

AMENDMENT NO. _____ Calendar No. _____

Purpose: In the nature of a substitute.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—117th Cong., 1st Sess.

(no.) _____

To address issues involving the People’s Republic of China.

Referred to the Committee on _____ and
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended
to be proposed by Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself and
Mr. RISCH)

Viz:

1 Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the fol-

2 lowing:

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the

5 “Strategic Competition Act of 2021”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for

7 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Findings.

Sec. 3. Definitions.

Sec. 4. Statement of policy.

Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.

Sec. 6. Rules of construction.

TITLE I—INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE

Subtitle A—Science and Technology

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Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply chain diversification and management.

Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

- Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
 Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure investment standards.
 Sec. 113. United States support for infrastructure.
 Sec. 114. Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network.
 Sec. 115. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure.
 Sec. 116. Report on the People’s Republic of China’s investments in foreign energy development.

Subtitle C—Digital Technology and Connectivity

- Sec. 121. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.
 Sec. 122. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.
 Sec. 123. Strategy for digital investment by United States International Development Finance Corporation.

Subtitle D—Countering Chinese Communist Party Malign Influence

- Sec. 131. Short title.
 Sec. 132. Authorization of appropriations for countering Chinese Influence Fund.
 Sec. 133. Findings on Chinese information warfare and malign influence operations.
 Sec. 134. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays Program.
 Sec. 135. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and discrimination.
 Sec. 136. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
 Sec. 137. Global engagement center.
 Sec. 138. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States of certain foreign gifts to and contracts with institutions of higher education.
 Sec. 139. Post-employment restrictions on Senate-confirmed officials at the Department of State.
 Sec. 140. Sense of Congress on prioritizing nomination of qualified ambassadors to ensure proper diplomatic positioning to counter Chinese influence.

TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

- Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
 Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
 Sec. 203. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the Quad.
 Sec. 204. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
 Sec. 205. Sense of Congress on enhancing United States–ASEAN cooperation on technology issues with respect to the People’s Republic of China.
 Sec. 206. Report on Chinese influence in international organizations.
 Sec. 207. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners.
 Sec. 208. Technology partnership office at the Department of State.
 Sec. 209. United States representation in standards-setting bodies.

- Sec. 210. Sense of Congress on centrality of sanctions and other restrictions to strategic competition with China.
- Sec. 211. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries.
- Sec. 212. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership.
- Sec. 213. Taiwan Fellowship Program.
- Sec. 214. Treatment of Taiwan government.
- Sec. 215. Taiwan symbols of sovereignty.
- Sec. 216. Report on origins of the COVID–19 pandemic.
- Sec. 217. Enhancement of diplomatic support and economic engagement with Pacific island countries.
- Sec. 218. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources devoted to the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 219. Advancing United States leadership in the United Nations System.
- Sec. 219A. Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018.
- Sec. 219B. Statement of policy on need for reciprocity in the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.
- Sec. 219C. Opposition to provision of assistance to People’s Republic of China by Asian Development Bank.
- Sec. 219D. Opposition to provision of assistance to People’s Republic of China by International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
- Sec. 219E. United States policy on Chinese and Russian government efforts to undermine the United Nations Security Council action on human rights.
- Sec. 219F. Deterring PRC use of force against Taiwan.
- Sec. 219G. Strategy to respond to sharp power operations targeting Taiwan.
- Sec. 219H. Study and report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl trafficking.

Subtitle B—International Security Matters

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- Sec. 222. Findings.
- Sec. 223. Sense of Congress regarding bolstering security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 224. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 225. Foreign military financing in the Indo-Pacific and authorization of appropriations for Southeast Asia maritime security programs and diplomatic outreach activities.
- Sec. 226. Foreign military financing compact pilot program in the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 227. Additional funding for international military education and training in the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 228. Prioritizing excess defense article transfers for the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 229. Prioritizing excess naval vessel transfers for the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 230. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial land features in the South China Sea.
- Sec. 231. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and partners.
- Sec. 232. Report on national technology and industrial base.
- Sec. 233. Report on diplomatic outreach with respect to Chinese military installations overseas.
- Sec. 234. Statement of policy regarding universal implementation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea.
- Sec. 235. Limitation on assistance to countries hosting Chinese military installations.

Subtitle C—Regional Strategies to Counter the People’s Republic of China

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- Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners around the world with respect to the People's Republic of China.

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- Sec. 408. Economic defense response teams.

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- Sec. 501. Findings on strategic security and arms control.

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1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is
4 leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, mili-
5 tary, technological, and ideological power to become
6 a strategic, near-peer, global competitor of the
7 United States. The policies increasingly pursued by
8 the PRC in these domains are contrary to the inter-
9 ests and values of the United States, its partners,
10 and much of the rest of the world.

11 (2) The current policies being pursued by the
12 PRC—

13 (A) threaten the future character of the
14 international order and are shaping the rules,
15 norms, and institutions that govern relations
16 among states;

17 (B) will put at risk the ability of the
18 United States to secure its national interests;
19 and

20 (C) will put at risk the future peace, pros-
21 perity, and freedom of the international commu-
22 nity in the coming decades.

23 (3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with
24 the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked

1 to advance the PRC's economic and social develop-
2 ment to ensure that the PRC participated in, and
3 benefitted from, the free and open international
4 order. The United States pursued these goals and
5 contributed to the welfare of the Chinese people
6 by—

7 (A) increasing the PRC's trade relations
8 and access to global capital markets;

9 (B) promoting the PRC's accession to the
10 World Trade Organization;

11 (C) providing development finance and
12 technical assistance;

13 (D) promoting research collaboration;

14 (E) educating the PRC's top students;

15 (F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge
16 technologies and scientific knowledge; and

17 (G) providing intelligence and military as-
18 sistance.

19 (4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to
20 pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an
21 increasingly authoritarian governance model at home
22 through increased restrictions on personal freedoms,
23 and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These
24 policies frequently and deliberately undermine
25 United States interests and are contrary to core

1 United States values and the values of other nations,
2 both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to
3 this strategic decision of the Chinese Communist
4 Party (CCP), the United States has been compelled
5 to reexamine and revise its strategy towards the
6 PRC.

7 (5) The General Secretary of the CCP and the
8 President of the PRC, Xi Jinping, has elevated the
9 “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” as cen-
10 tral to the domestic and foreign policy of the PRC.
11 His program demands—

12 (A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;

13 (B) concentration of military power;

14 (C) a strong role for the CCP in the state
15 and the economy;

16 (D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking
17 control over broadly asserted territorial claims;
18 and

19 (E) the denial of any values and individual
20 rights that are deemed to threaten the CCP.

21 (6) The PRC views its Leninist model of gov-
22 ernance, “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, as
23 superior to, and at odds with, the constitutional
24 models of the United States and other democracies.
25 This approach to governance is lauded by the CCP

1 as essential to securing the PRC's status as a global
2 leader, and to shaping the future of the world. In a
3 2013 speech, President Xi said, "We firmly believe
4 that as socialism with Chinese characteristics devel-
5 ops further . . . it is . . . inevitable that the superi-
6 ority of our socialist system will be increasingly ap-
7 parent . . . [and] our country's road of development
8 will have increasingly greater influence on the
9 world."

10 (7) The PRC's objectives are to first establish
11 regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to
12 use that dominant position to propel the PRC to be-
13 come the "leading world power," shaping an inter-
14 national order that is conducive to the CCP's inter-
15 ests. Achieving these objectives require turning the
16 PRC into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule
17 and using a strong military and advanced techno-
18 logical capability to pursue the PRC's objectives, re-
19 gardless of other countries' interests.

20 (8) The PRC is reshaping the current inter-
21 national order, which is built upon the rule of law
22 and free and open ideals and principles, by con-
23 ducting global information and influence operations,
24 seeking to redefine international laws and norms to
25 align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the

1 legitimacy of internationally recognized human
2 rights, and seeking to co-opt the leadership and
3 agenda of multinational organizations for the benefit
4 of the PRC and other authoritarian regimes at the
5 expense of the interests of the United States and the
6 international community. In December 2018, Presi-
7 dent Xi suggested that the CCP views its “historic
8 mission” as not only to govern China, but also to
9 profoundly influence global governance to benefit the
10 CCP.

11 (9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to
12 follow its model of “socialism with Chinese charac-
13 teristics”. During the 19th Party Congress in 2017,
14 President Xi said that the PRC could serve as a
15 model of development for other countries by utilizing
16 “Chinese wisdom” and a “Chinese approach to solv-
17 ing problems”.

18 (10) The PRC is promoting its governance
19 model and attempting to weaken other models of
20 governance by—

- 21 (A) undermining democratic institutions;
22 (B) subverting financial institutions;
23 (C) coercing businesses to accommodate
24 the policies of the PRC; and

1 (D) using disinformation to disguise the
2 nature of the actions described in subpara-
3 graphs (A) through (C).

4 (11) The PRC is close to its goal of becoming
5 the global leader in science and technology. In May
6 2018, President Xi said that for the PRC to reach
7 “prosperity and rejuvenation”, it needs to “endeavor
8 to be a major world center for science and innova-
9 tion”. The PRC has invested the equivalent of bil-
10 lions of dollars into education, research and develop-
11 ment, and established joint scientific research cen-
12 ters and science universities.

13 (12) The PRC’s drive to become a “manufac-
14 turing and technological superpower” and to pro-
15 mote “innovation with Chinese characteristics” is
16 coming at the expense of human rights and long-
17 standing international rules and norms with respect
18 to economic competition, and presents a challenge to
19 United States national security and the security of
20 allies and like-minded countries. In particular, the
21 PRC advances its illiberal political and social policies
22 through mass surveillance, social credit systems, and
23 a significant role of the state in internet governance.
24 Through these means, the PRC increases direct and
25 indirect government control over its citizens’ every-

1 day lives. Its national strategy of “Military-Civil Fu-
2 sion” mandates that civil and commercial research,
3 which increasingly drives global innovation, is lever-
4 aged to develop new military capabilities.

5 (13) The People’s Republic of China and the
6 Chinese Communist Party are committing crimes
7 against humanity and are engaged in an ongoing
8 genocide, in violation of the Convention on the Pre-
9 vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
10 done at Paris December 9, 1948, against the pre-
11 dominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and
12 religious minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur
13 Autonomous Region, including through campaigns of
14 imprisonment, torture, rape, and coercive birth pre-
15 vention policies.

16 (14) The PRC is using legal and illegal means
17 to achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing
18 and technological superpower. The PRC uses state-
19 directed industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to
20 ensure the dominance of PRC companies. The CCP
21 engages in and encourages actions that actively un-
22 dermine a free and open international market, such
23 as intellectual property theft, forced technology
24 transfers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and
25 mandatory CCP access to proprietary data as part

1 of business and commercial agreements between Chi-
2 nese and foreign companies.

3 (15) The policies referred to in paragraph (13)
4 are designed to freeze United States and other for-
5 eign firms out of the PRC market, while eroding
6 competition in other important markets. The heavy
7 subsidization of Chinese companies includes poten-
8 tial violation of its World Trade Organization com-
9 mitments. In May 2018, President Xi said that the
10 PRC aims to keep the “initiatives of innovation and
11 development security . . . in [China’s] own hands”.

12 (16) The PRC is advancing its global objectives
13 through a variety of avenues, including its signature
14 initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which
15 is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and in-
16 cludes the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road.
17 The PRC describes BRI as a straightforward and
18 wholly beneficial plan for all countries. However, it
19 eventually seeks to advance an economic system with
20 the PRC at its center, making it the most concrete
21 geographical representation of the PRC’s global am-
22 bitions. BRI increases the economic influence of
23 state-owned Chinese firms in global markets, en-
24 hances the PRC’s political leverage with government
25 leaders around the world, and provides greater ac-

1 cess to strategic nodes such as ports and railways.
2 Through BRI, the PRC seeks political deference
3 through economic dependence.

4 (17) The PRC is executing a plan to establish
5 regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and dis-
6 place the United States from the region. As a Pa-
7 cific power, the United States has built and sup-
8 ported enduring alliances and economic partnerships
9 that secure peace and prosperity and promote the
10 rule of law and political pluralism in a free and open
11 Indo-Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic
12 and military coercion in the region to secure its own
13 interests.

14 (18) The PRC's military strategy seeks to keep
15 the United States military from operating in the
16 Western Pacific and to erode United States security
17 guarantees.

18 (19) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclu-
19 sive control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air
20 space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually
21 exercising greater influence beyond the region. This
22 includes lanes crucial to commercial activity, energy
23 exploration, transport, and the exercise of security
24 operations in areas permitted under international
25 law.

1 (20) The PRC seeks so-called “reunification”
2 with Taiwan through whatever means may ulti-
3 mately be required. The CCP’s insistence that so-
4 called “reunification” is Taiwan’s only option makes
5 this goal inherently coercive. In January 2019,
6 President Xi stated that the PRC “make[s] no
7 promise to renounce the use of force and reserve[s]
8 the option of taking all necessary means”. Taiwan’s
9 embodiment of democratic values and economic lib-
10 eralism challenges President Xi’s goal of achieving
11 national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit Tai-
12 wan’s dominant strategic position in the First Island
13 Chain and to project power into the Second Island
14 Chain and beyond.

15 (21) In the South China Sea, the PRC has exe-
16 cuted an illegal island-building campaign that
17 threatens freedom of navigation and the free-flow of
18 commerce, damages the environment, bolsters PLA
19 power projection capabilities, and coerces and intimi-
20 dates other regional claimants in an effort to ad-
21 vance its unlawful claims and control the waters
22 around neighboring countries. Despite President Xi’s
23 September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC
24 did not intend to militarize the South China Sea,
25 during the 2017 19th Party Congress, President Xi

1 announced that “construction on islands and reefs in
2 the South China Sea have seen steady progress”.

3 (22) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA
4 to attain a level of capacity and capability superior
5 to the United States in terms of equipment and con-
6 duct of modern military operations by shifting its
7 military doctrine from having a force “adequate
8 [for] China’s defensive needs” to having a force
9 “commensurate with China’s international status”.
10 Ultimately, this transformation could enable China
11 to impose its will in the Indo-Pacific region through
12 the threat of military force. In 2017, President Xi
13 established the following developmental benchmarks
14 for the advancement of the PLA:

15 (A) A mechanized force with increased
16 informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020.

17 (B) The complete modernization of China’s
18 national defense by 2035.

19 (C) The full transformation of the PLA
20 into a world-class force by 2050.

21 (23) The PRC’s strategy and supporting poli-
22 cies described in this section undermine United
23 States interests, such as—

24 (A) upholding a free and open inter-
25 national order;

1 (B) maintaining the integrity of inter-
2 national institutions with liberal norms and val-
3 ues;

4 (C) preserving a favorable balance of
5 power in the Indo-Pacific;

6 (D) ensuring the defense of its allies;

7 (E) preserving open sea and air lanes;

8 (F) fostering the free flow of commerce
9 through open and transparent markets; and

10 (G) promoting individual freedom and
11 human rights.

12 (24) The global COVID–19 pandemic has in-
13 tensified and accelerated these trends in the PRC’s
14 behavior and therefore increased the need for United
15 States global leadership and a competitive posture.
16 The PRC has capitalized on the world’s focus on the
17 COVID–19 pandemic by—

18 (A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong
19 Kong’s autonomy, including imposing a so-
20 called “national security law” on Hong Kong;

21 (B) aggressively imposing its will in the
22 East and South China Seas;

23 (C) contributing to increased tensions with
24 India; and

1 (D) engaging in a widespread and govern-
2 ment-directed disinformation campaign to ob-
3 scure the PRC government's efforts to cover up
4 the seriousness of COVID-19, sow confusion
5 about the origination of the outbreak, and dis-
6 credit the United States, its allies, and global
7 health efforts.

8 (25) The CCP's disinformation campaign re-
9 ferred to in paragraph (24)(D) has included—

10 (A) concerted efforts, in the early days of
11 the pandemic, to downplay the nature and
12 scope of the outbreak in Wuhan in the PRC, as
13 well as cases of person-to-person transmission;

14 (B) claims that the virus originated in
15 United States biological defense research at
16 Fort Detrick, Maryland;

17 (C) Chinese state media reports insinu-
18 ating a possible link between the virus and
19 other United States biological facilities; and

20 (D) efforts to block access to qualified
21 international infectious disease experts who
22 might contradict the CCP's narrative.

23 (26) In response to the PRC's strategy and
24 policies, the United States must adopt a policy of

1 strategic competition with the PRC to protect and
2 promote our vital interests and values.

3 (27) The United States' policy of strategic com-
4 petition with respect to the PRC is part of a broader
5 strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific and the world
6 which centers around cooperation with United States
7 allies and partners to advance shared values and in-
8 terests and to preserve and enhance a free, open,
9 democratic, inclusive, rules-based, stable, and diverse
10 region.

11 (28) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of
12 2018 (Public Law 115–409) contributed to a com-
13 prehensive framework for promoting United State
14 security interests, economic interests, and values in
15 the Indo-Pacific region, investing \$7,500,000,000
16 over 5 years—

17 (A) to support greater security and defense
18 cooperation between the United States and al-
19 lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region;

20 (B) to advance democracy and the protec-
21 tion and promotion of human rights in the
22 Indo-Pacific region;

23 (C) to enhance cybersecurity cooperation
24 between the United States and partners in the
25 Indo-Pacific;

- 1 (D) to deepen people-to-people engagement
2 through programs such as the Young Southeast
3 Asian Leaders Initiative and the ASEAN Youth
4 Volunteers program; and
5 (E) to enhance energy cooperation and en-
6 ergy security in the Indo-Pacific region.

7 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

8 In this Act:

9 (1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-**
10 **TEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional com-
11 mittees” means—

12 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
13 the Senate; and

14 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
15 the House of Representatives.

16 (2) **CCP.**—The term “CCP” means the Chinese
17 Communist Party.

18 (3) **INDO-PACIFIC REGION.**—The terms “Indo-
19 Pacific” and “Indo-Pacific region” mean the 37
20 countries and the surrounding waterways that are
21 under the area of responsibility of the U.S. Indo-Pa-
22 cific Command. These countries are: Australia, Ban-
23 gladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China,
24 Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Malay-
25 sia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mon-

1 golia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, North Korea,
2 Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of
3 Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri
4 Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga,
5 Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam.

6 (4) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The
7 terms “People’s Liberation Army” and “PLA” mean
8 the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China.

9 (5) PRC; CHINA.—The terms “PRC” and
10 “China” mean the People’s Republic of China.

11 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

12 (a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United
13 States, in pursuing strategic competition with the PRC,
14 to pursue the following objectives:

15 (1) The United States global leadership role is
16 sustained and its political system and major founda-
17 tions of national power are postured for long-term
18 political, economic, technological, and military com-
19 petition with the PRC.

20 (2) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific re-
21 mains favorable to the United States and its allies.
22 The United States and its allies maintain unfettered
23 access to the region, including through freedom of
24 navigation and the free flow of commerce, consistent
25 with international law and practice, and the PRC

1 neither dominates the region nor coerces its neigh-
2 bors.

3 (3) The allies and partners of the United
4 States—

5 (A) maintain confidence in United States
6 leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pa-
7 cific region;

8 (B) can withstand and combat subversion
9 and undue influence by the PRC; and

10 (C) align themselves with the United
11 States in setting global rules, norms, and stand-
12 ards that benefit the international community.

13 (4) The combined weight of the United States
14 and its allies and partners is strong enough to dem-
15 onstrate to the PRC that the risks of attempts to
16 dominate other states outweigh the potential bene-
17 fits.

18 (5) The United States leads the free and open
19 international order, which is comprised of resilient
20 states and institutions that uphold and defend prin-
21 ciples, such as sovereignty, rule of law, individual
22 freedom, and human rights. The international order
23 is strengthened to defeat attempts at destabilization
24 by illiberal and authoritarian actors.

1 (6) The key rules, norms, and standards of
2 international engagement in the 21st century are
3 maintained, including—

4 (A) the protection of human rights, com-
5 mercial engagement and investment, and tech-
6 nology; and

7 (B) that such rules, norms, and standards
8 are in alignment with the values and interests
9 of the United States, its allies and partners,
10 and the free world.

11 (7) Assures that the CCP does not—

12 (A) subvert open and democratic societies;

13 (B) distort global markets;

14 (C) manipulate the international trade sys-
15 tem;

16 (D) coerce other nations via economic and
17 military means; or

18 (E) use its technological advantages to un-
19 dermine individual freedoms or other states' na-
20 tional security interests.

21 (8) The United States deters military con-
22 frontation with the PRC and both nations work to
23 reduce the risk of conflict.

24 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States,
25 in pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)—

1 (1) to strengthen the United States domestic
2 foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic
3 growth, education, scientific and technological inno-
4 vation, democratic institutions, and other areas that
5 improve the ability of the United States to pursue
6 its vital economic, foreign policy, and national secu-
7 rity interests;

8 (2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition
9 with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic,
10 development, military, informational, and techno-
11 logical realms that maximizes the United States'
12 strengths and increases the costs for the PRC of
13 harming United States interests and the values of
14 United States allies and partners;

15 (3) to lead a free, open, and secure inter-
16 national system characterized by freedom from coer-
17 cion, rule of law, open markets and the free flow of
18 commerce, and a shared commitment to security and
19 peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, and
20 good and transparent governance;

21 (4) to strengthen and deepen United States alli-
22 ances and partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific
23 and Europe, by pursuing greater bilateral and multi-
24 lateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared in-
25 terests and values and bolster partner countries'

1 confidence that the United States is and will remain
2 a strong, committed, and constant partner;

3 (5) to encourage and collaborate with United
4 States allies and partners in boosting their own ca-
5 pabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and pro-
6 tect shared interests and values, free from coercion
7 and external pressure;

8 (6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and
9 healthy competition in United States-China economic
10 relations by—

11 (A) advancing policies that harden the
12 United States economy against unfair and ille-
13 gal commercial or trading practices and the co-
14 ercion of United States businesses; and

15 (B) tightening United States laws and reg-
16 ulations as necessary to prevent the PRC's at-
17 tempts to harm United States economic com-
18 petitiveness;

19 (7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-
20 led growth in emerging markets around the world,
21 including through the use of United States Govern-
22 ment tools that—

23 (A) support greater private sector invest-
24 ment and advance capacity-building initiatives
25 that are grounded in the rule of law;

1 (B) promote open markets;

2 (C) establish clear policy and regulatory
3 frameworks;

4 (D) improve the management of key eco-
5 nomic sectors;

6 (E) combat corruption; and

7 (F) foster and support greater collabora-
8 tion with and among partner countries and the
9 United States private sector to develop secure
10 and sustainable infrastructure;

11 (8) to lead in the advancement of international
12 rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade
13 and open and integrated markets;

14 (9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy
15 in support of United States companies and busi-
16 nesses in partner countries that seek fair competi-
17 tion;

18 (10) to ensure that the United States leads in
19 the innovation of critical and emerging technologies,
20 such as next-generation telecommunications, artifi-
21 cial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconduc-
22 tors, and biotechnology, by—

23 (A) providing necessary investment and
24 concrete incentives for the private sector to ac-
25 celerate development of such technologies;

1 (B) modernizing export controls and in-
2 vestment screening regimes and associated poli-
3 cies and regulations;

4 (C) enhancing United States leadership in
5 technical standards-setting bodies and avenues
6 for developing norms regarding the use of
7 emerging critical technologies;

8 (D) reducing United States barriers and
9 increasing incentives for collaboration with al-
10 lies and partners on the research and co-devel-
11 opment of critical technologies;

12 (E) collaborating with allies and partners
13 to protect critical technologies by—

14 (i) crafting multilateral export control
15 measures;

16 (ii) building capacity for defense tech-
17 nology security;

18 (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in sup-
19 ply chains; and

20 (iv) ensuring diversification; and

21 (F) designing major defense capabilities
22 for export to allies and partners;

23 (11) to enable the people of the United States,
24 including the private sector, civil society, universities
25 and other academic institutions, State and local leg-

1 islators, and other relevant actors to identify and re-
2 main vigilant to the risks posed by undue influence
3 of the CCP in the United States;

4 (12) to implement measures to mitigate the
5 risks referred to in paragraph (11), while still pre-
6 serving opportunities for economic engagement, aca-
7 demic research, and cooperation in other areas
8 where the United States and the PRC share inter-
9 ests;

10 (13) to collaborate with advanced democracies
11 and other willing partners to promote ideals and
12 principles that—

13 (A) advance a free and open international
14 order;

15 (B) strengthen democratic institutions;

16 (C) protect and promote human rights;

17 and

18 (D) uphold a free press and fact-based re-
19 porting;

20 (14) to develop comprehensive and holistic
21 strategies and policies to counter PRC
22 disinformation campaigns;

23 (15) to demonstrate effective leadership at the
24 United Nations, its associated agencies, and other
25 multilateral organizations and defend the integrity

1 of these organizations against co-optation by illiberal
2 and authoritarian nations;

3 (16) to prioritize the defense of fundamental
4 freedoms and human rights in the United States re-
5 lationship with the PRC;

6 (17) to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul-
7 tilateral organizations, leveraging their significant
8 and growing capabilities to build a network of like-
9 minded states that sustains and strengthens a free
10 and open order and addresses regional and global
11 challenges to hold the Government of the PRC ac-
12 countable for—

13 (A) violations and abuses of human rights;

14 (B) restrictions on religious practices; and

15 (C) undermining and abrogating treaties,
16 other international agreements, and other inter-
17 national norms related to human rights;

18 (18) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, re-
19 pression, coercion, and other malign behavior to at-
20 tain unfair economic advantages and to pressure
21 other nations to defer to its political and strategic
22 objectives;

23 (19) to maintain United States access to the
24 Western Pacific, including by—

1 (A) increasing United States forward-de-
2 ployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region;

3 (B) modernizing the United States military
4 through investments in existing and new plat-
5 forms, emerging technologies, critical in-theater
6 force structure and enabling capabilities, joint
7 operational concepts, and a diverse, operation-
8 ally resilient and politically sustainable posture;
9 and

10 (C) operating and conducting exercises
11 with allies and partners—

12 (i) to mitigate the PLA's ability to
13 project power and establish contested zones
14 within the First and Second Island Chains;

15 (ii) to diminish the ability of the PLA
16 to coerce its neighbors;

17 (iii) to maintain open sea and air
18 lanes, particularly in the Taiwan Strait,
19 the East China Sea, and the South China
20 Sea; and

21 (iv) to project power from the United
22 States and its allies and partners to dem-
23 onstrate the ability to conduct contested lo-
24 gistics;

25 (20) to deter the PRC from—

1 (A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, includ-
2 ing by developing more combat-credible forces
3 that are integrated with allies and partners in
4 contact, blunt, and surge layers and able to de-
5 feat any PRC theory of victory in the First or
6 Second Island Chains of the Western Pacific
7 and beyond, as called for in the 2018 National
8 Defense Strategy;

9 (B) using grey-zone tactics below the level
10 of armed conflict; or

11 (C) initiating armed conflict;

12 (21) to strengthen United States-PRC military-
13 to-military communication and improve de-escalation
14 procedures to de-conflict operations and reduce the
15 risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-
16 level visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian
17 and military officials and other measures, in align-
18 ment with United States interests; and

19 (22) to cooperate with the PRC if interests
20 align, including through bilateral or multilateral
21 means and at the United Nations, as appropriate.

22 **SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

23 It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the
24 policy described in section 4(b) requires the following ac-
25 tions:

1 (1) Strategic competition with the PRC will re-
2 quire the United States—

3 (A) to marshal sustained political will to
4 protect its vital interests, promote its values,
5 and advance its economic and national security
6 objectives for decades to come; and

7 (B) to achieve this sustained political will,
8 persuade the American people and United
9 States allies and partners of—

10 (i) the challenges posed by the PRC;

11 and

12 (ii) the need for long-term competition
13 to defend shared interests and values.

14 (2) The United States must coordinate closely
15 with allies and partners to compete effectively with
16 the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners
17 to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing
18 and checking the aggressive and assertive behavior
19 of the PRC.

20 (3) The President of the United States must
21 lead and direct the entire executive branch to treat
22 the People's Republic of China as the greatest geo-
23 political and geoeconomic challenge for United
24 States foreign policy, increasing the prioritization of
25 strategic competition with the PRC and broader

1 United States interests in the Indo-Pacific region in
2 the conduct of foreign policy and assuring the alloca-
3 tion of appropriate resources adequate to the chal-
4 lenge.

5 (4) The head of every Federal department and
6 agency should designate a senior official at the level
7 of Under Secretary or above to coordinate the de-
8 partment's or agency's policies with respect to stra-
9 tegic competition with the PRC.

10 (5) The ability of the United States to execute
11 a strategy of strategic competition with the PRC will
12 be undermined if our attention is repeatedly diverted
13 to challenges that are not vital to United States eco-
14 nomic and national security interests.

15 (6) In the coming decades, the United States
16 must prevent the PRC from—

17 (A) establishing regional hegemony in the
18 Indo-Pacific; and

19 (B) using that position to advance its as-
20 sertive political, economic, and foreign policy
21 goals around the world.

22 (7) The United States must ensure that the
23 Federal budget is properly aligned with the strategic
24 imperative to compete with the PRC by—

1 (A) ensuring sufficient levels of funding to
2 resource all instruments of United States na-
3 tional power; and

4 (B) coherently prioritizing how such funds
5 are used.

6 (8) Sustained prioritization of the challenge
7 posed by the PRC requires—

8 (A) bipartisan cooperation within Con-
9 gress; and

10 (B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful
11 collaboration and consultation between the exec-
12 utive branch and Congress.

13 (9) The United States must ensure close inte-
14 gration among economic and foreign policymakers,
15 the private sector, civil society, universities and aca-
16 demic institutions, and other relevant actors in free
17 and open societies affected by the challenges posed
18 by the PRC to enable such actors—

19 (A) to collaborate to advance common in-
20 terests; and

21 (B) to identify appropriate policies—

22 (i) to strengthen the United States
23 and its allies;

24 (ii) to promote a compelling vision of
25 a free and open order; and

1 (iii) to push back against detrimental
2 policies pursued by the CCP.

3 (10) The United States must ensure that all
4 Federal departments and agencies are organized to
5 reflect the fact that strategic competition with the
6 PRC is the United States' greatest geopolitical and
7 geoeconomic challenge, including through the as-
8 signed missions and location of United States Gov-
9 ernment personnel, by—

10 (A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-
11 Pacific region, at posts around the world, and
12 in Washington DC, with priorities directly rel-
13 evant to advancing competition with the Peo-
14 ple's Republic of China;

15 (B) placing greater numbers of foreign
16 service officers, international development pro-
17 fessionals, members of the foreign commercial
18 service, intelligence professionals, and other
19 United States Government personnel in the
20 Indo-Pacific region; and

21 (C) ensuring that this workforce, both ci-
22 vilian and military, has the training in lan-
23 guage, technical skills, and other competencies
24 required to advance a successful competitive
25 strategy with the PRC.

1 (11) The United States must place renewed em-
2 phasis on strengthening the nonmilitary instruments
3 of national power, including diplomacy, information,
4 technology, economics, foreign assistance and devel-
5 opment finance, commerce, intelligence, and law en-
6 forcement, which are crucial for addressing the
7 unique economic, political, and ideological challenges
8 posed by the PRC.

9 (12) The United States must sustain resourcing
10 for a Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which shall be
11 aligned with the overarching political and diplomatic
12 objectives articulated in the Asia Reassurance Initia-
13 tive Act (Public Law 115–409), and must prioritize
14 the military investments necessary to achieve United
15 States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific, includ-
16 ing—

17 (A) promoting regional security in the
18 Indo-Pacific;

19 (B) reassuring allies and partners while
20 protecting them from coercion; and

21 (C) deterring conflict with the PRC.

22 (13) Competition with the PRC requires the
23 United States’ skillful adaptation to the information
24 environment of the 21st century. United States pub-

1 lic diplomacy and messaging efforts must effec-
2 tively—

3 (A) promote the value of partnership with
4 the United States;

5 (B) highlight the risks and costs of
6 enmeshment with the PRC; and

7 (C) counter CCP propaganda and
8 disinformation.

9 **SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.**

10 (a) **APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON**
11 **ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES.**—Nothing
12 in this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, super-
13 sede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the
14 United States Government under section 620M of the
15 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or sec-
16 tion 362 of title 10, United States Code.

17 (b) **NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY**
18 **FORCE.**—Nothing in this Act may be construed as author-
19 izing the use of military force.

1 **TITLE I—INVESTING IN A**
2 **COMPETITIVE FUTURE**
3 **Subtitle A—Science and**
4 **Technology**

5 **SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COM-**
6 **PANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVER-**
7 **SIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.**

8 (a) **AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.**—The
9 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
10 Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facili-
11 tate the contracting by the Department of State for the
12 professional services of qualified experts, on a reimburs-
13 able fee for service basis, to assist interested United States
14 persons and business entities with supply chain manage-
15 ment issues related to the PRC, including—

16 (1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating
17 certain production facilities to locations outside the
18 PRC;

19 (2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other ef-
20 forts to diversify supply chains to locations outside
21 of the PRC;

22 (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other chal-
23 lenges in the course of the activities described in
24 paragraphs (1) and (2); and

1 (4) identifying alternative markets for produc-
2 tion or sourcing outside of the PRC, including
3 through providing market intelligence, facilitating
4 contact with reliable local partners as appropriate,
5 and other services.

6 (b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons
7 hired to perform the services described in subsection (a)
8 shall—

9 (1) be under the authority of the United States
10 Chief of Mission in the country in which they are
11 hired, in accordance with existing United States
12 laws;

13 (2) coordinate with Department of State and
14 Department of Commerce officers; and

15 (3) coordinate with United States missions and
16 relevant local partners in other countries as needed
17 to carry out the services described in subsection (a).

18 (c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND ME-
19 DIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The services described in
20 subsection (a) shall be prioritized for assisting micro-,
21 small-, and medium-sized enterprises with regard to the
22 matters described in subsection (a).

23 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
24 authorized to be appropriated \$15,000,000 for each of fis-

1 cal years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes of carrying
2 out this section.

3 (e) PROHIBITION ON ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE BY
4 FOREIGN ADVERSARIES.—None of the funds appropriated
5 pursuant to this section may be provided to an entity—

6 (1) under the foreign ownership, control, or in-
7 fluence of the Government of the People’s Republic
8 of China or the Chinese Communist Party, or other
9 foreign adversary;

10 (2) determined to have beneficial ownership
11 from foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction,
12 direction, or influence of foreign adversaries; and

13 (3) that has any contract in effect at the time
14 of the receipt of such funds, or has had a contract
15 within the previous one year that is no longer in ef-
16 fect, with—

17 (A) the Government of the People’s Repub-
18 lic of China;

19 (B) the Chinese Communist Party;

20 (C) the Chinese military;

21 (D) an entity majority-owned, majority-
22 controlled, or majority-financed by the Govern-
23 ment of the People’s Republic of China, the
24 CCP, or the Chinese military; or

1 (E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an
2 entity described in subparagraph (D).

3 (f) DEFINITIONS.—The terms “foreign ownership,
4 control, or influence” and “FOCI” have the meanings
5 given those terms in the National Industrial Security Pro-
6 gram Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a suc-
7 cessor document.

8 **Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure** 9 **and Energy Development**

10 **SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-** 11 **FINED.**

12 In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of
13 Congress” means—

14 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
15 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

16 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
17 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
18 resentatives.

19 **SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUAL-** 20 **ITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STAND-** 21 **ARDS.**

22 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
23 gress that the United States should initiate collaboration
24 among governments, the private sector, and civil society
25 to encourage the adoption of the standards for quality

1 global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at
2 Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following
3 issues:

4 (1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in
5 which infrastructure investments are made.

6 (2) Anti-corruption.

7 (3) Rule of law.

8 (4) Human rights and labor rights.

9 (5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.

10 (6) Social and governance safeguards.

11 (7) Transparency.

12 (8) Environmental and energy standards.

13 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
14 gress that the United States should launch a series of fora
15 around the world showcasing the commitment of the
16 United States and partners of the United States to high-
17 quality development cooperation, including with respect to
18 the issues described in subsection (a).

19 **SEC. 113. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUC-**
20 **TURE.**

21 (a) FINDINGS.—The Global Infrastructure Coordi-
22 nating Committee (GICC) was established to coordinate
23 the efforts of the Department of State, the Department
24 of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, the De-
25 partment of Energy, the Department of Transportation,

1 the United States Agency for International Development,
2 the United States Trade and Development Agency, the
3 Development Finance Corporation, the Export-Import
4 Bank of the United States, and other agencies to catalyze
5 private sector investments around the world and to coordi-
6 nate the deployment of United States Government tech-
7 nical assistance and development finance tools, including
8 project preparation services and commercial advocacy.

9 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
10 gress that—

11 (1) the world’s infrastructure needs, including
12 in the transport, energy, and digital sectors, are vast
13 and growing;

14 (2) total or partial ownership or acquisition of,
15 or a significant financial stake or physical presence
16 in, certain types of infrastructure, including ports,
17 energy grids, 5G telecommunications networks, and
18 undersea cables, can provide an advantage to coun-
19 tries that do not share the interests and values of
20 the United States and its allies and partners, and
21 could therefore be deleterious to the interests and
22 values of the United States and its allies and part-
23 ners;

24 (3) the United States must continue to
25 prioritize support for infrastructure projects that are

1 physically secure, financially viable, economically
2 sustainable, and socially responsible;

3 (4) achieving the objective outlined in para-
4 graph (3) requires the coordination of all United
5 States Government economic tools across the inter-
6 agency, so that such tools are deployed in a way to
7 maximize United States interests and that of its al-
8 lies and partners;

9 (5) the GICC represents an important and con-
10 crete step towards better communication and coordi-
11 nation across the United States Government of eco-
12 nomic tools relevant to supporting infrastructure
13 that is physically secure, financially viable, economi-
14 cally sustainable, and socially responsible, and
15 should be continued; and

16 (6) the executive branch and Congress should
17 have consistent consultations on United States sup-
18 port for strategic infrastructure projects, including
19 how Congress can support such initiatives in the fu-
20 ture.

21 (c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180
22 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semi-
23 annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in
24 coordination with other Federal agencies that participate
25 in the GICC, and, as appropriate, the Director of National

1 Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate committees
2 of Congress a report that identifies—

3 (1) current, pending, and future infrastructure
4 projects, particularly in the transport, energy, and
5 digital sectors, that the United States is supporting
6 or will support through financing, foreign assistance,
7 technical assistance, or other means;

8 (2) a detailed explanation of the United States
9 and partner country interests served by the United
10 States providing support to such projects; and

11 (3) a detailed description of any support pro-
12 vided by other United States allies and partners to
13 such projects.

14 (d) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by sub-
15 section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
16 include a classified annex.

17 **SEC. 114. INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSACTION AND ASSIST-**
18 **ANCE NETWORK.**

19 (a) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State is author-
20 ized to establish an initiative, to be known as the “Infra-
21 structure Transaction and Assistance Network”, under
22 which the Secretary of State, in consultation with other
23 relevant Federal agencies, including those represented on
24 the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may
25 carry out various programs to advance the development

1 of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastruc-
2 ture in the Indo-Pacific region by—

3 (1) strengthening capacity-building programs to
4 improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and
5 procurement environments, and project preparation
6 capacity of countries that are partners of the United
7 States in such development;

8 (2) providing transaction advisory services and
9 project preparation assistance to support sustainable
10 infrastructure; and

11 (3) coordinating the provision of United States
12 assistance for the development of infrastructure, in-
13 cluding infrastructure that utilizes United States-
14 manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing in-
15 vestment led by the private sector.

16 (b) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the
17 “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” de-
18 scribed under subsection (a), the Secretary of State is au-
19 thorized to provide support, including through the Trans-
20 action Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost
21 the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and
22 assess the financial and environmental impacts of poten-
23 tial infrastructure projects, including through providing
24 services such as—

25 (1) legal services;

- 1 (2) project preparation and feasibility studies;
- 2 (3) debt sustainability analyses;
- 3 (4) bid or proposal evaluation; and
- 4 (5) other services relevant to advancing the de-
- 5 velopment of sustainable, transparent, and high-
- 6 quality infrastructure.

7 (c) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE FUND.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the “Infrastruc-

9 ture Transaction and Assistance Network” described

10 under subsection (a), the Secretary of State is au-

11 thORIZED to provide support, including through the

12 Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for technical assist-

13 ance, project preparation, pipeline development, and

14 other infrastructure project support.

15 (2) JOINT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—

16 Funds authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure

17 Fund should be used in coordination with the De-

18 partment of Defense, the International Development

19 Finance Corporation, like-minded donor partners,

20 and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support

21 joint infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific re-

22 gion.

23 (3) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—

24 Funds authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure

25 Fund should be used to support strategic infrastruc-

1 ture projects that are in the national security inter-
2 est of the United States and vulnerable to strategic
3 competitors.

4 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
5 authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years
6 2022 to 2026, \$75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Trans-
7 action and Assistance Network, of which \$20,000,000 is
8 to be provided for the Transaction Advisory Fund.

9 **SEC. 115. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE EN-**
10 **ERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct a com-
12 prehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in con-
13 sultation with the private sector, to counter predatory
14 lending and financing by the Government of the People’s
15 Republic of China, including support to companies incor-
16 porated in the PRC that engage in such activities, in the
17 energy sectors of developing countries.

18 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States
19 to—

20 (1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted
21 energy needs and capacities of developing countries,
22 and analyze the presence and involvement of PRC
23 state-owned industries and other companies incor-
24 porated in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing
25 labor, and financing of energy projects, including di-

1 rect financing by the PRC government, PRC finan-
2 cial institutions, or direct state support to state-
3 owned enterprises and other companies incorporated
4 in the PRC;

5 (2) pursue strategic support and investment op-
6 portunities, and diplomatic engagement on power
7 sector reforms, to expand the development and de-
8 ployment of advanced energy technologies in devel-
9 oping countries;

10 (3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants,
11 and other financial products on terms that advance
12 domestic economic and local employment opportuni-
13 ties, utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage
14 private sector growth, and, when appropriate United
15 States equity and sovereign lending products as al-
16 ternatives to the predatory lending tools offered by
17 Chinese financial institutions;

18 (4) pursue partnerships with likeminded inter-
19 national financial and multilateral institutions to le-
20 verage investment in advanced energy technologies
21 in developing countries; and

22 (5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the
23 cooperative development of advanced energy tech-
24 nologies with countries of strategic significance, par-
25 ticularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the

1 effects of energy engagement by the PRC through
2 predatory lending or other actions that negatively
3 impact other countries.

4 (c) **ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.**—
5 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
6 of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Sec-
7 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of En-
8 ergy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
9 mittees a United States Government strategy to increase
10 United States exports of advanced energy technologies
11 to—

12 (1) improve energy security in allied and devel-
13 oping countries;

14 (2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and
15 transparent energy markets;

16 (3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy
17 trading relationships; and

18 (4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.

19 **SEC. 116. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S**
20 **INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DEVEL-**
21 **OPMENT.**

22 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—No later than 180 days after the
23 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
24 for five years, the Administrator of the United States
25 Agency for International Development, in consultation

1 with the Secretary of State through the Assistant Sec-
2 retary for Energy Resources, shall submit to the appro-
3 priate congressional committees a report that—

4 (1) identifies priority countries for deepening
5 United States engagement on energy matters, in ac-
6 cordance with the economic and national security in-
7 terests of the United States and where deeper en-
8 ergy partnerships are most achievable;

9 (2) describes the involvement of the PRC gov-
10 ernment and companies incorporated in the PRC in
11 the development, operation, financing, or ownership
12 of energy generation facilities, transmission infra-
13 structure, or energy resources in the countries iden-
14 tified in paragraph (1);

15 (3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and
16 implications for United States national interests and
17 the interests of the countries identified in paragraph
18 (1), with respect to the PRC's involvement and in-
19 fluence in developing country energy production or
20 transmission; and

21 (4) outlines current and planned efforts by the
22 United States to partner with the countries identi-
23 fied in paragraph (1) on energy matters that sup-
24 port shared interests between the United States and
25 such countries.

1 (b) PUBLICATION.—The assessment required in sub-
2 section (a) shall be published on the United States Agency
3 for International Development’s website.

4 **Subtitle C—Digital Technology and** 5 **Connectivity**

6 **SEC. 121. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY** 7 **ISSUES.**

8 (a) LEADERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
9 SETTING.—It is the sense of Congress that the United
10 States must lead in international bodies that set the gov-
11 ernance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled tech-
12 nologies in order to ensure that these technologies operate
13 within a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital do-
14 main.

15 (b) COUNTERING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.—It
16 is the sense of Congress that the United States, along with
17 allies and partners, should lead an international effort
18 that utilizes all of the economic and diplomatic tools at
19 its disposal to combat the expanding use of information
20 and communications technology products and services to
21 surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known
22 as “digital authoritarianism”).

23 (c) NEGOTIATIONS FOR DIGITAL TRADE AGREE-
24 MENTS OR ARRANGEMENTS.—It is the sense of Congress
25 that the United States Trade Representative should nego-

1 tiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements or arrange-
2 ments relating to digital goods with the European Union,
3 Japan, Taiwan, the member countries of the Five Eyes
4 intelligence-sharing alliance, and other nations, as appro-
5 priate.

6 (d) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL
7 AGE.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States
8 should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of infor-
9 mation, including the ability to safely consume or publish
10 information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained
11 as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral
12 mechanism for communication.

13 (e) EFFORTS TO ENSURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVEL-
14 OPMENT DOES NOT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC GOVERN-
15 ANCE OR HUMAN RIGHTS.—It is the sense of Congress
16 that the United States should lead a global effort to de-
17 velop and adopt a set of common principles and standards
18 for critical technologies to ensure that the use of such
19 technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether
20 they are governments or other entities, and that they do
21 not threaten democratic governance or human rights.

