warfare warned of a potential "can of worms" that would be opened if AVC investigated Chinese BW programs and potential ties to research being done at the WIV. What, specifically, was the concern with regard to a "can of worms?"

Answer. ISN personnel at no point objected to such an investigation by AVC or warned against such investigation. Assertions to the contrary are incorrect.

Question. Why would the State Department Weapons of Mass Destruction programs, who are responsible for holding the PRC accountable to their international obligations, not opt to investigate every potential lead? If confirmed, will you allow the State Department investigation to continue into potential military links to the research at the WIV?

Answer. The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance has primary responsibility for issues related to assessing compliance with arms control agreements, and continues to monitor and assess information related to countries' compliance with the BWC, working closely with IC colleagues and others in the inter-agency. If confirmed, I will work closely with AVC and other partners to address such concerns.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO DR. C.S. ELIOT KANG BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

Question. What can the United States do to reinforce the norms of the Chemical Weapons Convention?

Answer. The Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) Bureau is the lead on the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, if confirmed, I commit to implementing Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act while also coordinating with AVC to limit the proliferation of chemical weapons.

Question. Is the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) up to the task? What reforms would you recommend to make it more effective?

Answer. The Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) Bureau is the lead on the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). If confirmed, I commit to coordinating with AVC to limit the proliferation of chemical weapons.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO DR. C.S. ELIOT KANG BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. If confirmed, are you committed to fully enforcing INKSNA and other U.S. non-proliferation sanctions?

Answer. Yes. Sanctions are a critical tool that contribute to nonproliferation goals. If confirmed, I would join the Department's commitment to implementing its sanctions authorities, including the requirements of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). The Department recently transmitted five INKSNA reports to Congress—in Feb 2020, Sept 2020, Nov 2020, Jan 2021, and July 2021—clearing a backlog of previously delayed reports. This has led to sanctions against 46 foreign entities/individuals for proliferation activities, including against 18 entities for supporting Iran's missile program.

Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions measures in supporting nuclear non-proliferation?

Answer. Sanctions are an effective tool in impeding, rolling back, and countering proliferation and changing the behavior of those who provide aid or support to proliferators. Sanctions are one of a number of important tools in the counterproliferation toolkit, and they can be deployed in a targeted and strategic manner. If confirmed, I will work closely with other agencies, particularly with the Department of the Treasury, to fully implement all U.S. nonproliferation sanctions, and to work with allies and partners to ensure U.N. sanctions are also implemented and enforced.

Question. Is Iran in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty? If so, how could Iran be compliant with the NPT when it has not answered the IAEA's questions on undeclared nuclear material and activities?

Answer. Iran is obligated under its NPT-required safeguards agreement to declare to the IAEA all peaceful nuclear material and related activities in Iran. Iran's failure to provide substantive or technically credible responses to the IAEA's questions related to possible undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran is cause for serious concern and raises serious questions regarding Iran's compliance with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations. These concerns are under active discussion in the IAEA Board of Governors. If confirmed, I will strongly support the IAEA's ongoing investigation in Iran into indications of possible undeclared nuclear mate-

rial and activities, as well as continued IAEA Board action as necessary to ensure Iran complies with its NPT-related obligations.

Question. Do you think the Biden administration should commit to not lifting or waiving sanctions on Iran until it, at a minimum, complies with the IAEA's requests on undeclared nuclear material and activities?

Answer. The long-term stability of any diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear challenge relies on the credible resolution of these serious safeguards concerns. The administration strongly supports the IAEA's ongoing investigations regarding possible undeclared nuclear material in Iran. Iran must provide the IAEA full cooperation without further delay. The foundation for any long-term solution is strong and credible verification; credible resolution of the serious safeguards concerns reported by the IAEA Director General must be a brick in that foundation. In addition to the assurances that would be provided if it does so, a mutual return to compliance with JCPOA commitments, which include the strongest verification and monitoring measures ever negotiated, would ensure that these critical measures are restored.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO DR. C.S. ELIOT KANG BY SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY

Question. The four Nuclear Security Summits successfully led to elimination or downblending of global civilian stocks of weapons usable fissile material. If confirmed, what diplomatic efforts will you take to encourage countries to reduce stocks of fissile material in their military programs and other non-military stocks that are not subject to IAEA safeguards?

Answer. The United States will continue to lead by example in eliminating surplus plutonium and downblending highly enriched uranium that are no longer needed for defense purposes. The United States has called on states to declare moratoria on production of fissile material for weapons, and if confirmed I will continue those efforts. In addition, I will support U.S. and international efforts and diplomacy related to placing fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA safeguards and arranging for its appropriate disposition.

Question. Extension of the State Department travel ban to North Korea and the need to obtain a specific license from the Treasury Department have made it more difficult for generous Americans and others to provide life-saving assistance to North Koreans—assistance that is explicitly exempted under U.S. law. If confirmed, will you work with your State and Treasury Department colleagues to issue new guidance that clearly defines what additional goods related to food and medicine to be exempted from U.S. sanctions?

Answer. The U.S. Government actively seeks to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance in the DPRK as a matter of U.S. policy, and maintains a number of sanctions exemptions and authorizations related to humanitarian aid. It has also led efforts to streamline the process for humanitarian exemptions in the U.N. Security Council DPRK sanctions committee. The DPRK itself has created the most significant barriers to the delivery of aid by closing its borders and limiting access for the personnel responsible for implementing such projects. If confirmed, I will work to support efforts aimed at helping humanitarian aid reach vulnerable people in the DPRK.

Question. In 2019, President Trump unsigned the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)—a global treaty that regulates the conventional arms trade—despite the fact that the treaty simply requires other countries to uphold the same domestic legal standard we have: to not transfer arms to countries if it is believed they will be used to violate international humanitarian law. Will the United States rescind the Trump administration's letter to the United Nations stating that the United States did not intend to ratify nor fulfill the obligations of this treaty?

Answer. If confirmed, I support reviewing the implications of decisions taken to date on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), both in the United States and in the ATT Conferences of States Parties, to determine the proper relationship of the United States to the Treaty. I believe this review should be situated within the larger context of U.S. policy on conventional arms transfers. The United States is the largest arms exporter in the world, and it is imperative that U.S. transfers of conventional arms are consistent with our laws, values, and interests.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
 SUBMITTED TO DR. C.S. ELIOT KANG BY SENATOR TED CRUZ

Question. In April 2019, then-nominee to be Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation Jeffrey L. Eberhardt confirmed in writing to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “given Iran’s past noncompliance with both its safeguards agreement and its NPT obligations, its failure to fully address IAEA questions related to past activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device, and the emergence of new questions surrounding Iran’s motives for retaining and concealing documents, equipment, and personnel related to its past nuclear weapons program, Iran’s standing as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT cannot be described as ‘good.’” Do you agree with Mr. Eberhardt’s assessment? If not, why not?

Answer. If being in “good standing” means being in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), then the United States has, including in the 2021 Compliance Report, indicated concern with regard to Iran’s compliance with Article III of the NPT. Given Iran’s past non-compliance with its obligations under the NPT and Iran’s NPT-required safeguards agreement and its present failure to fully address the IAEA’s current questions related to implementation of that safeguards agreement, Iran’s standing as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT cannot be described as “good.”

Question. Do you consider Iran’s past possession of the Nuclear Archive seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute non-compliance by Iran of its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)? If yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why

Answer. In 2005, the United States found Iran to be in non-compliance with Articles II and III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—as well as its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—and reported these findings to Congress. These findings concerned activities related to Iran’s pre-2004 efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, records of which were retained in the Iranian “nuclear archive” acquired by Israel in 2018. The IAEA is now seeking to resolve issues involving possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and still awaits the necessary substantive cooperation from Iran on its safeguards investigations. The IAEA Board of Governors has expressed serious concern regarding the lack of progress on these issues and has called on Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA without further delay.

Question. Do you consider Iran’s past concealment of the Nuclear Archive seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute non-compliance by Iran of its obligations under the NPT? If yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why.

Answer. In 2005, the United States found Iran to be in non-compliance with Articles II and III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—as well as its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—and reported these findings to Congress. These findings concerned activities related to Iran’s pre-2004 efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, records of which were retained in the Iranian “nuclear archive” acquired by Israel in 2018. The IAEA is now seeking to resolve issues involving possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and still awaits the necessary substantive cooperation from Iran on its safeguards investigations. The IAEA Board of Governors has expressed serious concern regarding the lack of progress on these issues and has called on Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA without further delay.

Question. Do you believe that Iran should be entitled to the use of civilian nuclear technology even if they are not a member in good standing of the NPT? If so, why? If not, why not?

Answer. Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all the Parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Iran must, however, comply with its international obligations when undertaking nuclear activities, including its obligations under Article II of the NPT and its NPT-required safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Question. Do you consider Iran to be entitled to benefit from nuclear technology pursuant to Article IV the NPT? If yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why.

Answer. Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all the Parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Iran must, however, comply with its international obligations when undertaking nuclear activities, including its obligation under Article II of the NPT not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

Question. Do you consider Iran to be specifically entitled to benefit from nuclear technology pursuant to Article IV the NPT? If yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why.

Answer. Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all the Parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Iran must, however, comply with its international obligations when undertaking nuclear activities, including its obligation under Article II of the NPT not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

Question. Paragraphs 10-15 of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 describe a so-called ‘snapback mechanism’ which reverses the termination of sanctions on Iran described in paragraph 7(a) of that resolution. The resolution requires a “JCPOA participant state” to notify the U.N. Security Council of an issue it believes constitutes “significant non-performance” of commitments under the JCPOA. By no later than December 2019, the State Department had conducted a legal analysis which concluded that “there is a legally available argument we can assert that the United States can initiate the snapback process under UNSCR 2231 by submitting a notification to the Security Council of an issue that the United States believes constitutes significant non-performance.” Do you agree with that conclusion, i.e. that there is a legally available argument for the United States to initiate the snapback process? If not, why not?

Answer. The U.S. initiation of the “snapback” of previous U.N. sanctions on Iran in 2020 resulted in an impasse at the U.N. Security Council that, as a practical matter, undermined its ability to address Iran’s destabilizing activities. The United States will continue to use domestic authorities to address Iran’s proliferation activities—including Executive Order 13949, which authorizes blocking sanctions related to the supply, sale, or transfer of arms or related materiel to or from Iran.

Question. Do you believe that Russia would be in violation of INKSNA if Russia sold advanced weapons to Iran, including missile technology?

Answer. The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) requires reports to Congress identifying, and the discretion to impose sanctions against, foreign persons that transfer or receive items controlled by the four multilateral export control regimes, (the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement), as well as other sensitive items, involving the subject countries. I understand that the Department is committed to implementing sanctions under INKSNA. For example, in July 2021, sanctions were imposed against three Russian entities, Asia-Invest LLC, Charter Green Light Moscow (CGLM), and NPP Pulsar LLC (Russia), for transferring sensitive items to Iran’s missile program.

Question. Do you believe that China would be in violation of and INKSNA if China sold advanced weapons to Iran, including missile technology?

Answer. The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) requires reports to Congress identifying, and the discretion to impose sanctions against, foreign persons that transfer or receive items controlled by the four multilateral export control regimes, (the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement), as well as other sensitive items, involving the subject countries. I understand that the Department is committed to implementing sanctions authorities under INKSNA, and that, for example, in November 2020, sanctions were imposed against two PRC entities, Chengdu Best New Materials Co Ltd and Zibo Elim Trade Company, Ltd. for transferring sensitive items and technology to Iran’s missile program.

Question. Do you assess that China is in violation of its Article VI obligations?

Answer. The State Department’s most recent Compliance Reports does not find China to be in violation of its obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’s. The AVC Bureau has the lead on compliance reporting to Congress.

Question. What leverage does the United States currently possess to dampen China’s nuclear buildup?

Answer. The answer to this question involves a range of national security instruments, but given the responsibilities of the position for which I have been nominated, I will respond from the perspective of nonproliferation. The PRC's nuclear weapons build-up risks undermining decades of international progress toward nuclear disarmament, one of the pillars of the NPT. It is urgent for China to take on greater responsibility and demonstrate greater transparency and restraint with respect to its nuclear weapons arsenal. The United States will pursue those objectives both in bilateral engagements with China and in multilateral fora such as the NPT Review Conference.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO DR. C.S. ELIOT KANG BY SENATOR CHRIS VAN HOLLEN

Question. Do you agree that greater enforcement of international sanctions against North Korea would strengthen U.S. leverage in nuclear talks with Pyongyang?

Answer. Yes. The DPRK's unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs constitute serious threats to international peace and security and the global nonproliferation regime. A series of United Nations Security Council resolutions have put in place sanctions to address the threat posed by the DPRK Government's weapons programs and proliferation activities and to deny it the means to advance its WMD and ballistic missile programs. If confirmed, I will continue to promote their full global implementation and look forward to supporting the administration's efforts to pursue calibrated and practical diplomacy with the DPRK.

