

AMENDMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_ Calendar No. \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose: In the nature of a substitute.

**IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—115th Cong., 2d Sess.**

**S. 2736**

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes.

Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and  
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended  
to be proposed by Mr. CORKER (for himself and Mr.  
MENENDEZ)

Viz:

1 Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the fol-  
2 lowing:

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This Act may be cited as the  
5 “Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018”.

6 (b) **TABLE OF CONTENTS.**—The table of contents for  
7 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Findings.

**TITLE I—UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY  
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION**

Sec. 101. Policy.

Sec. 102. Diplomatic strategy.

## 2

TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN  
THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

- Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
- Sec. 202. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
- Sec. 203. United States-China relationship.
- Sec. 204. United States-India strategic partnership.
- Sec. 205. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.
- Sec. 206. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership.
- Sec. 207. Quadrilateral security dialogue.
- Sec. 208. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.
- Sec. 209. Commitment to Taiwan.
- Sec. 210. North Korea strategy.
- Sec. 211. New Zealand.
- Sec. 212. The Pacific Islands.
- Sec. 213. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law.
- Sec. 214. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
- Sec. 215. Cybersecurity cooperation.
- Sec. 216. Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region.

TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS  
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

- Sec. 301. Findings; sense of Congress.
- Sec. 302. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic summits.
- Sec. 303. United States-ASEAN economic partnership.
- Sec. 304. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
- Sec. 305. Intellectual property protection.
- Sec. 306. Energy programs and initiatives.
- Sec. 307. Lower Mekong initiative.
- Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource conservation.

TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-  
PACIFIC REGION

- Sec. 401. Findings.
- Sec. 402. Trafficking-in-persons.
- Sec. 403. Freedom of the press.
- Sec. 404. Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel.
- Sec. 405. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement.
- Sec. 406. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Strategy.
- Sec. 407. Freedom of information to North Korea.
- Sec. 408. Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions and suspension of United States assistance.
- Sec. 409. Authorization of appropriations.
- Sec. 410. Indo-Pacific human rights and environmental defenders.
- Sec. 411. Young leaders people-to-people initiatives.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The Indo-Pacific region—

1 (A) represents nearly 50 percent of the  
2 global population;

3 (B) is home to some of the most dynamic  
4 economies in the world; and

5 (C) poses security challenges that threaten  
6 to undermine United States national security  
7 interests, regional peace, and global stability.

8 (2) The core tenets of the United States-backed  
9 international system are being challenged, including  
10 by—

11 (A) China’s illegal construction and mili-  
12 tarization of artificial features in the South  
13 China Sea and coercive economic practices;

14 (B) North Korea’s acceleration of its nu-  
15 clear and ballistic missile capabilities; and

16 (C) the increased presence throughout  
17 Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to  
18 in this Act as “ISIS”) and other international  
19 terrorist organizations that threaten the United  
20 States.

21 (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific re-  
22 gion continues to transform, presenting opportuni-  
23 ties and challenges to United States economic inter-  
24 ests.

1           (4) The United States has a fundamental inter-  
2           est in defending human rights and promoting the  
3           rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region. Although  
4           many countries in the region have improved the  
5           treatment of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific gov-  
6           ernments continue to commit human rights abuses  
7           and place restrictions on basic human rights and po-  
8           litical and civil liberties.

9           (5) Without strong leadership from the United  
10          States, the international system, fundamentally root-  
11          ed in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment  
12          of United States, regional, and global interests. It is  
13          imperative that the United States continue to play  
14          a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by—

- 15                   (A) defending peace and security;  
16                   (B) advancing economic prosperity; and  
17                   (C) promoting respect for fundamental  
18          human rights.

19          (6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia,  
20          the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy  
21          of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate  
22          held a series of hearings on United States leadership  
23          in the Indo-Pacific region, in which—

- 24                   (A) experts, including Representative  
25          Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci,

1 Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador  
2 Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr.  
3 Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the secu-  
4 rity challenges, economic opportunities, and im-  
5 peratives of promoting the rule of law, human  
6 rights, and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific re-  
7 gion; and

8 (B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dil-  
9 lon Professor of Government at the John F.  
10 Kennedy School of Government at Harvard  
11 University, testified, “As realistic students of  
12 history, Chinese leaders recognize that the role  
13 the United States has played since World War  
14 II as the architect and underwriter of regional  
15 stability and security has been essential to the  
16 rise of Asia, including China itself. But they be-  
17 lieve that as the tide that brought the United  
18 States to Asia recedes, America must leave with  
19 it. Much as Britain’s role in the Western Hemi-  
20 sphere faded at the beginning of the twentieth  
21 century, so must America’s role in Asia as the  
22 region’s historic superpower resumes its place.”.

23 (7) The United States National Security Strat-  
24 egy (referred to in this Act as the “National Secu-

1 rity Strategy”), which was released in December  
2 2017, states—

3 (A) “A geopolitical competition between  
4 free and repressive visions of world order is tak-  
5 ing place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region,  
6 which stretches from the west coast of India to  
7 the western shores of the United States, rep-  
8 represents the most populous and economically dy-  
9 namic part of the world. The United States in-  
10 terest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends  
11 back to the earliest days of our republic.”; and

12 (B) “Our vision for the Indo-Pacific ex-  
13 cludes no nation. We will redouble our commit-  
14 ment to established alliances and partnerships,  
15 while expanding and deepening relationships  
16 with new partners that share respect for sov-  
17 ereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule  
18 of law. We will reinforce our commitment to  
19 freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution  
20 of territorial and maritime disputes in accord-  
21 ance with international law. We will work with  
22 allies and partners to achieve complete,  
23 verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization on  
24 the Korean Peninsula and preserve the non-pro-  
25 liferation regime in Northeast Asia.”.

1 **TITLE I—UNITED STATES POL-**  
2 **ICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRAT-**  
3 **EGY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC**  
4 **REGION**

5 **SEC. 101. POLICY.**

6 It is the policy of the United States to develop and  
7 commit to a long-term strategic vision and a comprehen-  
8 sive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for  
9 the Indo-Pacific region that—

10 (1) secures the vital national security interests  
11 of the United States and our allies and partners;

12 (2) promotes American prosperity and economic  
13 interests by advancing economic growth and develop-  
14 ment of a rules-based Indo-Pacific economic commu-  
15 nity;

16 (3) advances American influence by reflecting  
17 the values of the American people and universal  
18 human rights;

19 (4) supports functional problem-solving regional  
20 architecture; and

21 (5) accords with and supports the rule of law  
22 and international norms.