22 (f) FORMATION OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY TRADE
23 ALLIANCE.—It is the sense of Congress that the United
24 States should examine opportunities for diplomatic nego-
25 tiations regarding the formation of mutually beneficial al-

1 liances relating to digitally-enabled technologies and serv-
2 ices.

3 **SEC. 122. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY**
4 **PARTNERSHIP.**

5 (a) DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY
6 PARTNERSHIP.—The Secretary of State is authorized to
7 establish a program, to be known as the “Digital
8 Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership” to help for-
9 eign countries—

10 (1) expand and increase secure Internet access
11 and digital infrastructure in emerging markets;

12 (2) protect technological assets, including data;

13 (3) adopt policies and regulatory positions that
14 foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable,
15 and secure internet, the free flow of data, multi-
16 stakeholder models of internet governance, and pro-
17 competitive and secure information and communica-
18 tions technology (ICT) policies and regulations;

19 (4) promote exports of United States ICT
20 goods and services and increase United States com-
21 pany market share in target markets;

22 (5) promote the diversification of ICT goods
23 and supply chain services to be less reliant on PRC
24 imports; and

1 (6) build cybersecurity capacity, expand inter-
2 operability, and promote best practices for a national
3 approach to cybersecurity.

4 (b) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180
5 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
6 retary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees
7 of Congress an implementation plan for the coming year
8 to advance the goals identified in subsection (a).

9 (c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the action plan
10 required by subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall
11 consult with—

12 (1) the appropriate congressional committees;

13 (2) leaders of the United States industry;

14 (3) other relevant technology experts, including
15 the Open Technology Fund;

16 (4) representatives from relevant United States
17 Government agencies; and

18 (5) representatives from like-minded allies and
19 partners.

20 (d) SEMIANNUAL BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not
21 later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
22 this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary
23 of State shall provide the appropriate congressional com-
24 mittees a briefing on the implementation of the plan re-
25 quired by subsection (b).

1 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
2 authorized to be appropriated \$100,000,000 for each of
3 fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.

4 **SEC. 123. STRATEGY FOR DIGITAL INVESTMENT BY UNITED**
5 **STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FI-**
6 **NANCE CORPORATION.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the
8 date of the enactment of this Act, the United States Inter-
9 national Development Finance Corporation, in consulta-
10 tion with the Administrator of the United States Agency
11 for International Development, shall submit to the appro-
12 priate congressional committees a strategy for support of
13 private sector digital investment that—

14 (1) includes support for information-
15 connectivity projects, including projects relating to
16 telecommunications equipment, mobile payments,
17 smart cities, and undersea cables;

18 (2) in providing such support, prioritizes pri-
19 vate sector projects—

20 (A) of strategic value to the United States;

21 (B) of mutual strategic value to the United
22 States and allies and partners of the United
23 States; and

24 (C) that will advance broader development
25 priorities of the United States; and

1 (3) helps to bridge the digital gap in less devel-
2 oped countries and among women and minority com-
3 munities within those countries;

4 (4) facilitates coordination, where appropriate,
5 with multilateral development banks and develop-
6 ment finance institutions of other countries with re-
7 spect to projects described in paragraph (1), includ-
8 ing through the provision of co-financing and co-
9 guarantees; and

10 (5) identifies the human and financial resources
11 available to dedicate to such projects and assesses
12 any constraints to implementing such projects.

13 (b) LIMITATION.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation may not
15 provide support for projects in which entities de-
16 scribed in paragraph (2) participate.

17 (2) ENTITIES DESCRIBED.—An entity described
18 in this subparagraph is an entity based in, or owned
19 or controlled by the government of, a country, in-
20 cluding the People's Republic of China, that does
21 not protect internet freedom of expression and pri-
22 vacy.

1 **Subtitle D—Countering Chinese**
2 **Communist Party Malign Influence**

3 **SECTION 131. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This subtitle may be cited as the “Countering Chi-
5 nese Communist Party Malign Influence Act”.

6 **SEC. 132. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR**
7 **COUNTERING CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND.**

8 (a) COUNTERING CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND.—

9 There is authorized to be appropriated \$300,000,000 for
10 each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the Countering
11 Chinese Influence Fund to counter the malign influence
12 of the Chinese Communist Party globally. Amounts appro-
13 priated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to
14 remain available until expended and shall be in addition
15 to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to
16 counter such influence.

17 (b) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—The obligation of
18 funds appropriated or otherwise made available to counter
19 the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party
20 globally shall be subject to prior consultation with, and
21 consistent with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance
22 Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notification
23 procedures of—

24 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
25 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
2 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
3 resentatives.

4 (c) POLICY GUIDANCE, COORDINATION, AND AP-
5 PROVAL.—

6 (1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State
7 shall designate an existing senior official of the De-
8 partment at the rank of Assistant Secretary or
9 above to provide policy guidance, coordination, and
10 approval for the obligation of funds authorized pur-
11 suant to subsection (a).

12 (2) DUTIES.—The senior official designated
13 pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for—

14 (A) on an annual basis, the identification
15 of specific strategic priorities for using the
16 funds authorized to be appropriated by sub-
17 section (a), such as geographic areas of focus or
18 functional categories of programming that
19 funds are to be concentrated within, consistent
20 with the national interests of the United States
21 and the purposes of this Act;

22 (B) the coordination and approval of all
23 programming conducted using the funds au-
24 thorized to be appropriated by subsection (a),
25 based on a determination that such program-

1 ming directly counters the malign influence of
2 the Chinese Communist Party, including spe-
3 cific activities or policies advanced by the Chi-
4 nese Communist Party, pursuant to the stra-
5 tegic objectives of the United States, as estab-
6 lished in the 2017 National Security Strategy,
7 the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and other
8 relevant national and regional strategies as ap-
9 propriate;

10 (C) ensuring that all programming ap-
11 proved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such
12 acts by the Chinese Communist Party described
13 in subsection (d) and adheres to the require-
14 ments outlined in subsection (e); and

15 (D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and
16 evaluation of the effectiveness of all program-
17 ming conducted using the funds authorized to
18 be appropriated by subsection (a) to ensure
19 that it advances United States interests and de-
20 grades the ability of the Chinese Communist
21 Party, to advance activities that align with sub-
22 section (d) of this section.

23 (3) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The senior
24 official designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall,

1 in coordinating and approving programming pursu-
2 ant to paragraph (2), seek to—

3 (A) conduct appropriate interagency con-
4 sultation; and

5 (B) ensure, to the maximum extent prac-
6 ticable, that all approved programming func-
7 tions in concert with other Federal activities to
8 counter the malign influence and activities of
9 the Chinese Communist Party.

10 (4) ASSISTANT COORDINATOR.—The Adminis-
11 trator of the United States Agency for International
12 Development shall designate a senior official at the
13 rank of Assistant Administrator or above to assist
14 and consult with the senior official designated pur-
15 suant to paragraph (1).

16 (d) MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this section, the term
17 “malign influence” with respect to the Chinese Com-
18 munist Party should be construed to include acts con-
19 ducted by the Chinese Communist Party or entities acting
20 on its behalf that—

21 (1) undermine a free and open international
22 order;

23 (2) advance an alternative, repressive inter-
24 national order that bolsters the Chinese Communist

1 Party's hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by
2 coercion and dependency;

3 (3) undermine the national security or sov-
4 ereignty of the United States or other countries; or

5 (4) undermine the economic security of the
6 United States or other countries, including by pro-
7 moting corruption.

8 (e) COUNTERING MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this sec-
9 tion, countering malign influence through the use of funds
10 authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) shall in-
11 clude efforts to—

12 (1) promote transparency and accountability,
13 and reduce corruption, including in governance
14 structures targeted by the malign influence of the
15 Chinese Communist Party;

16 (2) support civil society and independent media
17 to raise awareness of and increase transparency re-
18 garding the negative impact of activities related to
19 the Belt and Road Initiative and associated initia-
20 tives;

21 (3) counter transnational criminal networks
22 that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of
23 the Chinese Communist Party;

24 (4) encourage economic development structures
25 that help protect against predatory lending schemes,

1 including support for market-based alternatives in
2 key economic sectors, such as digital economy, en-
3 ergy, and infrastructure;

4 (5) counter activities that provide undue influ-
5 ence to the security forces of the People's Republic
6 of China;

7 (6) expose misinformation and disinformation
8 of the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda, in-
9 cluding through programs carried out by the Global
10 Engagement Center; and

11 (7) counter efforts by the Chinese Communist
12 Party to legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology
13 and governance models.

14 **SEC. 133. FINDINGS ON CHINESE INFORMATION WARFARE**
15 **AND MALIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.**

16 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
17 ings:

18 (1) In the report to Congress required under
19 section 1261(b) of the John S. McCain National De-
20 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Pub-
21 lic Law 115–232), the President laid out a broad
22 range of malign activities conducted by the Govern-
23 ment of the People's Republic of China and its
24 agents and entities, including—

1 (A) propaganda and disinformation, in
2 which “Beijing communicates its narrative
3 through state-run television, print, radio, and
4 online organizations whose presence is prolifer-
5 ating in the United States and around the
6 world”;

7 (B) malign political influence operations,
8 particularly “front organizations and agents
9 which target businesses, universities, think
10 tanks, scholars, journalists, and local state and
11 Federal officials in the United States and
12 around the world, attempting to influence dis-
13 course”; and

14 (C) malign financial influence operations,
15 characterized as the “misappropriation of tech-
16 nology and intellectual property, failure to ap-
17 propriately disclose relationships with foreign
18 government sponsored entities, breaches of con-
19 tract and confidentiality, and manipulation of
20 processes for fair and merit-based allocation of
21 Federal research and development funding”.

22 (2) Chinese information warfare and malign in-
23 fluence operations are ongoing. In January 2019,
24 then-Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats,
25 stated, “China will continue to use legal, political,

1 and economic levers—such as the lure of Chinese
2 markets—to shape the information environment. It
3 is also capable of using cyber attacks against sys-
4 tems in the United States to censor or suppress
5 viewpoints it deems politically sensitive.”.

6 (3) In February 2020, then-Director of the
7 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray,
8 testified to the Committee on the Judiciary of the
9 House of Representatives that the People’s Republic
10 of China has “very active [malign] foreign influence
11 efforts in this country,” with the goal of “trying to
12 shift our policy and our public opinion to be more
13 pro-China on a variety of issues”.

14 (4) The PRC’s information warfare and malign
15 influence operations continue to adopt new tactics
16 and evolve in sophistication. In May 2020, then-Spe-
17 cial Envoy and Coordinator of the Global Engage-
18 ment Center (GEC), Lea Gabrielle, stated that there
19 was a convergence of Russian and Chinese nar-
20 ratives surrounding COVID–19 and that the GEC
21 had “uncovered a new network of inauthentic Twit-
22 ter accounts” that it assessed was “created with the
23 intent to amplify Chinese propaganda and
24 disinformation”. In June 2020, Google reported that

1 Chinese hackers attempted to access email accounts
2 of the campaign staff of a presidential candidate.

3 (5) Chinese information warfare and malign in-
4 fluence operations are a threat to the national secu-
5 rity, democracy, and economic systems of the United
6 States and its allies and partners. In October 2018,
7 Vice President Michael R. Pence warned that “Bei-
8 jing is employing a whole-of-government approach,
9 using political, economic, and military tools, as well
10 as propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit
11 its interests in the United States.”.

12 (6) In February 2018, then-Director of the
13 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray,
14 testified to the Select Committee on Intelligence of
15 the Senate that the People’s Republic of China is
16 taking advantage of and exploiting the open research
17 and development environments of United States in-
18 stitutions of higher education to utilize “professors,
19 scientists and students” as “nontraditional collec-
20 tors” of information.

21 (b) PRESIDENTIAL DUTIES.—The President shall—

22 (1) protect our democratic institutions and
23 processes from malign influence from the People’s
24 Republic of China and other foreign adversaries; and

1 (2) consistent with the policy specified in para-
2 graph (1), direct the heads of the appropriate Fed-
3 eral departments and agencies to implement Acts of
4 Congress to counter and deter PRC and other for-
5 eign information warfare and malign influence oper-
6 ations without delay, including—

7 (A) section 1043 of the John S. McCain
8 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
9 Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232), which au-
10 thorizes a coordinator position within the Na-
11 tional Security Council for countering malign
12 foreign influence operations and campaigns;

13 (B) section 228 of the National Defense
14 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public
15 Law 116–92), which authorizes additional re-
16 search of foreign malign influence operations on
17 social media platforms;

18 (C) section 847 of such Act, which requires
19 the Secretary of Defense to modify contracting
20 regulations regarding vetting for foreign owner-
21 ship, control and influence in order to mitigate
22 risks from malign foreign influence;

23 (D) section 1239 of such Act, which re-
24 quires an update of the comprehensive strategy

1 to counter the threat of malign influence to in-
2 clude the People's Republic of China;

3 (E) section 5323 of such Act, which au-
4 thORIZES the Director of National Intelligence to
5 facilitate the establishment of Social Media
6 Data and Threat Analysis Center to detect and
7 study information warfare and malign influence
8 operations across social media platforms; and

9 (F) section 119C of the National Security
10 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059), which authorizes
11 the establishment of a Foreign Malign Influence
12 Response Center inside the Office of the Direc-
13 tor of National Intelligence.

14 **SEC. 134. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE**
15 **FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM.**

16 There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-
17 year period beginning on October 1, 2021, \$105,500,000,
18 to promote education, training, research, and foreign lan-
19 guage skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in ac-
20 cordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational
21 and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).

22 **SEC. 135. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN**
23 **RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION.**

24 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
25 ings:

1 (1) Since the onset of the COVID–19 pan-
2 demic, crimes and discrimination against Asians and
3 those of Asian descent have risen dramatically
4 worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations Secretary-
5 General Antonio Guterres said “the pandemic con-
6 tinues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia,
7 scapegoating and scare-mongering” and urged gov-
8 ernments to “act now to strengthen the immunity of
9 our societies against the virus of hate”.

10 (2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI)
11 workers make up a large portion of the essential
12 workers on the frontlines of the COVID-19 pan-
13 demic, making up 8.5 percent of all essential
14 healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI
15 workers also make up a large share—between 6 per-
16 cent and 12 percent based on sector—of the bio-
17 medical field.

18 (3) The United States Census notes that Amer-
19 icans of Asian descent alone made up nearly 5.9 per-
20 cent of the United States population in 2019, and
21 that Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial
22 group in the United States, projected to represent
23 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.

24 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
25 gress that—

1 (1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian
2 descent and concerning increase in anti-Asian senti-
3 ment and racism in the United States and around
4 the world have no place in a peaceful, civilized, and
5 tolerant world;

6 (2) the United States is a diverse nation with
7 a proud tradition of immigration, and the strength
8 and vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by
9 the diverse ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its
10 citizens, including Asian Americans and Pacific Is-
11 landers;

12 (3) the United States Government should en-
13 courage other foreign governments to use the official
14 and scientific names for the COVID–19 pandemic,
15 as recommended by the World Health Organization
16 and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
17 and

18 (4) the United States Government and other
19 governments around the world must actively oppose
20 racism and intolerance, and use all available and ap-
21 propriate tools to combat the spread of anti-Asian
22 racism and discrimination.

1 **SEC. 136. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUN-**
2 **TERING DISINFORMATION.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
4 ings:

5 (1) The PRC is increasing its spending on pub-
6 lic diplomacy including influence campaigns, adver-
7 tising, and investments into state-sponsored media
8 publications outside of the PRC. These include, for
9 example, more than \$10,000,000,000 in foreign di-
10 rect investment in communications infrastructure,
11 platforms, and properties, as well as bringing jour-
12 nalists to the PRC for training programs.

13 (2) The PRC, through the Voice of China, the
14 United Front Work Department (UFWD), and
15 UFWD's many affiliates and proxies, has obtained
16 unfettered access to radio, television, and digital dis-
17 semination platforms in numerous languages tar-
18 geted at citizens in other regions where the PRC has
19 an interest in promoting public sentiment in support
20 of the Chinese Communist Party and expanding the
21 reach of its misleading narratives and propaganda.

22 (3) Even in Western democracies, the PRC
23 spends extensively on influence operations, such as a
24 \$500,000,000 advertising campaign to attract cable
25 viewers in Australia and a more than \$20,000,000

1 campaign to influence United States public opinion
2 via the China Daily newspaper supplement.

3 (4) Radio Free Asia (referred to in this sub-
4 section as “RFA”), a private nonprofit multimedia
5 news corporation, which broadcasts in 9 East Asian
6 languages including Mandarin, Uyghur, Cantonese,
7 and Tibetan, has succeeded in its mission to reach
8 audiences in China and in the Central Asia region
9 despite the Chinese Government’s—

10 (A) efforts to practice “media sov-
11 ereignty,” which restricts access to the free
12 press within China; and

13 (B) campaign to spread disinformation to
14 countries abroad.

15 (5) In 2019, RFA’s Uyghur Service alerted the
16 world to the human rights abuses of Uyghur and
17 other ethnic minorities in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur
18 Autonomous Region.

19 (6) Gulchehra Hoja, a Uyghur journalist for
20 RFA, received the International Women’s Media
21 Foundation’s Courage in Journalism Award and a
22 2019 Magnitsky Human Rights Award for her cov-
23 erage of Xinjiang, while the Chinese Government de-
24 tained and harassed Ms. Hoja’s China-based family

1 and the families of 7 other RFA journalists in retal-
2 iation for their role in exposing abuses.

3 (7) In 2019 and 2020, RFA provided widely
4 disseminated print and digital coverage of the de-
5 cline in freedom in Hong Kong and the student-led
6 protests of the extradition law.

7 (8) In March 2020, RFA exposed efforts by the
8 Chinese Government to underreport the number of
9 fatalities from the novel coronavirus outbreak in
10 Wuhan Province, China.

11 (b) THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR GLOBAL
12 MEDIA.—The United States Agency for Global Media
13 (USAGM) and affiliate Federal and non-Federal entities
14 shall undertake the following actions to support inde-
15 pendent journalism, counter disinformation, and combat
16 surveillance in countries where the Chinese Communist
17 Party and other malign actors are promoting
18 disinformation, propaganda, and manipulated media mar-
19 kets:

20 (1) Radio Free Asia (RFA) shall expand do-
21 mestic coverage and digital programming for all
22 RFA China services and other affiliate language
23 broadcasting services.

1 (2) USAGM shall increase funding for RFA's
2 Mandarin, Tibetan, Uyghur, and Cantonese lan-
3 guage services.

4 (3) Voice of America shall establish a real-time
5 disinformation tracking tool similar to Polygraph for
6 Russian language propaganda and misinformation.

7 (4) USAGM shall expand existing training and
8 partnership programs that promote journalistic
9 standards, investigative reporting, cybersecurity, and
10 digital analytics to help expose and counter false
11 CCP narratives.

12 (5) The Open Technology Fund shall continue
13 and expand its work to support tools and technology
14 to circumvent censorship and surveillance by the
15 CCP, both inside the PRC as well as abroad where
16 the PRC has exported censorship technology, and in-
17 crease secure peer-to-peer connectivity and privacy
18 tools.

19 (6) Voice of America shall continue and review
20 opportunities to expand its mission of providing
21 timely, accurate, and reliable news, programming,
22 and content about the United States, including
23 news, culture, and values.

24 (7) The networks and grantees of the United
25 States Agency for Global Media shall continue their

1 mission of providing credible and timely news cov-
2 erage inclusive of the People's Republic of China's
3 activities in Xinjiang, including China's ongoing
4 genocide and crimes against humanity with respect
5 to Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, including
6 through strategic amplification of Radio Free Asia's
7 coverage, in its news programming in majority-Mus-
8 lim countries.

9 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
10 authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years
11 2022 through 2026 for the United States Agency for
12 Global Media, \$100,000,000 for ongoing and new pro-
13 grams to support local media, build independent media,
14 combat Chinese disinformation inside and outside of
15 China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and
16 monitor and evaluate these programs, of which—

17 (1) not less than \$70,000,000 shall be directed
18 to a grant to Radio Free Asia language services;

19 (2) not less than \$20,000,000 shall be used to
20 serve populations in China through Mandarin, Can-
21 tonese, Uyghur, and Tibetan language services; and

22 (3) not less than \$5,500,000 shall be used for
23 digital media services—

24 (A) to counter propaganda of non-Chinese
25 populations in foreign countries; and

1 (B) to counter propaganda of Chinese pop-
2 ulations in China through “Global Mandarin”
3 programming.

4 (d) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
7 nually thereafter for 5 years, the Chief Executive
8 Office of the United States Agency for Global
9 Media, in consultation with the President of the
10 Open Technology Fund, shall submit a report to the
11 appropriate congressional committees that outlines—

12 (A) the amount of funding appropriated
13 pursuant to subsection (c) that was provided to
14 the Open Technology Fund for purposes of cir-
15 cumventing Chinese Communist Party censor-
16 ship of the internet within the borders of the
17 People’s Republic of China;

18 (B) the progress that has been made in de-
19 veloping the technology referred to in subpara-
20 graph (A), including an assessment of whether
21 the funding provided was sufficient to achieve
22 meaningful penetration of People’s Republic of
23 China’s censors; and

24 (C) the impact of Open Technology Fund
25 tools on piercing Chinese Communist Party

1 internet censorship efforts, including the
2 metrics used to measure that impact and the
3 trajectory of that impact over the previous 5
4 years.

5 (2) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required
6 under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassi-
7 fied form, but may include a classified annex.

8 (e) SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.—The Secretary of
9 State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for
10 Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and in coordina-
11 tion with the Administrator of the United States Agency
12 for International Development, shall support and train
13 journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure
14 public accountability related to the Belt and Road Initia-
15 tive, the PRC's surveillance and digital export of tech-
16 nology, and other influence operations abroad direct or di-
17 rectly supported by the Communist Party or the Chinese
18 government.

19 (f) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Bureau
20 of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue
21 to support internet freedom programs.

22 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
23 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State,
24 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, \$170,000,000

1 for ongoing and new programs in support of press free-
2 dom, training, and protection of journalists.

3 **SEC. 137. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.**

4 (a) FINDING.—Congress established the Global En-
5 gagement Center to “direct, lead, and coordinate efforts”
6 of the Federal Government to “recognize, understand, ex-
7 pose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda
8 and disinformation globally”.

9 (b) EXTENSION.—Section 1287(j) of the National
10 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22
11 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking “the date that
12 is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act”
13 and inserting “December 31, 2027”.

14 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
15 gress that the Global Engagement Center should expand
16 its coordinating capacity through the exchange of liaison
17 officers with Federal departments and agencies that man-
18 age aspects of identifying and countering foreign
19 disinformation, including the National Counterterrorism
20 Center at the Office of the Director of National Intel-
21 ligence and from combatant commands.

22 (d) HIRING AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding any
23 other provision of law, the Secretary of State, during the
24 five year period beginning on the date of the enactment

1 of this Act and solely to carry out functions of the Global
2 Engagement Center, may—

3 (1) appoint employees without regard to the
4 provisions of title 5, United States Code, regarding
5 appointments in the competitive service; and

6 (2) fix the basic compensation of such employ-
7 ees without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III
8 of chapter 53 of such title regarding classification
9 and General Schedule pay rates.

10 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
11 authorized to be appropriated \$150,000,000 for fiscal year
12 2022 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign
13 state and non-state sponsored propaganda and
14 disinformation.

15 **SEC. 138. REVIEW BY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVEST-**
16 **MENT IN THE UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN**
17 **FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND CONTRACTS WITH**
18 **INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.**

19 (a) AMENDMENTS TO DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT
20 OF 1950.—

21 (1) DEFINITION OF COVERED TRANSACTION.—
22 Subsection (a)(4) of section 721 of the Defense Pro-
23 duction Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565) is amended—

24 (A) in subparagraph (A)—

1 (i) in clause (i), by striking “; and”
2 and inserting a semicolon;

3 (ii) in clause (ii), by striking the pe-
4 riod at the end and inserting “; and”; and

5 (iii) by adding at the end the fol-
6 lowing:

7 “(iii) any transaction described in
8 subparagraph (B)(vi) proposed or pending
9 after the date of the enactment of the
10 China Strategic Competition Act of
11 2021.”;

12 (B) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the
13 end the following:

14 “(vi) Any gift to an institution of
15 higher education from a foreign person, or
16 the entry into a contract by such an insti-
17 tution with a foreign person, if—

18 “(I)(aa) the value of the gift or
19 contract equals or exceeds
20 \$1,000,000; or

21 “(bb) the institution receives, di-
22 rectly or indirectly, more than one gift
23 from or enters into more than one
24 contract, directly or indirectly, with
25 the same foreign person for the same

1 purpose the aggregate value of which,
2 during the period of 2 consecutive cal-
3 endar years, equals or exceeds
4 \$1,000,000; and

5 “(II) the gift or contract—

6 “(aa) relates to research, de-
7 velopment, or production of crit-
8 ical technologies and provides the
9 foreign person potential access to
10 any material nonpublic technical
11 information (as defined in sub-
12 paragraph (D)(ii)) in the posses-
13 sion of the institution; or

14 “(bb) is a restricted or con-
15 ditional gift or contract (as de-
16 fined in section 117(h) of the
17 Higher Education Act of 1965
18 (20 U.S.C. 1011f(h))) that estab-
19 lishes control.”; and

20 (C) by adding at the end the following:

21 “(G) FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND CONTRACTS
22 WITH INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.—
23 For purposes of subparagraph (B)(vi):

24 “(i) CONTRACT.—The term ‘contract’
25 means any agreement for the acquisition

1 by purchase, lease, or barter of property or
2 services by a foreign person, for the direct
3 benefit or use of either of the parties.

4 “(ii) GIFT.—The term ‘gift’ means
5 any gift of money or property.

6 “(iii) INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDU-
7 CATION.—The term ‘institution of higher
8 education’ means any institution, public or
9 private, or, if a multicampus institution,
10 any single campus of such institution, in
11 any State—

12 “(I) that is legally authorized
13 within such State to provide a pro-
14 gram of education beyond secondary
15 school;

16 “(II) that provides a program for
17 which the institution awards a bach-
18 elor’s degree (or provides not less
19 than a 2-year program which is ac-
20 ceptable for full credit toward such a
21 degree) or a more advanced degree;

22 “(III) that is accredited by a na-
23 tionally recognized accrediting agency
24 or association; and

1 “(IV) to which the Federal Gov-
2 ernment extends Federal financial as-
3 sistance (directly or indirectly through
4 another entity or person), or that re-
5 ceives support from the extension of
6 Federal financial assistance to any of
7 the institution’s subunits.”.

8 (2) MANDATORY DECLARATIONS.—Subsection
9 (b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(aa) of such section is amended by
10 adding at the end the following: “Such regulations
11 shall require a declaration under this subclause with
12 respect to a covered transaction described in sub-
13 section (a)(4)(B)(vi)(II)(aa).”.

14 (3) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED.—Subsection
15 (f) of such section is amended—

16 (A) in paragraph (10), by striking “; and”
17 and inserting a semicolon;

18 (B) by redesignating paragraph (11) as
19 paragraph (12); and

20 (C) by inserting after paragraph (10) the
21 following:

22 “(11) as appropriate, and particularly with re-
23 spect to covered transactions described in subsection
24 (a)(4)(B)(vi), the importance of academic freedom at

1 institutions of higher education in the United States;
2 and”.

3 (4) MEMBERSHIP OF CFIUS.—Subsection (k) of
4 such section is amended—

5 (A) in paragraph (2)—

6 (i) by redesignating subparagraphs
7 (H), (I), and (J) as subparagraphs (I),
8 (J), and (K), respectively; and

9 (ii) by inserting after subparagraph
10 (G) the following:

11 “(H) In the case of a covered transaction
12 involving an institution of higher education (as
13 defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)), the Secretary
14 of Education.”; and

15 (B) by adding at the end the following:

16 “(8) INCLUSION OF OTHER AGENCIES ON COM-
17 MITTEE.—In considering including on the Com-
18 mittee under paragraph (2)(K) the heads of other
19 executive departments, agencies, or offices, the
20 President shall give due consideration to the heads
21 of relevant research and science agencies, depart-
22 ments, and offices, including the Secretary of Health
23 and Human Services, the Director of the National
24 Institutes of Health, and the Director of the Na-
25 tional Science Foundation.”.

1 (5) CONTENTS OF ANNUAL REPORT RELATING
2 TO CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES.—Subsection (m)(3) of
3 such section is amended—

4 (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking “;
5 and” and inserting a semicolon;

6 (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the
7 period at the end and inserting a semicolon;
8 and

9 (C) by adding at the end the following:

10 “(D) an evaluation of whether there are
11 foreign malign influence or espionage activities
12 directed or directly assisted by foreign govern-
13 ments against institutions of higher education
14 (as defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)) aimed at
15 obtaining research and development methods or
16 secrets related to critical technologies; and

17 “(E) an evaluation of, and recommenda-
18 tion for any changes to, reviews conducted
19 under this section that relate to institutions of
20 higher education, based on an analysis of dislo-
21 sure reports submitted to the chairperson under
22 section 117(a) of the Higher Education Act of
23 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f(a)).”.

24 (b) INCLUSION OF CFIUS IN REPORTING ON FOR-
25 EIGN GIFTS UNDER HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1965.—

1 Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
2 U.S.C. 1011f) is amended—

3 (1) in subsection (a), by inserting after “the
4 Secretary” the following: “and the Secretary of the
5 Treasury (in the capacity of the Secretary as the
6 chairperson of the Committee on Foreign Investment
7 in the United States under section 721(k)(3) of the
8 Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.
9 4565(k)(3)))”; and

10 (2) in subsection (d)—

11 (A) in paragraph (1)—

12 (i) by striking “with the Secretary”
13 and inserting “with the Secretary and the
14 Secretary of the Treasury”; and

15 (ii) by striking “to the Secretary” and
16 inserting “to each such Secretary”; and

17 (B) in paragraph (2), by striking “with the
18 Secretary” and inserting “with the Secretary
19 and the Secretary of the Treasury”.

20 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.—The amend-
21 ments made by subsection (a) shall—

22 (1) take effect on the date of the enactment of
23 this Act, subject to the requirements of subsections
24 (d) and (e); and

1 (2) apply with respect to any covered trans-
2 action the review or investigation of which is initi-
3 ated under section 721 of the Defense Production
4 Act of 1950 on or after the date that is 30 days
5 after the publication in the Federal Register of the
6 notice required under subsection (e)(2).

7 (d) REGULATIONS.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Committee on Foreign
9 Investment in the United States (in this section re-
10 ferred to as the “Committee”), which shall include
11 the Secretary of Education for purposes of this sub-
12 section, shall prescribe regulations as necessary and
13 appropriate to implement the amendments made by
14 subsection (a).

15 (2) ELEMENTS.—The regulations prescribed
16 under paragraph (1) shall include—

17 (A) regulations accounting for the burden
18 on institutions of higher education likely to re-
19 sult from compliance with the amendments
20 made by subsection (a), including structuring
21 penalties and filing fees to reduce such burdens,
22 shortening timelines for reviews and investiga-
23 tions, allowing for simplified and streamlined
24 declaration and notice requirements, and imple-

1 menting any procedures necessary to protect
2 academic freedom; and

3 (B) guidance with respect to—

4 (i) which gifts and contracts described
5 in described in clause (vi)(II)(aa) of sub-
6 section (a)(4)(B) of section 721 of the De-
7 fense Production Act of 1950, as added by
8 subsection (a)(1), would be subject to filing
9 mandatory declarations under subsection
10 (b)(1)(C)(v)(IV) of that section; and

11 (ii) the meaning of “control”, as de-
12 fined in subsection (a) of that section, as
13 that term applies to covered transactions
14 described in clause (vi) of paragraph
15 (4)(B) of that section, as added by sub-
16 section (a)(1).

17 (3) ISSUANCE OF FINAL RULE.—The Com-
18 mittee shall issue a final rule to carry out the
19 amendments made by subsection (a) after assessing
20 the findings of the pilot program required by sub-
21 section (e).

22 (e) PILOT PROGRAM.—

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on the date that
24 is 30 days after the publication in the Federal Reg-
25 ister of the matter required by paragraph (2) and

1 ending on the date that is 570 days thereafter, the
2 Committee shall conduct a pilot program to assess
3 methods for implementing the review of covered
4 transactions described in clause (vi) of section
5 721(a)(4)(B) of the Defense Production Act of
6 1950, as added by subsection (a)(1).

7 (2) PROPOSED DETERMINATION.—Not later
8 than 270 days after the date of the enactment of
9 this Act, the Committee shall, in consultation with
10 the Secretary of Education, publish in the Federal
11 Register—

12 (A) a proposed determination of the scope
13 of and procedures for the pilot program re-
14 quired by paragraph (1);

15 (B) an assessment of the burden on insti-
16 tutions of higher education likely to result from
17 compliance with the pilot program;

18 (C) recommendations for addressing any
19 such burdens, including shortening timelines for
20 reviews and investigations, structuring penalties
21 and filing fees, and simplifying and stream-
22 lining declaration and notice requirements to
23 reduce such burdens; and

1 (D) any procedures necessary to ensure
2 that the pilot program does not infringe upon
3 academic freedom.

4 (3) REPORT ON FINDINGS.—Upon conclusion of
5 the pilot program required by paragraph (1), the
6 Committee shall submit to Congress a report on the
7 findings of that pilot program that includes—

8 (A) a summary of the reviews conducted
9 by the Committee under the pilot program and
10 the outcome of such reviews;

11 (B) an assessment of any additional re-
12 sources required by the Committee to carry out
13 this section or the amendments made by sub-
14 section (a);

15 (C) findings regarding the additional bur-
16 den on institutions of higher education likely to
17 result from compliance with the amendments
18 made by subsection (a) and any additional rec-
19 ommended steps to reduce those burdens; and

20 (D) any recommendations for Congress to
21 consider regarding the scope or procedures de-
22 scribed in this section or the amendments made
23 by subsection (a).

1 **SEC. 139. POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS ON SENATE-**
2 **CONFIRMED OFFICIALS AT THE DEPART-**
3 **MENT OF STATE.**

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that—

6 (1) Congress and the executive branch have rec-
7 ognized the importance of preventing and mitigating
8 the potential for conflicts of interest following gov-
9 ernment service, including with respect to senior
10 United States officials working on behalf of foreign
11 governments; and

12 (2) Congress and the executive branch should
13 jointly evaluate the status and scope of post-employ-
14 ment restrictions.

15 (b) RESTRICTIONS.—Section 841 of the State De-
16 partment Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C.
17 2651a) is amended by adding at the end the following new
18 subsection:

19 “(i) EXTENDED POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS
20 FOR CERTAIN SENATE-CONFIRMED OFFICIALS.—

21 “(1) SECRETARY OF STATE AND DEPUTY SEC-
22 RETARY OF STATE.—With respect to a person serv-
23 ing as the Secretary of State or Deputy Secretary of
24 State, the restrictions described in section 207(f)(1)
25 of title 18, United States Code, shall apply to rep-
26 resenting, aiding, or advising a foreign governmental

1 entity before an officer or employee of the executive
2 branch of the United States at any time after the
3 termination of that person’s service as Secretary or
4 Deputy Secretary.

5 “(2) UNDER SECRETARIES, ASSISTANT SECRE-
6 TARIES, AND AMBASSADORS.—With respect to a per-
7 son serving as an Under Secretary, Assistant Sec-
8 retary, or Ambassador at the Department of State
9 or the United States Permanent Representative to
10 the United Nations, the restrictions described in sec-
11 tion 207(f)(1) of title 18, United States Code, shall
12 apply to representing, aiding, or advising a foreign
13 governmental entity before an officer or employee of
14 the executive branch of the United States for 3
15 years after the termination of that person’s service
16 in a position described in this paragraph, or the du-
17 ration of the term or terms of the President who ap-
18 pointed that person to their position, whichever is
19 longer.

20 “(3) PENALTIES AND INJUNCTIONS.—Any vio-
21 lations of the restrictions in paragraphs (1) or (2)
22 shall be subject to the penalties and injunctions pro-
23 vided for under section 216 of title 18, United
24 States Code.

25 “(4) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:

1 “(A) The term ‘foreign governmental en-
2 tity’ includes any person employed by—

3 “(i) any department, agency, or other
4 entity of a foreign government at the na-
5 tional, regional, or local level;

6 “(ii) any governing party or coalition
7 of a foreign government at the national,
8 regional, or local level; or

9 “(iii) any entity majority-owned or
10 majority-controlled by a foreign govern-
11 ment at the national, regional, or local
12 level.

13 “(B) The term ‘representation’ does not
14 include representation by an attorney, who is
15 duly licensed and authorized to provide legal
16 advice in a United States jurisdiction, of a per-
17 son or entity in a legal capacity or for the pur-
18 poses of rendering legal advice.

19 “(5) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The restrictions in
20 this subsection shall apply only to persons who are
21 appointed by the President to the positions ref-
22 erenced in this subsection on or after 120 days after
23 the date of the enactment of the Strategic Competi-
24 tion Act of 2021.

1 “(6) NOTICE OF RESTRICTIONS.—Any person
2 subject to the restrictions of this subsection shall be
3 provided notice of these restrictions by the Depart-
4 ment of State upon appointment by the President,
5 and subsequently upon termination of service with
6 the Department of State.”.

7 **SEC. 140. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PRIORITIZING NOMINA-**
8 **TION OF QUALIFIED AMBASSADORS TO EN-**
9 **SURE PROPER DIPLOMATIC POSITIONING TO**
10 **COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE.**

11 It is the sense of Congress that it is critically impor-
12 tant for the President to nominate qualified ambassadors
13 as quickly as possible, especially for countries in Central
14 and South America, to ensure that the United States is
15 diplomatically positioned to counter Chinese influence ef-
16 forts in foreign countries.

17 **TITLE II—INVESTING IN**
18 **ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS**
19 **Subtitle A—Strategic and**
20 **Diplomatic Matters**

21 **SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-**
22 **FINED.**

23 In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of
24 Congress” means—

1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
2 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

3 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
4 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
5 resentatives.

6 **SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT**
7 **FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PA-**
8 **CIFIC.**

9 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
10 gress that—

11 (1) the United States treaty alliances in the
12 Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to
13 the United States and are among the Nation’s most
14 precious assets, enabling the United States to ad-
15 vance its vital national interests, defend its territory,
16 expand its economy through international trade and
17 commerce, establish enduring cooperation among
18 like-minded countries, prevent the domination of the
19 Indo-Pacific and its surrounding maritime and air
20 lanes by a hostile power or powers, and deter poten-
21 tial aggressors;

22 (2) the Governments of the United States,
23 Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Phil-
24 ippines, and Thailand are critical allies in advancing
25 a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region and

1 tackling challenges with unity of purpose, and have
2 collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared in-
3 terest in areas such as defense and security, eco-
4 nomic prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and
5 fundamental freedoms;

6 (3) the United States greatly values other part-
7 nerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with
8 India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand,
9 and Vietnam as well as regional architecture such as
10 the Quad, the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
11 tions (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic
12 Community (APEC), which are essential to further
13 shared interests;

14 (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific
15 demands consistent United States and allied com-
16 mitment to strengthening and advancing our alli-
17 ances so that they are postured to meet these chal-
18 lenges, and will require sustained political will, con-
19 crete partnerships, economic, commercial, and tech-
20 nological cooperation, consistent and tangible com-
21 mitments, high-level and extensive consultations on
22 matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared co-
23 operation in the acquisition of key capabilities im-
24 portant to allied defenses, and unified mutual sup-

1 port in the face of political, economic, or military co-
2 ercion;

3 (5) fissures in the United States alliance rela-
4 tionships and partnerships benefit United States ad-
5 versaries and weaken collective ability to advance
6 shared interests; and

7 (6) the United States must work with allies to
8 prioritize human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific
9 region.

10 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
11 of the United States—

12 (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and secu-
13 rity cooperation between and among the United
14 States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the
15 Philippines, and Thailand, including through diplo-
16 matic engagement, regional development, energy se-
17 curity and development, scientific and health part-
18 nerships, educational and cultural exchanges, missile
19 defense, intelligence-sharing, space, cyber, and other
20 diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;

21 (2) to uphold our multilateral and bilateral
22 treaty obligations, including—

23 (A) defending Japan, including all areas
24 under the administration of Japan, under arti-
25 cle V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and

1 Security Between the United States of America
2 and Japan;

3 (B) defending the Republic of Korea under
4 article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Be-
5 tween the United States and the Republic of
6 Korea;

7 (C) defending the Philippines under article
8 IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the
9 United States and the Republic of the Phil-
10 ippines;

11 (D) defending Thailand under the 1954
12 Manila Pact and the Thanat-Rusk communique
13 of 1962; and

14 (E) defending Australia under article IV of
15 the Australia, New Zealand, United States Se-
16 curity Treaty;

17 (3) to strengthen and deepen the United States'
18 bilateral and regional partnerships, including with
19 India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand;

20 (4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of
21 Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to
22 promote human rights bilaterally and through re-
23 gional and multilateral fora and pacts; and

24 (5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, eco-
25 nomic, and security cooperation with regional part-

1 ners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore,
2 Indonesia, and India.

3 **SEC. 203. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH**
4 **THE QUAD.**

5 It is the sense of Congress that—

6 (1) the United States should reaffirm our com-
7 mitment to quadrilateral cooperation among Aus-
8 tralia, India, Japan, and the United States (the
9 “Quad”) to enhance and implement a shared vision
10 to meet shared regional challenges and to promote
11 a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-
12 Pacific that is characterized by democracy, rule of
13 law, and market-driven economic growth, and is free
14 from undue influence and coercion;

15 (2) the United States should seek to expand
16 sustained dialogue and cooperation through the
17 Quad with a range of partners to support the rule
18 of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peace-
19 ful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and
20 territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and pros-
21 perity and strengthen democratic resilience;

22 (3) the United States should seek to expand
23 avenues of cooperation with the Quad, including
24 more regular military-to-military dialogues, joint ex-
25 ercises, and coordinated policies related to shared in-

1 terests such as protecting cyberspace and advancing
2 maritime security; and

3 (4) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad
4 leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to
5 the economic and health impacts of COVID–19, in-
6 cluding expanding safe, affordable, and effective vac-
7 cine production and equitable access, and to address
8 shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical
9 technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure
10 investment, and humanitarian assistance and dis-
11 aster relief, as well as maritime domains, further ad-
12 vances the important cooperation among Quad na-
13 tions that is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region.

14 **SEC. 204. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH**
15 **ASEAN.**

16 It is the policy of the United States to—

17 (1) stand with the nations of the Association of
18 Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond
19 to COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in
20 building capacity to prepare for and respond to
21 pandemics and other public health challenges;

22 (2) support high-level United States participa-
23 tion in the annual ASEAN Summit held each year;

24 (3) reaffirm the importance of United States-
25 ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimi-

1 nation of barriers to cross-border commerce, and
2 support the ASEAN Economic Community's (AEC)
3 goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable
4 long-term economic growth and cooperation with the
5 United States that focuses on innovation and capac-
6 ity-building efforts in technology, education, disaster
7 management, food security, human rights, and trade
8 facilitation, particularly for ASEAN's poorest coun-
9 tries;

10 (4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to fos-
11 ter greater integration and unity within the ASEAN
12 community, as well as to foster greater integration
13 and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and
14 security partners, including Japan, the Republic of
15 Korea, Australia, the European Union, Taiwan, and
16 India;

17 (5) recognize the value of strategic economic
18 initiatives like United States-ASEAN Connect,
19 which demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and
20 the AEC and builds upon economic relationships in
21 the region;

22 (6) support ASEAN nations in addressing mar-
23 itime and territorial disputes in a constructive man-
24 ner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplo-
25 matic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and

1 international arbitration mechanisms, consistent
2 with international law, including through the adop-
3 tion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea
4 that represents the interests of all parties and pro-
5 motes peace and stability in the region;

6 (7) urge all parties involved in the maritime
7 and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region,
8 including the Government of the People's Republic
9 of China—

10 (A) to cease any current activities, and
11 avoid undertaking any actions in the future,
12 that undermine stability, or complicate or esca-
13 late disputes through the use of coercion, in-
14 timidation, or military force;

15 (B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals,
16 and other features, and refrain from new ef-
17 forts to militarize, including the construction of
18 new garrisons and facilities and the relocation
19 of additional military personnel, material, or
20 equipment;

21 (C) to oppose actions by any country that
22 prevent other countries from exercising their
23 sovereign rights to the resources in their exclu-
24 sive economic zones and continental shelves by
25 enforcing claims to those areas in the South

1 China Sea that lack support in international
2 law; and

3 (D) to oppose unilateral declarations of ad-
4 ministrative and military districts in contested
5 areas in the South China Sea;

6 (8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral ac-
7 tions that cause permanent physical damage to the
8 marine environment and support the efforts of the
9 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
10 and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the
11 illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the
12 region;

13 (9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a
14 common approach to reaffirm the decision of the
15 Permanent Court of Arbitration's 2016 ruling in
16 favor of the Republic of the Philippines in the case
17 against the People's Republic of China's excessive
18 maritime claims;

19 (10) reaffirm the commitment of the United
20 States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt
21 human smuggling and trafficking in persons and
22 urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional
23 mechanisms to provide assistance and support to
24 refugees and migrants;

1 (11) support the Mekong-United States Part-
2 nership;

3 (12) support newly created initiatives with
4 ASEAN countries, including the United States-
5 ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Pol-
6 icy Implementation Project, the United States-
7 ASEAN Innovation Circle, and the United States-
8 ASEAN Health Futures;

9 (13) encourage the President to communicate
10 to ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the
11 rule of law and open and transparent government,
12 strengthening civil society, and protecting human
13 rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing
14 politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary
15 killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, free-
16 dom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom
17 of speech and expression;

18 (14) support efforts by organizations in
19 ASEAN that address corruption in the public and
20 private sectors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, en-
21 force bribery criminalization in the private sector,
22 and build beneficial ownership transparency through
23 the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered
24 with the South East Asia Parties Against Corrup-
25 tion (SEA-PAC);

1 (15) support the Young Southeast Asian Lead-
2 ers Initiative as an example of a people-to-people
3 partnership that provides skills, networks, and lead-
4 ership training to a new generation that will create
5 and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and
6 partnerships, and rise to address the regional and
7 global challenges of the future;

8 (16) support the creation of initiatives similar
9 to the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for
10 other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-
11 people partnerships with an emphasis on civil society
12 leaders;

13 (17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments
14 that have fully upheld and implemented all United
15 Nations Security Council resolutions and inter-
16 national agreements with respect to the Democratic
17 People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic
18 missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN
19 governments to do the same; and

20 (18) allocate appropriate resources across the
21 United States Government to articulate and imple-
22 ment an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and sup-
23 ports ASEAN centrality and supports ASEAN as a
24 source of well-functioning and problem-solving re-
25 gional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.