Question. What steps would you recommend the administration take to pressure other countries, in particular China, to enforce international sanctions against North Korea?

Answer. DPRK-related sanctions implementation by other countries, including the PRC and Russia, has been uneven. I am clear-eyed that while our interests on the Korean Peninsula overlap at times, our priorities often differ significantly. If confirmed, I will continue to engage the PRC and Russia on DPRK issues and encourage both to play a positive role. I will continue to work with other U.N. Member States to promote full global sanctions implementation and enhance their capacity to fulfill their U.N. obligations.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to fully comply with the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI of Public Law 116-92; 133 Stat. 2244)?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Department's compliance with the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act, including as amended by the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019.

Question. In your view, does cooperation on naval nuclear propulsion constitute an allowable peaceful use under the U.S.-Australian civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, submitted to Congress pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended [P.L. 83-703; 42 U.S.C. §2153 et seq? If not, would such cooperation require congressional approval?

Answer. The 2010 U.S.-Australia Agreement Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy would not apply to cooperation on naval nuclear propulsion. Any cooperation will be undertaken consistent with requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, including with respect to any necessary agreements and requisite Congressional review in accordance with its provisions.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO HON. ADAM SCHEINMAN BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. China is growing its nuclear arsenal at an alarming rate. What impact will this have on the NPT? How should the U.S. address it, in the context of the NPT?

Answer. The PRC's nuclear weapons build-up risks undermining decades of international progress toward nuclear disarmament, one of the pillars of the NPT. It is urgent for China to take on greater responsibility, transparency, and restraint with

respect to its nuclear weapons arsenal. The United States will pursue those objectives both in bilateral engagements with China and in multilateral fora such as the NPT Review Conference.

Question. How will you evaluate if the NPT Revcon is a success? If confirmed, what will you do to make it a success?

Answer. NPT Review Conferences are held every five years to review the operation of the Treaty. There are no fixed standards for success, and past RevCons have reached consensus on various forms of final outcome documents. At a minimum, I expect that NPT Parties will recognize the continuing importance of the Treaty and reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty. If confirmed, I will work to build the broadest possible consensus on principles, goals, and specific actions to strengthen the NPT regime.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO HON. ADAM SCHEINMAN BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. Are the provisions of the NPT still relevant over fifty years later? How do you assess the effectiveness of the treaty for U.S. nonproliferation policy?

Answer. I believe that the provisions of the Treaty are still highly relevant and vital to the preservation of U.S., as well as international, security. The NPT is the international legal foundation for efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, one of the greatest threats to our national security. Almost all countries have joined the Treaty, which has helped forestall the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons predicted in the 1960s. The Treaty is among the most effective international regimes, contributing to the norm against nuclear proliferation as well as robust international nuclear safeguards, common nuclear supplier policies, and action on nuclear arms control.

Question. How do you view the NPT's three tenets, nonproliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy? Should one be prioritized over the others?

Answer. Each of these tenets—or “pillars,” as we often call them—represents a common interest of all NPT Parties. All states benefit from and can contribute to each. They should not be treated as competing interests. However, since some other Parties often emphasize the disarmament or peaceful uses pillars, we encourage all Parties to recognize that nonproliferation is an essential foundation for these other two. Further steps toward disarmament will be hindered if more nuclear proliferation occurs, and states are reluctant to supply nuclear wherewithal to others unless they are assured it will be used for solely peaceful purposes.

Question. How should the United States balance the goals of increasing states' access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the nonproliferation goals of preventing the further spread of sensitive fuel cycle nuclear technology (enrichment and reprocessing)?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work within the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to make good on its objective of expanding access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while promoting the highest standards of nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation and continuing the United States' long-standing policy of limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities around the world. Proliferation of such technologies is not necessary to meet the NPT States Parties' peaceful uses needs.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO HON. ADAM SCHEINMAN BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. The United Arab Emirates Ambassador to the United States earlier this year asked why under current U.S. policy an adversary—the regime in Iran—would be allowed to have an enrichment program while U.S. partners and allies were committed to nuclear programs without enrichment or reprocessing. How would you answer the ambassador's question?

Answer. The United States has long sought to limit the spread of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing capabilities. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran committed to strict limits on both the level and scale of its enrichment program and related research and development activities, as well as

limits on reprocessing. The administration believes that diplomacy and a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA are the best path to reestablishing limits on Iran's nuclear program and ensuring Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.

I have long applauded the constructive decision by the United Arab Emirates in 2008 to voluntarily refrain from domestic enrichment and reprocessing-related activities. If confirmed, I will continue to urge other countries to follow in a similar path and will support using all measures at our disposal to limit the spread of these sensitive technologies both in the region and globally.

Question. How should the administration address Middle Eastern states seeking enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to match Iran's if Washington re-enters the JCPOA and accepts the continued existence and future growth of Tehran's enrichment program?

Answer. The United States has a longstanding policy of limiting the further spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to the greatest extent possible, and we employ a range of tools to that end. The United States shares a common interest with regional partners in ensuring through diplomacy that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. If confirmed, I will urge regional states to rely on the existing international market for nuclear fuel and services, rather than seeking to acquire or develop such capabilities, and to apply the highest nonproliferation standards, including by bringing into force an IAEA Additional Protocol if they have not yet done so.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO HON. ADAM SCHEINMAN BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

Question. What leverage do we still have with Iran to halt further development of their nuclear program and restrain their destabilizing actions in the region?

Answer. If confirmed as Special Representative, I would not have direct responsibility for these issues, but I believe the high priority Iran places on sanctions relief gives us leverage in the negotiations on a mutual return to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). A mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA and to build on that basis are central to the administration's efforts to restrict Iran's nuclear program, secure diplomatic support for this goal, and address Iran's destabilizing activities in the region.

Question. I am pleased that the Biden administration has extended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (new START) until 2026. However, I remain concerned about Russia's nuclear program, particularly given its continued malign actions near and far beyond its borders. What more can be done to ensure continued dialogue with Russia on this matter, and how will you, if confirmed, ensure that we are able to conduct inspections as agreed to in New START?

Answer. The Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) Bureau is the lead on bilateral nuclear arms control with Russia. If confirmed, I commit to coordinating with AVC to ensure that Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) States Parties are appropriately informed of U.S. dialogue and bilateral treaty implementation with Russia. The administration has launched a Strategic Stability Dialogue with Russia to discuss strategic stability issues, including future arms control and risk reduction. The administration is also working with Russia to determine when New START inspections can be resumed safely.

Question. How can we build on the New START extension to cover tactical (i.e. short range missiles, nuclear artillery, etc.) and emerging nuclear weapon technologies (i.e. Skyfall, nuclear warhead unmanned subsurface vehicles, etc.)?

Answer. The Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) Bureau is the lead on bilateral nuclear arms control with Russia. If confirmed, I commit to coordinating with AVC to ensure that Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) States Parties are appropriately informed of U.S. dialogue and bilateral treaty implementation with Russia. The administration will use the time provided by extension of the New START Treaty to pursue with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons, including novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear arms.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO HON. ADAM SCHEINMAN BY SENATOR TED CRUZ

Question. In April 2019, then-nominee to be Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation Jeffrey L. Eberhardt confirmed in writing to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “given Iran’s past noncompliance with both its safeguards agreement and its NPT obligations, its failure to fully address IAEA questions related to past activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device, and the emergence of new questions surrounding Iran’s motives for retaining and concealing documents, equipment, and personnel related to its past nuclear weapons program, Iran’s standing as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT cannot be described as ‘good.’” Do you agree with Mr. Eberhardt’s assessment? If not, why not?

Answer. The United States has, including in the 2021 Compliance Report, indicated concern with regard to Iran’s compliance with Article III of the NPT. Given Iran’s past non-compliance with its obligations under the NPT and Iran’s NPT-required safeguards agreement and its present failure to fully address the IAEA’s current questions related to implementation of that safeguards agreement, Iran’s standing as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT cannot be described as “good.”

Question. Do you consider Iran’s past possession of the Nuclear Archive seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute non-compliance by Iran of its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)? If yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why

Answer. In 2005, the United States found Iran to be in non-compliance with Articles II and III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—as well as its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—and reported these findings to Congress. These findings concerned activities related to Iran’s pre-2004 efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, records of which were retained in the Iranian “nuclear archive” acquired by Israel in 2018. The IAEA is now seeking to resolve issues involving possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and still awaits the necessary substantive cooperation from Iran on its safeguards investigations. The IAEA Board of Governors has expressed serious concern regarding the lack of progress on these issues and has called on Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA without further delay.

Question. Do you consider Iran’s past concealment of the Nuclear Archive seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute non-compliance by Iran of its obligations under the NPT? If yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why.

Answer. In 2005, the United States found Iran to be in non-compliance with Articles II and III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—as well as its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—and reported these findings to Congress. These findings concerned activities related to Iran’s pre-2004 efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, records of which were retained in the Iranian “nuclear archive” acquired by Israel in 2018. The IAEA is now seeking to resolve issues involving possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and still awaits the necessary substantive cooperation from Iran on its safeguards investigations. The IAEA Board of Governors has expressed serious concern regarding the lack of progress on these issues and has called on Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA without further delay.

Question. Do you believe that Iran should be entitled to the use of civilian nuclear technology even if they are not a member in good standing of the NPT? If so, why? If not, why not?

Answer. Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all the Parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Iran must, however, comply with its international obligations when undertaking nuclear activities, including its obligations under Article II of the NPT and its NPT-required safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Question. Do you consider Iran to be entitled to benefit from nuclear technology pursuant to Article IV the NPT? If yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why.

Answer. Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all the Parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Iran must, however, comply with its international obligations when undertaking nuclear activities, including its obligation under Article II of the NPT not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

Question. Do you consider Iran to be specifically entitled to benefit from nuclear technology pursuant to Article IV the NPT? If yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why.

Answer. Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all the Parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Iran must, however, comply with its international obligations when undertaking nuclear activities, including its obligation under Article II of the NPT not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

Question. Do you assess that China is in violation of its Article VI obligations?

Answer. I understand the State Department examined the issue of China's compliance with NPT Article VI in connection with the 2021 compliance report and determined it did not merit inclusion. If confirmed, I commit to follow up with the AVC bureau, which is the Department lead on compliance reporting, and to support and advocate for the Administration's efforts to engage China in nuclear risk reduction talks.

Question. What leverage does the United States currently possess to dampen China's nuclear buildup?

Answer. The PRC's nuclear weapons build-up risks undermining decades of international progress toward nuclear disarmament, one of the pillars of the NPT. It is urgent for China to take on greater responsibility and demonstrate greater transparency and restraint with respect to its nuclear weapons arsenal. The United States will pursue those objectives both in bilateral engagements with China and in multilateral fora such as the NPT Review Conference.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO HON. ADAM SCHEINMAN BY SENATOR BILL HAGERTY

Question. In your view, has China exhibited good faith efforts to pursue nuclear negotiations with the United States or any other party of the NPT?

Answer. The PRC's nuclear weapons build-up risks undermining decades of international progress toward nuclear disarmament. It is urgent for China to take on greater responsibility, transparency, and restraint with respect to its nuclear weapons arsenal. If confirmed, I would work to pursue those objectives both in bilateral engagements with China and in multilateral fora such as the NPT Review Conference.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to providing regular updates to the committee on the Biden administration's effort to determine whether or not China has violated Article VI of the NPT?

Answer. The Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) Bureau has the lead on compliance reporting to Congress. If confirmed, I commit to working with them and Congress on matters related to the NPT.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO
HON. MARCIA STEPHENS BLOOM BERNICAT BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

State Department Attrition

Question. The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy recently released a report that found that almost a third of current foreign service officers are seriously considering leaving the Department. This finding reflects a broader trend of attrition within the foreign service over the past decade.

- What steps will you take, if confirmed, to improve foreign service retention and to ensure that the foreign service is motivated, engaged, and functioning to the highest degree of their professional capabilities? What steps will you take to en-

sure that the Department retains foreign service officers from a diversity of backgrounds?

Answer. On his first day in office, Secretary Blinken addressed the Department's workforce and underscored that our task "starts with rebuilding morale and trust" within our ranks. The Department is developing new approaches in support of the President's directive to revitalize the foreign policy and national security workforce. As part of this effort, the Secretary appointed Ambassador Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley as the Department's first Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer and, if confirmed, I plan to work closely with her to ensure that diversity and inclusion practices are integrated strategically into personnel-related policies. I also plan to promote workplace flexibilities and to highlight for the workforce resources available to assist employees: FSI workshops and engagements; 24/7 online access to WorkLife4You to address personal issues, including mental health; and TalentCare, the single touchpoint for resources for well-being, community, safety, and workplace flexibilities.

If confirmed, I am committed to strengthening our efforts to support, retain, and develop our already top notch Foreign Service and Civil Service employees to confront the foreign policy challenges of the 21st century.

