



II

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116TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

**S. 178**

To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary detention, torture, and harassment of these communities inside and outside China.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 17, 2019

Mr. RUBIO (for himself, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. GARDNER, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. CORNYN, Mr. BLUMENTHAL, Mr. DAINES, Mr. COONS, Mr. MORAN, Mr. KAINE, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Mr. COTTON, Mr. MERKLEY, Ms. WARREN, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. KING, Mr. TOOMEY, Mr. BROWN, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. BRAUN, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. PETERS, Mr. SASSE, Mr. CARDIN, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. SANDERS, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. REED, Mr. WARNER, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. ISAKSON, Mr. CASEY, and Mrs. CAPITO) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

\_\_\_\_\_ (legislative day, \_\_\_\_\_), \_\_\_\_\_

Reported by Mr. RISCH, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

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**A BILL**

To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary detention, torture, and harassment of these communities inside and outside China.

1        *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4        This Act may be cited as the “Uyghur Human Rights  
5 Policy Act of 2019”.

6 **SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE.**

7        The purpose of this Act is to direct United States  
8 resources to address gross violations of universally recog-  
9 nized human rights, including the mass internment of over  
10 1,000,000 Uyghurs and other predominately Muslim eth-  
11 nic minorities in China and the intimidation and threats  
12 faced by United States citizens and legal permanent resi-  
13 dents.

14 **SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**

15        In this section, the term “appropriate congressional  
16 committees” means—

17            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the  
18            Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee  
19            on Intelligence, the Committee on Banking, Hous-  
20            ing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judi-  
21            ciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the  
22            Senate; and

23            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the  
24            Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select  
25            Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Finan-

1 eial Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, and  
2 the Committee on Appropriations of the House of  
3 Representatives.

4 **SEC. 4. FINDINGS.**

5 Congress makes the following findings:

6 (1) The Government of the People's Republic of  
7 China (PRC) has a long history of repressing ap-  
8 proximately 13,000,000 Turkic, moderate Sunni  
9 Muslims, particularly Uyghurs, in the nominally au-  
10 tonomous Xinjiang region. These actions are in con-  
11 travention of international human rights standards,  
12 including the Universal Declaration of Human  
13 Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and  
14 Political Rights.

15 (2) In recent decades, central and regional Chi-  
16 nese government policies have systematically dis-  
17 criminated against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and  
18 other Muslims in Xinjiang by denying them a range  
19 of civil and political rights, including the freedoms of  
20 expression, religion, movement, and a fair trial,  
21 among others.

22 (3) Increased unrest in the Xinjiang region as  
23 a result of the central government's severe repres-  
24 sion is used in Orwellian fashion by the Government  
25 of the People's Republic of China as evidence of

1 “terrorism” and “separatism” and as an excuse for  
2 further disproportionate response.

3 (4) In 2014, Chinese authorities launched their  
4 latest “Strike Hard against Violent Extremism”  
5 campaign, in which the pretext of wide-scale, inter-  
6 nationally linked threats of terrorism were used to  
7 justify pervasive restrictions on, and gross human  
8 rights violations of, the ethnic minority communities  
9 of Xinjiang.

10 (5) Those policies included—

11 (A) pervasive, high-tech surveillance across  
12 the region, including the arbitrary collection of  
13 biodata, including DNA samples from children,  
14 without their knowledge or consent;

15 (B) the use of QR codes outside homes to  
16 gather information on how frequently individ-  
17 uals pray;

18 (C) facial and voice recognition software  
19 and “predictive policing” databases; and

20 (D) severe restrictions on the freedom of  
21 movement across the region.

22 (6) Chinese security forces have never been held  
23 accountable for credible reports of mass shootings in  
24 Alaqagha (2014), Hanerik (2013), and Siriqbuya

1 (2013), as well as the extrajudicial killings of  
2 Abdulbasit Ablimit (2013) and Rozi Osman (2014).

3 (7)(A) The August 2016 transfer of former  
4 Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary Chen  
5 Quanguo to become the Xinjiang Party Secretary  
6 prompted an acceleration in the crackdown across  
7 the region.

8 (B) Local officials in Xinjiang have used  
9 chilling political rhetoric to describe the purpose of  
10 government policy including “eradicating tumors”  
11 and “spray[ing] chemicals” on crops to kill the  
12 “weeds”.

13 (C) Uyghurs are forced to celebrate Chinese  
14 cultural traditions, such as Chinese New Year, and  
15 unique Uyghur culture is facing eradication due to  
16 state control over Uyghur cultural heritage, such as  
17 muqam (a musical tradition) and meshrep (tradi-  
18 tional cultural gatherings), and due to elimination of  
19 the Uyghur language as a medium of instruction in  
20 Xinjiang schools and universities.

21 (8) In 2017, credible reports found that family  
22 members of Uyghurs living outside of China had  
23 gone missing inside China, that Chinese authorities  
24 were pressuring those outside the country to return,

1 and that individuals were being arbitrarily detained  
2 in large numbers.

3 (9) There is ample credible evidence provided  
4 by scholars, human rights organizations, journalists,  
5 and think tanks substantiating the establishment by  
6 Chinese authorities of “political reeducation” camps.

7 (10) Independent organizations conducted  
8 interviews, including testimonies from Kayrat  
9 Samarkan, Omir Bekali, and Mihrigul Tursun, along  
10 with others who had been detained in such facilities,  
11 who described forced political indoctrination, torture,  
12 beatings, food deprivation, and solitary confinement,  
13 as well as uncertainty as to the length of detention,  
14 humiliation, and denial of religious, cultural, and lin-  
15 guistic freedoms, and confirmed that they were told  
16 by guards that the only way to secure release was  
17 to demonstrate sufficient political loyalty. Poor con-  
18 ditions and lack of medical treatment at such facili-  
19 ties appear to have contributed to the deaths of  
20 some detainees, including the elderly and infirm.  
21 Uyghurs Muhammed Salih Hajim (2018), Yacqujan  
22 Naman (2018), Abdughappar Abdujappar (2018),  
23 Ayhan Memet (2018), Abdulreshit Seley Hajim  
24 (2018), Nurimangul Memet (2018), Adalet Teyip  
25 (2018), Abdulhed Mehsum (2017), Hesen Imin

1 (2017), and Sawut Raxman (2017) reportedly died  
2 while in the custody of the Chinese authorities in  
3 “political reeducation” camps, without proper inves-  
4 tigation of the circumstances.