23 **SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.**

24 It is the diplomatic strategy of the United States—

25 (1) to work with United States allies—

1 (A) to confront common challenges;

2 (B) to improve information sharing;

3 (C) to increase defense investment and

4 trade;

5 (D) to ensure interoperability; and

6 (E) to strengthen shared capabilities;

7 (2) to strengthen relationships with partners

8 who—

9 (A) share mutual respect for the rule of

10 law;

11 (B) agree with fair and reciprocal trade;

12 and

13 (C) understand the importance of civil so-

14 ciety, the rule of law, and transparent govern-

15 ance;

16 (3) to support functional problem-solving re-

17 gional architecture, including through the Associa-

18 tion of Southeast Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Eco-

19 nomic Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit;

20 (4) to emphasize the commitment of the United

21 States—

22 (A) to freedom of navigation under inter-

23 national law;

24 (B) to promote peaceful resolutions of

25 maritime and territorial disputes; and



1           (C) to expand security and defense co-  
2           operation with allies and partners, as appro-  
3           priate;

4           (5) to pursue diplomatic measures to achieve  
5           complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization  
6           of North Korea;

7           (6) to improve civil society, strengthen the rule  
8           of law, and advocate for transparent governance;

9           (7) to develop and grow the economy through  
10          private sector partnerships between the United  
11          States and Indo-Pacific partners;

12          (8) to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade  
13          agreements in a free, fair, and reciprocal manner  
14          and build a network of partners in the Indo-Pacific  
15          committed to free markets;

16          (9) to work with and encourage Indo-Pacific  
17          countries—

18                 (A) to pursue high-quality and transparent  
19                 infrastructure projects;

20                 (B) to maintain unimpeded commerce,  
21                 open sea lines or air ways, and communication;  
22                 and

23                 (C) to seek the peaceful resolution of dis-  
24                 putes; and

1 (10) to sustain a strong military presence in the  
2 Indo-Pacific region and strengthen security relation-  
3 ships with allies and partners throughout the region.

4 **TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED**  
5 **STATES SECURITY INTERESTS**  
6 **IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION**

7 **SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

8 (a) **DEFINED TERM.**—In this section, the term “ap-  
9 propriate committees of Congress” means—

10 (1) the Committee on Appropriations of the  
11 Senate;

12 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the  
13 Senate;

14 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the  
15 House of Representatives; and

16 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the  
17 House of Representatives.

18 (b) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There  
19 are authorized to be appropriated for the Department of  
20 State, the United States Agency for International Devel-  
21 opment, and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense,  
22 \$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through  
23 2023, which shall be used—

24 (1) to advance United States foreign policy in-  
25 terests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in

1 recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and  
2 programs in the furtherance of United States strat-  
3 egy;

4 (2) to improve the defense capacity of partner  
5 nations to resist coercion and deter and defend  
6 against security threats, including through foreign  
7 military financing and international military edu-  
8 cation and training programs;

9 (3) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral  
10 engagements, particularly with the United States'  
11 most highly-capable allies and partners, to meet  
12 strategic challenges, including—

13 (A) certain destabilizing activities of the  
14 People's Republic of China; and

15 (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear  
16 and ballistic missile programs of the Demo-  
17 cratic People's Republic of Korea;

18 (4) to build new counterterrorism partnership  
19 programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing  
20 presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations  
21 that pose a significant threat to the United States,  
22 its allies, and its citizens' interests abroad; and

23 (5) to increase maritime domain awareness pro-  
24 grams in South Asia and Southeast Asia—

1 (A) by expanding the scope of naval and  
2 coast guard training efforts with Southeast  
3 Asian countries;

4 (B) by expanding cooperation with demo-  
5 cratic partners in South Asia, including Ban-  
6 gladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka;

7 (C) through intelligence sharing and other  
8 information-sharing efforts; and

9 (D) through multilateral engagements, in-  
10 cluding by involving Japan, Australia, and  
11 India in such efforts.

12 (e) COUNTERING CHINA'S INFLUENCE TO UNDER-  
13 MINE THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.—Amounts appro-  
14 priated pursuant to subsection (b) shall be made available  
15 for United States Government efforts to counter the stra-  
16 tegic influence of the People's Republic of China, in ac-  
17 cordance with the strategy required under section  
18 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Oper-  
19 ations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014  
20 (division K of Public Law 113–76; 128 Stat. 536) and  
21 in consultation with the appropriate committees of Con-  
22 gress.

23 (d) BURMA.—None of the amounts appropriated pur-  
24 suant to subsection (b) may be made available for Inter-  
25 national Military Education and Training and Foreign

1 Military Financing Programs for the armed forces of the  
2 Republic of the Union of Myanmar (historically known as  
3 “Burma”).

4 (e) PHILIPPINES.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—None of the amounts appro-  
6 priated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made  
7 available for counternarcotics assistance for the Phil-  
8 ippine National Police unless the Secretary of State  
9 determines and reports to the appropriate commit-  
10 tees of Congress that the Government of the Phil-  
11 ippines has adopted and is implementing a counter-  
12 narcotics strategy that is consistent with inter-  
13 national human rights standards, including inves-  
14 tigating and prosecuting individuals who are credibly  
15 alleged to have ordered, committed, or covered up  
16 extrajudicial killings and other gross violations of  
17 human rights in the conduct of counternarcotics op-  
18 erations.

19 (2) EXCEPTION.—The limitation under para-  
20 graph (1) shall not apply to funds made available—

21 (A) for drug demand reduction, maritime  
22 programs, or transnational interdiction pro-  
23 grams; or

1 (B) to support for the development of such  
2 counternarcotics strategy, after consultation  
3 with the appropriate committees of Congress.

4 (f) CAMBODIA.—None of the amounts authorized to  
5 be appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made  
6 available for United States assistance programs that ben-  
7 efit the Government of Cambodia unless the Secretary of  
8 State certifies and reports to the appropriate congres-  
9 sional committees that the requirements under section  
10 7043(b)(1) of division K of the Consolidated Appropria-  
11 tions Act, 2018 (Public Law 115–141) have been met.

12 **SEC. 202. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE-**  
13 **GION.**

14 (a) UNITED STATES-JAPAN ALLIANCE.—The United  
15 States Government—

16 (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Co-  
17 operation and Security between the United States  
18 and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960,  
19 and all related and subsequent bilateral security  
20 agreements and arrangements concluded on or be-  
21 fore the date of the enactment of this Act;

22 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-  
23 tween the United States and Japan in promoting  
24 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and

1           (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening  
2           of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between  
3           the United States and Japan.

