

**DARFUR REVISITED:
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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CONTENTS

	Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware	14
Prepared statement	14
Jones, General James L. Jr., USMC, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium ..	34
Lugar, Hon. Richard, U.S. Senator from Indiana	1
Zoellick, Hon. Robert B., Deputy Secretary, Department of State	3

APPENDIXES

Appendix I.—Prepared Statement of The Honorable Robert B. Zoellick	47
Appendix II.—Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Members of the Committee to Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick	61
Appendix III.—Prepared Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC, Com- mander, United States European Command	72
Appendix IV.—Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Members of the Committee to General James L. Jones, Jr.	84

DARFUR REVISITED: THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 2005

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in Room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, the Hon. Richard G. Lugar, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Sununu, Biden, Dodd, Feingold and Obama.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will be called to order.

The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to continue our examination of the crisis in Sudan. Our committee has been deeply interested in this issue. On July 22, 2004, Congress passed Senate Con. Res. 133, which declared the policies of the government of Sudan in the Darfur region to be genocide. A year ago this month, we invited former Secretary of State Colin Powell to testify before our committee on Sudan. At that hearing, he voiced the U.S. Government's conclusion that genocide was indeed occurring. Then in December, Congress passed the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, which I introduced with Senator Biden.

Our hope has been that the United States would maintain a strong leadership role in organizing and implementing the international response to the crisis in Sudan. In fact, the United States has provided diplomatic, economic, military, and humanitarian assistance that has mitigated the genocide, but not eliminated it. Compared with a year ago, casualty rates in Darfur have fallen significantly and humanitarian assistance is reaching displaced persons with greater consistency. In addition, largely through the work of former Presidential Envoy to Sudan and United States Ambassador, John Danforth, the United States helped broker the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the north and the south, signed January 9, 2005.

But despite this progress, millions of Sudanese still suffer in precarious circumstances, threatened by violence, hunger, and disease. Moreover, some U.S. diplomatic and economic initiatives to influence the actions of the Government of Sudan on Darfur continue

to be stymied by countries pursuing economic or political advantage.

The Darfur crisis is complex, but it has not been sudden. It has gradually unfolded, providing ample opportunity for humanitarian action by the international community. Although many nations have responded, the resolve and unity of the international community have not been commensurate to the horrors of the crisis. Khartoum's status as an oil exporter, a major arms importer, and an Islamic government has diminished the appetite for decisive action in some foreign capitals. But neither economic interests, nor religious identification should trump responsible international actions in a case where genocidal policies are being conducted.

Today's hearing on Sudan is an opportunity to explore ways the United States can continue to lead the humanitarian and diplomatic response to the genocide in Darfur. An important part of an effective response is the consolidation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was concluded with significant U.S. leadership. That agreement was intended to have a moderating influence on the Sudanese government and its policies in Darfur. Thus far, there is little evidence of that.

The African Union has taken gradual but useful steps as a regional organization in responding to the crisis in Sudan, as well as elsewhere on the continent. With transportation help from NATO, the African Union force in Sudan is expected to reach 7,700 troops by the end of October. The African Union, however, has capacity and capability limitations. If it is to succeed fully, it must continue to integrate international planning, logistics, and technical assistance into its operations.

Today we look forward to learning the estimates of our witnesses about the effectiveness of the current mandate for the African Union and the prospects for an expansion of that mandate. We also expect to hear what further role the United Nations and NATO can play in assisting in Darfur security. It is clear that the civilian population and humanitarian groups must be better protected from attacks by militias and rebels.

I am encouraged by the stability following the recent tragic death of the First Vice President, Dr. John Garang, in a helicopter crash. An international investigation will report on the causes of that crash, but preliminary reports indicate that it probably was an accident. Dr. Garang was instrumental in concluding the peace agreement, and his successors must sustain his decades-long commitment to Sudan by building a durable peace that brings economic development.

We are pleased today to be joined by two good friends of the committee, who speak with knowledge and authority about United States efforts in Sudan. First we will hear from Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. He will discuss the overarching United States approach to peace and stability across Sudan.

The administration has stated unequivocally that a resolution in Darfur is essential if there is to be an improvement in relations with the Sudanese government. I am encouraged by Secretary Zoellick's personal engagement in Sudan and his naming of a special representative, Roger Winter, to help resolve the crisis in

Darfur. Even as we focus on Darfur, we must be cognizant that simmering disputes in the East and the South remain a threat to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

On our second panel, we will hear from General James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Under General Jones' leadership, EUCOM has established constructive ties with numerous African militaries and begun a process of improving regional cooperation. The North Atlantic Council tasked General Jones with supporting the efforts of the African Union in Sudan. He has skillfully applied NATO's airlift capacity and other technical assistance to the endeavor, and has worked with other international partners to ensure the delivery of security resources to the region. We are interested in the lessons learned through this mission, but also the opportunities that such assistance gives for mutually reinforcing the common goal of peace and stability. We are also eager to hear about EUCOM's role in building cooperative security in the region, such as in Chad.

I thank our distinguished witnesses for coming this morning. We look forward to an insightful discussion on Sudan and Darfur.

As Senator Biden arrives and has an opportunity to look at his notes, I will recognize him for an opening statement. But at this time, I would like to call upon our first witness, the Honorable Robert Zoellick.

We appreciate very much your coming this morning. I understand that you have extensive testimony. And the committee will not have a time limit. We want to hear from you, and we appreciate your testimony. Please proceed.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT B. ZOELLICK, DEPUTY
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Secretary ZOELLICK. Thank you very much, Chairman, for inviting me. I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you and Senator Hagel, Senator Feingold, Senator Sununu. And it is always an honor to be working with General Jones, who has been an excellent partner on this.

I prepared a PowerPoint, which I thought might actually be a better way to go through some of this. So I hope you have it in front of you.

Let me just start on the first page, or page two. I have given you a map of Sudan. And the key aspect to take away, as many Americans are unaware, this is the largest country on the continent. It has nine neighbors in Africa, which suggests why you have such a strong regional interest of what goes on.

Now the next page sets out the goals of U.S. policy. I always think it is useful to be clear about what one is trying to accomplish. And it certainly enables you to help assess our performance.

First, the goal of a unified peaceful Sudan that would contribute to regional development and also cooperate with us on counterterrorism. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that means the key and full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accord that Senator Danforth did so much to accomplish to deal with the North-South strife.

But another important element will be economic development throughout all of Sudan, because part of the precursors of this problem has been the recurring cycle of famine and suffering that leads to cross border violence and refugee flows. We also want to have Sudan be a constructive participant in African in international affairs and to strengthen our counterterrorism cooperation.

Second, to achieve this overall goal, we need to follow through on the Government of National Unity that was created by the CPA, make sure it is responsive to the needs of all of Sudan's people and accountable to them through free and fair elections.

The device for this is, again, the follow-through under the CPA to have local, regional, and national elections in the four years. But equally important is building the capacity of the southern Sudanese government, because they will need this to be able to participate effectively in a federalized Sudan.

Third, an end to the violence in Darfur, which needs to lead to a reconciliation among the various tribal groups, eventually the voluntary return of people to their homes, and accountability for the perpetrators. At this point, our focus has been on humanitarian care, expanding the security network for civilians in Darfur and Chad through the security operations with also the tremendous help of the NGOs and the international observers. I have had three opportunities to visit Darfur over the past few months. The people on the ground there are doing tremendous things under extremely difficult conditions.

Fourth, and this relates to your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, at the same time, I think we can do these things in ways that strengthen the African Union's capacity to provide basic security, ensure humanitarian access, mediate political conflicts, and build from what we hope will be a success for them in Darfur and Sudan.

And fifth, to demonstrate strong U.S. support for peaceful development in democracy in all of Africa.

Now I am going to outline how we want to try to accomplish these goals. But looking at page four I want to just touch on a little bit of brief history, because I have found that in trying to understand the problems today, it is very critical to have a sense of some of the background.

Sudan as a country has been marked by ethno-religious exclusivism since Khartoum traders and mercenaries first tried to carve out a state through conquest in the Nile Valley in the 19th century. Historically, it has been dominated by a very small clique of traders, soldiers, and administrators. They tend to be drawn from three tribes that are north of Khartoum. This is an important point. Their orientation historically is toward the Arab world. So it is to Cairo, Damascus, Saudi Arabia.

So, in effect, Khartoum has been an Arab metropolis that has been surrounded by impoverished sub-Saharan expanses. In the South, you have a traditional African tribal structure, animist and Christian communities. In the West, in Darfur, you have a mixing of Arab and African tribes, which have come over the centuries in waves. Some of these people are actually connected to the Berbers in Morocco, because there have been long migrations for either reli-

gious or trade purposes. There are links to ancient Saharan peoples, Arab tribes from the North.

A point that I note is that this has led to a very complex mixture of nomads and farmers that has created an economic condition that is very dependent on a rain-fed boom and bust agriculture and grasses. This can create, and has created, an instability in the past. And frankly, Mr. Chairman, in addition to the Peace Accord that we are trying to achieve in Abuja right now, it would need to be combined, in my view, with a serious development effort so as to try to avoid the frictions of the past breaking out again.

In the North, you have a mixture of Arab tribes that predominate in urban areas. In the East, there has been generally an egalitarian, pastoral group, the Beja that has ancestral ties to Egypt.

Now in the past, until 1989, the way that Sudan was run was you had a very weak center in Khartoum that coopted these constituencies in the regions to create a power base. Indeed, there was an independent sultanate or the Fur dating back to the 17th century that was overthrown by the British in 1916. Indeed, the name Darfur comes from homeland of the Fur, because that was the key tribe there.

As many of you know, the history of British colonialism was an indirect rule system. So what the British did was they replaced this structure with an imperial native administration. They awarded homelands to paramount chiefs. And in doing so, they displaced this older, more fluid social order. And a key point, again, for the current conflict is that some of the nomadic groups did not get lands, because they were not settled agriculturists. This has set a long fuse for the future.

The nature of this rule depended on the effectiveness of local leadership in government. There was a very fascinating device by which they used tribal conferences among these mixtures to try to settled disputes. And I think this will be something that is important in the peace process in the future.

Sudan itself achieves independence in 1956. If you turn to page six, you will see this leads to the roots of the present-day conflict. Given this history, you have a very strong resentment on the periphery of the Muslim Arab domination in the center. And the southern groups really start to struggle at the same time of independence in 1956. There is a peace agreement in 1972 that fails because it was not fully implemented, a caution for all of us today. The government of Sudan tries to impose Shari'a Law in 1983. This resumes the civil war under the leadership of the late Dr. John Garang, a southerner who had been integrated into the army and, as some of you know, studied in the United States, got his doctorate at, I think, Iowa State or University of Iowa in agriculture and economics.

This also is the first use of a counterinsurgency tactic that you are going to see repeated, which is the government starts to mobilize militias, drawing with a sense of cruel irony here from the Darfur region of cattle-herding Arabs to lead their counterinsurgency strategy in the South. It is a very basic strategy, and it is a cruel one. It relies on brutality, starvation, and robbery to wipe out the locals. There is an estimated two-and-a-half-million

people that died in that conflict, which stretches across 21 years. And there are millions more displaced internally and externally.

Around the same time—and this is an important point to recognize—Darfur starts to have its first conflict, again, in the mid-eighties. It is based on the economic conditions. There is a drought and famine. There is a breakdown in migration. And at the same time, as I know many of you, particularly the Chairman will recall, this is the era in which Quaddafi was trying to move into Chad. So he tries to use this region as a backdoor into Chad.

For the first time in this mixture—remember, Darfur is all Muslim. It is not like the Christian South—he starts to divide the societies by creating an Islamic legion and comes up with a racial ideology of Arabism that plays into the present conflict.

In 1989, General Bashir overthrows the government, establishes the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation to rule over Sudan. The National Islamic Front is led by Dr. Turabi, who takes over as the leading party.

In the late Seventies to early Nineties, you have a hyperinflation that wipes out the middle class. Turabi is the leader of the vicious war in the South. At the same time, he is actually reaching out to Darfur, trying to bring in some of the less-accepted Muslim communities, but he does not have a real effect in terms of development.

In 1992, there is a declaration of Jihad in Kordofan against the SPLA. This is the southern group leading in the Nuba Mountains rebellion. It is a failure to create an Islamic state through force. In 1998, again, the strategy of army, militias, and starvation in the oilfield zones of Upper Nile province in southern Sudan is utilized.

During the nineties, Turabi hosts Osama bin Laden. With the United States attack in 1998, we see the start of a rethinking on the part of Bashir with Turabi. In 1999, there is a split in Khartoum. As a result, Bashir arrests Turabi.

On the top of page eight is the introduction to the effort that the United States launched under Senator Danforth in 2001 for a peace initiative. At this time, the focus is primarily on the North-South conflict. After September 11, the government of Sudan recognizes the dangers that it sees. Bashir is fearful of his associations with Osama bin Laden and the terrorists. He also realizes he cannot defeat Garang and the SPLM militarily.

So the context for the CPA agreement, and I think this is very important as we look to the future, is really politics driven by exhaustion. The Khartoum government realizes it cannot beat Garang in the South. It is worn down by decades of war. It has had these ideological projects that have produced nothing. And this is combined with Senator Danforth and major U.S. and international pressure. This is what produces the North-South Accord that was signed in January of 2005.

But I stress this because in my view the result was based on cold calculation. This is not some epiphany. The leopard does not fundamentally change his spots. And as we go forward, it is important that, as we consider the use of pressure and power, as well as incentives, that we keep that in mind.

The CPA accomplishes something very important. It creates a new pattern of power sharing with the historical problem of geo-

graphically defined constituencies. It offers prospects of development. They are developing oil resources. So they start to realize there is an interest in getting linked in the international economy.

But outside Khartoum, and this is again the issue that we struggle with today, there are two impulses. There is an impulse for equality, which you can implement through the CPA Accord, and emancipation. But that pulls people in the opposite direction. So should the peripheries try to win the strongest possible representation from the center or should they try to break away? This remains the fundamental question of Sudan.

On page nine I point out that even as you have this negotiation going on with the North-South Accord, Khartoum's old habits and fears of separation are also intentioned. In 2002, some Darfurians start to complain about Arab militia harassment. The problem festers. Some of the rebels attack a police station in 2003. So even as Khartoum is negotiating with the South, it unleashes an army and this brutal counterinsurgency strategy in Darfur in 2003.

We also suspect that some of the people in Khartoum felt that the negotiators in the North-South Accord were giving away too much. So you have this terrible sequence of loss of life, wide-spread rape, and destruction of villages. Over two million people are forced from their homelands. The violence is carried out by a combination of government forces, Arab militia, and the rebel groups. And the ties are not separate from the relationship in the South. Some of the rebel groups, the SLA, has some ties with the SPLM in the South. In this context, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. found that genocide occurred on September 9, 2004.

The U.N. then conducted an investigation. They came to a slightly different conclusion. They came to crimes against humanity, but they said that this was basically a definitional issue. They had a statement that it was similar in its effect to genocide.

But the other point about this is that, in addition to the North-South and Darfur, one has to be alert to is that there are dangers elsewhere in Sudan, the eastern provinces, as well as in Kordofan. As I noted when I pointed at the map, there is a very strong African interest in this, not only because of their empathy for the people of Sudan, but they are worried about destabilization of nine neighbors and the breakup of states. Because as they look at their own colonial borders, the pattern of breakup of African states is not one that anyone wants to see.

It is also an opportunity to demonstrate the African Union's ability to deal with African problems. And this goes to one of your points, Mr. Chairman. As many of you know, there was an organization called the OAU, the Organization of African Unity, until 2002. The Africans took what could turn out to be a very significant step in creating the African Union, which has a special political structure. It also has a structure to try to deal with some of these security issues.

It establishes among African countries "a right to intervene in international or regional conflicts." So this is an important precedent for Africans dealing with African problems.

On page ten, I just highlight the North-South Agreement, the CPA. It was begun in 2002, signed on January 9, 2005. I have

talked on occasion with Senator Danforth about his tremendous efforts to achieve this. And at heart, it tries to create a fair political relationship, where you have power and wealth sharing leading to national elections in four years. It has extraordinarily detailed implementation requirements—some 1,100 items one has to track in this process.

But among the key items, is a pre-interim period that was scheduled to be completed by July 9. That set up the Interim National Constitution. This in turn sets up a Government of National Unity for a six-year period, which was just recently formed. It establishes a new Institution of the Presidency, where Bashir is the president. The first vice president was from the SPLM, Dr. Garang, now Salva Kiir. Then the second vice president is Taha, the man who had negotiated with Garang the North-South Accord.

It has a bicameral national legislature that was just established. As I mentioned, on September 20 they announced the ministerial cabinet. It establishes the legal basis for the Government of southern Sudan. That is what is going on right now in southern Sudan—creating the legislature perhaps today and a constitution.

Then, it sets up a process for competitive elections, oil revenue sharing, joint integrated military units, and respect for human rights. The ongoing leverage for the South is they have an opt-out clause after six years.

Now as all this is happening, there is a terrible blow to the process in that Dr. Garang crashes on July 30. I was in Asia at the time, but I was very appreciative of the help of my colleagues. We sent out a team from the National Transportation Safety Board right away, which was important because, given the history of this conflict, you can imagine the stories that were starting to spread. There was communal violence that started to break out in Khartoum and Juba and other places. You mentioned Special Representative Roger Winter. He went out with our then Assistant Secretary for Africa, Connie Newman, promptly to try to calm things down.

They and the statements of Mrs. Garang, who is an extremely courageous person, Salva Kiir, who assumes Garang's post, frankly calms the situation down. But, and this is a point I want to stress, we are in a very sensitive moment because of this. Dr. Garang was a very strong leader in the system. So his organization, the SPLM, is now trying to work through how to set up a government of southern Sudan, how to be represented in Khartoum, how to help us in Darfur. And it is a point of some stretch.