1 **SEC. 205. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING UNITED**
2 **STATES-ASEAN COOPERATION ON TECH-**
3 **NOLOGY ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOP-**
4 **LE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

5 It is the sense of Congress that—

6 (1) the United States and ASEAN should com-
7 plete a joint analysis on risks of overreliance on Chi-
8 nese equipment critical to strategic technologies and
9 critical infrastructure;

10 (2) the United States and ASEAN should share
11 information about and collaborate on screening Chi-
12 nese investments in strategic technology sectors and
13 critical infrastructure;

14 (3) the United States and ASEAN should work
15 together on appropriate import restriction regimes
16 regarding Chinese exports of surveillance tech-
17 nologies;

18 (4) the United States should urge ASEAN to
19 adopt its March 2019 proposed sanctions regime
20 targeting cyber attacks;

21 (5) the United States should urge ASEAN to
22 commit to the September 2019 principles signed by
23 28 countries regarding “Advancing Responsible
24 State Behavior in Cyberspace”, a set of commit-
25 ments that support the “rules-based international
26 order, affirm the applicability of international law to

1 state-on-state behavior, adherence to voluntary
2 norms of responsible state behavior in peacetime,
3 and the development and implementation of practical
4 confidence building measures to help reduce the risk
5 of conflict stemming from cyber incidents”;

6 (6) the United States and ASEAN should ex-
7 plore how Chinese investments in critical technology,
8 including artificial intelligence, will impact Indo-Pa-
9 cific security over the coming decades.

10 **SEC. 206. REPORT ON CHINESE INFLUENCE IN INTER-**
11 **NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.**

12 (a) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 180 days
13 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
14 of State, in coordination with the Director of National In-
15 telligence, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
16 tions and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Sen-
17 ate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Perma-
18 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
19 Representatives a report on the expanded influence of the
20 Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
21 Chinese Communist Party in international organizations.

22 (b) **CONTENTS.**—The report required by subsection
23 (a) shall include analysis of the following:

24 (1) The influence of the PRC and Chinese
25 Communist Party in international organizations and

1 how that influence has expanded over the last 10
2 years, including—

3 (A) tracking countries' voting patterns
4 that align with Chinese government voting pat-
5 terns;

6 (B) the number of PRC nationals in lead-
7 ership positions at the D-1 level or higher;

8 (C) changes in PRC voluntary and manda-
9 tory funding by organization;

10 (D) adoption of Chinese Communist Party
11 phrases and initiatives in international organi-
12 zation language and programming;

13 (E) efforts by the PRC to secure legit-
14 imacy for its own foreign policy initiatives, in-
15 cluding the Belt and Road Initiative;

16 (F) the number of Junior Professional Of-
17 ficers that the Government of the People's Re-
18 public of China has funded by organization;

19 (G) tactics used by the Government of the
20 People's Republic of China or the CCP to ma-
21 nipulate secret or otherwise non-public voting
22 measures, voting bodies, or votes;

23 (H) the extent to which technology compa-
24 nies incorporated in the PRC, or which have
25 PRC or CCP ownership interests, provide

1 equipment and services to international organi-
2 zations; and

3 (I) efforts by the PRC's United Nations
4 Mission to generate criticism of the United
5 States in the United Nations, including any ef-
6 forts to highlight delayed United States pay-
7 ments or to misrepresent total United States
8 voluntary and assessed financial contributions
9 to the United Nations and its specialized agen-
10 cies and programs.

11 (2) The purpose and ultimate goals of the ex-
12 panded influence of the PRC government and the
13 Chinese Communist Party in international organiza-
14 tions, including an analysis of PRC Government and
15 Chinese Communist Party strategic documents and
16 rhetoric.

17 (3) The tactics and means employed by the
18 PRC government and the Chinese Communist Party
19 to achieve expanded influence in international orga-
20 nizations, including—

21 (A) incentive programs for PRC nationals
22 to join and run for leadership positions in inter-
23 national organizations;

24 (B) coercive economic and other practices
25 against other members in the organization; and

1 (C) economic or other incentives provided
2 to international organizations, including dona-
3 tions of technologies or goods.

4 (4) The successes and failures of the PRC gov-
5 ernment and Chinese Communist Party influence ef-
6 forts in international organizations, especially those
7 related to human rights, “internet sovereignty”, the
8 development of norms on artificial intelligence, labor,
9 international standards setting, and freedom of navi-
10 gation.

11 (c) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection
12 (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
13 clude a classified annex.

14 (d) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “inter-
15 national organizations” includes the following:

16 (1) The African Development Bank.

17 (2) The Asian Development Bank.

18 (3) The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.

19 (4) The Bank of International Settlements.

20 (5) The Caribbean Development Bank.

21 (6) The Food and Agriculture Organization.

22 (7) The International Atomic Energy Agency.

23 (8) The International Bank for Reconstruction
24 and Development.

- 1 (9) The International Bureau of Weights and
2 Measures.
- 3 (10) The International Chamber of Commerce.
- 4 (11) The International Civil Aviation Organiza-
5 tion.
- 6 (12) The International Criminal Police Organi-
7 zation.
- 8 (13) The International Finance Corporation.
- 9 (14) The International Fund for Agricultural
10 Development.
- 11 (15) The International Hydrographic Organiza-
12 tion.
- 13 (16) The International Labor Organization.
- 14 (17) The International Maritime Organization.
- 15 (18) The International Monetary Fund.
- 16 (19) The International Olympic Committee.
- 17 (20) The International Organization for Migra-
18 tion.
- 19 (21) The International Organization for Stand-
20 ardization.
- 21 (22) The International Renewable Energy
22 Agency.
- 23 (23) The International Telecommunications
24 Union.

1 (24) The Organization for Economic Coopera-
2 tion and Development.

3 (25) The Organization for the Prohibition of
4 Chemical Weapons.

5 (26) The United Nations.

6 (27) The United Nations Conference on Trade
7 and Development.

8 (28) The United Nations Educational, Sci-
9 entific, and Cultural Organization.

10 (29) The United Nations Industrial Develop-
11 ment Organization.

12 (30) The United Nations Institute for Training
13 and Research.

14 (31) The United Nations Truce Supervision Or-
15 ganization.

16 (32) The Universal Postal Union.

17 (33) The World Customs Organization.

18 (34) The World Health Organization.

19 (35) The World Intellectual Property Organiza-
20 tion.

21 (36) The World Meteorological Organization.

22 (37) The World Organization for Animal
23 Health.

24 (38) The World Tourism Organization.

25 (39) The World Trade Organization.

1 (40) The World Bank Group.

2 **SEC. 207. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND**
3 **PARTNERS.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
5 nation with the heads of other participating executive
6 branch agencies, shall establish and develop a program to
7 facilitate and encourage regular dialogues between United
8 States Government regulatory and technical agencies and
9 their counterpart organizations in allied and partner coun-
10 tries, both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institu-
11 tions and organizations—

12 (1) to promote best practices in regulatory for-
13 mation and implementation;

14 (2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory
15 outcomes based on scientific, technical, and other
16 relevant principles;

17 (3) to seek better harmonization and alignment
18 of regulations and regulatory practices;

19 (4) to build consensus around industry and
20 technical standards in emerging sectors that will
21 drive future global economic growth and commerce;
22 and

23 (5) to promote United States standards regard-
24 ing environmental, labor, and other relevant protec-
25 tions in regulatory formation and implementation, in

1 keeping with the values of free and open societies,
2 including the rule of law.

3 (b) PRIORITIZATION OF ACTIVITIES.—In facilitating
4 expert exchanges under subsection (a), the Secretary shall
5 prioritize—

6 (1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with
7 countries where greater regulatory coherence, har-
8 monization of standards, or communication and dia-
9 logue between technical agencies is achievable and
10 best advances the economic and national security in-
11 terests of the United States;

12 (2) multilateral coordination and collaboration
13 where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization
14 of standards, or dialogue on other relevant regu-
15 latory matters is achievable and best advances the
16 economic and national security interests of the
17 United States, including with—

18 (A) the European Union;

19 (B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
20 tion;

21 (C) the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
22 tions (ASEAN);

23 (D) the Organization for Economic Co-
24 operation and Development (OECD); and

25 (E) multilateral development banks; and

1 (3) regulatory practices and standards-setting
2 bodies focused on key economic sectors and emerg-
3 ing technologies.

4 (c) PARTICIPATION BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ENTI-
5 TIES.—With regard to the program described in sub-
6 section (a), the Secretary of State may facilitate, including
7 through the use of amounts appropriated pursuant to sub-
8 section (e), the participation of private sector representa-
9 tives, and other relevant organizations and individuals
10 with relevant expertise, as appropriate and to the extent
11 that such participation advances the goals of such pro-
12 gram.

13 (d) DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY THE SEC-
14 RETARY.—The Secretary of State is authorized to delegate
15 the responsibilities described in this section to the Under
16 Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the
17 Environment.

18 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be
20 appropriated \$2,500,000 for each of fiscal years
21 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.

22 (2) USE OF FUNDS.—The Secretary may make
23 available amounts appropriated pursuant to para-
24 graph (1) in a manner that—

1 (A) facilitates participation by representa-
2 tives from technical agencies within the United
3 States Government and their counterparts; and

4 (B) complies with applicable procedural re-
5 quirements under the State Department Basic
6 Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et
7 seq.) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
8 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.).

9 **SEC. 208. TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP OFFICE AT THE DE-**
10 **PARTMENT OF STATE.**

11 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
12 of the United States to lead new technology policy partner-
13 ships focused on the shared interests of the world’s tech-
14 nology-leading democracies.

15 (b) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall
16 establish an interagency-staffed Technology Partnership
17 Office (referred to in this section as the “Office”), which
18 shall be housed in the Department of State.

19 (c) LEADERSHIP.—

20 (1) AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE.—The Office shall
21 be headed by an Ambassador-at-Large for Tech-
22 nology, who shall—

23 (A) be appointed by the President, by and
24 with the advice and consent of the Senate;

1 (B) have the rank and status of ambas-
2 sador; and

3 (C) report to the Secretary of State, unless
4 otherwise directed.

5 (2) OFFICE LIAISONS.—The Secretary of Com-
6 merce and the Secretary of the Treasury shall each
7 appoint, from within their respective departments at
8 the level of GS–14 or higher, liaisons between the
9 Office and the Department of Commerce or the De-
10 partment of the Treasury, as applicable, to perform
11 the following duties:

12 (A) Collaborate with the Department of
13 State on relevant technology initiatives and
14 partnerships.

15 (B) Provide technical and other relevant
16 expertise to the Office, as appropriate.

17 (d) MEMBERSHIP.—In addition to the liaisons re-
18 ferred to in subsection (c), the Office shall include a rep-
19 resentative or expert detailee from key Federal agencies,
20 as determined by the Ambassador-at-Large for Tech-
21 nology.

22 (e) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the Office shall in-
23 clude responsibilities such as—

1 (1) creating, overseeing, and carrying out tech-
2 nology partnerships with countries and relevant po-
3 litical and economic unions that are committed to—

4 (A) the rule of law, freedom of speech, and
5 respect for human rights;

6 (B) the safe and responsible development
7 and use of new and emerging technologies and
8 the establishment of related norms and stand-
9 ards;

10 (C) a secure internet architecture governed
11 by a multi-stakeholder model instead of central-
12 ized government control;

13 (D) robust international cooperation to
14 promote an open internet and interoperable
15 technological products and services that are
16 necessary to freedom, innovation, transparency,
17 and privacy; and

18 (E) multilateral coordination, including
19 through diplomatic initiatives, information shar-
20 ing, and other activities, to defend the prin-
21 ciples described in subparagraphs (A) through
22 (D) against efforts by state and non-state ac-
23 tors to undermine them;

24 (2) harmonizing technology governance regimes
25 with partners, coordinating on basic and pre-com-

1 petitive research and development initiatives, and
2 collaborating to pursue such opportunities in key
3 technologies, including—

4 (A) artificial intelligence and machine
5 learning;

6 (B) 5G telecommunications and other ad-
7 vanced wireless networking technologies;

8 (C) semiconductor manufacturing;

9 (D) biotechnology;

10 (E) quantum computing;

11 (F) surveillance technologies, including fa-
12 cial recognition technologies and censorship
13 software; and

14 (G) fiber optic cables;

15 (3) coordinating with such countries regarding
16 shared technology strategies, including technology
17 controls and standards, as well as strategies with re-
18 spect to the development and acquisition of key tech-
19 nologies to provide alternatives for those countries
20 utilizing systems supported by authoritarian re-
21 gimes;

22 (4) supporting and expanding adherence to
23 international treaties and frameworks governing the
24 responsible use of new and emerging technologies;

1 (5) coordinating the adoption of shared data
2 privacy, data sharing, and data archiving standards
3 among the United States and partner countries and
4 relevant economic and political unions, including
5 complementary data protection regulations;

6 (6) coordinating with other technology partners
7 on export control policies, including as appropriate
8 through the Wassenaar Arrangement On Export
9 Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use
10 Goods and Technologies, done at The Hague Decem-
11 ber 1995, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Aus-
12 tralia Group, and the Missile Technology Control
13 Regime; supply chain security; and investment in or
14 licensing of critical infrastructure and dual-use tech-
15 nologies;

16 (7) coordinating with members of technology
17 partnerships on other policies regarding the use and
18 control of emerging and foundational technologies
19 through appropriate restrictions, investment screen-
20 ing, and appropriate measures with respect to tech-
21 nology transfers;

22 (8) coordinating policies, in coordination with
23 the Department of Commerce, around the resiliency
24 of supply chains in critical technology areas, includ-
25 ing possible diversification of supply chain compo-

1 nents to countries involved in technology partner-
2 ships with the United States, while also maintaining
3 transparency surrounding subsidies and product ori-
4 gins;

5 (9) sharing information regarding the tech-
6 nology transfer threat posed by authoritarian gov-
7 ernments and the ways in which autocratic regimes
8 are utilizing technology to erode individual freedoms
9 and other foundations of open, democratic societies;

10 (10) administering the establishment of—

11 (A) the common funding mechanism for
12 development and adoption of measurably secure
13 semiconductors and measurably secure semicon-
14 ductor supply chains created in and in accord-
15 ance with the requirements of section 9905 of
16 the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National De-
17 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
18 (Public Law 116–283); and

19 (B) the multilateral telecommunications se-
20 curity fund created in and in accordance with
21 the requirements of section 9202 of such Act;
22 and

23 (11) collaborating with private companies, trade
24 associations, and think tanks to realize the purposes
25 of paragraphs (1) through (10).

1 (f) SPECIAL HIRING AUTHORITIES.—The Secretary
2 of State may—

3 (1) appoint employees without regard to the
4 provisions of title 5, United States Code, regarding
5 appointments in the competitive service; and

6 (2) fix the basic compensation of such employ-
7 ees without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III
8 of chapter 53 of such title regarding classification
9 and General Schedule pay rates.

10 (g) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date
11 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
12 the next 3 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination
13 with the Director for National Intelligence, shall submit
14 an unclassified report to the appropriate congressional
15 committees, with a classified index, if necessary, regard-
16 ing—

17 (1) the activities of the Office, including any co-
18 operative initiatives and partnerships pursued with
19 United States allies and partners, and the results of
20 those activities, initiatives, and partnerships; and

21 (2) the activities of the Government of the Peo-
22 ples' Republic of China, the Chinese Communist
23 Party, and the Russian Federation in key technology
24 sectors and the threats they pose to the United
25 States, including—

- 1 (A) artificial intelligence and machine
2 learning;
- 3 (B) 5G telecommunications and other ad-
4 vanced wireless networking technologies;
- 5 (C) semiconductor manufacturing;
- 6 (D) biotechnology;
- 7 (E) quantum computing;
- 8 (F) surveillance technologies, including fa-
9 cial recognition technologies and censorship
10 software; and
- 11 (G) fiber optic cables.

12 (h) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ESTABLISHING INTER-
13 NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP.—It is the sense
14 of Congress that the Ambassador-at-Large for Technology
15 should seek to establish an International Technology Part-
16 nership for the purposes described in this section with for-
17 eign countries that have—

18 (1) a democratic national government and a
19 strong commitment to democratic values, including
20 an adherence to the rule of law, freedom of speech,
21 and respect for and promotion of human rights;

22 (2) an economy with advanced technology sec-
23 tors; and

24 (3) a demonstrated record of trust or an ex-
25 pressed interest in international cooperation and co-

1 ordination with the United States on important de-
2 fense and intelligence issues.

3 **SEC. 209. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STAND-**
4 **ARDS-SETTING BODIES.**

5 (a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This section may be cited as the
6 “Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G
7 Act of 2021”.

8 (b) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Con-
9 gress that—

10 (1) the United States and its allies and part-
11 ners should maintain participation and leadership at
12 international standards-setting bodies for 5th and
13 future generation mobile telecommunications sys-
14 tems and infrastructure;

15 (2) the United States should work with its allies
16 and partners to encourage and facilitate the develop-
17 ment of secure supply chains and networks for 5th
18 and future generation mobile telecommunications
19 systems and infrastructure; and

20 (3) the maintenance of a high standard of secu-
21 rity in telecommunications and cyberspace between
22 the United States and its allies and partners is a na-
23 tional security interest of the United States.

1 (c) ENHANCING REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP
2 OF UNITED STATES AT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS-SET-
3 TING BODIES.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall—

5 (A) establish an interagency working group
6 to provide assistance and technical expertise to
7 enhance the representation and leadership of
8 the United States at international bodies that
9 set standards for equipment, systems, software,
10 and virtually defined networks that support 5th
11 and future generation mobile telecommuni-
12 cations systems and infrastructure, such as the
13 International Telecommunication Union and the
14 3rd Generation Partnership Project; and

15 (B) work with allies, partners, and the pri-
16 vate sector to increase productive engagement.

17 (2) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The
18 interagency working group described in paragraph
19 (1)—

20 (A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of
21 State or a designee of the Secretary of State;
22 and

23 (B) shall consist of the head (or designee)
24 of each Federal department or agency the
25 President determines appropriate.

1 (3) BRIEFINGS.—

2 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180
3 days after the date of the enactment of this
4 Act, and subsequently thereafter as provided
5 under subparagraph (B), the interagency work-
6 ing group described in paragraph (1) shall pro-
7 vide a strategy to the appropriate congressional
8 committees that addresses—

9 (i) promotion of United States leader-
10 ship at international standards-setting bod-
11 ies for equipment, systems, software, and
12 virtually defined networks relevant to 5th
13 and future generation mobile telecommuni-
14 cations systems and infrastructure, taking
15 into account the different processes fol-
16 lowed by the various international stand-
17 ard-setting bodies;

18 (ii) diplomatic engagement with allies
19 and partners to share security risk infor-
20 mation and findings pertaining to equip-
21 ment that supports or is used in 5th and
22 future generation mobile telecommuni-
23 cations systems and infrastructure and co-
24 operation on mitigating such risks;

1 (iii) China's presence and activities at
2 international standards-setting bodies rel-
3 evant to 5th and future generation mobile
4 telecommunications systems and infra-
5 structure, including information on the dif-
6 ferences in the scope and scale of China's
7 engagement at such bodies compared to
8 engagement by the United States or its al-
9 lies and partners and the security risks
10 raised by Chinese proposals in such stand-
11 ards-setting bodies; and

12 (iv) engagement with private sector
13 communications and information service
14 providers, equipment developers, academia,
15 Federally funded research and development
16 centers, and other private-sector stake-
17 holders to propose and develop secure
18 standards for equipment, systems, soft-
19 ware, and virtually defined networks that
20 support 5th and future generation mobile
21 telecommunications systems and infra-
22 structure.

23 (B) SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS.—Upon re-
24 ceiving a request from the appropriate congres-
25 sional committees, or as determined appropriate

1 by the chair of the interagency working group
2 established pursuant to paragraph (1), the
3 interagency working group shall provide such
4 committees an updated briefing that covers the
5 matters described in clauses (i) through (iv) of
6 subparagraph (A).

7 **SEC. 210. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CENTRALITY OF SANC-**
8 **TIONS AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS TO STRA-**
9 **TEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA.**

10 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
11 ings:

12 (1) Sanctions and other restrictions, when used
13 as part of a coordinated and comprehensive strategy,
14 are a powerful tool to advance United States foreign
15 policy and national security interests.

16 (2) Congress has authorized and mandated a
17 broad range of sanctions and other restrictions to
18 address malign behavior and incentivize behavior
19 change by individuals and entities in the PRC.

20 (3) The sanctions and other restrictions author-
21 ized and mandated by Congress address a range of
22 malign PRC behavior, including—

23 (A) intellectual property theft;

24 (B) cyber-related economic espionage;

25 (C) repression of ethnic minorities;

1 (D) other human rights abuses;

2 (E) abuses of the international trading sys-
3 tem;

4 (F) illicit assistance to and trade with the
5 Government of the Democratic People’s Repub-
6 lic of Korea; and

7 (G) drug trafficking, including trafficking
8 in fentanyl and other opioids;

9 (4) The sanctions and other restrictions de-
10 scribed in this section include the following:

11 (A) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights
12 Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of
13 Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

14 (B) Section 1637 of the Carl Levin and
15 Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense
16 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (50
17 U.S.C. 1708).

18 (C) The Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21
19 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.).

20 (D) The Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Pub-
21 lic Law 116–149; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note).

22 (E) Section 7 of the Hong Kong Human
23 Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (Public
24 Law 116–76; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note).

1 (F) Section 6 of the Uyghur Human
2 Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–
3 145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

4 (G) The Export Control Reform Act of
5 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.).

6 (H) Export control measures required to
7 be maintained with respect to entities in the
8 telecommunications sector of the People’s Re-
9 public of China, including under section 1260I
10 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
11 Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92).

12 (I) Section 311 of the Countering Amer-
13 ica’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of
14 2018 (Public Law 115–44; 131 Stat. 942).

15 (J) The prohibition on the export of cov-
16 ered munitions and crime control items to the
17 Hong Kong Police Force under the Act entitled
18 “An Act to prohibit the commercial export of
19 covered munitions and crime control items to
20 the Hong Kong Police Force”, approved No-
21 vember 27, 2019 (Public Law 116–77; 133
22 Stat. 1173), as amended by section 1252 of the
23 William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense
24 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public
25 Law 116–283).

1 (5) Full implementation of the authorities de-
2 scribed in paragraph (4) is required under the re-
3 spective laws described therein and pursuant to the
4 Take Care Clause of the Constitution (article II, sec-
5 tion 3).

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
7 gress that—

8 (1) the executive branch has not fully imple-
9 mented the sanctions and other restrictions de-
10 scribed in subsection (a)(4) despite the statutory
11 and constitutional requirements to do so; and

12 (2) the President’s full implementation and exe-
13 cution of the those authorities is a necessary and es-
14 sential component to the success of the United
15 States in the strategic competition with China.

16 **SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7**
17 **AND G20 COUNTRIES.**

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that
19 the President, acting through the Secretary of State,
20 should initiate an agenda with G7 and G20 countries on
21 matters relevant to economic and democratic freedoms, in-
22 cluding the following:

23 (1) Trade and investment issues and enforce-
24 ment.

1 (2) Building support for international infra-
 2 structure standards, including those agreed to at the
 3 G20 summit in Osaka in 2018.

4 (3) The erosion of democracy and human
 5 rights.

6 (4) The security of 5G telecommunications.

7 (5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellec-
 8 tual property theft, massive subsidization of compa-
 9 nies, and other policies and practices.

10 (6) Predatory international sovereign lending
 11 that is inconsistent with Organisation for Economic
 12 Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Paris
 13 Club principles.

14 (7) International influence campaigns.

15 (8) Environmental standards.

16 (9) Coordination with like-minded regional part-
 17 ners that are not in the G7 and G20.

18 **SEC. 212. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PART-**
 19 **NERSHIP.**

20 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
 21 United States—

22 (1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the
 23 United States Indo-Pacific strategy;

24 (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its
 25 democracy as key elements for the continued peace

1 and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, and
2 a vital national security interest of the United
3 States;

4 (3) to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan
5 under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8)
6 and the “Six Assurances”;

7 (4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its
8 asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities
9 identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept;

10 (5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense
11 spending in order to fully resource its defense strat-
12 egy;

13 (6) to conduct regular transfers of defense arti-
14 cles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-de-
15 fense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop
16 and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including
17 anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense,
18 undersea warfare, advanced command, control, com-
19 munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
20 and reconnaissance, and resilient command and con-
21 trol capabilities, into its military forces;

22 (7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s
23 meaningful participation in the United Nations, the
24 World Health Assembly, the International Civil
25 Aviation Organization, the International Criminal

1 Police Organization, and other international bodies
2 as appropriate;

3 (8) to advocate for information sharing with
4 Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on
5 Cancer;

6 (9) to promote meaningful cooperation among
7 the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded
8 partners;

9 (10) to enhance bilateral trade, including poten-
10 tially through new agreements or resumption of
11 talks related to a possible Trade and Investment
12 Framework Agreement;

13 (11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursu-
14 ance of a bilateral free trade agreement;

15 (12) to expand bilateral economic and techno-
16 logical cooperation, including improving supply chain
17 security;

18 (13) to support United States educational and
19 exchange programs with Taiwan, including by pro-
20 moting the study of Chinese language, culture, his-
21 tory, and politics in Taiwan; and

22 (14) to expand people-to-people exchanges be-
23 tween the United States and Taiwan.

24 (b) SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL
25 AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH TAIWAN.—

1 (1) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES-
2 TAIWAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE FOUNDATION.—The
3 Secretary of State should consider establishing an
4 independent nonprofit that—

5 (A) is dedicated to deepening ties between
6 the future leaders of Taiwan and the United
7 States; and

8 (B) works with State and local school dis-
9 tricts and educational institutions to send high
10 school and university students to Taiwan to
11 study the Chinese language, culture, history,
12 politics, and other relevant subjects.

13 (2) PARTNER.—State and local school districts
14 and educational institutions, including public univer-
15 sities, are encouraged to partner with the Taipei
16 Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the
17 United States to establish programs to promote an
18 increase in educational and cultural exchanges.

19 **SEC. 213. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.**

20 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the
21 “Taiwan Fellowship Act”.

22 (b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

23 (1) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-
24 8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United States
25 policy “to preserve and promote extensive, close, and

1 friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations be-
2 tween the people of the United States and the people
3 on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China main-
4 land and all other peoples of the Western Pacific
5 area”.

6 (2) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Ini-
7 tiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), the
8 United States has grown its strategic partnership
9 with Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of 23,000,000 peo-
10 ple.

11 (3) Despite a concerted campaign by the Peo-
12 ple’s Republic of China to isolate Taiwan from its
13 diplomatic partners and from international organiza-
14 tions, including the World Health Organization, Tai-
15 wan has emerged as a global leader in the
16 coronavirus global pandemic response, including by
17 donating more than 2,000,000 surgical masks and
18 other medical equipment to the United States.

19 (4) The creation of a United States fellowship
20 program with Taiwan would support—

21 (A) a key priority of expanding people-to-
22 people exchanges, which was outlined in Presi-
23 dent Donald J. Trump’s 2017 National Secu-
24 rity Strategy;

1 (B) President Joseph R. Biden’s commit-
2 ment to Taiwan, “ a leading democracy and a
3 critical economic and security partner,” as ex-
4 pressed in his March 2021 Interim National Se-
5 curity Strategic Guidance; and

6 (C) April 2021 guidance from the Depart-
7 ment of State based on a review required under
8 the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (subtitle B
9 of title III of division FF of Public Law 116–
10 260) to “encourage U.S. government engage-
11 ment with Taiwan that reflects our deepening
12 unofficial relationship”.

13 (c) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this section are—

14 (1) to further strengthen the United States-Tai-
15 wan strategic partnership and broaden under-
16 standing of the Indo-Pacific region by temporarily
17 assigning officials of agencies of the United States
18 Government to Taiwan for intensive study in Man-
19 darin and placement as Fellows with the governing
20 authorities on Taiwan or a Taiwanese civic institu-
21 tion;

22 (2) to provide for eligible United States per-
23 sonnel to learn or strengthen Mandarin Chinese lan-
24 guage skills and to expand their understanding of

1 the political economy of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific
2 region; and

3 (3) to better position the United States to ad-
4 vance its economic, security, and human rights in-
5 terests and values in the Indo-Pacific region.

6 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

7 (1) AGENCY HEAD.—The term “agency head”
8 means in the case of the executive branch of United
9 States Government, or a legislative branch agency
10 described in paragraph (2), the head of the respec-
11 tive agency.

12 (2) AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
13 MENT.—The term “agency of the United States
14 Government” includes the Government Account-
15 ability Office, Congressional Budget Office, or the
16 Congressional Research Service of the legislative
17 branch as well as any agency of the executive
18 branch.

19 (3) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-
20 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-
21 gress” means—

22 (A) the Committee on Appropriations of
23 the Senate;

24 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
25 the Senate;

1 (C) the Committee on Appropriations of
2 the House of Representatives; and

3 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
4 the House of Representatives.

5 (4) DETAILEE.—The term “detailee”—

6 (A) means an employee of a branch of the
7 United States Government on loan to the Amer-
8 ican Institute in Taiwan, without a change of
9 position from the agency at which he or she is
10 employed; and

11 (B) a legislative branch employee from the
12 Government Accountability Office, Congres-
13 sional Budget Office, or the Congressional Re-
14 search Service.

15 (5) IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term “im-
16 plementing partner” means any United States orga-
17 nization described in 501(c)(3) of the Internal Rev-
18 enue Code of 1986 that—

19 (A) performs logistical, administrative, and
20 other functions, as determined by the Depart-
21 ment of State and the American Institute of
22 Taiwan in support of the Taiwan Fellowship
23 Program; and

1 (B) enters into a cooperative agreement
2 with the American Institute in Taiwan to ad-
3 minister the Taiwan Fellowship Program.

4 (e) ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PRO-
5 GRAM.—

6 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State
7 shall establish the “Taiwan Fellowship Program”
8 (referred to in this subsection as the “Program”) to
9 provide a fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of up to
10 2 years for eligible United States citizens. The De-
11 partment of State, in consultation with the Amer-
12 ican Institute in Taiwan and the implementing part-
13 ner, may modify the name of the Program.

14 (2) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT.—

15 (A) IN GENERAL.—The American Institute
16 in Taiwan should use amounts appropriated
17 pursuant to subsection (h)(1) to enter into an
18 annual or multi-year cooperative agreement
19 with an appropriate implementing partner.

20 (B) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Department of
21 State, in consultation with the American Insti-
22 tute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the imple-
23 menting partner, should award to eligible
24 United States citizens, subject to available
25 funding—

1 (i) approximately 5 fellowships during
2 the first 2 years of the Program; and

3 (ii) approximately 10 fellowships dur-
4 ing each of the remaining years of the Pro-
5 gram.

6 (3) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; IMPLE-
7 MENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days after
8 the date of the enactment of this Act, the American
9 Institute in Taiwan, in consultation with the Depart-
10 ment of State, should—

11 (A) begin negotiations with the Taipei
12 Economic and Cultural Representative Office,
13 or with another appropriate entity, for the pur-
14 pose of entering into an agreement to facilitate
15 the placement of fellows in an agency of the
16 governing authorities on Taiwan; and

17 (B) begin the process of selecting an im-
18 plementing partner, which—

19 (i) shall agree to meet all of the legal
20 requirements required to operate in Tai-
21 wan; and

22 (ii) shall be composed of staff who
23 demonstrate significant experience man-
24 aging exchange programs in the Indo-Pa-
25 cific region.

1 (4) CURRICULUM.—

2 (A) FIRST YEAR.—During the first year of
3 each fellowship under this subsection, each fel-
4 low should study—

5 (i) the Mandarin Chinese language;

6 (ii) the people, history, and political
7 climate on Taiwan; and

8 (iii) the issues affecting the relation-
9 ship between the United States and the
10 Indo-Pacific region.

11 (B) SECOND YEAR.—During the second
12 year of each fellowship under this subsection,
13 each fellow, subject to the approval of the De-
14 partment of State, the American Institute in
15 Taiwan, and the implementing partner, and in
16 accordance with the purposes of this section,
17 should work in—

18 (i) a parliamentary office, ministry, or
19 other agency of the governing authorities
20 on Taiwan; or

21 (ii) an organization outside of the gov-
22 erning authorities on Taiwan, whose inter-
23 ests are associated with the interests of the
24 fellow and the agency of the United States

1 Government from which the fellow had
2 been employed.

3 (5) FLEXIBLE FELLOWSHIP DURATION.—Not-
4 withstanding any requirement under this subsection,
5 the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
6 American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate,
7 the implementing partner, may award fellowships
8 that have a duration of less than two years, and may
9 alter the curriculum requirements under paragraph
10 (4) for such purposes.

11 (6) SUNSET.—The fellowship program under
12 this subsection shall terminate 7 years after the date
13 of the enactment of this Act.

14 (f) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—

15 (1) ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.—A United
16 States citizen is eligible for a fellowship under sub-
17 section (e) if he or she—

18 (A) is an employee of the United States
19 Government;

20 (B) has received at least one exemplary
21 performance review in his or her current United
22 States Government role within at least the last
23 three years prior to beginning the fellowship;

24 (C) has at least 2 years of experience in
25 any branch of the United States Government;

1 (D) has a demonstrated professional or
2 educational background in the relationship be-
3 tween the United States and countries in the
4 Indo-Pacific region; and

5 (E) has demonstrated his or her commit-
6 ment to further service in the United States
7 Government.

8 (2) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FELLOWS.—Each re-
9 cipient of a fellowship under subsection (e) shall
10 agree, as a condition of such fellowship—

11 (A) to maintain satisfactory progress in
12 language training and appropriate behavior in
13 Taiwan, as determined by the Department of
14 State, the American Institute in Taiwan and, as
15 appropriate, its implementing partner;

16 (B) to refrain from engaging in any intel-
17 ligence or intelligence-related activity on behalf
18 of the United States Government; and

19 (C) to continue Federal Government em-
20 ployment for a period of not less than 4 years
21 after the conclusion of the fellowship or for not
22 less than 2 years for a fellowship that is 1 year
23 or shorter.

24 (3) RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING
25 PARTNER.—

1 (A) SELECTION OF FELLOWS.—The imple-
2 menting partner, in close coordination with the
3 Department of State and the American Insti-
4 tute in Taiwan, shall—

5 (i) make efforts to recruit fellowship
6 candidates who reflect the diversity of the
7 United States;

8 (ii) select fellows for the Taiwan Fel-
9 lowship Program based solely on merit,
10 with appropriate supervision from the De-
11 partment of State and the American Insti-
12 tute in Taiwan; and

13 (iii) prioritize the selection of can-
14 didates willing to serve a fellowship lasting
15 1 year or longer.

16 (B) FIRST YEAR.—The implementing part-
17 ner should provide each fellow in the first year
18 (or shorter duration, as jointly determined by
19 the Department of State and the American In-
20 stitute in Taiwan for those who are not serving
21 a 2-year fellowship) with—

22 (i) intensive Mandarin Chinese lan-
23 guage training; and

1 (ii) courses in the political economy of
2 Taiwan, China, and the broader Indo-Pa-
3 cific.

4 (C) WAIVER OF REQUIRED TRAINING.—
5 The Department of State, in coordination with
6 the American Institute in Taiwan and, as ap-
7 propriate, the implementing partner, may waive
8 any of the training required under subpara-
9 graph (B) to the extent that a fellow has Man-
10 darin language skills, knowledge of the topic de-
11 scribed in subparagraph (B)(ii), or for other re-
12 lated reasons approved by the Department of
13 State and the American Institute in Taiwan. If
14 any of the training requirements are waived for
15 a fellow serving a 2-year fellowship, the training
16 portion of his or her fellowship may be short-
17 ened to the extent appropriate.

18 (D) OFFICE; STAFFING.—The imple-
19 menting partner, in consultation with the De-
20 partment of State and the American Institute
21 in Taiwan, may maintain an office and at least
22 1 full-time staff member in Taiwan—

23 (i) to liaise with the American Insti-
24 tute in Taiwan and the governing authori-
25 ties on Taiwan; and

1 (ii) to serve as the primary in-country
2 point of contact for the recipients of fellow-
3 ships under this section and their depend-
4 ents.

5 (E) OTHER FUNCTIONS.—The imple-
6 menting partner may perform other functions
7 in association in support of the Taiwan Fellow-
8 ship Program, including logistical and adminis-
9 trative functions, as prescribed by the Depart-
10 ment of State and the American Institute in
11 Taiwan.

12 (4) NONCOMPLIANCE.—

13 (A) IN GENERAL.—Any fellow who fails to
14 comply with the requirements under this sub-
15 section shall reimburse the American Institute
16 in Taiwan for—

17 (i) the Federal funds expended for the
18 fellow's participation in the fellowship, as
19 set forth in subparagraphs (B) and (C);
20 and

21 (ii) interest accrued on such funds
22 (calculated at the prevailing rate).

23 (B) FULL REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fellow
24 who violates subparagraph (A) or (B) of para-
25 graph (2) shall reimburse the American Insti-

1 (5) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days
2 after the selection of the first class of fellows under
3 this section, and annually thereafter for 7 years, the
4 Department of State shall offer to brief the appro-
5 priate committees of Congress regarding the fol-
6 lowing issues:

7 (A) An assessment of the performance of
8 the implementing partner in fulfilling the pur-
9 poses of this section.

10 (B) The names and sponsoring agencies of
11 the fellows selected by the implementing part-
12 ner and the extent to which such fellows rep-
13 resent the diversity of the United States.

14 (C) The names of the parliamentary of-
15 fices, ministries, other agencies of the governing
16 authorities on Taiwan, and nongovernmental in-
17 stitutions to which each fellow was assigned
18 during the second year of the fellowship.

19 (D) Any recommendations, as appropriate,
20 to improve the implementation of the Taiwan
21 Fellowship Program, including added flexibili-
22 ties in the administration of the program.

23 (E) An assessment of the Taiwan Fellow-
24 ship Program's value upon the relationship be-

1 tween the United States and Taiwan or the
2 United States and Asian countries.

3 (6) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.—

4 (A) IN GENERAL.—The financial records
5 of any implementing partner shall be audited
6 annually in accordance with generally accepted
7 auditing standards by independent certified
8 public accountants or independent licensed pub-
9 lic accountants who are certified or licensed by
10 a regulatory authority of a State or another po-
11 litical subdivision of the United States.

12 (B) LOCATION.—Each audit under sub-
13 paragraph (A) shall be conducted at the place
14 or places where the financial records of the im-
15 plementing partner are normally kept.

16 (C) ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS.—The imple-
17 menting partner shall make available to the ac-
18 countants conducting an audit under subpara-
19 graph (A)—

20 (i) all books, financial records, files,
21 other papers, things, and property belong-
22 ing to, or in use by, the implementing
23 partner that are necessary to facilitate the
24 audit; and

1 (ii) full facilities for verifying trans-
2 actions with the balances or securities held
3 by depositories, fiscal agents, and
4 custodians.

5 (D) REPORT.—

6 (i) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 6
7 months after the end of each fiscal year,
8 the implementing partner shall provide a
9 report of the audit conducted for such fis-
10 cal year under subparagraph (A) to the
11 Department of State and the American In-
12 stitute in Taiwan.

13 (ii) CONTENTS.—Each audit report
14 shall—

15 (I) set forth the scope of the
16 audit;

17 (II) include such statements,
18 along with the auditor's opinion of
19 those statements, as may be necessary
20 to present fairly the implementing
21 partner's assets and liabilities, surplus
22 or deficit, with reasonable detail;

23 (III) include a statement of the
24 implementing partner's income and
25 expenses during the year; and

1 (IV) include a schedule of—

2 (aa) all contracts and coop-
3 erative agreements requiring pay-
4 ments greater than \$5,000; and

5 (bb) any payments of com-
6 pensation, salaries, or fees at a
7 rate greater than \$5,000 per
8 year.

9 (iii) COPIES.—Each audit report shall
10 be produced in sufficient copies for dis-
11 tribution to the public.

12 (g) TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOVERN-
13 MENT SERVICE.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—

15 (A) DETAIL AUTHORIZED.—With the ap-
16 proval of the Secretary of State, an agency
17 head may detail, for a period of not more than
18 2 years, an employee of the agency of the
19 United States Government who has been award-
20 ed a fellowship under this section, to the Amer-
21 ican Institute in Taiwan for the purpose of as-
22 signment to the governing authorities on Tai-
23 wan or an organization described in subsection
24 (e)(4)(B)(ii).

1 (B) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall
2 enter into a written agreement with the Federal
3 Government before receiving a fellowship, in
4 which the fellow shall agree—

5 (i) to continue in the service of the
6 sponsoring agency at the end of fellowship
7 for a period of at least 4 years (or at least
8 2 years if the fellowship duration is 1 year
9 or shorter) unless the detailee is involun-
10 tarily separated from the service of such
11 agency; and

12 (ii) to pay to the American Institute
13 in Taiwan any additional expenses incurred
14 by the Federal Government in connection
15 with the fellowship if the detailee volun-
16 tarily separates from service with the spon-
17 soring agency before the end of the period
18 for which the detailee has agreed to con-
19 tinue in the service of such agency.

20 (C) EXCEPTION.—The payment agreed to
21 under subparagraph (B)(ii) may not be re-
22 quired of a detailee who leaves the service of
23 the sponsoring agency to enter into the service
24 of another agency of the United States Govern-
25 ment unless the head of the sponsoring agency

1 notifies the detailee before the effective date of
2 entry into the service of the other agency that
3 payment will be required under this subsection.

4 (2) STATUS AS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE.—A
5 detailee—

6 (A) is deemed, for the purpose of pre-
7 serving allowances, privileges, rights, seniority,
8 and other benefits, to be an employee of the
9 sponsoring agency;

10 (B) is entitled to pay, allowances, and ben-
11 efits from funds available to such agency, which
12 is deemed to comply with section 5536 of title
13 5, United States Code; and

14 (C) may be assigned to a position with an
15 entity described in section (f)(4)(B)(i) if accept-
16 ance of such position does not involve—

17 (i) the taking of an oath of allegiance
18 to another government; or

19 (ii) the acceptance of compensation or
20 other benefits from any foreign govern-
21 ment by such detailee.

22 (3) RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPONSORING AGEN-
23 CY.—

24 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Federal agency
25 from which a detailee is detailed should provide

1 the fellow allowances and benefits that are con-
2 sistent with Department of State Standardized
3 Regulations or other applicable rules and regu-
4 lations, including—

5 (i) a living quarters allowance to cover
6 the cost of housing in Taiwan;

7 (ii) a cost of living allowance to cover
8 any possible higher costs of living in Tai-
9 wan;

10 (iii) a temporary quarters subsistence
11 allowance for up to 7 days if the fellow is
12 unable to find housing immediately upon
13 arriving in Taiwan;

14 (iv) an education allowance to assist
15 parents in providing the fellow's minor
16 children with educational services ordi-
17 narily provided without charge by public
18 schools in the United States;

19 (v) moving expenses to transport per-
20 sonal belongings of the fellow and his or
21 her family in their move to Taiwan, which
22 is comparable to the allowance given for
23 American Institute in Taiwan employees
24 assigned to Taiwan; and

1 (vi) an economy-class airline ticket to
2 and from Taiwan for each fellow and the
3 fellow's immediate family.

4 (B) MODIFICATION OF BENEFITS.—The
5 American Institute in Taiwan and its imple-
6 menting partner, with the approval of the De-
7 partment of State, may modify the benefits set
8 forth in subparagraph (A) if such modification
9 is warranted by fiscal circumstances.

10 (4) NO FINANCIAL LIABILITY.—The American
11 Institute in Taiwan, the implementing partner, and
12 any governing authorities on Taiwan or nongovern-
13 mental entities in Taiwan at which a fellow is de-
14 tailed during the second year of the fellowship may
15 not be held responsible for the pay, allowances, or
16 any other benefit normally provided to the detailee.

17 (5) REIMBURSEMENT.—Fellows may be de-
18 tailed under paragraph (1)(A) without reimburse-
19 ment to the United States by the American Institute
20 in Taiwan.

21 (6) ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS.—Detailees
22 may be paid by the American Institute in Taiwan
23 for the allowances and benefits listed in paragraph
24 (3).

25 (h) FUNDING.—

1 (2) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The implementing
2 partner selected to implement the Taiwan Fellowship
3 Program may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or do-
4 nations of services or property in carrying out such
5 program, subject to the review and approval of the
6 American Institute in Taiwan.