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to address foreign service officers' concerns regarding assignments, promotions, bias, and family matters?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ask Department experts to examine whether there is a significantly higher rate of attrition for certain populations, and I commit to further analyzing mitigation measures to ensure the Department remains an employer of choice for all of our employees. Understanding why employees leave the Foreign Service is a crucial step in increasing retention. The Department has launched a revamped centralized exit survey to better understand the reasons employees may decide to leave, and the Department has utilized the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey to drill down on bureau level issues that affect retention in support of the President's directive to revitalize the foreign policy and national security workforce. I am committed to examining employee concerns, including assignments, promotions, bias, family member employment, education of dependents, and any other areas, which lead to a loss of our most valuable human resources. If confirmed, I will pursue programs and solutions that remove barriers to retention of our top talent.

Diversity

Question. I remain extremely concerned that the foreign service does not sufficiently reflect the makeup of this country and lags behind most of the rest of the federal government in hiring and retaining a diverse workforce. I appreciate that Secretary Blinken has made this a priority from day one. The fact remains, however, that much work lies ahead. Our diplomats and State Department personnel represent America to much of the world. It is critical that we have foreign service and civil service professionals who represent all the richness that our nation has to offer.

- How do you intend to ensure that the foreign service recruits and retains a diverse workforce?

Answer. If confirmed, I will lead GTM in its role to recruit and retain a workforce that represents America. I will ensure that GTM continues to integrate diversity and inclusion practices strategically into personnel-related policies in alignment with the Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer's vision and the Secretary's and administration's priorities. This includes fair and transparent interviewing and hiring, workplace flexibilities, and encouraging a culture of inclusion, including through professional development and advancement.

If confirmed, I am committed to listening to our members of the Foreign Service and ensuring we retain high performers by investing in their professional development and strengthening programs that mentor individuals for success, provide actionable feedback on performance, chart career progression, provide more inter-agency and other detail opportunities, and create more viable pathways to ensure professional growth.

Question. How do you plan to ensure that diversity is represented at all levels of the workforce, especially at senior levels? What specific steps do you plan to take with respect to mentoring young and mid-level professions, to eliminate bias in promotions, and to otherwise improve access to senior positions?

Answer. If confirmed, I will partner with the Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer (CDIO) to ensure that the Department represents the diversity of the American people. The Department is developing new approaches in support of the President's di-

rective to revitalize the foreign policy and national security workforce. GTM and the CDIO's office are working to track and ensure progress on performance metrics on diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility as outlined in the soon-to-be released Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan. The Department has already taken steps to widen the candidate pool of applicants for senior-level positions through mentorship programs, outreach to employee affinity groups, and the inclusion of interviewing parameters to ascertain the candidates' commitment to diversity and inclusion. In addition, the Department ensures that every promotion board panel is racially and ethnically diverse, gender balanced, and that all panel members receive unconscious bias training. If confirmed, I will continue these efforts to develop our diverse workforce, reach a wider candidate pool, and include more candidates from underrepresented backgrounds for senior positions.

Question. How will you promote diversity, equity, and inclusion in your own hiring and leadership?

Answer. If confirmed, I will lead GTM in its role to recruit and retain a workforce that represents America. I will ensure that GTM continues to integrate diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility practices strategically into personnel-related policies in alignment with the Secretary's and administration's priorities. This includes fair and transparent interviewing and hiring, workplace flexibilities, and encouraging a culture of inclusion through professional development and advancement for both the Foreign Service and Civil Service. If confirmed, I will partner with Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer (CDIO) Ambassador Abercrombie-Winstanley to ensure that the Department represents the diversity of the American people. As the Secretary has said, diversity and inclusion make us stronger, smarter, more creative, and more innovative. The CDIO and her office are building on the efforts established by the Bureau of Global Talent Management (GTM) and GTM will collaborate with the CDIO on the Department's Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan which will lay out the framework to implement wide-reaching diversity and inclusion initiatives along with concrete benchmarks and performance metrics.

Question. Do you commit to establish and demonstrate inclusive leadership practices and to build and maintain a safe work environment? How will you each carry that out in practice?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to establish and demonstrate inclusive leadership practices and to build and maintain a safe work environment. If confirmed, I will expect everyone in the workforce to promote a culture of inclusion where every voice is heard, respected, and valued. As a senior leader at the Department of State and two-time Ambassador, I have led numerous teams comprised of employees from a wide variety of backgrounds and worked deliberately to foster inclusive work environments.

I previously served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Human Resources, now the Bureau of Global Talent Management, where I worked directly on accountability mechanisms. If confirmed, I will use this experience to work with the Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer and Office of Civil Rights to strengthen these accountability mechanisms, which are a key component of a culture of inclusion.

Anomalous Health Incidents

Question. I remain extremely concerned that the Department's response to attacks on personnel, so-called Anomalous Health Incidents, remains woefully inadequate and that the Department is not consistently providing prompt and equitable treatment for affected personnel and family members.

- Do you commit to making the response and treatment of personnel a top priority if confirmed?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to making the response and treatment of personnel a top priority of mine.

Question. Do you agree these incidents must be taken seriously, and pose a threat to the health of State personnel?

Answer. Yes, I agree these incidents must be taken seriously, and pose a threat to the health of State personnel.

Question. What steps, specifically, will you take to improve communication with affected personnel, ensure the workforce is sufficiently aware of the symptoms to watch for and how to report suspected incidents, and ensure all medical treatment is covered and reimbursed?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Care Coordination Unit and Health Incidents Response Task Force (HIRTF) team on communication with affected per-

sonnel and the workforce writ large, and ensure that employees are apprised of their benefits. The Senior Care Coordinator and her team will continue to meet regularly with the group of injured employees and will remain available for individual meetings with those employees. If confirmed, I will meet with these employees as well. I will ensure that the GTM team also works with HIRTF to establish a webpage with information for Department personnel and will help amplify the page in our DG Digest and other communications. DS and MED has and will continue to take every opportunity to remind members of the State Department family of the response protocols for all personnel under COM security responsibility.

Assignment Restrictions

Question. I remain concerned about how assignment restrictions are imposed, the limitations they impose on State Department personnel, and the ability for personnel to appeal restrictions. Such restrictions have historically had a disproportionate effect on communities of color, and can impede career advancement.

- Do you share these concerns, and how do you intend to address these concerns, if confirmed?

Answer. I share your concerns about assignment restrictions. If confirmed, I will support the Department's review of legally available options and broader policy reforms regarding this process, with the goal to better leverage the expertise and capabilities of our entire workforce as well as to increase transparency. Assignment restrictions are based on a number of factors and are intended to mitigate security concerns related to foreign preference and foreign influence, where security clearances for individuals with these circumstances would otherwise be denied, leaving them wholly unable to serve the Department. Individuals who are restricted from serving in one or more countries have capabilities and expertise that contribute to the Department's overall mission and vision. The Department is determined to leverage the diversity and skills of our workforce in ways that make our policy more robust and transparent, while ensuring our national security information remains protected and security concerns are mitigated.

Question. What steps will you take to help improve the promotion board process and ensure that promotions are based on merit and not unduly influenced by bias?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the Department's efforts to increase the accountability for diversity & inclusion in evaluations.

Global Talent Management (GTM) makes every effort to make the Department's Selection Boards as diverse as possible, in accordance with the Foreign Service Act of 1980. The Department ensures that every promotion board panel is racially and ethnically diverse, gender balanced. Diversity of experience and perspective is also valued and this coming year, GTM will recruit Foreign Service Specialists to serve on Generalist Boards. Board members are also required to take diversity awareness and unconscious bias training, prior to beginning service. GTM has revised Selection Board procedures to focus on assessing potential for success at the next level versus past performance, valuing multifunctionality, and complexity of work over geography - and ensure that each Board member receives consistent guidance and training.

Workforce Training

Question. Workforce training is a key element to professional development, especially as it relates to improving management practices.

- Do you believe the Department should provide more opportunities for professional development training, particularly for management, and if so, what steps will you take to do so?

Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support expanding professional development opportunities for our Civil and Foreign Service workforce, including for managers and supervisors, by increasing both the number of programs offered and the number of employees participating. This includes incentivizing supervisors to empower employees to take advantage of long-term training opportunities, developmental rotations, domestic and overseas TDY opportunities, and details, as well as filling gaps left behind due to staffing shortages. For example, creating "backfill positions," (which in and of themselves would also provide professional development experience) would support bureaus experiencing staffing gaps when Civil Service employees are pursuing career development opportunities.

Question. What steps will you take to ensure that diversity, equity, and inclusion are incorporated into professional development training and mentorship opportunities?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility are incorporated into training, professional development opportunities, and mentoring programs throughout the Department in support of the Secretary's Office of Diversity and Inclusion's Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan (DISP). This includes continuing to train and educate supervisors about the importance of recruiting and retaining diverse teams and emphasizing that creating an environment of inclusion is essential aspect of good leadership. While training alone cannot transform the Department, I fully believe that it plays a central role in promoting culture change. If confirmed, I look forward to building a stronger, more inclusive State Department.

Mental Health

Question. As you know, the recent events in Afghanistan will likely bear heavily on many State Department personnel, whether that be because they previously served in Afghanistan or because they worked closely on the evacuation efforts.

- If confirmed, what steps will you take to ramp up mental health services and to encourage State Department employees to seek counseling and support when needed?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with our colleagues in the Bureau of Medical Services (MED) to ensure that we, as an organization, continue to hone processes to lower the barriers, perceived or otherwise, that stand in the way of our employees seeking and receiving the care they need. I will support the Department's efforts to communicate to employees that the act of seeking help from a counselor, psychotherapist, or other mental health professional to address grief, anxiety, family or marital issues, or other concerns, by itself, is not considered derogatory in a security clearance determination, and to dispel the perceived notion that seeking mental health care might adversely affect clearances and career trajectory.

Question. How will you communicate the availability of mental health resources and improve accessibility to them?

Answer. If confirmed, I will meet State Department personnel on the channels and platforms they listen to and learn from. We will use all available conduits, including staff emails, internal webpages, internal TV channels (a.k.a. BNET), newsletters, handouts, webinars, and message boards to make mental health resources and mental health care part of the ongoing, daily discussion at the Department of State. These will complement the in-person communication of available resources already happening through MED's psychologists and social workers in Employee Consultation Services (ECS) as well as psychiatrists overseas.

If confirmed, I will aim to improve accessibility and destigmatize mental health care. I will support the Department in making resources easily available where and when they are needed, meeting State Department personnel where they are overseas and at home. The Department does this now in-person whenever possible through Regional Psychiatrists posted overseas or ECS clinicians domestically. ECS has also expanded capacity recently to travel to overseas sites to work collaboratively with our psychiatrists to address crises, deteriorating morale, or burnout at posts. If confirmed, I will ensure that we are able to maintain this valuable service. I will work with MED to ensure continued availability and leverage of technologies such as WebEx, Microsoft Teams, and Zoom for the benefit of our employees and families.

Work-Life Balance

Question. The Department has made significant improvements regarding work-life balance, but many aspects, particularly related to moving and living overseas, reflect an outdated reality.

- What steps can the Department take to improve work-life balance for all employees, including those balancing family obligations? What do you intend to focus on to further improve work-life balance, if confirmed?

Answer. As our community readies for a return to on-site work, I am committed, if confirmed, to preserving the workplace flexibilities upon which employees have come to depend. This includes supporting the ongoing implementation of the Mobility Assessment Tool (MAT) to assess telework eligibility for domestic positions based on job function, training needed for a more efficient hybrid and remote workforce, and further expanding the Domestic Employee Teleworking Overseas (DETO) program, which enables domestic direct hire Department employees under certain conditions to telework from overseas in order to accompany their spouse to foreign posts of assignment. If confirmed, I will also listen to and assess workforce needs, including through Global Talent Management's (GTM) Innovation Portal.

Civil Service

Question. As you know, many have commented that a stark divide exists between the foreign service and the civil service, in part due to the opportunities that are available to foreign service officers, but not to those in the civil service.

- What is your assessment of the civil and foreign service divide? If confirmed, what steps will you take to help bridge this gap?

Answer. The strength of the Department's workforce is due in large part to the blending of unique but complementary skills and experiences among the various corps. If confirmed, I will look for opportunities to strengthen our partnership and bridge any perceived gap. If confirmed, I'm committed to listening to the entire workforce and ensuring we develop and retain high performers. I support expanding professional development opportunities and increasing not only the number of programs, but the number of employees participating.

If confirmed, I will also invest in Civil Service professional development tools and training that chart career progression, prepare employees to take on leadership roles earlier in their careers, and create pathways for those aspiring to the Senior Executive Service.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO
HON. MARCIA STEPHENS BLOOM BERNICAT BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to develop the State Department workforce capabilities with respect to strategic competition with China?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the continued efforts of the Bureau of Global Talent Management, the Foreign Service Institute, and the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs to create stronger incentives for officers to increase their Chinese language skills and regional expertise. Concepts already in progress include a Trans-Pacific Fellowship program in Taipei; revamping language and hardship incentives; and revising the promotion precepts to place additional emphasis on super-hard language skills in promotion reviews. Currently, the Department has 24 additional Chinese Language designated positions worldwide that are not located in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. The Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs has several lines of effort with the Bureau of Global Talent Management, the interagency, and the Secretary to grow and develop our pool of China experts to coordinate State's policy, outreach and engagement with partners and allies on China, to implement cutting-edge policies with rapid interagency input, and to advise Department, interagency, and like-minded government partners on effective competition with China.