5 (11) Uyghurs and Kazakhs, who have now ob-  
6 tained permanent residence or citizenship in other  
7 countries, attest to receiving threats and harassment  
8 from Chinese officials.

9 (12) Under pressure from the Government of  
10 the People’s Republic of China, countries have fore-  
11 bly returned Uyghurs to China in violation of the  
12 non-refoulement principle and their well-founded  
13 fear of persecution. States returning Uyghurs in-  
14 clude Egypt (2017), the United Arab Emirates  
15 (2017), Malaysia (2011, 2013), Thailand (2011,  
16 2015), Laos (2010), Burma (2010), Cambodia  
17 (2009), Vietnam (2014), Kazakhstan (1999, 2001,  
18 2003, 2006), Uzbekistan (2007), Tajikistan (2011),  
19 Pakistan (2003, 2009, 2011), Nepal (2002), and  
20 India (2016).

21 (13) Six journalists for Radio Free Asia’s  
22 Uyghur service have publicly detailed abuses their  
23 family members in Xinjiang have endured in re-  
24 sponse to their work exposing abusive policies across  
25 the region.

1           (14) Several United States-based companies are  
2           conducting business with Xinjiang authorities with-  
3           out sufficient due diligence or safeguards to ensure  
4           their business operations do not create or contribute  
5           to human rights violations.

6           (15) The Government of the People's Republic  
7           of China is increasingly investing in the "Belt and  
8           Road Initiative" across Xinjiang and throughout  
9           Central Asia, extending its influence through organi-  
10          zations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-  
11          tion without regard to the political, cultural, or lin-  
12          guistic rights of ethnic minorities.

13          (16) The Secretary of State, Congressional Ex-  
14          ecutive Commission on China, Tom Lantos Human  
15          Rights Commission, and individual members of the  
16          executive branch and Congress have all expressed  
17          growing concern regarding the pervasive human  
18          rights abuses across Xinjiang and the "political re-  
19          education" camps.

20          (17) In August 2018, the United Nations Com-  
21          mittee to Eliminate Racial Discrimination challenged  
22          the Government of the People's Republic of China  
23          over abuses in Xinjiang, including the establishment  
24          of mass arbitrary detention camps.



1           (18) Between August and September 2018,  
2 Chinese authorities responded to these allegations by  
3 either flatly denying them or insisting that the facili-  
4 ties are “vocational training centers”.

5           (19) In September 2018, newly appointed  
6 United Nations High Commissioner for Human  
7 Rights Michele Bachelet noted in her first speech as  
8 High Commissioner the “deeply disturbing allega-  
9 tions of large-scale arbitrary detentions of Uighurs  
10 and other Muslim communities, in so-called re-edu-  
11 cation camps across Xinjiang”.

12           (20) On September 18, 2018, the Washington  
13 Post editorial board wrote, “At stake is not just the  
14 welfare of the Uighurs, but also whether the tech-  
15 nologies of the 21st century will be employed to  
16 smother human freedom.”

17           (21) In December 2018 testimony before the  
18 Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and Inter-  
19 national Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on  
20 Foreign Relations of the Senate, Deputy Assistant  
21 Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor  
22 Scott Busby testified that the number of those de-  
23 tained in camps since April 2017 was “at least  
24 800,000 and possibly more than 2 million”.

1           (22) In December 2018, independent media re-  
2           ports pointed to growing evidence of forced labor in  
3           the camps, as well as reports of individuals who have  
4           been released from camps being forced to labor in  
5           nearby factories for low wages under threat of being  
6           sent back to “political reeducation” camps.

7           (23) In December 2018 and January 2019,  
8           Chinese officials organized visits to “political reedu-  
9           cation” camps in Xinjiang for a small group of for-  
10          eign journalists and diplomats from 12 non-Western  
11          countries. In the months preceding the visits, inter-  
12          national media reported that officials worked to re-  
13          move security features from some “political reeduca-  
14          tion” facilities, and coached detainees and area resi-  
15          dents not to make negative comments about the  
16          camps. Reports also indicated that officials had  
17          transferred large numbers of detainees to detention  
18          facilities in other parts of China.

19          (24) Experts have described the Xinjiang region  
20          as “a police state to rival North Korea, with a for-  
21          malized racism on the order of South African apart-  
22          heid” and the repression in the Xinjiang region as  
23          a “slow motion Tiananmen”.

24 **SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

25          It is the sense of Congress that—

1           (1) the President should condemn abuses  
2 against Turkic Muslims by Chinese authorities in  
3 Xinjiang and call on Chinese President Xi Jinping  
4 to recognize the profound abuse and likely lasting  
5 damage of China's current policies, and immediately  
6 close the "political reeducation" camps, lift all re-  
7 strictions on and ensure respect for internationally  
8 guaranteed human rights across the region, and  
9 allow for reestablishment of contact between those  
10 inside and outside China;

11           (2) the United States Government should de-  
12 velop a strategy to support the United Nations High  
13 Commissioner for Human Rights and numerous  
14 United Nations Special Rapporteurs' urgent calls for  
15 immediate and unfettered access to Xinjiang, includ-  
16 ing the "political reeducation" camps and instruct  
17 representatives of the United States at the United  
18 Nations to use the voice and vote of the United  
19 States to condemn the mass arbitrary detainment,  
20 torture, and forced labor of Turkic Muslims in the  
21 People's Republic of China;

22           (3) the Secretary of State should consider the  
23 applicability of existing authorities, including the  
24 Global Magnitsky Act (subtitle F of Public Law  
25 114-328), to impose targeted sanctions on members

1 of the Government of the People's Republic of  
2 China, the Chinese Communist Party, and state se-  
3 curity apparatus, including Xinjiang Party Secretary  
4 Chen Quanguo and other officials credibly alleged to  
5 be responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang  
6 and elsewhere;

