| 117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION | S. |
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To address the participation of Taiwan in the Inter-American Development Bank.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

| Mr. | Menendez (for himself, Mr. Risch | ı, Mr. | Kaine, | Mr. Inh | ЮFE, | Mr. | Mar- |
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| | KEY, and Mr. RUBIO) introduced the | ne foll | lowing bi | ill; which | was | read | twice |
| | and referred to the Committee on _ | | | | | | |
| | _ | | | | | | |

A BILL

To address the participation of Taiwan in the Inter-American Development Bank.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
 3 SECTION 1. FINDINGS.
 4 Congress makes the following findings:
 5 (1) The Inter-American Development Bank (referred to in this Act as the "IDB") was established
 7 in 1959 and—
- 8 (A) is the premier multilateral development 9 bank in the Western Hemisphere;

| 1 | (B) is the largest source of development fi- |
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| 2 | nancing for Latin America and the Caribbean; |
| 3 | and |
| 4 | (C) issued more than \$140,000,000,000 in |
| 5 | loans and grants between 2011 and 2021. |
| 6 | (2) The IDB— |
| 7 | (A) has 48 member states, of which 26 are |
| 8 | borrowing members in the Latin America and |
| 9 | the Caribbean region; and |
| 10 | (B) constitutes a critical forum for fos- |
| 11 | tering collective action and meeting shared re- |
| 12 | gional challenges, including COVID-19 recovery |
| 13 | and response. |
| 14 | (3) Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Peo- |
| 15 | ple's Republic of China are among the 22 non-bor- |
| 16 | rowing, non-Western Hemisphere members of the |
| 17 | IDB. |
| 18 | (4) Taiwan— |
| 19 | (A) has been an observer at the IDB since |
| 20 | 1991; |
| 21 | (B) has contributed to a specialized finan- |
| 22 | cial intermediary development fund at IDB Lab |
| 23 | since 2006; |

| 1 | (C) has been a non-regional member coun- |
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| 2 | try of the Central American Bank for Economic |
| 3 | Integration since 1992; |
| 4 | (D) is a member of the Asian Development |
| 5 | Bank, the World Trade Organization, the Asia- |
| 6 | Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the Inter- |
| 7 | national Chamber of Commerce; and |
| 8 | (E) is a participant of the Organisation for |
| 9 | Economic Co-operation and Development's |
| 10 | Competition Committee, its Steel Committee, |
| 11 | and its Fisheries Committee. |
| 12 | (5) Taiwan's economy is the 7th largest in Asia |
| 13 | and the 20th largest in the world by purchasing |
| 14 | power parity. |
| 15 | (6) Taiwan has been a model contributor of for- |
| 16 | eign aid in Latin America and the Caribbean, allo- |
| 17 | cating between 30 percent and 50 percent of its for- |
| 18 | eign aid budget to Latin America and the Carib- |
| 19 | bean. |
| 20 | (7) Since 2010, Taiwan's International Co- |
| 21 | operation and Development Fund has funded 95 |
| 22 | projects in Central America, 64 projects in the Car- |
| 23 | ibbean, and 21 projects in South America. |
| 24 | (8) Taiwan has been a firm supporter of Haiti |
| 25 | as it confronts multiple simultaneous crises— |

| 1 | (A) by providing more than \$145,000,000 |
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| 2 | in financing to modernize Haiti's electrical grid |
| 3 | (B) by delivering 280,000 masks at the |
| 4 | height of the COVID-19 pandemic; and |
| 5 | (C) by pledging \$500,000 in disaster relief |
| 6 | immediately after the August 14, 2021 earth- |
| 7 | quake in Haiti. |
| 8 | (9) According to data from the Pan American |
| 9 | Development Foundation, communities receiving as- |
| 10 | sistance from Taiwan display increased— |
| 11 | (A) food security; |
| 12 | (B) income generation; and |
| 13 | (C) capacity to recover from natural disas- |
| 14 | ters. |
| 15 | (10) Taiwan has placed special emphasis on |
| 16 | fostering development in Central America and in the |
| 17 | Caribbean, including by signing the Agreement on |
| 18 | the Republic of China (Taiwan) - Central America |
| 19 | Economic Development Fund in 1998. |
| 20 | (11) Through its non-regional partner status at |
| 21 | the Central American Bank for Economic Integra- |
| 22 | tion, Taiwan has provided \$266,700,000 in financial |
| 23 | assistance to help Central American countries re- |
| 24 | spond to the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 22 |
| 25 | 2021, the Central American Bank for Economic In- |

| 1 | tegration announced the opening of its Representa- |
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| 2 | tive Office in Taiwan, deepening investment ties be- |
| 3 | tween Taiwan and Central America. |
| 4 | (12) Taiwan maintains diplomatic relations |
| 5 | with 9 countries in Latin America and the Carib- |
| 6 | bean and 8 representative offices in 7 other coun- |
| 7 | tries in the region. |
| 8 | (13) Since 2016, the Government of the Peo- |
| 9 | ple's Republic of China has engaged in aggressive |
| 10 | economic diplomacy to compel the withdrawal of dip- |
| 11 | lomatic recognition for Taiwan, most notably in |
| 12 | Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, |
| 13 | all of which have terminated longstanding and pro- |
| 14 | ductive diplomatic relationships with Taiwan and |
| 15 | granted diplomatic recognition to the People's Re- |
| 16 | public of China. |
| 17 | (14) The Government of the People's Republic |
| 18 | of China— |
| 19 | (A) announced a \$1,100,000,000 construc- |
| 20 | tion project in Panama on the day that Panama |
| 21 | switched its recognition from Taiwan to the |
| 22 | People's Republic of China; and |
| 23 | (B) similarly offered assistance packages |
| 24 | to the Dominican Republic and El Salvador in |

