

TESTIMONY

“Reconstructing to Rebalance Haiti after the Earthquake”

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Thank you for inviting me to testify today.

My first visit to Haiti was in 1974. My first full day in Haiti was the day that Haiti’s National Soccer Team scored *the* incredible goal against Italy in the World Cup. That may not mean much to Americans, but to Haitians it means *everything*. I have come to take this coincidence as a sign that there was bound to be some kind of unbreakable bond between Haiti and me. And that came to pass.

My most recent visit ended on January 10, 2010, two days before the earthquake. In between, I have visited Haiti more than 100 times, as a US government official working with the Inter-American Foundation and the Department of State; as a scholar and researcher, and as a friend of Haiti and its people. I have traveled throughout that beautiful, if benighted, land. I have met and broken bread with Haitians of all walks of life. I have stayed at the now-destroyed Montana Hotel. I had dinner there 5 days before the quake, chatting with waiters and barmen I had befriended over the years. I speak Creole. I have lost friends and colleagues in the tragedy. I am anxious to share my views and ideas with you.

In the deep darkness of the cloud cast over Haiti by the terrible tragedy of January 12 there is an opportunity for the country and its people to score another incredible goal, not so much by reconstructing or rebuilding, but by restoring a balance to achieve a nation with less poverty and inequity, improved social and economic inclusion, greater human dignity, a rehabilitated environment, stronger public institutions, and a national infrastructure for economic growth and investment. And, if that goal is to be scored, relationships between Haitians and outsiders also will have to be rebalanced toward partnership and respect of the value and aspirations of all Haiti's people.

A Country Out-of-Balance

In the five decades that I have traveled to Haiti, I have seen the country become terribly out-of-balance. Much of this revolves around the unnatural growth of Haiti's cities, especially in what Haitians call "the Republic of Port-au-Prince." In the late 1970s, Haiti's rural to urban demographic ratio was 80% to 20%. Today it is 55% to 45%. The earlier ratio reflected what had been chiefly an agrarian society since independence. The population of Port-au-Prince in the late 1970's was a little over 500,000 – already too many people to be adequately supported by the city's physical infrastructure. By then, Haitians from the countryside had already begun trickling into the capital city as a result Dictator Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier's (1957 – 1972) quest to centralize his grip on power. Under Papa Doc, a ferocious neglect beyond PAP took place, as ports in secondary cities languished, asphalted roads disintegrated and, in some cases, were actually ripped-up, and swatches of the countryside were systematically deforested under the guise of national security or by way of timber extraction monopolies granted to Duvalier's cronies. Small farmers were ignored as state-supported agronomists sought office jobs in the capital.

The only state institutions present in the countryside were army and paramilitary (*Tonton Makout*) posts and tax offices – which enforced what rural dwellers told me was

a ‘squeeze – suck’ (*pese - souse*) system of state predation. With wealth, work and what passed for an education and health infrastructure increasingly concentrated in Port-au-Prince (PAP), it was no wonder that poor rural Haitians had begun to trickle off the land into coastal slums with names like “Boston” and “Cite Simon” (named after Papa Doc’s wife), and onto unoccupied hillsides and ravines within and surrounding the city.

The trickle turned into a flood in the early 1980’s when the rapacious regime of Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier (1972 - 1986) yielded to Haiti’s international ‘partners’ – governments, international financial institutions, and private investors – who had set their sights on transforming Haiti into the “Taiwan of the Caribbean.” Political stability under the dictatorship combined with ample cheap labor and location near the US formed a triumvirate that shored up this idea, and the “Tawanization” of Haiti proceeded, creating by the mid-1980’s somewhere between 60K and 100K jobs in assembly factories, all located within PAP. Fueled by a parallel neglect of Haiti’s rural economy and people, the prospect of a job in a factory altered the off-the-land trickle into a flood, as desperate families crowded the capital in search of work and the amenities – education, especially – that the city offered. Between 1982 and 2008, Port-au-Prince grew from 763,000 to between 2.5 and 3 million, with an estimated 75,000 newcomers flooding the city each year.¹

As immigrants piled up in slums, on deforested and unstable hillsides, and in urban ravines, the opportunity offered by the city became a mirage. Following the ouster of Duvalier in 1986 when, as Haitians say, “the muzzle had fallen” (*babouket la tonbe*) and freedom of speech and assembly returned, factory jobs began to dry up as nervous investors sought quieter, more stable locations. By the 1990’s, only a fraction of those jobs remained. Yet the poor continued to flow into the city.