In 2020, the State Department stood-up a Mandarin Language Task Force to answer the continuing critical need for regional expertise and advanced Chinese language skills. The Task Force has already delivered an Advanced Mandarin Training Program, with students starting in-country, in-depth language training in Summer 2021.

If confirmed, I will also encourage deploying our employees with China expertise to Posts throughout the world to better track China's activities globally.

Question. What is your view on the assignments restrictions process? What steps can be done to conduct such a process with greater transparency and clarity?

Answer. Though assignment restrictions presently affect a small percentage of the Department's workforce, the Department is reviewing legally available options and broader policy reforms regarding this process. The aim is to better leverage the expertise and capabilities of our entire workforce as well as to increase transparency. Assignment restrictions are based on a number of factors and are intended to mitigate security concerns related to foreign preference and foreign influence, where security clearances for individuals with these circumstances would otherwise be denied, leaving them wholly unable to serve the Department. Individuals who are restricted from serving in one or more countries have capabilities and expertise that contribute to the Department's mission and vision. The Department is determined to leverage the diversity and skills of our workforce in ways that make our policy more robust and transparent, while ensuring our national security information remains protected and security concerns are mitigated.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO
HON. MARCIA STEPHENS BLOOM BERNICAT BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Diversity

Question. The Director General of the Foreign Service has traditionally played a significant role with respect to State Department diversity and inclusion programs.

- If confirmed, what specific knowledge and experiences from your time at the State Department will you apply to your work in diversity and inclusion?

Answer. As a senior leader at the Department of State and two-time Ambassador, I have built and led numerous teams comprised of employees from a wide variety of backgrounds, and worked deliberately to foster inclusive work environments. If confirmed, I will expect everyone in the workforce to promote a culture of inclusion where every voice is heard, respected, and valued.

I previously served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Human Resources, now the Bureau of Global Talent Management, where I worked directly to strengthen accountability mechanisms. If confirmed, I will use this knowledge to work with the Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer and Office of Civil Rights to strengthen these accountability mechanisms, which are a key component of a culture of inclusion.

Question. How will you collaborate on these matters with the State Department's Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, who is occupying a newly created position? Please explain the intended contours of your working relationship.

Answer. If confirmed, I will partner with Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer (CDIO) Ambassador Abercrombie-Winstanley to ensure that the Department represents the diversity of the American people. As the Secretary has said, diversity and inclusion make us stronger, smarter, more creative, and more innovative. The CDIO and her office are building on the efforts established by the Bureau of Global Talent Management (GTM) and GTM will collaborate with the CDIO on the Department's Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan which will lay out the framework to implement wide-reaching diversity and inclusion initiatives along with concrete benchmarks and performance metrics.

If confirmed, I will lead GTM in its role to recruit, develop and retain a workforce that represents America in support of the President's directive to revitalize the foreign policy and national security workforce. I will ensure that GTM continues to integrate diversity and inclusion practices strategically into personnel-related policies in alignment with the CDIO's vision and the Secretary's and Administration's priorities. This includes fair and transparent interviewing and hiring, workplace flexibilities, and encouraging a culture of inclusion through professional development and advancement for both the Foreign Service and Civil Service, as well as our Locally Employed Staff.

Professional Education and Training

Question. Many stakeholders, including former State Department officials, have long expressed concern that the State Department values and emphasizes the professional education and training of its personnel to a much lesser degree than not only other U.S. agencies, but also the diplomatic corps of other countries such as China. Some note that this issue partially reflects agency culture and management practices, observing that there are widely-held views in the State Department that education and training programs do not enhance one's career and may damage promotion prospects.

- Please share your views on whether the State Department's agency culture and management practices discourage personnel from pursuing training and professional development opportunities, especially in the Foreign Service. What changes, if any, should the State Department consider with respect to Foreign Service promotion criteria, time-in-class restrictions, or other policies to provide more incentives for personnel to seek out such opportunities?

Answer. The Department of State recognizes that our greatest asset is our people. Both Civil Service and Foreign Service employees are encouraged to participate in details and long-term professional development opportunities, many of which are highly sought after and prestigious. Time-in-class extensions are granted for periods of long-term training, including language training, to ensure employees will not be penalized by pursuing opportunities that enhance their skills. Foreign Service Selection Boards are instructed to place an emphasis on continued development of professional expertise and multifunctionality and to consider positively the successful acquisition and/or use of a foreign language. If confirmed, I will continue to explore incentives for Department personnel to pursue training and professional develop-

ment to ensure our workforce has the skills and expertise needed to further U.S. security.

Professional Education and Training. Many stakeholders, including former State Department officials, have long expressed concern that the State Department values and emphasizes the professional education and training of its personnel to a much lesser degree than not only other U.S. agencies, but also the diplomatic corps of other countries such as China. Some note that this issue partially reflects agency culture and management practices, observing that there are widely-held views in the State Department that education and training programs do not enhance one's career and may damage promotion prospects.

Question. As Director General, what changes would you propose to training and professional development programs for Foreign Service and Civil Service staff?

Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support expanding professional opportunities for our Civil and Foreign Service workforce by increasing both the number of programs offered and the number of employees participating. The Department is developing new approaches in support of the President's directive to revitalize the foreign policy and national security workforce. This includes incentivizing supervisors to empower employees to take advantage of long-term training opportunities, developmental rotations, domestic and overseas TDY opportunities, and details, as well as filling gaps left behind due to staffing shortages. For example, full-time professional development and training/backfill positions would support bureaus experiencing staffing gaps when Civil Service employees are pursuing career development opportunities.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO
HON. MARCIA STEPHENS BLOOM BERNICAT BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

Question. For years now, Government Accountability Office reports have pointed out the lack of diversity in the Department of State, and in particular at higher levels of leadership. These recommendations were repeated again in the latest report last year, which Secretary Blinken acknowledged, and yet we have not seen the numbers change.

- If confirmed, what will be your first steps as Director General to truly address diversity at the State Department? Will you commit to ensuring a fair assignments process, and to making data on diversity in the various bureaus and posts widely available?

Answer. If confirmed, I will lead GTM in its role to recruit and retain a workforce that represents America in support of the President's directive to revitalize the foreign policy and national security workforce. I will ensure, if confirmed, that GTM continues to integrate diversity and inclusion practices strategically into personnel-related policies in alignment with the Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer's vision and the Secretary's and administration's priorities. This includes fair and transparent interviewing and hiring, workplace flexibilities, and encouraging a culture of inclusion through professional development and advancement. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring the continuation of a fair assignments process, and to making data on diversity in the various bureaus widely available consistent with applicable law, including PII privacy laws, and the EEOC's regulatory requirements.

Question. Is the State Department still deploying Foreign Service Officers to posts where reports of directed energy attacks have taken place? If so, what assurances are you providing to these individuals? If confirmed, how will you prepare our Foreign Service officers accordingly?

Answer. The interagency community is actively examining a range of hypotheses but has made no determination about the cause of these incidents or whether they can be attributed to a foreign actor. All Foreign Service employees receive regular updates about anomalous health incidents (AHI) through various means of communication. AHIs have been a top priority for Secretary Blinken, who set clear goals for the Health Incident Response Task Force (HIRTF) to strengthen the Department's communication with the workforce, provide care for affected employees and family members, and better protect against these events in the future as the Department continues to work closely with the interagency to find the cause of these AHI. If confirmed, there is nothing I will take more seriously than the health and security of the workforce. HIRTF is actively working to communicate response protocols to the field, in the form of ALDACs, via Regional Executive Directors to their respective bureaus, and workforce messaging from the desk of the Secretary. Regional Security Officers cover AHIs during their newcomer and regular security

briefings at overseas posts. Further, if confirmed, I will collaborate with HIRTF and the Foreign Service Institute to deploy AHI-related content into the Security Overseas Seminar (SOS). The SOS is mandatory for all direct-hire federal employees posted overseas and highly recommended for Eligible Family Members (EFMs) and Members of Household.

Question. Can I get your commitment that, if confirmed, you will ensure that it will be State Department policy for all individuals who desire it to have access to the Walter Reed medical facility?

Answer. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to ensure all our employees have access to the best medical care available. The Department has established relationships with several centers of medical excellence including Walter Reed Medical Center. I will continue to advocate for access to Walter Reed along with other health care centers recommended by the Bureau of Medical Services or preferred by the individual.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO
HON. MARCIA STEPHENS BLOOM BERNICAT BY SENATOR CORY A. BOOKER

Promoting Diversity

Question. Prioritizing diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility at the State Department is essential. Ensuring that the Department's personnel is representative of the American people is critical to ensuring the effectiveness of our diplomacy and ensuring that the United States leads by example when championing human rights around the world. To remove barriers low-income students and students of color face to participating in internship opportunities and help foster a more diverse Foreign Service and workforce at the Department of State, I have introduced a bipartisan bill, the Department of State Student Internship Program Act, to ensure that internships at the State Department are remunerated. This is just one of many steps that can be taken to improve diversity.

- What other changes do you think could be made to help increase diversity in the State Department's recruitment?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing conversations with you and others in Congress on the one-semester paid internship program in your bill and the House-passed Department of State Authorization Act of 2021.

The Department's top recruitment priority is enhancing diversity among career candidates, in support of the President's directive to revitalize the foreign policy and national security workforce. If confirmed, I will review proposals to continue the Department's efforts to build a more diverse workforce. The recruitment team created a new Volunteer Recruitment Corps which leverages the Department workforce, particularly members of the Department's employee affinity groups, to augment outreach to prospective applicants. The team added virtual private sector recruitment best practices, including candidate sourcing via national networks and databases.

The Department expanded the Pickering and Rangel Fellowships by 50 percent, starting with the 2021 program year, and recruited record numbers of outstanding, diverse candidates for both. The Department is considering new Fellowships to meet Specialist career track hiring needs and diversity and inclusion initiatives, as we have done for Information Specialists with the Foreign Affairs IT Fellowship (FAIT).

Question. My internship bill will help to address recruitment, but retention of employees of color has been another major problem at the State Department. What do you believe are the most important steps the State Department can take to increase retention?

Answer. If confirmed, I will lead GTM in its role to recruit, develop and retain a workforce that represents America. I will ensure that GTM continues to integrate diversity and inclusion practices strategically into personnel-related policies in alignment with the Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer's vision and the Secretary's and Administration's priorities. This includes fair and transparent interviewing and hiring, workplace flexibilities, and encouraging a culture of inclusion through professional development and advancement for both the Foreign Service and Civil Service.

If confirmed, I am committed to listening to the workforce and ensuring we retain high performers by investing in their professional development and strengthening programs that mentor individuals for success, provide actionable feedback on performance, chart career progression, provide more training and interagency and other detail opportunities, and create viable pathways for those in the Civil Service and Foreign Service as they aspire to advance their careers.

Question. My internship bill will require additional financial resource. What initiatives can the State Department pursue immediately to increase diversity that do not require additional resources?

Answer. Currently 16 regional Diplomats in Residence are based around the country, hosted by universities but responsible for recruitment of professionals and students in a geographic region, not just on campus. Seven are hosted by Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Hispanic Serving Institutions. The all-virtual environment enabled our Diplomats in Residence and recruiters to attend more virtual career fairs, host online information sessions, intensify activity on social media platforms to include working professionals, and reach far more people across the country in FY 2020 than in the previous years, including a 39 percent increase in participation in diversity-focused events. If confirmed, I will encourage even more digital engagement with diverse, prospective candidates with skills sets that will enhance our national security.

The State Department encourages all employees to recruit diverse talent by using their professional affiliations and networks to amplify Department career opportunities. The new Volunteer Recruiter Corps, launched in January 2021, has opened recruitment activities to more Department employees, leveraging the Department's existing talent and diversity. Half of the initial 500 participants are members of the Department's 17 Employee Affinity Groups (EAGs) and all EAGs are represented in the Volunteer Recruiter Corps. If confirmed, I will consult with the recruitment team on broadening and further engaging the Corps.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO
HON. BATHSHEBA NELL CROCKER BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees

Question. As the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) marks its 70th anniversary, global displacement is at an all-time high. Demands for life-saving assistance will only increase as the disaster in Afghanistan, exacerbated by a hasty U.S. withdrawal, continues to unfold, forcing hundreds of thousands of vulnerable Afghan to seek safety and shelter as refugees.

Question. If confirmed, how will you approach ameliorating conditions for the existing 2.6 million registered Afghan refugees (2.2 million of whom are registered in Iran and Pakistan, which presents extraordinary challenges), in addition to the inevitable exodus of hundreds of thousands more Afghans feeling rule by the Taliban?