7 (i) STUDY AND REPORT.—Not later than one year
8 prior to the sunset of the fellowship program under sub-
9 section (e), the Comptroller General of the United States
10 shall conduct a study and submit to the Committee on
11 Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
12 Foreign Affairs of the House a report that includes—

13

14 (A) an analysis of the United States Gov-
15 ernment participants in this program, including
16 the number of applicants and the number of fel-
17 lowships undertaken, the place of employment,
18 and as assessment of the costs and benefits for
19 participants and for the United States Govern-
20 ment of such fellowships;

21 (B) an analysis of the financial impact of
22 the fellowship on United States Government of-
23 fices which have provided Fellows to participate
24 in the program; and

1 (C) recommendations, if any, on how to
2 improve the fellowship program.

3 **SEC. 214. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Department of State and
5 other United States Government departments and agen-
6 cies shall engage with the democratically elected govern-
7 ment of Taiwan as the legitimate representative of the
8 people of Taiwan and end the outdated practice of refer-
9 ring to the government in Taiwan as the “Taiwan authori-
10 ties”. Notwithstanding the continued supporting role of
11 the American Institute in Taiwan in carrying out United
12 States foreign policy and protecting United States inter-
13 ests in Taiwan, the United States Government shall not
14 place any restrictions on the ability of officials of the De-
15 partment of State and other United States Government
16 departments and agencies to interact directly and rou-
17 tinely with counterparts in the Taiwan government.

18 (b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this para-
19 graph shall be construed as entailing restoration of diplo-
20 matic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or
21 altering the United States Government’s position on Tai-
22 wan’s international status.

23 **SEC. 215. TAIWAN SYMBOLS OF SOVEREIGNTY.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
25 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State

1 shall rescind any contact guideline, internal restriction,
2 section of the Foreign Affairs Manual or Foreign Affairs
3 Handbook, related guidance, or related policies that, ex-
4 plicitly or implicitly, including through restrictions or limi-
5 tations on activities of United States personnel, limits the
6 ability of members of the armed forces of the Republic
7 of China (Taiwan) and government representatives from
8 the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office
9 (TECRO) to display for official purposes symbols of Re-
10 public of China sovereignty, including—

11 (1) the flag of the Republic of China (Taiwan);

12 and

13 (2) the corresponding emblems or insignia of
14 military units.

15 (b) OFFICIAL PURPOSES DEFINED.—In this section,
16 the term “official purposes” means—

17 (1) the wearing of official uniforms;

18 (2) conducting government-hosted ceremonies
19 or functions; and

20 (3) appearances on Department of State social
21 media accounts promoting engagements with Tai-
22 wan.

23 (c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-
24 tion shall be construed as entailing restoration of diplo-
25 matic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or

1 altering the United States Government’s position on Tai-
2 wan’s international status.

3 **SEC. 216. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID-19 PAN-**
4 **DEMIC.**

5 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
6 gress that—

7 (1) it is critical to understand the origins of the
8 COVID-19 pandemic so the United States can bet-
9 ter prepare, prevent, and respond to pandemic
10 health threats in the future;

11 (2) given the impact of the COVID-19 pan-
12 demic on all Americans, the American people deserve
13 to know what information the United States Govern-
14 ment possesses about the origins of COVID-19, as
15 appropriate;

16 (3) Congress shares the concerns expressed by
17 the United States Government and 13 other foreign
18 governments that the international team of experts
19 dispatched to the People’s Republic of China by the
20 World Health Organization (WHO) to study the ori-
21 gins of the SARS-CoV-2 virus was “significantly
22 delayed and lacked access to complete, original data
23 and samples”;

24 (4) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Di-
25 rector-General of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom

1 Ghebreyesus, further affirms that the investigative
2 team had encountered “difficulties” in accessing
3 necessary raw data, that “we have not yet found the
4 source of the virus,” and that “all hypotheses re-
5 main on the table”; and

6 (5) it is critical for independent experts to have
7 full access to all pertinent human, animal, and envi-
8 ronmental data, live virus samples, research, and
9 personnel involved in the early stages of the out-
10 break relevant to determining how this pandemic
11 emerged.

12 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days
13 after enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
14 ligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the
15 Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary
16 of Energy, and other relevant executive departments, shall
17 submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report
18 consisting of—

19 (1) an assessment of the most likely source or
20 origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including a de-
21 tailed review of all information the United States
22 possesses that it has identified as potentially rel-
23 evant to the source or origin of the SARS-CoV-2
24 virus, including zoonotic transmission and spillover,
25 the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), or other

1 sources of origin, transmission, or spillover, based on
2 the information the United States Government has
3 to date;

4 (2) an identification of the leading credible
5 theories of the etiology of the SARS-CoV-2 virus by
6 the United States Government, the steps the United
7 States has taken to validate those theories, and any
8 variance in assessment or dissent among or between
9 United States intelligence agencies, executive agen-
10 cies, and executive offices of the most likely source
11 or origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, and the basis
12 for such variance or dissent;

13 (3) a description of all steps the United States
14 Government has taken to identify and investigate
15 the source of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including a
16 timeline of such efforts;

17 (4) a detailed description of the data to which
18 the United States and the WHO have requested and
19 have access to in order to determine the origin of
20 the source of the SARS-CoV-2 virus;

21 (5) an account of efforts by the PRC to cooper-
22 ate with, impede, or obstruct any inquiry or inves-
23 tigation to determine the source and transmission of
24 SARS-CoV-2 virus, including into a possible lab
25 leak, or to create or spread misinformation or

1 disinformation regarding the source and trans-
2 mission of SARS–CoV–2 virus by the PRC or CCP,
3 including by national and local governmental and
4 health entities;

5 (6) a detailed account of information known to
6 the United States Government regarding the WIV
7 and associated facilities, including research activities
8 on coronaviruses and gain-of-function research, any
9 reported illnesses of persons associated with the lab-
10 oratory with symptoms consistent with COVID–19
11 and the ultimate diagnosis, and a timeline of re-
12 search relevant to coronaviruses;

13 (7) a list of any known obligations on the PRC
14 that require disclosure and cooperation in the event
15 of a viral outbreak like SARS–CoV–2; and

16 (8) an overview of United States engagement
17 with the PRC with respect to coronaviruses that in-
18 cludes—

19 (A) a detailed accounting of United States
20 engagement with the WIV and similar labs in
21 the PRC specific to coronaviruses, including a
22 detailed accounting of United States Govern-
23 ment-sponsored research and funding and diplo-
24 matic engagements such as “track 1.5” and
25 “track 2” engagements; and

1 (B) an assessment of any additional scru-
2 tinity of United States Government funding to
3 support gain-of-function research in the PRC
4 after the moratorium on such funding was lift-
5 ed in 2017, and whether United States Govern-
6 ment funding was used to support gain-of-func-
7 tion research in the PRC, during the morato-
8 rium on gain-of-function research (2014–2017).

9 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
10 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include
11 a classified annex.

12 (d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
13 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
14 tees of Congress” means—

15 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
16 Senate;

17 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
18 Senate;

19 (3) the Committee on Health, Education,
20 Labor, and Pensions of the Senate;

21 (4) the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
22 sources of the Senate;

23 (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
24 House of Representatives;

1 (6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
2 ligence of the House of Representatives; and

3 (8) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of
4 the House of Representatives.

5 **SEC. 217. ENHANCEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND**
6 **ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT WITH PACIFIC IS-**
7 **LAND COUNTRIES.**

8 (a) **AUTHORITY.**—The Secretary of State and Sec-
9 retary of Commerce are authorized to hire Locally Em-
10 ployed Staff in Pacific island countries for the purpose of
11 providing increased diplomatic support and promoting in-
12 creased economic and commercial engagement between the
13 United States and Pacific Island countries.

14 (b) **AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.**—

15 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—Of the amounts authorized
16 to be appropriated or otherwise made available to
17 the Department of State and the Department of
18 Commerce for fiscal year 2022, not more than
19 \$10,000,000 , respectively, shall be available to
20 carry out the purposes of this section.

21 (2) **TERMINATION.**—The availability of funds in
22 paragraph (1) shall expire on October 1, 2026.

23 (c) **REPORT.**—Not later than one year after the date
24 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
25 5 years, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Com-

1 merce shall provide to the appropriate committees of Con-
2 gress a report on the activities of the Department of State
3 and Department of Commerce Locally Employed Staff in
4 Pacific island countries, which shall include—

5 (1) a detailed description of the additional dip-
6 lomatic, economic, and commercial engagement and
7 activities in the Pacific island countries provided by
8 Locally Employed Staff; and

9 (2) an assessment of the impact of the activities
10 with respect to the diplomatic, economic, and secu-
11 rity interests of the United States.

12 (d) EXCEPTION FOR AMERICAN SAMOA.—The Sec-
13 retary of State may, as appropriate, treat the territory of
14 American Samoa as a foreign country for purposes of car-
15 rying out this section.

16 (e) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
17 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
18 tees of Congress” means—

19 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
20 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
21 tation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
22 sources, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
23 Senate; and

24 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
25 Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Com-

1 mittee on Natural Resources, and the Committee on
2 Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

3 **SEC. 218. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PER-**
4 **SONNEL AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE**
5 **INDO-PACIFIC.**

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
7 ings:

8 (1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of
9 State allocated \$1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific
10 region in bilateral and regional foreign assistance
11 (FA) resources, including as authorized by section
12 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of
13 2018 (Public Law 115–409; 132 Stat. 5391), and
14 \$798,000,000 in the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic en-
15 gagement (DE) budget. These amounts represent
16 only 5 percent of the DE budget and only 4 percent
17 of the total Department of State-USAID budget.

18 (2) Over the last 5 years the DE budget and
19 personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5
20 percent of the total, while FA resources averaged
21 only 4 percent of the total.

22 (3) In 2020, the Department of State began a
23 process to realign certain positions at posts to en-
24 sure that its personnel footprint matches the de-

1 mands of great-power competition, including in the
2 Indo-Pacific.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that—

5 (1) the size of the United States diplomatic
6 corps must be sufficient to meet the current and
7 emerging challenges of the 21st century, including
8 those posed by the PRC in the Indo-Pacific region
9 and elsewhere;

10 (2) the increase must be designed to meet the
11 objectives of an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on
12 strengthening the good governance and sovereignty
13 of states that adhere to and uphold the rules-based
14 international order; and

15 (3) the increase must be implemented with a
16 focus on increased numbers of economic, political,
17 and public diplomacy officers, representing a cumu-
18 lative increase of at least 200 foreign service officer
19 generalists, to—

20 (A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade
21 and open investment environments for United
22 States companies, and engaged in increased
23 commercial diplomacy in key markets;

24 (B) better articulate and explain United
25 States policies, strengthen civil society and

1 democratic principles, enhance reporting on
2 Chinese the PRC's global activities, promote
3 people-to-people exchanges, and advance United
4 States influence; and

5 (C) increase capacity at small- and me-
6 dium-sized embassies and consulates in the
7 Indo-Pacific and other regions around the
8 world, as necessary.

9 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—

10 (1) It shall be the policy of the United States
11 to ensure Department of State funding levels and
12 personnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the re-
13 gion's high degree of importance and significance to
14 United States political, economic, and security inter-
15 ests.

16 (2) It shall be the policy of the United States
17 to increase DE and FA funding and the quantity of
18 personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region re-
19 spective to the Department of State's total budget.

20 (3) It shall be the policy of the United States
21 to increase the number of resident Defense attachés
22 in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in locations
23 where the People's Republic of China has a resident
24 military attaché but the United States does not, to
25 assure coverage of all appropriate posts.

1 (d) ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after
2 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
3 State shall provide to the appropriate committees of Con-
4 gress an action plan with the following elements:

5 (1) Identification of requirements to advance
6 United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific
7 and the personnel and budgetary resources needed
8 to meet them, assuming an unconstrained resource
9 environment.

10 (2) A plan to increase the portion of the De-
11 partment's budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in
12 terms of DE and FA focused on development, eco-
13 nomic, and security assistance.

14 (3) A plan to increase the number of positions
15 at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with
16 responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a
17 description of increases at each post or bureau, a
18 breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of
19 how such increases in personnel will advance United
20 States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.

21 (4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks
22 that the Department will meet in implementing the
23 action plan.

24 (5) A description of any barriers to imple-
25 menting the action plan.

1 (e) UPDATES TO REPORT AND BRIEFING.—Every 90
2 days after the submission of the action plan described in
3 subsection (c), the Secretary shall submit an update and
4 brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the imple-
5 mentation of such action plan, with supporting data and
6 including a detailed assessment of benchmarks reached.

7 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
8 authorized to be appropriated, for fiscal year 2022,
9 \$2,000,000,000 in bilateral and regional foreign assist-
10 ance resources to carry out the purposes of part 1 and
11 chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
12 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq., 2346 et seq.) to the Indo-Pacific
13 region and \$1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement re-
14 sources to the Indo-Pacific region.

15 (g) INCLUSION OF AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED PURSU-
16 ANT TO ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.—
17 Amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection
18 (f) include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant
19 to section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act
20 of 2018 (Public Law 115–409).

21 (h) SECRETARY OF STATE CERTIFICATION.—Not
22 later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this
23 Act, the Secretary of State shall certify, to the appropriate
24 committees of Congress, whether or not the benchmarks

1 described in the action plan in subsection (c) have been
2 met. This certification is non-delegable.

3 **SEC. 219. ADVANCING UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP IN THE**
4 **UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.**

5 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
7 establish, within the Bureau of International Organi-
8 zation Affairs of the Department of State, a Special
9 Representative for Advancing United States Leader-
10 ship in the United Nations (referred to in this sec-
11 tion as the “Special Representative”). The Special
12 Representative shall serve concurrently as a Deputy
13 Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of International
14 Organization Affairs of the Department of State.
15 The Special Representative shall report directly to
16 the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Inter-
17 national Organization Affairs, in coordination and
18 consultation with the Representative of the United
19 States to the United Nations.

20 (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Special Representative
21 shall assume responsibility for—

22 (1) promoting United States leadership and
23 participation in the United Nations system, with a
24 focus on issue areas where authoritarian nations are

1 exercising increased influence in and determining the
2 agenda of the United Nations system;

3 (2) highlighting how investments in the United
4 Nations advance United States interests and enable
5 stronger coalitions to hold authoritarian regimes to
6 account;

7 (3) ensuring United States emphasis on the
8 need for United Nations employees to uphold the
9 principals of impartiality enshrined in the United
10 Nations charter, rules, and regulations;

11 (4) monitoring and developing and imple-
12 menting plans to counter undue influence, especially
13 by authoritarian nations, within the United Nations
14 system;

15 (5) assessing how United States decisions to
16 withdraw from United Nations bodies impacts
17 United States influence at the United Nations and
18 multilateral global initiatives;

19 (6) promoting the participation and inclusion of
20 Taiwan in the United Nations system;

21 (7) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations
22 jobs and identifying qualified Americans and other
23 qualified nationals to promote for these positions;

24 (8) tracking leadership changes in United Na-
25 tions secretariat, funds, programs and agencies, and

1 developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of
2 like-minded states are assembled to ensure leader-
3 ship races are not won by countries that do not
4 share United States interests;

5 (9) advancing other priorities deemed relevant
6 by the Secretary of State to ensuring the integrity
7 of the United Nations system;

8 (10) eliminating current barriers to the employ-
9 ment of United States nationals in the United Na-
10 tions Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies;
11 and

12 (11) increasing the number of qualified United
13 States candidates for leadership and oversight posi-
14 tions at the United Nations Secretariat, funds, pro-
15 grams, agencies, and at other international organiza-
16 tions.

17 (c) SUPPORT.—The Secretary of State shall make
18 any necessary adjustments to the current structure of the
19 Bureau of International Organization Affairs, including
20 the respective roles and responsibilities of offices in that
21 Bureau, to ensure appropriate support for the mission and
22 work of the Special Representative.

23 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
24 authorized to be appropriated \$5,000,000 for fiscal years

1 2022 through 2026 to carry out the responsibilities under
2 subsection (b).

3 **SEC. 219A. ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.**

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Is it the sense of Con-
5 gress that—

6 (1) the Indo-Pacific region is home to many of
7 the world’s most dynamic democracies, economic op-
8 portunities, as well as many challenges to United
9 States interests and values as a result of the growth
10 in authoritarian governance in the region and by
11 broad challenges posed by nuclear proliferation, the
12 changing environment, and deteriorating adherence
13 to human rights principles and obligations;

14 (2) the People’s Republic of China poses a par-
15 ticular threat as it repeatedly violates internationally
16 recognized human rights, engages in unfair economic
17 and trade practices, disregards international laws
18 and norms, coerces its neighbors, engages in malign
19 influence operations, and enables global digital
20 authoritarianism;

21 (3) the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018
22 (referred to in this section as “ARIA”) enhances the
23 United States’ commitment in the Indo-Pacific re-
24 gion by—

1 (A) expanding its defense cooperation with
2 its allies and partners;

3 (B) investing in democracy and the protec-
4 tion of human rights;

5 (C) engaging in cybersecurity initiatives;
6 and

7 (D) supporting people-to-people engage-
8 ment and other shared priorities; and

9 (4) the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pa-
10 cific Strategy Report concludes that ARIA “en-
11 shrines a generational whole-of-government policy
12 framework that demonstrates U.S. commitment to a
13 free and open Indo-Pacific region”.

14 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—The
15 Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–
16 409) is amended—

17 (1) in section 201(b), by striking
18 “\$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019
19 through 2023” and inserting “\$2,000,000,000 for
20 each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026”;

21 (2) in section 215(b), by striking “2023” and
22 inserting “2026”;

23 (3) in section 306(a)—

24 (A) in paragraph (1), by striking “5
25 years” and inserting “8 years”; and

1 (B) in paragraph (2), by striking “2023”
2 and inserting “2026”;

3 (4) in section 409(a)(1), by striking “2023”
4 and inserting “2026”;

5 (5) in section 410—

6 (A) in subsection (c), by striking “2023”
7 and inserting “2026”; and

8 (B) in subsection (d), in the matter pre-
9 ceding paragraph (1), by striking “2023” and
10 inserting “2026”; and

11 (6) in section 411, by striking “2023” and in-
12 serting “2026”.

13 **SEC. 219B. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON NEED FOR RECI-**
14 **PROCITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN**
15 **THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE’S RE-**
16 **PUBLIC OF CHINA.**

17 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
18 United States—

19 (1) to clearly differentiate, in official state-
20 ments, media communications, and messaging, be-
21 tween the people of China and the Communist Party
22 of China;

23 (2) that any negotiations toward a trade agree-
24 ment with the People’s Republic of China should be

1 concluded in a manner that addresses unfair trading
2 practices by the People’s Republic of China;

3 (3) that such an agreement should, to the ex-
4 tent possible—

5 (A) ensure that the People’s Republic of
6 China commits to structural changes in its
7 trade and economic policies;

8 (B) hold the People’s Republic of China
9 accountable to those commitments; and

10 (C) promote access to reciprocal direct in-
11 vestment; and

12 (4) to seek and develop a relationship with the
13 People’s Republic of China that is founded on the
14 principles of basic reciprocity across sectors, includ-
15 ing economic, diplomatic, educational, and commu-
16 nications sectors.

17 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
19 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
20 retary of State, in consultation with other relevant
21 Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to
22 the appropriate congressional committees a report
23 on the manner in which the Government of the Peo-
24 ple’s Republic of China creates barriers to the work
25 of United States diplomats and other officials, jour-

1 nalists, and businesses, and nongovernmental orga-
2 nizations based in the United States, in the People's
3 Republic of China.

4 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-
5 graph (1) shall include the following:

6 (A) A summary of obstacles that United
7 States diplomats and other officials, journalists,
8 and businesses encounter in carrying out their
9 work in the People's Republic of China.

10 (B) A summary of the obstacles Chinese
11 diplomats and other officials, journalists, and
12 businesses encounter while working in the
13 United States.

14 (C) A description of the efforts that offi-
15 cials of the United States have made to rectify
16 any differences in the treatment of diplomats
17 and other officials, journalists, and businesses
18 by the United States and by the People's Re-
19 public of China, and the results of those efforts.

20 (D) An assessment of the adherence of the
21 Government of the People's Republic of China,
22 in its treatment of United States citizens, to
23 the requirements of—

24 (i) the Convention on Consular Rela-
25 tions, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and

1 entered into force March 19, 1967 (21
2 U.S.T. 77); and

3 (ii) the Consular Convention, signed
4 at Washington September 17, 1980, and
5 entered into force February 19, 1982, be-
6 tween the United States and the People's
7 Republic of China.

8 (E) An assessment of any impacts of the
9 People's Republic of China's internet restric-
10 tions on reciprocity between the United States
11 and the People's Republic of China.

12 (F) A summary of other notable areas
13 where the Government of the People's Republic
14 of China or entities affiliated with that Govern-
15 ment are able to conduct activities or invest-
16 ments in the United States but that are denied
17 to United States entities in the People's Repub-
18 lic of China.

19 (G) Recommendations on efforts that the
20 Government of the United States could under-
21 take to improve reciprocity in the relationship
22 between the United States and the People's Re-
23 public of China.

24 (3) FORM OF REPORT; AVAILABILITY.—

1 (A) FORM.—The report required by para-
2 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified
3 form, but may include a classified index.

4 (B) AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified por-
5 tion of the report required by paragraph (1)
6 shall be posted on a publicly available internet
7 website of the Department of State.

8 (4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
9 TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “ap-
10 propriate congressional committees” means the
11 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
12 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
13 Representatives.

14 (c) RECIPROCITY DEFINED.—In this section, the
15 term “reciprocity” means the mutual and equitable ex-
16 change of privileges between governments, countries, busi-
17 nesses, or individuals.

18 **SEC. 219C. OPPOSITION TO PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO**
19 **PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BY ASIAN DE-**
20 **VELOPMENT BANK.**

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
22 ings:

23 (1) Through the Asian Development Bank,
24 countries are eligible to borrow from the Bank until
25 they can manage long-term development and access

1 to capital markets without financial resources from
2 the Bank.

3 (2) The Bank uses the gross national income
4 per capita benchmark used by the International
5 Bank for Reconstruction and Development to trigger
6 the graduation process. For fiscal year 2021, the
7 graduation discussion income is a gross national in-
8 come per capita exceeding \$7,065.

9 (3) The People's Republic of China exceeded
10 the graduation discussion income threshold in 2016.

11 (4) Since 2016, the Asian Development Bank
12 has continued to approve loans and technical assist-
13 ance to the People's Republic of China totaling
14 \$7,600,000,000. The Bank has also approved non-
15 sovereign commitments in the People's Republic of
16 China totaling \$1,800,000,000 since 2016.

17 (5) The World Bank calculates the People's Re-
18 public of China's most recent year (2019) gross na-
19 tional income per capita as \$10,390.

20 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
21 United States to oppose any additional lending from the
22 Asian Development Bank to the People's Republic of
23 China as a result of the People's Republic of China's suc-
24 cessful graduation from the eligibility requirements for as-
25 sistance from the Bank.

1 (c) OPPOSITION TO LENDING TO PEOPLE’S REPUB-
2 LIC OF CHINA.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall in-
3 struct the United States Executive Director of the Asian
4 Development Bank to use the voice, vote, and influence
5 of the United States to oppose any loan or extension of
6 financial or technical assistance by the Asian Development
7 Bank to the People’s Republic of China.

8 **SEC. 219D. OPPOSITION TO PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO**
9 **PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BY INTER-**
10 **NATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND**
11 **DEVELOPMENT.**

12 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
13 ings:

14 (1) The People’s Republic of China is the
15 world’s second largest economy and a major global
16 lender.

17 (2) In February 2021, the People’s Republic of
18 China’s foreign exchange reserves totaled more than
19 \$3,200,000,000,000.

20 (3) The World Bank classifies the People’s Re-
21 public of China as having an upper-middle-income
22 economy.

23 (4) On February 25, 2021, President Xi
24 Jinping announced “complete victory” over extreme
25 poverty in the People’s Republic of China.

1 (5) The Government of China utilizes state re-
2 sources to create and promote the Asian Infrastruc-
3 ture Investment Bank, the New Development Bank,
4 and the Belt and Road Initiative.

5 (6) The People's Republic of China is the
6 world's largest official creditor.

7 (7) Through the International Bank for Recon-
8 struction and Development, countries are eligible to
9 borrow from the Bank until they can manage long-
10 term development and access to capital markets
11 without financial resources from the Bank.

12 (8) The World Bank reviews the graduation of
13 a country from eligibility to borrow from the Inter-
14 national Bank for Reconstruction and Development
15 once the country reaches the graduation discussion
16 income, which is equivalent to the gross national in-
17 come. For fiscal year 2021, the graduation discus-
18 sion income is a gross national income per capita ex-
19 ceeding \$7,065.

20 (9) The People's Republic of China exceeded
21 the graduation discussion income threshold in 2016.

22 (10) Since 2016, the International Bank for
23 Reconstruction and Development has approved
24 projects totaling \$8,930,000,000 to the People's Re-
25 public of China.

1 (11) The World Bank calculates the People's
2 Republic of China's most recent year (2019) gross
3 national income per capita as \$10,390.

4 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
5 United States to oppose any additional lending from the
6 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
7 to the People's Republic of China as a result of the Peo-
8 ple's Republic of China's successful graduation from the
9 eligibility requirements for assistance from the Bank.

10 (c) OPPOSITION TO LENDING TO PEOPLE'S REPUB-
11 LIC OF CHINA.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall in-
12 struct the United States Executive Director of the Inter-
13 national Bank for Reconstruction and Development to use
14 the voice, vote, and influence of the United States—

15 (1) to oppose any loan or extension of financial
16 or technical assistance by the International Bank for
17 Reconstruction and Development to the People's Re-
18 public of China; and

19 (2) to end lending and assistance to countries
20 that exceed the graduation discussion income of the
21 Bank.

22 (d) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than one year
23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
24 thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to
25 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and

1 the Committee on Financial Services and the Committee
2 on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a re-
3 port that includes—

4 (1) an assessment of the status of borrowing by
5 the People's Republic of China from the World
6 Bank;

7 (2) a list of countries that have exceeded the
8 graduation discussion income at the International
9 Bank for Reconstruction and Development;

10 (3) a list of countries that have graduated from
11 eligibility for assistance from the Bank; and

12 (4) a description of the efforts taken by the
13 United States to graduate countries from such eligi-
14 bility once they exceed the graduation discussion in-
15 come.

16 **SEC. 219E. UNITED STATES POLICY ON CHINESE AND RUS-**
17 **SIAN GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO UNDER-**
18 **MINE THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUN-**
19 **CIL ACTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS.**

20 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress—

21 (1) notes with growing concern that the Peo-
22 ple's Republic of China and Russia have, at the
23 United Nations, aligned with one another in blocking
24 Security Council action on Syria, Myanmar,

1 Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and other countries credibly
2 accused of committing human rights abuses;

3 (2) recognizes that it is not only the use of the
4 veto on the United Nations Security Council, but
5 also the threat of the use of a veto, that can prevent
6 the Security Council from taking actions aimed at
7 protecting human rights;

8 (3) condemns efforts by China and Russia to
9 undermine United Nations Security Council actions
10 aimed at censuring governments credibly accused of
11 committing or permitting the commission of human
12 rights violations; and

13 (4) denounces the tactical alignment between
14 the People's Republic of China and Russia within
15 the United Nations Security Council to challenge the
16 protection of human rights and the guarantee of hu-
17 manitarian access.

18 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
19 of the United States to—

20 (1) reaffirm its commitment to maintain inter-
21 national peace and security, develop friendly rela-
22 tions among nations, and cooperate in solving inter-
23 national problems and promoting respect for human
24 rights;

1 (2) highlight efforts by the People’s Republic of
2 China and Russia to undermine international peace
3 and security, protect human rights, and guarantee
4 humanitarian access to those in need;

5 (3) increase the role and presence of the United
6 States at the United Nations and its constituent
7 bodies to advance United States interests, including
8 by counteracting malign Chinese and Russian influ-
9 ence; and

10 (4) urge allies and like-minded partners to work
11 together with the United States to overcome Chinese
12 and Russian efforts to weaken the United Nations
13 Security Council by preventing it from carrying out
14 its core mandate.

15 **SEC. 219F. DETERRING PRC USE OF FORCE AGAINST TAI-**
16 **WAN.**

17 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
18 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
19 tees of Congress” means—

20 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
21 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
22 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

23 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
24 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent

1 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
2 Representatives.

3 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
4 of the United States—

5 (1) to strenuously oppose any action by the
6 People’s Republic of China to use force to change
7 the status quo on Taiwan; and

8 (2) that, in order to deter the use of force by
9 the People’s Republic of China to change the status
10 quo on Taiwan, the United States should coordinate
11 with allies and partners to identify and develop sig-
12 nificant economic, diplomatic, and other measures to
13 deter and impose costs on any such action by the
14 People’s Republic of China, and to bolster deterrence
15 by articulating such policies publicly, as appropriate
16 and in alignment with United States interests .

17 (c) WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT REVIEW.—Not later
18 than 14 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
19 the President shall convene the heads of all relevant Fed-
20 eral departments and agencies to conduct a whole-of-gov-
21 ernment review of all available economic, diplomatic, and
22 other measures to deter the use of force by the People’s
23 Republic of China to change the status quo of Taiwan.

24 (d) BRIEFING REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days
25 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90

1 days thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, the
2 Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the
3 Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National Intel-
4 ligence, and any other relevant heads of Federal depart-
5 ments and agencies shall brief the appropriate committees
6 of Congress on all available economic, diplomatic, and
7 other strategic measures to deter PRC use of force to
8 change the status quo of Taiwan and provide a detailed
9 description and review of—

10 (1) efforts to date by the United States Govern-
11 ment to deter the use of force by the People's Re-
12 public of China to change the status quo of Taiwan;
13 and

14 (2) progress to date of all coordination efforts
15 between the United States Government and its allies
16 and partners with respect to deterring the use of
17 force to change the status quo of Taiwan.

18 (e) COORDINATED CONSEQUENCES WITH ALLIES
19 AND PARTNERS.—The Secretary of State shall coordinate
20 with United States allies and partners to identify and de-
21 velop significant economic, diplomatic, and other measures
22 to deter the use of force by the People's Republic of China
23 to change the status quo of Taiwan.

1 **SEC. 219G. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO SHARP POWER OP-**
2 **ERATIONS TARGETING TAIWAN.**

3 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the
4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
5 shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to
6 sharp power operations and the united front campaign
7 supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of
8 China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed
9 toward persons or entities in Taiwan.

10 (b) **ELEMENTS.**—The strategy required under sub-
11 section (a) shall include the following elements:

12 (1) Development of a response to PRC propa-
13 ganda and disinformation campaigns and cyber-in-
14 trusions targeting Taiwan, including—

15 (A) assistance in building the capacity of
16 the Taiwan government and private-sector enti-
17 ties to document and expose propaganda and
18 disinformation supported by the Government of
19 the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese
20 Communist Party, or affiliated entities;

21 (B) assistance to enhance the Taiwan gov-
22 ernment’s ability to develop a whole-of-govern-
23 ment strategy to respond to sharp power oper-
24 ations, including election interference; and

1 (C) media training for Taiwan officials and
2 other Taiwan entities targeted by
3 disinformation campaigns.

4 (2) Development of a response to political influ-
5 ence operations that includes an assessment of the
6 extent of influence exerted by the Government of the
7 People's Republic of China and the Chinese Com-
8 munist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, fi-
9 nancial institutions, media organizations, and other
10 entities.

11 (3) Support for exchanges and other technical
12 assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system's
13 ability to respond to sharp power operations.

14 (4) Establishment of a coordinated partnership,
15 through the Global Cooperation and Training
16 Framework, with like-minded governments to share
17 data and best practices with the Government of Tai-
18 wan on ways to address sharp power operations sup-
19 ported by the Government of the People's Republic
20 of China and the Chinese Communist Party.

21 **SEC. 219H. STUDY AND REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS**
22 **TO ADDRESS CHINESE FENTANYL TRAF-**
23 **FICKING.**

24 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

1 (1) In January 2020, the DEA named China as
2 the primary source of United States-bound illicit
3 fentanyl and synthetic opioids.

4 (2) While in 2019 China instituted domestic
5 controls on the production and exportation of
6 fentanyl, some of its variants, and two precursors
7 known as NPP and 4–ANPP, China has not yet ex-
8 panded its class scheduling to include many fentanyl
9 precursors such as 4–AP, which continue to be traf-
10 ficked to second countries in which they are used in
11 the final production of United States-bound fentanyl
12 and other synthetic opioids.

13 (3) The DEA currently maintains a presence in
14 Beijing but continues to seek Chinese approval to
15 open offices in the major shipping hubs of
16 Guangzhou and Shanghai.

17 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

18 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-
19 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-
20 gress” means—

21 (A) the Committee on the Judiciary of the
22 Senate;

23 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
24 the Senate;

1 (C) the Committee on the Judiciary of the
2 House of Representative; and

3 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
4 the House of Representatives.

5 (2) CHINA.—The term “China” means the Peo-
6 ple’s Republic of China.

7 (3) DEA.—The term “DEA” means the Drug
8 Enforcement Administration.

9 (4) PRECURSORS.—The term “precursors”
10 means chemicals used in the illicit production of
11 fentanyl and related synthetic opioid variants.

12 (c) CHINA’S CLASS SCHEDULING OF FENTANYL AND
13 SYNTHETIC OPIOID PRECURSORS.—Not later than 180
14 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
15 retary of State and Attorney General shall submit to the
16 appropriate committees of Congress a written report—

17 (1) detailing a description of United States
18 Government efforts to gain a commitment from the
19 Chinese Government to submit unregulated fentanyl
20 precursors such as 4-AP to controls; and

21 (2) a plan for future steps the United States
22 Government will take to urge China to combat illicit
23 fentanyl production and trafficking originating in
24 China.

1 (d) ESTABLISHMENT OF DEA OFFICES IN CHINA.—
2 Not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act, the
3 Secretary of State and Attorney General shall provide to
4 the appropriate committees of Congress a classified brief-
5 ing on—

6 (1) outreach and negotiations undertaken by
7 the United States Government with the Chinese
8 Government aimed at securing its approval for the
9 establishment of DEA offices in Shanghai and
10 Guangzhou China; and

11 (2) additional efforts to establish new partner-
12 ships with provincial-level authorities to counter the
13 illicit trafficking of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and
14 their precursors.

15 (e) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under
16 subsection (c) shall be unclassified with a classified annex.

17 **Subtitle B—International Security** 18 **Matters**

19 **SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.**

20 In this subtitle:

21 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-
22 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-
23 gress” means—

24 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
25 the Committee on Armed Services, and the

1 Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
2 and

3 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
4 Committee on Armed Services, and the Com-
5 mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
6 resentatives.

7 (2) COMPANY.—The term “company” means
8 any corporation, company, limited liability company,
9 limited partnership, business trust, business associa-
10 tion, or other similar entity.

11 (3) OTHER SECURITY FORCES.—The term
12 “other security forces”—

13 (A) includes national security forces that
14 conduct maritime security; and

15 (B) does not include self-described militias
16 or paramilitary organizations.

17 **SEC. 222. FINDINGS.**

18 Congress makes the following findings:

19 (1) The People’s Republic of China aims to use
20 its growing military might in concert with other in-
21 struments of its national power to displace the
22 United States in the Indo-Pacific and establish he-
23 gemony over the region.

1 (2) The military balance of power in the Indo-
2 Pacific region is growing increasingly unfavorable to
3 the United States because—

4 (A) the PRC is rapidly modernizing and
5 expanding the capabilities of the PLA to project
6 power and create contested areas across the en-
7 tire Indo-Pacific region;

8 (B) PLA modernization has largely fo-
9 cused on areas where it possesses operational
10 advantages and can exploit weaknesses in the
11 United States suite of capabilities; and

12 (C) current United States force structure
13 and presence do not sufficiently counter threats
14 in the Indo-Pacific, as United States allies,
15 bases, and forces at sea in the Indo-Pacific re-
16 gion are concentrated in large bases that are
17 highly vulnerable to the PRC's strike capabili-
18 ties.

19 (3) This shift in the regional military balance
20 and erosion of conventional and strategic deterrence
21 in the Indo-Pacific region—

22 (A) presents a substantial and imminent
23 risk to the security of the United States; and

24 (B) left unchecked, could—

1 (i) embolden the PRC to take actions,
2 including the use of military force, to
3 change the status quo before the United
4 States can mount an effective response;
5 and

6 (ii) alter the nuclear balance in the
7 Indo-Pacific.

8 (4) The PRC sees an opportunity to diminish
9 confidence among United States allies and partners
10 in the strength of United States commitments, even
11 to the extent that these nations feel compelled to
12 bandwagon with the PRC to protect their interests.
13 The PRC is closely monitoring the United States re-
14 action to PRC pressure and coercion of United
15 States allies, searching for indicators of United
16 States resolve.

17 (5) Achieving so-called “reunification” of Tai-
18 wan to mainland China is a key step for the PRC
19 to achieve its regional hegemonic ambitions. The
20 PRC has increased the frequency and scope of its
21 exercises and operations targeting Taiwan, such as
22 amphibious assault and live-fire exercises in the Tai-
23 wan Strait, PLA Air Force flights that encircle Tai-
24 wan, and flights across the unofficial median line in
25 the Taiwan Strait. The Government of the PRC’s

1 full submission of Hong Kong potentially accelerates
2 the timeline of a Taiwan scenario, and makes the
3 defense of Taiwan an even more urgent priority.

4 (6) The defense of Taiwan is critical to—

5 (A) defending the people of Taiwan;

6 (B) limiting the PLA's ability to project
7 power beyond the First Island Chain, including
8 to United States territory, such as Guam and
9 Hawaii;

10 (C) defending the territorial integrity of
11 Japan;

12 (D) preventing the PLA from diverting
13 military planning, resources, and personnel to
14 broader military ambitions; and

15 (E) retaining the United States credibility
16 as a defender of the democratic values and free-
17 market principles embodied by Taiwan's people
18 and government;

19 (7) The PRC capitalized on the world's atten-
20 tion to COVID-19 to advance its military objectives
21 in the South China Sea, intensifying and accel-
22 erating trends already underway. The PRC has sent
23 militarized survey vessels into the Malaysian Exclu-
24 sive Economic Zone, announced the establishment of
25 an administrative district in the Spratly and Paracel

1 Islands under the Chinese local government of
2 Sansha, aimed a fire control radar at a Philippine
3 navy ship, encroached on Indonesia's fishing
4 grounds, sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat, announced
5 new "research stations" on Fiery Cross Reef and
6 Subi Reef, landed special military aircraft on Fiery
7 Cross Reef to routinize such deployments, and sent
8 a flotilla of over 200 militia vessels to Whitsun Reef,
9 a feature within the exclusive economic zone of the
10 Philippines.

11 (8) On July 13, 2020, the Department of State
12 clarified United States policy on the South China
13 Sea and stated that "Beijing's claims to offshore re-
14 sources across most of the South China Sea are
15 completely unlawful".

16 (9) These actions in the South China Sea en-
17 able the PLA to exert influence and project power
18 deeper into Oceania and the Indian Ocean. As Admi-
19 ral Phil Davidson, Commander of Indo-Pacific Com-
20 mand, testified in 2019, "In short, China is now ca-
21 pable of controlling the South China Sea in all sce-
22 narios short of war with the United States."

23 (10) The PLA also continues to advance its
24 claims in the East China Sea, including through a
25 high number of surface combatant patrols and fre-

1 quent entry into the territorial waters of the
2 Senkaku Islands, over which the United States rec-
3 ognizes Japan’s administrative control. In April
4 2014, President Barack Obama stated, “Our com-
5 mitment to Japan’s security is absolute and article
6 five of the U.S.-Japan security treaty covers all ter-
7 ritory under Japan’s administration, including the
8 Senkaku islands.”.

9 (11) On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Mi-
10 chael R. Pompeo stated, “As the South China Sea
11 is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Phil-
12 ippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South
13 China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations
14 under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.”.

15 (12) The PLA also continues to advance its in-
16 fluence over the Korean Peninsula, including
17 through a series of joint air exercises with the Rus-
18 sian Federation in the Republic of Korea’s Air De-
19 fense Identification Zone.

20 (13) The PLA is modernizing and gaining crit-
21 ical capability in every branch and every domain, in-
22 cluding—

23 (A) positioning the PLA Navy to become a
24 great maritime power or “blue-water” navy that
25 can completely control all activity within the

1 First Island Chain and project power beyond it
2 with a fleet of 425 battle force ships by 2030;

3 (B) increasing the size and range of its
4 strike capabilities, including approximately
5 1,900 ground-launched short- and intermediate-
6 range missiles capable of targeting United
7 States allies and partners in the First and Sec-
8 ond Island chains, United States bases in the
9 Indo-Pacific, and United States forces at sea;

10 (C) boosting capabilities for air warfare,
11 including with Russian-origin Su-35 fighters
12 and S-400 air defense systems, new J-20 5th
13 generation stealth fighters, advanced H-6
14 bomber variants, a long-range stealth bomber,
15 and Y-20 heavy lift aircraft;

16 (D) making critical investments in new do-
17 mains of warfare, such as cyber warfare, elec-
18 tronic warfare, and space warfare; and

19 (E) increasing the size of its nuclear stock-
20 pile and delivery systems.

21 (14) The PRC is pursuing this modernization
22 through all means at its disposal, including its Mili-
23 tary-Civil Fusion initiative, which enlists the whole
24 of PRC society in developing and acquiring tech-
25 nology with military applications to pursue techno-

1 logical advantage over the United States in artificial
2 intelligence, hypersonic glide vehicles, directed en-
3 ergy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counter-
4 space weapons, and other emerging capabilities.

5 (15) The United States lead in the development
6 of science and technology relevant to defense is erod-
7 ing in the face of competition from the PRC. United
8 States research and development spending on de-
9 fense capabilities has declined sharply as a share of
10 global research and development. The commercial
11 sector's leading role in innovation presents certain
12 unique challenges to the Department of Defense's
13 reliance on technology for battlefield advantage.

14 (16) The PRC has vastly increased domestic re-
15 search and development expenditures, supported the
16 growth of new cutting-edge industries and tapped
17 into a large workforce to invest in fostering science
18 and engineering talent.

19 (17) The PRC is increasing exports of defense
20 and security capabilities to build its defense tech-
21 nology and industrial base and improve its own mili-
22 tary capabilities, as well as its influence with coun-
23 tries that purchase and become dependent on its
24 military systems.

1 **SEC. 223. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BOLSTERING**
2 **SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INDO-PA-**
3 **CIFIC.**

4 It is the Sense of Congress that steps to bolster
5 United States security partnership in the Indo-Pacific
6 must include—

7 (1) supporting Japan in its development of
8 long-range precision fires, munitions, air and missile
9 defense capacity, interoperability across all domains,
10 maritime security, and intelligence, and surveillance
11 and reconnaissance capabilities;

12 (2) launching a United States-Japan national
13 security innovation fund to solicit and support pri-
14 vate sector cooperation for new technologies that
15 could benefit the United States and Japan's mutual
16 security objectives;

17 (3) promoting a deeper defense relationship be-
18 tween Japan and Australia, including supporting re-
19 ciprocal access agreements and trilateral United
20 States-Japan-Australia intelligence sharing;

21 (4) encouraging and facilitating Taiwan's accel-
22 erated acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities,
23 which are crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan
24 from invasion, including long-range precision fires,
25 munitions, anti-ship missiles, coastal defense, anti-
26 armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced com-

1 mand, control, communications, computers, intel-
2 ligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR),
3 and resilient command and control capabilities, and
4 increasing the conduct of relevant and practical
5 training and exercises with Taiwan's defense forces;
6 and

7 (5) prioritizing building the capacity of United
8 States allies and partners to protect defense tech-
9 nology.