I have had a chance to talk to Mr. Kiir a couple times by phone. I hope he will come actually to Washington in a month or two. And if he does, I hope he has a chance to meet with some of you. He is a military commander. He has not really had this kind of exposure. I think it is important that he have a chance to talk to the Congress, as well as the Executive Branch.

On the other hand, you also have a challenge for the people in Khartoum. They worked out this arrangement with Dr. Garang. And now they have a new set of players, and some of them may be tempted to overreach. This goes back to the point I made about the cold calculations.

There is another important issue, which is that Garang was the one figure in the South that really stood for a unified Sudan. And one of the questions will be whether his colleagues will remain committed to this position.

On page 12, I just highlight what I think is a potential critical issue, which is the connection of an upward or downward spiral. On the one hand, the Comprehensive Peace Accord does much more than settle the dispute between North and South. It actually creates a political and a constitutional framework for people to try to resolve the conflicts in Darfur and other regions.

We hope, as I mentioned, that the SPLM involvement in the Government of National Unity could help us resolve Darfur. I spoke yesterday to the new foreign minister of the Government of National Unity, who is from the SPLM, Lam Akol, about trying to work with us on these issues.

If we are successful, the backing that the United States and the rest of the world has shown for the North-South Accord, including financially, could create a positive incentive for these other regions to come to peaceful accords. So the upward spiral is the implementation of the CPA, a new Sudanese government, expanded AU mission on the ground, and reconciliation in Darfur all within this political framework.

But the point that I have made to people throughout the Sudanese political structure North and South is there is a potential downward spiral. If we cannot maintain peace and security in Darfur, improve the situation, and move to a peace process, the ability for us to support this new hopeful government is going to be severely undermined. That is the downward spiral.

On page 13, I just mention some of Darfur's needs. The basic part, of course, is always supplying food and basic necessities. You have some two million people that have been forced off their lands. And at the same time, you have the need to improve security outside the camps and inside the camps. But that is basically, for all the work that that requires, that is a holding action. It needs to be combined with a political reconciliation process, bringing together the government, the rebel groups, and various tribes. That is what is going on right now in Abuja, Nigeria, a peace negotiation.

As I have suggested, I think that is actually going to have to be combined, if they reach a peace accord on paper, with some efforts to deal with the economic and social issues that drove the conflict. The good news is that it has been a good rainy season. Some improvement in security and distribution of seeds suggests that we are going to have a better planting season in West Darfur and some of the other states. But the insecurity and limited access is still going to interfere with this harvest. So we are going to be needing to provide substantial food assistance throughout 2006.

One point of particular compliment here. When I go to Darfur, I talk not only with the NGO workers, but our AID teams. And they have done a fantastic job. These people, as I mentioned, are in extraordinarily difficult conditions. They are adapting to an environment that is still violent, still faces bandits, and, frankly, they have done some heroic work.

The United States, and this is something we can be proud of as a country, has provided 68 percent of the food delivered to Darfur in 2005. It is an issue I raised with our European and other colleagues. They are on the hook to do more, but it is something perhaps—I know many of you meet with Europeans—we could put on their screen a little bit more.

What you have seen at this point is some decline of harassment of some of the NGOs by the government, but the rebel harassment and banditry has increased.

The AU, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, is in the process of expanding its security forces. They are currently up to the 6,000 of the 7,700. We are extraordinarily pleased to have had help from NATO and the EU in terms of the transport, logistical, and planning support. Just to give you a little sense, since your opening statement suggested an interest in the multilateral diplomacy aspect, I first had a chance to talk about this with General Jones on an earlier trip I took and stopped in Brussels and spoke to the NAC ambassadors.

Secretary Rice also pressed to try to get NATO backing for this. As you know, the EU then said, well, we want to be part of it. And we said fine, let's all do it together. Then we had to get the African Union to ask for NATO's help. But, it is a good example of how NATO can adapt and change.

The deployment target for completion is October 2005. An important part is not to see this only as soldiers. One of the most critical operations is civilian police presence that is included in that. They are expanding, the African Union is expanding their operation in about 70 camps. And in particular—we will touch on this a little bit later—we put a particular emphasis on the safety of women. There are things that can be done inside the camps. We are going to do some things in terms of crisis centers to try to help.

It is of some significance, if you think about this history of a colonial area of Sudan, that we got them to accept the AU and the NATO presence. This is something that we want to continue to encourage. I was particularly pleased that the U.S. was able to form a partnership with the Rwandans, who frankly—I was just talking about this with General Jones—have been some of the better troops. They have been through a genocide. We have brought two of their three new battalions. I think over the next week or two we are going to bring their third battalion.

We have also provided, since the African Union mission began in 2004, about \$170 million of support. But this is an issue, just to alert you and appropriators, we may have to come back to as we go forward.

When Secretary Rice visited in July, she made a particular emphasis on trying to emphasize using the Trafficking in Persons Report to strengthen the efforts of women against such violence. We worked out an arrangement actually where we are going to put in additional resources, and the government of Sudan has also committed to a series of steps, some of which include reviewing their criminal procedures and investigations, these terrible reports that these women have made. We have asked them to send out senior

women leaders from Sudan to talk about this issue. We are trying to emphasize this is an overall part of the Darfur response.

In general in Darfur, what you have seen is the large-scale organized violence has substantially subsided. But the situation remains very fragile and dangerous. So you no longer have the government forces in major actions. And until about a week ago, you didn't have major rebel forces in actions. But you still have the Janjaweed and other militias undisbanded. They continue to contribute to the violence.

And you also have a situation—there are no angels in this part of the world—where the rebels are also grabbing cattle and trying to stop humanitarian supplies. Keep in mind that one of the rebel groups, the JEM, goes back in its links to Turabi, who was the prime minister, or was the leader who was deposed, who had the ties with Osama bin Laden.

What I am sure you have also noticed is that over the past week there has been an upsurge in violence. Roger Winter is in the region right now talking with the SLA leaders and the people in Khartoum about this. This is particularly dangerous. This is a tinderbox. And this is a place where you could imagine the cycle restarting.

Our best estimate is what has gone on is that some of the rebel leaders were positioning themselves for the negotiations in Abuja, because there are splits among the rebel groups. Frankly, one of the important messages that I want to send today and I hope you send is that no one should be engaging in violence. If people try to think this going to improve their negotiating position, it is going to undermine their position with us.

The progress in Abuja has started. It is very modest. There was a Declaration of Principles that was signed on July 5. The AU has done an important job in this. The man in charge of it is the former prime minister of Tanzania, Salim Salim. But as I mentioned, some infighting among the SLM rebels has impeded the talks. That is something we are actually working on these very days.

This is a classic issue where to work this, we have to get everybody pushing the rebel groups and the government to try to reach an accord in the framework of the CPA. So we are working with the U.N. special representative, the AU, and Europeans, Chadians, the Libyans have contributed, and the Egyptians. We have to put a common pressure on the parties.

We also have the follow-through on the U.N. resolutions on economic sanctions and accountability, because it is vital that there be a signal, particularly since it is dangerous that there is no impunity for crimes. The ICC began its investigations in June. The goal here is to provide a secure environment, and create an opportunity, as I suggested before, to tribal reconciliation, so people can return home in the start of 2006.

But this will be an ambitious tasking. To do this, one is then going to have to take on disarming the militias, the huge challenge of restarting life, which involves grazing rights and water issues, tribal tensions, and a series of the historical topics I mentioned before.

Now, on the CPA follow-through, there is the need to follow through on the financial support. I think in the letter you sent me, Mr. Chairman, you asked about some of this information. This was put together at an Oslo Donors Conference that I attended. There were some \$4.5 billion of pledges. I have given you an overview of the U.S. support. I talked with the Norwegian development minister, Hilda Johnson, who has done a very good job, and was in Washington recently. Unfortunately, the government—well, I do not want to complain about the new government—but the government in Oslo is changing, and she will no longer be in this position. Regardless, we need to work with the Norwegians and others on the follow-up on their pledges.

One of the U.N. resolutions was to put a U.N. peacekeeping mission in the South; and, again, to distinguish the AU mission in Darfur. I have noted the progress on that. There are about 2,500 people that have been deployed. We hope for the final deployment by the end of the year.

Then we have a major food issue, not only in Darfur but also in the South. And here, just as the United States has provided about 66 or 68 percent in Darfur, we have provided about 61 percent in the South.

The reason this is so important is you are now at a point where you have to show that peace works. If people go home and they cannot get food, you are going to have a hard time demonstrating that you have a new future for Sudan. We expect the harvest to be somewhat better. But you are talking about a couple million people that could be coming back. So we are working closely with AID on some basic packages to get them started.

Another issue that is very important is there has been a group in the far south called the Lord's Resistance Army that is led by a crackpot who basically requires kids to go do his killing for him. We have been working very closely with the Ugandans since this group has operated traditionally out of northern Uganda. President Museveni has been fighting the LRA. In the past, the government in Khartoum was supporting the LRA. They have withdrawn that support. Now it appears we have a situation where Khartoum, the SPLM, and the Ugandans are all pushing together on the Lord's Resistance Army. There is some evidence I have seen that they may have tried to flee to Congo. So we also have to press Congo on this.

I also mentioned at the start, though, it is very important we keep our eye on the formation of the government of Southern Sudan. I have been to Rumbek. I went on my first visit, which is in the south. It is pretty basic there. We are spending about \$20 million for programs to help set up this government and about \$17 million additionally on the security side.

We need to continue to push the Sudanese government on CPA implementation as well, because there are other groups. I mentioned at the start the Beja in the east, and there are some groups in the north. This is a centrifugal force problem. We have to try to urge them to continue to come to terms. And there has been some good news on that front.

We also have to focus on the formation of the Government of National Unity. As I mentioned, we had a team that arrived promptly after Dr. Garang's death. Salva Kiir and the SPLM have announced their support for the CPA. The process is moving forward. The New National Assembly, and President Bashir has made the positive statements. The new ministers are being named. And Jendayi Frazier, who is sitting behind me, our new Assistant Secretary for Africa, is going to go out in a couple weeks and try to meet the new government.

As I mentioned, previously, we also have to work with the government about returnees in the South. There are about two million people around Khartoum in IDP camps. Frankly, some of them have been forced out violently. Thus we have been trying to work with the Wali in Khartoum, as well as the national government to stop that.

There are some key issues that I see regarding the CPA implementation. We have had some delays resulting from Dr. Garang's death, but we need to keep pressure on the withdrawal of the Sudanese army from the South, because Juba will be the headquarters of the South. It is hard to build your headquarters if the other army is still there. That has started.

We have to put in place the key mechanisms of the CPA. And here the one I really want to stress is there is something called the Assessment Evaluation Commission, which is to have oversight over the whole process. That is one that I regularly pressed with my calls yesterday and others with Vice President Taha recently. That has to get in place and then some of these others, like the National Petroleum Commission, which will involve the resource sharing.

We need to have active SPLM engagement with the Government of National Unity. And my point here is, Dr. Garang did this. This is what he was about. But you have a new team here, and it is very important that they have their place at the table and that they use it. We need the parties and the powers in Khartoum to work seriously with the SPLM. There can be a temptation with some of these new players that they may try to work around them. There is a new advisory council been appointed for the president that looks suspiciously like a shadow cabinet.

And, as I mentioned, there are efforts against the Lord's Resistance Army. One other sensitive issue, just to alert you to it, given the problems in terms of some of the discussions of land territories, there was, as part of the CPA, a Boundary Commission for Abyei set up to determine the boundaries of this region. It was chaired actually by a former U.S. ambassador. It has come up with a finding. And it is going to be a very complicated implementation, but it needs to be implemented.

So finally, Mr. Chairman, in summary, as you can see, this is a problem that has lots of threads. And while many people focus on Darfur, what I am trying to do today is to emphasize, if you look at Darfur without looking at the North-South, you are not going to see the picture. We have to work on multiple transitions, from war to peace, from centralization to a genuine federalism, emergency problems to development, and military rule to democracy.

There is a chance for an upwards spiral, where these pieces could fit together, or there is a chance for a downward spiral. This is a classic multilateral diplomacy problem. We are working with the AU, the EU, Arab League, and a whole series of partners on other allies to make it work. I mentioned the trips that the Secretary and I have made. Given the importance of this issue, and since Roger Winter has been an active player in Sudan for some 25 years, and worked as part of AID in the President's first term, I asked him to be my special representative to give me additional support on the ground.

I know there is a strong interest in the Congress on this topic. I appreciate that because we are going to need more support as this process goes along, both in the messages that are sent and with the resources. I will just perhaps say the obvious. It is not going to be a smooth or clear-cut path. But I do think there is a pathway ahead.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to take your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zoellick can be found in the Appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Zoellick, for a very comprehensive briefing. We appreciate the preparation and likewise your own participation in all of this. And we are delighted that Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer is with you today. You mentioned her active participation.

I would like to call now on the distinguished Ranking Member of the committee, Senator Biden, for his opening comments.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE**

Senator BIDEN. I echo the Chairman's sentiment. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here. I think it is, to state the obvious, important that high-ranking officials are here and reporting directly. And we appreciate it.

I have an opening statement, which I apologize for not being here to give. I would ask unanimous consent that it be able to be placed in the record. And I will withhold it.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record in full.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this timely and important hearing. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here and for your tireless efforts in Sudan. It's also a pleasure to have General Jones with us today. In my experience, he is a man who doesn't see problems—he looks for solutions.

Last September, Secretary Powell released the findings of a State Department investigation which found that genocide was occurring in Darfur.

Now, here we are over a year later—and it is not clear to me that any of the fundamentals have changed for the vast majority of the 3.4 million people affected by the war in Darfur.

According to a leading Washington based NGO, as many as 400,000 people may have been killed as a result of the hostilities. Countless women have been raped, and continue to be the victim of sexual violence. Two million people are still displaced from their houses. The fragile cease-fire in Darfur seems to have disinte-

grated in the past month. Banditry has increased exponentially. The headlines coming out of Sudan over the past couple of weeks read “Darfur Risks Descending Into Anarchy,” and “Fresh Fighting in Darfur Threatens Peace Talks.” Just this morning, the BBC reports that U.N. Humanitarian Relief Coordinator Jan Egland is saying that violence in Darfur is so bad that the humanitarian relief effort could “all end tomorrow.”

I know there has been some movement. The July 5 agreement between Khartoum and rebels on a Declaration of Principles may provide a framework through which to handle further peace negotiations. With NATO’s help, the African Union has been able to deploy nearly 2,000 additional troops to Darfur, for a total of about 5,800. The death of John Garang did not result, as some feared, in the unraveling of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

But none of this progress has resulted in peace in Darfur. Instead, it seems to me that the situation in Darfur has changed from one in which clearly identifiable actors are engaged in straightforward hostilities into one in which there is persistent violence by people who are difficult to identify.

And I am not convinced we are doing all we can to stop the violence and create the conditions that allow people to go home. When I was on the Chad-Sudan border early this summer, an AU commander told me the AU lacks the mandate, the men and the material to really make a difference. Since then, NATO has stepped in to help deploy more AU forces. But I still think the AU would benefit from a small number of NATO troops on the ground to back them up. I believe that if NATO stood up to back the AU mission, the Janjaweed, the rebels, and the bandits would stand down.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is important that during this hearing we come to a mutual understanding of not only how to measure progress in Darfur, but more important, how exactly we should define success. What are the minimum conditions that must exist in Darfur before we can declare the AU mission a success? I want to be sure that we clarify this issue here today because I for one am very concerned that we are all beginning to suffer from “Darfur fatigue.”

What do I mean by that?

I mean that, with so many problems here at home after Katrina and Rita—not to mention Iraq—the American people understandably may want us to refocus our efforts and our resources. And we may have to make some strong arguments to convince them we cannot make our responsibilities at home and abroad a zero sum game.

I mean that we are becoming inured to the suffering of nearly two million people living in camps because the World Health Organization says that their overall health has improved.

I believe that we may mistakenly believe that current security conditions in Darfur are acceptable because while the Sudanese government is still sending military aircraft into Darfur for “observation,” at least they haven’t dropped bombs on civilians in a few months.

I mean that, in a state of exhaustion, we might come to believe that since less than 10-percent of nearly two million displaced people have risked their lives to go home to plant crops this year, they’re fine with the new status quo—and we should be, too.

So I hope that during your testimony Mr. Secretary you will clearly and specifically lay out what has to happen on the ground in Darfur for the administration to consider the situation resolved, and what exactly our policy is to get there.

Because no matter how tired we get, the people of Darfur are even more tired. They are tired, they are scared, and they are traumatized. And unlike all of us in this room, they do not get to turn the channel, or turn to page two, or wake up from the nightmare of their lives.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

Senator BIDEN. And when I get to my turn to question, I will fold in some of the observations I was about to make. And it is great to see General Jones here.

General, welcome.

The CHAIRMAN. We have good participation and obviously another important speaker later on. So the Chair will suggest an eight-minute limit for questions in a round. And hopefully this will give members a chance—

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, could I make a suggestion maybe?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator DODD. I find a lot of my questions will be for both General Jones and the Secretary. I wonder if we might hear from General Jones and then have the opportunity to—is that possible or what?

The CHAIRMAN. The jurisdictional problem here is that the Secretary is an official of the United States Government. And General Jones is wearing his NATO cap.

Senator DODD. You had better put it on, General. I did not recognize you this morning.

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. So, I do not want to draw too much from all of that. But the Chair wrestled with these problems and we have two panels.