7 (4) the Secretary of State should fully imple-  
8 ment the provisions of the Frank Wolf International  
9 Religious Freedom Act (Public Law 114-281) and  
10 consider strategically employing sanctions and other  
11 tools under the International Religious Freedom Act  
12 (22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.) and to employ measures re-  
13 quired as part of the "Country of Particular Con-  
14 cern" (CPC) designation for the Government of the  
15 People's Republic of China that directly address par-  
16 ticularly severe violations of religious freedom;

17 (5) the Secretary of Commerce should review  
18 and consider the prohibition on the sale or provision  
19 of any United States-made goods or services to any  
20 state agent in Xinjiang, and add the Xinjiang  
21 branch of the Chinese Communist Party, the  
22 Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, and the Xinjiang  
23 Office of the United Front Work Department, or  
24 any entity acting on their behalf to facilitate the  
25 mass internment or forced labor of Turkic Muslims;

1 to the “Entity List” administered by the Depart-  
2 ment of Commerce;

3 (6) the Secretary of State should explore appro-  
4 priate mechanisms to establish a voluntary database  
5 to which United States citizens or permanent resi-  
6 dent family members of the Uyghur diaspora can  
7 provide details about missing family members, with  
8 a view towards pressing for information and ac-  
9 countability from the Government of the People’s  
10 Republic of China, and take appropriate measures to  
11 expedite the asylum claims of Uyghurs, Kazakhs,  
12 and other Turkic Muslim minorities;

13 (7) United States companies and individuals  
14 selling goods or services or otherwise operating in  
15 Xinjiang should take steps, including in any public  
16 or financial filings, to publicly assert that their com-  
17 mercial activities are not contributing to human  
18 rights violations in Xinjiang or elsewhere in China  
19 and that their supply chains are not compromised by  
20 forced labor;

21 (8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation and ap-  
22 propriate United States law enforcement entities  
23 should track and take steps to hold accountable offi-  
24 cials from China who harass, threaten, or intimidate  
25 United States citizens and legal permanent resi-

1       dents, including Turkic Muslims, Uyghur-Americans,  
2       Chinese-Americans, and Chinese nationals legally  
3       studying or working in the United States;

4           (9) the Secretary of State should work with tra-  
5       ditional United States allies and partners to take  
6       similar steps and coordinate closely on targeted  
7       sanctions and visa restrictions; and

8           (10) the work of Radio Free Asia's Uyghur lan-  
9       guage service should be commended for providing a  
10      detailed and accurate account of current events fac-  
11      ing Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in China  
12      despite efforts by the Government of the People's  
13      Republic of China to intimidate their reporting  
14      through threats and detention of family members  
15      living in China.

16 **SEC. 6. NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT.**

17       (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the  
18      date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National  
19      Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State,  
20      shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees  
21      a classified and unclassified report to assess national and  
22      regional security threats posed by the crackdown across  
23      Xinjiang, the frequency with which Central and Southeast  
24      Asian governments are forcibly returning Turkic Muslim  
25      refugees and asylum seekers, and the transfer or develop-

1 ment of technology used by the Government of the Peo-  
2 ple's Republic of China that facilitates the mass intern-  
3 ment and surveillance of Turkic Muslims, including tech-  
4 nology relating to predictive policing and large-scale data  
5 collection and analysis.

6 (b) ANNEX.—The report required under subsection  
7 (a) shall include an annex with a list of all Chinese compa-  
8 nies involved in the construction or operation of the “polit-  
9 ical education” camps, and the provision or operation of  
10 surveillance technology or operations, across Xinjiang.

11 **SEC. 7. PROTECTING CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS OF THE**  
12 **UNITED STATES FROM INTIMIDATION AND**  
13 **COERCION.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
15 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Fed-  
16 eral Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Sec-  
17 retary of State, shall provide a report to the appropriate  
18 congressional committees that outlines any and all efforts  
19 to provide information to and protect United States citi-  
20 zens and residents, including ethnic Uyghurs and Chinese  
21 nationals legally studying or working temporarily in the  
22 United States who have experienced harassment or intimi-  
23 dation by officials or agents of the Government of the Peo-  
24 ple's Republic of China and the Communist Party within  
25 the United States and those whose families in China have

1 experienced threats or detention because of their work or  
2 advocacy.

3 (b) DATABASE OF DETAINED FAMILY MEMBERS OF  
4 UNITED STATES CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS.—The Sec-  
5 retary of State should explore appropriate mechanisms to  
6 establish a voluntary database to which United States citi-  
7 zens or permanent resident family members of the Uyghur  
8 diaspora can provide details about missing family mem-  
9 bers, with a view towards pressing for information and ac-  
10 countability from the Government of the People's Republic  
11 of China and to take appropriate measures to expedite the  
12 asylum claims of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic  
13 Muslim minorities.

14 **SEC. 8. REPORT ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.**

15 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date  
16 of the enactment of this Act, the CEO of the United  
17 States Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appro-  
18 priate congressional committees a report that—

19 (1) describes the current status and reach of  
20 United States broadcasting to the Xinjiang region  
21 and Uyghur speaking communities globally, barriers  
22 to the free flow of news and information to these  
23 communities, and, if appropriate, detailed technical  
24 and fiscal requirements necessary to increase broad-



1 easting and other media to these communities glob-  
2 ally;

3 (2) describes efforts to intimidate Radio Free  
4 Asia and Voice of America reporters reporting on  
5 human rights issues in the People's Republic of  
6 China; and

7 (3) in consultation with the Global Engagement  
8 Center at the Department of State, describes and  
9 assesses disinformation and propaganda by the Gov-  
10 ernment of the People's Republic of China or other  
11 members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization  
12 targeting Uyghur communities globally and efforts  
13 to downplay gross violations of universally recog-  
14 nized human rights occurring in the Xinjiang region  
15 and any activities or programs that address these ef-  
16 forts.