10 **SEC. 224. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

11 It shall be the policy of the United States to—

12 (1) prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United
13 States foreign policy, and prioritize resources for
14 achieving United States political and military objec-
15 tives in the region;

16 (2) exercise freedom of operations in the inter-
17 national waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific
18 maritime domains, which are critical to the pros-
19 perity, stability, and security of the Indo-Pacific re-
20 gion;

21 (3) maintain forward-deployed forces in the
22 Indo-Pacific region, including a rotational bomber
23 presence, integrated missile defense capabilities,
24 long-range precision fires, undersea warfare capabili-
25 ties, and diversified and resilient basing and rota-

1 tional presence, including support for pre-positioning
2 strategies;

3 (4) strengthen and deepen the alliances and
4 partnerships of the United States to build capacity
5 and capabilities, increase multilateral partnerships,
6 modernize communications architecture, address
7 anti-access and area denial challenges, and increase
8 joint exercises and security cooperation efforts;

9 (5) reaffirm the commitment and support of the
10 United States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pa-
11 cific region, including longstanding United States
12 policy regarding—

13 (A) Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Co-
14 operation and Security between the United
15 States and Japan, signed at Washington Janu-
16 ary 19, 1960;

17 (B) Article III of the Mutual Defense
18 Treaty between the United States and the Re-
19 public of Korea, signed at Washington October
20 1, 1953;

21 (C) Article IV of the Mutual Defense Trea-
22 ty between the United States and the Republic
23 of the Philippines, signed at Washington Au-
24 gust 30, 1951, including that, as the South
25 China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed at-

1 tack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public ves-
2 sels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual
3 defense obligations under Article IV of our mu-
4 tual defense treaty;

5 (D) Article IV of the Australia, New Zea-
6 land, United States Security Treaty, done at
7 San Francisco September 1, 1951; and

8 (E) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
9 Treaty, done at Manila September 8, 1954, to-
10 gether with the Thanat-Rusk Communique of
11 1962;

12 (6) collaborate with United States treaty allies
13 in the Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral se-
14 curity and defense cooperation with other regional
15 partners;

16 (7) ensure the continuity of operations by the
17 United States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific re-
18 gion, including, as appropriate, in cooperation with
19 partners and allies, in order to reaffirm the principle
20 of freedom of operations in international waters and
21 airspace in accordance with established principles
22 and practices of international law;

23 (8) sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public
24 Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the “Six As-
25 surances” provided by the United States to Taiwan

1 in July 1982 as the foundations for United States-
2 Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the fullest extent
3 possible, the extensive, close, and friendly relations
4 of the United States and Taiwan, including coopera-
5 tion to support the development of capable, ready,
6 and modern forces necessary for the defense of Tai-
7 wan;

8 (9) enhance security partnerships with India,
9 across Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the
10 Indo-Pacific;

11 (10) deter acts of aggression or coercion by the
12 PRC against United States and allies' interests, es-
13 pecially along the First Island Chain and in the
14 Western Pacific, by showing PRC leaders that the
15 United States can and is willing to deny them the
16 ability to achieve their objectives, including by—

17 (A) consistently demonstrating the political
18 will of the United States to deepening existing
19 treaty alliances and growing new partnerships
20 as a durable, asymmetric, and unmatched stra-
21 tegic advantage to the PRC's growing military
22 capabilities and reach;

23 (B) maintaining a system of forward-de-
24 ployed bases in the Indo-Pacific region as the
25 most visible sign of United States resolve and

1 commitment to the region, and as platforms to
2 ensure United States operational readiness and
3 advance interoperability with allies and part-
4 ners;

5 (C) adopting a more dispersed force pos-
6 ture throughout the region, particularly the
7 Western Pacific, and pursuing maximum access
8 for United States mobile and relocatable
9 launchers for long-range cruise, ballistic, and
10 hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific
11 region;

12 (D) fielding long-range, precision-strike
13 networks to United States and allied forces, in-
14 cluding ground-launched cruise missiles, under-
15 sea and naval capabilities, and integrated air
16 and missile defense in the First Island Chain
17 and the Second Island Chain, in order to deter
18 and prevent PRC coercion and aggression, and
19 to maximize the United States ability to oper-
20 ate;

21 (E) strengthening extended deterrence to
22 ensure that escalation against key United
23 States interests would be costly, risky, and self-
24 defeating; and

1 (F) collaborating with allies and partners
2 to accelerate their roles in more equitably shar-
3 ing the burdens of mutual defense, including
4 through the acquisition and fielding of advanced
5 capabilities and training that will better enable
6 them to repel PRC aggression or coercion; and
7 (11) maintain the capacity of the United States
8 to impose prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial,
9 reputational, and military costs on the PRC for acts
10 of coercion or aggression, including to defend itself
11 and its allies regardless of the point of origin of at-
12 tacks against them.

13 **SEC. 225. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING IN THE INDO-PA-**
14 **CIFIC AND AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-**
15 **TIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA MARITIME SE-**
16 **CURITY PROGRAMS AND DIPLOMATIC OUT-**
17 **REACH ACTIVITIES.**

18 (a) FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING FUNDING.—In
19 addition to any amount appropriated pursuant to section
20 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) (re-
21 lating to foreign military financing assistance), there is
22 authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2022
23 through fiscal year 2026 for activities in the Indo-Pacific
24 region in accordance with this section—

25 (1) \$110,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;

- 1 (2) \$125,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
- 2 (3) \$130,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;
- 3 (4) \$140,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and
- 4 (5) \$150,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.

5 (b) SOUTHEAST MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT INI-
6 TIATIVE.—There is authorized to be appropriated
7 \$10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026
8 for the Department of State for International Narcotics
9 Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) for the support
10 of the Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initia-
11 tive.

12 (c) DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH ACTIVITIES.—There is
13 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State
14 \$1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026,
15 which shall be used—

16 (1) to conduct, in coordination with the Depart-
17 ment of Defense, outreach activities, including con-
18 ferences and symposia, to familiarize partner coun-
19 tries, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, with
20 the United States' interpretation of international law
21 relating to freedom of the seas; and

22 (2) to work with allies and partners in the
23 Indo-Pacific region to better align respective inter-
24 pretations of international law relating to freedom of
25 the seas, including on the matters of operations by

1 military ships in exclusive economic zones, innocent
2 passage through territorial seas, and transits
3 through international straits.

4 (d) PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION AND PURPOSE.—

5 Using amounts appropriate pursuant to subsection (a),
6 the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary
7 of Defense, is authorized to provide assistance, for the
8 purpose of increasing maritime security and domain
9 awareness for countries in the Indo-Pacific region—

10 (1) to provide assistance to national military or
11 other security forces of such countries that have
12 maritime security missions among their functional
13 responsibilities;

14 (2) to provide training to ministry, agency, and
15 headquarters level organizations for such forces; and

16 (3) to provide assistance and training to other
17 relevant foreign affairs, maritime, or security-related
18 ministries, agencies, departments, or offices that
19 manage and oversee maritime activities and policy
20 that the Secretary of State may so designate.

21 (e) DESIGNATION OF ASSISTANCE.—Assistance pro-
22 vided by the Secretary of State under subsection (g) shall
23 be known as the “Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initia-
24 tive” (in this section referred to as the “Initiative”).

1 (f) PROGRAM OBJECTIVES.—Assistance provided
2 through the Initiative may be used to accomplish the fol-
3 lowing objectives:

4 (1) Retaining unhindered access to and use of
5 international waterways in the Indo-Pacific region
6 that are critical to ensuring the security and free
7 flow of commerce and to achieving United States na-
8 tional security objectives.

9 (2) Improving maritime domain awareness in
10 the Indo-Pacific region.

11 (3) Countering piracy in the Indo-Pacific re-
12 gion.

13 (4) Disrupting illicit maritime trafficking activi-
14 ties and other forms of maritime trafficking activity
15 in the Indo-Pacific that directly benefit organiza-
16 tions that have been determined to be a security
17 threat to the United States.

18 (5) Enhancing the maritime capabilities of a
19 country or regional organization to respond to
20 emerging threats to maritime security in the Indo-
21 Pacific region.

22 (6) Strengthening United States alliances and
23 partnerships in Southeast Asia and other parts of
24 the Indo-Pacific region.

25 (g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amount appropriated
2 pursuant to subsection (a) (relating to foreign mili-
3 tary financing assistance), there is authorized to be
4 appropriated to the Department of State for the
5 Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative and other
6 related regional programs exactly—

7 (A) \$70,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;

8 (B) \$80,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;

9 (C) \$90,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;

10 (D) \$100,000,000 for fiscal year 2025;

11 and

12 (E) \$110,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.

13 (2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The “Indo-Pa-
14 cific Maritime Security Initiative” and funds author-
15 ized for the Initiative shall include existing regional
16 programs carried out by the Department of State re-
17 lated to maritime security, including the Southeast
18 Asia Maritime Security Initiative.

19 (h) ELIGIBILITY AND PRIORITIES FOR ASSIST-
20 ANCE.—

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
22 use the following considerations when selecting
23 which countries in the Indo-Pacific region should re-
24 ceive assistance pursuant to the Initiative:

1 (A) Assistance may be provided to a coun-
2 try in the Indo-Pacific region to enhance the ca-
3 pabilities of that country according to the objec-
4 tives outlined in (f), or of a regional organiza-
5 tion that includes that country, to conduct—

6 (i) maritime intelligence, surveillance,
7 and reconnaissance;

8 (ii) littoral and port security;

9 (iii) Coast Guard operations;

10 (iv) command and control; and

11 (v) management and oversight of mar-
12 itime activities.

13 (B) Priority shall be placed on assistance
14 to enhance the maritime security capabilities of
15 the military or security forces of countries in
16 the Indo-Pacific region that have maritime mis-
17 sions and the government agencies responsible
18 for such forces.

19 (2) TYPES OF ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING.—

20 (A) AUTHORIZED ELEMENTS OF ASSIST-
21 ANCE.—Assistance provided under paragraph
22 (1)(A) may include the provision of equipment,
23 training, and small-scale military construction.

24 (B) REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF ASSISTANCE
25 AND TRAINING.—Assistance and training pro-

1 vided under subparagraph (A) shall include ele-
2 ments that promote—

3 (i) the observance of and respect for
4 human rights; and

5 (ii) respect for legitimate civilian au-
6 thority within the country to which the as-
7 sistance is provided.

8 **SEC. 226. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING COMPACT PILOT**
9 **PROGRAM IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

10 (a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is
11 authorized to be appropriated \$20,000,000 for each of fis-
12 cal years 2022 and 2023 for the creation of a pilot pro-
13 gram for foreign military financing (FMF) compacts.

14 (b) **ASSISTANCE.**—

15 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State is
16 authorized to create a pilot program, for a duration
17 of two years, with an assessment for any additional
18 or permanent programming, to provide assistance
19 under this section for each country that enters into
20 an FMF Challenge Compact with the United States
21 pursuant to subsection (d) to support policies and
22 programs that advance the progress of the country
23 in achieving lasting security and civilian-military
24 governance through respect for human rights, good
25 governance (including transparency and free and

1 fair elections), and cooperation with United States
2 and international counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking,
3 and counter-crime efforts and programs.

4 (2) FORM OF ASSISTANCE.—Assistance under
5 this subsection may be provided in the form of
6 grants, cooperative agreements, contracts, or no-in-
7 terest loans to the government of an eligible country
8 described in subsection (c).

9 (c) ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.—

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—A country shall be a can-
11 didate country for purposes of eligibility for assist-
12 ance for fiscal years 2022 and 2023 if—

13 (A) the country is classified as a lower
14 middle income country in the then-most recent
15 edition of the World Development Report for
16 Reconstruction and Development published by
17 the International Bank for Reconstruction and
18 Development and has an income greater than
19 the historical ceiling for International Develop-
20 ment Association eligibility for the fiscal year
21 involved; and

22 (B) the Secretary of State determines that
23 the country is committed to seeking just and
24 democratic governance, including with a dem-
25 onstrated commitment to—

- 1 (i) the promotion of political plu-
2 ralism, equality, and the rule of law;
3 (ii) respect for human and civil rights;
4 (iii) protection of private property
5 rights;
6 (iv) transparency and accountability
7 of government;
8 (v) anti-corruption; and
9 (vi) the institution of effective civilian
10 control, professionalization, and respect for
11 human rights by and the accountability of
12 the armed forces.

13 (2) IDENTIFICATION OF ELIGIBLE COUN-
14 TRIES.—Not later than 90 days prior to the date on
15 which the Secretary of State determines eligible
16 countries for an FMF Challenge Compact, the Sec-
17 retary—

18 (A) shall prepare and submit to the appro-
19 priate congressional committees a report that
20 contains a list of all eligible countries identified
21 that have met the requirements under para-
22 graph (1) for the fiscal year; and

23 (B) shall consult with the appropriate con-
24 gressional committees on the extent to which

1 such countries meet the criteria described in
2 paragraph (1).

3 (d) FMF CHALLENGE COMPACT.—

4 (1) COMPACT.—The Secretary of State may
5 provide assistance for an eligible country only if the
6 country enters into an agreement with the United
7 States, to be known as an “FMF Challenge Com-
8 pact” (in this subsection referred to as a “Com-
9 pact”) that establishes a multi-year plan for achiev-
10 ing shared security objectives in furtherance of the
11 purposes of this title.

12 (2) ELEMENTS.—The elements of the Compact
13 shall be those listed in subsection (c)(1)(B) for de-
14 termining eligibility, and be designed to significantly
15 advance the performance of those commitments dur-
16 ing the period of the Compact.

17 (3) IN GENERAL.—The Compact should take
18 into account the national strategy of the eligible
19 country and shall include—

20 (A) the specific objectives that the country
21 and the United States expect to achieve during
22 the term of the Compact, including both how
23 the foreign military financing under the Com-
24 pact will advance shared security interests and
25 advance partner capacity building efforts as

1 well as to advance national efforts towards just
2 and democratic governance;

3 (B) the responsibilities of the country and
4 the United States in the achievement of such
5 objectives;

6 (C) regular benchmarks to measure, where
7 appropriate, progress toward achieving such ob-
8 jectives; and

9 (D) the strategy of the eligible country to
10 sustain progress made toward achieving such
11 objectives after expiration of the Compact.

12 (e) CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION PRIOR TO COM-
13 PACT NEGOTIATIONS.—Not later than 15 days before
14 commencing negotiations of a Compact with an eligible
15 country, the Secretary of State shall consult with the ap-
16 propriate congressional committees with respect to the
17 proposed Compact negotiation and shall identify the objec-
18 tives and mechanisms to be used for the negotiation of
19 the Compact.

20 (f) ASSESSMENT OF PILOT PROGRAM AND REC-
21 OMMENDATIONS.—Not later than 90 days after the con-
22 clusion of the pilot program, the Secretary of State shall
23 provide a report to the appropriate congressional commit-
24 tees with respect to the pilot program, including an assess-
25 ment of the success and utility of the pilot program estab-

1 lished under this subsection in meeting United States ob-
2 jectives and a recommendation with respect to whether to
3 continue a further foreign military financing compact pro-
4 gram on a pilot or permanent basis.

5 **SEC. 227. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL**
6 **MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE**
7 **INDO-PACIFIC.**

8 There is authorized to be appropriated for each of
9 fiscal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Depart-
10 ment of State, out of amounts appropriated or otherwise
11 made available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II
12 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347
13 et seq.) (relating to international military education and
14 training (IMET) assistance), \$45,000,000 for activities in
15 the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this Act.

16 **SEC. 228. PRIORITIZING EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE TRANS-**
17 **FERS FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

18 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
19 gress that the United States Government should prioritize
20 the review of excess defense article transfers to Indo-Pa-
21 cific partners.

22 (b) FIVE-YEAR PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after
23 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
24 develop a five-year plan to prioritize excess defense article

1 transfers to the Indo-Pacific and provide a report describ-
2 ing such plan to the appropriate committees of Congress.

3 (c) **TRANSFER AUTHORITY.**—Section 516(c)(2) of
4 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
5 2321j(e)(2)) is amended by inserting “, Thailand, Indo-
6 nesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia” after “and to the Phil-
7ippines”.

8 (d) **REQUIRED COORDINATION.**—The United States
9 Government shall coordinate and align excess defense arti-
10 cle transfers with capacity building efforts of regional al-
11 lies and partners.

12 (e) **TAIWAN.**—Taiwan shall receive the same benefits
13 conferred for the purposes of transfers pursuant to section
14 516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
15 U.S.C. 2321j(e)(2)).

16 **SEC. 229. PRIORITIZING EXCESS NAVAL VESSEL TRANS-**
17 **FERS FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

18 (a) **AUTHORITY.**—The President is authorized to
19 transfer to a government of a country listed pursuant to
20 the amendment made under section 228(c) two OLIVER
21 HAZARD PERRY class guided missile frigates on a grant
22 basis under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
23 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).

24 (b) **GRANTS NOT COUNTED IN ANNUAL TOTAL OF**
25 **TRANSFERRED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES.**—The value

1 of a vessel transferred to another country on a grant basis
2 pursuant to authority provided by this section shall not
3 be counted against the aggregate value of excess defense
4 articles transferred in any fiscal year under section 516
5 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).

6 (c) COSTS OF TRANSFERS.—Any expense incurred by
7 the United States in connection with a transfer authorized
8 by this section shall be charged to the recipient notwith-
9 standing section 516(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
10 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e)).

11 (d) REPAIR AND REFURBISHMENT IN UNITED
12 STATES SHIPYARDS.—To the maximum extent prac-
13 ticable, the President shall require, as a condition of the
14 transfer of a vessel under this subsection, that the recipi-
15 ent to which the vessel is transferred have such repair or
16 refurbishment of the vessel as is needed, before the vessel
17 joins the naval forces of that recipient, performed at a
18 shipyard located in the United States.

19 (e) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORITY.—The authority to
20 transfer a vessel under this section shall expire at the end
21 of the 3-year period beginning on the date of the enact-
22 ment of this Act.

1 **SEC. 230. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM**
2 **OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER-**
3 **WAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC**
4 **AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE**
5 **SOUTH CHINA SEA.**

6 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress—

7 (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions
8 or the use of force to impede freedom of operations
9 in international airspace by military or civilian air-
10 craft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize the
11 Indo-Pacific region;

12 (2) urges the Government of the People's Re-
13 public of China to refrain from implementing the de-
14 clared East China Sea Air Defense Identification
15 Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea,
16 which is contrary to freedom of overflight in inter-
17 national airspace, and to refrain from taking similar
18 provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific re-
19 gion;

20 (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court
21 of Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on
22 both parties and that the People's Republic of Chi-
23 na's claims to offshore resources across most of the
24 South China Sea are unlawful; and

25 (4) condemns the People's Republic of China
26 for failing to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of

1 Arbitration ruling, despite the PRC's obligations as
2 a state party to the United Nations Convention on
3 the Law of the Sea.

4 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
5 of the United States to—

6 (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for al-
7 lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-
8 ing longstanding United States policy regarding Ar-
9 ticle V of the United States-Philippines Mutual De-
10 fense Treaty and reaffirm its position that Article V
11 of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty
12 applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Is-
13 lands;

14 (2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights,
15 freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace
16 above it, that belong to all nations, and oppose the
17 militarization of new and reclaimed land features in
18 the South China Sea;

19 (3) continue certain policies with respect to the
20 PRC claims in the South China Sea, namely—

21 (A) that PRC claims in the South China
22 Sea, including to offshore resources across most
23 of the South China Sea, are unlawful;

24 (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a
25 maritime claim vis-à-vis the Philippines in areas

1 that the Permanent Court of Arbitration found
2 to be in the Philippines' Exclusive Economic
3 Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf;

4 (C) to reject any PRC claim to waters be-
5 yond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived
6 from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands;
7 and

8 (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial
9 or maritime claim to James Shoal;

10 (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in
11 destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation
12 or efforts to unlawfully assert administration over
13 disputed claims;

14 (5) ensure that disputes are managed without
15 intimidation, coercion, or force;

16 (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust
17 claims in accordance with international law;

18 (7) uphold the principle that territorial and
19 maritime claims, including territorial waters or terri-
20 torial seas, must be derived from land features and
21 otherwise comport with international law;

22 (8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regula-
23 tions covering disputed areas in the South China
24 Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the
25 region;

1 (9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if
2 that Code of Conduct reflects the interests of South-
3 east Asian claimant states and does not serve as a
4 vehicle for the People's Republic of China to advance
5 its unlawful maritime claims;

6 (10) reaffirm that an existing body of inter-
7 national rules and guidelines, including the Inter-
8 national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
9 Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs),
10 is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation be-
11 tween the United States Armed Forces and the
12 forces of other countries, including the People's Re-
13 public of China;

14 (11) support the development of regional insti-
15 tutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional
16 Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting
17 Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded
18 ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical coopera-
19 tion in the region and reinforce the role of inter-
20 national law;

21 (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships
22 with other countries in the region for maritime do-
23 main awareness and capacity building, as well as ef-
24 forts by the United States Government to explore
25 the development of appropriate multilateral mecha-

1 nisms for a “common operating picture” in the
2 South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries
3 that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing
4 behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities;

5 (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent
6 any other country from exercising its sovereign
7 rights to the resources of the exclusive economic
8 zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by making claims
9 to those areas in the South China Sea that have no
10 support in international law; and

11 (14) assure the continuity of operations by the
12 United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including,
13 when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and
14 allies, to reaffirm the principle of freedom of oper-
15 ations in international waters and airspace in ac-
16 cordance with established principles and practices of
17 international law.

18 **SEC. 231. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-**

19 **PACIFIC ALLIES AND PARTNERS.**

20 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
21 gress that—

22 (1) the Secretary of State should expand and
23 strengthen existing measures under the United
24 States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide
25 capabilities to allies and partners consistent with

1 agreed-on division of responsibility for alliance roles,
2 missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and part-
3 ners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with
4 United States strategic imperatives;

5 (2) the United States should design for export
6 to Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities crit-
7 ical to maintaining a favorable military balance in
8 the region, including long-range precision fires, air
9 and missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise mis-
10 siles, land attack cruise missiles, conventional
11 hypersonic systems, intelligence, surveillance, and re-
12 connaissance capabilities, and command and control
13 systems;

14 (3) the United States should pursue, to the
15 maximum extent possible, anticipatory technology
16 security and foreign disclosure policy on the systems
17 described in paragraph (2); and

18 (4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with
19 the Secretary of Defense, should—

20 (A) urge allies and partners to invest in
21 sufficient quantities of munitions to meet con-
22 tingency requirements and avoid the need for
23 accessing United States stocks in wartime; and

1 (B) cooperate with allies to deliver such
2 munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies'
3 capacity to produce such munitions.

4 (b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In
5 this section, the term “appropriate committees of Con-
6 gress” means—

7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
8 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
10 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
11 resentatives.

12 (c) REPORT.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
14 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
15 of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-
16 fense, shall submit to the appropriate committees of
17 Congress a report that describes United States pri-
18 orities for building more capable security partners in
19 the Indo-Pacific region.

20 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report
21 required under paragraph (1) shall—

22 (A) provide a priority list of defense and
23 military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and
24 partners must possess for the United States to

1 be able to achieve its military objectives in the
2 Indo-Pacific region;

3 (B) identify, from the list referred to in
4 subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best
5 provided, or can only be provided, by the
6 United States;

7 (C) identify—

8 (i) actions required to prioritize
9 United States Government resources and
10 personnel to expedite fielding the capabili-
11 ties identified in subparagraph (B); and

12 (ii) steps needed to fully account for
13 and a plan to integrate all means of
14 United States foreign military sales, direct
15 commercial sales, security assistance, and
16 all applicable authorities of the Depart-
17 ment of State and the Department of De-
18 fense;

19 (D) assess the requirements for United
20 States security assistance, including Inter-
21 national Military Education and Training, in
22 the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means
23 to deliver critical partner capability require-
24 ments identified in subparagraph (B);

1 (E) assess the resources necessary to meet
2 the requirements for United States security as-
3 sistance, and identify resource gaps;

4 (F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling
5 requirements for United States security assist-
6 ance in the Indo-Pacific region, including re-
7 sources and personnel limits, foreign legislative
8 and policy barriers, and factors related to spe-
9 cific partner countries;

10 (G) identify limitations on the ability of
11 the United States to provide such capabilities,
12 including those identified under subparagraph
13 (B), because of existing United States treaty
14 obligations, United States policies, or other reg-
15 ulations;

16 (H) recommend improvements to the proc-
17 ess for developing requirements for United
18 States partner capabilities; and

19 (I) identify required jointly agreed rec-
20 ommendations for infrastructure and posture,
21 based on any ongoing mutual dialogues.

22 (3) FORM.—The report required under this
23 subsection shall be unclassified, but may include a
24 classified annex.

1 **SEC. 232. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUS-**
2 **TRIAL BASE.**

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that—

5 (1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated
6 approach, which leverages economies of scale with
7 major allies, is necessary for the United States to re-
8 tain its lead in defense technology;

9 (2) allowing for the export, re-export, or trans-
10 fer of defense-related technologies and services to
11 members of the national technology and industrial
12 base (as defined in section 2500 of title 10, United
13 States Code) would advance United States security
14 interests by helping to leverage the defense-related
15 technologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies
16 to reduce the dependence on other countries, includ-
17 ing countries that pose challenges to United States
18 interests around the world, for defense-related inno-
19 vation and investment; and

20 (3) it is in the interest of the United States to
21 continue to increase cooperation with Australia,
22 Canada, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
23 and Northern Ireland to protect critical defense-re-
24 lated technology and services and leverage the in-
25 vestments of like-minded, major ally nations in order

1 to maximize the strategic edge afforded by defense
2 technology innovation.

3 (b) REPORT.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
5 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
6 of State shall submit a report to the appropriate
7 congressional committees that—

8 (A) describes the Department of State's ef-
9 forts to facilitate access among the national
10 technology and industrial base to defense arti-
11 cles and services subject to the United States
12 Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the
13 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
14 2778(a)(1)); and

15 (B) identifies foreign legal and regulatory
16 challenges, as well as foreign policy or other
17 challenges or considerations that prevent or
18 frustrate these efforts, to include any gaps in
19 the respective export control regimes imple-
20 mented by United Kingdom of Great Britain
21 and Northern Ireland, Australia, or Canada.

22 (2) FORM.—This report required under para-
23 graph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a
24 classified annex.

1 **SEC. 233. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH WITH RE-**
2 **SPECT TO CHINESE MILITARY INSTALLA-**
3 **TIONS OVERSEAS.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
6 in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit
7 a report to the appropriate committees of Congress re-
8 garding United States diplomatic engagement with other
9 nations that host or are considering hosting any military
10 installation of the Government of the People’s Republic
11 of China.

12 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
13 quired under subsection (a) shall include—

14 (1) a list of countries that currently host or are
15 considering hosting any military installation of the
16 Government of the People’s Republic of China;

17 (2) a detailed description of United States dip-
18 lomatic and related efforts to engage countries that
19 are considering hosting a military installation of the
20 Government of the People’s Republic of China, and
21 the results of such efforts;

22 (3) an assessment of the adverse impact on
23 United States interests of the Government of the
24 People’s Republic of China successfully establishing
25 a military installation at any of the locations it is
26 currently considering;

1 (4) a description and list of any commercial
2 ports outside of the People’s Republic of China that
3 the United States Government assesses could be
4 used by the Government of the People’s Republic of
5 China for military purposes, and any diplomatic ef-
6 forts to engage the governments of the countries
7 where such ports are located;

8 (5) the impact of the military installations of
9 the Government of the People’s Republic of China
10 on United States interests; and

11 (6) lessons learned from the diplomatic experi-
12 ence of addressing the PRC’s first overseas base in
13 Djibouti.

14 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under
15 subsection (a) shall be classified, but may include a un-
16 classified summary.

17 **SEC. 234. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING UNIVERSAL**
18 **IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS**
19 **SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.**

20 It is the policy of the United States to sustain max-
21 imum economic pressure on the Government of the Demo-
22 cratic People’s Republic of Korea (referred to in this sec-
23 tion as the “DPRK”) until the regime undertakes com-
24 plete, verifiable, and irreversible actions toward
25 denuclearization, including by—

1 (1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to
2 implement and enforce existing United Nations
3 sanctions with regard to the DPRK;

4 (2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and
5 in accordance with United Nations Security Council
6 resolutions, to end the practice of hosting DPRK
7 citizens as guest workers, recognizing that such
8 workers are demonstrated to constitute an illicit
9 source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nu-
10 clear ambitions;

11 (3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to
12 pursue rigorous interdiction of shipments to and
13 from the DPRK, including ship-to-ship transfers,
14 consistent with United Nations Security Council res-
15 olutions;

16 (4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities—

17 (A) to cease business activities with United
18 Nations-designated entities and their affiliates
19 in the DPRK; and

20 (B) to expel from the PRC individuals who
21 enable the DPRK to acquire materials for its
22 nuclear and ballistic missile programs; and

23 (5) enforcing United Nations Security Council
24 resolutions with respect to the DPRK and United
25 States sanctions, including those pursuant to the

1 North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act
2 of 2016 (Public Law 114–122), the Countering
3 America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Pub-
4 lic Law 115–44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea
5 Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019
6 (title LXXI of division F of Public Law 116–92),
7 and relevant United States executive orders.

8 **SEC. 235. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES**
9 **HOSTING CHINESE MILITARY INSTALLA-**
10 **TIONS.**

11 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
12 gress that—

13 (1) although it casts the Belt and Road Initia-
14 tive (BRI) as a development initiative, the People’s
15 Republic of China is also utilizing the BRI to ad-
16 vance its own security interests, including to expand
17 its power projection capabilities and facilitate great-
18 er access for the People’s Liberation Army through
19 overseas military installations; and

20 (2) the expansion of the People’s Liberation
21 Army globally through overseas military installations
22 will undermine the medium- and long-term security
23 of the United States and the security and develop-
24 ment of strategic partners in critical regions around
25 the world, which is at odds with United States goals

1 to promote peace, prosperity, and self-reliance
2 among partner nations, including through the Mil-
3 lennium Challenge Corporation.

4 (b) LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE.—Except as pro-
5 vided in subsection (c), for fiscal years 2022 through
6 2031, the government of a country that is hosting on its
7 territory a military installation of the Government of the
8 People’s Republic of China or facilitates the expansion of
9 the presence of the People’s Liberation Army for purposes
10 other than participating in United Nations peacekeeping
11 operations or for temporary humanitarian, medical, and
12 disaster relief operations in such country shall not be eligi-
13 ble for assistance under sections 609 or 616 of the Millen-
14 nium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7708, 7715).

15 (c) NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER.—The President
16 may, on a case by case basis, waive the limitation in sub-
17 section (b) if the President submits to the appropriate con-
18 gressional committees—

19 (1) a written determination that the waiver is
20 important to the national interests of the United
21 States; and

22 (2) a detailed explanation of how the waiver is
23 important to those interests.

1 **Subtitle C—Regional Strategies to**
2 **Counter the People’s Republic**
3 **of China**

4 **SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH**
5 **ALLIES AND PARTNERS AROUND THE WORLD**
6 **WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC**
7 **OF CHINA.**

8 It is the policy of the United States—

9 (1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships in
10 Europe and with like-minded countries around the
11 globe to effectively compete with the People’s Repub-
12 lic of China; and

13 (2) to work in collaboration with such allies and
14 partners—

15 (A) to address significant diplomatic, eco-
16 nomic, and military challenges posed by the
17 People’s Republic of China;

18 (B) to deter the People’s Republic of
19 China from pursuing military aggression;

20 (C) to promote the peaceful resolution of
21 territorial disputes in accordance with inter-
22 national law;

23 (D) to promote private sector-led long-term
24 economic development while countering efforts
25 by the Government of the People’s Republic of

1 China to leverage predatory economic practices
2 as a means of political and economic coercion in
3 the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;

4 (E) to promote the values of democracy
5 and human rights, including through efforts to
6 end the repression by the Chinese Communist
7 Party of political dissidents and Uyghurs and
8 other ethnic Muslim minorities, Tibetan Bud-
9 dhists, Christians, and other minorities;

10 (F) to respond to the crackdown by the
11 Chinese Communist Party, in contravention of
12 the commitments made under the Sino-British
13 Joint Declaration of 1984 and the Basic Law
14 of Hong Kong, on the legitimate aspirations of
15 the people of Hong Kong; and

16 (G) to counter the Chinese Communist
17 Party's efforts to spread disinformation in the
18 People's Republic of China and beyond with re-
19 spect to the response of the Chinese Communist
20 Party to COVID-19.

21 **PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

22 **SEC. 245. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED**
23 **STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.**

24 It is the sense of Congress that—

1 (1) the United States and Canada have a
2 unique relationship based on shared geography, ex-
3 tensive personal connections, deep economic ties,
4 mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision to
5 uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules
6 based international order established after World
7 War II;

8 (2) the United States and Canada can better
9 address the People's Republic of China's economic,
10 political, and security influence through closer co-
11 operation on counternarcotics, environmental stew-
12 ardship, transparent practices in public procurement
13 and infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and
14 connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations,
15 bilateral legal matters, and support for democracy,
16 good governance, and human rights;

17 (3) amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the
18 United States and Canada should maintain joint ini-
19 tiatives to address border management, commercial
20 and trade relations and infrastructure, a shared ap-
21 proach with respect to the People's Republic of
22 China, and transnational challenges, including
23 pandemics, energy security, and environmental stew-
24 ardship;

1 (4) the United States and Canada should en-
2 hance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation,
3 influence operations, economic espionage, and propa-
4 ganda efforts;

5 (5) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastruc-
6 ture investments, particularly in 5G telecommuni-
7 cations technology, extraction of natural resources,
8 and port infrastructure, pose national security risks
9 for the United States and Canada;

10 (6) the United States should share, as appro-
11 priate, intelligence gathered regarding—

12 (A) Huawei’s 5G capabilities; and

13 (B) the PRC government’s intentions with
14 respect to 5G expansion;

15 (7) the United States and Canada should con-
16 tinue to advance collaborative initiatives to imple-
17 ment the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada
18 Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development
19 Collaboration; and

20 (8) the United States and Canada must
21 prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in
22 the Arctic, including by modernizing the North
23 American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
24 to effectively defend the Northern Hemisphere
25 against the range of threats by peer competitors, in-

1 cluding long-range missiles and high-precision weap-
2 ons.

3 **SEC. 246. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE GOVERN-**
4 **MENT OF CHINA'S ARBITRARY IMPRISON-**
5 **MENT OF CANADIAN CITIZENS.**

6 It is the sense of Congress that—

7 (1) the Government of the People's Republic of
8 China's apparent arbitrary detention and abusive
9 treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and
10 Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Gov-
11 ernment of Canada's arrest of Meng Wanzhou is
12 deeply concerning;

13 (2) the Government of Canada has shown inter-
14 national leadership by—

15 (A) upholding the rule of law and com-
16 plying with its international legal obligations,
17 including those pursuant to the Extradition
18 Treaty Between the United States of America
19 and Canada, signed at Washington December
20 3, 1971; and

21 (B) launching the Declaration Against Ar-
22 bitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations,
23 which has been endorsed by 57 countries and
24 the European Union, and reaffirms well-estab-
25 lished prohibitions under international human

1 rights conventions against the arbitrary deten-
2 tion of foreign nationals to be used as leverage
3 in state-to-state relations; and

4 (3) the United States continues to join the Gov-
5 ernment of Canada in calling for the immediate re-
6 lease of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for
7 due process for Canadian national Robert
8 Schellenberg.

9 **SEC. 247. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH**
10 **CANADA.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
12 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
13 mit a strategy to the appropriate congressional committees
14 that describes how the United States will enhance coopera-
15 tion with the Government of Canada in managing rela-
16 tions with the PRC government.

17 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
18 section (a) shall—

19 (1) identify key policy points of convergence
20 and divergence between the United States and Can-
21 ada in managing relations with the People’s Repub-
22 lic of China in the areas of technology, trade, eco-
23 nomic practices, cyber security, secure supply chains
24 and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;

1 (2) include a description of United States devel-
2 opment and coordination efforts with Canadian
3 counterparts to enhance the cooperation between the
4 United States and Canada with respect to—

5 (A) managing economic relations with the
6 People’s Republic of China;

7 (B) democracy and human rights in the
8 People’s Republic of China;

9 (C) technology issues involving the Peo-
10 ple’s Republic of China;

11 (D) defense issues involving the People’s
12 Republic of China; and

13 (E) international law enforcement and
14 transnational organized crime issues.

15 (3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to
16 work with Canada to counter the PRC’s projection
17 of an authoritarian governing model around the
18 world;

19 (4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence
20 cooperation to date and future plans to support Ca-
21 nadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives
22 to Huawei’s 5G technology;

23 (5) detail diplomatic and defense collabora-
24 tion—

1 (A) to advance joint United States-Cana-
2 dian priorities for responsible stewardship in
3 the Arctic Region; and

4 (B) to counter the PRC's efforts to project
5 political, economic, and military influence into
6 the Arctic Region; and

7 (6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Can-
8 ada to track and counter the PRC's attempts to
9 exert influence across the multilateral system, in-
10 cluding at the World Health Organization.

11 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under this section
12 shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be
13 made available to the public, but may include a classified
14 annex, if necessary.

15 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after
16 the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less fre-
17 quently than every 180 days thereafter for 5 years, the
18 Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate con-
19 gressional committees regarding the development and im-
20 plementation of the strategy required under this section.

1 **SEC. 248. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COM-**
2 **PETITIVENESS, GOVERNANCE, HUMAN**
3 **RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN**
4 **AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
6 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
7 in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the
8 Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United
9 States Trade Representative, and the Chief Executive Of-
10 ficer of the United States International Development Fi-
11 nance Corporation, shall submit a multi-year strategy for
12 increasing United States economic competitiveness and
13 promoting good governance, human rights, and the rule
14 of law in Latin American and Caribbean countries, par-
15 ticularly in the areas of investment, equitable and sustain-
16 able development, commercial relations, anti-corruption
17 activities, and infrastructure projects, to—

18 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
19 Senate;

20 (2) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;

21 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the
22 Senate;

23 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
24 House of Representatives;

25 (5) the Committee on Ways and Means of the
26 House of Representatives; and

1 (6) the Committee on Appropriations of the
2 House of Representatives.

3 (b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required
4 under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, includ-
5 ing benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to—

6 (1) enhance the technical capacity of countries
7 in the region to advance the sustainable development
8 of equitable economies;

9 (2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between
10 the countries of the Americas;

11 (3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and
12 competitive environment for United States busi-
13 nesses in the region;

14 (4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to re-
15 view long term financial sustainability and security
16 implications of foreign investments in strategic sec-
17 tors or services, including transportation, commu-
18 nications, natural resources, and energy;

19 (5) establish competitive and transparent infra-
20 structure project selection and procurement proc-
21 esses that promote transparency, open competition,
22 financial sustainability, adherence to robust global
23 standards, and the employment of the local work-
24 force;

1 (6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust
2 democratic governance, fair competition, combatting
3 corruption, and ending impunity;

4 (7) identify and mitigate obstacles to private
5 sector-led economic growth in Latin America and
6 the Caribbean; and

7 (8) maintain transparent and affordable access
8 to the internet and digital infrastructure in the
9 Western Hemisphere.

10 (c) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 1 year
11 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
12 thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, after con-
13 sultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary
14 of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States
15 Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United
16 States International Development Finance Corporation,
17 shall brief the congressional committees listed in sub-
18 section (a) regarding the implementation of this part, in-
19 cluding examples of successes and challenges.

20 **SEC. 249. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-**
21 **TIONS AND THE DEFENSE SECTOR IN LATIN**
22 **AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.**

23 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
24 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
25 tees of Congress” means—

1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
2 Senate;

3 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
4 Senate;

5 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the
6 Senate;

7 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
8 House of Representatives;

9 (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
10 ligence of the House of Representatives; and

11 (6) the Committee on Appropriations of the
12 House of Representatives.

13 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
15 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
16 of State, working through the Assistant Secretary of
17 State for Intelligence and Research, and in coordina-
18 tion with the Director of National Intelligence and
19 the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall
20 submit a report to the appropriate congressional
21 committees that assesses the nature, intent, and im-
22 pact to United States strategic interests of Chinese
23 diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the deci-
24 sions, procedures, and programs of multilateral or-
25 ganizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, in-

1 cluding the World Bank, International Monetary
2 Fund, Organization of American States, and the
3 Inter-American Development Bank.

4 (2) DEFENSE SECTOR.—The report required
5 under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of
6 the nature, intent, and impact on United States
7 strategic interests of Chinese military activity in
8 Latin America and the Caribbean, including military
9 education and training programs, weapons sales, and
10 space-related activities in the military or civilian
11 spheres, such as—

12 (A) the satellite and space control station
13 the People’s Republic of China constructed in
14 Argentina; and

15 (B) defense and security cooperation car-
16 ried out by the People’s Republic of China in
17 Latin America and the Caribbean, including
18 sales of surveillance and monitoring technology
19 to governments in the region such as Venezuela,
20 Cuba, Ecuador, and Colombia, and the poten-
21 tial use of such technologies as tools of Chinese
22 intelligence services.

23 (3) FORM.—The report required under para-
24 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form
25 and shall include classified annexes.

1 **SEC. 250. ADDRESSING CHINA'S SOVEREIGN LENDING**
2 **PRACTICES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CAR-**
3 **IBBEAN.**

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that—

6 (1) since 2005, the Government of the People's
7 Republic of China has expanded sovereign lending to
8 governments in Latin America and the Caribbean
9 with loans that are repaid or collateralized with nat-
10 ural resources or commodities;

11 (2) several countries in Latin American and the
12 Caribbean that have received a significant amount of
13 sovereign lending from the Government of the Peo-
14 ple's Republic of China face challenges in repaying
15 such loans;

16 (3) the Government of the People's Republic of
17 China's predatory economic practices and sovereign
18 lending practices in Latin America and the Carib-
19 bean negatively influence United States national in-
20 terests in the Western Hemisphere;

21 (4) the Inter-American Development Bank, the
22 premier multilateral development bank dedicated to
23 the Western Hemisphere, should play a significant
24 role supporting the countries of Latin America and
25 the Caribbean in achieving sustainable and service-
26 able debt structures; and

1 (5) a tenth general capital increase for the
2 Inter-American Development Bank would strengthen
3 the Bank's ability to help the countries of Latin
4 America and the Caribbean achieve sustainable and
5 serviceable debt structures.

6 (b) SUPPORT FOR A GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE.—
7 The President shall take steps to support a tenth general
8 capital increase for the Inter-American Development
9 Bank, including advancing diplomatic engagement to build
10 support among member countries of the Bank for a tenth
11 general capital increase for the Bank

12 (c) TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.—The Inter-Amer-
13 ican Development Bank Act (22 U.S.C. 283 et seq.) is
14 amended by adding at the end the following:

15 **“SEC. 42. TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.**

16 “(a) VOTE AUTHORIZED.—The United States Gov-
17 ernor of the Bank is authorized to vote in favor of a reso-
18 lution to increase the capital stock of the Bank by
19 \$80,000,000,000 over a period not to exceed 5 years.

20 “(b) SUBSCRIPTION AUTHORIZED.—

21 “(1) IN GENERAL.—The United States Gov-
22 ernor of the Bank may subscribe on behalf of the
23 United States to 1,990,714 additional shares of the
24 capital stock of the Bank.

1 “(2) LIMITATION.—Any subscription by the
2 United States to the capital stock of the Bank shall
3 be effective only to such extent and in such amounts
4 as are provided in advance in appropriations Acts.

5 “(c) LIMITATIONS ON AUTHORIZATION OF APPRO-
6 PRIATIONS.—

7 “(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to pay for the in-
8 crease in the United States subscription to the Bank
9 under subsection (b), there is authorized to be ap-
10 propriated \$24,014,857,191 for payment by the Sec-
11 retary of the Treasury.

12 “(2) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.—Of the amount
13 authorized to be appropriated under paragraph
14 (1)—

15 “(A) \$600,371,430 shall be for paid in
16 shares of the Bank; and

17 “(B) \$23,414,485,761 shall be for callable
18 shares of the Bank.”.

19 (d) ADDRESSING CHINA’S SOVEREIGN LENDING IN
20 THE AMERICAS.—The Secretary of the Treasury and the
21 United States Executive Director to the Inter-American
22 Development Bank shall use the voice, vote, and influence
23 of the United States—

24 (1) to advance efforts by the Bank to help
25 countries restructure debt resulting from sovereign

1 lending by the Government of the People's Republic
2 of China in order to achieve sustainable and service-
3 able debt structures; and

4 (2) to establish appropriate safeguards and
5 transparency and conditionality measures to protect
6 debt-vulnerable member countries of the Inter-Amer-
7 ican Development Bank that borrow from the Bank
8 for the purposes of restructuring Chinese bilateral
9 debt held by such countries and preventing such
10 countries from incurring subsequent Chinese bilat-
11 eral debt.

12 (e) BRIEFINGS.—

13 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 90 days
14 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
15 every 90 days thereafter for 6 years, the President
16 shall provide to the Committee on Foreign Relations
17 of the Senate, the Committee on Finance of the Sen-
18 ate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
19 of Representatives, and the Committee on Financial
20 Services of the House of Representatives a briefing
21 detailing efforts to carry out subsection (b) and (d)
22 and the amendment made by subsection (c).

23 (2) PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE
24 AND SERVICEABLE DEBT STRUCTURES.—Not later
25 than 180 days after the successful completion of a

1 tenth general capital increase for the Inter-American
2 Development Bank, and every 180 days thereafter
3 for a period of 3 years, the President shall provide
4 to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
5 ate, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, the
6 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
7 resentatives, and the Committee on Financial Serv-
8 ices of the House of Representatives a briefing on
9 efforts by the Bank to support countries in Latin
10 American and the Caribbean in their efforts to
11 achieve sustainable and serviceable debt structures.

12 **SEC. 251. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND**
13 **THE CARIBBEAN.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appro-
15 priated to the Department of State \$12,000,000 for the
16 International Military Education and Training Program
17 for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal
18 years 2022 through 2026.

19 (b) MODERNIZATION.—The Secretary of State shall
20 take steps to modernize and strengthen the programs re-
21 ceiving funding under subsection (a) to ensure that such
22 programs are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent
23 choice for international military education and training for
24 Latin American and Caribbean partners.

1 (c) REQUIRED ELEMENTS.—The programs referred
2 to in subsection (a) shall—

3 (1) provide training and capacity-building op-
4 portunities to Latin American and Caribbean secu-
5 rity services;

6 (2) provide practical skills and frameworks
7 for—

8 (A) improving the functioning and organi-
9 zation of security services in Latin America and
10 the Caribbean;

11 (B) creating a better understanding of the
12 United States and its values; and

13 (C) using technology for maximum effi-
14 ciency and organization; and

15 (3) promote and ensure that security services in
16 Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian
17 authority and operate in compliance with inter-
18 national norms, standards, and rules of engagement,
19 including a respect for human rights.

20 (d) LIMITATION.—Security assistance under this sec-
21 tion is subject to limitations as enshrined in the require-
22 ments of section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of
23 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).

1 **SEC. 252. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN**
2 **AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING**
3 **ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE**
4 **RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECH-**
5 **NOLOGIES.**

6 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
7 gress that—

8 (1) the Government of the People’s Republic of
9 China is exporting its model for internal security
10 and state control of society through advanced tech-
11 nology and artificial intelligence; and

12 (2) the inclusion of communication networks
13 and communications supply chains with equipment
14 and services from companies with close ties to or
15 that are susceptible to pressure from governments or
16 security services without reliable legal checks on gov-
17 ernmental powers can lead to breaches of citizens’
18 private information, increased censorship, violations
19 of human rights, and harassment of political oppo-
20 nents.