4           (b) UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLI-  
5 ANCE.—The United States Government—

6           (1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty  
7           Between the United States and the Republic of  
8           Korea, done at Washington October 1, 1953, and all  
9           related and subsequent bilateral security agreements  
10          and arrangements concluded on or before the date of  
11          the enactment of this Act;

12          (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-  
13          tween the United States and South Korea in pro-  
14          moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region;  
15          and

16          (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening  
17          of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between  
18          the United States and the Republic of Korea.

19          (c) UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE.—The  
20 United States Government—

21          (1) is committed to the Security Treaty Be-  
22          tween Australia and the United States of America,  
23          done at San Francisco September 1, 1951, and all  
24          related and subsequent bilateral security agreements

1 and arrangements concluded on or before the date of  
2 the enactment of this Act;

3 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-  
4 tween the United States and Australia in promoting  
5 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and

6 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening  
7 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between  
8 the United States and Australia.

9 (d) UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE.—The  
10 United States Government is committed to the Mutual  
11 Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines  
12 and the United States of America, done at Washington  
13 August 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral  
14 security agreements and arrangements concluded on or be-  
15 fore the date of the enactment of this Act, including the  
16 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Ma-  
17 nila April 28, 2014.

18 (e) THAILAND.—The United States Government is  
19 committed to—

20 (1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assist-  
21 ance Between the Government of the United States  
22 of America and the Government of Thailand, done  
23 at Bangkok October 17, 1950;

24 (2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Trea-  
25 ty, done at Manila September 8, 1954; and



1           (3) all related and subsequent bilateral security  
2           agreements and arrangements concluded on or be-  
3           fore the date of the enactment of this Act, including  
4           the Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-United  
5           States Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok Novem-  
6           ber 15, 2012.

7 **SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.**

8           (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—

9           (1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese ac-  
10          tions that seek—

11                   (A) to further constrain space for civil so-  
12                   ciety within China; and

13                   (B) to undermine a rules-based order in  
14                   the Indo-Pacific region;

15           (2) encourages China to play a constructive role  
16           in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect  
17           for the rule of law and international norms;

18           (3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and  
19           comprehensive relationship with China—

20                   (A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and

21                   (B) by addressing areas of disagreement,  
22                   including over human rights, economic policies,  
23                   and maritime security; and

24           (4) is committed to working with China on  
25           shared regional and global challenges, especially—

1 (A) upholding and strengthening the rules-  
2 based international system; and

3 (B) the denuclearization of North Korea.

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
5 gress that the United States should—

6 (1) welcome a decision by China to change  
7 course and pursue a responsible results-oriented re-  
8 lationship with the United States and engagement  
9 on global issues;

10 (2) encourage China to play a constructive role  
11 in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and

12 (3) continue to call out Chinese actions that un-  
13 dermine the rules-based international system.

14 **SEC. 204. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—

16 (1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic  
17 partnership between the United States and India in  
18 promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific re-  
19 gion;

20 (2) calls for the strengthening and broadening  
21 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between  
22 the United States and India; and

23 (3) is committed to—

1 (A) the New Framework for the United  
2 States-India Defense Relationship, done at Ar-  
3 lington, Virginia on June 28, 2005;

4 (B) the United States-India Defense Tech-  
5 nology and Trade Initiative, launched in 2012;

6 (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-  
7 Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on  
8 January 25, 2015;

9 (D) the United States-India Joint State-  
10 ment on Prosperity Through Partnership,  
11 issued on June 26, 2017; and

12 (E) all related and subsequent bilateral  
13 and security agreements and arrangements con-  
14 cluded as of the date of the enactment of this  
15 Act.

16 (b) INDIA AS MAJOR DEFENSE PARTNER.—Congress  
17 makes the following findings:

18 (1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National De-  
19 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Pub-  
20 lic Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751  
21 note) requires the recognition of India as a major  
22 defense partner.

23 (2) The designation of India as a major defense  
24 partner, which is unique to India—

1 (A) institutionalizes the progress made to  
2 facilitate defense trade and technology sharing  
3 between the United States and India;

4 (B) elevates defense trade and technology  
5 cooperation between the United States and  
6 India to a level commensurate with the closest  
7 allies and partners of the United States;

8 (C) facilitates technology sharing between  
9 the United States and India, including license-  
10 free access to a wide range of dual-use tech-  
11 nologies, after taking into account national se-  
12 curity concerns; and

13 (D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination  
14 on defense strategy and policy, military ex-  
15 changes, and port calls in support of defense  
16 cooperation between the United States and  
17 India.

18 **SEC. 205. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNER-**  
19 **SHIP.**

20 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
21 gress that the United States should—

22 (1) support and reaffirm the elevation of the  
23 United States-Association of Southeast Asian Na-  
24 tions (referred to in this section as “ASEAN”) rela-  
25 tionship to a strategic partnership;

1           (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping  
2           build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economi-  
3           cally integrated, and socially responsible community  
4           of nations that has common rules, norms, proce-  
5           dures, and standards which are consistent with  
6           international law and the principles of a rules-based  
7           Indo-Pacific community;

8           (3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to fos-  
9           ter greater integration among its members;

10          (4) recognize the value of—

11                 (A) ASEAN engagement with economic,  
12                 political, and security partners within Asia and  
13                 elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the Eu-  
14                 ropean Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Nor-  
15                 way, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and

16                 (B) strategic economic initiatives, such as  
17                 the United States-ASEAN Connect, which dem-  
18                 onstrate a commitment to ASEAN and the  
19                 ASEAN Economic Community and build upon  
20                 economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific re-  
21                 gion;

22          (5) support efforts by the nations comprising  
23          ASEAN—

24                 (A) to address maritime and territorial dis-  
25                 putes in a constructive manner; and

1 (B) to pursue claims through peaceful, dip-  
2 lomatic, and legitimate regional and inter-  
3 national arbitration mechanisms, consistent  
4 with international law, including through the  
5 adoption of a code of conduct in the South  
6 China Sea to further promote peace and sta-  
7 bility in the Indo-Pacific region;

8 (6) support efforts by United States partners  
9 and allies in ASEAN—

10 (A) to enhance maritime capability and  
11 maritime domain awareness;

12 (B) to protect unhindered access to, and  
13 use of, international waterways in the Asia-Pa-  
14 cific region that are critical to ensuring the se-  
15 curity and free flow of commerce;

16 (C) to counter piracy;

17 (D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking  
18 activities such as the trafficking of persons,  
19 goods, and drugs; and

20 (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of  
21 countries or regional organizations to respond  
22 to emerging threats to maritime security in the  
23 Asia-Pacific region; and

24 (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a  
25 common approach to reaffirm the decision of the

1 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling with respect  
2 to the case between the Republic of the Philippines  
3 and the People’s Republic of China.