¹ Robert Maguire, *Haiti After the Donors’ Conference: A Way Forward*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, Special Report 232, September 2009.

Papa Doc's centralization, combined, under the rule of Baby Doc, with the urban-centric/Taiwanization policies of key donor countries (including the US) and international banks had a devastating impact on Haiti. Enacted by a government and business elite who saw these policies as a golden opportunity to make money, the internationally-driven Tawanization of Haiti neglected what Francis Fukuyama has pointed out as the key to Taiwan's own success: a necessary investment in universal education and agrarian improvement *before* investing in factories.² Haiti's people were viewed internationally and by local elites strictly as pliant and ample cheap labor. Education might make them ornery. Avoid it. Why invest in agriculture when cheaper food – heavily subsidized imported flour and rice – could feed Haiti's growing urban masses? In the late 1970's Haiti did not need to import food. Today, it imports some 55% of its foodstuff, including 360,000 metric tons of rice annually from the US.³

The folly of these policies was seen in early 2008, during the global crisis of rapid and uncontrolled commodity price increase, when that rice, still readily available, was no longer cheap and the urban poor took to eating mud cookies to survive. Another spin-off of these fallacious policies of the 80's was political instability. Poor Haitians took to the streets in early 2008 to protest "*lavi chè*" (the high cost of living), with the result being the ouster of the government headed by Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis who, coincidentally, had just won praise from the US and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for the creation of a national poverty reduction and economic growth strategy that would serve as a blueprint for developing *all* of Haiti, and reversing the long history of rural neglect.

Rural neglect combined with migration to cities, moreover, placed considerable pressure on those still in the countryside to provide the wood and charcoal the burgeoning urban population required. Here was a recipe for desperately poor people

² Francis Fukuyama, "Poverty, Inequality and Democracy: The Latin American Experience," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 4 (October 2008).

³ Op.cit, Maguire, "*Haiti After the Donor's Conference*"

to further ravish the environment. Today, 25 of Haiti's 30 watersheds are practically devoid of vegetative cover.

Port-au-Prince, and other cities, particularly Gonaives, had become disasters waiting to happen as a result of these developments. The vast majority of the 200,000 who perished on January 12th were poor people crowded on marginal land and into sub-standard housing devastated by the quake. The vast majority of the thousands who died in the floods in Gonaives in 2004 and 2008 were poor people crowded on alluvial coastal mud flats and in river flood plains. For Haiti's poor, their country has become a dangerous place and a dead-end. Is it surprising that Haitians seek any opportunity to look for life (*chèche lavi*) elsewhere? As one peasant told me in the 1990's, 'we have only two choices: die slow or die fast. That's why we take the chance of taking the boats (to go to Miami)' (*pwan kantè*).

Haiti had lost its balance in other ways, particularly in social and economic equity, and in the ability of the state to care for its citizens. By 2007, 78 percent of all Haitians – urban and rural – survived on \$2.00 a day or less, while 68 percent of the total national income went to the wealthiest 20 percent of the population.⁴ During the 29 year Duvalier dictatorship, Haitian state institutions virtually collapsed under the weight of bad governance. Following the 1986 ouster of Baby Doc, who, ironically, was lorded with foreign funds that went principally to Swiss bank accounts, donors were loathe to work with successor governments – including those democratically elected. Instead, they chose to funnel hundreds of millions annually through foreign-based NGOs that enacted 'projects' drawn up in Washington, New York, Ottawa, etc. and that lasted only as long as the money did. Haitians, by the early 1990s, were derisively calling their country a "Republic of NGOs" and by 2008, none other than the President of the World Bank,

⁴ Maureen Taft-Morales, "Haiti: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, May 5, 2009.

Robert Zoellick, lamented the cacophony of “feel good, flag-draped projects” that had proven a vastly inadequate substitute for a coherent national development strategy.⁵

Without doubt, Haiti was seriously out-of-balance before the earthquake and Port-au-Prince was a disaster waiting to happen. Many had feared that it would come by way of a hurricane; rather the earth shook. Now, let us see how we might make a positive contribution in restoring balance to Haiti so that when, inevitably, the country is struck by another natural disaster – be it seismic or meteorological – it is less vulnerable and better able to confront and cope with the disaster.