21 (b) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of
22 State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with govern-
23 ments and civil society organizations in Latin America and
24 the Caribbean to—

1 (1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil
2 liberties posed by technologies and services described
3 in subsection (a); and

4 (2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate
5 such risks.

6 (c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief Ex-
7 ecutive Officer of the United States Agency for Global
8 Media, working through the Open Technology Fund, and
9 the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of De-
10 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Internet Freedom
11 and Business and Human Rights Section, shall expand
12 and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship technology
13 and services to journalists in Latin America and the Car-
14 ibbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely access
15 or share digital news and information.

16 (d) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of
17 State, through the Assistant Secretary of State for De-
18 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and in coordination
19 with the Administrator of the United States Agency for
20 International Development, shall work through nongovern-
21 mental organizations to—

22 (1) support and promote programs that support
23 internet freedom and the free flow of information
24 online in Latin America and the Caribbean;

1 (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reli-
2 able access to internet in Latin America and the
3 Caribbean;

4 (3) provide integrated support to civil society
5 for technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy,
6 and applied research programs in Latin America
7 and the Caribbean;

8 (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in
9 Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative
10 techniques necessary to ensure public accountability
11 and prevent government overreach in the digital
12 sphere;

13 (5) assist independent media outlets and jour-
14 nalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build
15 their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth
16 news reports covering governance and human rights
17 topics;

18 (6) provide training for journalists and civil so-
19 ciety leaders on investigative techniques necessary to
20 improve transparency and accountability in govern-
21 ment and the private sector;

22 (7) provide training on investigative reporting
23 of incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business
24 and commercial practices related to the People's Re-
25 public of China, including the role of the Govern-

1 ment of the People’s Republic of China in such prac-
2 tices;

3 (8) assist nongovernmental organizations to
4 strengthen their capacity to monitor the activities
5 described in paragraph (7); and

6 (9) identify local resources to support the pre-
7 ponderance of activities that would be carried out
8 under this subsection.

9 (e) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not more than 180
10 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every
11 180 days thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State,
12 the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
13 national Development, and the Chief Executive Officer of
14 the United States Agency for Global Media shall provide
15 a briefing regarding the efforts described in subsections
16 (c), (d), and (e) to—

17 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
18 Senate;

19 (2) the Committee on Appropriations of the
20 Senate;

21 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
22 House of Representatives; and

23 (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the
24 House of Representatives.

1 **PART II—TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE**
2 **SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE TRANSATLANTIC**
3 **ALLIANCE.**

4 It is the sense of Congress that—

5 (1) the United States, European Union, and
6 European countries are close partners, sharing val-
7 ues grounded in democracy, human rights, trans-
8 parency, and the rules-based international order es-
9 tablished after World War II;

10 (2) without a common approach by the United
11 States, European Union, and European countries on
12 connectivity, trade, transnational problems, and sup-
13 port for democracy and human rights, the People’s
14 Republic of China will continue to increase its eco-
15 nomic, political, and security leverage in Europe;

16 (3) the People’s Republic of China’s deployment
17 of assistance to European countries following the
18 COVID–19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach
19 to aid, but it also highlighted Europe’s deep eco-
20 nomic ties to the People’s Republic of China;

21 (4) as European states seek to recover from the
22 economic toll of the COVID–19 outbreak, the United
23 States must stand in partnership with Europe to
24 support our collective economic recovery, reinforce
25 our collective national security, and defend shared
26 values;

1 (5) the United States, European Union, and
2 European countries should coordinate on joint strat-
3 egies to diversify reliance on supply chains away
4 from the People’s Republic of China, especially in
5 the medical and pharmaceutical sectors;

6 (6) the United States, European Union, and
7 European countries should leverage their respective
8 economic innovation capabilities to support the glob-
9 al economic recovery from the COVID–19 recession
10 and draw a contrast with the centralized economy of
11 the People’s Republic of China;

12 (7) the United States, United Kingdom, and
13 European Union should accelerate efforts to de-escalate
14 their trade disputes, including negotiating a
15 United States-European Union trade agreement that
16 benefits workers and the broader economy in both
17 the United States and European Union;

18 (8) the United States, European Union, and
19 Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address
20 economic challenges posed by the People’s Republic
21 of China;

22 (9) the United States, European Union, and
23 countries of Europe should enhance cooperation to
24 counter PRC disinformation, influence operations,
25 and propaganda efforts;

1 (10) the United States and European nations
2 share serious concerns with the repressions being
3 supported and executed by the Government of the
4 People’s Republic of China, and should continue im-
5 plementing measures to address the Government of
6 the People’s Republic of China’s specific abuses in
7 Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build
8 joint mechanisms and programs to prevent the ex-
9 port of China’s authoritarian governance model to
10 countries around the world;

11 (11) the United States and European nations
12 should remain united in their shared values against
13 attempts by the Government of the People’s Repub-
14 lic of China at the United Nations and other multi-
15 lateral organizations to promote efforts that erode
16 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the
17 “community of a shared future for mankind” and
18 “democratization of international relations”;

19 (12) the People’s Republic of China’s infra-
20 structure investments around the world, particularly
21 in 5G telecommunications technology and port infra-
22 structure, could threaten democracy across Europe
23 and the national security of key countries;

24 (13) as appropriate, the United States should
25 share intelligence with European allies and partners

1 on Huawei's 5G capabilities and the intentions of
2 the Government of the People's Republic of China
3 with respect to 5G expansion in Europe;

4 (14) the European Union's Investment Screen-
5 ing Regulation, which came into force in October
6 2020, is a welcome development, and member states
7 should closely scrutinize PRC investments in their
8 countries through their own national investment
9 screening measures;

10 (15) the President should actively engage the
11 European Union on the implementation of the Ex-
12 port Control Reform Act regulations and to better
13 harmonize United States and European Union poli-
14 cies with respect to export controls;

15 (16) the President should strongly advocate for
16 the listing of more items and technologies to restrict
17 dual use exports controlled at the National Security
18 and above level to the People's Republic of China
19 under the Wassenaar Arrangement;

20 (17) the United States should explore the value
21 of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating
22 Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
23 (CoCom) that would specifically coordinate United
24 States and European Union export control policies

1 with respect to limiting exports of sensitive tech-
2 nologies to the People’s Republic of China; and

3 (18) the United States should work with coun-
4 terparts in Europe to—

5 (A) evaluate United States and European
6 overreliance on goods originating in the Peo-
7 ple’s Republic of China, including in the med-
8 ical and pharmaceutical sectors, and develop
9 joint strategies to diversify supply chains;

10 (B) counter PRC efforts to use COVID-
11 19-related assistance as a coercive tool to pres-
12 sure developing countries by offering relevant
13 United States and European expertise and as-
14 sistance; and

15 (C) leverage the United States and Euro-
16 pean private sectors to advance the post-
17 COVID–19 economic recovery.

18 **SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC CO-**
19 **OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE PEO-**
20 **PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
22 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief
23 the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee
24 on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on
25 Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of

1 the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the
2 United States will enhance cooperation with the European
3 Union, NATO, and European partner countries with re-
4 spect to the People's Republic of China.

5 (b) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required by subsection
6 (a) shall do the following:

7 (1) Identify the senior Senate-confirmed De-
8 partment of State official that leads United States
9 efforts to cooperate with the European Union,
10 NATO, and European partner countries to advance
11 a shared approach with respect to the People's Re-
12 public of China.

13 (2) Identify key policy points of convergence
14 and divergence between the United States and Euro-
15 pean partners with respect to the People's Republic
16 of China in the areas of technology, trade, and eco-
17 nomic practices.

18 (3) Describe efforts to advance shared interests
19 with European counterparts on—

20 (A) economic challenges with respect to the
21 People's Republic of China;

22 (B) democracy and human rights chal-
23 lenges with respect to the People's Republic of
24 China;

1 (C) technology issues with respect to the
2 People's Republic of China;

3 (D) defense issues with respect to the Peo-
4 ple's Republic of China; and

5 (E) developing a comprehensive strategy to
6 respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
7 established by the Government of the People's
8 Republic of China.

9 (4) Describe the coordination mechanisms
10 among key regional and functional bureaus within
11 the Department of State and Department of Defense
12 tasked with engaging with European partners on the
13 People's Republic of China.

14 (5) Detail diplomatic efforts up to the date of
15 the briefing and future plans to work with European
16 partners to counter the Government of the People's
17 Republic of China's advancement of an authoritarian
18 governance model around the world.

19 (6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the
20 date of the briefing and future plans to support Eu-
21 ropean efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives
22 to Huawei's 5G technology.

23 (7) Detail how United States public diplomacy
24 tools, including the Global Engagement Center of
25 the Department of State, will coordinate efforts with

1 counterpart entities within the European Union to
2 counter Chinese propaganda.

3 (8) Describe the staffing and budget resources
4 the Department of State dedicates to engagement
5 between the United States and the European Union
6 on the People's Republic of China and provide an
7 assessment of out-year resource needs to execute the
8 strategy.

9 (9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with Euro-
10 pean partners to track and counter Chinese attempts
11 to exert influence across multilateral fora, including
12 at the World Health Organization.

13 (c) FORM.—The briefing required by section (a) shall
14 be classified.

15 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after
16 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days
17 thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall consult
18 with the appropriate congressional committees regarding
19 the development and implementation of the elements de-
20 scribed in subsection (b).

21 **SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON**
22 **PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE.**

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should work with
24 transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among
25 the Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada,

1 and the European Development Finance Institutions
2 (called the DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination on
3 shared objectives to foster private sector-led development
4 and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed fi-
5 nancing in emerging markets, particularly as related to
6 the People's Republic of China's Belt and Road Initiative
7 (BRI), including by integrating efforts such as—

8 (1) the European Union Strategy on Con-
9 necting Europe and Asia;

10 (2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas
11 Initiative Fund;

12 (3) the Blue Dot Network among the United
13 States, Japan, and Australia; and

14 (4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has
15 leveraged \$65,000,000,000 for infrastructure
16 projects and emphasizes transparency standards.

17 (b) COOPERATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS.—The
18 United States, European Union, and European countries
19 should coordinate efforts to address the Government of the
20 People's Republic of China's use of the United Nations
21 to advance and legitimize BRI as a global good, including
22 the proliferation of memoranda of understanding between
23 the People's Republic of China and United Nations funds
24 and programs on BRI implementation.

1 (c) STANDARDS.—The United States and the Euro-
2 pean Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to
3 enhance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the
4 Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for
5 Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with devel-
6 oping countries.

7 **SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BE-**
8 **TWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND BETWEEN**
9 **CHINA AND RUSSIA.**

10 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
11 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
12 tees of Congress” means—

13 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
14 Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
15 Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce,
16 Science, and Transportation, the Committee on En-
17 ergy and Natural Resources, the Committee on
18 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Com-
19 mittee on Finance, and the Committee on Appro-
20 priations of the Senate; and

21 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per-
22 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-
23 mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy
24 and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Serv-
25 ices, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the

1 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
2 resentatives.

3 (b) REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIRED.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Di-
6 rector of National Intelligence shall, in coordination
7 with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De-
8 fense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
9 Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such
10 other heads of Federal agencies as the Director con-
11 siders appropriate, submit to the appropriate com-
12 mittees of Congress a report and brief the appro-
13 priate committees of Congress on cooperation be-
14 tween the People's Republic of China and the Is-
15 lamic Republic of Iran and between the People's Re-
16 public of China and the Russian Federation.

17 (2) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under
18 paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

19 (A) An identification of major areas of dip-
20 lomatic energy, infrastructure, banking, finan-
21 cial, economic, military, and space coopera-
22 tion—

23 (i) between the People's Republic of
24 China and the Islamic Republic of Iran;
25 and

1 (ii) between the People’s Republic of
2 China and the Russian Federation.

3 (B) An assessment of the effect of the
4 COVID–19 pandemic on such cooperation.

5 (C) An assessment of the effect that
6 United States compliance with the Joint Com-
7 prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) starting in
8 January 14, 2016, and United States with-
9 drawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had
10 on the cooperation described in subparagraph
11 (A)(i).

12 (D) An assessment of the effect on the co-
13 operation described in subparagraph (A)(i) that
14 would be had by the United States reentering
15 compliance with the JCPOA or a successor
16 agreement and the effect of the United States
17 not reentering compliance with the JCPOA or
18 reaching a successor agreement.

19 (3) FORM.—The report submitted under para-
20 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
21 but may include a classified annex.

22 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SHARING WITH ALLIES
23 AND PARTNERS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Di-
24 rector of National Intelligence and the heads of other ap-
25 propriate Federal departments and agencies should share

1 the findings of the report submitted under subsection (b)
2 with important allies and partners of the United States,
3 as appropriate.

4 **SEC. 259. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT AL-**
5 **TERNATIVES TO THE BELT AND ROAD INITIA-**
6 **TIVE.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should seek oppor-
8 tunities to partner with multilateral development finance
9 institutions to develop financing tools based on shared de-
10 velopment finance criteria and mechanisms to support in-
11 vestments in developing countries that—

12 (1) support low carbon economic development;
13 and

14 (2) promote resiliency and adaptation to envi-
15 ronmental changes.

16 (b) PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT.—The Chief Execu-
17 tive Officer of the United States International Develop-
18 ment Finance Corporation should seek to partner with
19 other multilateral development finance institutions and de-
20 velopment finance institutions to leverage the respective
21 available funds to support low carbon economic develop-
22 ment, which may include nuclear energy projects, environ-
23 mental adaptation, and resilience activities in developing
24 countries.

1 (c) ALTERNATIVES TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
2 CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE.—The President
3 shall work with European counterparts to establish a for-
4 mal United States-European Commission Working Group
5 to develop a comprehensive strategy to develop alternatives
6 to the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s
7 Belt and Road Initiative for development finance. United
8 States participants in the working group shall seek to inte-
9 grate existing efforts into the strategy, including efforts
10 to address the Government of the People’s Republic of
11 China’s use of the United Nations to advance the Belt
12 and Road Initiative, including the proliferation of memo-
13 randa of understanding between the People’s Republic of
14 China and United Nations funds and programs regarding
15 the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative.

16 (d) CO-FINANCING OF INFRASTRUCTURE
17 PROJECTS.—

18 (1) AUTHORIZATION.—Subject to paragraph
19 (2), the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the
20 United States Development Agency, and other rel-
21 evant agency heads are authorized to co-finance in-
22 frastructure projects that advance the development
23 objectives of the United States overseas and provide
24 viable alternatives to projects that would otherwise
25 be included within China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

1 (2) CONDITIONS.—Co-financing arrangements
2 authorized pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be
3 approved unless—

4 (A) the projects to be financed—

5 (i) promote the public good;

6 (ii) promote low carbon emissions,
7 which may include nuclear energy projects;
8 and

9 (iii) will have substantially lower envi-
10 ronmental impact than the proposed Belt
11 and Road Initiative alternative; and

12 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
13 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-
14 fairs of the House of Representatives are noti-
15 fied not later than 15 days in advance of enter-
16 ing into such co-financing arrangements.

17 **PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA**

18 **SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL**

19 **ASIA.**

20 It is the sense of Congress that—

21 (1) the United States should continue to stand
22 with friends and partners in South and Central Asia
23 as they contend with efforts by the Government of
24 the People’s Republic of China to interfere in their

1 respective political systems and encroach upon their
2 sovereign territory; and

3 (2) the United States should reaffirm its com-
4 mitment to the Comprehensive Global Strategic
5 Partnership with India and further deepen bilateral
6 defense consultations and collaboration with India
7 commensurate with its status as a major defense
8 partner.

9 **SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH**
10 **SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
12 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
13 mit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Com-
14 mittee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Com-
15 mittee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed
16 Services of the House of Representatives a strategy for
17 how the United States will engage with the countries of
18 South and Central Asia, including through the C5+1
19 mechanism, with respect to the People’s Republic of
20 China.

21 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
22 section (a) shall include the following elements:

23 (1) A detailed description of the security and
24 economic challenges that the People’s Republic of
25 China poses to the countries of South and Central

1 Asia, including border disputes with South and Cen-
2 tral Asian countries that border the People's Repub-
3 lic of China, PRC investments in land and sea ports,
4 transportation infrastructure, and energy projects
5 across the region.

6 (2) A detailed description of United States ef-
7 forts to provide alternatives to PRC investment in
8 infrastructure and other sectors in South and Cen-
9 tral Asia.

10 (3) A detailed description of bilateral and re-
11 gional efforts to work with countries in South Asia
12 on strategies to build resilience against PRC efforts
13 to interfere in their political systems and economies.

14 (4) A detailed description of United States dip-
15 lomatic efforts to work with the Government of Af-
16 ghanistan on addressing the challenges posed by
17 PRC investment in the Afghan mineral sector.

18 (5) A detailed description of United States dip-
19 lomatic efforts with the Government of Pakistan
20 with respect to matters relevant to the People's Re-
21 public of China, including investments by the Peo-
22 ple's Republic of China in Pakistan through the Belt
23 and Road Initiative.

24 (6) In close consultation with the Government
25 of India, identification of areas where the United

1 States Government can provide diplomatic and other
2 support as appropriate for India's efforts to address
3 economic and security challenges posed by the Peo-
4 ple's Republic of China in the region.

5 (7) A description of the coordination mecha-
6 nisms among key regional and functional bureaus
7 within the Department of State and Department of
8 Defense tasked with engaging with the countries of
9 South and Central Asia on issues relating to the
10 People's Republic of China.

11 (8) A description of the efforts being made by
12 Federal departments agencies, including the Depart-
13 ment of State, the United States Agency for Inter-
14 national Development, the Department of Com-
15 merce, the Department of Energy, and the Office of
16 the United States Trade Representative, to help the
17 nations of South and Central Asia develop trade and
18 commerce links that will help those nations diversify
19 their trade away from the People's Republic of
20 China.

21 (9) A detailed description of United States dip-
22 lomatic efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey,
23 and any other countries with significant populations
24 of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities fleeing perse-
25 cution in the People's Republic of China to press

1 those countries to refrain from deporting ethnic mi-
2 norities to the People’s Republic of China, protect
3 ethnic minorities from intimidation by Chinese gov-
4 ernment authorities, and protect the right to the
5 freedoms of assembly and expression.

6 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (a)
7 shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be
8 made available to the public, but may include a classified
9 annex as necessary.

10 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 120 days after
11 the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less than
12 annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State
13 shall consult with the Committee on Foreign Relations
14 and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and
15 the Committee of Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
16 Appropriations of the House of Representatives regarding
17 the development and implementation of the strategy re-
18 quired under subsection (a).

19 **PART IV—AFRICA**

20 **SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SE-**
21 **CURITY ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUB-**
22 **LIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA.**

23 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
24 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
25 tees of Congress” means—

1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
2 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
3 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

4 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
5 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent
6 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
7 Representatives.

8 (b) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—Not later than
9 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
10 Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Director
11 of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate com-
12 mittees of Congress a report that assesses the nature and
13 impact of the People’s Republic of China’s political, eco-
14 nomic, and security sector activity in Africa, and its im-
15 pact on United States strategic interests, including—

16 (1) the amount and impact of direct invest-
17 ment, loans, development financing, oil-for-loans
18 deals, and other preferential trading arrangements;

19 (2) the involvement of PRC state-owned enter-
20 prises in Africa;

21 (3) the amount of African debt held by the Peo-
22 ple’s Republic of China;

23 (4) the involvement of PRC private security,
24 technology and media companies in Africa;

1 (5) the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to
2 African countries;

3 (6) the scope of Chinese investment in and con-
4 trol of African energy resources and minerals critical
5 for emerging and foundational technologies;

6 (7) an analysis on the linkages between Bei-
7 jing's aid and assistance to African countries and
8 African countries supporting PRC geopolitical goals
9 in international fora;

10 (8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to fa-
11 cilitate illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in
12 counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled ex-
13 tractive resources and wildlife products, from Africa
14 to the People's Republic of China;

15 (9) the methods and techniques that the Peo-
16 ple's Republic of China uses to exert undue influence
17 on African governments and facilitate corrupt activ-
18 ity in Africa, including through the CCP's party-to-
19 party training program, and to influence African
20 multilateral organizations; and

21 (10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and
22 educational activities undertaken by the PRC and
23 CCP to seek to expand its influence in Africa.

1 **SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE**
2 **UNITED STATES IN AFRICA.**

3 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
4 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
5 tees of Congress” means—

6 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
7 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
8 Finance of the Senate; and

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
10 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
11 Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

12 (b) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180
13 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
14 retary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary
15 of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney
16 General, the United States Trade Representative, the Ad-
17 ministrator of the United States Agency for International
18 Development, and the leadership of the United States
19 International Development Finance Corporation, submit
20 to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting
21 forth a multi-year strategy for increasing United States
22 economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in
23 the investment climate in Africa, including through sup-
24 port for democratic institutions, the rule of law, including
25 property rights, and for improved transparency, anti-cor-
26 ruption and governance.

1 (c) ELEMENTS.—The strategy submitted pursuant to
2 subsection (a) shall include—

3 (1) a description and assessment of barriers to
4 United States investment in Africa for United States
5 businesses, including a clear identification of the dif-
6 ferent barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized
7 businesses, and an assessment of whether existing
8 programs effectively address such barriers;

9 (2) a description and assessment of barriers to
10 African diaspora investment in Africa, and rec-
11 ommendations to overcome such barriers;

12 (3) an identification of the economic sectors in
13 the United States that have a comparative advan-
14 tage in African markets;

15 (4) a determination of priority African coun-
16 tries for promoting two-way trade and investment
17 and an assessment of additional foreign assistance
18 needs, including democracy and governance and rule
19 of law support, to promote a conducive operating en-
20 vironment in priority countries;

21 (5) an identification of opportunities for stra-
22 tegic cooperation with European allies on trade and
23 investment in Africa, and for establishing a dialogue
24 on trade, security, development, and environmental
25 issues of mutual interest; and

1 (6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Af-
2 rica Leaders Summit to promote two-way trade and
3 investment, strategic engagement, and security in
4 Africa

5 (d) ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
6 HUMAN RESOURCES CAPACITY.—The Comptroller Gen-
7 eral of the United States shall—

8 (1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign
9 Commercial Service Officers and Department of
10 State Economic Officers at United States embassies
11 in sub-Saharan Africa; and

12 (2) develop and submit to the appropriate con-
13 gressional committees an assessment of whether
14 human resource capacity in such embassies is ade-
15 quate to meet the goals of the various trade and eco-
16 nomic programs and initiatives in Africa, including
17 the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Pros-
18 per Africa.

19 **SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT**
20 **TO AFRICA.**

21 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
22 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
23 tees of Congress” means—

1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
2 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
3 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

4 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
5 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent
6 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
7 Representatives.

8 (b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO COUNTER
9 PRC CYBER AGGRESSION IN AFRICA.—

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish
11 an interagency Working Group, which shall include
12 representatives of the Department of State, the De-
13 partment of Defense, the Office of the Director of
14 National Intelligence, and such other agencies of the
15 United States Government as the President con-
16 siders appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber
17 aggression with respect to Africa.

18 (2) DUTIES.—The Working Group established
19 pursuant to this subsection shall develop and submit
20 to the appropriate congressional committees a set of
21 recommendations for—

22 (A) bolstering the capacity of governments
23 in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data
24 networks and critical infrastructure where ap-
25 plicable;

1 (B) providing alternatives to Huawei;

2 (C) an action plan for United States em-
3 bassies in Africa to offer to provide assistance
4 to host-country governments with respect to
5 protecting their vital digital networks and infra-
6 structure from PRC espionage, including an as-
7 sessment of staffing resources needed to imple-
8 ment the action plan in embassies in Africa;

9 (D) utilizing interagency resources to
10 counter PRC disinformation and propaganda in
11 traditional and digital media targeted to Afri-
12 can audiences; and

13 (E) helping civil society in Africa counter
14 digital authoritarianism and identifying tools
15 and assistance to enhance and promote digital
16 democracy.

17 **SEC. 274. INCREASING PERSONNEL IN UNITED STATES EM-**
18 **BASSIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA FOCUSED**
19 **ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

20 The Secretary of State may station on a permanent
21 basis Department of State personnel at such United
22 States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa as the Secretary
23 considers appropriate focused on the activities, policies
24 and investments of the People's Republic of China in Afri-
25 ca.

1 **SEC. 275. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIA-**
2 **TIVE.**

3 (a) FINDING.—Congress finds that youth in Africa
4 can have a positive impact on efforts to foster economic
5 growth, improve public sector transparency and govern-
6 ance, and counter extremism, and should be an area of
7 focus for United States outreach on the continent.

8 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States,
9 in cooperation and collaboration with private sector com-
10 panies, civic organizations, nongovernmental organiza-
11 tions, and national and regional public sector entities, to
12 commit resources to enhancing the entrepreneurship and
13 leadership skills of African youth with the objective of en-
14 hancing their ability to serve as leaders in the public and
15 private sectors in order to help them spur growth and
16 prosperity, strengthen democratic governance, and en-
17 hance peace and security in their respective countries of
18 origin and across Africa.

19 (c) YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.—

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is hereby established
21 the Young African Leaders Initiative, to be carried
22 out by the Secretary of State.

23 (2) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Secretary is author-
24 ized to support the participation in the Initiative es-
25 tablished under this paragraph, in the United
26 States, of fellows from Africa each year for such

1 education and training in leadership and profes-
2 sional development through the Department of State
3 as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. The
4 Secretary shall establish and publish criteria for eli-
5 gibility for participation as such a fellow, and for se-
6 lection of fellows among eligible applicants for a fel-
7 lowship.

8 (3) RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES.—Under the Ini-
9 tiative, United States citizens may engage in such
10 reciprocal exchanges in connection with and collabo-
11 ration on projects with fellows under paragraph (1)
12 as the Secretary considers appropriate.

13 (4) REGIONAL CENTERS AND NETWORKS.—The
14 Administrator of the United States Agency for
15 International Development shall establish each of
16 the following:

17 (A) Not fewer than four regional centers in
18 Africa to provide in-person and online training
19 throughout the year in business and entrepre-
20 neurship, civic leadership, and public manage-
21 ment.

22 (B) An online network that provides infor-
23 mation and online courses on, and connections
24 with leaders in, the private and public sectors
25 in Africa.

1 (d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
2 gress that the Secretary of State should increase the num-
3 ber of fellows from Africa participating in the Mandela
4 Washington Fellowship above the current 700 projected
5 for fiscal year 2021.

6 **SEC. 276. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.**

7 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
8 ment of this Act, the CEO of the United States Agency
9 for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate congres-
10 sional committees a report on the resources and timeline
11 needed to establish within the Agency an organization
12 whose mission shall be to promote democratic values and
13 institutions in Africa by providing objective, accurate, and
14 relevant news and information to the people of Africa and
15 counter disinformation from malign actors, especially in
16 countries where a free press is banned by the government
17 or not fully established, about the region, the world, and
18 the United States through uncensored news, responsible
19 discussion, and open debate.

20 **PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

21 **SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN,**
22 **AND ACCESS TO, THE MIDDLE EAST AND**
23 **NORTH AFRICA.**

24 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
25 gress that—

1 (1) the economic influence of the People’s Re-
2 public of China through its oil and gas imports from
3 the Middle East, infrastructure investments, tech-
4 nology transfer, and arms sales provide influence
5 and leverage that runs counter to United States in-
6 terests in the region;

7 (2) the People’s Republic of China seeks to
8 erode United States influence in the Middle East
9 and North Africa through the sale of Chinese arms,
10 associated weapons technology, and joint weapons
11 research and development initiatives;

12 (3) the People’s Republic of China seeks to es-
13 tablish military or dual use facilities in geographi-
14 cally strategic locations in the Middle East and
15 North Africa to further the Chinese Communist Par-
16 ty’s Belt and Road Initiative at the expense of
17 United States national security interests; and

18 (4) the export of certain communications infra-
19 structure from the People’s Republic of China de-
20 grades the security of partner networks, exposes in-
21 tellectual property to theft, threatens the ability of
22 the United States to conduct security cooperation
23 with compromised regional partners, and furthers
24 China’s authoritarian surveillance model.

25 (b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

1 (D) an assessment of the People's Republic
2 of China's joint research and development with
3 the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on
4 the United States' national security interests,
5 and recommended steps to mitigate the People's
6 Republic of China's influence in this area;

7 (E) an assessment of arms sales and weap-
8 ons technology transfers from the People's Re-
9 public of China to the Middle East and North
10 Africa, impacts on United States' national secu-
11 rity interests, and recommended steps to miti-
12 gate the People's Republic of China's influence
13 in this area;

14 (F) an assessment of the People's Republic
15 of China's military sales to the region including
16 lethal and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems;

17 (G) an assessment of People's Republic of
18 China military basing and dual-use facility ini-
19 tiatives across the Middle East and North Afri-
20 ca, impacts on United States' national security
21 interests, and recommended steps to mitigate
22 the People's Republic of China's influence in
23 this area;

1 (H) efforts to improve regional security co-
2 operation with United States allies and partners
3 with a focus on—

4 (i) maritime security in the Arabian
5 Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Medi-
6 terranean;

7 (ii) integrated air and missile defense;

8 (iii) cyber security;

9 (iv) border security; and

10 (v) critical infrastructure security, to
11 include energy security;

12 (I) increased support for government-to-
13 government engagement on critical infrastruc-
14 ture development projects including ports and
15 water infrastructure;

16 (J) efforts to encourage United States pri-
17 vate sector and public-private partnerships in
18 healthcare technology and foreign direct invest-
19 ment in non-energy sectors;

20 (K) efforts to expand youth engagement
21 and professional education exchanges with key
22 partner countries;

23 (L) specific steps to counter increased in-
24 vestment from the People's Republic of China
25 in telecommunications infrastructure and diplo-

1 matic efforts to stress the political, economic,
2 and social benefits of a free and open internet;

3 (M) efforts to promote United States pri-
4 vate sector engagement in and public-private
5 partnerships on renewable energy development;

6 (N) the expansion of public-private part-
7 nership efforts on water, desalination, and irri-
8 gation projects; and

9 (O) efforts to warn United States partners
10 in the Middle East and North Africa of the
11 risks associated with the People's Republic of
12 China's telecommunications infrastructure and
13 provide alternative "clean paths" to the Peo-
14 ple's Republic of China's technology.

15 **SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND**
16 **NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.**

17 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
18 ings:

19 (1) The United States and the international
20 community have long-term interests in the stability,
21 security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle
22 East and North Africa.

23 (2) In addition to and apart from military and
24 security efforts, the United States should harness a
25 whole of government approach, including bilateral

1 and multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort,
2 and public diplomacy to compete with and counter
3 Chinese Communist Party influence.

4 (3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of
5 United States engagement, transparent governance
6 structures, and active civil society engagement help
7 counter predatory foreign investment and influence
8 efforts.

9 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
10 United States that the United States and the international
11 community should continue diplomatic and economic ef-
12 forts throughout the Middle East and North Africa that
13 support reform efforts to—

- 14 (1) promote greater economic opportunity;
- 15 (2) foster private sector development;
- 16 (3) strengthen civil society; and
- 17 (4) promote transparent and democratic gov-
18 ernance and the rule of law.

19 **PART VI—ARCTIC REGION**

20 **SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.**

21 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARCTIC SECURITY.—

22 It is the sense of Congress that—

- 23 (1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment—

1 (A) creates new national and regional secu-
2 rity challenges due to increased military activity
3 in the Arctic;

4 (B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerg-
5 ing as a major theater of conflict in ongoing
6 strategic competition;

7 (C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic lit-
8 toral nations have inadequate capacity to patrol
9 the increased vessel traffic in this remote re-
10 gion, which is a result of diminished annual lev-
11 els of sea ice;

12 (D) impacts public safety due to increased
13 human activity in the Arctic region where
14 search and rescue capacity remains very lim-
15 ited; and

16 (E) threatens the health of the Arctic's
17 fragile and pristine environment and the unique
18 and highly sensitive species found in the Arc-
19 tic's marine and terrestrial ecosystems; and

20 (2) the United States should reduce the con-
21 sequences outlined in paragraph (1) by—

22 (A) carefully evaluating the wide variety
23 and dynamic set of security and safety risks un-
24 folding in the Arctic;

1 (B) developing policies and making prep-
2 arations to mitigate and respond to threats and
3 risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to
4 work with allies and partners in the Arctic re-
5 gion to deter potential aggressive activities and
6 build Arctic competencies;

7 (C) adequately funding the National Earth
8 System Prediction Capability to substantively
9 improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on
10 the time scales necessary to ensure regional se-
11 curity and trans-Arctic shipping;

12 (D) investing in resources, including a sig-
13 nificantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure
14 that the United States has adequate capacity to
15 prevent and respond to security threats in the
16 Arctic region;

17 (E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with
18 all nations in the Arctic region for—

19 (i) maintaining peace and stability in
20 the Arctic region;

21 (ii) fostering cooperation on steward-
22 ship and safety initiatives in the Arctic re-
23 gion;

1 (iii) ensuring safe and efficient man-
2 agement of commercial maritime traffic in
3 the Arctic;

4 (iv) promoting responsible natural re-
5 source management and economic develop-
6 ment; and

7 (v) countering China's Polar Silk
8 Road initiative; and

9 (F) examining the possibility of recon-
10 vening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum.

11 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
12 United States—

13 (1) to recognize only the nations enumerated in
14 subsection (c)(1) as Arctic nations, and to reject all
15 other claims to this status; and

16 (2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a
17 serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the
18 interests of United States allies and partners.

19 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

20 (1) ARCTIC NATIONS.—The term “Arctic na-
21 tions” means the 8 nations with territory or exclu-
22 sive economic zones that extend north of the
23 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator,
24 namely Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway,

1 Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden,
2 and Iceland.

3 (2) ARCTIC REGION.—The term “Arctic Re-
4 gion” means the geographic region north of the
5 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator.

6 (d) DESIGNATION.—The Assistant Secretary of State
7 for Oceans and International Environmental and Sci-
8 entific Affairs (OES) shall designate a deputy assistant
9 secretary serving within the Bureau of Oceans and Inter-
10 national Environmental and Scientific Affairs as “Deputy
11 Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs”, who shall be re-
12 sponsible for OES affairs in the Arctic Region.

13 (e) DUTIES.—The Deputy Assistant Secretary for
14 Arctic Affairs shall—

15 (1) facilitate the development and coordination
16 of United States foreign policy in the Arctic Region
17 relating to—

18 (A) strengthening institutions for coopera-
19 tion among the Arctic nations;

20 (B) enhancing scientific monitoring and re-
21 search on local, regional, and global environ-
22 mental issues;

23 (C) protecting the Arctic environment and
24 conserving its biological resources;

1 (D) promoting responsible natural resource
2 management and economic development; and

3 (E) involving Arctic indigenous people in
4 decisions that affect them.

5 (2) coordinate the diplomatic objectives with re-
6 spect to the activities described in paragraph (1),
7 and, as appropriate, represent the United States
8 within multilateral fora that address international
9 cooperation and foreign policy matters in the Arctic
10 Region;

11 (3) help inform, in coordination with the Bu-
12 reau of Economic and Business Affairs,
13 transnational commerce and commercial maritime
14 transit in the Arctic Region;

15 (4) coordinate the integration of scientific data
16 on the current and projected effects of emerging en-
17 vironmental changes on the Arctic Region and en-
18 sure that such data is applied to the development of
19 security strategies for the Arctic Region;

20 (5) make available the methods and approaches
21 on the integration of environmental science and data
22 to other regional security planning programs in the
23 Department of State to better ensure that broader
24 decision making processes may more adequately ac-
25 count for the changing environment;

1 (6) assist with the development of, and facili-
2 tate the implementation of, an Arctic Region Secu-
3 rity Policy in accordance with subsection (f);

4 (7) use the voice, vote, and influence of the
5 United States to encourage other countries and
6 international multilateral organizations to support
7 the principles of the Arctic Region Security Policy
8 implemented pursuant to subsection (f); and

9 (8) perform such other duties and exercise such
10 powers as the Assistant Secretary of State for
11 Oceans and International Environmental and Sci-
12 entific Affairs shall prescribe.

13 (f) RANK AND STATUS.—The Secretary of State may
14 change the title of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arc-
15 tic Affairs designated under subsection (c) to Special Rep-
16 resentative or Special Envoy with the rank of Ambassador
17 if—

18 (1) the President nominates the person so des-
19 ignated to that rank and status; and

20 (2) the Senate confirms such person to such
21 rank and status.

22 (g) ARCTIC REGION SECURITY POLICY.—The Bu-
23 reau of European and Eurasian Affairs shall be the lead
24 bureau for developing and implementing the United
25 States' Arctic Region Security Policy, in coordination with

1 the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
2 and Scientific Affairs, the Bureau of Political-Military Af-
3 fairs, embassies, other regional bureaus, and relevant of-
4 fices to advance United States national security interests,
5 including through conflict prevention efforts, security as-
6 sistance, humanitarian disaster response and prevention,
7 and economic and other relevant assistance programs. The
8 Arctic Region Security Policy shall assess, develop, budget
9 for, and implement plans, policies, and actions—

10 (1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the
11 United States in Arctic nations, including through
12 enhancements to diplomatic missions and facilities,
13 participation in regional and bilateral dialogues re-
14 lated to Arctic security, and coordination of United
15 States initiatives and assistance programs across
16 agencies to protect the national security of the
17 United States and its allies and partners;

18 (2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic
19 nations to the effects of environmental change and
20 increased civilian and military activity by Arctic na-
21 tions and other nations that may result from in-
22 creased accessibility of the Arctic Region;

23 (3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic
24 Region and Arctic nations that—

1 (A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic
2 environment; and

3 (B) are strategically significant to the
4 United States;

5 (4) to coordinate the integration of environ-
6 mental change and national security risk and vulner-
7 ability assessments into the decision making process
8 on foreign assistance awards with Greenland;

9 (5) to advance principles of good governance by
10 encouraging and cooperating with Arctic nations on
11 collaborative approaches—

12 (A) to responsibly manage natural re-
13 sources in the Arctic Region;

14 (B) to share the burden of ensuring mari-
15 time safety in the Arctic Region;

16 (C) to prevent the escalation of security
17 tensions by mitigating against the militarization
18 of the Arctic Region;

19 (D) to develop mutually agreed upon mul-
20 tilateral policies among Arctic nations on the
21 management of maritime transit routes through
22 the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the
23 transit policies for access to and transit in the
24 Arctic Region by non-Arctic nations; and

1 (E) to facilitate the development of Arctic
2 Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability
3 and public safety in disaster situations in a hu-
4 mane and responsible fashion; and

5 (6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, sur-
6 vivability, and resiliency of United States interests
7 and non-defense assets in the Arctic Region.

8 **PART VII—OCEANIA**

9 **SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN-**
10 **GAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.**

11 It shall be the policy of the United States—

12 (1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a
13 strategic national security and economic priority of
14 the United States Government;

15 (2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and
16 democratic governance across Oceania as part of a
17 free and open Indo-Pacific region;

18 (3) to broaden and deepen relationships with
19 the Freely Associated States of the Republic of
20 Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the
21 Federated States of Micronesia through robust de-
22 fense, diplomatic, economic, and development ex-
23 changes that promote the goals of individual states
24 and the entire region;

1 (4) to work with the governments of Australia,
2 New Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance
3 goals of the Oceania region concerning health, envi-
4 ronmental protection, disaster resilience and pre-
5 paredness, illegal, unreported and unregulated fish-
6 ing, maritime security, and economic development;

7 (5) to participate, wherever possible and appro-
8 priate, in existing regional organizations and inter-
9 national structures to promote the national security
10 and economic goals of the United States and coun-
11 tries of the Oceania region;

12 (6) to invest in a whole-of-government United
13 States strategy that will enhance youth engagement
14 and advance long-term growth and development
15 throughout the region, especially as it relates to pro-
16 tecting marine resources that are critical to liveli-
17 hoods and strengthening the resilience of the coun-
18 tries of the Oceania region against current and fu-
19 ture threats resulting from extreme weather and se-
20 vere changes in the environment;

21 (7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign
22 influence and corruption aimed at undermining the
23 political, environmental, social, and economic sta-
24 bility of the people and governments of the countries
25 of Oceania;

1 (8) to improve the local capacity of the coun-
2 tries of Oceania to address public health challenges
3 and improve global health security;

4 (9) to help the countries of Oceania access mar-
5 ket-based private sector investments that adhere to
6 best practices regarding transparency, debt sustain-
7 ability, and environmental and social safeguards as
8 an alternative to state-directed investments by au-
9 thoritarian governments;

10 (10) to ensure the people and communities of
11 Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and de-
12 grading munitions hazards and other debris that
13 threaten health and livelihoods;

14 (11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering
15 United States support for maintaining Taiwan's dip-
16 lomatic partners in Oceania; and

17 (12) to work cooperatively with all governments
18 in Oceania to promote the dignified return of the re-
19 mains of members of the United States Armed
20 Forces that are missing in action from previous con-
21 flicts in the Indo-Pacific region.

22 **SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.**

23 (a) OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.—Not later than
24 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
25 Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-

1 sional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening
2 United States engagement with the countries of Oceania,
3 including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with
4 Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared
5 concerns and promote shared goals in pursuit of security
6 and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.

7 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategic roadmap required by
8 subsection (a) shall include the following:

9 (1) A description of United States regional
10 goals and concerns with respect to Oceania and in-
11 creasing engagement with the countries of Oceania.

12 (2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of
13 United States regional goals and concerns that are
14 shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, in-
15 cluding a review of issues related to anticorruption,
16 maritime and other security issues, environmental
17 protection, fisheries management, economic growth
18 and development, and disaster resilience and pre-
19 paredness.

20 (3) A review of ongoing programs and initia-
21 tives by the governments of the United States, Aus-
22 tralia, New Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of those
23 shared regional goals and concerns, including with
24 respect to the issues described in paragraph (1).

1 (4) A review of ongoing programs and initia-
2 tives by regional organizations and other related
3 intergovernmental structures aimed at addressing
4 the issues described in paragraph (1).

5 (5) A plan for aligning United States programs
6 and resources in pursuit of those shared regional
7 goals and concerns, as appropriate.

8 (6) Recommendations for additional United
9 States authorities, personnel, programs, or resources
10 necessary to execute the strategic roadmap.

11 (7) Any other elements the Secretary considers
12 appropriate.

13 **SEC. 293. REVIEW OF USAID PROGRAMMING IN OCEANIA.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
15 nation with the Administrator of the United States Agen-
16 cy for International Development (in this section referred
17 to as “USAID”), should include the Indo-Pacific countries
18 of Oceania in existing strategic planning and multi-sector
19 program evaluation processes, including the Department
20 of State’s Integrated Country Strategies and USAID’s
21 Country Development Cooperation Strategies, the Joint
22 Strategic Plan, and the Journey to Self-Reliance Country
23 Roadmaps.

24 (b) PROGRAMMATIC CONSIDERATIONS.—Evaluations
25 and considerations for Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania

1 in the program planning and strategic development pro-
2 cesses under subsection (a) should include—

3 (1) descriptions of the diplomatic and develop-
4 ment challenges of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oce-
5 ania as those challenges relate to the strategic, eco-
6 nomic, and humanitarian interests of the United
7 States;

8 (2) reviews of existing Department of State and
9 USAID programs to address the diplomatic and de-
10 velopment challenges of those countries evaluated
11 under paragraph (1);

12 (3) descriptions of the barriers, if any, to in-
13 creasing Department of State and USAID program-
14 ming to Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania, includ-
15 ing—

16 (A) the relative income level of the Indo-
17 Pacific countries of Oceania relative to other re-
18 gions where there is high demand for United
19 States foreign assistance to support develop-
20 ment needs;

21 (B) the relative capacity of the Indo-Pa-
22 cific countries of Oceania to absorb United
23 States foreign assistance for diplomatic and de-
24 velopment needs through partner governments
25 and civil society institutions; and

1 (C) any other factor that the Secretary or
2 Administrator determines may constitute a bar-
3 rier to deploying or increasing United States
4 foreign assistance to the Indo-Pacific countries
5 of Oceania;

6 (4) assessments of the presence of, degree of
7 international development by, partner country in-
8 debtedness to, and political influence of malign for-
9 eign governments, such as the Government of the
10 People's Republic of China, and non-state actors;

11 (5) assessments of new foreign economic assist-
12 ance modalities that could assist in strengthening
13 United States foreign assistance in the Indo-Pacific
14 countries of Oceania, including the deployment of
15 technical assistance and asset recovery tools to part-
16 ner governments and civil society institutions to help
17 develop the capacity and expertise necessary to
18 achieve self-sufficiency;

19 (6) an evaluation of the existing budget and re-
20 source management processes for the Department of
21 State's and USAID's mission and work with respect
22 to its programming in the Indo-Pacific countries of
23 Oceania;

24 (7) an explanation of how the Secretary and the
25 Administrator will use existing programming proc-

1 esses, including those with respect to development of
2 an Integrated Country Strategy, Country Develop-
3 ment Cooperation Strategy, the Joint Strategic
4 Plan, and the Journey to Self-Reliance Country
5 Roadmaps, to advance the long-term growth, govern-
6 ance, economic development, and resilience of the
7 Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania; and

8 (8) any recommendations about appropriate
9 budgetary, resource management, and programmatic
10 changes necessary to assist in strengthening United
11 States foreign assistance programming in the Indo-
12 Pacific countries of Oceania.

13 **SEC. 294. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE.**

14 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than one year after the
15 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
16 shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the
17 feasibility and advisability of establishing a United States-
18 based public-private sponsored security dialogue (to be
19 known as the “Oceania Security Dialogue”) among the
20 countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring
21 and discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic,
22 and national security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oce-
23 ania.

24 (b) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—The briefing required by
25 subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, include the following:

1 (1) A review of the ability of the Department
2 of State to participate in a public-private sponsored
3 security dialogue.