17 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
18 gress that the journalists of the Uyghur language service  
19 of Radio Free Asia should be highly commended for their  
20 reporting on the human rights and political situation in  
21 Xinjiang despite efforts to silence or intimidate their re-  
22 porting through the detention of family members and rel-  
23 atives by the Government of the People's Republic of  
24 China.

1 **SEC. 9. ANNUAL REPORT.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the  
3 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter,  
4 the Secretary of State, after consulting relevant Federal  
5 agencies and civil society organizations, shall submit to the  
6 appropriate congressional committees and make available  
7 on the website of Department of State an interagency re-  
8 port that includes—

9 (1) an assessment of the number of individuals  
10 detained in political “reeducation camps” and condi-  
11 tions in the camps for detainees in the Xinjiang re-  
12 gion, including whether detainees endure torture,  
13 forced renunciation of faith, or other mistreatment;

14 (2) a description, as possible, of the geographic  
15 location of the camps and estimates of the number  
16 of people detained in such facilities;

17 (3) a description, as possible, of the methods  
18 used by People’s Republic of China authorities to  
19 “reeducate” Uyghur detainees as well as the Peo-  
20 ple’s Republic of China agencies in charge of reedu-  
21 cation;

22 (4) an assessment of the number of individuals  
23 being arbitrarily detained, including in pretrial de-  
24 tention centers and prisons;

1           (5) an assessment of forced labor in the camps  
2           and in regional factories for low wages under threat  
3           of being sent back to “political reeducation” camps;

4           (6) a list of Chinese companies and industries  
5           benefiting from such labor, and a description of ac-  
6           tions taken to address forced labor in Xinjiang con-  
7           current with the People’s Republic of China’s Tier  
8           3 designation under the 2018 Trafficking in Persons  
9           Report;

10          (7) an assessment of the level of access People’s  
11          Republic of China authorities grant to diplomats,  
12          journalists, and others to the Xinjiang region and a  
13          description of measures used to impede efforts to  
14          monitor human rights conditions in the Xinjiang re-  
15          gion;

16          (8) an assessment of the repressive surveillance,  
17          detection, and control methods used by People’s Re-  
18          public of China authorities in the Xinjiang region,  
19          and a list of individuals who hold senior leadership  
20          positions and are responsible for “high-tech” polic-  
21          ing, mass incarceration, and reeducation efforts tar-  
22          geting Uyghur and other predominately Muslim eth-  
23          nic minorities in the Xinjiang region; and

24          (9) a description of United States diplomatic ef-  
25          forts to address the gross violations of universally

1 recognized rights in the Xinjiang region and to pro-  
2 tect asylum seekers from the region, including in  
3 multilateral institutions and through bilateral rela-  
4 tions with the People's Republic of China, the na-  
5 tions of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation  
6 (OIC), and other countries.

7 (b) TERMINATION.—The Secretary of State may ter-  
8 minate the report required under subsection (a) if the Sec-  
9 retary certifies to the appropriate congressional commit-  
10 tees that the gross violations of universally recognized  
11 human rights and mass detention of Uyghurs and other  
12 predominately Muslim ethnic minorities have ended in the  
13 Xinjiang region.

14 **SEC. 10. SPECIAL COORDINATOR AT THE DEPARTMENT OF**  
15 **STATE.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State should  
17 consider the establishment of a new position within the  
18 Department of State, the United States Special Coordi-  
19 nator for Xinjiang, who will coordinate diplomatic, polit-  
20 ical, public diplomacy, financial assistance, sanctions,  
21 counterterrorism, security resources, and congressional re-  
22 porting requirements within the United States Govern-  
23 ment to respond to the gross violations of universally ree-  
24 ognized human rights occurring in the Xinjiang region,  
25 including by addressing the mass detentions of Uyghurs

1 and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities, the de-  
2 ployment of technologically advanced surveillance and po-  
3 lice detection methods, and the counterterrorism and  
4 counter-radicalism claims used to justify the policies of the  
5 Government of the People's Republic of China in Xinjiang.

6 (b) APPOINTMENT.—If the Secretary determines that  
7 establishment of the position described in subsection (a)  
8 is appropriate, the Secretary may appoint the Special Co-  
9 ordinator from among officers and employees of the De-  
10 partment of State. The Secretary may allow such officer  
11 or employee to retain the position (and the responsibilities  
12 associated with such position) held by such officer or em-  
13 ployee prior to the appointment of such officer or employee  
14 to the position of Special Coordinator.

15 (c) TERMINATION.—The Secretary of State may ter-  
16 minate the Special Coordinator position 45 days after cer-  
17 tifying to the appropriate congressional committees that  
18 the gross violations of universally recognized human rights  
19 and mass detention of Uyghurs and other predominately  
20 Muslim ethnic minorities have ended in the Xinjiang re-  
21 gion.

22 (d) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary shall consult  
23 with the chairman and ranking minority members of the  
24 appropriate congressional committees prior to the designa-  
25 tion of the Special Coordinator under this section.

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 *This Act may be cited as the “Uyghur Human Rights*  
3 *Policy Act of 2019”.*

4 **SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE.**

5 *The purpose of this Act is to direct United States re-*  
6 *sources to address gross violations of universally recognized*  
7 *human rights, including the mass internment of over*  
8 *1,000,000 Uyghurs and other predominately Muslim ethnic*  
9 *minorities in China and the intimidation and threats faced*  
10 *by United States citizens and legal permanent residents.*

11 **SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**

12 *In this section, the term “appropriate congressional*  
13 *committees” means—*

14 *(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*  
15 *Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee*  
16 *on Intelligence, the Committee on Banking, Housing,*  
17 *and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary,*  
18 *and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;*  
19 *and*

20 *(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*  
21 *mittee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Com-*  
22 *mittee on Intelligence, the Committee on Financial*  
23 *Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the*  
24 *Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-*  
25 *resentatives.*

1 **SEC. 4. FINDINGS.**

2 *Congress makes the following findings:*

3 *(1) The Government of the People's Republic of*  
4 *China has a long history of repressing approximately*  
5 *13,000,000 Turkic, moderate Sunni Muslims, particu-*  
6 *larly Uyghurs, in the nominally autonomous*  
7 *Xinjiang region. These actions are in contravention of*  
8 *international human rights standards, including the*  
9 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the*  
10 *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.*