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage actively with the leadership of the key U.N. humanitarian agencies in Geneva as well as NGOs to ensure coordination and help monitor evolving needs inside and outside Afghanistan. The United States is currently working with these and other partners to review and strengthen humanitarian preparedness and priority interventions in the region in the event of new refugee outflows from Afghanistan, and the Geneva-based agencies will be crucial to this ongoing effort. If confirmed, I will ensure that the U.S. mission in Geneva coordinates closely across the interagency and engages regularly with the Geneva-based humanitarian agencies, including UNHCR, and with key donors and other partners to ensure the U.N. system is appropriately responding to Afghan's evolving needs, inside and outside Afghanistan.

Question. If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring that U.S. assistance for Afghan refugees provided through U.N. agencies, including UNHCR, reaches its intended beneficiaries and does not materially benefit the Taliban?

Answer. The United States is the largest single donor of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, and we will continue our life-saving support for vulnerable populations in Afghanistan and in the region. If confirmed, I will support all efforts to ensure humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan directly benefits the people of Afghanistan. U.S. humanitarian assistance is provided on the basis of need through our international and non-governmental partners, and not through the Taliban. U.N. agencies that deliver U.S. humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan follow similar risk mitigation requirements as other implementers of U.S. assistance. These risk mitigation measures include extensive vetting to reduce the risk of the diversion of funds and other resources. Monitoring and strict notification requirements are in place to flag issues that could impact assistance delivery.

If confirmed, I will support the Department's close coordination with international partners to stress the importance of remaining united in our approach to Afghanistan and delivering humanitarian assistance with impartiality, neutrality, and inde-

pendence. If confirmed, I will also support the Department's work with the international community to encourage unhindered humanitarian access, freedom of movement and employment opportunities for aid workers of all genders, and the safety and security of humanitarian staff.

At the same time, humanitarian access in places like Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen remains highly constrained. With humanitarians increasingly under attack, these areas have become the most dangerous places in the world for aid workers. To further complicate matters, some UNHCR-supported camps (most notably in the DRC following the Rwanda genocide in 1994, but also more recently in the displaced persons camps in South Sudan), have served as hotbeds for recruitment by armed actors and other abuses, including extreme violence against women and girls.

Question. What more can UNHCR do to facilitate and secure humanitarian access, prevent diversion by malign actors, protect humanitarians and beneficiaries from attack and abuse, and promote accountability?

Answer. As the world's largest single donor to global humanitarian response efforts, the United States has a longstanding commitment to ensuring appropriate access and effective delivery of assistance. By working with partner nations and through important international mechanisms, including, *inter alia*, the U.N. Security Council, the United States has always been a leading voice to reinforce the crucial principle of U.N. neutrality and push for all appropriate access.

If confirmed, I will work with UNHCR, other U.N. humanitarian agencies, NGOs, and other member states to identify, highlight, and address factors that hinder humanitarian access and accountability, from risks to humanitarian staff to bureaucratic obstacles imposed by governments that delay or divert assistance, as well as mechanisms, such as biometrics, that could be used to strengthen accountability around assistance. While the United States is the largest single donor to UNHCR, close coordination with other like-minded actors also supports the effective delivery of life-saving assistance to those in need with the safety and security of aid workers at front-of-mind. If confirmed, I will prioritize U.S. leadership on these issues through engagement with diplomatic counterparts, U.N. humanitarian agency leadership, public facing engagements, and through governing and other executive bodies on which the United States sits.

Question. Under what circumstances, if any, should assistance to camps for displaced persons be halted?

Answer. Considerations for halting assistance to camps is a complex process and must take into account the context of the camps and the conflict. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the U.S. continues to provide support on the basis of need, whether those in question are in camps or are integrated with host communities, and that assistance to refugee camps is delivered according to international standards. If confirmed, I will actively pursue burden-sharing with other donors, national refugee inclusion policies with refugee host countries, and work to advance relief to development coherence where possible.

Question. If confirmed, will you commit to impressing upon the U.N.'s Geneva-based humanitarian assistance agencies, and UNHCR in-particular, the importance of establishing and utilizing biometrics and other verification mechanisms that will enable the agencies to track refugees and internally displaced persons throughout the life of their displacement, improve operational planning, eliminate redundancies, and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of donor contributions?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that these methods are implemented in an effective and transparent manner that improves accountability for donor contributions and contributes to the larger goal of providing quality assistance to beneficiaries. If confirmed, I will also urge reluctant states to conduct joint biometric registrations with UNHCR, where possible, with the aim of building the capacities of host nations to eventually take over the responsibility for registering refugees on their territories. Finally, if confirmed, I will encourage other states to utilize biometric registration and identity management for refugees, particularly those unwilling or unable to do so, while attentive to the risk of such data falling into the hands of those who might misuse it.

Question. What concrete steps do you plan to take to reform the U.N. Human Rights Council in order to eliminate Agenda Item 7 and improve council membership?

Answer. The United States is committed to seeking reforms of the U.N. Human Rights Council, particularly with respect to the Council's disproportionate focus on Israel. When the U.S. has had a seat at the table, we have been able to advocate

on Israel's behalf, and have seen changes, such as a reduction in the number of resolutions targeting Israel. If confirmed, I will prioritize working closely with U.S. friends and allies, as well as non-traditional partners, to address the Council's problematic anti-Israel bias and will engage regularly with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to make clear U.S. opposition to problematic anti-Israel mandates.

When the United States plays an active and constructive role on the Council, we have been able to engage with our allies and partners to keep off some of the countries with the worst human rights records and to encourage and support countries with better records to run for seats. More broadly, if confirmed, I will work closely with U.S. friends and allies to push back on the People's Republic of China's efforts to erode respect for human rights in favor of its authoritarian aims and will work to expand space for civil society engagement in the Council's work, something the PRC has worked to restrict in recent years.

Question. What points of leverage will you use to secure reforms at the U.N. Human Rights Council?

Answer. I am committed to seeking reforms of the U.N. Human Rights Council, if confirmed. U.S. engagement at the HRC can be a force for positive change, and we must continue to prioritize needed reforms as part of our re-engagement. If confirmed, I will ensure U.S. leadership on a robust reform agenda. Past experience has shown that when the United States is at the table, working closely with U.S. friends and allies, as well as non-traditional partners, we can make progress on addressing the Council's problematic anti-Israel bias. If confirmed, I will also press for U.N. member states to more carefully consider the human rights records of countries running for election to the Council and encourage countries with good records to run. If confirmed, I will ensure that U.S. expectations around Council reforms are prioritized in our diplomatic engagements in Geneva.

Question. What would you define as "success" for U.N. Human Rights Council?

Answer. The United States firmly believes that we advance America's national interests best when we have a seat at the table in the multilateral system, including the Human Rights Council (HRC). Through robust U.S. advocacy since our return to the Council as observers in February, we have pushed to ensure the Council has shined a powerful light on Beijing's human rights abuses in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong; pressured regimes around the world, such as Belarus, Burma, Eritrea, Syria, and Venezuela, by sharpening investigative mechanisms into their human rights violations and abuses; and worked to advance equality for all, protecting women's human rights, advancing the human rights of LGBTQI+ individuals, and assuming a leadership role on racial justice.

If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to ensure the Council focuses on its core mission—to shine a light on the world's worst human rights abusers—and on the need to protect civilians. I will also work closely with other member states to improve the Council's record through a considered reform effort and to address the Council's credibility gap due to its anti-Israel bias and its poor membership.

Question. If the Council does not eliminate Agenda Item 7, will the United States continue to run for election at the UNHRC?

Answer. Yes. U.S. membership on the Council puts us in a much stronger position from which to continue to push against anti-Israel actions at the HRC and pursue our broader human rights agenda, including ensuring the HRC addresses other serious human rights situations around the world. If confirmed, I will prioritize continued efforts to eliminate Agenda Item 7 as well as other needed reforms of the HRC.

Question. In May, the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC) created a new commission of inquiry to investigate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The new commission's mandate is much broader in scope chronologically, geographically, and substantively than the mandates of its predecessors.

The Biden administration has chosen to reengage with the UNHRC, with Secretary Blinken asserting that despite the Council's flawed record on Israel "the best way to improve the Council is to engage with it and its members in a principled fashion." Blinken committed that the U.S. would be at the Council "table using the full weight of our diplomatic leadership" and said we "strongly believe that when the United States engages constructively with the Council, in concert with our allies and friends, positive change is within reach." Yet the mandate and membership of the new UNHRC commission of inquiry represents a change for the worse rather than the better.

Answer. The United States strongly opposed the special session of the U.N. Human Rights Council following the conflict in Gaza in May, 2021. The session ex-

emphasizes the Council's disproportionate focus on Israel. The establishment of an open-ended Commission of Inquiry distracts from the diplomatic work necessary to provide greater dignity, freedom, and prosperity for Israelis and Palestinians. If confirmed, I will work closely with Israel and likeminded partners to influence the scope and timeline of this Commission as part of broader efforts to ensure Israel is treated fairly by the Human Rights Council, in line with other U.N. member states. If confirmed, I will also engage regularly with the High Commissioner for Human Rights to make clear U.S. opposition to the Commission. The United States does not intend to cooperate with the Commission.

Question. If confirmed, will you use the full weight of our diplomatic leadership to stop the UNHRC from attacking Israel?

Answer. Yes. I am committed to working with Israel and our other allies and partners to reduce and eventually eliminate the HRC's attacks on Israel. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the United States uses the full weight of our diplomatic leadership, in Geneva and in our bilateral and multilateral missions around the world, to address the Human Rights Council's longstanding anti-Israel bias.

Question. How specifically would you plan to defend Israel?

Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize working closely with U.S. friends and allies, as well as non-traditional partners, to address the Council's problematic anti-Israel bias and will engage regularly with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to make clear U.S. opposition to problematic anti-Israel mandates. If confirmed, I will work to reduce the number of Israel-related resolutions at the Council, make clear U.S. opposition to all anti-Israel mandates and aim to reduce the impact of such mandates, and bolster the number of countries aligned with U.S. views on the need to permanently tackle the Council's bias against Israel. If confirmed, I will ensure that the United States uses its voice and position in Geneva to push back on efforts to unfairly single out Israel, works to counteract existing mechanisms that are biased against Israel, and consistently makes clear U.S. opposition to anti-Israel efforts.

Question. Will you ensure that no U.S. taxpayer dollars are used to fund this UNHRC commission of inquiry?

Answer. The Commission of Inquiry, like all other HRC mandates, is funded by the U.N. regular budget. As such, there is no means to ensure that no funding for this mandate comes from the United States regular contributions to the U.N. budget. However, if confirmed, I will ensure that the United States uses its voice strongly at all opportunities to register our opposition to this commission.

Question. The People's Republic of China (PRC) Government is actively trying to reshape international institutions to advance its malign economic and governance model, including the United Nations. If confirmed, how will you work with our democratic allies and partners to build resiliency to attempts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to undermine the integrity of multilateral institutions and longstanding, widely held democratic values, including with regard to the important work of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, the World Health Organization, and the World Intellectual Property Organization?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with colleagues across the Department to strengthen our alliances and partnerships as well as improve outreach to other countries based on shared multilateral priorities, both in Geneva and through bilateral channels. The United States has had success coordinating with allies and partners to advance an affirmative vision that supports and defends the rules-based international order and deters the PRC's attempts to undermine core U.N. principles. As part of this effort, if confirmed, I will ensure we make clear through our diplomatic engagements that the PRC's actions to bully and coerce undermine the U.N.'s foundational principle of sovereign equality. If confirmed, I will also prioritize working with allies and partners to support qualified and independent candidates for senior leadership positions at the Geneva-based organizations and counter the PRC's attempts to set the agenda in standard-setting bodies and to include ideological language in U.N. documents. This will enable us to better defend and improve the work of U.N. institutions in Geneva, including the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, the World Health Organization, and the World Intellectual Property Organization.

Question. Do you commit to monitoring such attempts and taking appropriate actions?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, this will be one of my top priorities. The United States is best able to address these issues when we are actively engaged and leading at the U.N. and its specialized agencies and related organizations. If confirmed, I will use our re-engagement with the U.N. system to reassert U.S. leadership and work with our allies and partners to defend the foundational values of the U.N. and international rules, standards, and norms. If confirmed, I will seek to improve the U.N.'s effectiveness, transparency, and impartiality; take targeted actions to oppose harmful PRC efforts, such as its use of the U.N. and international organizations to promote the Belt and Road Initiative or incorporate its ideology into U.N. documents. If confirmed I will also support qualified and independent candidates for key positions and ensure that we advance our priorities on issues ranging from human rights to emerging technologies, including in standard-setting organizations.

Question. China has focused intensely on securing leadership roles in various U.N. agencies, particularly those overseeing technical standards that will shape the future. In many cases, these leaders have overtly advanced CCP goals, instead of acting independently to advance the global good. It is clear the United States has had mixed success with elections for heads of International Organizations in the past and is taking more robust and coordinated steps to advocate for qualified and independent candidates in U.N. bodies. If confirmed, will you prioritize robust strategies to secure the election qualified and independent candidates to lead the highly specialized U.N. agencies based in Geneva?