Secretary Zoellick, you have asked for congressional support and resources. Can you give any more specific an idea of what would be desirable? You have given a very comprehensive briefing. It is dazzlingly complex. As you pointed out, moving circles intersect, and the dynamics are really uncertain. To say the least, this is very difficult for many of us on this committee, quite apart from our colleagues who do not have the opportunity to study this in the same way, to understand what the role of the United States ought to be beyond what you are doing diplomatically, in terms of money, appropriations or programs or of congressional participation.

Can you address this more specifically?

Secretary ZOELLICK. Mr. Chairman, I will give you an overview. And I am sure we could follow up with you and your staff in greater detail, if you wish. Part of the challenge in dealing with this issue in budget terms is, we put together our budgets for 2006 in the summer of 2004. Well, as you have seen, it is a little hard to preview some of these issues.

Now fortunately—and we have had excellent cooperation from AID on this—in areas like food supplies, there are various emergency accounts. There are accounts that are not just designed for Sudan but can be adjusted for various purposes. I would highlight for you a few areas.

One, we have discussed the African Union force. At the time that budgets were put together in the 2004 period for 2006, we were making an assumption that it might be a U.N. force in the west, as opposed to the African Union force. And as you know, it is a different peacekeeping account for U.N. than it is for general peacekeeping.

When this African Union force started to come in place, we worked out language that allowed us to take some money from the U.N. peacekeeping account, \$50 million, over the past months. But one issue will be what will be the ongoing needs of this African Union force.

A topic I have talked about with Senator Biden in other context is, there is some discussion about if at some point the African Union force will transition to a U.N. force. Then it becomes a question of that account. So one issue is the support for the peacekeeping arrangements.

A second is the humanitarian supplies. And again, as I noted in the tables at the back, we have some flexibility with AID and others about how we program some of these funds, depending on the food needs. But this is one we are going to have to watch together.

A third is, and I have already given you some sense the support we have given to the government of Southern Sudan. These are not necessarily large sums in terms of standing up. Remember, this is starting from scratch. I mean, we are helping them create a national bank. We are helping them create ministries, to list the use of just some of the funds that we have devoted to this endeavor.

Now one of the issues legally we are going to have to work on is that, as you know, we have imposed sanctions all over the place in dealing with Sudan. We found ourselves with our hands tied in helping with the new government of the South, given these sanctions. So this has been an issue we have already talked about with some people on the House side, that is to give us a bit more freedom to handle some issues in the South.

The last piece of it is what I have suggested to you—and I cannot go any further than really just put this on your screen—is if we are able to get a peace accord in Abuja—and Jan Pronk, the U.N. special representative, is pushing people to reach this by the end of the year. That is going to be ambitious, given these problems that I have described, but we may, I hope, make some further progress.

If we can create conditions for people to start to return home, the reason I perhaps gave you a little bit of the history here was because it is not just going to be words on paper, we are going to have to create conditions for people to actually make it and get a start again. That is going to require a more serious development effort. So that is more of the anticipatory area.

And the last part, Mr. Chairman, because I know many of you spend time with people around the world, as I do—this should not be only a U.S. show. You see, the United States is putting in about 68 percent of the food in Darfur and 61 percent for the country as a whole. As you know, there is a big debate about food aid that I read about on the trade side and, as you also know, the European Union wants to cut down our food aid. Well, I hope then they help supply some of the food aid here.

So, we need more help from some of the other players internationally. And I think that this is one of the benefits of kind of having multiple roles. I hit a lot of these people, but you can help him, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that give complete room for all the activities that are going on? There is no conflict currently that I know of within the Security Council. Is that right?

Secretary ZOELLICK. No. And in fact, the U.N. Security Council just extended the mandate of the southern forces to, I believe, March of next year. One of the issues that we need to discuss with the African Union is, you know, at some point what are their thoughts about melding their force with the U.N. peacekeeping force. Again, this is a point of some sensitivity. The African Union is justifiably proud of what they have accomplished.

As I pointed out, they have expanded their forces. They are not quite at the 7,700. And there is some discussion about trying to go to 12,000. I am not sure whether they really could identify the forces for this. This is a point that I know General Jones might talk about.

We have helped with transportation. We have helped with logistics. NATO ran a map planning exercise recently. From what I have seen on the ground, we can also—I mean, we as a group—Canadians, Europeans, others—can help is in terms of some of the operational performance. You have platoons and companies out there trying to play a role that is part military diplomacy, part peacekeeping.

It is an evolving role for them. And, frankly, they have gotten people wounded in the line of action. We have a lot of respect for what they have done. We also have to think again with them at what point does this transition into a broader U.N. force, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there peace with the neighbors of Sudan? Are there any difficulties with any of the neighbors fomenting trouble or taking advantage of the situation?

Secretary ZOELLICK. Yes. But it comes from different directions. Let us start in the Darfur where I know a number of you have interests. I think Senator Biden visited Chad. You have tribes that go across these areas. The president of Chad is a Zagawa. They are one of the key tribes along with the Fur and a couple others that are a key part of the strife.

I met with the foreign minister of Chad recently. Part of what we have done with the AU diplomacy and our bilateral diplomacy is to try to keep everybody on the same sheet of music. They are worried about destabilizing their own situation. The people of Chad have, at some high cost, taken some 200,000 of the refugees. I do not mean to highlight them as a problem. I am just saying that it is an issue of the instability.

I mentioned Uganda in the South with the Lord's Resistance Army. That is another key point. In the East, there are very sensitive relations with Eritrea and Ethiopia. Eritrea has had differences with the government in Khartoum. That has been from where some of the rebel groups have operated. A couple months ago, we had some concerns about whether the Beja, this group in the East I mentioned, was being stirred up by Eritrea. We have talked with the Eritreans. The fact that there are difficulties with Eritrea, Ethiopia, and with the border elsewhere makes this additionally complex.

But I guess what I would emphasize, Mr. Chairman, is, and your question draws this out, one reason I was trying to give people a sense of this is that to accomplish the diplomacy in this, you are working in a regional context. You have to do it. The good news so far in Darfur is from Libya to the United States people were pushing people to reach an accord. And we have to just keep that pressure up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for jumping in with both feet into this. I mean this sincerely. This is a travesty. I know you know it. You have seen it. A number of us have been there. And it is monumental.

Let me make one reference to my opening statement. I think that we have, to use an overused phrase up here on the Hill, a very narrow window here. The American people are about to suffer from fatigue here. The fact that there are two million displaced persons, the fact that there has been some ramping down of the genocidal activity, the fact that there is some progress being made, couple that with the incredible burden that the American people are feeling, as is everyone, including the President, of the loss of life in Iraq, the hundreds of billions of dollars total being expended, now another gosh-knows-how-much money for the Gulf States, and I am a little worried that we have not sorted out what resources will be needed.

You mention the need for congressional support and resources. I think that is going to have to be pretty targeted pretty quick, pretty soon, because, you know, we will hear not irrationally from our constituents that charity begins at home. This is a situation where progress has been made, but a lot more has to be done.

And so I would urge, to the extent that you can get a fix on what you think is going to be needed. In addition, perhaps not to answer now in the eight minutes I have, but in a written response, a pretty detailed assessment; if you can tell us, who else is in the game, what other countries are contributing, what European countries are doing beyond the NATO mission, it would be very helpful.

After I got back from visiting a refugee camp in Chad—the northernmost—about 15 kilometers from the border, I kept contact with a number of the NGOs that we ran into; to be precise about this, my staff has kept in contact. And they are acknowledging that on the ground that there has been some progress. But they are concerned that the lack of the physical capacity of the AU, the African Union, in terms of literally the weapons they carry, the logistical capability they have, is beginning to wear off a little bit in terms of people thinking that they had better be careful, because the AU may respond.

I have a number of questions for General Jones more specifically about what we do relative to the AU, what NATO does. But here is my concern. The mandate that the AU has and Khartoum's, how can I say it, acquiescence in that mandate seems to me to still be relatively narrow. And this transition, looking at a transition from African Union to U.N. control forces, I think is pretty dicey. But let me, with that background, ask this question: You seem to—and I am not disagreeing with you. I just want to make sure I understand it. You seem to be putting a lot of your hope and expectations on the North-South agreement succeeding in the sense that in Khartoum there is southern representation that has some political clout, that as a consequence of that, there will be a more rational policy coming out of Khartoum towards Darfur.

Is that correct? Am I connecting the dots?

Secretary ZOELLICK. That is one element, Senator, but there are other elements. I think the government of Sudan unleashed this

merciless campaign. They thought that they could wipe these guys out before everybody noticed. They were wrong. And that is why I said at one point, these are all cold, hardheaded calculations.

They have now realized that that is not in their own interest. So they pulled back their own forces. But the Janjaweed with their links to the government is still around. I think the key is that it won't only be the point that you properly identified I hope will help us, the presence of the southerners in the government, but also the work of the African Union negotiators in Abuja and all these other players I mentioned to Senator Lugar to put pressure on the rebel groups and the government to reach an accord.

At this point, Senator, one of the greatest difficulties we are dealing with is splits among the rebel groups. The government is at the table. And I do not mean to say that they are, you know, angels in the process. But they are ready to go. And, I do not only mean the difference between the SLM and the JEM, but within the SLM you have some different generations of leadership. And that is an issue we are working very hard right now.

Senator BIDEN. I met with some of those leaders. They came in. They came across the border from Sudan. They were actually field commanders. At least they identified themselves as that. And as best as we could assess from our checking with your folks, they were. But my sense, for what it is worth, is that they will be manageable in direct proportion to their being convinced that Khartoum is in fact not just waiting until the crisis occurs somewhere else in the world and the focus gets taken off of this area, because that is my greatest concern. And it will happen. This is a volatile world we are in right now.

My time is almost up, so let me conclude by asking you about Chad. One of the things that I observed, I mean, what a God-forsaken part of the world in terms of natural resources or lack thereof, with people who really did, because of tribal connections, open up, at least the present leader of Chad, open up access to a couple hundred thousand people coming across the border.

I apologize for not knowing this, but have we made any commitment, or the international community made any commitment, to make Chad whole economically for what has been an absorption of resources, not the least of which is just clear cutting the few pieces of wood that exists sticking out of that desert area?

What are we doing relative to the impact for them? If we had 3,000 folks coming from Haiti into Florida, or 300,000 or 200,000 or 100,000, we would have a significant impact. And I found it fascinating—and I will end with this, Mr. Chairman—when I met with Chadians, they want to know how they can get into the camps. And I asked them, “What do you mean, get into the camps?” They said, “Why can't we go into the camps and get water? Why can't we go into the camps and get food? Why can't we live in the camps?” which I thought was a pretty interesting observation of the status of their circumstances absent this influx.

So my question is: Tell me about Chad resources, impact of the several hundred thousand folks, and are we or the international community doing anything to “make them whole,” if you will, for lack of a better phrase?

And I thank you for your testimony.

Secretary ZOELLICK. The key point, Senator, is that they are included in the whole humanitarian effort. So when I talk about the support for Darfur, I am also including what is the aid we are providing for the 200,000 or so refugees in some 12 camps in Chad. The whole project of humanitarian support applies to all those people.

Now second, this is why it is important that we not stop where we are with humanitarian support and basic security. The point I am trying to emphasize is we really have to keep pressing this peace negotiation process forward so those people can go home, otherwise they become an ongoing burden.

Third, I think I mentioned also I just met with the Chad foreign minister last week around the U.N. meetings, in part to get a better sense of how they see things and ways we can work together. They are one of the co-mediators in the Abuja peace process that is going forward.

I think we have a pretty good shared interest and connection with them. But it is a good counsel to make sure that we are worried about their stability, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Secretary, welcome. What in your opinion is the relationship between China and Sudan?

Secretary ZOELLICK. Well, at this point, it is primarily energy and energy development. Although if you look at one of the charts I had in the back here, China is going to contribute to some of the peacekeeping force in the South, which is a good effort and shows responsibility. When I was in Beijing in late July, early August, for some strategic discussions, and this is a point I made in a speech recently as well, I emphasized to the Chinese that they needed to consider that, as they were trying to develop energy resources in various parts of the world—and this is not just Sudan, but it is Burma, Iran, and others—they need to consider the impression that that will create for us and for others when we see issues like genocide.

I said they can make their own determination, but there are probably ways we can work together. They can also maintain their energy development. And I got a general response about willingness to do that, to work with the government to try to press the government to follow through on these accords. They benefit from a stable system, too.

Indeed, one of the follow-up actions of the discussions that I had, Senator, is that Assistant Secretary Frazer is going to have a discussion with the Chinese about Africa in general. I think this is something we need to do and broaden more. We may not be in agreement on every issue, whether it be Sudan or Zimbabwe or others, but it is important that they understand where there will be costs in their relations with us and others. And I think there is some chance that we can get some help. They will not be necessarily as public as we are, but they might press the government on some of the things we would like.

Senator HAGEL. Have they, in your opinion, hindered our efforts with the United Nations or any other multilateral institution that we have been working with regarding Sudan?

Secretary ZOELLICK. In the context of early this year, we had to deal with what became the three Security Council resolutions—one to set up the North-South peacekeeping force, one dealing with the economic sanctions, and one dealing with the ICC and the issues of impunity.

I do not know for sure on the peacekeeping force, but they are participating. I do not recall any difficulty in that context. On economic sanctions, they have been more resistant, as they have been in other areas, but they accepted the type of sanctions that were developed.

And on the ICC, I do not know, in particular. I was just trying to make sure we could abstain, frankly.

Senator HAGEL. Is this an area that you noted in your testimony in reference to working with the various multilateral institutions, regionalization, your noting of your, I am not certain of the title, representative in the area, along with the assistant secretary who is sitting behind you, to try to more fully work with China and other nations? And in context with that question, how will the assistant secretary work with your personal representative? And what will be the relationship, and how will they make adjustments, especially focusing on what you had talked about in your testimony, getting more regional effort, not just through the African Union, but the nine neighbors, China not a neighbor, but very important?

Secretary ZOELLICK. Well, I am the overall point. The President and the Secretary look to me to try to pull this together, whether it involves AID, the various bureaus in the State Department that have an interest, the NSC, DOD, and others. That is my role and responsibility.

And on some of the things you mentioned regarding China, I think I may be able to be of help. That is why I am raising this in Beijing and talking about it in my speeches, because on this and some other issues, since I am playing on multiple topics at once, I can emphasize the priority of this for the United States.

I will give you another example. When I was in Egypt and meeting with President Mubarak, I was emphasizing the importance of us working closely together on this. When you get further away from the African context, it is part of my role. Although, as I mentioned, Assistant Secretary Frazer will be leading our discussion with her Chinese counterpart to talk about Sudan and others.

Roger Winter, the special representative for me, works with the Africa office. He does not have a separate office. He is attached to my office representing the particular role and interests that I have been asked to play on this issue. But he is very much integrated with the African bureau. That is where the staff and the support and the others involved come from. We had the good fortune that he did this before, when he was at AID working on the North-South Accord.

His relations with Sudan are very extensive over many years. This really gives us a tremendous asset in terms of some of the

people in the South and, I hope, dealing with some of the rebel groups. But obviously, I look to Assistant Secretary Frazer to help pull the overall effort together.

And as I mentioned, this is a topic where Senator Biden and the Chairman mentioned there is just a heck of a lot of work to do with a heck of a lot of players. So, I can do some of it. Roger can do some of it. Andrew Natsios can do some of it. Secretary Frazer can do some of it. I have weekly meetings where we are tasking these things out and trying to anticipate and work the diplomatic problems that arise day by day.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. You noted a number of times in your testimony the efforts of the African Union and the progress, I think would be a fair way to state it, of the African Union. And I would like to pursue that in my last question.

And by the way, I share your positive sense of direction. And I have always believed—and I was in Nigeria and Abuja the morning the Nigerian president convened the African Union conference to deal with this in August of last year.

The continent of Africa is going to have to equip itself to deal with its problems. We can support and we can help, but I think that is much to your point in your testimony and what you have been about as well over the last few years. And with that in mind, where are the institutional weaknesses and strengths in your opinion as this problem in Darfur is going to be with us for a while, as the African Union takes on more and more of a role, outside of just the peacekeeping, outside of the military, the security, but the geopolitical strategic, as well as diplomatic leadership, to address this problem?

Secretary ZOELLICK. Well, again—and I know you know the region and the issues very well—the African Union has come a long way in a very short time. But not surprisingly, their basic problem is one of lack of resources to make some of these things happen. But the head of the African Union Commission is Chairman Konare, who is the former president of Mali, a very poor country, but democratic, has done a fantastic job.

As you mentioned in the case of Nigeria, there is an ongoing president, in addition to the president of the commission, this has been President Obasanjo. They have set up a series of, I think, eight or nine commissions, one of the most important one being a peace and security commission that is headed by an Algerian named Djinnet.

So in some ways, Senator, if you can imagine the trials of the European Union in a much poorer context, trying to come together and work cooperatively, that is the work ahead of them. But what I have been sincerely impressed by is, in a relative short time, after having the strategy of hands off everybody and neighbors, they are really trying to come to grips with these issues.

Now let me take it more directly. In the diplomatic side, the Abuja peace talks were chaired by, I mentioned, former Prime Minister Salim. We can help. For example, we probably have some of the best ties with the SLA, which I was mentioning in one of the previous questions. We need to let them know that we want them

to have a fair chance to negotiate an arrangement. But they also cannot return to violence.

So this week, to be frank, to give you an insight on this, with Roger being there, we pressed very hard. And I think it is because of us, we have them back at the table. That is just a start. So there are things that we can help diplomatically.

On the military side, and this is an area where I imagine General Jones can comment more, they need everything from armored personnel carriers, which the Canadians are helping to supply so they can perform the mission better that Senator Biden talked about, to paying the troops. We have provided in-kind support. This is, as those of you who have been out there know, this is a rough part of the world. And so troops have to be housed somewhere. We have paid for that and set up with a group called PAE, a contracting service, so they have places to live and operate. The troops have to be paid.