Rebalancing to ‘Build Back Better’

Allow me to stress two points: we must be fully cognizant of past mistakes, such as those outlined above; and the key to ‘building Haiti back better’ is to work toward a more balanced nation with less poverty and inequities, less social and economic exclusion, greater human dignity, and a commitment of Haitians and non-Haitians toward these essential humanistic goals. With this, Haiti can also achieve and sustain a rehabilitated natural environment, stronger public institutions, a national infrastructure for growth and investment, and relationships between Haitians and outsiders that are based on partnership, mutual respect, and respect of the value and aspirations of all Haiti’s people.

What follows are ideas and recommendations based on not only my experience in Haiti, but on endless discussions/conversations with Haitian interlocutors. In this regard, I should add that the principal reason for my visit to Port-au-Prince in early January was to deliver an address on prospects for rebalancing Haiti. That presentation was made to an audience of 50 or so Haitian civil servants and policy analysts – some of whom I fear are no longer with us - who gathered in Port-au-Prince at a Haitian think tank. My ideas were received by them with great and at times animated interest.

⁵ Robert Zoellick, “Securing Development” (remarks at the United States Institute of Peace conference titled *Passing the Baton*, Washington, DC January 8, 2009.

1. Welcoming Dislocated Persons: A de facto Decentralization

Since the quake, some 250,000 Port-au-Prince residents have fled the city, returning to towns and villages from which they had migrated or where they have family. An estimated 55,000 have shown up in Hinche in Haiti's Central Plateau; the population of Petite Riviere de l'Artibonite has swelled from 37,000 to 62,000; St. Marc's 60,000, has swollen to 100,000.⁶ The flight of Haitians away from a city that now represents death, destruction and loss might become a silver lining in today's very dark cloud. If that is to be the case, however, we – both the government of Haiti and its international partners – must catch up with and get ahead of this movement. Already underdeveloped rural infrastructures and the resources of already impoverished rural families are being stretched. The provision of basic services to these displaced populations is an urgent priority. If conditions in the countryside are not improved, the displaced will ultimately return to Port-au-Prince, to replicate the dangerous dynamics of earlier decades.

To catch up and get ahead of this reverse migration, we should support an idea proffered by the Government of Haiti in Montreal last week: the reinforcement of 200 decentralized communities. As soon as possible, "Welcome Centers" might be stood up in towns and villages. They can be temporary, to be made permanent later. They can serve as decentralized 'growth poles' that offer multiple services, including relief in the short term, with health and education facilities attached. Let us not forget that Haiti has lost many of its schools and among those fleeing the devastated city are tens of thousands of students. Twenty five percent of Haitian rural districts do not have schools. And schools that exist outside Port-au-Prince are usually seriously deficient. The reverse migration we are seeing today offers a golden opportunity to rebalance the education and health system of Haiti.

The centers can coordinate investment and employment opportunities, as well as state services including robust agronomic assistance to farmers. Haiti's planting season is

⁶ Trenton Daniel, "Thousands flee capital to start anew," [Miami Herald](#), January 23, 2010; Mitchell Landsberg, "The displaced flow into a small Haitian town," [Los Angeles Times](#), February 1, 2010; data from MINISTAH headquarters in Hinche.

almost here and now more than ever the country needs a bountiful harvest. Displaced people working as paid labor can reinforce Haiti's farmers. Infrastructure needs to be rebuilt – or built for the first time - including schools, health clinics, community centers, roads, bridges and drainage canals. Hillsides need rehabilitation, particularly with vegetative cover and perhaps even stone terraces. Providing work for not just the displaced, but to those they are joining in towns and villages throughout Haiti, will go a long way toward rebalancing Haitian economy and society, and toward repairing a social fabric ripped to shreds by decades of neglect and subsequent migration. This is an opportunity that must be seized.