4 (b) REPORT ON STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR EN-  
5 GAGEMENT WITH ASEAN.—

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days  
7 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-  
8 nually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit  
9 a report to the appropriate congressional committees  
10 on a strategic framework to administer programs,  
11 projects, and activities of the United States to sup-  
12 port diplomatic and economic engagement between  
13 the United States and ASEAN member countries for  
14 the 10-year period beginning on the date of the en-  
15 actment of this Act.

16 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under  
17 paragraph (1) shall address the following elements  
18 of United States strategy:

19 (A) Promoting commercial engagement be-  
20 tween the United States and member countries  
21 of ASEAN.

22 (B) Helping member countries of ASEAN  
23 use sustainable, efficient, and innovative tech-  
24 nologies in their respective energy sectors.

1           (C) Supporting economic conditions in  
2 member countries of ASEAN that promote in-  
3 novation, the creation of new businesses, sus-  
4 tainable growth, and the education of the re-  
5 gion's future innovators, entrepreneurs, and  
6 business leaders.

7           (D) Working with member countries of  
8 ASEAN to improve the policy and regulatory  
9 environment for growth, trade, innovation, and  
10 investment.

11           (E) Supporting the regional integration ob-  
12 jectives of member countries of ASEAN under  
13 the ASEAN Economic Community.

14           (F) Partnership opportunities with the  
15 governments of other countries friendly to the  
16 United States that have committed to a high  
17 set of standards for investment and develop-  
18 ment with ASEAN, as determined by the Sec-  
19 retary of State.

20 **SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRI-**  
21 **LATERAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP.**

22           It is the sense of Congress that the President should  
23 develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security co-  
24 operation between the United States, South Korea, and



1 Japan, including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and  
2 other defense-related initiatives.

3 **SEC. 207. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.**

4 It is the sense of Congress that—

5 (1) the security dialogue between the United  
6 States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to ad-  
7 dress pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific  
8 region in order to promote—

9 (A) a rules-based order;

10 (B) respect for international law; and

11 (C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and

12 (2) such a dialogue is intended to augment,  
13 rather than to replace, current mechanisms.

14 **SEC. 208. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH-**  
15 **EAST ASIA.**

16 (a) INDONESIA.—The United States Government is  
17 committed to—

18 (1) the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive  
19 Partnership, done in Washington November 9, 2010;

20 (2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive De-  
21 fense Cooperation, done in Washington October 26,  
22 2015; and

23 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-  
24 curity agreements and arrangements between the

1 United States and Indonesia concluded on or before  
2 the date of the enactment of this Act.

3 (b) MALAYSIA.—The United States Government is  
4 committed to—

5 (1) the United States-Malaysia Comprehensive  
6 Partnership, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;

7 (2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the  
8 Comprehensive Partnership between the United  
9 States of America and Malaysia, done in Wash-  
10 ington September 13, 2017; and

11 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-  
12 curity agreements and arrangements between the  
13 United States and Malaysia concluded on or before  
14 the date of the enactment of this Act.

15 (c) SINGAPORE.—The United States Government is  
16 committed to—

17 (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Be-  
18 tween the United States of America and the Repub-  
19 lic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partner-  
20 ship in Defense and Security, done at Washington  
21 July 12, 2005;

22 (2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agree-  
23 ment, done at Arlington, Virginia December 7,  
24 2015; and

1           (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-  
2           curity agreements and arrangements between the  
3           United States and Singapore concluded on or before  
4           the date of the enactment of this Act.

5           (d) VIETNAM.—The United States Government is  
6           committed to—

7           (1) the United States-Vietnam Comprehensive  
8           Partnership, done at Washington December 16,  
9           2013;

10          (2) the United States-Vietnam Joint Vision  
11          Statement on Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on  
12          June 1, 2015;

13          (3) the United States-Vietnam Joint Vision  
14          Statement, done at Washington May 31, 2017; and

15          (4) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-  
16          curity agreements and arrangements between the  
17          United States and Vietnam concluded on or before  
18          the date of the enactment of this Act.

19          (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
20          gress that the United States should deepen diplomatic,  
21          economic, and security cooperation, especially in the areas  
22          of maritime security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia,  
23          Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.

1 **SEC. 209. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.**

2 (a) UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.—It  
3 is the policy of the United States—

4 (1) to support the close economic, political, and  
5 security relationship between Taiwan and the United  
6 States;

7 (2) to faithfully enforce all existing United  
8 States Government commitments to Taiwan, con-  
9 sistent with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Pub-  
10 lic Law 96–8), the 3 joint communiques, and the Six  
11 Assurances agreed to by President Ronald Reagan  
12 in July 1982; and

13 (3) to counter efforts to change the status quo  
14 and to support peaceful resolution acceptable to both  
15 sides of the Taiwan Strait.

16 (b) ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.—The President should  
17 conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan  
18 that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future  
19 threats from the People’s Republic of China, including  
20 supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate  
21 asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including under-  
22 sea warfare and air defense capabilities, into its military  
23 forces.

24 (c) TRAVEL.—The President should encourage the  
25 travel of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in

1 accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–  
2 135).

3 **SEC. 210. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.**

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-  
5 ings:

6 (1) The Government of the Democratic People’s  
7 Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the inter-  
8 national community by illicitly developing its nuclear  
9 and ballistic missile programs, in violation of United  
10 Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006),  
11 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270  
12 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017),  
13 and 2397 (2017 ).

14 (2) The Government of the Democratic People’s  
15 Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights  
16 abuses against its own people and citizens of other  
17 countries, including the United States, the Republic  
18 of Korea, and Japan.

19 (3) The United States is committed to pursuing  
20 a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic Peo-  
21 ple’s Republic of Korea through a policy of max-  
22 imum pressure and engagement, in close concert  
23 with its partners.