11 *(2) In recent decades, central and regional Chi-*  
12 *nese government policies have systematically dis-*  
13 *criminated against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and*  
14 *other Muslims in Xinjiang by denying them a range*  
15 *of civil and political rights, including the freedoms of*  
16 *expression, religion, movement, and a fair trial,*  
17 *among others.*

18 *(3) Increased unrest in the Xinjiang region as a*  
19 *result of the central government's severe repression is*  
20 *used in Orwellian fashion by the Government of the*  
21 *People's Republic of China as evidence of "terrorism"*  
22 *and "separatism" and as an excuse for further dis-*  
23 *proportionate response.*

24 *(4) In 2014, Chinese authorities launched their*  
25 *latest "Strike Hard against Violent Extremism" cam-*  
26 *paign, in which the pretext of wide-scale, internation-*

1 *ally linked threats of terrorism were used to justify*  
2 *pervasive restrictions on, and gross human rights vio-*  
3 *lations against, the ethnic minority communities of*  
4 *Xinjiang.*

5 *(5) Those policies included—*

6 *(A) pervasive, high-tech surveillance across*  
7 *the region, including the arbitrary collection of*  
8 *biodata, such as DNA samples from children,*  
9 *without their knowledge or consent;*

10 *(B) the use of QR codes outside homes to*  
11 *gather information on how frequently individ-*  
12 *uals pray;*

13 *(C) facial and voice recognition software*  
14 *and “predictive policing” databases; and*

15 *(D) severe restrictions on the freedom of*  
16 *movement across the region.*

17 *(6) Chinese security forces have never been held*  
18 *accountable for credible reports of mass shootings in*  
19 *Alaqagha (2014), Hanerik (2013), and Siriqbuya*  
20 *(2013), as well as the extrajudicial killings of*  
21 *Abdulbasit Ablimit (2013) and Rozi Osman (2014).*

22 *(7)(A) The August 2016 transfer of former Tibet*  
23 *Autonomous Region Party Secretary Chen Quanguo*  
24 *to become the Xinjiang Party Secretary prompted an*  
25 *acceleration in the crackdown across the region.*



1           (B) Local officials in Xinjiang have used chilling  
2 political rhetoric to describe the purpose of govern-  
3 ment policy, including “eradicating tumors” and  
4 “spray[ing] chemicals” on crops to kill the “weeds”.

5           (C) Uyghurs are forced to celebrate Chinese cul-  
6 tural traditions, such as Chinese New Year, and  
7 unique Uyghur culture is facing eradication due to  
8 state control over Uyghur cultural heritage, such as  
9 muqam (a musical tradition) and meshrep (tradi-  
10 tional cultural gatherings), and due to elimination of  
11 the Uyghur language as a medium of instruction in  
12 Xinjiang schools and universities.

13           (8) In 2017, credible reports found that family  
14 members of Uyghurs living outside of China had gone  
15 missing inside China, that Chinese authorities were  
16 pressuring those outside the country to return, and  
17 that individuals were being arbitrarily detained in  
18 large numbers.

19           (9) There is ample credible evidence provided by  
20 scholars, human rights organizations, journalists, and  
21 think tanks substantiating the establishment by Chi-  
22 nese authorities of “political reeducation” camps.

23           (10) Independent organizations conducted inter-  
24 views, including testimonies from Kayrat Samarkan,  
25 Omir Bekali, and Mihrigul Tursun, along with others

1        *who had been detained in such facilities, who de-*  
2        *scribed forced political indoctrination, torture, beat-*  
3        *ings, food deprivation, and solitary confinement, as*  
4        *well as uncertainty as to the length of detention, hu-*  
5        *miliation, and denial of religious, cultural, and lin-*  
6        *guistic freedoms, and confirmed that they were told*  
7        *by guards that the only way to secure release was to*  
8        *demonstrate sufficient political loyalty. Poor condi-*  
9        *tions and lack of medical treatment at such facilities*  
10       *appear to have contributed to the deaths of some de-*  
11       *tainees, including the elderly and infirm. Uyghurs*  
12       *Muhammed Salih Hajim (2018), Yaqupjan Naman*  
13       *(2018), Abdughappar Abdujappar (2018), Ayhan*  
14       *Memet (2018), Abdulreshit Seley Hajim (2018),*  
15       *Nurimangul Memet (2018), Adalet Teyip (2018),*  
16       *Abdulehed Mehsum (2017), Hesen Imin (2017), and*  
17       *Sawut Raxman (2017) reportedly died while in the*  
18       *custody of the Chinese authorities in “political reedu-*  
19       *cation” camps, without proper investigation of the*  
20       *circumstances.*

21            *(11) Uyghurs and Kazakhs, who have now ob-*  
22        *tained permanent residence or citizenship in other*  
23        *countries, attest to receiving threats and harassment*  
24        *from Chinese officials.*

1           (12) Under pressure from the Government of the  
2           People's Republic of China, countries have forcibly re-  
3           turned Uyghurs to China in violation of the non-  
4           refoulement principle and their well-founded fear of  
5           persecution. States returning Uyghurs include Egypt,  
6           Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Burma, Cambodia, Viet-  
7           nam, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan,  
8           Nepal, and India.

9           (13) Six journalists for Radio Free Asia's  
10          Uyghur service have publicly detailed abuses their  
11          family members in Xinjiang have endured in response  
12          to their work exposing abusive policies across the re-  
13          gion.

14          (14) Several United States-based companies are  
15          conducting business with Xinjiang authorities without  
16          sufficient due diligence or safeguards to ensure their  
17          business operations do not create or contribute to  
18          human rights violations.

19          (15) The Government of the People's Republic of  
20          China is increasingly investing in the "Belt and  
21          Road Initiative" across Xinjiang and throughout  
22          Central Asia, extending its influence through organi-  
23          zations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-  
24          tion without regard to the political, religious, cul-  
25          tural, or linguistic rights of ethnic minorities.