2. Support the Creation of a National Civic Service Corps

Since 2007, various Haitian government officials and others have been working quietly on the prospect of creating a Haitian National Civic Service Corps. Citizen civic service is mandated in Article 52-3 of the Haitian constitution and, even before the quake, the idea of a civic service corps to mobilize unemployed and disaffected youth seemed attractive. Now is the time for this idea to take off. As I have recently written, a 700,000-strong national civic service corps will rapidly harness untapped labor in both rural and urban settings, especially among Haiti's large youthful population, to rebuild Haiti's public infrastructure required for economic growth and environmental rehabilitation and protection; increase productivity, particularly of farm products; restore dignity and pride through meaningful work; and give Haitian men and women a stake in their country's future. It will also form the basis of a natural disaster response mechanism.⁷

If this all sounds familiar, it should: the idea of a Haitian National Civic Service Corps parallels the same thinking that went into the creation of such New Deal programs as the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).

⁷ Robert Maguire and Robert Muggah, "A New Deal-style corps could rebuild Haiti," [Los Angeles Times](#), January 31, 2010.

We have seen what these programs did to help the United States and its people stand up during a difficult time.

In the aftermath of the storms that devastated Haiti in 2008, Haitian President Prèval asked not for charity, but for a helping hand to allow Haitians to rebuild their country. Today he is making a similar point. Here is more symmetry between the Haiti and the U.S. As Harry Hopkins, the legendary administrator of the Works Progress Administration, pointed out: “most people would rather work than take handouts. A paycheck from work didn’t feel like charity, with the shame that it conferred. It was better if the work actually built something. Then workers could retain their old skills or develop new ones, and add improvements to the public infrastructure like roads and parks and playgrounds.”⁸ Let’s help Haiti restore its balance by supporting a national civic service corps that can accomplish the same for Haiti and its people as our New Deal programs did in the United States decades ago.

To reiterate, as was the case with our New Deal, Haiti’s civic service corps must be a ‘cash-for-work’ initiative. Cash-for-work will inject serious liquidity into the Haitian economy and stimulate recovery from the bottom-up. Already there are various entities employing Haitians in a variety of cash-for-work programs. This Monday, for example, the UNDP announced that it has enrolled 32,000 in a cash-for-work rubble removing program; a number expected to double by tomorrow.⁹ Coordination of existing efforts within an envisaged national program will be essential to maximizing how Haiti can be built back better – by its own people, with everyone wearing the same uniform.

A special commission, similar to those established by President Prèval in 2007 to engage Haitians from diverse sectors to study and make recommendations on key issues confronting his government, might be established to oversee this coordination. (Other special commissions could be mounted to tackle other topics or needs and as a means of expanding the Haitian government’s human resource circle.) Such a commission

⁸ Nick Taylor, *American Made: The Enduring Legacy of the WPA*, (New York: Bantam Books, 2008), p.99.

⁹ UNDP, “Fast Fact of the Week,” accessed on February 2, 2010 at undp.washington@undp.org

could be enlarged to include representatives of key donors. A central figure like Harry Hopkins will have to lead the endeavor. Perhaps such a figure could emerge from Haiti's vaunted private sector. In any case, let's avoid a repetition of the cacophony of feel good, flag-draped projects.

3. Strengthen Haitian state institutions through accompaniment, cooperation and partnership

At the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Haiti held last week, witnesses spoke of the need to rebuild the Haitian state from the bottom up, and of working with Haitian officials – not pushing them aside. I agree with these points whole-heartedly. This is not the time to impose governance on Haiti – that is a 19th century idea unfit for the 21st century. This is an opportunity to help strengthen Haiti's public institutions, not to replace them.

As pointed out above, the capacity of the Haitian state, never strong to begin with, has deteriorated progressively over the past 50 years. In recent years that was due in part to international policies that circumvented state institutions in favor of private ones – both within Haiti and from beyond, and left the resource-strapped government virtually absent in the lives of its citizens. In the aftermath of the quake, we see starkly the results of the decimation of the Haiti state. The already weak state has been further set back by the death of civil servants and the loss of state facilities and physical resources. In this context, the government of President Rene Prèval and Prime Minister Jean Max Bellerive has taken much criticism for its response – or lack thereof – in the past few weeks.