1 (b) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT  
2 TO SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S RE-  
3 PUBLIC OF KOREA.—

4 (1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of  
5 the United States to continue to impose sanctions  
6 with respect to activities of the Government of the  
7 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, persons act-  
8 ing for or on behalf of such government, or other  
9 persons in accordance with Executive Order 13687  
10 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing addi-  
11 tional sanctions with respect to North Korea), Exec-  
12 utive Order 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to  
13 blocking the property of certain persons engaging in  
14 significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), Exec-  
15 utive Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to  
16 blocking the property of the Government of North  
17 Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, and prohib-  
18 iting certain transactions with respect to North  
19 Korea), and Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg.  
20 44705; relating to imposing additional sanctions  
21 with respect to North Korea), as such Executive or-  
22 ders are in effect on the day before the date of the  
23 enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People's  
24 Republic of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit  
25 activities described in such Executive orders, includ-

1       ing actions in violation of the United Nations Secu-  
2       rity Council resolutions referred to in subsection  
3       (a)(1).

4           (2) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after ter-  
5       minating any sanction with respect to the activities  
6       of the Government of the Democratic People’s Re-  
7       public of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of  
8       such government, or any other person provided for  
9       in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the  
10      Secretary of State shall submit a report to the ap-  
11      propriate congressional committees justifying the  
12      termination of the sanction and explaining the rela-  
13      tionship between such termination and the cessation  
14      of any illicit activity that violates any of the United  
15      Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in  
16      subsection (a)(1) by such Government or person.

17           (3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this  
18      subsection shall be construed to limit the authority  
19      of the President pursuant to the International  
20      Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701  
21      et seq.).

22      (c) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT  
23      TO NEGOTIATION ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S RE-  
24      PUBLIC OF KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE  
25      PROGRAMS.—It is the policy of the United States that the

1 objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and  
2 ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People's Re-  
3 public of Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible  
4 dismantlement of such programs.

5 (d) REPORT ON A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE  
6 THREATS POSED BY, AND THE CAPABILITIES OF, THE  
7 DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after  
9 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180  
10 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, or a designee  
11 of the Secretary, shall submit a report to the appro-  
12 priate congressional committees that describes ac-  
13 tions taken by the United States to address the  
14 threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the Demo-  
15 cratic People's Republic of Korea.

16 (2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required under  
17 paragraph (1) shall include—

18 (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the  
19 United States to identify strategies and policies,  
20 including an assessment of the strengths and  
21 weaknesses of such strategies and policies—

22 (i) to achieve peaceful  
23 denuclearization of the Democratic Peo-  
24 ple's Republic of Korea; and



1                   (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by  
2                   the ballistic missile program of the Demo-  
3                   cratic People’s Republic of Korea;

4                   (B) an assessment of—

5                   (i) potential road maps toward peace-  
6                   ful denuclearization of the Democratic  
7                   People’s Republic of Korea and the elimi-  
8                   nation of the nuclear and ballistic missile  
9                   threats posed by the Democratic People’s  
10                  Republic of Korea; and

11                  (ii) specific actions that the Demo-  
12                  cratic People’s Republic of Korea would  
13                  need to take for each such roadmap to be-  
14                  come viable;

15                  (C) a summary of the United States strat-  
16                  egy to increase international coordination and  
17                  cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or  
18                  multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement  
19                  and interdiction, to address the threat posed by  
20                  the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the  
21                  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which  
22                  shall include—

23                  (i) a description of the actions taken  
24                  by the Secretary of State, or designees of  
25                  the Secretary, to consult with governments

1 around the world, with the purpose of in-  
2 ducing such governments to fully imple-  
3 ment the United Nations Security Council  
4 resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1);

5 (ii) a description of the actions taken  
6 by such governments to fully implement  
7 United Nations Security Council resolu-  
8 tions related to the Democratic People's  
9 Republic of Korea;

10 (iii) a list of countries with govern-  
11 ments that the Secretary has determined  
12 are noncooperative with respect to imple-  
13 menting the United Nations Security  
14 Council resolutions referred to in sub-  
15 section (a)(1); and

16 (iv) a plan of action to engage, and  
17 increase cooperation with respect to the  
18 Democratic People's Republic of Korea,  
19 with the governments of the countries on  
20 the list described in clause (iii);

21 (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the  
22 national export control regimes of countries  
23 that are members of the United Nations, and  
24 multilateral export control regimes, that are  
25 necessary to enforce sanctions imposed with re-

1 spect to the Democratic People’s Republic of  
2 Korea pursuant to the United Nations Security  
3 Council resolutions referred to in subsection  
4 (a)(1); and

5 (E) an action plan to encourage and assist  
6 countries in adopting and using authorities nec-  
7 essary to enforce export controls required by  
8 United Nations Security Council resolutions.

9 (3) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required  
10 under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassi-  
11 fied form, but may include a classified annex.

12 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
13 gress that—

14 (1) representatives of the United States shall  
15 use the voice and vote of the United States in all  
16 international organizations, as appropriate, to advo-  
17 cate for the expulsion of the Democratic People’s  
18 Republic of Korea from such organizations, until  
19 such time as the Democratic People’s Republic of  
20 Korea meets its commitments under the United Na-  
21 tions Security Council resolutions referred to in sub-  
22 section (a)(1); and

23 (2) the Secretary of State should work to in-  
24 duce countries to meet their commitments under the  
25 United Nations Security Council resolutions referred

1 to in subsection (a)(1), including by considering ap-  
2 propriate adjustments to the diplomatic posture and  
3 foreign assistance of the United States with govern-  
4 ments that the Secretary has determined are non-  
5 cooperative with respect to implementing the United  
6 Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in  
7 subsection (a)(1).

8 **SEC. 211. NEW ZEALAND.**

9 The United States Government is committed to—

10 (1) the Wellington Declaration, signed on No-  
11 vember 5, 2010, which reaffirmed close ties and out-  
12 lined future practical cooperation between the  
13 United States and New Zealand;

14 (2) the Washington Declaration, signed on  
15 June 19, 2012, which strengthened the defense rela-  
16 tionship by providing a framework and strategic  
17 guidance for security cooperation and defense dia-  
18 logues; and

19 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-  
20 curity agreements and arrangements between the  
21 United States and New Zealand concluded on or be-  
22 fore the date of enactment of this Act.

23 **SEC. 212. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that  
25 the United States should—

1           (1) support strong United States engagement  
2           with the nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji,  
3           Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States  
4           of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea,  
5           Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and  
6           Vanuatu;

7           (2) deepen its cooperation with the nations of  
8           the South Pacific in areas of mutual interest, includ-  
9           ing—

10                   (A) fisheries and marine resource con-  
11                   servation;

12                   (B) environmental challenges and resil-  
13                   ience;

14                   (C) global health;

15                   (D) development and trade; and

16                   (E) people-to-people ties; and

17           (3) continue to provide assistance to the Pacific  
18           Islands, as appropriate, to support the rule of law,  
19           good governance, and economic development.