So there are a lot of areas in terms of the resource side, if they are going to have an effective mission.

Now this, I think, just looking ahead, Senator, this is one of the bigger questions in some of the work we have been fortunate to do with EUCOM. What investments do we want to make in this kind of a peacekeeping mission over time to help develop their capabilities. Because, frankly, it can be inappropriate for U.S. forces to be there. So if we are going to deal with these problems, how can we enhance their capabilities?

There is some other work that has actually just been started by a former colleague of mine, David Gombert, at the National Defense University, who is actually trying to see how, with some investment, he might be able to use some of the net center capabilities to have a rather small, but well-organized and well-prepared force with sensors and information technology and others that could really deal with these problems in the future.

I have encouraged David to talk to you, people on the Hill, and also, frankly, we are looking at it in our office, and at the Department of Defense. This is maybe a subject we could have some further discussion about, if it is of interest here.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me begin by thanking Secretary Zoellick and General Jones. It is a pleasure to see both of you here. And I understand—I apologize, Mr. Chairman.

With my familiarity, General Jones, I had forgotten for a moment your new role here, I suspect, General.

And so I understand why you cannot have them at the table simultaneously. But I have great respect for both these individuals and thank them for their efforts.

I am sure the Chairman, I missed his opening comments, but I presume you went over and mentioned some of the data and statistics regarding the tragedy of Darfur. And I guess the numbers, Mr. Zoellick, I presume you agree with them, roughly two million peo-

ple have been displaced as a result of this situation. And the numbers of those who have lost their lives, you see the low number of around 70,000, the high number around 400,000. What is your statistic? What is your number you use of the number of people who have lost their lives?

Secretary ZOELLICK. Well, I will tell you, frankly, I do not think anybody knows. And I have said that publicly. And any of those numbers, and this is an important point to have out, are way too high, I mean, way too high to have that many people die.

Senator DODD. But you would not necessarily argue with the 400,000 number either then, for that matter.

Secretary ZOELLICK. Well, this opens a big debate, Senator. I will just point out that our Office of Intelligence and Research have done various estimates. It depends on what time period you start. And they have looked at these with some 50 epidemiological studies. It is all on our website explaining the logic.

Frankly, the U.N. World Health Organization Collaborating Center for Research did a review in May with a 42-page document titled "Darfur, Counting the Deaths, Mortality Estimates from Multiple Survey Data." And they are basically in the same range that we are.

To get to the numbers—and, you know, this is whether it is 160,000, 180,000, the U.N. representative of England has used the 180,000 number, but he has also referenced some of these U.N. studies—to get to the number that you are talking—you mentioned the high-end number—there are only two surveys that we are aware of. They basically take the most intense period of mortality in a rather limited area and expand them over a 26-month period. That is probably an overestimate. But I hasten to say, you know, that no one can know for sure.

So you and your staff can look at what we have on the website and criticize it or analyze it. And again, you have very similar work from the U.N. World Health Organization looking at some 50 studies.

Senator DODD. But the numbers are pretty staggering.

Secretary ZOELLICK. Whatever they are, they are too high.

Senator DODD. And the amount of refugees, that 200,000, that is a more accurate number. We have a better a count on that.

Secretary ZOELLICK. That, again, I am being careful. That is refugees in Chad. So that is cross-border. As you said, you have some two million-plus internally displaced.

Senator DODD. Right. Displaced.

It was about a year ago, in fact on September 9 of last year, Secretary Powell was sitting at that table, not in this room. We had a hearing in another location. And on that day he called the activities in Darfur genocide. What is the position of the administration today? Do you still agree with Secretary Powell that you would call it genocide?

Secretary ZOELLICK. Well, even more, I agree with President Bush, who has made the same statement. So yes. And what happened after that, Senator, is that we worked to pass a U.N. resolution that set up a committee of investigation. The committee of investigation reported in January of 2005. They did not find geno-

cide, but they found crimes against humanity. Their statement, probably just worth making sure that we have here on the record, because I do not want them to have their position——

Senator DODD. Well, they took a different position. I know. I mean, I realize the United States took the position this is genocide.

Secretary ZOELLICK. Right.

Senator DODD. The U.N. has a different position. Is it our view that the Sudanese government is complicit very directly in this genocide?

Secretary ZOELLICK. Well, it is what is now being pursued by the International Criminal Court——

Senator DODD. I know that. I want to know what the United States position is. Do we believe the Sudanese government is directly complicit in this genocidal behavior?

Secretary ZOELLICK. I would have to say yes. I mean, they were part of the whole process that was going on.

Senator DODD. Well, that bring me to the question, because obviously while there has been a lot of good things that have happened, and I want to emphasize that, the amount of resources that we have voted on here and have been expended to try and provide some relief for these people here, I am deeply worried that, one, we still have under the African American Union situation, if we look at the larger picture here and despite the U.N. investigation here, as I understand it anyway, and you correct me if I am wrong, the U.N. declines to endorse the United States assertion that the Sudanese government is very directly, as a whole, complicit in genocide.

In its limited or unlimited report, the U.N. says the responsibility for their actions in Darfur are limited to individuals. And this does not even take into account, of course, that many members of the African Union do not even view what is happening in Darfur as genocide, which raises the point, when you look at what they can do, they are limited, as I understand it, to protecting the monitors rather the civilian population.

Is that not true?

Secretary ZOELLICK. You are moving through a couple different topics here. So let me take each one. To be fair to the U.N., their finding on January 25 was that this was no less serious and heinous than genocide. What this deals with is a different view in terms of the Genocide Convention of 1947 and 1948. So again, crimes against humanity, which they found, is what we used in the Nuremberg trials.

What I have tried to be careful about on this, Senator, is I do not want to cast dispersions on people like President Mbeki, who do not have the same finding we do. We all agree what happened was outrageous. It was heinous. We believe it is genocide. They believe it is crimes against humanity. We have to stop it. We have to get it turned around and fixed.

What you are then asking about was the African Union mission.

Senator DODD. Right.

Secretary ZOELLICK. And on this, the African Union mission was expanded in May of this year after a review of its role. And again, since these are African Union forces, we have made clear that we could welcome an additional expansion of the mandate, if they so

chose. But it is important to have a sense of what these people are really doing on the ground. Because it effects the nature of their peacekeeping force, if you had the government actually engaged in large-scale violence, they could not stand up to it. So it needs to be combined with diplomacy to pull the government forces back, which they have.

When I talked with the Rwandan deputy commander, who is a first-rate individual, he described it almost as a military diplomacy. Let me give you a practical example so you have a sense of what they do.

On one of the visits that I was at, I had a presentation about the location of the forces, the rebel forces, the government forces. It was like a splotch on different maps. There was an NGO, Doctors Without Borders, that had a hospital that said we may have to close down because we are not getting people coming to our hospital.

The Rwandan commander who was with me pulled aside the rebel officers—and this also tells you something interesting. They have liaison from the rebels and the government with the AU forces there—pulled them aside and basically said: Look, it is your people who are dying. We have to negotiate some safe corridors to get these people through, which is what they did.

So the nature of the peacekeeping mission here is one where there is a certain deterrence factor. And as I said, recently, with the expanded mandate, they put some armored personnel carriers in some of the camps. But in the diplomatic context of where you separate the forces, they are expanding their numbers, trying to lessen the tension.

The reason I mention this, Senator, is that now and then there is a sense that this will be solved if we give them a greater combat mandate. I do not think that is the case.

Senator DODD. Well, let me ask you this. Let me jump to one area very quickly. The light went on here. And that is, I am distressed in a sense. You mentioned the Nuremberg trials. We will be—I think November 20 would be the sixtieth anniversary of the opening of those trials. United States led the way. In fact in this very room, Judge Roberts, who is going to be confirmed in a day or so for Chief Justice of the United States, used Robert Jackson as a model, the chief prosecutor for the United States during those trials.

It is troublesome to me, and I understand the administration's view in not wanting to endorse the establishment of a permanent international criminal court, but I am perplexed over how we can call something genocide, how we can agree that the Sudanese government is very complicit in this genocidal behavior, and then abstain when it comes to a resolution, 1593, before the United Nations, which would establish the bringing of the Sudanese officials before a criminal court.

Again, the generation that said no, we are going to try these criminals from the 13-year era, the Nazi regime 60 years ago, today an administration that is reluctant and abstains when genocidal behavior occurs from allowing these thugs to be brought to trial.

I do not understand that. Could you explain why the administration is abstaining on this particular issue?

Secretary ZOELLICK. Well, Senator, you know well the concerns that the United States has as the greatest power in the world with our forces around that our people could be subject to the International Criminal Court. And I might add—

Senator DODD. This is a specific request, though.

Secretary ZOELLICK. Senator, if I could finish the answer.

It is not just the administration. There is an act passed by Congress, the American Service Members Protection Act, that reflects this policy passed by the U.S. Congress.

Senator DODD. Yes.

Secretary ZOELLICK. So I think the important thing is, you are right, we did abstain. And, under this act, we have the ability, if asked to cooperate, to cooperate. As I said in the House, if people ask for our help, we will try to make sure that this gets pursued fully. We do not want to see impunity for any of these actors.

Senator DODD. We have supported in the past specific—and certainly in Bosnia, the situation there—the criminal trials involving those individuals. Why would we support one there and not one here?

Secretary ZOELLICK. We are not failing to support the action of the prosecutor in this effort.

Senator DODD. Are we going to, if they ask for our support?

Secretary ZOELLICK. And again, Senator, if you ask about U.S. leadership on this issue, I think you will find that most people in the world, the African Union I have encountered, the U.N. officials I have talked to, feel that the United States, starting with Senator Danforth, have really displayed some very important leadership.

So I do not think there is any question of our moral position.

Senator DODD. Well, I do not disagree with that. I said that earlier. My concern is whether or not we are going to stand up a generation later. We watched Rwanda. We saw what happened with Bosnia. We have it here now. We have called it genocide. We said the Sudanese government is complicit. And yet we are abstaining when it comes to bringing these people to bar justice. I am saddened by that.

Thank you.

Secretary ZOELLICK. Senator, I think the important part is, frankly, not those actions, but it is what we are doing on the ground. And I think what we are doing in terms of food, security, diplomacy, making the CPA work, is what will demonstrate the United States role in the history books.

Senator DODD. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Mr. Secretary, thank you for your diligence on this and other issues and efforts to follow up with my office on a number of issues.

Let me first ask you about this. Many recent reports characterized conditions on the ground in Darfur as having somewhat sta-

bilized. And these reports cite relatively steady humanitarian indicators to back up this assertion. But it seems to me that the people of Darfur living in the midst of a chronic crisis—I happen to have had the chance earlier this year to be in Chad and visit one of those camps, as well, that Senator Biden visited. Not the same camp, but a similar camp, I think.

They are utterly dependent on international humanitarian assistance for survival. And in the meantime, humanitarian organizations are coming under increasingly frequent attack. The people of Darfur are uprooted from their homes and fearful of security conditions outside of and sometimes within the camps. And MSF and other organizations continue to report widespread incidences of rape.

So there seems to me to be nothing really all that stable at all about the situation of desperation and vulnerability. What, in your view, is the realistic time frame or time line for improving the conditions in which these people are living and creating an environment of security in which people can voluntarily return to their villages and rebuild their lives?

Secretary ZOELLICK. Senator, let me start by saying the reports that you have seen from the U.N. and the African Union, and I think your comments reflect this, need to be put in a relative context. It is still a very violent place. It is still a very dangerous place. What has changed is the nature of the large-scale conflict and warfare.

So I think that with what is still happening we should be pushing to get civilian police monitors and a lot of other things to improve the humanitarian security situation. I would add to that the vagaries of weather. You have rainy seasons. You just had flooding. You had some terrible conditions that I just read about a couple days ago that have taken out a number of these camps. So it is a precarious situation. It is extremely fragile.

What I have tried to emphasize, Senator, is a three-part formula. One is we have to continue to be creative and move forward to get the humanitarian supplies to these people, the food, fight the disease, and try to improve the conditions for women, some of the things I mentioned in the testimony.

Second, we need to expand the security arrangements. Part of this is getting more of the African Union forces there, some of the things I mentioned about civilian police somewhat equipping them, some ways to be able to help execute the mission further, and then, as we have discussed, to say what else one might need to be able to do.

But if I could emphasize one point, it is that we cannot stop there, because this remains very fragile and dangerous. So the point that I have tried to emphasize is we have to get this Abuja peace process forward so that we can try to use the type of framework we used in the CPA to try to reach some peace accord.

You asked about a time frame. Jan Pronk, the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative, has said we should try to get this done by the end of this year, because that would allow people to start to return home, if all goes well, before the rainy season next

year. I have used that comment to say yes, we should really try to do that. It is going to be a stretch goal for the reasons I mentioned.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Just some more follow-up on the AU force. Consistently, reports from the ground in Darfur praise the efforts made by the African Union thus far. But they also underscore the reality that this force is obviously not sufficient to provide security or protect civilians. And it does not have confidence of the people in Darfur who have to make judgments about their own security.

Do you believe that more AU troops on the ground will make a critical difference in changing these perceptions, or is a stronger mandate necessary or both? I am curious for your reactions to those.

Secretary ZOELLICK. Yes. The evidence has shown, and U.N. reports show this, the more forces there are, the more it helps improve the situation. But this is an extraordinarily large area. So that also goes to the ability of the forces to have the mobility to execute their mission, some of the things I mentioned on the operational planning side. And again, there are things that the African Union is now doing to try with additional forces to create a confidence environment. So you have probably read the stories about women being afraid to go out and get wood. They are willing to go out and get some wood.

Frankly, we are, also with the help of AID, trying to come up with some stoves and other things that do not have to use as much wood, so people do not have to go out as much.

I think there is going to now be an assessment when they get up to the 7,700, which I hope will be at the end of October, about where one goes next. And as I mentioned, there was some discussion about willing to go to a higher number, 12,000. But I also see the African Union's straining to get up to the 7,700 number. They have had some difficulty. There is a question about South African forces that had been pledged and who else may go.

So we will have to work with the AU as they reach that point to determine if there is a need for additional forces, can they provide them. And as I have also suggested, whether you have a U.N. peacekeeping mission in the South, can this be blended in some fashion?

On the mandate issue, we are open to a more expanded mandate, if they choose. They are their forces. They are their people. It is in some ways a little presumptuous for us to tell them who they should be fighting. Okay? But as I have suggested, I do not think it is just a question of words on paper. It is a question about how they feel and the execution of that mandate. And that, as I tried to describe with Senator Dodd, one really has to see the situation on the ground. It is not a situation where these forces are going to be in a major military action with the other parties. They are basically playing a deterrence role, a confidence building role, some protection around the camps, and, frankly, mediation of these forces.

Senator FEINGOLD. But in terms of simply giving them the additional mandate, you seem skeptical that that alone would—that the

AU by itself, even with the mandate, would be able to handle all of this. You seem to be suggesting a need for more.

Secretary ZOELLICK. Well, first off, as a policy matter, we would not resist a stronger mandate, and for the reasons that I suggested.

Senator FEINGOLD. But does that do the job?

Secretary ZOELLICK. Pardon?

Senator FEINGOLD. My sense from your remarks is that that, by itself, does not do the job and does necessarily mean that the AU by itself would have the capacity to handle this situation on its own.

Secretary ZOELLICK. That is the question, Senator, as you said "do the job." It is important to have a sense of what the job is.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me turn to the North-South process again. Are you confident that the well-sharing arrangements, which will be implemented fairly and transparently, given the fact that the SPLM failed to secure control of either the finance ministry or the ministry for mining and energy? And what will it take to sustain a Southerner's confidence in well-sharing arrangements in light of these decisions with regard to those key cabinet positions?

Secretary ZOELLICK. We are going to press on all these points, Senator. And let me start with even in the South, as they stand up their new government, we need to make sure that it is a transparent government so that as we provide aid and others provide aid, we can be certain that we do not have problems of corruption.

As for how things will work with the Government of National Unity, I stressed earlier the importance of the Assessment Evaluation Commission, which will be an oversight body that will include people from outside Sudan to help monitor these actions.

In terms of the overall support, for example, on the petroleum side, after the Government of Southern Sudan is formed, there is supposed to be a National Petroleum Commission formed that is also supposed to examine these numbers and process it transparently.

So, Senator, the basic answer is I am not sure of anything. And that is why I identified these topics. We have to keep pressing both parties to make sure that it has full implementation. I certainly would not take any of this for granted.

Senator FEINGOLD. Just before my time is up—I guess it is up right now. Let me just say, in terms of the issue we were talking about before in Darfur, what the job is, I think it is civilian protection and providing security so that people feel safe and they can go home. I heard people in Chad tell me they did not feel safe going home. And they are not able to go home and rebuild their villages.

The question I asked you is, can the AU do that job?

Secretary ZOELLICK. Yes. And what I was, again, trying to do was draw some threads here together. I think for people to eventually go home, Senator, it is going to require a peace accord, which is not just AU military forces. It is going to require the disbanding of the Janjaweed, which is not just a question of the AU going into military action.

What I am trying to suggest here is that it is important for the AU to be able to have the additional capability, the weaponry, the

words and mandate, but to see that action outside, loosely speaking, the larger diplomatic and political context, I think runs a risk of misleading about what can reasonably be accomplished here.

Just let me take a moment to give you one more sentence. The critical point now is that the government of Sudan is not engaged militarily as they were before. Their military capabilities could overwhelm the AU forces. So as it is in traditional peacekeeping missions, with people in the midst of a war zone, indeed, it is very hard to have a peacekeeping force.