It is easy to kick someone in the teeth when he or she is already on the mat. Rather than swinging our foot, however, we should offer our hand. This is the time of the Haitian government's greatest need. Achieving cooperation and partnership, as pointed out by Canadian Prime Minister Harper at the recently-held Montreal Conference, is the

biggest concern.¹⁰ Over the past four years, the Prèval government has won praise internationally – and among most in Haiti – over its improved management of the affairs of the state. Political conflict, though still extant, has diminished considerably. Haiti’s terribly polarized society is a little less polarized today. Moderation and greater inclusion – not demagoguery and a winner-takes-all attitude – have worked their way into the ethos of the Haitian political culture. Partnership to strengthen the Haitian state was on the horizon following the ‘new paradigm for partnership’ agreed to at the April 2009 Donors Conference.¹¹ Let’s stay that course. Generations of bad governance and a zero sum political culture are not turned around overnight.

Quietly, but steadily in the post-quake period, the Haitian government has been picking itself up by its bootstraps beyond the photo-ops and glare of the cameras to reassemble, and then to reassert, itself.¹² Still, given the magnitude of this catastrophe, the government is overmatched. Any government would be. This is not the time to cast aspersions. It is the time to work in partnership and to accompany Haitian leaders through their time of loss and sorrow, into a more balanced and better future.

4. Get Money into the Hands of Poor People

In 1999, Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto estimated that there was \$5.2 billion in ‘dead capital’ in Haiti, shared among 82 percent of the population. Of this sum, \$3.2 billion was located in rural Haiti. This amount dwarfed by four times the total assets of Haiti’s 123 largest formal enterprises.¹³ This capital, principally in the hands of poor people in the form of property, land, and goods, is considered ‘dead’ because it cannot be used to leverage further capital for investment and growth. To free it up, clear titling would be required along with a reduction of red tape and corruption, and a brand new

¹⁰ CTV.ca News Staff, “Foreign Ministers vow to be ‘partners’ with Haiti,” accessed on January 30, 2010 at [www.http://ottawa.ctv.ca/servlet/an/plocal/CTVNews/20100125/Haiti_conference_100125/2010](http://ottawa.ctv.ca/servlet/an/plocal/CTVNews/20100125/Haiti_conference_100125/2010)

¹¹ Government of Haiti, “Vers un Nouveau Paradigme de Cooperation,” April 2009

¹² Jacqueline Charles, “Haiti President Rene Preval quietly focuses on ‘managing country,’” *Miami Herald*, February 2, 2010

¹³ Hernando de Soto, *The Mystery of Capital* (New York:Basic Books, 2000).

attitude toward Haiti's most vibrant form of capitalism – its' informal economy – and the poor entrepreneurs who make it work. Doubtless, you have seen post-quake stories of how Haiti's grassroots entrepreneurs began rebounding within days.

A key to Haiti's recovery – and, yes, to its rebalancing – is to get capital into the hands of grassroots entrepreneurs – be they still in Port-au-Prince or elsewhere in the country. Formalizing dead capital – which will be a long, tedious and conflictive path, but one that perhaps can be facilitated now through such steps as the issuance of provisional land and property titles that subsequently are fully formalized – is but one way of getting liquid assets into poor people's hands. Others, more expeditious, include:

- More small loans (microcredit) to entrepreneurs, particularly those who produce something, including farmers. Farmers with capital will not just produce more food, but will increase employment. Government studies indicate that a 10% increase in man-hours on farms will create 40,000 new jobs.¹⁴ One strong candidate to improve microcredit throughout Haiti is an organization called FONKOZE. With more than 33 branches country-wide, it serves some 175,000 members, mostly among those who make – or made prior to their engagement with microcredit - \$2.00 a day or less. FONKOZE also facilitates the efficient and lower cost decentralizing of the flow of funds sent to Haiti from family abroad.
- Haiti must now benefit from a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program. Brilliantly popular in such places as Mexico and Brazil, CCT programs serve as a means of transferring cash to the poorest of the poor, conditioned upon the children of poor families attending quality schools and fully operational clinics. Mexico's program is largely rural; Brazil's more urban-oriented. In both cases, they have succeeded in assisting millions of poor families improve living standards while sending their children to schools and clinics. As such, CCTs have invested in future human resources. Such a program in Haiti could

¹⁴ Government of Haiti, "Rapport d'évaluation des besoins après désastre Cyclones Fay, Gustav, Hanna et Ike," November 2008.

accomplish these goals, but only if Haiti's educational and health systems are extended into rural areas (helping to rebalance) and upgraded in existing locations (helping to rebuild). Importantly, CCT programs provide the government with the challenge/opportunity of being a positive presence in the lives of citizens. In Haiti, this is essential as a means of enabling the government to move from being largely absent to being positively present in the lives of citizens, and to demonstrate therefore that there are tangible fruits of democratic governance.