20           (b) UNITED STATES-COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIA-  
21           TION.—It is the sense of Congress that the Compacts of  
22           Free Association entered between the United States and  
23           the Freely Associated States (Republic of Marshall Is-  
24           lands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Repub-  
25           lic of Palau)—

1           (1) enhance the strategic posture of the United  
2 States in the Western Pacific;

3           (2) reinforce United States regional commit-  
4 ment;

5           (3) preempt potential adversaries from estab-  
6 lishing positional advantage; and

7           (4) further self-governance, economic develop-  
8 ment, and self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated  
9 States.

10 **SEC. 213. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT;**

11 **PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.**

12       (a) **FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.**—It is the policy of  
13 the United States—

14           (1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of  
15 Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation,  
16 and overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region,  
17 in accordance with applicable international law; and

18           (2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations  
19 to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South  
20 China Sea, in accordance with applicable inter-  
21 national law.

22       (b) **JOINT INDO-PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.**—

23 It is the sense of Congress that the President should de-  
24 velop a diplomatic strategy that includes working with  
25 United States allies and partners to conduct joint mari-

1 time training and freedom of navigation operations in the  
2 Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the  
3 South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international  
4 system benefitting all countries.

5 **SEC. 214. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.**

6 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

7 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-  
8 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-  
9 gress” means—

10 (A) the Committee on Armed Services of  
11 the Senate;

12 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of  
13 the Senate;

14 (C) the Committee on Armed Services of  
15 the House of Representatives; and

16 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of  
17 the House of Representatives.

18 (2) ISIS.—The term “ISIS” means the Islamic  
19 State of Iraq and Syria.

20 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date  
21 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-  
22 telligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the  
23 Secretary of Defense, and other appropriate Federal offi-  
24 cials, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees  
25 of Congress that contains an assessment of the current

1 and future capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-  
2 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist groups in South-  
3 east Asia that pose a significant threat to the United  
4 States, its allies, and its citizens interests abroad.

5 (c) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-  
6 section (b) shall include—

7 (1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-  
8 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-af-  
9 filiated fighters in Southeast Asia;

10 (2) an estimate of the number of ISIS-linked,  
11 al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-  
12 affiliated fighters expected to return to Southeast  
13 Asia from fighting in the Middle East;

14 (3) an analysis of the amounts and sources of  
15 ISIS-linked, al Qaeda-linked, and other various ex-  
16 tremist group affiliated-fighters in Southeast Asia;

17 (4) the current resources available to combat  
18 the threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other  
19 violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in South-  
20 east Asia, and the additional resources required to  
21 combat such threat;

22 (5) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of  
23 ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent ex-  
24 tremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively



1 in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Philippines,  
2 Indonesia, and Malaysia;

3 (6) a description of the capabilities and re-  
4 sources of governments in Southeast Asia to counter  
5 violent extremist groups; and

6 (7) a list of additional United States resources  
7 and capabilities that the Department of Defense and  
8 the Department of State recommend providing to  
9 governments in Southeast Asia to combat violent ex-  
10 tremist groups.

11 **SEC. 215. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.**

12 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
13 gress that there should be robust cybersecurity coopera-  
14 tion between the United States and nations in the Indo-  
15 Pacific region—

16 (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity  
17 threats, including state-sponsored threats;

18 (2) to share best practices to combat such  
19 threats; and

20 (3) to strengthen resilience against misinforma-  
21 tion and propaganda.

22 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There  
23 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be  
24 necessary for each of the fiscal years 2019 through  
25 2023—

1           (1) to build capacity for responding to cyberse-  
2           curity threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region;  
3           and

4           (2) to enhance cooperation between the United  
5           States and Indo-Pacific nations for combating such  
6           threats.

7   **SEC. 216. NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE**  
8                                   **INDO-PACIFIC REGION.**

9           (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—

10           (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear and  
11           other weapons of mass destruction, and their means  
12           of delivery, constitutes a threat to international  
13           peace and security;

14           (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique chal-  
15           lenge posed to regional and global stability by the il-  
16           licit use, and the proliferation to and from North  
17           Korea, of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies,  
18           and other weapons of mass destruction;

19           (3) notes efforts by China and Russia—

20           (A) to expand and modernize their respec-  
21           tive nuclear arsenals, including through signifi-  
22           cant research and development resources in  
23           hypersonic glide vehicles and other advanced  
24           technologies; and

1 (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear  
2 technologies; and

3 (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many  
4 countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear en-  
5 ergy for a variety of peaceful applications.

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
7 gress that the United States Government should under-  
8 take all reasonable and appropriate efforts to pursue effec-  
9 tive arms control and nonproliferation policies in the Indo-  
10 Pacific region to limit the further spread of weapons of  
11 mass destruction and their means of delivery.

12 **TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED**  
13 **STATES ECONOMIC INTER-**  
14 **ESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC**  
15 **REGION**

16 **SEC. 301. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

17 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-  
18 ings:

19 (1) According to the United States Chamber of  
20 Commerce, by 2030—

21 (A) 66 percent of the global middle class  
22 population will be living in Asia; and

23 (B) 59 percent of middle class consump-  
24 tion will take place in Asia.

1           (2) According to the Asian Development  
2 Bank—

3           (A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilat-  
4 eral or regional trade agreements; and

5           (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian  
6 countries are under negotiation or concluded  
7 and awaiting entry into force.

8           (3) Free trade agreements between the United  
9 States and 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region  
10 (Australia, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea)  
11 have entered into force.

12           (4) The member states of the Association of  
13 Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section  
14 as “ASEAN”), as a group—

15           (A) represent the fifth largest economy in  
16 the world; and

17           (B) have a combined gross domestic prod-  
18 uct of \$2,400,000,000,000.

19           (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member  
20 states grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015,  
21 and the total value of bilateral trade between the  
22 United States and ASEAN member states has in-  
23 creased by 78 percent since 2004.

24           (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by  
25 companies in ASEAN member states to consumers

1 in the United States was \$77,000,000,000, while the  
2 United States 2015 trade surplus of services pro-  
3 vided to consumers in ASEAN member states was  
4 \$8,000,000,000.

5 (7) According to US-ASEAN Business Council,  
6 goods and services exported from the United States  
7 to ASEAN member states support 550,000 jobs in  
8 the United States.

9 (8) According to the Business Roundtable—

10 (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei,  
11 Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New  
12 Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were re-  
13 sponsible for a combined 40 percent of global  
14 gross domestic product in 2017; and

15 (B) United States bilateral trade with the  
16 other nations referred to in subparagraph (A)  
17 supports 15,600,000 jobs in the United States.