1           (16) *The Secretary of State, Congressional-Exec-*  
2           *utive Commission on China, Tom Lantos Human*  
3           *Rights Commission, and individual members of the*  
4           *executive branch and Congress have all expressed*  
5           *growing concern regarding the pervasive human*  
6           *rights abuses across Xinjiang and the “political re-*  
7           *education” camps.*

8           (17) *In August 2018, the United Nations Com-*  
9           *mittee to Eliminate Racial Discrimination challenged*  
10          *the Government of the People’s Republic of China over*  
11          *abuses in Xinjiang, including the establishment of*  
12          *mass arbitrary detention camps.*

13          (18) *Between August and September 2018, Chi-*  
14          *nese authorities responded to these allegations by ei-*  
15          *ther flatly denying them or insisting that the facili-*  
16          *ties are “vocational training centers”.*

17          (19) *In September 2018, newly appointed United*  
18          *Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights*  
19          *Michele Bachelet noted in her first speech as High*  
20          *Commissioner the “deeply disturbing allegations of*  
21          *large-scale arbitrary detentions of Uighurs and other*  
22          *Muslim communities, in so-called re-education camps*  
23          *across Xinjiang”.*

24          (20) *On September 18, 2018, the Washington*  
25          *Post editorial board wrote, “At stake is not just the*

1        *welfare of the Uighurs, but also whether the tech-*  
2        *nologies of the 21st century will be employed to*  
3        *smother human freedom.”*

4            *(21) In December 2018 testimony before the Sub-*  
5        *committee on East Asia, the Pacific, and Inter-*  
6        *national Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on*  
7        *Foreign Relations of the Senate, Deputy Assistant*  
8        *Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor*  
9        *Scott Busby testified that the number of those de-*  
10       *tained in camps since April 2017 was “at least*  
11       *800,000 and possibly more than 2 million”.*

12           *(22) In December 2018, independent media re-*  
13       *ports pointed to growing evidence of forced labor in*  
14       *the camps, as well as reports of individuals who have*  
15       *been released from camps being forced to labor in*  
16       *nearby factories for low wages under threat of being*  
17       *sent back to “political reeducation” camps.*

18           *(23) In December 2018 and January 2019, Chi-*  
19       *nese officials organized visits to “political reeduca-*  
20       *tion” camps in Xinjiang for a small group of foreign*  
21       *journalists and diplomats from 12 non-Western coun-*  
22       *tries. In the months preceding the visits, international*  
23       *media reported that officials worked to remove secu-*  
24       *rity features from some “political reeducation” facili-*  
25       *ties, and coached detainees and area residents not to*

1       *make negative comments about the camps. Reports*  
2       *also indicated that officials had transferred large*  
3       *numbers of detainees to detention facilities in other*  
4       *parts of China.*

5               *(24) Experts have described the Xinjiang region*  
6       *as “a police state to rival North Korea, with a for-*  
7       *malized racism on the order of South African apart-*  
8       *heid” and the repression in the Xinjiang region as a*  
9       *“slow motion Tiananmen”.*

10              *(25) On December 31, 2018, President Donald J.*  
11       *Trump signed into law the Asia Reassurance Initia-*  
12       *tive Act of 2018 (Public Law 105–409), which con-*  
13       *demned China’s “forced disappearances, extralegal de-*  
14       *tentions, invasive and omnipresent surveillance, and*  
15       *lack of due process in judicial proceedings,” author-*  
16       *ized funding to promote democracy, human rights,*  
17       *and the rule of law in China, and supported sanc-*  
18       *tions designations against any entity or individual*  
19       *that—*

20                        *(A) violates human rights or religious free-*  
21                        *doms; or*

22                        *(B) engages in censorship activities.*

23       **SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

24       *It is the sense of Congress that—*

1           (1) *the President should condemn abuses against*  
2           *Turkic Muslims by Chinese authorities in Xinjiang*  
3           *and call on Chinese President Xi Jinping to recognize*  
4           *the profound abuse and likely lasting damage of Chi-*  
5           *na's current policies, and immediately close the "po-*  
6           *litical reeducation" camps, lift all restrictions on and*  
7           *ensure respect for internationally guaranteed human*  
8           *rights across the region, and allow for reestablishment*  
9           *of contact between those inside and outside China;*

10           (2) *the United States Government should develop*  
11           *a strategy to support the United Nations High Com-*  
12           *missioner for Human Rights and numerous United*  
13           *Nations Special Rapporteurs' urgent calls for imme-*  
14           *diate and unfettered access to Xinjiang, including the*  
15           *"political reeducation" camps, and instruct represent-*  
16           *atives of the United States at the United Nations to*  
17           *use the voice and vote of the United States to con-*  
18           *demn the mass arbitrary detainment, torture, and*  
19           *forced labor of Turkic Muslims in the People's Repub-*  
20           *lic of China;*

21           (3) *the Secretary of State should consider the ap-*  
22           *plicability of existing authorities, including the Glob-*  
23           *al Magnitsky Act (subtitle F of Public Law 114-328),*  
24           *to impose targeted sanctions on members of the Gov-*  
25           *ernment of the People's Republic of China, the Chi-*

1        *nese Communist Party, and state security apparatus,*  
2        *including Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo*  
3        *and other officials credibly alleged to be responsible*  
4        *for human rights abuses in Xinjiang and elsewhere;*

5            *(4) the Secretary of State should fully implement*  
6        *the provisions of the Frank Wolf International Reli-*  
7        *gious Freedom Act (Public Law 114–281) and con-*  
8        *sider strategically employing sanctions and other*  
9        *tools under the International Religious Freedom Act*  
10        *(22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.) and to employ measures re-*  
11        *quired as part of the “Country of Particular Con-*  
12        *cern” (CPC) designation for the Government of the*  
13        *People’s Republic of China that directly address par-*  
14        *ticularly severe violations of religious freedom;*