Answer. If confirmed, one of my top priorities will be the election and appointment of qualified, independent candidates to leadership positions in the U.N. system. Such personnel are critical to ensuring the U.N. operates effectively and in line with its foundational principles and values. They also bring strong technical and policy skills that enhance the performance and outcomes within the U.N. system, which, in turn, bolster U.S. efforts on U.N. reform and good governance. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs has established a new office focused in part on managing, supporting, and coordinating elections and appointments for qualified U.S. and like-minded candidates for leadership roles in the U.N. system. That office works closely with our multilateral missions, including Geneva, to ensure the United States identifies and advocates on behalf of interested candidates for key positions across U.N. organizations and agencies. If confirmed, I will prioritize engaging with top U.N. leadership and our partners and allies to advocate for the placement of qualified applicants and candidates, including U.S. citizens, at the U.N. and in specialized and technical agencies.

Question. How do you propose to counter China's malign influence at the WHO? Please be specific.

Answer. The United States is best able to respond to this challenge when we are engaged and leading at organizations, including the WHO. If confirmed, I will use our re-engagement with the WHO to reassert U.S. leadership and work with allies and partners to push back against the PRC's attempts to reshape international institutions, rules, standards, and values.

The United States is taking a leadership role in discussions on strengthening and reforming the WHO as an opportunity to push forward critical reforms that will, *inter alia*, focus on better pandemic preparedness and response, efficiency and effectiveness, transparency, and accountability. This includes working to improve WHO transparency and accountability through more effective implementation of the International Health Regulations and insulating the WHO Director-General from political influence and pressure. If confirmed, I will prioritize U.S. leadership on these and other reforms to improve WHO's performance and accountability and bolster global health security. U.S. leadership on these issues at the WHO is critical both to ensuring progress on strengthening global health security and rebuilding WHO credibility but also to pushing back on the PRC's efforts to undermine the organization's accountability, transparency, and governance. If confirmed, I will also ensure close engagement with like-minded partners and WHO leadership to push for Taiwan's meaningful participation at the WHO, including participation at the World Health Assembly.

Question. How will you ensure that COVAX, the vaccines pillar of the WHO-supported Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, does not become a vehicle for subsidizing and distributing substandard Chinese vaccines?

Answer. Gavi will not use funds from the generous U.S. contribution supporting COVAX to purchase vaccines produced by Chinese companies. U.S. funds have either already been spent down to purchase vaccines made by non-Chinese manufacturers or are being used to support the purchase of Pfizer vaccines or vaccine readiness efforts in recipient countries. Given the immense need for vaccines around the

world to help control and end the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. government is supportive of COVAX's efforts to rapidly roll-out vaccines authorized by the World Health Organization (WHO) as safe and effective. We understand that a condition for distribution via COVAX is a WHO authorization via an emergency use listing (EUL). If confirmed, I will ensure close engagement with Gavi to understand its current and future plans for vaccine roll-out and work with the organization as it tries to identify additional sources of vaccine to address its supply challenges, with more vaccines made by non-Chinese companies expected to come online in the coming months.

Question. What are the top five reforms that you believe the United States should pursue at the WHO?

Answer. The World Health Organization is in need of reform and, if confirmed, I will support U.S. efforts to make the WHO stronger, more independent, and fit for purpose. The United States is using its leadership role on WHO strengthening and reform efforts to focus on improving WHO's ability to prevent, detect, and respond to future pandemics by:

- Improving surveillance and alert systems, including through partnerships with Member States and nonstate actors;
- Increasing transparency and the ability of the WHO and Member States to quickly and effectively respond to outbreaks, especially through strengthened implementation of and compliance with the International Health Regulations; and
- Increasing the WHO's cost effectiveness and sustainability.

The May 2021 World Health Assembly (WHA) established a Member State Working Group on Strengthening WHO Preparedness for and Response to Health Emergencies (WGPR) to propose actions for WHO reform based on the recommendations by three independent review panels and Member States for consideration at the next World Health Assembly. If confirmed, I am committed to energetically supporting these efforts, ensuring strong U.S. leadership to push for a set of practical and meaningful reforms that will address performance, management, and accountability issues at the organization.

Question. Do you believe the WHO should lead emergency health operations, or would it be better placed to focus on the technical and normative aspects of its mission?

Answer. The WHO engages in vital emergency health work around the world, including, for example, the work it is doing to provide critical healthcare assistance, including to combat the polio epidemic in Afghanistan. But the COVID-19 pandemic revealed troubling gaps in global public health investments, capacities, and norms. The United States reengaged in the World Health Organization in January in order to advance critically needed reforms, reassert our role as a leader in global health security, and help the world combat the COVID-19 pandemic. The United States took an active role in working with G7 and other partners to lay the groundwork to strengthen WHO's global health emergency preparedness and response. If confirmed, I will support a more transparent, effective, and agile WHO that will be better placed to detect, report, and respond to emerging health emergencies.

Question. In preparing for the next World Health Assembly, do you agree that diplomatic engagement, including with regard to negotiating governance reforms at the WHO, would be best left to competent diplomats reporting to the Secretary of State while the technical aspects of the International Health Regulations are left to the Department of Health and Human Services? Do you see a difference?

Answer. The Department of State continues to advance WHO reforms in close collaboration with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). We take a whole-of-government approach that leverages all agencies' competencies. For example, the U.S. delegation to the WHO Working Group on WHO Strengthening for Preparedness and Response to Health Emergencies includes key representatives with subject matter expertise and multilateral skills from State, HHS, USAID, and the National Security Council. The strong cooperation between State, HHS, and other relevant agencies will ensure that the United States achieves the best possible results from the WHO reform process. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the U.S. brings to bear the full weight of its diplomatic and technical leadership to drive WHO reform efforts and the ongoing work and oversight of the organization.

Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that Taiwan is granted full observer status at the WHO and the World Health Assembly, regardless of Chinese obstructionism?

Answer. It is deeply unfortunate that Taiwan's expertise and experience on COVID-19 were missing from the 2021 World Health Assembly and for the previous several years. The United States has continued to express its concern to the World Health Organization leadership, and if confirmed, I will continue U.S. efforts to build support for Taiwan's participation at the World Health Assembly through diplomatic engagement with WHO member states, WHO leadership, and media and other outreach to raise public awareness.

If confirmed, I will continue U.S. policy to work closely with like-minded partners to counter the PRC's efforts to restrict Taiwan's meaningful participation at the WHO, World Health Assembly, and other U.N. bodies, as well as its efforts to shrink space for civil society's meaningful participation in U.N. fora.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO
HON. BATHSHEBA NELL CROCKER BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

Question. As we know, women's access to health care, including sexual and reproductive health care like modern contraceptives, plays a significant role in their empowerment. It also dramatically reduces maternal and newborn deaths. Yet the previous administration undertook a campaign against inclusive policies and language that has undermined U.S. credibility on gender equality and women's empowerment.

- Can you speak to how you will work within the U.N. system in Geneva to promote access to health care for women?

Answer. The United States is best able to promote access to health care for women when we are engaged and leading in international organizations. If confirmed, I will contribute to the administration's re-engagement across the multilateral system by working with partners and allies to improve global health capabilities and equitable access to health care for women and girls. The administration has prioritized the promotion of women's global health and equity, and that action is evident in U.S. efforts to increase access to comprehensive health care for women and girls; to restore appropriate references to gender in U.N. documents; to address health disparities; to advance sexual and reproductive health and rights; to prevent and respond to gender-based violence (GBV); and to address the gender-specific health effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

If confirmed, I will advance these priorities across the U.N. organizations in Geneva, including through raising these priorities with leadership of key U.N. humanitarian organizations, working with likeminded partners, and ensuring the United States uses its voice in governing and executive boards to ensure continued progress and to make clear the strong U.S. support for women's health and gender equity.

Question. Will you commit to ensuring that the United States talks about gender—both by once again using the word and promoting the idea—in our engagement with the United Nations?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will promote gender equity and equality and women's empowerment across the full spectrum of Geneva-based agencies and in all the work they conduct. This will include promotion and protection of the rights of LGBTQI+ persons and the return of U.S. use of and support for the term "gender" in our statements at the U.N. and in negotiated U.N. documents.

If confirmed, I will also restore the U.S. voice in support of women's and girls' sexual and reproductive health and rights, including access to voluntary family planning, as a key element of the Biden-Harris administration's broader commitment to promoting women's health and advancing gender equity and equality in the United States and around the world.

Question. Women's access to health care, including sexual and reproductive health care like modern contraceptives, plays a significant role in their ability to advance their education, participate in the economy and support their families and communities.

- Can you speak to how you will work in this post to promote access to comprehensive health care across U.N. offices in Geneva?

Answer. The best way to promote equitable health care access, including for women, is for the United States to demonstrate leadership on these issues on the global stage, including within international organizations such as the U.N. If confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris administration's determined reengagement and leadership by working across the U.N. agencies in Geneva and with likeminded

partners to identify and pursue all appropriate means of promoting equitable and comprehensive access to health care, including sexual and reproductive health care.

This means not only strengthening actions through bodies such as the World Health Organization, but also ensuring that women's and girls' health remains a central objective for organizations such as the U.N. Refugee Agency, U.N. Women, UNICEF, the U.N. Population Fund, and others charged with supporting human health and wellbeing. If confirmed, I look forward to invigorating U.S. diplomatic engagement in Geneva to focus on these crucial needs.

Question. If confirmed, how will you approach restoring relationships with U.S. allies and U.S. leadership within the U.N. system?

Answer.

The Biden-Harris administration has charted a course to mend and, where needed, modernize America's alliances. If confirmed, I will support those efforts by strengthening U.S. leadership at the Geneva-based international organizations, rebuilding partnerships, advocating for qualified and independent U.S. and likeminded candidates for U.N. positions, and pushing for necessary reforms. I firmly support the administration's belief that the United States is most influential when it is at the table, working in partnership with allies, and when it is engaged across the multilateral system from a position of strength and leadership.

That is the intent in seeking election to the U.N. Human Rights Council, and in returning with renewed vigor to dozens of other multilateral bodies. If confirmed, I will prioritize reestablishing strong relationships with likeminded partners and allies to advance common priorities and forming relationships with non-traditional partners that can be critical to U.S. efforts to ensure the U.N. system remains grounded on its foundational principles and aims and is not co-opted by those who seek to undermine the rules-based international order.

Question. In your opinion, has the lack of U.S. leadership at the U.N. allowed for countries that seek to overturn democratic norms to push their agendas within the U.N. system? Where should we be most concerned about this, and what are the first steps to undoing these efforts?

Answer. The United States is best able to address efforts to undermine and weaken the U.N. system when we are engaged and leading at the U.N. and its specialized agencies and related organizations. If confirmed, I will use our re-engagement with the U.N. system to reassert U.S. leadership and work with our partners and allies to push back against attempts to reshape the U.N. and international rules, standards, and values. We are seeing these attempts play out in different ways across the U.N. system, including in the human rights space, in specialized and technical organizations, and in standard-setting bodies.

If confirmed, I will seek to improve the U.N.'s effectiveness, transparency, and impartiality; take targeted actions to oppose efforts by some countries to use the U.N. and international organizations to promote signature foreign policy platforms or insert national ideology and policy into U.N. documents; support qualified and independent candidates for key positions; and ensure that we advance our priorities on issues ranging from global health security to humanitarian assistance and human rights to emerging technologies, including in standard-setting bodies.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO
HON. BATHSHEBA NELL CROCKER BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. The U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has a long history of anti-Israel bias. The Council has repeatedly chastised Israel and held it to a double standard, while ignoring gross human rights abuses around the world. To this day, Israel is the only country subject to a permanent spot on the Council's agenda.

- If confirmed, how will you counter anti-Israel bias at the U.N. Human Rights Council and other U.N. agencies?

Answer. The United States is committed to seeking reforms of the U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC), particularly with respect to the HRC's disproportionate focus on Israel and the HRC's problematic membership. When we have had a seat at the table, we have been able to advocate on Israel's behalf, and we have seen changes like a reduction in the number of resolutions targeting Israel. If confirmed, I will prioritize working closely with U.S. friends and allies, as well as non-traditional partners, to address the HRC's problematic anti-Israel bias and will engage regularly with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to make clear U.S. opposition to problematic anti-Israel mandates. If confirmed, I will ensure that

the United States uses its voice and position in Geneva to push back on efforts to unfairly single out Israel, works to counteract existing mechanisms that are biased against Israel, and consistently makes clear U.S. opposition to anti-Israel efforts.

Question. Following the launching of thousands of rockets toward Israel from Gaza this May, the Human Rights Council took the ridiculous step to establishing a permanent commission of inquiry to investigate Israel. What are your thoughts on the commission? Should the U.S. cooperate with commission?