18 (9) According to the United States National Se-  
19 curity Strategy—

20 (A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic  
21 Cooperation “remain centerpieces of the Indo-  
22 Pacific’s regional architecture and platforms for  
23 promoting an order based on freedom”; and

24 (B) the United States will “work with  
25 partners to build a network of states dedicated

1 to free markets and protected from forces that  
2 would subvert their sovereignty.”.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
4 gress that trade between the United States and the na-  
5 tions in the Indo-Pacific region is vitally important to the  
6 United States economy, United States exports, and jobs  
7 in the United States.

8 **SEC. 302. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL AGREE-**  
9 **MENTS, AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMITS.**

10 Congress supports—

11 (1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade  
12 agreements that increase United States employment  
13 and expand the economy;

14 (2) formal economic dialogues that include con-  
15 crete, verifiable, and measured outcomes;

16 (3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties  
17 between the United States and nations in the Indo-  
18 Pacific region;

19 (4) negotiations of the Trade in Services Agree-  
20 ment and the Environmental Goods Agreement that  
21 include several major Asian economies; and

22 (5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing  
23 high-level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-  
24 tion forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Group

1 of 20 to pursue United States economic objectives in  
2 the Indo-Pacific region.

3 **SEC. 303. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNER-**  
4 **SHIP.**

5 The President is authorized to negotiate a com-  
6 prehensive economic engagement framework with the As-  
7 sociation of Southeast Asian Nations.

8 **SEC. 304. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILI-**  
9 **TATION.**

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to  
11 produce a robust and comprehensive trade capacity build-  
12 ing and trade facilitation strategy for the Indo-Pacific re-  
13 gion.

14 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There  
15 are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may  
16 be necessary to carry out subsection (a).

17 **SEC. 305. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.**

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to  
19 make enforcement of United States intellectual property  
20 laws a top priority, including taking all appropriate action  
21 to deter and punish commercial cyber-enabled theft of in-  
22 tellectual property.

23 (b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after  
24 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there-

1 after, the President shall submit a report to Congress  
2 that—

3 (1) describes the efforts of the United States  
4 Government to combat intellectual property viola-  
5 tions and commercial cyber-enabled theft in the  
6 Indo-Pacific region, particularly the People’s Repub-  
7 lic of China; and

8 (2) includes a country-by-country assessment of  
9 priority areas for United States engagement and ca-  
10 pacity building assistance.

11 (c) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There  
12 are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may  
13 be necessary to sponsor bilateral and multilateral activities  
14 designed to build capacity in the identified priority areas  
15 described in the annual report required under subsection  
16 (b).

17 **SEC. 306. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.**

18 (a) **INDO-PACIFIC ENERGY STRATEGY.**—

19 (1) **STRATEGY.**—Not later than 180 days after  
20 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually  
21 thereafter, the President shall establish a com-  
22 prehensive, integrated, multiyear strategy to encour-  
23 age the efforts of Indo-Pacific countries to imple-  
24 ment national power strategies and cooperation with  
25 United States energy companies to develop an ap-



1       appropriate mix of power solutions to provide access to  
2       sufficient, reliable, and affordable power in order to  
3       reduce poverty and drive economic growth and job  
4       creation.

5               (2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

6       There are authorized to be appropriated such  
7       amounts as may be necessary to carry out para-  
8       graph (1).

9               (b) RELIABLE ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS.—It is the  
10      sense of Congress that—

11              (1) the President should establish bilateral and  
12      regional initiatives to increase energy security in the  
13      Indo-Pacific region;

14              (2) the United States should reaffirm support  
15      for liquefied natural gas exports to the nations in  
16      the Indo-Pacific region;

17              (3) the United States should seek to establish  
18      partnership between Department of Energy national  
19      laboratories and Indo-Pacific countries to provide  
20      technical assistance on electrical grid development  
21      and for the development and deployment of new and  
22      advanced energy technologies; and

23              (4) the United States should explore opportuni-  
24      ties to partner with the private sector and multilat-  
25      eral institutions, such as the World Bank and the

1 Asian Development Bank, to promote universal ac-  
2 cess to reliable electricity in Myanmar (historically  
3 known as “Burma”).

4 **SEC. 307. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.**

5 The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Ad-  
6 ministrator of the United States Agency for International  
7 Development, should increase regional engagement in the  
8 areas of environment, health, education, and infrastruc-  
9 ture development with the Lower Mekong countries, in-  
10 cluding—

11 (1) assisting in the development of programs  
12 that focus on forecasting environmental challenges  
13 and resilience;

14 (2) assisting with transnational cooperation on  
15 sustainable uses of forest and water resources with  
16 the goal of preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong  
17 Basin and access to safe drinking water;

18 (3) assisting with education enrollment and  
19 broadband internet connectivity, particularly English  
20 training and connectivity in rural communities; and

21 (4) improving global health in the Lower  
22 Mekong countries, including—

23 (A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate;

24 and

1 (B) helping regional partners to track and  
2 treat malaria and tuberculosis.

3 **SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH**  
4 **AND NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION.**

5 It is the sense of Congress that the President should  
6 encourage the governments of countries in the Indo-Pa-  
7 cific region and United States private sector interests with  
8 operations and investments in the region to deploy agri-  
9 culture practices that—

10 (1) conserve natural resources; and

11 (2) preserve culturally and ecological valuable  
12 lands and water bodies.

13 **TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED**  
14 **STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-**  
15 **PACIFIC REGION**

16 **SEC. 401. FINDINGS.**

17 Congress makes the following findings:

18 (1) The promotion of human rights and respect  
19 for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in  
20 the United States' national security interest.

21 (2) Continued support for human rights, demo-  
22 cratic values, and good governance is critical to a  
23 successful United States diplomatic strategy in the  
24 Indo-Pacific.

1           (3) Strong support for human rights and de-  
2           mocracy in the Indo-Pacific region is critical to ef-  
3           forts to reduce poverty, build rule of law, combat  
4           corruption, reduce the allure of extremism, and pro-  
5           mote economic growth.

6           (4) There are serious concerns with the rule of  
7           law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North  
8           Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all  
9           been identified by Freedom House as “Not Free”.

10          (5) There have been unacceptable human rights  
11          developments in—

12                 (A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been  
13                 identified by Freedom House as “Not Free”,  
14                 according to the Department of State, and the  
15                 Department of State has declared that the vio-  
16                 lence against the Rohingya constitutes ethnic  
17                 cleansing;

18                 (B) the Philippines, which has been identi-  
19                 fied by Freedom House as “Partly Free”, and  
20                 where there are continued disturbing reports of  
21                 extra-judicial killings; and

22                 (C) China, where forced disappearances,  
23                 extralegal detentions, and lack of due process in  
24                 judicial proceedings remain troublesome.