So it is the responsibility of us and other governments to make sure that the government of Sudan does not undertake those military actions, that they do not have the helicopters flying. That is one of the things I spend time trying to make sure stays in place.

In terms of the African Union capabilities, I think more troops will help. I think that getting them the armored personnel carriers that they can have in some of the locations will help. And the more that there are, I think the more areas that they are able to cover. I spend a lot of time talking with a lot of outside groups on this. I do not want to leave the false impression that to “solve” the problem or do the job is simply a question of additional either AU or, for that matter, other capabilities of a military nature. It has to be a military diplomatic—

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, the only thing that that leaves me concerned about is does this leave the government of Sudan basically in the driver’s seat? Do they get to decide whether to disarm and disband the militias? I mean—

Secretary ZOELLICK. No, because that is why we and everybody else are involved and, you know, we have a combination of sanctions. We are using the African Union, the European Union, and others to press them on action, and this goes to the point that I also tried to make about the connection of the North-South Accord with Darfur.

Look, Senator, some people consider this highly controversial. I made the point that do not expect that the North-South Accord can live in isolation from Darfur. So if, as a strategic matter, the people in Khartoum want to try to have this Government of National Unity work with all that could be with it. And you want us and the international community to help, then we had better get Darfur fixed.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

I just have one short question, Mr. Secretary. The new State Department Office for Stabilization and Reconstruction headed by former Ambassador Carlos Pascual is in Sudan presently. This is their first operation. Can you describe how and where they are engaged and how they are doing?

Secretary ZOELLICK. Yes. That is an important part. I should have mentioned this, Senator, to your first question about the several types of resources. Because this is the exact concept we are trying to get some of our transition support to help. Ambassador Pasquel’s team has first helped on the southern side, as we are trying to think about how to stand up the government of Southern

Sudan and how to deal with some of the security forces and their reorganization.

There are also some other issues in the South as there has been South-South strife, as well. You properly remind me that as part of the team that I have at the State Department, they are part of the team that I draw on on this, and particularly, as we would also turn to some of the things that I hope we will be able to do in Darfur at another stage, I would expect them also to be involved with that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much. We appreciate that you and Secretary Rice have been working to perfect this. This new team is going to need a great deal of assistance, both through identification of their mission and likewise the budget for the mission. I am sure you understand.

Senator Dodd?

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, I just had one additional question for the secretary.

I understand your answer, obviously, to the question I raised about the ICC. Under the American Services Protection Act, there is a clause in that law that allows for the United States to cooperate with these international criminal courts. The simple question I have for you, if we are asked to cooperate with the court in pursuing the officials of the Sudanese government, will we be cooperative in that regard?

Secretary ZOELLICK. Yes. That is the point I was trying to make.

Senator DODD. And that is the provision in the law that you are aware of, as well.

Secretary ZOELLICK. Yes.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Zoellick, for your testimony, the preparation, and the comprehensive nature with which you have responded to our questions. We appreciate having you, as always.

Secretary ZOELLICK. Thanks, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to call now General James Jones.

As I welcome General Jones, the Chair would like to point out that very recently General Jones was with me in Algeria and Morocco. And he was extremely helpful in the rescue mission of 404 Moroccan prisoners held by the Polisario in the southwest Sahara desert for sometimes over 20 years at a time.

General Jones provided two aircraft, 38 Marines, and a humanitarian mission that was extraordinarily helpful. This is a part of his mission in NATO and with EUCOM to make certain that the United States is coordinating with friends in Africa, and specifically Algeria and Morocco on this occasion.

It is a privilege to have you again before us, General Jones. And would you please proceed with your testimony?

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE (SACEUR), SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED POWERS EUROPE, MONS, BELGIUM

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is a great pleasure to be here. And I am appearing before you in response to the invitation letter in two hats—one is NATO commander and one is European commander—to talk a little bit about Africa and NATO's efforts in Africa with specific emphasis on Darfur. And I will do that very briefly, because I think I can summarize it very quickly. And also the United States European Command's theater security engagement in Africa.

And I have before you some charts, and I will just refer to them just so you can follow along. The first one that you have before you is the Unified Command Plan. And it shows you the expanse of the U.S. European Command's area of operation, which includes 91 countries in Europe, Africa, and the Near East.

In the European Command and in NATO, we feel that the African reality is here for us and for those who are concerned about the strategic future and its implications with regard to our collective security in the 21st century. NATO's initial attention to Africa and the crisis in Sudan and its revitalized Mediterranean dialogue are indications of a growing awareness of this new reality within the alliance itself. How EUCOM's theater security strategy helps to bring stability to vast areas plagued by chronic instability is a developing success story, which could be the prologue for our engagement in the 21st century.

Let me turn very quickly to NATO and ask you to look at the second chart that should be in your stack in front of you. At 26 nations, NATO is today our most important and enduring strategic alliance. It is changing dramatically and has changed over the last three years. It has gone from being essentially a reactive, defensive, static, linear alliance arrayed against an equally static threat to a more proactive capability that is developing agility, speed, and a geostrategic sense of its missions for the 21st century.

Today, NATO is involved in operations in Afghanistan, in Iraq, from which I just returned this morning, in the Balkans, an operation-active endeavor in the Mediterranean. We have bilateral relations with Russia, the Ukraine, Partnership for Peace nations, the Mediterranean dialogue nations, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. And NATO's primary example for transformation is the development of the NATO Response Force.

The third chart will talk briefly about NATO's mission to Darfur. The African mission in the Sudan known as AMIS is an example of the alliance's extended focus and willing reach. Secretary Zoellick's exposé more than adequately captured the history and the current issues of today's problem. So I will just simply comment on the three facets of the NATO mission.

This is a 15-nation contribution to coordinate airlift donation with AU troop, African Union troop, deployment plans. Secondly, to support the U.N. peacekeeping and planning and conducting of a map exercise to help train the staff of the AMIS force headquarters

at El Fasher. And three, capacity building for the staff officers of the AMIS.

The keys to our operation are that NATO is in support of the African Union, that NATO works closely with African Union officials. And so far one of my conclusions of this effort has been that this underscores the ability of NATO to work with multiple organizations, such as the U.N., the EU, the AU, and other organizations simultaneously.

NATO is today considering additional requests from the African Union, which it has received. The North Atlantic Council has probably already discussed it, and I am just not aware of what they have decided. But my guess is that they will prolong their mission. It is obvious that the strategic importance of Africa is growing, and we are not alone. We, the United States, are not alone in recognizing this fact.

For example, China plays an increasingly active economic role in Africa today with an increase of 48 percent in its economic aspirations since 2002. To paraphrase a statement made to me by an African leader about the growing China relationship in Africa. He says: We love the United States. You, above all else, tell us exactly what we need. And then China turns around and gives it to us.

The United States still remains number one in economic relations in the totality of Africa with a \$44 billion in 2005. However, in Africa we have to be concerned about the inroads of Jihadism, which is slow but steady. In my view, it is the number one common concern loosely referred to as terrorism in large, generally ungoverned areas, which spawn recruiting for such activities from among the hopeless.

Shifting demographics and pandemic diseases are well-known. The median age of Africa will soon be 15 years old, whereas in Europe it will soon approach 50 years old. This disproportionate distribution of wealth between the haves and the have-nots, corruption, crime, piracy in potentially wealthy states, but immense opportunities to bring stability and economic recovery through a proactive engagement over a sustained period of time.

It is estimated that 25 percent of the United States oil imports will come from the Gulf of Guinea within the next ten years. And liquid natural gas from the region will reach \$30 billion within a 10-year period.

Theater security corporation activities led by the European Command is derived from our regional priority and policy guidance from the Secretary of Defense's security cooperation guidance. The centerpiece of our efforts for security and stability lies in building relationships with allies and regional partners. Theater security cooperation is regionally focused across five regions of Africa. And your next chart should show how the African Union itself looks at Africa in terms of five distinct regions.

A few examples of theater security initiatives may be helpful. The Global Peace Operations Initiative, known as GPOI, meets our growing need for peacekeeping operations, enables us to work with lead nations and international organizations. In Africa, US-GPOI will expand existing Africa contingency operations, training and as-

sistance programs to develop the African capacity for peacekeeping operations and support.

Eighty million dollars in appropriations for GPOI was provided in the 1005 omnibus appropriations bill. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your efforts on GPOI in getting funds to meet our growing need for well-trained peacekeeping operation troops, and thank the many members of the committee for their interest in developing and recognizing the strategic importance of Africa.

Next I have two slides that may be of some interest to the committee on the State Partnership Program, which is probably one of the least understood, but most highly successful programs that the United States has, not only in Africa but in Europe. And I have taken the liberty of showing you the distribution of our National Guard Partnership Programs in both Europe and Africa.

Of note, in 2003 there were no programs of that kind of Africa. And you can see the progress we have made in a short period of time. This, to me, is an irreplaceable effort on behalf of our state National Guard air and ground forces to develop partnerships in developing areas of the world that are based on mutual trust and confidence and confidence sharing and capacity building. I can think of no program that has more long-term significance and potential than the State Partnership Program.

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, known as TSCTI, is a long-term interagency effort to combat terrorism in the Trans-Saharan Africa. Its goals is to assist governments to better understand and control events in their borders, to deny safe haven for terrorist practices, recruiting, and training, and to help fragile democracies who need our proactive help to be successful in combating serious challenges within their borders, challenges such as security, social problems, economic problems, offsetting the Jihadism recruiting, corruption, and crime, and a myriad of other difficulties that plague many nations in Africa.

Another approach is a clearinghouse approach. Clearinghouses created for Africa, the South Caucuses in southeastern Europe, allowing the U.S. to coordinate our actions with those of other nations involved in similar efforts in the same regions. This has the effect of eliminating redundancy. It saves money. It allows for more cohesive international efforts. And it deconflicts many international programs.

Africa Clearinghouse has brought 13 African countries together with NATO, the EU, and the United Nations. An inaugural conference was held in May 2004, focused on West Africa and the Economic Community of West African States, known as ECOWAS. And in December of that year, a similar conference was held, which focused on the Eastern African states. So the clearinghouse concept is very, very efficient and very important for the future of our combined international activities in Africa.

Finally, a word about our security assistance programs. Foreign Military Financing, or FMF, is the means for those who can afford it to obtain U.S. equipment. The FMF request for 2006 is at \$38.5 million.

Secondly, the International Military Education and Training, known as IMET, provides education and training for foreign mili-

tary and civilian personnel. Today's IMET recipients are tomorrow's foreign military and civilian leaders. The EUCOM portion for Africa of the IMET request for 2006 is \$12.9 million.

One of the regular comments that one hears in Africa with regard to the United States is that we are increasingly seen by many as being difficult to work with, slow, and cumbersome in our responses. And when we do respond, there are too many strings attached and too many conditions to the assistance that we provide.

It is increasingly clear to me that our client states, especially in Africa, have other options that they can turn to, and they are capitalizing on them. Nonetheless, most would prefer a U.S. relationship. Usually on security issues, the first telephone call they make is to the United States for assistance.

In conclusion, it is a privilege to represent our proud nation as a supreme allied commander of Europe and commander of the U.S. European Command. The tasks we face in Africa are enormous but are not insurmountable. The indispensable influence attained by our forward presence coupled with our theater security cooperation programs provides the best chance of prevailing in the global war on terrorism and in meeting our national security goals.

As we work together to improve our capabilities and to advance U.S. policy objectives, we must also recognize that today's complex security environment requires a greater degree of coordination within our own government and among our allies in order to be effective. As we support the African Union's effort in Darfur, NATO is determined to work in full transparency with the European Union, the United Nations, NGOs, and individual nations.

Although very limited in scope and duration, the NATO response to the crisis in Darfur is consistent with the transformation of the alliance in response to the new security environment. NATO and the United States, through the European Command, are engaged in the most fundamental transformation and contemporary history. It is an exciting time to be in Europe and to be Africa.

And Mr. Chairman, I look forward to responding to any questions you might have. Thank you for your attention.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, General Jones.

[The prepared statement of General Jones can be found in the Appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. We will once again have an eight-minute question period for each one of us.

Let me start, General Jones, by saying that your own leadership in the African mission has been really extraordinary. And I ask from that context, on behalf of many of us, for you to discuss how NATO became involved in Africa at all. Concerning the context of our discussion with Darfur, we are pleased that you are involved. The same question, I suppose, could have been raised, and has been at various NATO conferences, as to why NATO has taken an interest in the Middle East, or taken a look at the Mediterranean associations in which NATO has been involved.

You have mentioned these wide relationships with the United Nations as a whole, but also obviously with the EU, with the African Union. Describe the evolution of how the NATO mission, the

trans-Atlantic alliance and the mutual defense that was implied by that almost half a century ago, has moved to Africa, quite apart from other situations.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, the evolution was not a rapid one, as you know. NATO, as a result of the Prague Summit in 2002, began its most fundamental transformation in terms of its capabilities. And as I mentioned, it finds itself now in different parts of the world, a far cry from the static defense philosophy of the 20th century.

I believe that NATO's interest in Africa is still quite embryonic. But nonetheless, it is moving in the right direction. There is an Article 5 mission in the Mediterranean entitled Operation Active Endeavor. It is NATO's only counterterrorism operation. But it spans the entire length of the Mediterranean.

NATO recently revised its Mediterranean dialogue with seven Mediterranean countries as partners, five of which are on the southern rim of the Mediterranean, and is attracting that kind of interest in the security of this very important body of this very important sea.

Despite the many political difficulties that some countries have in the region, particularly the North Africa, the one thing they have in common is a deep and abiding respect for the prospects of terrorism occurring in their own backyards and not knowing anything about it. Similarly, the divide between North Africa and the Mediterranean is no longer a wide expanse. In literal terms, it is a little bit like stepping over a stream.

And European countries and the alliance are properly concerned about mass immigration, unlawful immigration, the spread of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, narco-trafficking, and Jihadism coming from the south to the north. And so I think NATO is coming to the realization that a little proactive engagement could probably go a long way, instead of being reactive and waiting for something extraordinarily bad to happen and then having to spend millions, if not billions, of Euros to counter whatever happens down the road.

NATO is also planning on having its final exercise certifying the NATO response force next year in Cape Verde islands, which is a considerable strategic distance, but it is in a southern direction. NATO has always been an east-west orientation. And it is exciting for me, at least on a strategic sense, to see that kind of attention.

And the same holds true in the Middle East. The Secretary General and NATO have sent emissaries to all countries in the Persian Gulf to discuss how NATO might be of assistance in some way. Some of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, notably Israel and Jordan, of course, are very close to the theater. So these are dialogues that are going on. And it is a characteristic of an expanding scope of NATO's strategic focus. And I think it is encouraging.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is a very important explanation, in terms of both the geographical compactness now realized and Europe's own situation with regard to many persons who have come from the northern African states and who are resident now in Europe, with sometimes the potential for terrorism and the actuality of it in some unfortunate instances. It does show the evolution of

static conflict in Europe with respect to the war on terrorism or the problems of international drugs or other things that plague people.

And you have shown the tie-ins with the states of our country, which is interesting, because there were many such pairings in Europe. But now, as NATO's focus and Europe's come together, this type of confluence of interest is apparent.

One thing you touched upon that is important, I think, is to understand the tremendous search by China for petrochemicals, and oil in particular, in Africa, and how this affects the geopolitics. We may be unfair in our criticism of the Chinese, but at least we have observed that they are not fastidious with regard to the democratic elements. Wherever there is oil, there are apparently deals to be made, to bid for the last acre.

And the Chinese are not alone in that. They are sometimes accompanied by people from India, for example, which is confusing to us. As we saw just in the last few days, gas pipelines suggested from India to Iran, at the very time that we are involved in delicate negotiations with European friends with regard to nuclear weapons in Iran.

Can you comment on this particular problem? It touches upon Sudan, and it touches upon Algeria, as well as other countries that have resources of this kind. Is this pervasive search for oil, maybe even this desperate search, likely due to the geopolitics that are involved? And how does that affect your mission?

General JONES. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, a military officer in uniform ventures into the political world at great risk. But there is some clear signs of what is going on. I think it is more fact, not conjecture. But a country like China, for example, is not encumbered with some of the laws and regulations, quite appropriately, that we have. And they are actively working in Africa. And I might add that they are also doing the same thing in our own hemisphere, in South America. But that is for somebody else to talk about. But that is fairly well recognized.

But they are actively—they are busy in Africa on a very wide plane, to include scholarships for young Africans to come to China to study, all expenses paid, to bring African officers to China to study Chinese tactics and Chinese weaponry, and then return to their countries. And they are making these offers on a broad scale at a very reduced rate, very affordable rate, many times absolutely free.

And the economic bargaining that goes in is at rates that are very, very attractive and without any strings attached. So this is, I think this is something that the United States, and certainly other nations, have to look at. And I was pleased to hear that there was going to be a conference with China on that issue. And I think it is important that—that is not to say that China cannot compete in Africa, but we all, as much as possible, ought to be playing by the same rules. And right now there is wide, it seems to me, to be wide disparity in how we are playing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, General Jones. It is a pleasure to have you here. I cannot think at this moment in transition—and

you have referenced how NATO, when you were here in the Senate and we were beginning—this is a different NATO. It is a different world. And at this critical moment in this transition period, when some in this country have questioned the utility of NATO and the total expenditures that we have in NATO, I cannot think of anybody we could have had better positioned to be the Supreme Allied Commander than you. You bring a breath of knowledge and also a breath of candor and straightforwardness that those of us that sit on this side of the table have truly valued. And I am not being solicitous.

So I want to thank you. Thank you for your leadership. And that is not a usual thankful, General. I mean that sincerely. It is a big deal. And it is a big deal where you are right now for us, in my view.