| 1 | 2018 in exchange for these countries ceasing |
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| 2 | their diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. |
| 3 | (15) Taiwan's international engagement has |
| 4 | faced increased resistance from the Government of |
| 5 | the People's Republic of China, which has used its |
| 6 | influence to deny Taiwan's invitations to multilateral |
| 7 | fora. For example, Taiwan was not invited to the |
| 8 | 2016 Assembly of the International Civil Aviation |
| 9 | Organization (ICAO), despite participating as a |
| 10 | guest at ICAO's 2013 summit. Taiwan's requests to |
| 11 | participate in the General Assembly of the Inter- |
| 12 | national Criminal Police Organization (commonly |
| 13 | known as "INTERPOL") were also rejected. |
| 14 | (16) Taiwan's inclusion in multilateral organi- |
| 15 | zations, such as the IDB, advances peace and sta- |
| 16 | bility in the world and in the Western Hemisphere |
| 17 | specifically. |
| 18 | (17) Congress has demonstrated a longstanding |
| 19 | policy of supporting Taiwan's participation in inter- |
| 20 | national bodies that address shared transnational |
| 21 | challenges by— |
| 22 | (A) authorizing the Secretary of State, in |
| 23 | Public Law 106–137, Public Law 107–10, and |
| 24 | Public Law 108–235, to initiate a United |
| 25 | States plan for supporting Taiwan's participa- |

| 1 | tion as an observer in the activities of the |
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| 2 | World Health Organization; |
| 3 | (B) directing the Secretary of State, in |
| 4 | Public Law 113–17, to report on a strategy to |
| 5 | obtain observer status for Taiwan at the Inter- |
| 6 | national Civil Aviation Organization Assembly; |
| 7 | and |
| 8 | (C) directing the Secretary of State, in |
| 9 | Public Law 114–139, to develop a strategy to |
| 10 | obtain observer status for Taiwan at the |
| 11 | INTERPOL Assembly. |
| 12 | (18) Despite these efforts, Taiwan has not re- |
| 13 | ceived an invitation to attend as an observer any of |
| 14 | the events of the international organizations referred |
| 15 | to in paragraph (17) since 2016. |
| 16 | SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS. |
| 17 | It is the sense of Congress that— |
| 18 | (1) the United States fully supports Taiwan's |
| 19 | participation in, and contribution to, international |
| 20 | organizations and underscores the importance of the |
| 21 | relationship between Taiwan and the United States; |
| 22 | (2) diversifying the Inter-American Develop- |
| 23 | ment Bank's donor base and increasing ally engage- |
| 24 | ment in the Western Hemisphere reinforces United |
| 25 | States national interests; |

| 1 | (3) Taiwan's significant contribution to the de- |
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| 2 | velopment and economies of Latin America and the |
| 3 | Caribbean demonstrate that Taiwan's membership |
| 4 | in the IDB as a non-borrowing member would ben- |
| 5 | efit the IDB and the entire Latin American and |
| 6 | Caribbean region; and |
| 7 | (4) non-borrowing membership in the IDB |
| 8 | would allow Taiwan to substantially leverage and |
| 9 | channel the immense resources Taiwan already pro- |
| 10 | vides to Latin America and the Caribbean to reach |
| 11 | a larger number of beneficiaries. |
| 12 | SEC. 3. PLAN FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE |
| 13 | INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK. |
| 14 | The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Sec- |
| 15 | retary of the Treasury, is authorized— |
| 16 | (1) to initiate a United States plan to endorse |
| 17 | non-borrowing IDB membership for Taiwan; and |
| 18 | (2) to instruct the United States Governor of |
| 19 | the IDB to work with the IDB Board of Governors |
| 20 | to admit Taiwan as a non-borrowing member of the |
| 21 | IDB. |

| 1 | SEC. 4. REPORT CONCERNING MEMBER STATE STATUS FOR |
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| 2 | TAIWAN AT THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOP- |
| 3 | MENT BANK. |
| 4 | Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact- |
| 5 | ment of this Act, and not later than April 1 of each year |
| 6 | thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the |
| 7 | Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit an unclassified re- |
| 8 | port to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate |
| 9 | and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of |
| 10 | Representatives that— |
| 11 | (1) describes the United States plan to endorse |
| 12 | and obtain non-borrowing membership status for |
| 13 | Taiwan at the IDB; |
| 14 | (2) includes an account of the efforts that the |
| 15 | Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury |
| 16 | have made to encourage IDB member states to pro- |
| 17 | mote Taiwan's bid to obtain non-borrowing member- |
| 18 | ship at the IDB; and |
| 19 | (3) identifies the steps that the Secretary of |
| 20 | State and the Secretary of the Treasury will take to |
| 21 | endorse and obtain non-borrowing membership sta- |
| 22 | tus for Taiwan at the IDB in the following year. |