1           (6) according to the National Security Strategy,  
2           the United States—

3                   (A) will “support, with our words and ac-  
4                   tions, those who live under oppressive regimes  
5                   and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and  
6                   the rule of law”;

7                   (B) “may use diplomacy, sanctions, and  
8                   other tools to isolate states and leaders who  
9                   threaten our interests and whose actions run  
10                  contrary to our values”; and

11                  (C) “will support efforts to advance wom-  
12                  en’s equality, protect the rights of women and  
13                  girls, and promote women and youth empower-  
14                  ment programs”.

15 **SEC. 402. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.**

16           The President is encouraged to pursue additional ef-  
17           forts to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery  
18           in the Indo-Pacific region.

19 **SEC. 403. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.**

20           It is the sense of Congress that—

21                   (1) United States Government officials should  
22                   lead by example—

23                           (A) by continuing to advocate for freedom  
24                           of the press in the Indo-Pacific region; and

1 (B) by engaging with the press corps at  
2 every appropriate opportunity; and

3 (2) the United States should advocate and sup-  
4 port a Ministerial to Advance Press Freedom in the  
5 Indo-Pacific to convene government and civil society,  
6 including journalists, to discuss and address the  
7 challenges facing press freedom in the Indo-Pacific  
8 region.

9 **SEC. 404. DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR PER-**  
10 **SONNEL.**

11 It is the sense of Congress that—

12 (1) United States embassies and consulates in  
13 the Indo-Pacific region should have personnel, as ap-  
14 propriate, who are dedicated to reporting on and ad-  
15 vancing United States democracy, human rights,  
16 labor, anti-corruption, and good governance policy  
17 interests; and

18 (2) appropriate resources should be made avail-  
19 able to carry out such activities.

20 **SEC. 405. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-**  
21 **TO-PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT.**

22 The Secretary of State should, as appropriate—

23 (1) establish high-level bilateral and regional  
24 dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region re-

1       garding human rights and religious freedom viola-  
2       tions;

3               (2) establish or support robust, people-to-people  
4       exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, par-  
5       ticularly programs engaging young leaders; and

6               (3) establish educational exchanges and capac-  
7       ity-building programs emphasizing civil society devel-  
8       opment.

9       **SEC. 406. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS**

10                               **HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY.**

11       (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
12       gress that the United States should continue to work with  
13       ASEAN to improve the capacity of ASEAN to address  
14       human rights, democracy, and good governance issues in  
15       Southeast Asia.

16       (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after the  
17       date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State  
18       shall submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional  
19       committees to increase cooperation with ASEAN to pro-  
20       mote human rights, democracy, and good governance in  
21       Southeast Asia.

22       (c) CONTENTS.—The strategy submitted under sub-  
23       section (b) should include—

1           (1) an assessment of the types of United States  
2           Government resources available to support increased  
3           cooperation; and

4           (2) an assessment to identify entities within  
5           ASEAN that the United States could potentially  
6           support or partner with to promote human rights,  
7           democracy, and good governance in Southeast Asia.

8   **SEC. 407. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH KOREA.**

9           The President is encouraged to continue efforts to en-  
10          hance freedom of information access with regard to North  
11          Korea.

12   **SEC. 408. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANC-**  
13                   **TIONS AND SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES**  
14                   **ASSISTANCE.**

15          (a) **SANCTIONS.**—It is the sense of Congress that the  
16          President should impose sanctions, in accordance with ap-  
17          plicable law and other relevant authorities, including tar-  
18          geted financial penalties and visa bans, on any individual  
19          or entity that—

20               (1) violates human rights or religious freedoms;

21          or

22               (2) engages in censorship activities.

23          (b) **SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.**—It is  
24          the sense of Congress that the President should, in accord-  
25          ance with applicable law, terminate, suspend, or otherwise



1 alter United States economic assistance to any country  
2 that has engaged in serious violations of human rights or  
3 religious freedoms.

4 **SEC. 409. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

5 (a) PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE INDO-PA-  
6 CIFIC REGION.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be  
8 appropriated \$210,000,000, for each of the fiscal  
9 years 2019 through 2023, to promote democracy,  
10 strengthen civil society, human rights, rule of law,  
11 transparency, and accountability in the Indo-Pacific  
12 region, including for universities, civil society, and  
13 multilateral institutions that are focusing on edu-  
14 cation awareness, training, and capacity building.

15 (2) DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.—Amounts appro-  
16 priated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made  
17 available for United States Government efforts, led  
18 by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,  
19 Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy,  
20 the rule of law, and human rights in the People's  
21 Republic of China.

22 (3) TIBET.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to  
23 paragraph (1) shall be made available for non-  
24 governmental organizations to support activities pre-  
25 serving cultural traditions and promoting sustainable

1 development, education, and environmental conserva-  
2 tion in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autono-  
3 mous Region and in other Tibetan communities in  
4 China, India, and Nepal.

5 **SEC. 410. INDO-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRON-**  
6 **MENTAL DEFENDERS.**

7 (a) **DEFINED TERM.**—In this section, the term  
8 “human rights and environmental defenders” means indi-  
9 viduals, working alone or in groups, who nonviolently ad-  
10 vocate for the promotion and protection of universally rec-  
11 ognized human rights, fundamental freedoms, land issues,  
12 or the conservation of local ecosystems if the advocacy of  
13 such issues may result in the risk of safety or life.

14 (b) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Con-  
15 gress that human rights and environmental defenders in  
16 the Indo-Pacific region have been facing increased difficul-  
17 ties with the rise of unprecedented crackdowns and con-  
18 flicts.

19 (c) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There  
20 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be  
21 necessary to support human rights and environmental de-  
22 fenders through the Department of State’s Human Rights  
23 Defenders Fund.

1 **SEC. 411. YOUNG LEADERS PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIA-**  
2 **TIVES.**

3       There are authorized to be appropriated such  
4 amounts as may be necessary, for fiscal years 2019  
5 through 2025, to support Indo-Pacific young leaders ini-  
6 tiatives, including the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Ini-  
7 tiative, the ASEAN Youth Volunteers Program, and other  
8 people-to-people exchange programs that focus on building  
9 the capacity of democracy, human rights, and good gov-  
10 ernance activists in the Indo-Pacific region.