I want to pursue a little bit of what the Chairman was talking about. There is, at least in my travels in Europe, a growing recognition of the importance strategically of Africa to Europe. As you said, the Mediterranean is not very wide anymore. And the concern about a destabilized continent and what it can and might do to a stable Europe is something I think is daunting on people.

But do you think there is the sense—and I realize you are a military man. But I have, if I may say—when I first got here as a young 29-year-old kid elected to the Senate, I thought everyone—this is a slight exaggeration; it is a real exaggeration—but I thought everyone that all the flag officers in the United States military were Slim Pickens jumping out of the back of a B-52, sitting on a hydrogen bomb. Remember that movie?

And in the last 25 years, the single-most competent people that I have encountered in all of government have been flag officers. If I had to list the top 25 people that have impressed me in my last 32 years, I would say 15 of them would be wearing a uniform; because you not only understand the Constitution, you understand foreign policy and you understand military person.

So I am not being solicitous when I ask you this question. What is your sense from the perm reps that you have to deal with every day, that is the civilian ambassadors, if you will, at NATO, as to their sense of the emerging competition that China presents in Africa? Is it palpable yet or is it only kind of at this strategic military level that people are thinking about it?

General JONES. I think the answer to that is it is still very embryonic and very nationally focused in terms of individual domestic economic issues and where they are engaged. And on Africa, as you know, it is very sensitive in view of the history of many European countries in the continent. But it—I think the good news is that there are elements of change here. And I think that particularly with the world of the U.S. European Command—and if I might, I meant to introduce Major General Scott Gration, who is the J-5 at the U.S. European Command. And the reason he is here, other than the fact that he is a great U.S. Air Force officer, is that he is the son of an African missionary. And he spent 17 years or 18 years of his life in Eastern Africa and speaks fluent Swahili.

And I cannot tell you what a difference it makes when I go to Africa or when General Wall goes and we get off the airplane and

here is an Air Force general officer who speaks fluent Swahili and was raised in Africa. So it gives us a real leg up on understanding the issues, as only somebody who has lived there can explain them.

But I do believe that the focus of the Mediterranean dialogue, the mission in Darfur, the NATO response force operation in Cape Verde next year, and the operation Active Endeavor, all of these are southern leanings that never existed in NATO just three years ago.

Senator BIDEN. One of the things that some of us—I do not speak for the Chairman, but my recollection is he may have shared the same view, that when some of us over a year ago or longer said NATO should get in the game here in Darfur, we were basically told by some that, as my Grampa would say, “that horse can’t carry that sleigh,” that NATO is too overextended, NATO is preoccupied, *et cetera*.

And it is interesting to me that the gold standard, quite frankly, unfortunately for you all, is NATO. And when NATO stands up, most folks, the bad guys, usually stand down. I am being a bit facetious, but not really. My view was in our discussions about NATO’s involvement was that I was convinced that if NATO stood up in any form, that the Janjaweed would stand down, and Khartoum would back down.

Now here is the question I have. And my time is running and I see my colleague from Illinois is here. So I will try to consolidate this question. It seems to me that your present activity, and you listed it as it relates to Darfur, to go from the general to the specific, we are getting airlift map exercises, capacity building, that we have a shot here of doing something that can extend beyond the benefits that may flow to Darfur immediately. And that is to begin the process of maybe, maybe, moving the AU, the African Union, military capacity to a different stage, a different place, that this may be this exercise that allows that to begin to happen.

And so my question is, as it relates to Darfur, given the constraints of the mandate under which the AU is currently operating, such as Khartoum’s ability to keep the African Union from deploying to prevent attacks, if you were asked by the NAC—and you may not want to answer this. But if I know you well enough, as I think I do, hopefully you will—if you were asked by the NAC, what further assistance would you recommend that NATO provide the AU in order to enhance their ability to protect civilians in Darfur beyond what you are doing, if—so it goes more to your capacity, if you were given the mandate or instructions. Is there the capacity in NATO to do more? I am not suggesting you are not doing all you have been asked to do.

General JONES. The contribution of NATO nations, just from a point of interest, included airlift donations from Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, U.K., and the United States, and personnel from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, U.K., and the U.S. deployed on this mission, go into Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, and other parts in Africa.

The mission has been very carefully and very intentionally scripted to provide support to the African Union. And therefore, it is the African Union that NATO has asked to tell us what it is,

where we can be helpful. And what they have asked for are the three elements that I described.

My feeling is that the African Union right now and the military forces that we are dealing with are in fact about as far along as they can be. We are talking about eight battalions, roughly, six of which have been lifted into Darfur already. Two are not quite far enough along to actually go there.

So the capacity of what the African Union can contribute in terms of troops is limited somewhat by the experience factor. Although they can get a lot of men, they just cannot get a lot of trained men. And secondly, the ability to sustain those forces over a period of time. And that is a big problem.

So if, in fact, the alliance wanted to do more, it would be in the area, I think, of training, of providing capacity, of developing combat service support, and the logistics for support of these battalions that are operating at huge distances. I asked General Gration how big Sudan was in relation to something in the United States. He said from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico and from the East Coast to the Mississippi. That is Sudan. Extraordinary distances.

And I am always relearning that lesson when I am thinking of Africa, that you could take all of China, all of Russia, most of Europe, put it in Africa and still have a lot of room. So an enormous place. And that strategic distance makes it difficult.

So I would say, if NATO wished and if the EU wished, or other nations, keep supporting the African Union. Stay with it. Teach them the values of how militaries operate in a democracy. Make sure that human rights is part of the whole thing. And do the nuts and bolts work that has to be done to develop these competent forces. I do not think there is an overnight solution.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent, at the request of Senator Kerry—he is unable to be here, but he would like to keep the record open until Friday so he can submit questions. And with your permission, I would like—I do not want to hold anything up here—to submit a few more questions for the record, including the possibility of no-fly zones being able to be enforced and a few other things.

But I thank you, all three of you gentlemen in uniform—there are four, excuse me, in uniform here today—for being here. You are an incredible asset to us. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden. The record will be kept open through Friday to accommodate both Senator Kerry and any questions that you may formulate for the witness.

Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you so much for not only appearing before us today but also for the excellent work that you are doing. Since I am the last person here, I will try to be brief and not delay your departure. I just wanted to pick up on some themes that Ranking Member Biden discussed. And I apologize that I missed your initial testimony due to a conflicting meeting. If I am going over old ground, please say so.

It sounds like there is an assessment that the AU forces over time can be an extraordinarily valuable asset for the entire con-

tinent. It also appears that their immediate presence is having some salutary effect in at least witnessing what is taking place and, as a consequence, preventing some of the more outrageous activities from occurring.

It also sounds, though, that because of just limited troop levels and capacity that the AU is not in a position to either provide ongoing protection in this vast region to many Sudanese who are still in their villages or outside of settlements. A corollary of this is that if we ever wanted to move the internally displaced persons back to their homes, they would continue to be vulnerable.

There has been talk about increasing the levels of AU troops to 12,000. Is that feasible in any reasonable period of time? If not, what is your response, and what is your military judgment, with respect to the possibility of blue helmeting troops to get additional troops there?

General JONES. Thank you, Senator. This is a complex issue, because when you talk about training competent formations, military formations, depending on where they come from from donor countries, the distance factor, as I mentioned earlier, is a huge problem because it involves how you sustain these forces once they are there.

And a second challenge is how you rotate them, because they cannot obviously stay forever. So you need a rotation base for the force that goes in there. But given resources, of which the AU does not have a lot of, but given resources and given training commitments by competent nations who wish to do that kind of thing, capacity building, training headquarters, and the like, you could increase the capacity relatively quickly.

But it would take a dedicated commitment over a reasonably sustained period of time and the resources to do that. The training aspect of it is really not terribly difficult, but the totality of what needs to be done is expensive and it will take time. But it can be done.

Senator OBAMA. So is it your judgment, then, that it is something that would be useful, if we had the resources to do it?

General JONES. I think you could do it. And I think the African Union is the way to do it. I think in all of our activities, whether it is NATO or the U.S. European Command in Africa, we always try to make sure that there is African buy-in to what we are doing and there is an African identification with what we are doing. So that Africans must be involved in developing their own future. And it must be, in my view, the—it is nonnegotiable that they are off to the side while we are doing anything. They have to be fully involved and have ownership. And that works extraordinarily well, as you know.

Senator OBAMA. Right. Along those same lines, and let me broaden the lens here for a second, you know, we have a specific problem in Darfur, in Sudan. But as you are sadly aware, there are a lot of other potential hot spots throughout the Continent of Africa. One of the things that I am interested in is what lessons we have learned from a military perspective in terms of how we might be able to trigger early warning systems in Africa, and inject ourselves in a constructive way prior to things getting completely out

of control? How might NATO or the U.S. European Command play a role in conflict resolution in advance of the kinds of severe civil war situations that we are seeing?

General JONES. Senator, I thank you for that question, because that is something that we have been thinking quite about in the European Command, because it is at the essence of, I think, success and failure in the 21st Century. And the way I would answer the question is to say that I personally believe that reactive costs are always vastly more expensive than proactive costs. So I am an advocate for proactive engagement.

The key is to be able to decide where and at what time and how you engage. So whether it is the United States bilaterally or within a coalition or as part of NATO, I think the principle is the same. For example, in Africa, using the proactive versus reactive analogy, in 2004, we expended \$2.9 billion or 96 percent of our total Africa security costs in a reactive way, whereas a proactive engagement was only \$120 million.

And what I am trying to suggest here is that if we are able, and as we are doing, by the way, in North African and sub-Saharan African where there is a common coming together among nations about the concerns of security of their vastly undermanned spaces and their borders, which have shown the beginnings of Jihadism activities and recruiting, terrorism, if you will, we are engaging for a very small amount of money with U.S. forces and forces of other countries to help various nations train their forces in support of a democracy.

But the difference is we are not waiting for something bad to happen. We are doing it with them, pushing them to the front, encouraging them to work with their neighbors on this common problem. And it has been astounding to see the progress in a short period of time. It is not page one of the Washington Post, but it will help prevent a page one for the Washington Post in 10 years' time or 15 years' time. And I believe that this proactive engagement is really the key.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, General.

I would love at some point, Mr. Chairman, to explore this question further and get some specifics in terms of what is effective, what is not—

General JONES. I would be glad to.

Senator OBAMA. —and what that might mean in terms of our ongoing engagement with the continent. I appreciate your appearance here.

General JONES. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have additional questions, you may proceed, if you want to.

Senator OBAMA. I think the general has already been generous with his time. And you have been patient with me, as usual.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, sir.

General, we thank you again for your comprehensive analysis and for your personal leadership. And we appreciate the military personnel who have accompanied you to the hearing. Thanks again for all that you do for our country and for NATO and for EUCOM.

General JONES. Thank you very much, Senator. It is a pleasure to be here.

The CHAIRMAN. With that, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

APPENDIXES

Appendix I.—Prepared Statement¹ of the Honorable Robert B. Zoellick

Goals of U.S. Policy

Unified, peaceful Sudan that contributes to regional development and cooperates on counter-terrorism.

- Fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Accords (CPA) between North and South.
- Economic development of all areas of Sudan.
- Ending the recurring cycle of famine and suffering, cross-border violence, and refugee flows.
- Re-establish Sudan as a constructive participant in African and international affairs.
- Strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation.

A Government of National Unity that advances Sudan's development, is responsive to the needs of all Sudan's peoples, and is accountable to the Sudanese people through free elections.

- Participatory and inclusive democratic government in a federal system that respects human rights and shares resources for the benefit of all Sudanese.
- Successful, free, fair, and democratic elections at the local, regional, and national levels within four years.
- Build the capacity of the Government of Southern Sudan, improve conditions in southern Sudan and other marginalized areas.

An end to violence in Darfur, reconciliation among tribal and other groups, the voluntary return of people to their homes, and accountability for the perpetrators.

- In the meantime, humanitarian care and security for IDPs and other civilians in Darfur and Chad, and security of operations for NGOs and international donors.

Strengthened African Union capacity to provide basic security, ensure humanitarian access, and mediate political conflicts, drawing on success in Darfur and all of Sudan.

Demonstration of strong U.S. support for Africa's peaceful development and democracy.

Background and Context

Sudan has been marked by ethno-religious exclusivism since Khartoum traders and mercenaries carved out a state through conquest in the Nile Valley in the 19th Century.

Historically dominated by a small clique of traders, soldiers, and administrators.

- Drawn from tribes along the Nile north of Khartoum.
- Arab cultural and religious orientation; links to Cairo, Damascus, Saudi Arabia.

¹Deputy Zoellick's statement was presented to the committee in the form of a *Powerpoint* presentation. So that the statement could be included in this hearing print, we have converted the statement to simple text.

Khartoum has been an Arab metropolis surrounded by impoverished sub-Saharan expanses.

- In the South, a traditional African tribal structure (animist and Christian communities).
- In the West, in Darfur, a mixing of African-Arab Muslim tribes which have come over centuries in waves: West Africans on long migrations (and trade routes); ancient Saharan peoples; and Arab tribes from the North.

Mixture of nomads and farmers, complex networks connected to desert-edged villages, very dependent on rain-fed (boom and bust) agriculture and grasses.

- In the North, a mixture of Arab tribes (comprised of Nubians—a significant minority group) predominate in the urban areas.
- In the East, generally egalitarian, pastoral Beja with ancestral ties to Egypt and Nubians.

In the past (until 1989), a weak center in Khartoum co-opted regional constituencies to create a power base.

- Independent Fur Sultanate (of 17th century) of Darfur overthrown by the British in 1916.
- Imperial “native administration” awarded homelands with paramount chiefs, displacing older, more fluid social order. (Some nomadic groups didn’t get lands, lighting a long fuse for the future.)
- Rule depended on effectiveness of local leadership and government.
- Tribal conferences as a means to settle disputes.

Sudan achieved independence from Great Britain in 1956.

- Largest country on the continent.
- Borders nine other countries.
- Estimated 40 million people in 2005.

Roots of conflict:

- Strong resentment from the periphery of Muslim Arab domination at the center—southern groups commence struggle coincident with independence in 1956.
- Peace agreement in 1972 failed because it was not fully implemented; GOS imposed Shari’a Law in 1983; southern civil war resumes under the leadership of Dr. John Garang, a southerner who had been integrated into the GOS military during the 1972 peace implementation.
- First use of government-mobilized militias in the South as a counterinsurgency strategy in mid-1980s, drawing on cattle-herding Arabs of Darfur (reliance on brutality, starvation, and robbery).
- An estimated two and one-half million die in conflict that stretches across 21 years. Millions more displaced internally and externally.

Darfur in conflict in the mid-1980s:

- Drought and famine of 1984–85—breakdown and migration.
- In 1987, Libya used the region as a “backdoor” into Chad.
- “Islamic Legion” and a new racial ideology (“Arabism”).

In 1989, General Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir overthrew the government to abort a peace initiative and established the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation to rule Sudan. The National Islamic Front, led by Dr. Hassan al Turabi, took over as the leading party.

Hyperinflation of 1978–95 wipes out Sudan’s traditional middle-class.

Turabi prosecutes a vicious war in the south; reaches out with Islamic embrace in Darfur, but without real effect on development.

In 1992, declaration of Jihad in Kordofan against SPLA-led Nuba Mountains rebellion; failed effort to create Islamic state through force.

In 1998, army, militias, and starvation used in oilfield zones of Upper Nile province in southern Sudan; battle over money and power, as well as Islam.

During 1990s, Turabi hosts Osama bin Laden.

U.S. attack on a suspect WMD production facility possibly linked to al-Qaida in Khartoum, August 1998.

In 1999, split within Islamic movement in Khartoum: President Bashir arrests Turabi.

The U.S. launches a peace initiative for Sudan in early 2001. Senator Danforth appointed September 5, 2001.

After September 11, 2001, the GOS accelerates reorientation toward the U.S.

- Bashir fearful of Sudan's association with terrorists.
- GOS cannot defeat Garang and the SPLM militarily.

Politics driven by exhaustion—worn down by decades of war, failure of ambitious ideological projects—and substantial U.S. and international pressure led to North-South Accord (Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)) signed in January 2005.

- New pattern of power-sharing among geographically-defined constituencies.
- Prospects for development (in part through energy) with greater international acceptance.

Outside Khartoum, the impulse for equality and emancipation pulls in opposite directions: Should the peripheries win strongest possible representation at the center to obtain fair share of power and resources, or should they break away?

Khartoum's old habits—and fears of separation—are also in tension with the negotiated power-sharing.

- In 2002, some Darfurians complained of Arab militia harassment; the problem festered and the rebels attacked a police station in 2003.
- Even as Khartoum negotiated with the SPLM in the south (starting 2002), it unleashed the army and a brutal militia counterinsurgency in Darfur in 2003.
- Some in Khartoum believe CPA negotiation gives away too much.
- Large loss of life, widespread rape and destruction of villages, over two million forced from their homelands. Violence carried out by government forces, Arab militias (Jinjaweed), SLA, and JEM. Large-scale interference with humanitarian programs by GOS.
- Some Darfur rebels (SLA) have ties with SPLM.
- U.S. finds genocide has occurred in Darfur (September 9, 2004); UN rules "crimes against humanity" (January 2005).

Dangers elsewhere in Sudan: Eastern provinces as well as Kordofan.

- Need to try to prevent flare ups of violence.

Strong African interest to: avoid destabilization of nine neighbors; prevent possible breakups of states; demonstrate the African Union's ability to deal with African problems.

The Naivasha (North-South) Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

U.S. initiative led to active IGAD peace process.

Begun in 2002, signed January 9, 2005.

- U.S. mediation vital, led by Senator Danforth.

A fair political arrangement founded on power and wealth sharing, leading to national elections within 4 years.