4 (2) An assessment of the potential locations for
5 conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue in the ju-
6 risdiction of the United States.

7 (3) Consideration of dates for conducting an
8 Oceania Security Dialogue that would maximize par-
9 ticipation of representatives from the Indo-Pacific
10 countries of Oceania.

11 (4) A review of the funding modalities available
12 to the Department of State to help finance an Oce-
13 ania Security Dialogue, including grant-making au-
14 thorities available to the Department of State.

15 (5) An assessment of any administrative, statu-
16 tory, or other legal limitations that would prevent
17 the establishment of an Oceania Security Dialogue
18 with participation and support of the Department of
19 State as described in subsection (a).

20 (6) An analysis of how an Oceania Security
21 Dialogue could help to advance the Boe Declaration
22 on Regional Security, including its emphasis on the
23 changing environment as the greatest existential
24 threat to countries of Oceania.

1 (7) An evaluation of how an Oceania Security
2 Dialogue could help amplify the issues and work of
3 existing regional structures and organizations dedi-
4 cated to the security of the Oceania region, such as
5 the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific Environmental
6 Security Form.

7 (8) An analysis of how an Oceania Security
8 Dialogue would help with implementation of the
9 strategic roadmap required by section 292 and ad-
10 vance the National Security Strategy of the United
11 States.

12 (c) INTERAGENCY CONSULTATION.—To the extent
13 practicable, the Secretary of State may consult with the
14 Secretary of Defense and, where appropriate, evaluate the
15 lessons learned of the Regional Centers for Security Stud-
16 ies of the Department of Defense to determine the feasi-
17 bility and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security
18 Dialogue.

19 **SEC. 295. REPORT ON COUNTERING ILLEGAL, UNRE-**
20 **PORTED, AND UNREGULATED FISHING IN**
21 **OCEANIA.**

22 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
23 gress that—

1 (1) many countries of the Oceania region de-
2 pend on commercial tuna fisheries as a critical com-
3 ponent of their economies;

4 (2) the Government of the People's Republic of
5 China has used its licensed fishing fleet to exert
6 greater influence in Oceania, but at the same time,
7 its licensed fishing fleet is also a major contributor
8 to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (in
9 this section referred to as "IUU fishing") activities;

10 (3) the sustainability of Oceania's fisheries is
11 threatened by IUU fishing, which depletes both com-
12 mercially important fish stocks and non-targeted
13 species that help maintain the integrity of the ocean
14 ecosystem;

15 (4) in addition, IUU fishing puts pressure on
16 protected species of marine mammals, sea turtles,
17 and sea birds, which also jeopardizes the integrity of
18 the ocean ecosystem;

19 (5) further, because IUU fishing goes unre-
20 corded, the loss of biomass compromises scientists'
21 work to assess and model fishery stocks and advise
22 managers on sustainable catch levels;

23 (6) beyond the damage to living marine re-
24 sources, IUU fishing also contributes directly to ille-

1 gal activity in the Oceania region, such as food
2 fraud, smuggling, and human trafficking;

3 (7) current approaches to IUU fishing enforce-
4 ment rely on established methods, such as vessel
5 monitoring systems, logbooks maintained by govern-
6 ment fisheries enforcement authorities to record the
7 catches landed by fishing vessels, and corroborating
8 data on catches hand-collected by human observer
9 programs;

10 (8) such established methods are imperfect be-
11 cause—

12 (A) vessels can turn off monitoring sys-
13 tems and unlicensed vessels do not use them;
14 and

15 (B) observer coverage is thin and subject
16 to human error and corruption;

17 (9) maritime domain awareness technology so-
18 lutions for vessel monitoring have gained credibility
19 in recent years and include systems such as observ-
20 ing instruments deployed on satellites, crewed and
21 uncrewed air and surface systems, aircraft, and sur-
22 face vessels, as well as electronic monitoring systems
23 on fishing vessels;

1 (10) maritime domain awareness technologies
2 hold the promise of significantly augmenting the
3 current IUU fishing enforcement capacities; and

4 (11) maritime domain awareness technologies
5 offer an avenue for addressing key United States na-
6 tional interests, including those interests related
7 to—

8 (A) increasing bilateral diplomatic ties with
9 key allies and partners in the Oceania region;

10 (B) countering illicit trafficking in arms,
11 narcotics, and human beings associated with
12 IUU fishing;

13 (C) advancing security, long-term growth,
14 and development in the Oceania region;

15 (D) supporting ocean conservation objec-
16 tives;

17 (E) reducing food insecurity; and

18 (F) countering attempts by the Govern-
19 ment of the People’s Republic of China to grow
20 its influence in the Oceania region.

21 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
24 retary of State, in consultation with the Adminis-
25 trator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-

1 ministration, the Commandant of the Coast Guard,
2 and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the
3 appropriate congressional committees a report as-
4 sessing the use of advanced maritime domain aware-
5 ness technology systems to combat IUU fishing in
6 Oceania.

7 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-
8 graph (1) shall include—

9 (A) a review of the effectiveness of existing
10 monitoring technologies, including electronic
11 monitoring systems, to combat IUU fishing;

12 (B) recommendations for effectively inte-
13 grating effective monitoring technologies into a
14 Oceania-wide strategy for IUU fishing enforce-
15 ment;

16 (C) an assessment and recommendations
17 for the secure and reliable processing of data
18 from such monitoring technologies, including
19 the security and verification issues;

20 (D) the technical and financial capacity of
21 countries of the Oceania region to deploy and
22 maintain large-scale use of maritime domain
23 awareness technological systems for the pur-
24 poses of combating IUU fishing and supporting
25 fisheries resource management;

1 (E) a review of the technical and financial
2 capacity of regional organizations and inter-
3 national structures to support countries of the
4 Oceania region in the deployment and mainte-
5 nance of large-scale use of maritime domain
6 awareness technology systems for the purposes
7 of combating IUU fishing and supporting fish-
8 eries resource management;

9 (F) an evaluation of the utility of using
10 foreign assistance, security assistance, and de-
11 velopment assistance provided by the United
12 States to countries of the Oceania region to
13 support the large-scale deployment and oper-
14 ations of maritime domain awareness systems
15 to increase maritime security across the region;
16 and

17 (G) an assessment of the role of large-scale
18 deployment and operations of maritime domain
19 awareness systems throughout Oceania to sup-
20 porting United States economic and national se-
21 curity interests in the Oceania region, including
22 efforts related to countering IUU fishing, im-
23 proving maritime security, and countering ma-
24 lign foreign influence.

1 **SEC. 296. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the
3 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
4 Peace Corps shall submit to Congress a report on strate-
5 gies for to reasonably and safely expand the number of
6 Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania, with the goals of—

7 (1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps
8 to all currently feasible locations in Oceania; and

9 (2) working with regional and international
10 partners of the United States to expand the presence
11 of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania
12 communities in support of climate resilience initia-
13 tives.

14 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection
15 (a) shall—

16 (1) assess the factors contributing to the cur-
17 rent absence of the Peace Corps and its volunteers
18 in Oceania;

19 (2) examine potential remedies that include
20 working with United States Government agencies
21 and regional governments, including governments of
22 United States allies—

23 (A) to increase the health infrastructure
24 and medical evacuation capabilities of the coun-
25 tries of Oceania to better support the safety of
26 Peace Corps volunteers while in those countries;

1 (B) to address physical safety concerns
2 that have decreased the ability of the Peace
3 Corps to operate in Oceania; and

4 (C) to increase transportation infrastruc-
5 ture in the countries of Oceania to better sup-
6 port the travel of Peace Corps volunteers and
7 their access to necessary facilities;

8 (3) evaluate the potential to expand the deploy-
9 ment of Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the
10 countries of Oceania address social, economic, and
11 development needs of their communities that require
12 specific professional expertise; and

13 (4) explore potential new operational models to
14 address safety and security needs of Peace Corps
15 volunteers in the countries of Oceania, including—

16 (A) changes to volunteer deployment dura-
17 tions; and

18 (B) scheduled redeployment of volunteers
19 to regional or United States-based healthcare
20 facilities for routine physical and behavioral
21 health evaluation.

22 (c) VOLUNTEERS IN LOW-INCOME OCEANIA COMMU-
23 NITIES.—

24 (1) IN GENERAL.—In examining the potential
25 to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in

1 low-income Oceania communities under subsection
2 (a)(2), the Director of the Peace Corps shall con-
3 sider the development of initiatives described in
4 paragraph (2).

5 (2) INITIATIVES DESCRIBED.—Initiatives de-
6 scribed in this paragraph are volunteer initiatives
7 that help the countries of Oceania address social,
8 economic, and development needs of their commu-
9 nities, including by—

10 (A) addressing, through appropriate resil-
11 ience-based interventions, the vulnerability that
12 communities in Oceania face as result of ex-
13 treme weather, severe environmental change,
14 and other climate related trends; and

15 (B) improving, through smart infrastruc-
16 ture principles, access to transportation and
17 connectivity infrastructure that will help ad-
18 dress the economic and social challenges that
19 communities in Oceania confront as a result of
20 poor or nonexistent infrastructure.

21 (d) OCEANIA DEFINED.—In this section, the term
22 “Oceania” includes the following:

- 23 (1) Easter Island of Chile.
24 (2) Fiji.
25 (3) French Polynesia of France.

- 1 (4) Kiribati.
- 2 (5) New Caledonia of France.
- 3 (6) Nieu of New Zealand.
- 4 (7) Papua New Guinea.
- 5 (8) Samoa.
- 6 (9) Vanuatu.
- 7 (10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Aus-
- 8 tralia.
- 9 (11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand.
- 10 (12) The Coral Islands of Australia.
- 11 (13) The Federated States of Micronesia.
- 12 (14) The Norfolk Island of Australia.
- 13 (15) The Pitcairn Islands of the United King-
- 14 dom.
- 15 (16) The Republic of the Marshal Islands.
- 16 (17) The Republic of Palau.
- 17 (18) The Solomon Islands.
- 18 (19) Tokelau of New Zealand.
- 19 (20) Tonga.
- 20 (21) Tuvalu.
- 21 (22) Wallis and Futuna of France.

1 **TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR**
2 **VALUES**

3 **SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO-**
4 **MOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG.**

5 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
6 authorized to be appropriated \$10,000,000 for fiscal year
7 2022 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
8 Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy
9 in Hong Kong.

10 (b) ADMINISTRATION.—The Secretary of State shall
11 designate an office with the Department of State to ad-
12 minister and coordinate the provision of such funds de-
13 scribed in subsection (a) within the Department of State
14 and across the United States Government.

15 **SEC. 302. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO**
16 **FORCED LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR**
17 **AUTONOMOUS REGION.**

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur
19 Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145;
20 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended—

21 (1) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as sub-
22 paragraph (F); and

23 (2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the fol-
24 lowing:

1 “(E) Serious human rights abuses in con-
2 nection with forced labor.”.

3 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.—The amend-
4 ment made by subsection (a)—

5 (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of
6 this Act; and

7 (2) applies with respect to the first report re-
8 quired by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human
9 Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted after such date
10 of enactment.

11 **SEC. 303. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
12 **SYSTEMATIC RAPE, COERCIVE ABORTION,**
13 **FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY**
14 **CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE**
15 **XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur
17 Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145;
18 22 U.S.C. 6901 note), as amended by section 302, is fur-
19 ther amended—

20 (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (F) as sub-
21 paragraph (G); and

22 (2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the fol-
23 lowing:

1 “(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion,
2 forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive
3 implantation policies and practices.”.

4 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.—The amend-
5 ment made by subsection (a)—

6 (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of
7 this Act; and

8 (2) applies with respect to the first report re-
9 quired by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human
10 Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted after such date
11 of enactment.

12 **SEC. 304. REPORT ON CORRUPT ACTIVITIES OF SENIOR OF-**
13 **FICIALS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S**
14 **REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

15 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
16 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
17 tees of Congress” means—

18 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
19 Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
20 fairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
21 the Senate; and

22 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
23 Committee on Financial Services, and the Perma-
24 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
25 of Representatives.

1 (b) ANNUAL REPORT REQUIRED.—

2 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
3 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
4 nually thereafter through 2026, the Director of the
5 Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the
6 Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, and
7 any other relevant United States Government offi-
8 cial, shall submit to the appropriate committees of
9 Congress a report on the corruption and corrupt ac-
10 tivities of senior officials of the Government of
11 China.

12 (2) ELEMENTS.—

13 (A) IN GENERAL.—Each report under
14 paragraph (1) shall include the following ele-
15 ments:

16 (i) A description of the wealth and
17 sources of wealth of senior officials of the
18 Government of China.

19 (ii) A description of corrupt activities,
20 including activities taking place outside of
21 China, engaged in by senior officials of the
22 Government of China.

23 (iii) A description of any gaps in the
24 ability of the intelligence community to col-

1 lect information covered in clauses (i) and
2 (ii).

3 (B) SCOPE OF REPORTS.—The first report
4 under paragraph (1) shall include comprehen-
5 sive information on the matters described in
6 subparagraph (A). Any succeeding report under
7 paragraph (1) may consist of an update or sup-
8 plement to the preceding report under that sub-
9 section.

10 (3) FORM.—Each report under paragraph (1)
11 shall include an unclassified executive summary of
12 the elements described in clauses (i) and (ii) of para-
13 graph (2)(A), and may include a classified annex.

14 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
15 gress that the United States should undertake every effort
16 and pursue every opportunity to expose the corruption and
17 related practices of senior officials of the Government of
18 China, including President Xi Jinping.

19 **SEC. 305. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS**
20 **HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL THAT COMMIT**
21 **HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.**

22 The President shall direct the Permanent Represent-
23 ative of the United States to the United Nations to use
24 the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to—

1 (1) reform the process for removing members of
2 the United Nations Human Rights Council that
3 commit gross and systemic violations of human
4 rights, including—

5 (A) lowering the threshold vote at the
6 United Nations General Assembly for removal
7 to a simple majority;

8 (B) ensuring information detailing the
9 member country's human rights record is pub-
10 licly available before the vote on removal; and

11 (C) making the vote of each country on the
12 removal from the United Nations Human
13 Rights Council publicly available;

14 (2) reform the rules on electing members to the
15 United Nations Human Rights Council to ensure
16 United Nations members that have committed gross
17 and systemic violations of human rights are not
18 elected to the Human Rights Council; and

19 (3) oppose the election to the Human Rights
20 Council of any United Nations member—

21 (A) currently designated as a country en-
22 gaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations
23 of internationally recognized human rights pur-
24 suant to section 116 or section 502B of the

1 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2 2151n, 2304) ;

3 (B) currently designated as a state sponsor
4 of terrorism;

5 (C) currently designated as a Tier 3 coun-
6 try under the Trafficking Victims Protection
7 Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);

8 (D) the government of which is identified
9 on the list published by the Secretary of State
10 pursuant to section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers
11 Prevention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c–1(b))
12 as a government that recruits and uses child
13 soldiers; or

14 (E) the government of which the United
15 States determines to have committed genocide
16 or crimes against humanity.

17 **SEC. 306. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET.**

18 (a) RANK OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDI-
19 NATOR FOR TIBETAN ISSUES.—Section 621 of the Ti-
20 betan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amend-
21 ed—

22 (1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), and
23 (d), as subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively; and

24 (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the fol-
25 lowing:

1 “(b) RANK.—The Special Coordinator shall either be
2 appointed by the President, with the advice and consent
3 of the Senate, or shall be an individual holding the rank
4 of Under Secretary of State or higher.”.

5 (b) TIBET UNIT AT UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN
6 BEIJING.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
8 establish a Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the
9 United States Embassy in Beijing, People’s Republic
10 of China.

11 (2) OPERATION.—The Tibet Unit established
12 under paragraph (1) shall operate until such time as
13 the Government of the People’s Republic of China
14 permits—

15 (A) the United States Consulate General
16 in Chengdu, People’s Republic of China, to re-
17 open; or

18 (B) a United States Consulate General in
19 Lhasa, Tibet, to open.

20 (3) STAFF.—

21 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall—

22 (i) assign not fewer than 2 United
23 States direct-hire personnel to the Tibet
24 Unit established under paragraph (1); and

1 (ii) hire not fewer than 1 locally en-
2 gaged staff member for such unit.

3 (B) LANGUAGE TRAINING.—The Secretary
4 shall make Tibetan language training available
5 to the personnel assigned under subparagraph
6 (A), consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act of
7 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

8 **SEC. 307. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL EN-**
9 **GAGEMENT ON THE SUCCESSION OR REIN-**
10 **CARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND RELI-**
11 **GIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.**

12 (a) REAFFIRMATION OF POLICY.—It is the policy of
13 the United States, as provided under section 342(b) of di-
14 vision FF of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021
15 (Public Law 116–260), that any “interference by the Gov-
16 ernment of the People’s Republic of China or any other
17 government in the process of recognizing a successor or
18 reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future
19 Dalai Lamas would represent a clear abuse of the right
20 to religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan
21 people”.

22 (b) INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT RELI-
23 GIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.—The Sec-
24 retary of State should engage with United States allies
25 and partners to—

1 (1) support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders’
2 sole religious authority to identify and install the
3 15th Dalai Lama;

4 (2) oppose claims by the Government of the
5 People’s Republic of China that the PRC has the
6 authority to decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 15th
7 Dalai Lama; and

8 (3) reject interference by the Government of the
9 People’s Republic of China in the religious freedom
10 of Tibetan Buddhists.

11 **SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TREATMENT OF**
12 **UYGHURS AND OTHER ETHNIC MINORITIES**
13 **IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE-**
14 **GION.**

15 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
16 ings:

17 (1) The Uyghurs are one of several predomi-
18 nantly Muslim Turkic groups living in the Xinjiang
19 Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the north-
20 west of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

21 (2) Following Uyghur demonstrations and un-
22 rest in 2009 and clashes with government security
23 personnel and other violent incidents in subsequent
24 years, PRC leaders sought to “stabilize” the XUAR
25 through large-scale arrests and extreme security

1 measures, under the pretext of combatting alleged
2 terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic sepa-
3 ratism.

4 (3) In May 2014, the PRC launched its “Strike
5 Hard Against Violent Extremism” campaign, which
6 placed further restrictions on and facilitated addi-
7 tional human rights violations against minorities in
8 the XUAR under the pretext of fighting terrorism.

9 (4) In August 2016, Chinese Communist Party
10 (CCP) Politburo member Chen Quanguo, former
11 Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party Secretary,
12 known for overseeing intensifying security operations
13 and human rights abuses in the TAR, was appointed
14 as Party Secretary of the XUAR.

15 (5) Beginning in 2017, XUAR authorities have
16 sought to forcibly “assimilate” Uyghurs and other
17 Turkic minorities into Chinese society through a pol-
18 icy of cultural erasure known as “Sinicization”.

19 (6) Since 2018, credible reporting including
20 from the BBC, France24, and the New York Times
21 has shown that the Government of the PRC has
22 built mass internment camps in the XUAR, which it
23 calls “vocational training” centers, and detained
24 Uyghurs and other groups in them and other facili-
25 ties.

1 (7) Since 2015, XUAR authorities have arbi-
2 trarily detained an estimated 1,500,000 Uyghurs—
3 12.5 percent of the XUAR’s official Uyghur popu-
4 lation of 12,000,000—and a smaller number of
5 other ethnic minorities in the “vocational training”
6 centers and other detention and pre-detention facili-
7 ties.

8 (8) In 2017, the XUAR accounted for less than
9 two percent of the PRC’s total population but 21
10 percent of all arrests in China.

11 (9) The Atlantic, Radio Free Asia, and other
12 sources have revealed that detainees are forced to re-
13 nounce many of their Islamic beliefs and customs
14 and repudiate Uyghur culture, language, and iden-
15 tity.

16 (10) Investigations by Human Rights Watch
17 and other human rights organizations have docu-
18 mented how detainees are subject to political indoc-
19 trination, forced labor, crowded and unsanitary con-
20 ditions, involuntary biometric data collection, both
21 medical neglect and intrusive medical interventions,
22 food and water deprivation, beatings, sexual violence,
23 and torture.

24 (11) Research by the Australian Strategic Pol-
25 icy Institute suggests that, since late 2019, many

1 detainees have been placed in higher security facili-
2 ties and convicted of formal crimes.

3 (12) Human Rights Watch has reported that
4 the PRC uses data collection programs, including fa-
5 cial recognition technology, to surveil Uyghurs in the
6 XUAR and to identify individuals whom authorities
7 may detain.

8 (13) PRC authorities have placed countless
9 children whose parents are detained or in exile in
10 state-run institutions and boarding schools without
11 the consent of their parents.

12 (14) New York Times reporting revealed that
13 numerous local PRC officials who did not agree with
14 the policies carried out in XUAR have been fired
15 and imprisoned.

16 (15) Associated Press reporting documented
17 widespread and systemic efforts by PRC authorities
18 to force Uyghur women to take contraceptives or to
19 subject them to sterilization or abortion, threatening
20 to detain those who do not comply.

21 (16) PRC authorities prohibit family members
22 and advocates inside and outside China from having
23 regular communications with relatives and friends
24 imprisoned in the XUAR, such as journalist and en-
25 trepreneur Ekpar Asat.

1 (17) PRC authorities have imposed pervasive
2 restrictions on the peaceful practice of Islam in the
3 XUAR, to the extent that Human Rights Watch as-
4 serts the PRC “has effectively outlawed the practice
5 of Islam”.

6 (18) Individuals who are not detained in camps
7 have been forced to attend political indoctrination
8 sessions, subjected to movement restrictions, mass
9 surveillance systems, involuntary biometric data col-
10 lection, and other human rights abuses.

11 (19) International media, nongovernmental or-
12 ganizations, scholars, families, and survivors have
13 reported on the systemic nature of many of these
14 abuses.

15 (20) On June 26, 2020, a group of 50 inde-
16 pendent United Nations experts jointly expressed
17 alarm over China’s deteriorating human rights
18 record, including its repression in Xinjiang, and
19 called on the international community “to act collec-
20 tively and decisively to ensure China respects human
21 rights and abides by its international obligations”.

22 (21) On October 6, 2020, 39 United Nations
23 member countries issued a public statement con-
24 demning human rights violations by PRC authorities
25 and calling on the PRC to allow the United Nations

1 High Commissioner for Human Rights unfettered
2 access to Xinjiang.

3 (22) The United States Congress passed the
4 Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public
5 Law 116–145).

6 (23) The United States Congress passed the
7 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
8 (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22
9 U.S.C. 2656 note), which has been used to sanction
10 PRC officials and entities for their activities in the
11 XUAR.

12 (24) The United States Government has imple-
13 mented additional targeted restrictions on trade with
14 Xinjiang and imposed visa and economic sanctions
15 on PRC officials and entities for their activities in
16 the XUAR.

17 (25) The United States Government has docu-
18 mented human rights abuses and violations of indi-
19 vidual freedoms in the XUAR, including in the 2019
20 Department of State Report on International Reli-
21 gious Freedom.

22 (26) On January 19, 2021, then-Secretary of
23 State Michael Pompeo “determined that the PRC,
24 under the direction and control of the CCP, has
25 committed genocide against the predominantly Mus-

1 lim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority
2 groups in Xinjiang”.

3 (27) On January 19, 2021, during his con-
4 firmation hearing, Secretary of State Antony
5 Blinken testified that “forcing men, women, and
6 children into concentration camps, trying to in effect
7 reeducate them to be adherents to the Chinese Com-
8 munist Party—all of that speaks to an effort to
9 commit genocide”.

10 (28) On January 19, 2021, Secretary of the
11 Treasury Janet L. Yellen, during her confirmation
12 hearing, publicly stated that China is guilty of “hor-
13 rendous human rights abuses”.

14 (29) On January 27, 2021, in response to a
15 question from the press regarding the Uyghurs, Sec-
16 retary Blinken stated that his “judgement remains
17 that genocide was committed against the Uyghurs”.

18 (30) On March 10, 2021, in response to a ques-
19 tion on Xinjiang during his testimony before the
20 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
21 resentatives, Secretary Blinken reiterated, “We’ve
22 been clear, and I’ve been clear, that I see it as geno-
23 cide, other egregious abuses of human rights, and
24 we’ll continue to make that clear.”.

1 (31) The 2020 Department of State Country
2 Reports on Human Rights Practices: China states
3 that “[g]enocide and crimes against humanity oc-
4 curred during the year against the predominantly
5 Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious mi-
6 nority groups in Xinjiang”.

7 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
8 gress that—

9 (1) the atrocities committed by the CCP
10 against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim
11 Turkic groups in Xinjiang, including forced labor,
12 sexual violence, the internment of over 1,000,000 in-
13 dividuals, and other horrific abuses must be con-
14 demned;

15 (2) the President, the Secretary of State, and
16 the United States Ambassador to the United Na-
17 tions should speak publicly about the ongoing
18 human rights abuses in the XUAR, including in for-
19 mal speeches at the United Nations and other inter-
20 national fora;

21 (3) the President, the Secretary of State, and
22 the United States Ambassador to the United Na-
23 tions should appeal to the United Nations Secretary-
24 General to take a more proactive and public stance
25 on the situation in the XUAR, including by sup-

1 porting calls for an investigation and accountability
2 for individuals and entities involved in abuses
3 against the people of the XUAR;

4 (4) the United States should continue to use
5 targeted sanctions and all diplomatic tools available
6 to hold those responsible for the atrocities in
7 Xinjiang to account;

8 (5) United States agencies engaged with China
9 on trade, climate, defense, or other bilateral issues
10 should include human rights abuses in the XUAR as
11 a consideration in developing United States policy;

12 (6) the United States supports Radio Free Asia
13 Uyghur, the only Uyghur-language news service in
14 the world independent of Chinese government influ-
15 ence; and

16 (7) the United States recognizes the repeated
17 requests from the United Nations High Commis-
18 sioner for Human Rights for unfettered access to
19 the XUAR and the PRC's refusal to comply, and
20 therefore—

21 (A) PRC authorities must allow unfettered
22 access by the United Nations Office of the High
23 Commissioner for Human Rights to the XUAR;

24 (B) the United States should urge collabo-
25 rative action between the United States Govern-

1 ment and international partners to pressure
2 PRC authorities to allow unfettered access to
3 the XUAR;

4 (C) the President, the Secretary of State,
5 and the United States Ambassador to the
6 United Nations should simultaneously outline a
7 strategy to investigate the human rights abuses
8 and crimes that have taken place in the XUAR,
9 collect evidence, and transfer the evidence to a
10 competent court; and

11 (D) United States partners and allies
12 should undertake similar strategies in an effort
13 to build an international investigation outside of
14 the PRC if PRC authorities do not comply with
15 a United Nations investigation in the XUAR.

16 **SEC. 309. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET**
17 **FREEDOM AND GREAT FIREWALL CIR-**
18 **CUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF**
19 **HONG KONG.**

20 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
21 ings:

22 (1) The People's Republic of China has repeat-
23 edly violated its obligations under the Joint Declara-
24 tion by suppressing the basic rights and freedoms of
25 Hong Kongers.

1 (2) On June 30, 2020, the National People’s
2 Congress passed a “National Security Law” that
3 further erodes Hong Kong’s autonomy and enables
4 authorities to suppress dissent.

5 (3) The Government of the People’s Republic of
6 China continues to utilize the National Security Law
7 to undermine the fundamental rights of the Hong
8 Kong people through suppression of the freedom of
9 speech, assembly, religion, and the press.

10 (4) Article 9 of the National Security Law au-
11 thorizes unprecedented regulation and supervision of
12 internet activity in Hong Kong, including expanded
13 police powers to force internet service providers to
14 censor content, hand over user information, and
15 block access to platforms.

16 (5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong
17 Broadband Network blocked public access to HK
18 Chronicles, a website promoting pro-democracy view-
19 points, under the authorities of the National Secu-
20 rity Law.

21 (6) On February 12, 2021, internet service pro-
22 viders blocked access to the Taiwan Transitional
23 Justice Commission website in Hong Kong.

24 (7) Major tech companies including Facebook,
25 Twitter, WhatsApp and Google have stopped review-

1 ing requests for user data from Hong Kong authori-
2 ties.

3 (8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy
4 activists in Hong Kong were arrested and charged
5 under the National Security Law on the charge of
6 “conspiracy to commit subversion”.

7 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
8 gress that the United States should—

9 (1) support the ability of the people of Hong
10 Kong to maintain their freedom to access informa-
11 tion online; and

12 (2) focus on investments in technologies that
13 facilitate the unhindered exchange of information in
14 Hong Kong in advance of any future efforts by the
15 Chinese Communist Party—

16 (A) to suppress internet access;

17 (B) to increase online censorship; or

18 (C) to inhibit online communication and
19 content-sharing by the people of Hong Kong.

20 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

21 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-
22 GRESS.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
23 mittees” means—

24 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
25 the Senate;

1 (B) the Committee on Appropriations of
2 the Senate;

3 (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of
4 the Senate;

5 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
6 the House of Representatives;

7 (E) the Committee on Appropriations of
8 the House of Representatives; and

9 (F) the Permanent Select Committee on
10 Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

11 (2) WORKING GROUP.—The term “working
12 group” means—

13 (A) the Under Secretary of State for Civil-
14 ian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights;

15 (B) the Assistant Secretary of State for
16 East Asian and Pacific Affairs;

17 (C) the Chief Executive Officer of the
18 United States Agency for Global Media and the
19 President of the Open Technology Fund; and

20 (D) the Administrator of the United States
21 Agency for International Development.

22 (3) JOINT DECLARATION.—The term “Joint
23 Declaration” means the Joint Declaration of the
24 Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
25 and Northern Ireland and the Government of the

1 People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong
2 Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.

3 (d) HONG KONG INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAM.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is
5 authorized to establish a working group to develop
6 a strategy to bolster internet resiliency and online
7 access in Hong Kong. The Secretary shall establish
8 a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program in the Bu-
9 reau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at
10 the Department of State. Additionally, the President
11 of the Technology Fund is authorized to establish a
12 Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program. These pro-
13 grams shall operate independently, but in strategic
14 coordination with other entities in the working
15 group. The Open Technology Fund shall remain
16 independent from Department of State direction in
17 its implementation of this, and any other Internet
18 Freedom Programs.

19 (2) INDEPENDENCE.—During the period begin-
20 ning on the date of the enactment of this Act and
21 ending on September 30, 2023, the Program shall
22 be carried out independent from the mainland China
23 internet freedom portfolios in order to focus on sup-
24 porting liberties presently enjoyed by the people of
25 Hong Kong.

1 (3) CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF
2 STATE PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023,
3 the Secretary of State may—

4 (A) consolidate the Program with the
5 mainland China initiatives in the Bureau of De-
6 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor; or

7 (B) continue to carry out the Program in
8 accordance with paragraph (2).

9 (4) CONSOLIDATION OF OPEN TECHNOLOGY
10 FUND PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023,
11 the President of the Open Technology Fund may—

12 (A) consolidate the Program with the
13 mainland China initiatives in the Open Tech-
14 nology Fund; or

15 (B) continue to carry out the Program in
16 accordance with paragraph (2).

17 (e) SUPPORT FOR INTERNET FREEDOM TECH-
18 NOLOGY PROGRAMS.—

19 (1) GRANTS AUTHORIZED.—

20 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State,
21 working through the Bureau of Democracy,
22 Human Rights, and Labor, and the Open Tech-
23 nology Fund, separately and independently
24 from the Secretary of State, are authorized to
25 award grants and contracts to private organiza-

1 tions to support and develop programs in Hong
2 Kong that promote or expand—

3 (i) open, interoperable, reliable and
4 secure internet; and

5 (ii) the online exercise of human
6 rights and fundamental freedoms of indi-
7 vidual citizens, activists, human rights de-
8 fenders, independent journalists, civil soci-
9 ety organizations, and marginalized popu-
10 lations in Hong Kong.

11 (B) GOALS.—The goals of the programs
12 developed with grants authorized under sub-
13 paragraph (A) should be—

14 (i) to make the internet available in
15 Hong Kong;

16 (ii) to increase the number of the
17 tools in the technology portfolio;

18 (iii) to promote the availability of such
19 technologies and tools in Hong Kong;

20 (iv) to encourage the adoption of such
21 technologies and tools by the people of
22 Hong Kong;

23 (v) to scale up the distribution of such
24 technologies and tools throughout Hong
25 Kong;

1 (vi) to prioritize the development of
2 tools, components, code, and technologies
3 that are fully open-source, to the extent
4 practicable;

5 (vii) to conduct research on repressive
6 tactics that undermine internet freedom in
7 Hong Kong;

8 (viii) to ensure digital safety guidance
9 and support is available to repressed indi-
10 vidual citizens, human rights defenders,
11 independent journalists, civil society orga-
12 nizations and marginalized populations in
13 Hong Kong; and

14 (ix) to engage American private indus-
15 try, including e-commerce firms and social
16 networking companies, on the importance
17 of preserving internet access in Hong
18 Kong.

19 (C) GRANT RECIPIENTS.—Grants author-
20 ized under this paragraph shall be distributed
21 to multiple vendors and suppliers through an
22 open, fair, competitive, and evidence-based deci-
23 sion process—

24 (i) to diversify the technical base; and

1 (ii) to reduce the risk of misuse by
2 bad actors.

3 (D) SECURITY AUDITS.—New technologies
4 developed using grants from this paragraph
5 shall undergo comprehensive security audits to
6 ensure that such technologies are secure and
7 have not been compromised in a manner detri-
8 mental to the interests of the United States or
9 to individuals or organizations benefitting from
10 programs supported by the Open Technology
11 Fund.

12 (2) FUNDING SOURCE.—The Secretary of State
13 is authorized to expend funds from the Human
14 Rights and Democracy Fund of the Bureau of De-
15 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Depart-
16 ment of State during fiscal year 2020 for grants au-
17 thorized under paragraph (1) at any entity in the
18 working group.

19 (3) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

20 (A) OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.—In addi-
21 tion to the funds authorized to be expended
22 pursuant to paragraph (2), there are authorized
23 to be appropriated to the Open Technology
24 Fund \$5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022
25 and 2023 to carry out this subsection. This

1 funding is in addition to the funds authorized
2 for the Open Technology Fund through the Na-
3 tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
4 Year 2021 (Public Law 116–92).

5 (B) BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
6 RIGHTS, AND LABOR.—In addition to the funds
7 authorized to be expended pursuant to para-
8 graph (2), there are authorized to be appro-
9 priated to the Office of Internet Freedom Pro-
10 grams in the Bureau of Democracy, Human
11 Rights, and Labor of the Department of State
12 \$10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and
13 2023 to carry out this section.

14 (C) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts appro-
15 priated pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B)
16 shall remain available until expended.

17 (f) STRATEGIC PLANNING REPORT.—Not later than
18 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
19 Secretary of State and the working group shall submit a
20 classified report to the appropriate committees of Con-
21 gress that—

22 (1) describes the Federal Government’s plan to
23 bolster and increase the availability of Great Fire-
24 wall circumvention and internet freedom technology
25 in Hong Kong during fiscal year 2022;

1 (2) outlines a plan for—

2 (A) supporting the preservation of an
3 open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet
4 in Hong Kong;

5 (B) increasing the supply of the technology
6 referred to in paragraph (1);

7 (C) accelerating the dissemination of such
8 technology;

9 (D) promoting the availability of internet
10 freedom in Hong Kong;

11 (E) utilizing presently-available tools in the
12 existing relevant portfolios for further use in
13 the unique context of Hong Kong;

14 (F) expanding the portfolio of tools in
15 order to diversify and strengthen the effective-
16 ness and resiliency of the circumvention efforts;

17 (G) providing training for high-risk groups
18 and individuals in Hong Kong; and

19 (H) detecting analyzing, and responding to
20 new and evolving censorship threats;

21 (3) includes a detailed description of the tech-
22 nical and fiscal steps necessary to safely implement
23 the plans referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2), in-
24 cluding an analysis of the market conditions in
25 Hong Kong;

1 (4) describes the Federal Government’s plans
2 for awarding grants to private organizations for the
3 purposes described in subsection (e)(1)(A);

4 (5) outlines the working group’s consultations
5 regarding the implementation of this section to en-
6 sure that all Federal efforts are aligned and well co-
7 ordinated; and

8 (6) outlines the Department of State’s strategy
9 to influence global internet legal standards at inter-
10 national organizations and multilateral fora.

11 **SEC. 310. ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY ON INTERNATIONAL**
12 **AGREEMENTS AND QUALIFYING NON-BIND-**
13 **ING INSTRUMENTS.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 112b of title 1, United
15 States Code, is amended—

16 (1) in the section heading, by striking “**trans-**
17 **mission to Congress**” and inserting “**trans-**
18 **parency provisions**”;

19 (2) by striking subsection (e);

20 (3) in subsection (a), by striking “The Sec-
21 retary” and all that follows through “notice from the
22 President.”;

23 (4) by redesignating subsection (a), as amended
24 by paragraph (2), as subsection (e);

1 (5) by inserting before subsection (b) the fol-
2 lowing:

3 “(a)(1) Not later than 5 business days after the date
4 on which the Secretary or an officer or employee of the
5 Department of State approves the negotiation or conclu-
6 sion of an international agreement or qualifying non-bind-
7 ing instrument, the Secretary, through the Legal Adviser
8 of the Department, shall provide written notice of such
9 approval to the appropriate congressional committees.

10 “(2) The written notice required by paragraph (1)
11 shall include the following:

12 “(A) A description of the intended scope, sub-
13 stance, form, and parties to or participants in the
14 international agreement or qualifying non-binding
15 instrument.

16 “(B) A description of the primary legal author-
17 ity that, in the view of the Secretary, provides au-
18 thorization for the negotiation, conclusion, or nego-
19 tiation and conclusion of the international agreement
20 or qualifying non-binding instrument. If multiple au-
21 thorities are relied upon, the Secretary may cite all
22 such authorities but shall identify a primary author-
23 ity. All citations to a treaty or statute shall include
24 the specific article or section and subsection ref-
25 erence whenever available and, if not available, shall

1 be as specific as possible. If the primary authority
2 relied upon is article II of the Constitution of the
3 United States, the Secretary shall explain the basis
4 for that reliance.

5 “(C) A statement of intended opportunities for
6 public comment on the proposed international agree-
7 ment or qualifying non-binding instrument and the
8 timing of such opportunities.

9 “(D) A statement describing any new or
10 amended statutory or regulatory authority antici-
11 pated to be required to fully implement the proposed
12 international agreement or qualifying non-binding
13 instrument.

14 “(3) The written notice required by paragraph (1)
15 and all information contained therein shall be provided in
16 unclassified form, unless the proposed text of the inter-
17 national agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument
18 that is the subject of the notification is classified.”;

19 (6) by striking subsection (b) and inserting the
20 following:

21 “(b)(1) Not later than 5 business days after the date
22 on which an international agreement or a qualifying non-
23 binding instrument is signed or otherwise concluded, the
24 Secretary shall transmit the text of the international

1 agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument to the ap-
2 propriate congressional committees.

3 “(2) The Secretary should simultaneously make the
4 text of the international agreement or qualifying non-bind-
5 ing instrument, and the notification required by subsection
6 (a), available to the public on the website of the Depart-
7 ment of State, unless such text or notification is classi-
8 fied.”;

9 (7) in subsection (c), in the first sentence, by
10 striking “of State”;

11 (8) by redesignating subsection (c) as sub-
12 section (h);

13 (9) by redesignating subsection (d) as sub-
14 section (k);

15 (10) by inserting after subsection (b) the fol-
16 lowing:

17 “(c)(1) Not later than 15 business days after the date
18 on which an international agreement enters into force or
19 a qualifying non-binding instrument becomes effective, the
20 Secretary shall make the text of the international agree-
21 ment or qualifying non-binding instrument and the notifi-
22 cation required by subsection (a) available to the public
23 on the website of the Department of State.

24 “(2) The requirement in paragraph (1)—

1 “(A) shall not apply to any text of the inter-
2 national agreement or qualifying non-binding instru-
3 ment that is classified; and

4 “(B) shall apply to any text of the international
5 agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument that
6 is unclassified.

7 “(d)(1) Not later than 5 business days after the date
8 on which any implementing material, whether binding or
9 non-binding, for an international agreement or qualifying
10 non-binding instrument, is concluded, the Secretary shall
11 submit such material to the appropriate congressional
12 committees.

13 “(2) Paragraph (1) shall apply—

14 “(A) with respect to an international agree-
15 ment, until the agreement is no longer in force; and

16 “(B) with respect to a qualifying non-binding
17 instrument, until the instrument is no longer effec-
18 tive.”;

19 (11) in subsection (e), as redesignated by para-
20 graph (4)—

21 (A) by inserting “or qualifying non-binding
22 instrument” after “international agreement”;
23 and

1 (B) by striking “shall transmit” and all
2 that follows and inserting the following:

3 “shall—

4 “(1) provide to the Secretary the text of such
5 agreement or non-binding instrument not later than
6 5 business days after the date on which such agree-
7 ment or non-binding instrument is signed or other-
8 wise concluded; and

9 “(2) on an ongoing basis, provide any imple-
10 menting material to the Secretary for transmittal to
11 Congress.”;

12 (12) by redesignating subsection (f) as sub-
13 section (l);

14 (13) by inserting after subsection (e) the fol-
15 lowing:

16 “(f)(1) Each department or agency of the United
17 States Government that enters into any international
18 agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument on behalf
19 of the United States shall designate a Chief International
20 Agreements Officer, who shall—

21 “(A) be selected from among employees of such
22 department or agency;

23 “(B) serve concurrently as the Chief Inter-
24 national Agreements Officer; and

1 “(C) subject to the authority of the head of
2 such department or agency, have department- or
3 agency-wide responsibility for efficient and appro-
4 priate compliance with this section.

5 “(2) The Chief International Agreements Officer of
6 the Department of State shall serve in the Office of the
7 Legal Adviser with the title of International Agreements
8 Compliance Officer.

9 “(g) Texts of oral international agreements and
10 qualifying non-binding instruments shall be reduced to
11 writing and subject to the requirements of subsections (a)
12 through (c).”;

13 (14) by inserting after subsection (h), as reded-
14 ignated by paragraph (8), the following:

15 “(i) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
16 amounts appropriated to the Department of State under
17 any law shall be available for obligation or expenditure to
18 conclude or implement or to support the conclusion or im-
19 plementation of (including through the use of personnel
20 or resources subject to the authority of a chief of mission)
21 an international agreement or qualifying non-binding in-
22 strument, other than to facilitate compliance with this sec-
23 tion, until the Secretary satisfies the substantive require-
24 ments in subsections (a) through (c) and subsection (f).

1 “(j)(1) Not less frequently than twice each year, the
2 Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct
3 an audit of the compliance of the Secretary with the re-
4 quirements of this section.

5 “(2) In any instance in which a failure by the Sec-
6 retary to comply with such requirements is due to the fail-
7 ure or refusal of another agency to provide information
8 or material to the Department of State, or the failure to
9 do so in a timely manner, the Comptroller General shall
10 engage such other agency to determine—

11 “(A) the cause and scope of such failure or re-
12 fusal;

13 “(B) the specific office or offices responsible for
14 such failure or refusal; and

15 “(C) penalties or other recommendations for
16 measures to ensure compliance with statutory re-
17 quirements.

18 “(3) The Comptroller General shall submit to the ap-
19 propriate congressional committees the results of each
20 audit required by paragraph (1).

21 “(4) The Comptroller General and the Secretary shall
22 make the results of each audit required by paragraph (1)
23 publicly available on the websites of the Government Ac-
24 countability Office and the Department of State, respec-
25 tively.”;

1 (15) in subsection (k), as redesignated by para-
2 graph (9)—

3 (A) in paragraph (1)—

4 (i) by striking “The Secretary of
5 State shall annually submit to Congress”
6 and inserting “Not later than February 1
7 of each year, the Secretary shall submit to
8 the appropriate congressional committees”;
9 and

10 (ii) by striking “an index of” and all
11 that follows and inserting the following: “a
12 list of—

13 “(A) all international agreements and quali-
14 fying non-binding instruments that were signed or
15 otherwise concluded, entered into force or otherwise
16 became effective, or that were modified or otherwise
17 amended during the preceding calendar year; and

18 “(B) for each agreement and instrument in-
19 cluded in the list under subparagraph (A)—

20 “(i) the dates of any action described in
21 such subparagraph;

22 “(ii) the title of the agreement or instru-
23 ment; and

24 “(iii) a summary of the agreement or in-
25 strument (including a description of the dura-

1 tion of activities under the agreement or instru-
2 ment and a description of the agreement or in-
3 strument).”;

4 (B) in paragraph (2), by striking “may be
5 submitted in classified form” and inserting
6 “shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
7 may include a classified annex”; and

8 (C) by adding at the end the following:

9 “(3)(A) The Secretary should make the report, except
10 for any classified annex, available to the public on the
11 website of the Department of State.

12 “(B) Not later than February 1 of each year, the Sec-
13 retary shall make available to the public on the website
14 of the Department of State each part of the report involv-
15 ing an international agreement or qualifying non-binding
16 instrument that entered into force or became effective dur-
17 ing the preceding calendar year, except for any classified
18 annex or information contained therein.”; and

19 (16) by adding after subsection (l), as redesis-
20 gnated by paragraph (12), the following:

21 “(m) There is authorized to be appropriated
22 \$1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026
23 for purposes of implementing the requirements of this sec-
24 tion.

25 “(n) In this section:

1 “(1) The term ‘appropriate congressional com-
2 mittees’ means—

3 “(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations
4 of the Senate; and

5 “(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
6 the House of Representatives.

7 “(2) The term ‘international agreement’ in-
8 cludes—

9 “(A) treaties that require the advice and
10 consent of the Senate, pursuant to article II of
11 the Constitution of the United States; and

12 “(B) other international agreements com-
13 monly referred to as ‘executive agreements’ for
14 purposes of Federal law, and which are not sub-
15 ject to the advice and consent of the Senate.