Answer. The United States strongly opposed the special session of the U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC) following the conflict in Gaza in May 2021. The session exemplifies the HRC's disproportionate focus on Israel. The establishment of an open-ended Commission of Inquiry distracts from the diplomatic work necessary to provide greater dignity, freedom, and prosperity for Israelis and Palestinians. If confirmed, I will work to influence the scope and timeline of this Commission as part of broader efforts to ensure Israel is treated fairly by the Human Rights Council, in line with other U.N. member states. The United States does not intend to cooperate with the Commission.

Question. The Biden administration has chosen to reengage with the UNHRC in the hopes of improving the council's record. Yet this mandate and membership of the new UNHRC commission of inquiry represents a change for the worse rather than the better.

- If confirmed, will you use the full weight of American diplomatic leadership to stop the UNHRC from engaging in anti-Israel bias?

Answer. I am committed to working with Israel and our other allies and partners to reduce and eventually eliminate attacks on Israel by the Human Rights Council. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the United States uses the full weight of our diplomatic leadership, in Geneva and in our bilateral and multilateral missions around the world, to address the HRC's longstanding anti-Israel bias.

Question. The Chinese Communist Party has sought to use U.N. bodies—including the UNHRC—to aggressively promote a new definition of human rights. For instance, in 2017 and 2018, the CCP was able to offer resolutions that called for “people-centered development,” building a “community of common human destiny,” and “mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of human rights.” These resolutions—which passed—downplay an individual's inherent human dignity and gives authoritarians around the world tacit acceptance for abuse.

- If confirmed, how will you combat the CCP's sophisticated efforts to revise international human rights norms at the U.N.?

Answer. The United States will continue to be vigilant and work with others to ensure we have the broadest possible defense of the multilateral system's values and norms and are best placed to counter the PRC's efforts to erode global human rights norms and pursue its authoritarian aims. If confirmed, I will work with colleagues across the Department to strengthen current alliances and partnerships as well as improve outreach to other countries based on shared human rights priorities, both in Geneva and through bilateral channels. As part of this effort, the U.S. will also make clear that the PRC's actions to bully and coerce undermine the U.N.'s foundational principle of sovereign equality. If confirmed, pushing back on the PRC's efforts to reshape global human rights norms at the U.N. will be one of my top priorities, and I will use the full weight of U.S. diplomatic leadership toward these efforts.

Question. One of the many consequences of the Biden administration's disastrous Afghanistan decision is that the Taliban is now in a position to appoint a new envoy for Afghanistan at the U.N. If appointed, this envoy will assume Afghanistan's membership on the Commission for the Status of Women. This is ludicrous considering the Taliban has been and still is, one of the worst oppressors of women's rights.

- If confirmed, how will you encourage the U.N. to invoke Rule 29 to ensure a Taliban appointee does not become Afghanistan's envoy to the U.N.?

Answer. The United States has consistently emphasized the importance of any future government in Afghanistan to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans. This includes the rights of women, children, and minority groups. The United States is closely watching the Taliban's actions across the country in this regard, and we will judge them by their actions, including with respect to their representational efforts at the U.N.

As Secretary Blinken has said, the Taliban want international legitimacy. It is vital that the international community work in unison to send a clear message that

legitimacy is earned through concrete actions. If confirmed, I will work to reinforce these efforts across the Geneva-based organizations, including ensuring appropriate focus of the U.N. Human Rights Council on the human rights situation in Afghanistan.

Question. If confirmed, how will you use your position to ensure that U.N. humanitarian assistance does not benefit the Taliban?

Answer. The United States is the largest single donor of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, and we will continue our life-saving support for vulnerable populations in Afghanistan and in the region. If confirmed, I will support all efforts to ensure humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan directly benefits the people of Afghanistan. U.S. humanitarian assistance is provided on the basis of need through our international and non-governmental partners, and not through the Taliban. U.N. agencies that deliver U.S. humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan follow similar risk mitigation requirements as other implementers of U.S. assistance. These risk mitigation measures include extensive vetting to reduce the risk of the diversion of funds and other resources. Monitoring and strict notification requirements are in place to flag issues that could impact assistance delivery.

If confirmed, I will support the Department's close coordination with international partners to stress the importance of remaining united in our approach to Afghanistan and delivering humanitarian assistance with impartiality, neutrality, and independence. If confirmed, I will also support the Department's work with the international community to encourage unhindered humanitarian access, freedom of movement for aid workers of all genders, and the safety and security of humanitarian staff. If confirmed, I will engage regularly with U.N. humanitarian leadership in Geneva in support of these efforts, as well as with other donor countries.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO
HON. BATHSHEBA NELL CROCKER BY SENATOR CORY A. BOOKER

Re-establishing U.S. Leadership in U.N. Bodies

Question. China has secured leadership roles in a number of U.N. bodies over the last few years, including the Food and Agriculture Organization (elected in 2019), International Telecommunication Union (re-elected in 2018), International Civil Aviation Organization (re-appointed in 2019 and leaving office in August 2021), and U.N. Industrial Development Organization (re-appointed in 2017), at the time when the prior administration withdrew the United States from a number of U.N. bodies, dealing a double blow to our influence with the U.N. system. The Biden administration has taken steps to rejoin a number of bodies.

- What further steps does the administration plan on taking to re-establish U.S. leadership with the U.N. system and to ensure that either the United States or our allies regain leadership roles in important U.N. bodies?

Answer. The election and appointment of qualified and independent candidates to positions in the U.N. system are critical to ensuring that the U.N. operates effectively and in line with its foundational principles and values. Qualified U.S. citizens and nationals from like-minded countries bring strong technical, policy, and management skills that enhance the performance and outcomes within the U.N. system, which, in turn, bolster our efforts on U.N. reform and good governance.

The Bureau of International Organization Affairs has established a new office focused in part on managing, supporting, and coordinating elections and appointments for qualified U.S. and like-minded candidates for leadership roles in the U.N. system. That office works closely with posts such as Geneva to ensure the United States is well-positioned to identify and advocate on behalf of interested candidates for key positions across multiple U.N. organizations and agencies. If confirmed, I will prioritize engaging with senior U.N. leadership as well as our allies and partners to advocate for placement and election of qualified and independent applicants and candidates, including U.S. citizens, at the U.N. and in its specialized and technical agencies. If confirmed, I will also prioritize working closely across the inter-agency, with U.S. bilateral and multilateral missions, and with Congress to ensure that we dedicate robust diplomatic efforts to leadership election and appointment campaigns.

Question. What can the State Department do to counter China's growing influence within the U.N. system?

Answer. The United States is best able to respond to this challenge when we are engaged and leading at the U.N. and its specialized agencies and related organizations. If confirmed, I will use our re-engagement with the U.N. system to reassert U.S. leadership and work with our allies and partners to push back against the PRC's attempts to reshape international institutions, rules, standards, and values. I will seek to improve the U.N.'s effectiveness, transparency, and impartiality; support qualified and independent candidates for key positions; ensure that we advance our priorities on issues ranging from human rights to emerging technologies, including in standard-setting bodies; and take targeted actions to oppose harmful PRC efforts, such as its use of the U.N. and international organizations to promote the Belt and Road Initiative or its incorporation of PRC ideology and policy into U.N. documents. If confirmed, I will also work closely with like-minded partners to counter the PRC's efforts to restrict Taiwan's meaningful participation in U.N. bodies and its efforts to shrink space for civil society's meaningful participation in U.N. fora.

Question. The African bloc within the U.N. is a large bloc of countries that tends to vote together and can be decisive with respect to votes at the United Nations. China has done a lot economically and diplomatically to successfully court this bloc, for example convincing almost all African countries to abandon Taiwan in favor of China.

- What can the State Department do to work with this bloc to better explain U.S. positions and have it vote with the United States at the U.N.?

Answer. The United States shares many priorities with countries in Africa, yet too often in multilateral fora our votes do not align. If confirmed, I will work with colleagues across the Department to improve outreach and partnerships with African and other G-77 countries on our shared multilateral priorities, both in Geneva and through our bilateral channels. As part of this effort, we will also make clear that the PRC's actions to coerce and bully countries to support its positions at the U.N. undermine the U.N.'s foundational principle of sovereign equality and work with those countries to defend our shared interests at the U.N.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO
HON. BATHSHEBA NELL CROCKER BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. If confirmed, what specific reforms will you push for at the Human Rights Council? How will you fight anti-Israel bias at the U.N. Human Rights Council?

Answer. The United States is committed to seeking reforms of the U.N. Human Rights Council, particularly with respect to the Council's disproportionate focus on Israel and the Council's problematic membership. When we have had a seat at the table, we have been able to advocate on Israel's behalf, and we have seen changes like a reduction in the number of resolutions targeting Israel. If confirmed, I will prioritize working closely with U.S. friends and allies, as well as non-traditional partners, to address the Council's problematic anti-Israel bias and will engage regularly with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to make clear U.S. opposition to problematic anti-Israel mandates.

We have also seen that when the United States plays an active and constructive role on the Council, we have been able to engage with our allies and partners to keep off some of the countries with the worst human rights records and to encourage and support countries with better records to run for seats. More broadly, if confirmed, I would work closely with U.S. friends and allies to push back on the People's Republic of China's efforts to erode global human rights norms in favor of its authoritarian aims and will work to expand space for civil society engagement in the Council's work, something the PRC has worked to restrict in recent years. If confirmed, I will ensure the United States prioritizes these specific reforms.

Question. Following the launching of thousands of rockets at Israel from Gaza this May, the Human Rights Council took the step of establishing a permanent commission of inquiry to investigate Israel, the only such permanent agenda item of the council. What are your thoughts on the commission? Should the U.S. cooperate with commission?

Answer. The United States strongly opposed the special session of the U.N. Human Rights Council following the conflict in Gaza in May, 2021. The session exemplifies the Council's disproportionate focus on Israel. The establishment of an open-ended Commission of Inquiry distracts from the diplomatic work necessary to

provide greater dignity, freedom, and prosperity for Israelis and Palestinians. If confirmed, I will work closely with Israel and likeminded partners to influence the scope and timeline of this Commission as part of broader efforts to ensure Israel is treated fairly by the Human Rights Council, in line with other U.N. member states. The United States does not intend to cooperate with the Commission, and if confirmed, I will make clear U.S. opposition to the Commission through regular engagements with the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and diplomatic counterparts.

Question. As you know, China continues to seek leadership posts and influence inside key standards-making bodies like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), World Intellectual Property Organization, and International Organization for Standardization. What do you believe is required to effectively push back on Chinese efforts to codify CCP-friendly international standards?

Answer. The United States has consistently participated in the activities of key standard-setting bodies to ensure U.S. interests are represented, while standing as a bulwark against PRC interests. This is achieved by ensuring that organizations are transparent and accountable to membership, focused on mandates and core competencies, and led by independent, qualified candidates.

Strong leadership and engagement in international technology standards development activities are essential to the national security and economic security of the United States. If confirmed, I will prioritize electing qualified and independent candidates to lead important standard-setting bodies, including the election of American citizen Doreen Bogdan-Martin as Secretary-General of the ITU, and robust strategies to work with our allies and partners to strengthen the international standards development process in alignment with our shared values and principles. I will also work to ensure the U.S. private sector can appropriately engage in standard-setting processes and will strengthen relationships with leadership of the Geneva-based standard-setting bodies so that the U.S. can most effectively advance our interests.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO
HON. BATHSHEBA NELL CROCKER BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. The U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has been subject to bipartisan criticism for endemic anti-Israel bias. It has in recent years taken a leading role in promoting economic measures against Israeli Jews and in territories where Israeli Jews live. The Human Rights Council has published a blacklist of companies doing business in the West Bank and East Jerusalem—including American companies. The move puts these companies at severe reputational and potentially even legal risks, pursuant to American statutes prohibiting participation in such boycott efforts.

- What specific steps do you intend to take to ensure that the Council retracts databases and other lists seeking to pressure companies into curtailing activities with Israel?

Answer. The United States opposed the creation of the database and release of the report, as mandated by the Human Rights Council in 2016, and continues to oppose any work to update it. The United States has not provided and has no intention to provide any information to OHCHR for the database. If confirmed, I will also encourage other countries not to provide any information for the database. The United States continues to engage with the High Commissioner in Geneva to make its views and opposition clear and to push for retraction of the database. If confirmed, I will continue this effort.

Question. How long do you assess it will take you to ensure that the Council retracts all such databases and other lists?

Answer. I cannot offer a specific timeline. However, I can assure you that, if I am confirmed, the United States, and I personally, will continue to engage regularly with the High Commissioner in Geneva to urge the retraction of this database and push to ensure that the database is not further updated.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO DR. MICHAEL CARPENTER BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. What are your views on the future of the Minsk Group and how we can promote a better future in the region amid increased Azeri and Turkish aggression?

Answer. The United States takes its role as one of the three OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs—with France and Russia—very seriously. If confirmed, I will support the mandate of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs to help Armenia and Azerbaijan negotiate a peaceful, comprehensive settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and will support efforts invigorate the Minsk Group Co-Chair process to find a lasting solution that brings peace and stability to the South Caucasus region. If confirmed, I will also look for opportunities for broader OSCE engagement in the South Caucasus region to promote peace, security, and stability.