- Very detailed implementation requirements.
- Pre-Interim period ended as scheduled on July 9.

Ratified Interim National Constitution, initiating a new Government of National Unity for 6-Year Interim Period.

Established new Institution of Presidency (Garang sworn in as First VP).

Instituted a bicameral national legislature (established September 1, 2005).

Shared ministerial positions (announced September 20, 2005).

Established legal basis for Government of Southern Sudan.

- Commits parties to develop process for competitive elections, oil-revenue sharing, joint-integrated military units, and respect for human rights.
- South can "opt-out" through referendum at end of 6-Year Interim Period.

Death of Dr. John Garang

On July 30, Dr. Garang was killed in a helicopter crash. The U.S. dispatched an NTSB team to participate in the international investigation of the crash's causes, deemed an accident by Mrs. Garang and the SPLM (final report expected January 2006).

Communal violence erupts in Khartoum, Juba, and other cities.

- To address sources of fragility, we accelerated work in Juba (water and sanitation, electricity, food assistance), in the three transition areas (Abyei, Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile), and with the new Government of South Sudan.

Salva Kiir, Garang's deputy, is announced as the new head of the SPLM and First Vice President of Sudan in an orderly succession process, signaling reliance on CPA.

Dr. Garang is buried in Juba, the "capital" of the South on August 6 with President Bashir and Salva Kiir participating in the service. Security was provided by joint SPLA and GOS military forces.

Sensitive moment for both new SPLM leadership and North-South working relations.

Dr. Garang was the strongest Southern voice for a unified Sudan under the CPA.

The CPA and Darfur: Reinforcing Upward, Arresting Downward Spirals

The CPA creates a political and constitutional framework for sharing authority and wealth within which to end the conflicts in Darfur and other regions.

SPLM involvement in the new Government of National Unity should also help resolve Darfur.

Backing by the U.S. and countries around the world creates a positive incentive to come to terms.

So the "upward spiral" is CPA implementation, a new Sudanese government and approach, an expanded AU mission on the ground, and reconciliation in Darfur (and other areas) within this political framework.

But ongoing tragedy in Darfur will preclude U.S. and other support for the new government and CPA implementation: the "downward spiral."

Darfur's Needs:

Supply food and basic necessities to camps for people forced off lands (some 2 million) and communities affected by the conflict; improve security inside and outside camps; foster political reconciliation among the government, rebel groups, and various tribes; and redress long-term economic and social issues driving conflict.

Good rains, improved security, and the distribution of seeds has led to a projected 60% increase over 2004 in the amount of crops planted in West Darfur, the most stable of the three states of Darfur. Increases have been seen in all three states.

However, insecurity and limited access will still interfere with the 2005 harvest. Continued food assistance will be needed in 2006.

Drought exacerbating human needs, increasing displaced populations.

Food flowing: AID has done a great job along with NGOs.

- 68% of food delivered to Darfur in 2005 is supplied by the U.S.
- GOS harassment of NGOs has decreased while rebel harassment and banditry has increased.

The AU is expanding security forces to 7,700 (currently 6,003 deployed).

- NATO/EU are providing transport, logistical, planning support.
- Deployment targeted for completion in October 2005.
- Expand AU police operations to about 70 camps. Need to stress safety of women.
- Sudanese government supports AU/NATO role.
- U.S.: Airlifted Rwandans; visited Rwanda to discuss and thank; \$50 million deployed promptly to build quarters; assisted with AU planning and logistics.

Secretary Rice made ending violence against women a major priority. Sudanese government has made commitments; U.S. has linked progress to Trafficking in Per-

sons status. U.S. will support by opening women's crisis centers in Darfur and monitoring progress closely.

Large-scale organized violence has substantially subsided, but situation remains fragile and dangerous.

GOS military pulled back, but Jinjaweed and other militias have not been disbanded and continue to contribute to the violence.

Rebels (SLA/JEM) active, attacking humanitarian convoys and fighting over livestock.

- JEM connects with Turabi, the former Prime Minister.
- Recent increase in violence; possibly positioning for negotiations.

AU peace talks between GOS and rebels have made modest progress, resumed September 15 with training workshops; substantive talks began September 26

- Declaration of Principles signed July 5, 2005.
- Important for the AU to continue to lead.
- SLM infighting has impeded talks.
- U.S. supporting through work with UN representative, partner countries for AU, SPLM, senior U.S. officials on the scene.

UN resolutions on economic sanctions and accountability signal no impunity for crimes against humanity or genocide, by any party.

- ICC has begun its investigations.

Goal is to create secure environment and political, tribal reconciliation so people can voluntarily return home safely beginning during the first half of 2006.

- Disarm militias.
- Still face huge challenge of restarting life, redressing issues of land, grazing rights, and water.
- Tribal tensions due to land, drought, new settlements will remain—conflict among tribes over local resources.

CPA Follow-Through:

Oslo Donors Conference:

- \$4.5 billion pledges (for CPA implementation and humanitarian needs throughout Sudan); need delivery.
- U.S. (for all of Sudan): \$630 million in FY 2004; \$1.135 billion in FY 2005, plus additional \$132 million CIPA; seeking \$540 million in FY 2006, plus additional \$250 million CIPA.
- Norway leading on follow-up for donors. From FY 2003-2005, U.S. has committed more than \$1.9 billion to Sudan.

UNSC Resolution 1590 on March 24 authorized 10,715 observer force for southern Sudan. (2622 deployed as of 21 September 2005)

- UNSC Resolution 1627 (September 23) extended the UNMIS mandate through March 24, 2006.
- Deployment started in May 2005; aim for completion by December 2005.
- U.S. maintaining Civilian Protection Monitoring Team through October; excellent monitoring work.

Food shortages for returnees and displaced persons.

- U.S. has provided over 61% of food delivered to non-Darfur Sudan in 2005.
- Acute food shortages are occurring in remote areas of Sudan, including parts of Bahr Al Ghazal, Nuba Mountains, and Upper Nile.
- Prospects are better for the 2005 harvest, but estimates suggest it will still be far less than normal. The pace of population returns to Southern Sudan is expected to accelerate following the rainy season and the consolidation of the Government of Southern Sudan, which will increase humanitarian needs.
- Peace in Darfur will increase humanitarian requirements to support returns.

Press Sudanese Government to work with SPLM and Uganda on Lord's Resistance Army (in far south).

Working with Government of Southern Sudan to set up basic institutional capabilities:

- Sent Interagency Assessment Team.
- Total of \$19.68 million in FY05 for programs to assist the formation of the GOSS.
- Need to show progress and transparency in the south.

Continuing to push the Sudanese government on CPA implementation in an inclusive fashion (to include other groups).

Formation of the Government of National Unity and other CPA steps delayed due to death of Dr. Garang.

- Need to work with GONU through the challenging transition.
- U.S. team arrived promptly to signal U.S. support for CPA and consult with the parties on the way forward in the wake of Dr. Garang's death.
- SPLM and Salva Kiir have affirmed support for the CPA.
- CPA implementation moving forward. New National Assembly with SPLM representation has met. President Bashir made positive statement.
- GONU was formally constituted with appointment of new ministers on September 20.
- Need to support formation of Government of Southern Sudan.

Support safe and voluntary return of displaced Sudanese.

Encourage GONU to improve international acceptability.

- Especially Darfur, handling of IDPs and refugees.

Encourage new policies at national, local, and provincial governance; promoting security and community-level conflict resolution; economic development; and health and education.

- GONU needs to cease forced relocations of IDPs from sites near Khartoum.

Issues Regarding CPA Implementation

Delays related to Dr. Garang's death.

Steady reduction of Sudanese military forces in Juba is a prerequisite for Juba serving as the new capital for the Government of Southern Sudan.

Key mechanisms of CPA need to be put in place, e.g. Assessment and Evaluation Commission, National Petroleum Commission.

Need active SPLM engagement in GONU.

Need powers in Khartoum to work seriously with SPLM as GONU partners.

Stop violent displacement of IDPs in Khartoum by State authorities.

GONU partners need to act jointly to eliminate LRA presence in Sudan.

The report of the Abyei Boundaries Commission needs to be implemented in a manner that fully complies with the provisions of the CPA.

In Summary

Need to work with Sudan an multiple transitions:

- War to peace.
- Centralization to genuine federalism—devolution of power.
- Emergency to development.
- Military rule to democracy.

Upward or Downward Spirals.

Working closely with AU.

- Multilateral diplomacy with particular African partners; the UN; Arab states; UK, Canada, Norway, Netherlands; NATO; EU; others.

Three visits to Khartoum, different parts of Darfur, Rumbek in southern Sudan.


Secretary Rice visited Khartoum and Darfur in mid-July.

Appointed Special Representative Roger Winter to augment my personal involvement, working closely with Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer.


Will need Congressional support and resources.

Not a smooth, nor clear-cut path.


Must concentrate on both achieving accords and implementing them—lots of detailed work.



SUDAN




AMIS Locations in Darfur as of Sept. 9, 2005




Map of UNMIS Sector Allocations

Funding FY 2004-FY 2006

U. S. Assistance to Sudan/Chad (excluding Assessed Contributions)




FY2005 includes supplemental funding.
 In addition, U.S. contributions to UN Peacekeeping for Sudan: FY05=\$132M, FY06=\$250M
 FY 2006 does not reflect potential reallocations of foreign assistance funds to meet emergent needs.




FY 2005 includes \$113.4 million in supplemental funding, including \$25 million in PL 480 food aid. Some accounts in FY 2006 are estimates based upon allocations from regional and global accounts. Emergency resources are allocated against emergency priority needs. Food and disaster assistance numbers could change depending on appropriation level and reallocations to meet emergent needs during FY 06.

Darfur/Chad: Non-Humanitarian Aid FY 04 - FY 06




FY 2005 includes \$50 million in supplemental funding to support the African Union Mission in Sudan.

Sudan (non-Darfur): Humanitarian Aid FY 04 - FY 06



FY 2005 includes \$75 million in supplemental funding, including \$70 million in PL 480 food aid. Some accounts in FY 2006 are estimates based upon allocations from regional and global accounts. Emergency resources are allocated against emergency priority needs. Food and disaster numbers could change depending on appropriation level and needs during FY 06.

Sudan (non-Darfur): Reconstruction and Other Non-Humanitarian Aid FY 04 - FY 06



FY 2005 includes \$32 million in supplemental funding for security sector reform and implementation of the CPA. Some accounts in FY 2006 are estimates based upon allocations from regional and global accounts and could increase. Emergency resources are allocated against emergency priority needs. Excludes potential allocation of FY 2006 requested funding for a Conflict Response Fund and other potential transfers using Foreign Assistance Act authorities.

Appendix II.—Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Members of the Committee to Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BIDEN
TO DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELICK

Question. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who are operational have said that the presence of the African Union (AU) has made a difference, but there are some problems. First, the AU is ill-equipped. For example, one of the AU brigades in North Darfur is woefully under equipped with only two vehicles for 144 soldiers, and one AK-47 rifle and two magazines of ammunition per soldier, which seems to me to be barely enough for self-defense. Second, civilians on the ground say that the armed groups get to know the AU schedule. If the AU patrols on Friday, for example, the attacks happen on a Wednesday. So the janjaweed are able to outsmart the AU much of the time. As a result, many civilians are losing confidence in the AU's ability to improve security.

Is it true that the AU is not properly equipped to do its job? Is the current AU appeal for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) fully funded? How much money was requested specifically to support AMIS in the President's FY 06 budget request? Out of which account was it requested? How much money do you anticipate needing in the coming year to support the AU? What are we doing bilaterally through NATO, to improve the capabilities of the contingents on the ground to provide security effectively?

Answer. The presence of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has made a notable difference and has contributed to the fact that large-scale violence in Darfur has subsided, particularly in those areas where AMIS is deployed. We are continuing to work closely with Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, the EU, NATO and others to make sure that AMIS has what it needs to successfully accomplish its mission. We have committed over \$160 million to AMIS thus far, primarily for camp construction, operations and maintenance. We are encouraging the EU to release the €70 million it has identified for AMIS in 2006 from its African Peace Facility. Since NATO became involved, we have been able to coordinate the airlift to Darfur of nearly 5,000 additional AMIS personnel as well as provide additional training for newly deployed and rotating troops. AMIS is now at approximately 6,100 personnel on the ground. We are also working to deploy 105 Canadian-contributed Armored Personnel Carriers and support vehicles to Darfur as part of Canada's larger \$100 million-plus AMIS commitment. In addition to NATO airlift assistance, we continue coordinate with AMIS to pursue the possibility of an expanded NATO support role to bolster command and control in discussions with the AU.

Due to the evolving and expanding AMIS operation throughout FY 05, and our budget cycles, the Administration did not request funds to support AMIS in the President's FY 06 budget. To fund AMIS we were compelled to allocate \$160 million in PKO funds from FY 05 accounts and the FY05 supplemental. We urge Congress' support for new Sudan funding needs and we will continue to work with Congress to ensure that AMIS is properly equipped, particularly for such needs as ground and aviation fuel, salaries and medical assistance, and camp operations and maintenance.

But ending the violence in Darfur will take more than just improving the capabilities of peacekeeping forces. We are working hard to augment the AU's capabilities to deter and, when necessary, respond to ceasefire violations by any side. But we and the AU believe the ultimate solution to violence in Darfur is a peace agreement in Abuja. For that reason, we support the AU mediation with technical experts. Our continued strong pressure on both the government and the Darfur rebels underscores to the parties our determination to resolve the Darfur crisis.

Question. Rape has been rampant in Darfur. According to NGO's working in the field, even in instances in which the general security situation improves, sexual violence continues unabated. The requirement for women to go through the police to seek medical care—which the government knows they will rarely do—still exists de facto if not de jure. Clearly the government is prepared to go to extraordinary lengths to prevent the world from knowing the extensive use of sexual violence as a weapon of war in Darfur. Do you agree with those who say that sexual violence in Darfur has not diminished and that the perpetrators operate with complete impunity?

Answer. Secretary Rice and I believe that ending violence against women is a critical component of our policy on Sudan. During our visits to Darfur, both the Secretary and I spoke with victims and heard their horrific stories. In response, the United States has taken a number of steps to address this problem, and we are beginning to see some changes, but much more remains to be done.

For example, we launched an initiative to combat violence against women, including working with the Government of National Unity (GONU) to implement new institutional policies and procedures to protect women from violence and end the impunity long associated with the crime of rape. One component of our plan is the opening and expansion of women's crisis centers in IDP camps.

We are also aggressively monitoring an action plan developed by the Government of National Unity aimed at violence against women in Darfur. This action plan includes removal of the notorious "Form 8" filing requirement, which forced rape victims to file a form with the police before seeking medical attention. The Sudanese penal code has been amended to clarify that Form 8 is no longer required for rape victims seeking medical services. Further, we are pressing the Sudanese government to disseminate information on the removal of the Form 8 requirement at every level of government. Additionally, the Sudanese action plan includes a series of workshops in Khartoum and the state capitals in Darfur intended to raise awareness that violence against women is a crime punishable by law. Under the plan, police forces will be given extra training on protecting human rights, especially those of women and girls. Vice President Taha has agreed to chair a technical committee devoted to overseeing implementation of this action plan.

Local government officials in Darfur have started to acknowledge that rape is a problem—this is a big step from a few months ago, but is clearly only a first step. In order to change the climate of impunity, government officials must take steps to enforce appropriate laws. We have used resolutions at the UN to pressure the government to end the climate of impunity, such as UNSCR 1591, establishing a UN Sanctions committee empowered to freeze the assets and impose travel bans on individuals responsible for violence and atrocities in Darfur.

Question. According to the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Sudan was removed from Tier 3 to Tier 2 Watchlist because of the government's commitment to implement a plan of action to end sexual violence against women in Darfur. What does sexual violence in Darfur have to do with trafficking in persons? Are people being trafficked from Darfur? Why did the announcement of a plan—rather than its implementation—prompt the removal of Sudan from Tier 3?

Answer. Sexual violence is directly related to trafficking in persons. In Darfur, one of the consequences of rape is cultural ostracism. Victims are often forced to leave their home communities, shunned by family members, and left with no resources to care for themselves and their children, and often find themselves vulnerable targets of abduction, trafficking, and further sexual exploitation. For other girls and women, a sexual assault may be only the first act of violation, to be followed by abduction and sale into servitude.

The Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report released on June 1, 2005, stated that Sudan is a source country for women and children trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and sexual exploitation. On July 21, Secretary Rice visited an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in Darfur, talked with victims of rape, and emphasized the need for the government to actively take steps to combat violence against women in Darfur. On August 13, the Sudanese responded with an action plan, indicating the steps it would take and the ministries responsible for implementation. During the next month, the government began to implement the plan and we are seeing the first steps of recognition by local governments in Darfur that sexual violence is a problem that must be addressed.

The TIP legislation is designed to encourage and to acknowledge government planning to combat trafficking. In accordance with the legislation, the Administration placed Sudan on the Tier 2 Watch List (T2WL) for TIP on a probationary basis, based on its action plan. Since the T2WL designation involves no change in US policy other than a prohibition, we view this action as an incentive to achieve better results on this important issue, which is the objective of our TIP efforts.

Of particular note, the Government sent an order to the Director General of the Ministry of Interior to distribute Form 8 clarification (Form 8 required a Sudanese woman to name her assailant, in the case of rape, before she was able to receive medical treatment—a procedure which put many women at immediate risk of retaliation by the accused) to all police stations in Darfur. We have told the Sudanese we expect progress on the plan and a tangible demonstration of improvements in

the status of women in Darfur. We plan an interim assessment in two months and will continue to reevaluate Sudan's TIP ranking.

Question. What is the U.S. Government doing to ensure that over 11,500 aid workers on the ground in Darfur are able to provide desperately needed humanitarian services in an increasingly hostile environment?