16 “(3) The term ‘qualifying non-binding instru-
17 ment’ means a non-binding instrument that—

18 “(A) is signed or otherwise concluded with
19 one or more foreign governments or inter-
20 national organizations; and

21 “(B)(i) has an important effect on the for-
22 eign policy of the United States; or

23 “(ii) is the subject of a written communica-
24 tion from the Chair or Ranking Member of ei-

1 ther of the appropriate congressional commit-
2 tees to the Secretary.

3 “(4) The term ‘Secretary’ means the Secretary
4 of State.

5 “(5) The term ‘text of the international agree-
6 ment or qualifying non-binding instrument’ includes
7 any annex, appendix, codicil, side agreement, imple-
8 menting material, document, or guidance, technical
9 or other understanding, and any related agreement
10 or non-binding instrument, whether entered into or
11 implemented prior to the entry into force of the
12 agreement or the effective date of the qualifying
13 non-binding instrument or to be entered into or im-
14 plemented in the future.”.

15 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections
16 at the beginning of chapter 2 of title 1, United States
17 Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section
18 112b and inserting the following:

 “112b. United States international agreements; transparency provisions.”.

19 (c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 317(h)(2)
20 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
21 195c(h)(2)) is amended by striking “Section 112b(c)” and
22 inserting “Section 112b(h)”.

1 **SEC. 311. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO-**
2 **TECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S**
3 **REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

4 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Amounts authorized to be appro-
5 priated or otherwise made available to carry out section
6 409 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative (Public Law 115–
7 409) include programs that prioritize the protection and
8 advancement of the freedoms of association, assembly, re-
9 ligious, and expression for women, human rights activists,
10 and ethnic and religious minorities in the People's Repub-
11 lic of China.

12 (b) **USE OF FUNDS.**—Amounts appropriated pursu-
13 ant to subsection (a) may be used to fund nongovern-
14 mental agencies within the Indo-Pacific region that are fo-
15 cused on the issues described in subsection (a).

16 (c) **CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.**—In carrying out
17 this section, the Assistant Secretary of Democracy,
18 Human Rights and Labor shall consult with the appro-
19 priate congressional committees and representatives of
20 civil society regarding—

21 (1) strengthening the capacity of the organiza-
22 tions referred to in subsection (b);

23 (2) protecting members of the groups referred
24 to in subsection (a) who have been targeted for ar-
25 rest, harassment, forced sterilizations, coercive abor-
26 tions, forced labor, or intimidation, including mem-

1 bers residing outside of the People’s Republic of
2 China; and

3 (3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest pos-
4 sible audiences within the People’s Republic of
5 China about United States Government efforts to
6 protect freedom of association, expression, assembly,
7 and the rights of ethnic minorities.

8 **SEC. 312. DIPLOMATIC BOYCOTT OF THE XXIV OLYMPIC**
9 **WINTER GAMES AND THE XIII PARALYMPIC**
10 **WINTER GAMES.**

11 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
12 of the United States—

13 (1) to implement a diplomatic boycott of the
14 XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the XIII
15 Paralympic Winter Games in the PRC; and

16 (2) to call for an end to the Chinese Communist
17 Party’s ongoing human rights abuses, including the
18 Uyghur genocide.

19 (b) FUNDING PROHIBITION.—

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other
21 provision of law, the Secretary of State may not obli-
22 gate or expend any Federal funds to support or fa-
23 cilitate the attendance of the XXIV Olympic Winter
24 Games or the XIII Paralympic Winter Games by
25 any employee of the United States Government.

1 (2) EXCEPTION.—Paragraph (1) shall not
2 apply to the obligation or expenditure of Federal
3 funds necessary—

4 (A) to support—

5 (i) the United States Olympic and
6 Paralympic Committee;

7 (ii) the national governing bodies of
8 amateur sports; or

9 (iii) athletes, employees, or contrac-
10 tors of the Olympic and Paralympic Com-
11 mittee or such national governing bodies;
12 or

13 (B) to provide consular services or security
14 to, or otherwise protect the health, safety, and
15 welfare of, United States persons, employees,
16 contractors, and their families.

17 (3) WAIVER.—The Secretary of State may
18 waive the applicability of paragraph (1) in a cir-
19 cumstance in which the Secretary determines a waiv-
20 er is the national interest.

1 **TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR**
2 **ECONOMIC STATECRAFT**

3 **SEC. 401. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING**
4 **THE PRC'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY.**

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
6 ings:

7 (1) The People's Republic of China, at the di-
8 rection of the Chinese Communist Party, is advanc-
9 ing an ecosystem of anticompetitive economic and
10 industrial policies that—

11 (A) distort global markets;

12 (B) limit innovation;

13 (C) unfairly advantage PRC firms at the
14 expense of the United States and other foreign
15 firms; and

16 (D) unfairly and harmfully prejudice con-
17 sumer choice.

18 (2) Of the extensive and systemic economic and
19 industrial policies pursued by the PRC, the mass
20 subsidization of PRC firms, intellectual property
21 theft, and forced technology transfer are among the
22 most damaging to the global economy.

23 (3) Through regulatory interventions and direct
24 financial subsidies, the CCP, for the purposes of ad-
25 vancing national political and economic objectives,

1 directs, coerces, and influences in anti-competitive
2 ways the commercial activities of firms that are di-
3 rected, financed, influenced, or otherwise controlled
4 by the state, including state-owned enterprises, and
5 ostensibly independent and private Chinese compa-
6 nies, such as technology firms in strategic sectors.

7 (4) The PRC Government, at the national and
8 subnational levels, grants special privileges or status
9 to certain PRC firms in key sectors designated as
10 strategic, such as telecommunications, oil, power,
11 aviation, banking, and semiconductors. Enterprises
12 receive special state preferences in the form of favor-
13 able loans, tax exemptions, and preferential land ac-
14 cess from the CCP.

15 (5) The subsidization of PRC companies, as de-
16 scribed in paragraphs (3) and (4)—

17 (A) enables these companies to sell goods
18 below market prices, allowing them to outbid
19 and crowd out market-based competitors and
20 thereby pursue global dominance of key sectors;

21 (B) distorts the global market economy by
22 undermining longstanding and generally accept-
23 ed market-based principles of fair competition,
24 leading to barriers to entry and forced exit from

1 the market for foreign or private firms, not only
2 in the PRC, but in markets around the world;

3 (C) creates government-sponsored or sup-
4 ported de facto monopolies, cartels, and other
5 anti-market arrangements in key sectors, lim-
6 iting or removing opportunities for other firms;
7 and

8 (D) leads to, as a result of the issues de-
9 scribed in paragraphs (A) through (C), declines
10 in profits and revenue needed by foreign and
11 private firms for research and development.

12 (6) The CCP incentivizes and empowers PRC
13 actors to steal critical technologies and trade secrets
14 from private and foreign competitors operating in
15 the PRC and around the world, particularly in areas
16 that the CCP has identified as critical to advancing
17 PRC objectives. The PRC, as directed by the CCP,
18 also continues to implement anti-competitive regula-
19 tions, policies, and practices that coerce the
20 handover of technology and other propriety or sen-
21 sitive data from foreign enterprises to domestic
22 firms in exchange for access to the PRC market.

23 (7) Companies in the United States and in for-
24 eign countries compete with state-subsidized PRC
25 companies that enjoy the protection and power of

1 the state in third-country markets around the world.
2 The advantages granted to PRC firms, combined
3 with significant restrictions to accessing the PRC
4 market itself, severely hamper the ability of United
5 States and foreign firms to compete, innovate, and
6 pursue the provision of best value to customers. The
7 result is an unbalanced playing field. Such an
8 unsustainable course, if not checked, will over time
9 lead to depressed competition around the world, re-
10 duced opportunity, and harm to both producers and
11 consumers.

12 (8) As stated in the United States Trade Rep-
13 resentative's investigation of the PRC's trade prac-
14 tices under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
15 (19 U.S.C. 2411), conducted in March 2018, "When
16 U.S. companies are deprived of fair returns on their
17 investment in IP, they are unable to achieve the
18 growth necessary to reinvest in innovation. In this
19 sense, China's technology transfer regime directly
20 burdens the innovation ecosystem that is an engine
21 of economic growth in the United States and simi-
22 larly-situated economies."

23 (9) In addition to forced technology described
24 in this subsection, the United States Trade Rep-
25 resentative's investigation of the PRC under section

1 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411) also
2 identified requirements that foreign firms license
3 products at less than market value, government-di-
4 rected and government-subsidized acquisition of sen-
5 sitive technology for strategic purposes, and cyber
6 theft as other key PRC technology and industrial
7 policies that are unreasonable and discriminatory.
8 These policies place at risk United States intellectual
9 property rights, innovation and technological devel-
10 opment, and jobs in dozens of industries.

11 (10) Other elements of the PRC's ecosystem of
12 industrial policies that harm innovation and distort
13 global markets include—

14 (A) advancement of policies that encourage
15 local production over imports;

16 (B) continuation of policies that favor
17 unique technical standards in use by PRC firms
18 rather than globally accepted standards, which
19 often force foreign firms to alter their products
20 and manufacturing chains to compete;

21 (C) requirements that foreign companies
22 disclose proprietary information to qualify for
23 the adoption of their standards for use in the
24 PRC domestic market; and

1 (D) maintenance of closed procurement
2 processes, which limit participation by foreign
3 firms, including by setting terms that require
4 such firms to use domestic suppliers, transfer
5 know-how to firms in the PRC, and disclose
6 proprietary information.

7 (11) The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and
8 associated industry-specific efforts under this initia-
9 tive, such as the Digital Silk Road, are key vectors
10 to advance the PRC's mercantilist policies and prac-
11 tices globally. The resulting challenges do not only
12 affect United States firms. As the European Cham-
13 ber of Commerce reported in a January 2020 report,
14 the combination of concessional lending to PRC
15 state-owned enterprises, nontransparent procure-
16 ment and bidding processes, closed digital standards,
17 and other factors severely limit European and other
18 participation in BRI and make "competition [with
19 PRC companies] in third-country markets extremely
20 challenging". This underscores a key objective of
21 BRI, which is to ensure the reliance of infrastruc-
22 ture, digital technologies, and other important goods
23 on PRC supply chains and technical standards.

24 (12) On January 9, 2021, the Ministry of Com-
25 merce of the PRC issued Order No. 1 of 2021, enti-

1 tled “Rules on Counteracting Unjustified
2 Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation
3 and other Measures”, which establishes a blocking
4 regime in response to foreign sanctions on Chinese
5 individuals and entities. That order allows the Gov-
6 ernment of the PRC to designate specific foreign
7 laws as “unjustified extraterritorial application of
8 foreign legislation” and to prohibit compliance with
9 such foreign laws.

10 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
11 gress that—

12 (1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket
13 economy like the PRC’s economy, which has cap-
14 tured such a large share of global economic ex-
15 change, are in many ways unprecedented and re-
16 quire sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term
17 focus and engagement;

18 (2) in order to truly address the most detri-
19 mental aspects of CCP-directed mercantilist eco-
20 nomic strategy, the United States must adopt poli-
21 cies that—

22 (A) expose the full scope and scale of intel-
23 lectual property theft and mass subsidization of
24 Chinese firms, and the resulting harm to the

1 United States, foreign markets, and the global
2 economy;

3 (B) ensure that PRC companies face costs
4 and consequences for anticompetitive behavior;

5 (C) provide options for affected United
6 States persons to address and respond to un-
7 reasonable and discriminatory CCP-directed in-
8 dustrial policies; and

9 (D) strengthen the protection of critical
10 technology and sensitive data, while still fos-
11 tering an environment that provides incentives
12 for innovation and competition;

13 (3) the United States must work with its allies
14 and partners through the Organization for Economic
15 Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World
16 Trade Organization, and other venues and fora—

17 (A) to reinforce long-standing generally ac-
18 cepted principles of fair competition and market
19 behavior and address the PRC's anticompetitive
20 economic and industrial policies that undermine
21 decades of global growth and innovation;

22 (B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted
23 the same treatment as that of a free-market
24 economy until it ceases the implementation of
25 laws, regulations, policies, and practices that

1 provide unfair advantage to PRC firms in fur-
2 therance of national objectives and impose un-
3 reasonable, discriminatory, and illegal burdens
4 on market-based international commerce; and

5 (C) to align policies with respect to curbing
6 state-directed subsidization of the private sec-
7 tor, such as advocating for global rules related
8 to transparency and adherence to notification
9 requirements, including through the efforts cur-
10 rently being advanced by the United States,
11 Japan, and the European Union;

12 (4) the United States and its allies and part-
13 ners must collaborate to provide incentives to their
14 respective companies to cooperate in areas such as—

15 (A) advocating for protection of intellectual
16 property rights in markets around the world;

17 (B) fostering open technical standards;
18 and

19 (C) increasing joint investments in over-
20 seas markets; and

21 (5) the United States should develop policies
22 that—

23 (A) insulate United States entities from
24 PRC pressure against complying with United
25 States laws;

1 (B) counter the potential impact of the
2 blocking regime of the PRC described in sub-
3 section (a)(12), including by working with allies
4 and partners of the United States and multilat-
5 eral institutions; and

6 (C) plan for future actions that the Gov-
7 ernment of the PRC may take to undermine the
8 lawful application of United States legal au-
9 thorities, including with respect to the use of
10 sanctions.

11 **SEC. 402. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST.**

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the
13 date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently
14 than annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of
15 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce,
16 the Attorney General, the United States Trade Represent-
17 ative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall cre-
18 ate a list (referred to in this section as the “intellectual
19 property violators list”) that identifies—

20 (1) all centrally administered state-owned enter-
21 prises incorporated in the People’s Republic of
22 China that have benefitted from—

23 (A) a significant act or series of acts of in-
24 tellectual property theft that subjected a United

1 States economic sector or particular company
2 incorporated in the United States to harm; or

3 (B) an act or government policy of involun-
4 tary or coerced technology transfer of intellec-
5 tual property ultimately owned by a company
6 incorporated in the United States; and

7 (2) any corporate officer of, or principal share-
8 holder with controlling interests in, an entity de-
9 scribed in paragraph (1).

10 (b) RULES FOR IDENTIFICATION.—To determine
11 whether there is a credible basis for determining that a
12 company should be included on the intellectual property
13 violators list, the Secretary of State, in coordination with
14 the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Rep-
15 resentative, and the Director of National Intelligence,
16 shall consider—

17 (1) any finding by a United States court that
18 the company has violated relevant United States
19 laws intended to protect intellectual property rights;
20 or

21 (2) substantial and credible information re-
22 ceived from any entity described in subsection (c) or
23 other interested persons.

24 (c) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out this section, the
25 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of

1 Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and
2 the Director of National Intelligence, may consult, as nec-
3 essary and appropriate, with—

4 (1) other Federal agencies, including inde-
5 pendent agencies;

6 (2) the private sector;

7 (3) civil society organizations with relevant ex-
8 pertise; and

9 (4) the Governments of Australia, Canada, the
10 European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South
11 Korea, and the United Kingdom.

12 (d) REPORT.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
14 publish, in the Federal Register, an annual report
15 that—

16 (A) lists the companies engaged in the ac-
17 tivities described in subsection (a)(1); and

18 (B) describes the circumstances sur-
19 rounding actions described in subsection (a)(2),
20 including any role of the PRC government;

21 (C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the
22 economic advantage derived by the companies
23 engaged in the activities described in subsection
24 (a)(1); and

1 (D) assesses whether each company en-
2 gaged in the activities described in subsection
3 (a)(1) is using or has used the stolen intellec-
4 tual property in commercial activity in Aus-
5 tralia, Canada, the European Union, Japan,
6 New Zealand, South Korea, the United King-
7 dom, or the United States.

8 (2) FORM.—The report published under para-
9 graph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a
10 classified annex.

11 (e) DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.—The Direc-
12 tor of National Intelligence may authorize the declassifica-
13 tion of information, as appropriate, to inform the contents
14 of the report published pursuant to subsection (d).

15 (f) REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT BUSINESS-CON-
16 FIDENTIAL INFORMATION.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and
18 the heads of all other Federal agencies involved in
19 the production of the intellectual property violators
20 list shall protect from disclosure any proprietary in-
21 formation submitted by a private sector participant
22 and marked as business-confidential information,
23 unless the party submitting the confidential business
24 information—

1 (A) had notice, at the time of submission,
2 that such information would be released by the
3 Secretary; or

4 (B) subsequently consents to the release of
5 such information.

6 (2) NONCONFIDENTIAL VERSION OF REPORT.—
7 If confidential business information is provided by a
8 private sector participant, a nonconfidential version
9 of the report under subsection (d) shall be published
10 in the Federal Register that summarizes or deletes,
11 if necessary, the confidential business information.

12 (3) TREATMENT AS TRADE SECRETS.—Propri-
13 etary information submitted by a private party
14 under this section—

15 (A) shall be considered to be trade secrets
16 and commercial or financial information (as de-
17 fined under section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United
18 States Code); and

19 (B) shall be exempt from disclosure with-
20 out the express approval of the private party.

21 **SEC. 403. GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF**
22 **CHINA SUBSIDIES LIST.**

23 (a) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date
24 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
25 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the

1 United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of
2 Commerce, shall publish an unclassified report in the Fed-
3 eral Register that identifies—

4 (1) subsidies provided by the PRC government
5 to enterprises in the PRC; and

6 (2) discriminatory treatment favoring enter-
7 prises in the PRC over foreign market participants.

8 (b) SUBSIDIES AND DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT
9 DESCRIBED.—In compiling the report under subsection
10 (a), the Secretary of State shall consider—

11 (1) regulatory and other policies enacted or pro-
12 moted by the PRC government that—

13 (A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in
14 the PRC at the expense of foreign market par-
15 ticipants;

16 (B) shield centrally administered, state-
17 owned enterprises from competition; or

18 (C) otherwise suppress market-based com-
19 petition;

20 (2) financial subsidies, including favorable lend-
21 ing terms, from or promoted by the PRC govern-
22 ment or centrally administered, state-owned enter-
23 prises that materially benefit PRC enterprises over
24 foreign market participants in contravention of gen-
25 erally accepted market principles; and

1 (3) any subsidy that meets the definition of
2 subsidy under article 1 of the Agreement on Sub-
3 sidies and Countervailing Measures referred to in
4 section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round Agree-
5 ments Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)).”.

6 (c) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State, in co-
7 ordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the United
8 States Trade Representative, may, as necessary and ap-
9 propriate, consult with—

10 (1) other Federal agencies, including inde-
11 pendent agencies;

12 (2) the private sector; and

13 (3) civil society organizations with relevant ex-
14 pertise.

15 **SEC. 404. COUNTERING FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
17 nation with the Attorney General, shall offer to provide
18 technical assistance to establish legislative and regulatory
19 frameworks to combat the bribery of foreign public offi-
20 cials consistent with the principles of the OECD Conven-
21 tion on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
22 International Business Transactions to the governments
23 of countries—

24 (1) that are partners of the United States;

1 eligible for assistance from the International Development
2 Association that request forbearance to respond to the
3 COVID–19 pandemic.

4 (b) DEBT RELIEF.—The Secretary of the Treasury,
5 in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall engage
6 with international financial institutions and other bilateral
7 official creditors to advance policy discussions on restruc-
8 turing, rescheduling, or canceling the sovereign debt of
9 countries eligible for assistance from the International De-
10 velopment Association, as necessary, to respond to the
11 COVID–19 pandemic.

12 (c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 45
13 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every
14 90 days thereafter until the end of the COVID–19 pan-
15 demic, as determined by the World Health Organization,
16 or until two years after the date of the enactment of this
17 Act, whichever is earlier, the Secretary of the Treasury,
18 in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit
19 to the committees specified in subsection (d) a report that
20 describes—

21 (1) actions that have been taken to advance
22 debt relief for countries eligible for assistance from
23 the International Development Association that re-
24 quest forbearance to respond to the COVID–19 pan-
25 demic in coordination with international financial in-

1 stitutions, the Group of 7 (G7), the Group of 20
2 (G20), Paris Club members, and the Institute of
3 International Finance;

4 (2) mechanisms that have been utilized and
5 mechanisms that are under consideration to provide
6 the debt relief described in paragraph (1);

7 (3) any United States policy concerns regarding
8 debt relief to specific countries;

9 (4) the balance and status of repayments on all
10 loans from the People's Republic of China to coun-
11 tries eligible for assistance from the International
12 Development Association, including—

13 (A) loans provided as part of the Belt and
14 Road Initiative of the People's Republic of
15 China;

16 (B) loans made by the Export-Import
17 Bank of China;

18 (C) loans made by the China Development
19 Bank; and

20 (D) loans made by the Asian Infrastruc-
21 ture Investment Bank; and

22 (5) the transparency measures established or
23 proposed to ensure that funds saved through the
24 debt relief described in paragraph (1) will be used
25 for activities—

1 (A) that respond to the health, economic,
2 and social consequences of the COVID–19 pan-
3 demic; and

4 (B) that are consistent with the interests
5 and values of the United States.

6 (d) COMMITTEES SPECIFIED.—The committees spec-
7 ified in this subsection are—

8 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
9 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
10 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;
11 and

12 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
13 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
14 Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

15 **SEC. 406. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE**
16 **GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS HONG**
17 **KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES**
18 **LAWS AND PROTECTIONS.**

19 Title III of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act
20 of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5731 et seq.) is amended by adding
21 at the end the following:

1 **“SEC. 303. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH**
2 **THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS**
3 **HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED**
4 **STATES LAWS AND PROTECTIONS.**

5 “(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after
6 the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary
7 of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
8 committees a report on the manner and extent to which
9 the Government of the People’s Republic of China uses
10 the status of Hong Kong to circumvent the laws and pro-
11 tections of the United States.

12 “(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection
13 (a) shall include the following:

14 “(1) In consultation with the Secretary of Com-
15 merce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
16 Director of National Intelligence—

17 “(A) an assessment of how the Govern-
18 ment of the People’s Republic of China uses
19 Hong Kong to circumvent United States export
20 controls; and

21 “(B) a list of all significant incidents in
22 which the Government of the People’s Republic
23 of China used Hong Kong to circumvent such
24 controls during the reporting period.

25 “(2) In consultation with the Secretary of the
26 Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce—

1 “(A) an assessment of how the Govern-
2 ment of the People’s Republic of China uses
3 Hong Kong to circumvent duties on merchan-
4 dise exported to the United States from the
5 People’s Republic of China; and

6 “(B) a list of all significant incidents in
7 which the Government of the People’s Republic
8 of China used Hong Kong to circumvent such
9 duties during the reporting period.

10 “(3) In consultation with the Secretary of the
11 Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and
12 the Director of National Intelligence—

13 “(A) an assessment of how the Govern-
14 ment of the People’s Republic of China uses
15 Hong Kong to circumvent sanctions imposed by
16 the United States or pursuant to multilateral
17 regimes; and

18 “(B) a list of all significant incidents in
19 which the Government of the People’s Republic
20 of China used Hong Kong to circumvent such
21 sanctions during the reporting period.

22 “(4) In consultation with the Secretary of
23 Homeland Security and the Director of National In-
24 telligence, an assessment of how the Government of
25 the People’s Republic of China uses formal or infor-

1 mal means to extradite or coercively move individ-
2 uals, including United States persons, from Hong
3 Kong to the People's Republic of China.

4 “(5) In consultation with the Secretary of De-
5 fense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the
6 Director of Homeland Security—

7 “(A) an assessment of how the intelligence,
8 security, and law enforcement agencies of the
9 Government of the People's Republic of China,
10 including the Ministry of State Security, the
11 Ministry of Public Security, and the People's
12 Armed Police, use the Hong Kong Security Bu-
13 reau and other security agencies in Hong Kong
14 to conduct espionage on foreign nationals, in-
15 cluding United States persons, conduct influ-
16 ence operations, or violate civil liberties guaran-
17 teed under the laws of Hong Kong; and

18 “(B) a list of all significant incidents of
19 such espionage, influence operations, or viola-
20 tions of civil liberties during the reporting pe-
21 riod.

22 “(c) FORM OF REPORT; AVAILABILITY.—

23 “(1) FORM.—The report required by subsection
24 (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
25 include a classified index.

1 “(2) AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion
2 of the report required by subsection (a) shall be
3 posted on a publicly available internet website of the
4 Department of State.

5 “(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

6 “(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
7 TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional com-
8 mittees’ means—

9 “(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
10 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
11 Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and
12 the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
13 Senate; and

14 “(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
15 the Committee on Financial Services, the Per-
16 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, and
17 the Committee on Ways and Means of the
18 House of Representatives.

19 “(2) FOREIGN NATIONAL.—The term ‘foreign
20 national’ means a person that is neither—

21 “(A) an individual who is a citizen or na-
22 tional of the People’s Republic of China; or

23 “(B) an entity organized under the laws of
24 the People’s Republic of China or of a jurisdic-
25 tion within the People’s Republic of China.

1 “(3) REPORTING PERIOD.—The term ‘reporting
2 period’ means the 5-year period preceding submis-
3 sion of the report required by subsection (a).

4 “(4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
5 ‘United States person’ means—

6 “(A) a United States citizen or an alien
7 lawfully admitted for permanent residence to
8 the United States; or

9 “(B) an entity organized under the laws of
10 the United States or of any jurisdiction within
11 the United States, including a foreign branch of
12 such an entity.”.

13 **SEC. 407. ANNUAL REVIEW ON THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE**
14 **COMPANIES IN UNITED STATES CAPITAL**
15 **MARKETS.**

16 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In
17 this section, the term “appropriate committees of Con-
18 gress” means—

19 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
20 Senate;

21 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
22 Senate;

23 (3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
24 Urban Affairs of the Senate;

1 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
2 House of Representatives;

3 (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
4 ligence of the House of Representatives; and

5 (6) the Committee on Financial Services of the
6 House of Representatives.

7 (b) REPORT.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
9 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
10 nually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Sec-
11 retary of State, in consultation with the Director of
12 National Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treas-
13 ury, shall submit an unclassified report to the appro-
14 priate committees of Congress that describes the
15 risks posed to the United States by the presence in
16 United States capital markets of companies incor-
17 porated in the PRC.

18 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report
19 required under paragraph (1) shall—

20 (A) identify companies incorporated in the
21 PRC that—

22 (i) are listed or traded on one or sev-
23 eral stock exchanges within the United
24 States, including over-the-counter market
25 and “A Shares” added to indexes and ex-

1 change-traded funds out of mainland ex-
2 changes in the PRC; and

3 (ii) based on the factors for consider-
4 ation described in paragraph (3), have
5 knowingly and materially contributed to—

6 (I) activities that undermine
7 United States national security;

8 (II) serious abuses of internation-
9 ally recognized human rights; or

10 (III) a substantially increased fi-
11 nancial risk exposure for United
12 States-based investors;

13 (B) describe the activities of the companies
14 identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and
15 their implications for the United States; and

16 (C) develop policy recommendations for the
17 United States Government, State governments,
18 United States financial institutions, United
19 States equity and debt exchanges, and other
20 relevant stakeholders to address the risks posed
21 by the presence in United States capital mar-
22 kets of the companies identified pursuant to
23 subparagraph (A).

24 (3) FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION.—In com-
25 pleting the report under paragraph (1), the Presi-

1 dent shall consider whether a company identified
2 pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)—

3 (A) has materially contributed to the devel-
4 opment or manufacture, or sold or facilitated
5 procurement by the PLA, of lethal military
6 equipment or component parts of such equip-
7 ment;

8 (B) has contributed to the construction
9 and militarization of features in the South
10 China Sea;

11 (C) has been sanctioned by the United
12 States or has been determined to have con-
13 ducted business with sanctioned entities;

14 (D) has engaged in an act or a series of
15 acts of intellectual property theft;

16 (E) has engaged in corporate or economic
17 espionage;

18 (F) has contributed to the proliferation of
19 nuclear or missile technology in violation of
20 United Nations Security Council resolutions or
21 United States sanctions;

22 (G) has contributed to the repression of re-
23 ligious and ethnic minorities within the PRC,
24 including in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re-
25 gion or Tibet Autonomous Region;

1 (H) has contributed to the development of
2 technologies that enable censorship directed or
3 directly supported by the PRC government;

4 (I) has failed to comply fully with Federal
5 securities laws (including required audits by the
6 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board)
7 and “material risk” disclosure requirements of
8 the Securities and Exchange Commission; or

9 (J) has contributed to other activities or
10 behavior determined to be relevant by the Presi-
11 dent.

12 (c) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub-
13 section (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
14 may include a classified annex.

15 (d) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified portion of the
16 report under subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to
17 the public online through relevant United States Govern-
18 ment websites.

19 **SEC. 408. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS.**

20 (a) PILOT PROGRAM.—Not later than 180 days after
21 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, act-
22 ing through the Secretary of State, shall develop and im-
23 plement a pilot program for the creation of deployable eco-
24 nomic defense response teams to help provide emergency
25 technical assistance and support to a country subjected

1 to the threat or use of coercive economic measures and
2 to play a liaison role between the legitimate government
3 of that country and the United States Government. Such
4 assistance and support may include the following activi-
5 ties:

6 (1) Reducing the partner country's vulnerability
7 to coercive economic measures.

8 (2) Minimizing the damage that such measures
9 by an adversary could cause to that country.

10 (3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral
11 contingency plans that may exist for responding to
12 the threat or use of such measures.

13 (4) In coordination with the partner country,
14 developing or improving plans and strategies by the
15 country for reducing vulnerabilities and improving
16 responses to such measures in the future.

17 (5) Assisting the partner country in dealing
18 with foreign sovereign investment in infrastructure
19 or related projects that may undermine the partner
20 country's sovereignty.

21 (6) Assisting the partner country in responding
22 to specific efforts from an adversary attempting to
23 employ economic coercion that undermines the part-
24 ner country's sovereignty, including efforts in the
25 cyber domain, such as efforts that undermine cyber-

1 security or digital security of the partner country or
2 initiatives that introduce digital technologies in a
3 manner that undermines freedom, security, and sov-
4 ereignty of the partner country.

5 (7) Otherwise providing direct and relevant
6 short-to-medium term economic or other assistance
7 from the United States and marshalling other re-
8 sources in support of effective responses to such
9 measures.

10 (b) INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT.—The pilot program
11 required by subsection (a) should include the following ele-
12 ments:

13 (1) Identification and designation of relevant
14 personnel within the United States Government with
15 expertise relevant to the objectives specified in sub-
16 section (a), including personnel in—

17 (A) the Department of State, for over-
18 seeing the economic defense response team’s ac-
19 tivities, engaging with the partner country gov-
20 ernment and other stakeholders, and other pur-
21 poses relevant to advancing the success of the
22 mission of the economic defense response team;

23 (B) the United States Agency for Inter-
24 national Development, for the purposes of pro-

1 viding technical, humanitarian, and other as-
2 sistance, generally;

3 (C) the Department of the Treasury, for
4 the purposes of providing advisory support and
5 assistance on all financial matters and fiscal
6 implications of the crisis at hand;

7 (D) the Department of Commerce, for the
8 purposes of providing economic analysis and as-
9 sistance in market development relevant to the
10 partner country's response to the crisis at hand,
11 technology security as appropriate, and other
12 matters that may be relevant;

13 (E) the Department of Energy, for the
14 purposes of providing advisory services and
15 technical assistance with respect to energy
16 needs as affected by the crisis at hand;

17 (F) the Department of Homeland Security,
18 for the purposes of providing assistance with re-
19 spect to digital and cybersecurity matters, and
20 assisting in the development of any contingency
21 plans referred to in paragraphs (3) and (6) of
22 subsection (a) as appropriate;

23 (G) the Department of Agriculture, for
24 providing advisory and other assistance with re-
25 spect to responding to coercive measures such

1 as arbitrary market closures that affect the
2 partner country's agricultural sector;

3 (H) the Office of the United States Trade
4 Representative with respect to providing sup-
5 port and guidance on trade and investment
6 matters; and

7 (I) other Federal departments and agen-
8 cies as determined by the President.

9 (2) Negotiation of memoranda of under-
10 standing, where appropriate, with other United
11 States Government components for the provision of
12 any relevant participating or detailed non-Depart-
13 ment of State personnel identified under paragraph
14 (1).

15 (3) Negotiation of contracts, as appropriate,
16 with private sector representatives or other individ-
17 uals with relevant expertise to advance the objectives
18 specified in subsection (a).

19 (4) Development within the United States Gov-
20 ernment of—

21 (A) appropriate training curricula for rel-
22 evant experts identified under paragraph (1)
23 and for United States diplomatic personnel in a
24 country actually or potentially threatened by co-
25 ercive economic measures;

1 (B) operational procedures and appropriate
2 protocols for the rapid assembly of such experts
3 into one or more teams for deployment to a
4 country actually or potentially threatened by co-
5 ercive economic measures; and

6 (C) procedures for ensuring appropriate
7 support for such teams when serving in a coun-
8 try actually or potentially threatened by coer-
9 cive economic measures, including, as applica-
10 ble, logistical assistance, office space, informa-
11 tion support, and communications.

12 (5) Negotiation with relevant potential host
13 countries of procedures and methods for ensuring
14 the rapid and effective deployment of such teams,
15 and the establishment of appropriate liaison relation-
16 ships with local public and private sector officials
17 and entities.

18 (c) REPORTS REQUIRED .—

19 (1) REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT.—Upon estab-
20 lishment of the pilot program required by subsection
21 (a), the Secretary of State shall provide the appro-
22 priate committees of Congress with a detailed report
23 and briefing describing the pilot program, the major
24 elements of the program, the personnel and institu-
25 tions involved, and the degree to which the program

1 incorporates the elements described in subsection
2 (a).

3 (2) FOLLOW-UP REPORT.—Not later than one
4 year after the report required by paragraph (1), the
5 Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate com-
6 mittees of Congress with a detailed report and brief-
7 ing describing the operations over the previous year
8 of the pilot program established pursuant to sub-
9 section (a), as well as the Secretary’s assessment of
10 its performance and suitability for becoming a per-
11 manent program.

12 (3) FORM.—Each report required under this
13 subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form,
14 but may include a classified annex.

15 (d) DECLARATION OF AN ECONOMIC CRISIS RE-
16 QUIRED.—

17 (1) NOTIFICATION.—The President may acti-
18 vate an economic defense response team for a period
19 of 180 days under the authorities of this section to
20 assist a partner country in responding to an unusual
21 and extraordinary economic coercive threat by an
22 adversary of the United States upon the declaration
23 of a coercive economic emergency, together with no-
24 tification to the Committee on Foreign Relations of

1 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
2 the House of Representatives.

3 (2) EXTENSION AUTHORITY.—The President
4 may activate the response team for an additional
5 180 days upon the submission of a detailed analysis
6 to the committees described in paragraph (1) justi-
7 fying why the continued deployment of the economic
8 defense response team in response to the economic
9 emergency is in the national security interest of the
10 United States.

11 (e) SUNSET.—The authorities provided under this
12 section shall expire on December 31, 2026.

13 (f) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Neither the authority
14 to declare an economic crisis provided for in subsection
15 (d), nor the declaration of an economic crisis pursuant to
16 subsection (d), shall confer or be construed to confer any
17 authority, power, duty, or responsibility to the President
18 other than the authority to activate an economic defense
19 response team as described in this section.

20 (g) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
21 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
22 tees of Congress” means—

23 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
24 Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
25 fairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and

1 Transportation, the Committee on Energy and Nat-
2 ural Resources, the Committee on Agriculture, Nu-
3 trition, and Forestry, and the Committee on Finance
4 of the Senate; and

5 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
6 Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on
7 Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Agri-
8 culture, and the Committee on Ways and Means of
9 the House of Representatives.

10 **TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC**
11 **SECURITY**

12 **SEC. 501. FINDINGS ON STRATEGIC SECURITY AND ARMS**
13 **CONTROL.**

14 Congress makes the following findings:

15 (1) The United States and the PRC have both
16 made commitments to advancing strategic security
17 through enforceable arms control and non-prolifera-
18 tion agreements as states parties to the Treaty on
19 the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at
20 Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.

21 (2) The United States has long taken tangible
22 steps to seek effective, verifiable, and enforceable
23 arms control and non-proliferation agreements that
24 support United States and allied security by—

1 (A) controlling the spread of nuclear mate-
2 rials and technology;

3 (B) placing limits on the production, stock-
4 piling, and deployment of nuclear weapons;

5 (C) decreasing misperception and mis-
6 calculation; and

7 (D) avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms
8 competition.

9 (3) In May 2019, Director of the Defense Intel-
10 ligence Agency Lieutenant General Robert Ashley
11 stated, “China is likely to at least double the size of
12 its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing
13 the most rapid expansion and diversification of its
14 nuclear arsenal in China’s history.”. The PLA is
15 building a full triad of modernized fixed and mobile
16 ground-based launchers and new capabilities for nu-
17 clear-armed bombers and submarine-launched bal-
18 listic missiles.

19 (4) In June 2020, the Department of State
20 raised concerns in its annual “Adherence to and
21 Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation,
22 and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments”
23 report to Congress that the PRC is not complying
24 with the “zero-yield” nuclear testing ban and ac-

1 cused the PRC of “blocking the flow of data from
2 the monitoring stations” in China.

3 (5) The Department of Defense 2020 Report on
4 Military and Security Developments Involving the
5 People’s Republic of China states that the PRC “in-
6 tends to increase peacetime readiness of its nuclear
7 forces by moving to a launch on warning posture
8 with an expanded silo-based force”.

9 (6) The Department of Defense report also
10 states that, over the next decade, the PRC’s nuclear
11 stockpile—currently estimated in the low 200s—is
12 projected to least double in size as the PRC expands
13 and modernizes its nuclear force.

14 (7) The PRC is conducting research on its first
15 potential early warning radar, with technical co-
16 operation from Russia. This radar could indicate
17 that the PRC is moving to a launch-on warning pos-
18 ture.

19 (8) The PRC plans to use its increasingly capa-
20 ble space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities
21 against United States early warning systems and
22 critical infrastructure in a crisis scenario. This poses
23 great risk to strategic security, as it could lead to
24 inadvertent escalation.

1 (9) The PRC's nuclear expansion comes as a
2 part of a massive modernization of the PLA which,
3 combined with the PLA's aggressive actions, has in-
4 creasingly destabilized the Indo-Pacific region.

5 (10) The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which
6 was elevated in 2015 to become a separate branch
7 within the PLA, has formed 11 new missile brigades
8 since May 2017, some of which are capable of both
9 conventional and nuclear strikes. Unlike the United
10 States, which separates its conventional strike and
11 nuclear capabilities, the PLARF appears to not only
12 co-locate conventional and nuclear forces, including
13 dual-use missiles like the DF-26, but to task the
14 same unit with both nuclear and conventional mis-
15 sions. Such intermingling could lead to inadvertent
16 escalation in a crisis. The United States Defense In-
17 telligence Agency determined in March 2020 that
18 the PLA tested more ballistic missiles than the rest
19 of the world combined in 2019.

20 (11) A January 2021 report from the Institute
21 for Defense Analysis found that many United States
22 and international observers viewed China's no first-
23 use policy with skepticism, especially in the wake of
24 the expansion and modernization of its nuclear capa-
25 bilities.

1 (12) The long-planned United States nuclear
2 modernization program will not increase the United
3 States nuclear weapons stockpile, predates China's
4 conventional military and nuclear expansion, and is
5 not an arms race against China.

6 (13) The United States extended nuclear deter-
7 rence—

8 (A) provides critical strategic security
9 around the world;

10 (B) is an essential element of United
11 States military alliances; and

12 (C) serves a vital non-proliferation func-
13 tion.

14 (14) As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-
15 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Wash-
16 ington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, the PRC
17 is obligated under Article Six of the treaty to pursue
18 arms control negotiations in good faith.

19 (15) The United States has, on numerous occa-
20 sions, called on the PRC to participate in strategic
21 arms control negotiations, but the PRC has thus far
22 declined.

23 (16) The Governments of Japan, the United
24 Kingdom, Poland, Slovenia, Denmark, Norway, Lat-
25 via, Lithuania, Estonia, the Netherlands, Romania,

1 Austria, Montenegro, Ukraine, Slovakia, Spain,
2 North Macedonia, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Cro-
3 atia, and Albania, as well as the Deputy Secretary
4 General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
5 have all encouraged the PRC to join arms control
6 discussions.

7 **SEC. 502. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIA-**
8 **LOGUE.**

9 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
10 United States—

11 (1) to pursue, in coordination with United
12 States allies, arms control negotiations and sus-
13 tained and regular engagement with the PRC—

14 (A) to enhance understanding of each oth-
15 er's respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and ca-
16 pabilities;

17 (B) to improve transparency; and

18 (C) to help manage the risks of miscalcula-
19 tion and misperception;

20 (2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Gov-
21 ernment of the People's Republic of China on rel-
22 evant bilateral issues that lays the groundwork for
23 bringing the People's Republic of China into an
24 arms control framework, including—

1 (A) fostering bilateral dialogue on arms
2 control leading to the convening of bilateral
3 strategic security talks;

4 (B) negotiating norms for outer space;

5 (C) developing pre-launch notification re-
6 gimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation;
7 and

8 (D) expanding lines of communication be-
9 tween both governments for the purposes of re-
10 ducing the risks of conventional war and in-
11 creasing transparency;

12 (3) to pursue relevant capabilities in coordina-
13 tion with our allies and partners to ensure the secu-
14 rity of United States and allied interests in the face
15 of the PRC's military modernization and expansion,
16 including—

17 (A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic
18 missiles;

19 (B) integrated air and missile defense;

20 (C) hypersonic missiles;

21 (D) intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
22 naissance;

23 (E) space-based capabilities;

24 (F) cyber capabilities; and

1 (G) command, control, and communica-
2 tions;

3 (4) to maintain sufficient force structure, pos-
4 ture, and capabilities to provide extended nuclear de-
5 terrence to United States allies and partners;

6 (5) to maintain appropriate missile defense ca-
7 pabilities to protect against threats to the United
8 States homeland and our forces across the theater
9 from rogue intercontinental ballistic missiles from
10 the Indo-Pacific region; and

11 (6) to ensure that the United States declaratory
12 policy reflects the requirements of extended deter-
13 rence, to both assure allies and to preserve its non-
14 proliferation benefits.

15 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
16 gress that—

17 (1) in the midst of growing competition between
18 the United States and the PRC, it is in the interest
19 of both nations to cooperate in reducing risks of con-
20 ventional and nuclear escalation;

21 (2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other
22 PLA attack on United States early warning sat-
23 ellites, other portions of the nuclear command and
24 control enterprise, or critical infrastructure poses a
25 high risk to inadvertent but rapid escalation;

1 (3) the United States and its allies should pro-
2 mote international norms on military operations in
3 space, the employment of cyber capabilities, and the
4 military use of artificial intelligence, as an element
5 of risk reduction regarding nuclear command and
6 control; and

7 (4) United States allies and partners should
8 share the burden of promoting and protecting such
9 norms by voting against the PRC's proposals re-
10 garding the weaponization of space, highlighting un-
11 safe behavior by the PRC that violates international
12 norms, such as in rendezvous and proximity oper-
13 ations, and promoting responsible behavior in space
14 and all other domains.

15 **SEC. 503. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO EN-**
16 **GAGE THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON**
17 **NUCLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE**
18 **ISSUES.**

19 (a) REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES-
20 CHINA ARMS CONTROL.—Not later than 180 days after
21 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
22 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and
23 the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate
24 committees of Congress a report, and if necessary a sepa-
25 rate classified annex, that examines the approaches and

1 strategic effects of engaging the Government of the Peo-
2 ple's Republic of China on arms control and risk reduc-
3 tion, including—

4 (1) areas of potential dialogue between the Gov-
5 ernments of the United States and the People's Re-
6 public of China, including on ballistic, hypersonic
7 glide, and cruise missiles, conventional forces, nu-
8 clear, space, and cyberspace issues, as well as other
9 new strategic domains, which could reduce the likeli-
10 hood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to
11 occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the
12 Indo-Pacific;

13 (2) how the United States Government can
14 incentivize the Government of the People's Republic
15 of China to engage in a constructive arms control
16 dialogue;

17 (3) identifying strategic military capabilities of
18 the People's Republic of China that the United
19 States Government is most concerned about and how
20 limiting these capabilities may benefit United States
21 and allied security interests;

22 (4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control
23 nuclear, conventional, and unconventional military
24 escalation between the United States and the Peo-
25 ple's Republic of China;

1 (5) the personnel and expertise required to ef-
2 fectively engage the People's Republic of China in
3 strategic stability and arms control dialogues; and

4 (6) opportunities and methods to encourage
5 transparency from the People's Republic of China.

6 (b) REPORT ON ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH THE
7 RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
8 CHINA.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the
9 enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consulta-
10 tion with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
11 Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of
12 Congress a report that describes—

13 (1) a concrete plan for arms control talks that
14 includes both the People's Republic of China and the
15 Russian Federation;

16 (2) if a trilateral arms control dialogue does not
17 arise, what alternative plans the Department of
18 State envisages for ensuring the security of the
19 United States and its allies security from Russian
20 and Chinese nuclear weapons;

21 (3) effects on the credibility of United States
22 extended deterrence assurances to allies and part-
23 ners if the United States is faced with two nuclear-
24 armed peer competitors and any likely corresponding
25 implications for regional security architectures;

1 (4) efforts at engaging the People’s Republic of
2 China to join arms control talks, whether on a bilat-
3 eral or multilateral basis; and

4 (5) the interest level of the Government of
5 China in joining arms control talks, whether on a bi-
6 lateral or multilateral basis.

7 (c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
8 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
9 tees of Congress” means—

10 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
11 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee
12 on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate;
13 and

14 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
15 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee
16 on Energy and Commerce of the House of Rep-
17 resentatives.