5. Seek-out and Support Institutions, Businesses, and Leaders who work toward Greater Inclusion, Less Inequality, and Enact Socially-Responsible Strategies for Investing in Haiti.

One cannot discuss the future of Haiti without considering the prospect of external investment to create factory jobs, particularly in view of the HOPE II legislation and its potential benefits. Beyond any doubt, factory jobs should be a part of Haiti's future. Already, some of the assembly plants in Port-au-Prince are back in operation, to the satisfaction of both owners and workers.¹⁵ In this regard, support should be given to the "Renewing Hope for Haitian Trade and Investment Act for 2010" introduced by Senators Wyden and Nelson. But, as this legislation is considered, three important points must be kept in mind *if* this job creation strategy is to be a plus in helping Haiti to rebalance, 'build back better' and avoid mistakes of the past.

First, the fiasco of the 1980's 'Taiwanization' period must not be repeated. Universal *free* education and rural investment are important, and though they will not precede assembly investment, they must robustly parallel it and eventually get ahead of it. Investment in Haiti should not ignore decentralized agri-business possibilities and the economic growth and development it can bring through jobs and the infusion of cash into the Haitian economy.

¹⁵ Jim Wyss and Jacqueline Charles, "Workers flock to clothing factories as industrial park reopens," [Miami Herald](#), January 27, 2010.

Second, assembly plants cannot be concentrated largely in Port-au-Prince. If nothing else, the shattered infrastructure of the city should serve as an incentive for decentralization. Haiti has at least a dozen coastal cities that either already have a functioning, albeit usually rudimentary, infrastructure or where a port and support infrastructure can be built – perhaps at a lower costs than Port-au-Prince.

Decentralization to coastal cities and towns offers Haiti and investors an opportunity to undo the damage begun fifty years ago by Papa Doc’s insidious centralization in Port-au-Prince and to rebalance the prospects for economic growth and infrastructure development (including electricity) to all of Haiti.

Third, investors, owners and managers must be mindful of the fact that Haitian workers are more than plentiful cheap labor. As Secretary of State Clinton said at the April Donors’ Conference, “talent is universal; opportunity is not.”¹⁶ A key to Haiti’s renaissance is to improve the opportunity environment for all of its people. Haiti’s Diaspora offers bountiful evidence of what can be achieved when opportunities are twinned with talent.

Jeffrey Sachs has equated factory jobs in Bangladesh with the first rung on a ladder toward greater opportunity and development.¹⁷ In Haiti, however, the ladder for most factory workers, in view of their survival wages juxtaposed with a constantly increasing cost of living and the absence of any public social safety net, has a single rung. Haiti’s opportunity environment will be improved considerably:

- If investors, owners, and managers recognize that Haiti’s workers have legitimate aspirations to improve their lives, and their honest days’ work should be means for that, and;
- If investors, owners and managers follow that recognition with actions that demonstrate socially responsible investing and public-private partnerships that improve workers status and conditions, and;

¹⁶ Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at the Haiti Donors Conference,” April 14, 2009, accessed on February 2 at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/04/121674.htm>.

¹⁷ Jeffrey Sachs, *The End to Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Times*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2005)

- If the Haitian state has the strength and resources to become and remain a positive presence in workers lives by providing services to them and their children, particularly in education, health, and safety from gangs and other criminal elements whose activities are often financed by narcotics trafficking.

* * *

If there is a silver lining in the deep dark cloud of Haiti's recent catastrophe, it is that this offers all of us – Haitians, 'friends of Haiti' and those whose connection with Haiti may simply be as a bureaucrat or investor – an opportunity to learn from mistakes made in the relatively recent past and take steps that will rebalance that country so that it will move forward unequivocally toward less poverty and inequity, diminished social and economic exclusion, greater human dignity, a rehabilitated environment, stronger public institutions, and a national infrastructure for economic growth and investment.

Thank you.