Question. So how will you use the OSCE platform to draw attention to human rights abuses and the erosion of the rule of law in Turkey?

Answer. I share your concerns about democratic backsliding and the erosion of the rule of law in Turkey. If confirmed, I will speak frankly about democracy and human rights concerns with my Turkish counterparts. I will also raise these concerns in statements at the Permanent Council and other OSCE venues to ensure that all participating States are held accountable for their OSCE commitments.

Question. What would you do as ambassador to make sure that Turkey is unable to derail the OSCE's work on these important issues?

Answer. All participating States, including Turkey, freely adopted OSCE commitments on respect for human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. If confirmed, I will use OSCE platforms to hold Turkey and other states accountable for their failures to uphold these commitments. I share your concern that countries could seek to evade criticism of their records by obstructionist tactics, as is currently the case with Russia's blocking of procedural decisions regarding the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting. If confirmed, I will continue to take the firm U.S. position that such tactics are unacceptable and work with allies and partners to uphold the principle that the human rights record of all participating States is subject to review.

Question. Given the Kremlin intransigence, what steps will you take within the OSCE to ensure that the Kremlin is held accountable for abuses against its own people?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue spotlighting Russia's failures to uphold its freely made commitments on human rights, rule of law, and democracy. I will amplify the voices of embattled civil society activists, human rights defenders, and independent journalists. I will raise the cases of political prisoners and call out abuses. I agree the Kremlin has obstructed the work of the OSCE inside Russia for many years, including in the runup to this year's parliamentary elections. After obstructing independent media coverage and genuine opposition participation, and after imposing unjustified restrictions on OSCE observation, the OSCE rightly decided not to observe this year's elections. However, that does not mean Russia will evade the spotlight or international accountability. If confirmed, I will continue the U.S. Mission to the OSCE's efforts to call out the Kremlin's failures to abide by its OSCE commitments.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO DR. MICHAEL CARPENTER BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Nontransparent Behavior with Respect to Its War Games

Question. Russia's history and continued practice of under-reporting, mischaracterizing, or permanently repositioning forces under the rubric of exercises is dangerously destabilizing. Many of the confidence- and security-building measures contained in the OSCE's Vienna Document are designed to provide transparency regarding military activities, including military exercises in the field. If it chose to, Russia could demonstrate its commitment to international stability by ensuring it is transparent before, during, and after military exercises. This would give other OSCE participating States greater confidence that Russia will refrain from an unlawful threat or use of force. Unfortunately, Russia does not consistently fulfill the transparency measures it committed to in the Vienna Document. If confirmed, I will continue to call upon Russia to meet its international obligations and its commit-

ments under the Vienna Document and will use the OSCE platform to call out its destabilizing military activities while keeping our allies and partners united.

- Is the Vienna document still relevant given how frequently Russia violates its spirit and intent? What reforms are most pressing to maintain OSCE as a relevant institution?

Answer. The Vienna Document remains a pillar of military transparency and confidence-building in Europe and Eurasia. If confirmed, I will work to build support for Vienna Document modernization so its provisions are better adapted to new military realities, including by working with allies and partners to push Russia to participate constructively in results-oriented negotiations. Russia's repeated failures over the years to fulfill certain of its Vienna Document commitments in good faith undermines other states' confidence in Russia's commitment to international stability. However, the United States and our allies are better off with these commitments in place, in part so we can hold Russia to account.

The OSCE's comprehensive security concept linking respect for human rights within states to cooperation and peace among states helps the United States advance its interests within the organization, and this concept remains highly relevant today. Useful reforms would include those mandating a timely adoption of the Unified Budget and steps to facilitate OSCE's core functions, including holding all three implementation/review meetings annually. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress on the question of reforms and will steadfastly defend the continued independence of OSCE institutions and field missions, which do invaluable work to advance our interests.

Question. If confirmed, how will you engage with OSCE to counter the growing belligerence of Russia and its encroachment into Belarus?

Answer. I am deeply troubled by Russia's malign activities in Belarus, including its insertion of Russian propagandists into Belarusian state-controlled media outlets to replace Belarusian journalists and Belarusian technical personnel, who were either fired due to their participation in the pro-democracy movement or quit in peaceful protest. Other Russian "advisors" have also been deployed to Belarus to assist the regime with consolidating power.

The United States, together with 16 other participating States, invoked the OSCE's Moscow Mechanism in September 2020 to investigate human rights abuses in Belarus. The Moscow Mechanism is a unique OSCE tool that allows for an investigation to be launched without consensus and independently of the OSCE Chairmanship. The resulting OSCE Rapporteur's report on Belarus thoroughly documented ongoing human rights abuses and made specific recommendations, such as calling for an end to torture, the release of all political prisoners, the launch of an inclusive national dialogue, and new, free and fair elections. If confirmed, I will use all applicable OSCE platforms and tools to support the human rights and democratic aspirations of the Belarusian people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Belarus.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO DR. MICHAEL CARPENTER BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Human Rights

Question. Over the past year, the world has suffered the crippling impact of COVID-19, which has disproportionately affected our most vulnerable citizens and allowed some governments to exploit the pandemic to limit fundamental freedoms. Corruption threatens peace, prosperity, and human rights across the region, and the Kremlin remains intransigent in its overt violence against its neighbors as well as its covert attempts to undermine democratic institutions elsewhere.

- As Ambassador, what would be your top priorities for the U.S. Mission to the OSCE?

Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize respect for democracy and human rights and continue efforts to push back on Russian and PRC malign influence across the OSCE region, particularly Russia's aggression in Ukraine, and redouble U.S. engagement to resolve protracted conflicts in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh. I will focus on addressing conventional military concerns and updating the Vienna Document, as well as addressing "hybrid" threats such as election interference, energy coercion, disinformation, cyber operations, and transnational repression. I will prioritize establishing stronger anti-corruption measures, and work with allies and partners to strengthen the resilience of frontline democracies. Finally, I

will use OSCE platforms and institutional tools to defend human rights and human dignity, promote democratic reforms, and push back against growing restrictions on civil society, media and internet freedom, judicial independence, and the rising tide of intolerance.

Question. How can the OSCE contribute to its mission of promoting human rights and democracy in Belarus and countries undergoing similar situations?

Answer. If confirmed, I will use all available OSCE platforms and tools to shine a light on the appalling human rights situation in Belarus while affirming our support for democratic norms and institutions. While it is up to the people of Belarus to decide their political future, the OSCE must continue to hold the authorities in Belarus accountable for their actions. The successful invocation of the OSCE's Moscow Mechanism by the United States and 16 other countries in 2020 resulted in the issuance of a report documenting ongoing human rights abuses and offering policy recommendations, such as calling for an end to torture, the release of all political prisoners, the launch of an inclusive national dialogue, and new, free and fair elections. If confirmed, I will continue calling Belarus and other participating States to account when they violate their human rights obligations or disregard the OSCE commitments they freely pledged to uphold. Additionally, I will continue support for the OSCE's independent institutions, which conduct invaluable human rights programming, spotlight repressions against journalists and human rights defenders, and provide support to vulnerable populations.

Rise in Violence:

Question. Since 2015, I have served as the Special Representative on Anti-Semitism, Racism, and Intolerance for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. We've seen, in recent months, current events trigger latent bias in our communities. We go back to 9/11 where we saw the rise of hate against the Muslim community, which was translated into violence against Muslim Americans. We saw during COVID-19 latent bias against the Asian American community. Once again, as a result of recent violence in the Middle East, we see a rise of anti-Semitism here in the United States and around the world.

- The center's Early Warning Project provides an innovative risk assessment tool using methods to spotlight countries where mass atrocities have not begun, but where the risk of such violence is high. The warning signs are there. As Ambassador, how are you planning on addressing this issue with many OSCE participating states?

Answer. I share your alarm at the rise of anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim hatred, xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance in the OSCE region that, if left unchecked, can lead to mass atrocities. Whole-of-government approaches, such as efforts to implement the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act and the Global Fragility Act, provide the Department, in collaboration with other agencies, opportunities to innovate, leverage and utilize valuable tools for early warning and early action regarding mass atrocities. Various nongovernmental organizations also provide useful metrics for assessing risk of mass atrocities. At the OSCE, the Conflict Prevention Center staffs a round-the-clock Situation Room to look for early warning signs and bring them to the attention of participating States.

If confirmed, I will condemn hate in all of its forms, and use the OSCE's diplomatic, educational, and programmatic tools to build international coalitions to act swiftly whenever and wherever there is a risk of violence or mass atrocities. In this regard, preventative diplomacy is critical. If confirmed, I will also continue U.S. support for the tolerance projects of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and encourage active engagement by the High Commissioner on National Minorities to address the triggers of inter-ethnic conflict and engage in conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO DR. MICHAEL CARPENTER BY SENATOR TED CRUZ

Nord Stream 2

Question. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline is opposed by OSCE countries. In 2019, the OSCE passed a resolution "expressing particular concern about the Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream pipeline projects and their potential to be used for the political or economic coercion of supply-dependent participating State."

Congress has of course mandated the use of sanctions to stop Nord Stream 2 from coming online, and on September 15 you testified “I think it’s very important that the U.S. continues to be ready to use all of the authorities contained within PEESA and CAATSA which are the laws of the land when it comes to this.” The statement is in tension with statements from other Biden administration officials, who have publicly said that the pipeline cannot be stopped, in part because it has been physically completed. European allies that believe the pipeline should be stopped have, in turn, emphasized that there are still several months to prevent its certification and activation.

- Please clarify your September 15 testimony by describing what authorities within PEESA and CAATSA should be used.

Answer. The Protecting European Energy Security Act (PEESA) and the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) both provide the administration with authorities to sanction foreign persons who engage in certain activity related to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. I understand the Administration remains committed to implementing CAATSA and PEESA, as amended, and that work continues to examine entities involved in potentially sanctionable activity.

Question. Please assess whether you believe the Nord Stream 2 pipeline can still be stopped from coming online.

Answer. It is my understanding that while the physical work required to construct the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is either finished or close to being finished, it could take several more months before German authorities are ready to certify the pipeline for use. If confirmed, I will continue to oppose the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and work to strengthen the energy security of our allies and partners.

If confirmed, I will use OSCE platforms and tools to push back against the Kremlin’s coercive energy policies and advance a more secure and sustainable energy future for Ukraine and other frontline European countries. I would continue to support the OSCE’s work to build the capacity of participating States to protect their energy networks, diversify their energy mixes, improve the investment climate in the energy sector, and reduce the environmental footprint of energy production, use, and transport.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO DR. MICHAEL CARPENTER BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

Question. How can we apply more pressure in Belarus within the OSCE context? Can we do more to support the democratic movement led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya?

Answer. If confirmed, I will use all available OSCE platforms and tools to spotlight the appalling human rights situation in Belarus, urge the Lukashenka regime to engage in a facilitated dialogue with the democratic opposition and civil society, and support the Belarusian people’s democratic aspirations. The OSCE must continue to hold Belarus’ authorities accountable for their severe human rights abuses and allow for the voices of civil society and democratic leaders to be heard. The 2020 invocation of the OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism by the United States and sixteen other countries resulted in a report documenting human rights abuses and making policy recommendations supported by the United States, such as an immediate end to violence and torture, unconditional release of all political prisoners, launch of an OSCE-facilitated national dialogue inclusive of civil society and the political opposition, and new, free and fair elections under international observation.

Question. I was able to visit Georgia earlier this summer and was initially encouraged by the progress undertaken by the April 19 agreements. However, recent events over the course of the summer indicate that there is still insufficient political will to advance the April 19 agreement.

- The next round of elections is scheduled for early October—what role will the OSCE take in observing these elections?

Answer. The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has deployed an election observation mission (EOM) for Georgia’s October 2 local elections. The EOM will consist of 12 international experts, 30 long-term observers, and 350 short-term observers. Observers will monitor all aspects of the election, including implementation of electoral reforms, the campaign environment, media coverage, and election dispute resolution. Short-term observers will monitor the opening of polling stations, voting processes, the counting of ballots, and tabula-

tion of results. The EOM will assess the elections for compliance with OSCE commitments and standards, and international obligations related to the holding of free and fair elections.

Question. What can be done to ensure that the elections are free and fair, and that if so, all parties accept the results to allow Georgia to move forward politically?

Answer. The Georgian Government, all political parties, all candidates, and election officials have an important role in upholding the highest standards of integrity before, during, and after Election Day. A robust OSCE election observation mission in Georgia will help establish a clear factual record of election processes and conduct, as will nonpartisan domestic election monitoring. The United States has provided substantial bilateral assistance over the years to promote professional and transparent election administration and nonpartisan domestic election monitoring. If confirmed, I will continue efforts in support of democratic reforms and encourage enhanced OSCE engagement in Georgia. Timely implementation of inclusive and transparent democratic reforms can reduce political polarization and help Georgia advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