15            *(5) the Secretary of Commerce should review and*  
16        *consider prohibiting the sale or provision of any*  
17        *United States-made goods or services to any state*  
18        *agent in Xinjiang, and adding the Xinjiang branch*  
19        *of the Chinese Communist Party, the Xinjiang Public*  
20        *Security Bureau, and the Xinjiang Office of the*  
21        *United Front Work Department, or any entity acting*  
22        *on their behalf to facilitate the mass internment or*  
23        *forced labor of Turkic Muslims, to the “Entity List”*  
24        *administered by the Department of Commerce;*



1           (6) *United States companies and individuals*  
2           *selling goods or services or otherwise operating in*  
3           *Xinjiang should take steps, including in any public*  
4           *or financial filings, to publicly assert that their com-*  
5           *mercial activities are not contributing to human*  
6           *rights violations in Xinjiang or elsewhere in China*  
7           *and that their supply chains are not compromised by*  
8           *forced labor;*

9           (7) *the Federal Bureau of Investigation and ap-*  
10          *propriate United States law enforcement entities*  
11          *should track and take steps to hold accountable offi-*  
12          *cial from China who harass, threaten, or intimidate*  
13          *not only United States citizens and legal permanent*  
14          *residents, including Turkic Muslims, Uyghur-Ameri-*  
15          *cans, and Chinese-Americans, but also Chinese na-*  
16          *tionals legally studying or working in the United*  
17          *States;*

18          (8) *the Secretary of State should work with tra-*  
19          *ditional United States allies and partners to take*  
20          *similar steps and coordinate closely on targeted sanc-*  
21          *tions and visa restrictions;*

22          (9) *the Secretary of State should appoint a*  
23          *United States Special Coordinator for Xinjiang, from*  
24          *officers and employees of the Department of State,*  
25          *who will coordinate diplomatic, political, public di-*

1        *plomacy, financial assistance, sanctions, counterter-*  
2        *rorism, security resources, and congressional report-*  
3        *ing requirements within the United States Govern-*  
4        *ment to respond to the gross violations of universally*  
5        *recognized human rights occurring in the Xinjiang*  
6        *region, including by addressing—*

7                *(A) the mass detentions of Uyghurs and*  
8                *other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities;*

9                *(B) the deployment of technologically ad-*  
10              *vanced surveillance and police detection methods;*  
11              *and*

12              *(C) the counterterrorism and counter-radi-*  
13              *calism claims used to justify the policies of the*  
14              *Government of the People's Republic of China in*  
15              *Xinjiang;*

16              *(10) the United States Special Coordinator for*  
17              *Xinjiang position should continue until the mass sur-*  
18              *veillance and internment of Uyghurs and other pre-*  
19              *dominantly Muslim ethnic minorities has ended and*  
20              *all detainees released; and*

21              *(11) the full and timely implementation of sec-*  
22              *tions 408, 409, and 410 of the Asia Reassurance Ini-*  
23              *tiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409) is critical*  
24              *to demonstrating unwavering support by the United*  
25              *States for the universally recognized human rights of*

1        *all ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities in*  
2        *China, including Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.*

3        **SEC. 6. NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT.**

4        (a) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 180 days after the  
5        *date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National*  
6        *Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State,*  
7        *shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees*  
8        *a report to assess national and regional security threats*  
9        *posed by the crackdown across Xinjiang, the frequency with*  
10       *which Central and Southeast Asian governments are forc-*  
11       *ibly returning Turkic Muslim refugees and asylum seekers,*  
12       *and the transfer or development of technology used by the*  
13       *Government of the People’s Republic of China that facili-*  
14       *tates the mass internment and surveillance of Turkic Mus-*  
15       *lims, including technology relating to predictive policing*  
16       *and large-scale data collection and analysis.*

17       (b) *ANNEX.*—The report required under subsection (a)  
18       *shall include an unclassified annex with a list of all Chinese*  
19       *companies involved in the construction or operation of the*  
20       *“political education” camps, and the provision or operation*  
21       *of surveillance technology or operations, across Xinjiang.*

22       (c) *FORM OF REPORT.*—The report required under  
23       *subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form*  
24       *but may contain a classified annex.*

1 **SEC. 7. PROTECTING CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS OF THE**  
2 **UNITED STATES FROM INTIMIDATION AND**  
3 **COERCION.**

4 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 90 days after the  
5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal  
6 Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Secretary  
7 of State, shall provide a report to the appropriate congress-  
8 sional committees that outlines any and all efforts to pro-  
9 vide information to and protect United States citizens and  
10 residents, including ethnic Uyghurs and Chinese nationals  
11 legally studying or working temporarily in the United  
12 States, who have experienced harassment or intimidation  
13 by officials or agents of the Government of the People's Re-  
14 public of China and the Communist Party within the  
15 United States and those whose families in China have expe-  
16 rienced threats or detention because of their work or advo-  
17 cacy.

18 (b) *DATABASE OF DETAINED FAMILY MEMBERS OF*  
19 *UNITED STATES CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS.*—The Sec-  
20 retary of State should explore appropriate mechanisms to  
21 establish a voluntary database to which United States citi-  
22 zens or permanent resident family members of the Uyghur  
23 diaspora can provide details about missing family mem-  
24 bers, with a view towards pressing for information and ac-  
25 countability from the Government of the People's Republic  
26 of China and to take appropriate measures to expedite the

1 *asylum claims of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic Mus-*  
2 *lim minorities.*

3 **SEC. 8. REPORT ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.**

4 (a) *REPORT.*—*Not later than 120 days after the date*  
5 *of the enactment of this Act, the CEO of the United States*  
6 *Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate*  
7 *congressional committees a report that—*

8 (1) *describes the current status and reach of*  
9 *United States broadcasting to the Xinjiang region*  
10 *and Uyghur speaking communities globally, barriers*  
11 *to the free flow of news and information to these com-*  
12 *munities, and, if appropriate, detailed technical and*  
13 *fiscal requirements necessary to increase broadcasting*  
14 *and other media to these communities globally;*

15 (2) *describes efforts to intimidate Radio Free*  
16 *Asia and Voice of America reporters reporting on*  
17 *human rights issues in the People's Republic of*  
18 *China; and*

19 (3) *in consultation with the Global Engagement*  
20 *Center at the Department of State, describes and as-*  
21 *sesses disinformation and propaganda by the Govern-*  
22 *ment of the People's Republic of China or other mem-*  
23 *bers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization tar-*  
24 *geting Uyghur communities globally and efforts to*  
25 *downplay gross violations of universally recognized*

1        *human rights occurring in the Xinjiang region and*  
2        *any activities or programs that address these efforts.*

3        (b) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the*  
4        *United States to commend and support the journalists of*  
5        *the Uyghur language service of Radio Free Asia for their*  
6        *reporting on the human rights and political situation in*  
7        *Xinjiang despite efforts to silence or intimidate their report-*  
8        *ing through the detention of family members and relatives*  
9        *by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.*

10        **SEC. 9. REPORT AND SEMI-ANNUAL BRIEFING.**

11        (a) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the*  
12        *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,*  
13        *after consulting relevant Federal agencies and civil society*  
14        *organizations, shall submit to the appropriate congressional*  
15        *committees and make available on the website of the De-*  
16        *partment of State an interagency report that includes—*

17                (1) *an assessment of the number of individuals*  
18                *detained in political “reeducation camps” and condi-*  
19                *tions in the camps for detainees in the Xinjiang re-*  
20                *gion, including whether detainees endure torture,*  
21                *forced renunciation of faith, or other mistreatment;*

22                (2) *a description, as possible, of the geographic*  
23                *location of the camps and estimates of the number of*  
24                *people detained in such facilities;*

1           (3) a description, as possible, of the methods used  
2 by People’s Republic of China authorities to “redu-  
3 cate” Uyghur detainees, as well as the People’s Re-  
4 public of China agencies in charge of reeducation;

5           (4) an assessment of the number of individuals  
6 being arbitrarily detained, including in pretrial de-  
7 tention centers and prisons;

8           (5) an assessment of forced labor in the camps  
9 and in regional factories for low wages under threat  
10 of being sent back to “political reeducation” camps;

11           (6) a list of Chinese companies and industries  
12 benefitting from such labor, and a description of ac-  
13 tions taken to address forced labor in Xinjiang con-  
14 current with the People’s Republic of China’s Tier 3  
15 designation under the 2018 Trafficking in Persons  
16 Report;

17           (7) an assessment of the level of access People’s  
18 Republic of China authorities grant to diplomats,  
19 journalists, and others to the Xinjiang region and a  
20 description of measures used to impede efforts to mon-  
21 itor human rights conditions in the Xinjiang region;

22           (8) an assessment of the repressive surveillance,  
23 detection, and control methods used by People’s Re-  
24 public of China authorities in the Xinjiang region,  
25 and a list of individuals who hold senior leadership

1       positions and are responsible for “high-tech” policing,  
2       mass incarceration, and reeducation efforts targeting  
3       Uyghur and other predominately Muslim ethnic mi-  
4       norities in the Xinjiang region;

5               (9) a description of United States diplomatic ef-  
6       forts to address the gross violations of universally rec-  
7       ognized human rights in the Xinjiang region and to  
8       protect asylum seekers from the region, including in  
9       multilateral institutions and through bilateral rela-  
10      tions with the People’s Republic of China, the nations  
11      of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC),  
12      and other countries; and

13              (10) a description, as appropriate, of diplomatic  
14      efforts by United States allies and other nations to  
15      address the gross violations of universally recognized  
16      human rights in the Xinjiang region and to protect  
17      asylum seekers from the region.

18      (b) *BRIEFING AND SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS.*—

19              (1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 60 days after  
20      the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180  
21      days thereafter, the Secretary of State, or the Sec-  
22      retary’s designee, shall provide a briefing to the ap-  
23      propriate congressional committees covering the sub-  
24      jects listed in subsection (a). At the time of each brief-  
25      ing, the Department of State shall provide unclassi-



1 *fied written materials detailing the subject matters*  
2 *covered in paragraphs (1), (2), (4), (6), and (9) of*  
3 *such subsection.*

4 (2) *TERMINATION.—The briefing requirement*  
5 *under paragraph (1) terminates 5 years after the date*  
6 *of the enactment of this Act.*

7 **SEC. 10. REPORT ON SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN**  
8 **RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE XINJIANG RE-**  
9 **REGION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

10 (a) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the*  
11 *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State*  
12 *shall, except as provided in subsection (c), submit to Con-*  
13 *gress a report that includes a statement of whether the per-*  
14 *sons described in subsection (b) meet the criteria to be des-*  
15 *ignated for the imposition of sanctions under section 1263*  
16 *of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act*  
17 *(subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–238; 22 U.S.C.*  
18 *2656 note) because the persons—*

19 (1) *are responsible for extrajudicial killings, tor-*  
20 *ture, or other gross violations of internationally recog-*  
21 *nized human rights in the Xinjiang region of the Peo-*  
22 *ple’s Republic of China; or*

23 (2) *materially assisted, sponsored, or provided fi-*  
24 *nancial, material, or technological support for, or*  
25 *goods or services in support of, such violations.*

1           (b) *PERSONS DESCRIBED.*—*The persons described in*  
2 *this subsection are the following:*

3                   (1) *The Party Secretary for Xinjiang region of*  
4 *the People’s Republic of China, Chen Quanguo.*

5                   (2) *Senior full or alternate members of the Cen-*  
6 *tral Committee of the Communist Party of China*  
7 *whose professional responsibilities relate to the gov-*  
8 *ernmental administration of the Xinjiang region, or*  
9 *who have conducted business with government entities*  
10 *in the Xinjiang region.*

11           (c) *EXCEPTION.*—*The Secretary shall not be required*  
12 *to submit a report under subsection (a) if the Secretary de-*  
13 *termines, not later than 90 days after the date of the enact-*  
14 *ment of this Act, that the Government of the People’s Repub-*  
15 *lic of China allows independent, unrestricted, and unsuper-*  
16 *vised access to the Xinjiang region for international human*  
17 *rights organizations.*