Answer. During my trips to Darfur, I have been impressed by the dedication and professionalism of the NGO workers I have met—they work under extremely difficult conditions and yet bring care and commitment to their work. When I visit Sudan, I always make it a point to visit NGO workers and talk with them about ways we can help.

I have personally intervened with the SLM to respect and support the efforts of humanitarian workers. The SLM issued a statement stating it would protect these workers. During the course of my last visit, I also raised my concern over the commercial traffic ban at the Kalma IDP camp.

We are working closely with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the UN, international partners, and non-government organizations to create a secure environment for delivery of humanitarian relief and ensure that these workers have the support they need in order to be able to reach the people in need.

In partnership with the UN, AMIS is focused on ensuring the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. Much of AMIS's activity is through what they call "military diplomacy." They mediate conflict by facilitating dialogue between warring tribal groups. When I was in Golo, Rwandan Deputy Force Commander Kazura pulled together representatives from the Sudanese Government, the SLA, and several local NGOs to jointly agreed on the creation of a humanitarian corridor so that injured civilians could reach a local hospital.

We continue to encourage the AU to coordinate closely with NGOs to ensure that AMIS efforts to improve overall security in Darfur are also carefully directed at producing a secure environment for delivery of humanitarian relief. When requested and possible, AMIS provides escort for humanitarian convoys. To further facilitate the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance to the most critically vulnerable populations throughout Darfur, the USG has also provided more than \$17.8 million to the UN World Food Program for the transportation of humanitarian personnel and goods in difficult to access areas, as well as for logistics, road rehabilitation, and communications support.

But ending the violence in Darfur will take more than just changing the composition and capabilities of peacekeeping forces. We are working hard to augment the AU's capabilities to deter and, when necessary, respond to ceasefire violations by any side. But we and the AU believe the ultimate solution to violence in Darfur is a peace agreement in Abuja.

Question. What role, if any, do you believe the UN will play in peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace-building in Darfur over the long-term?

Answer. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has had considerable success in stopping large-scale organized violence in Darfur under extremely difficult conditions. The strong support provided by the United States and other nations to AMIS has forged a partnership that highlights the importance of enabling African responses to African crises. Though acts of violence and banditry still occur in Darfur, the UN and other international observers agree that AMIS has been critical to improving the conditions for the people of Darfur in the areas where it operates.

AMIS has made an unprecedented effort to end the violence and atrocities in Darfur, but we need to assess continually whether it has the capacity for future operations such as facilitating the return of refugees and IDPs. AMIS has a broad mandate, and the number of AMIS troops has increased, but as this complex and multidimensional peacekeeping mission expands, we need to evaluate how AMIS is responding. An AU-led assessment mission will visit Darfur in December for this purpose. The mission will include U.S., EU, UN, and NATO representatives.

We remain focused on increasing international support to AMIS, while also working closely with the AU and others to determine next steps. We will proceed carefully with this assessment since we don't want to undermine this important African response to a major African problem. Further, we want to ensure the possible extension of a UN peacekeeping force, and that its troop components correspond to Darfur sensibilities and needs. As you are aware, while the UN peacekeeping force in the South (UNMIS) is established, it is not yet fully deployed. Among the options we will examine jointly with the AU is whether there should be an increased role for

the UN, and possibly one which could incorporate elements of the AU peacekeeping force.

But ending the violence in Darfur will take more than just changing the composition and capabilities of peacekeeping forces. We are working hard to to augment the AU's capabilities to deter and, when necessary, respond to ceasefire violations by any side. But we and the international community believe the ultimate solution to violence in Darfur is a peace agreement in Abuja.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KERRY
TO DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK

Question. Large scale attacks by the government forces and related militias have declined in recent months. But daily attacks against civilians and aid workers continue, in a climate of banditry and lawlessness. Just this month, a humanitarian convoy was ambushed by armed men, villages in south Darfur were attacked by Arab tribesman, and commercial convoys were attacked in west Darfur. The aid workers were robbed, beaten, and threatened with death if they returned to the region. And displaced civilians throughout many of the Darfur regions say they still did not feel safe enough to go home, despite deployment of the African Union forces.

Is the administration convinced that the African Union, even with logistical and transport assistance from NATO, is an adequate international response to the ongoing genocide in Darfur?

Answer. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has made an impact and is justifiably proud of what it has accomplished. Though acts of violence and banditry still occur in Darfur, AMIS has been critical to improving the conditions for the people of Darfur in the areas where it operates. AMIS has showed the importance of enabling African responses to African crises, with strong support from the United States and other international donors.

AMIS has made an unprecedented effort to end the violence and atrocities in Darfur, but we need to assess continually whether it has the capacity for future operations such as facilitating the return of refugees and IDPs. AMIS has a broad mandate, and the number of AMIS troops has increased, but as this complex and multidimensional peacekeeping mission expands, we need to evaluate how AMIS is responding. An AU-led assessment mission will visit Darfur in December for this purpose. The mission will include U.S., EU, UN, and NATO representatives.

We are focused on increasing international support to AMIS, while also working closely with the AU and others to determine next steps. Among the options we will examine jointly with the AU is whether there should be an increased role for the UN. We will proceed carefully with this assessment since we don't want to undermine this important African response to a major African problem. Further, we want to ensure the possible extension of a UN peacekeeping force, and that its troop components correspond to Darfur sensibilities and needs. As you are aware, while the UN peacekeeping force in the South (UNMIS) is established, it is not yet fully deployed. Among the options we will examine jointly with the AU is whether there should be an increased role for the UN, and possibly one which could incorporate elements of the AU peacekeeping force. But ending the violence in Darfur will take more than just changing the composition and capabilities of peacekeeping forces. We are working hard to augment the AU's already impressive capabilities to deter and, when necessary, respond to ceasefire violations by any side. But we and the AU believe the ultimate solution to violence in Darfur is a peace agreement in Abuja.

Question. Reportedly, many of those perpetrating violence on the ground are fully aware of the African Union's limited mandate and believe that AU forces will not intervene during violent clashes. In addition, many civilians seem to be losing confidence because of apparent confusion among various African troop contributors over the mandate.

- a. How does the administration interpret the mandate of the AU forces?
- b. Do you believe that the mandate allows these forces to intervene and protect civilians? If so, in what way and under what conditions?
- c. Do you believe the mandate should be expanded and would the administration support such an expansion?
- d. Wouldn't it make sense to give all of the AU forces a clear mandate and robust rules of engagement to provide the security environment we say we want?

Answer. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has a broad mandate that allows troops to monitor and observe compliance with the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement; to assist in the process of confidence building; to contribute to a secure environment for delivery of humanitarian relief; to support the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes; and, to contribute to the improvement of the overall security situation in Darfur. The AU's mandate and rules of engagement were expanded in May to include allowing AU troops "to protect civilians under imminent threat." Though acts of violence and banditry still occur in Darfur, the international community agrees that AMIS has been critical to improving the conditions for the people of Darfur in the areas where it operates.

We would support any expansion of the mandate that the AU feels necessary to better ensure that violence and banditry are reduced and that would bolster the confidence of the Darfur people. However, the central issue is more one of resources and its role. We have consulted with AMIS about its needs, assured it that we would support a further augmentation of troops, and redoubled our efforts to deploy 105 Canadian contributed Armored Personnel Carriers to Darfur. However, since these are AU troops, adopting a more robust peacekeeping role could also increase the threat level to these troops. Of necessity we look to the AMIS leadership to make the decision about the appropriate combat response, since it is one which affects the lives of their personnel.

But a broadened AU mandate or more troops on the ground will not solve the fundamental problems in Darfur. Ending the violence in Darfur will take more than a military solution; it will require a political agreement in Abuja. Consequently, our efforts are focused in two directions: strengthening AMIS in Darfur and accelerating the Abuja peace process upon which a sustainable peace depends.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR OBAMA
TO DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK

Question. Mr. Secretary, in July, 2004, the AU prepared a plan for making the mission in Sudan more effective. This plan emphasized the importance of disarming Janjaweed militias protecting civilians, and facilitating humanitarian assistance.

The AU, however, soon concluded that Khartoum's tacit cooperation was needed for successful deployment—limiting the scope of AU activities to those acceptable to the Sudanese government and significantly scaling back the AU's mandate.

a. The AU is doing extremely dangerous work under some of the most difficult conditions imaginable, and I applaud their efforts. However, my question is this: as long as the AU mission—no matter how good its intentions—is built within a framework that rests on the tacit approval of Khartoum, isn't it inherently limited on what it can hope to accomplish in Darfur?

b. How can we change the AU mission to get out of this box? How do we divorce the structure of the AU away from the influence of Khartoum?

c. Let me play devil's advocate and ask if you believe the AU approach to be flawed? Do we need to be thinking about options outside the AU—such as a UN "blue helmeted" peacekeeping mission, with a strong mandate from the Security Council and a steady funding stream? Do we need to consider some other approach?

Answer. I agree that the African Union (AU) is doing hard work and has had success. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has made an unprecedented effort to end large-scale violence and atrocities in Darfur. The strong support provided by the United States and other nations has forged a partnership that highlights the importance of enabling African responses to African crises. Though acts of violence and banditry still occur in Darfur, the UN and other international observers agree that AMIS has been critical to improving the conditions for the people of Darfur in the areas where it operates. Importantly, the AU's presence in Darfur has provided international observation of the conflict and the activities of each party.

The Sudanese government has given permission to the AU to operate a military mission inside its territory partly because the AU has played such an effective mediating role. Khartoum granted approval for 105 armored personnel carriers that have been made available to AMIS by our Canadian allies. The Sudanese government has also agreed to NATO and European Union airlift assistance to AMIS.

AMIS has made an unprecedented effort to end the violence and atrocities in Darfur, but we need to assess continually whether it has the capacity for future operations such as facilitating the return of refugees and IDPs. AMIS has a broad mandate, and the number of AMIS troops has increased but as this complex and

multidimensional peacekeeping mission expands, we need to evaluate how AMIS is responding. An AU-led assessment mission will visit Darfur in November for this purpose. The mission will include U.S., EU, UN, and NATO representatives.

We are focused on increasing international support to AMIS, while also working closely with the AU and others to determine next steps. Among the options we will examine jointly with the AU is whether there should be an increased role for the UN, and one that possibly could incorporate elements of the AU peacekeeping force. An AU-led assessment mission will visit Darfur in December for this purpose. The mission will include U.S., EU, UN, and NATO representatives.

But ending the violence in Darfur will take more than just changing the composition and capabilities of peacekeeping forces. We are working hard to augment the AU's capabilities to deter, and when necessary, respond to ceasefire violations by any side. But we and the AU believe the ultimate solution to violence in Darfur is a peace agreement in Abuja.

To fund AMIS we were compelled to allocate \$160 million in PKO funds from FY 05 accounts and the FY 05 supplemental. We could help AMIS more if we had the financial resources. We look for an increase in financial support from the Congress in the next spending bill.

Question. Mr. Secretary, there is no question that the AU is doing dangerous work under some of the most difficult conditions imaginable. That said, a number of analysts have identified three basic problems with the AU Mission in Sudan:

One, a problematic mandate, which is not sufficiently clear concerning the protection of civilians and humanitarian workers. Two, a lack of troops—at most 7,700 soldiers by the end of October (current levels are between 5,500 and 5,800)—to patrol a vast area. Three, a lack of capacity: intelligence, interoperability, logistics, and air support.

a. Are we sure that we can do enough to fix these three base, but substantial, flaws of the AU Mission in Sudan—in a relatively short amount of time—in order for this force to be effective at ending the violence in Darfur? Or should we be thinking of solutions outside of the AU?

b. Mr. Secretary, please detail what the U.S. and the international community is doing to address the flaws—that I just outlined—with the AU mission. Is this enough? What else can and should be done?

Answer. We believe that the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) can be justifiably proud of what it has accomplished. Though acts of violence and banditry still occur in Darfur, the UN and international observers agree that AMIS has been critical to transforming the security situation and improving the conditions for the people of Darfur in the areas where it is operational. The strong support provided by the United States and other nations to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has highlighted the importance of enabling African responses to African crises.

We are working with other donors and now NATO to increase AMIS capacity. We are working closely with Canada to provide and maintain 105 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) to AMIS troops. The U.S. has provided 16 experienced contract military observers; promoted and supported NATO airlift and training; and initiated regular joint assessment missions. In addition, our work on camp construction, operation, and maintenance provides the backbone of AMIS's logistical infrastructure.

AMIS has a broad mandate that allows troops to monitor and observe compliance with the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement; to assist in the process of confidence building; to contribute to a secure environment for delivery of humanitarian relief; to support the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes; and, to contribute to the improvement of the overall security situation in Darfur. The AU's mandate and rules of engagement were expanded in May to include allowing AU troops "to protect civilians under imminent threat."

We would support any expansion of the mandate that the AU feels necessary to better ensure that violence and banditry are reduced and that would bolster the confidence of the Darfur people. However, the central issue is more one of resources and its role. We have consulted with AMIS about its needs, and assured it that we would support a further augmentation of troops, and we have redoubled our efforts to deploy 105 Canadian contributed Armored Personnel Carriers to Darfur. The AU remains essentially a monitoring force. It is not in Darfur to fight a war or enforce the peace. Since these are AU troops, adopting a more robust peacekeeping role could increase the threat level to these troops. Of necessity we look to the AMIS leadership to make the decision about the appropriate combat response, since it is one which affects the lives of their personnel.

AMIS has made an unprecedented effort to end the violence and atrocities in Darfur, but we need to assess continually whether it has the capacity for future operations such as facilitating the return of refugees and IDPs. AMIS has a broad mandate, and the number of AMIS troops has increased to almost 6,100 currently, but as this complex and multidimensional peacekeeping mission expands, we need to evaluate how AMIS is responding.

We are focused on increasing international support to AMIS, while also working closely with the AU and others to determine next steps. Among the options we will examine jointly with the AU is whether there should be an increased role for the UN, and possibly one which could incorporate elements of the AU peacekeeping force.

We will proceed carefully with this assessment since we don't want to undermine this important African response to a major African problem. Further, we want to ensure the possible extension of a UN peacekeeping force, and that its troop components correspond to Darfur sensibilities and needs. As you are aware, while the UN peacekeeping force in the South (UNMIS) is established, it is not yet fully deployed.

Ending the violence in Darfur will take more than just changing the composition and capabilities of peacekeeping forces. We are working hard to augment the AU's capabilities to deter and, when necessary, respond to ceasefire violations by any side. But we and the AU believe the ultimate solution to violence in Darfur is a peace agreement in Abuja. For this reason, we continue to support the AU mediation with technical experts, work closely with all the parties at the peace talks, and keep the pressure on the government and rebel groups to move them to reach a swift settlement.

Question. Senior Rwandan officials have asserted that, despite the limited AU mandate, Rwandan troops would defend civilians if attacked. There have been instances, documented by NGOs, where Rwandan troops have taken up positions to prevent the Janjaweed from attacking civilian villages.

- a. Does the U.S. Government believe that the Rwandans are acting appropriately and are we encouraging other members of the AU Mission in Sudan to follow suit?
- b. Mr. Secretary, how does the U.S. Government read the AU mandate? Does it allow for the protection of civilians?
- c. What are the implications for the mission if you have different components of the AU forces interpreting the mandate differently?

Answer. The AU's mandate and rules of engagement were expanded in May to specifically include language allowing AU troops "to protect civilians under imminent threat." I have seen similar reports of Rwandans being proactive and have also heard of AMIS forces positioning armed personnel carriers in IDP camps to deter attacks. I believe they are acting appropriately and we similarly encourage others, recognizing it's their lives that are on the line. In addition, the African Union (AU) mandate allows troops to monitor and observe compliance with the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement; to assist in the process of confidence building; to contribute to a secure environment for delivery of humanitarian relief; to support the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes; and, to contribute to the improvement of the overall security situation in Darfur. I believe that the AU understands and is implementing its mandate, although performance varies. We would welcome and support any expansion of the mandate that the AU feels necessary to better ensure that violence and banditry are reduced and that would bolster the confidence of the Darfur people.

Ultimately, ending the violence in Darfur will take more than a military solution. We are working hard to augment the AU's capabilities to deter and, when necessary, respond to ceasefire violations by any side. But we and the AU believe ending violence in Darfur cannot be accomplished solely by changing the size, mandate, composition, or leadership of any peacekeeping force. Consequently, our efforts are focused in two directions: strengthening AMIS in Darfur and accelerating the Abuja peace talks upon which a sustainable settlement depends.

Question. Mr. Secretary, one of the key issues, seldom discussed but nonetheless critical, to dealing with the bloodshed in Darfur, as well as the North-South process, is the role of other nations in the region.

For example, Eritrea and Sudan have been fighting a proxy war since the 1990's. Egypt is watching the North-South agreement very closely because of their interest in water resources from the Nile. And, the Ugandans are very much involved in the developments in Southern Sudan. There are other examples, as well.

I believe that these regional issues are critical, especially over the long-term, to bringing lasting peace to Sudan. If neighboring countries believe it is in their interest to continue proxy wars or meddle in a fragile peace process, they will continue to create serious obstacles.

What are we doing to change this dynamic?

Is U.S. policy sufficiently geared towards addressing some of these regional problems?

Answer. I agree with your observation that events in Sudan are closely linked to the actions and attitudes of Sudan's neighbors, and that is why U.S. policy has put a strong emphasis on regional cooperation. Sudan is the largest country in Africa, and the history of Sudan's conflicts shows that the role of other nations is critical.

For example, we are working to engage Sudan's neighbors in the peace process in Darfur and in other parts of Sudan. As you have noted, Eritrea has had differences with the government in Khartoum, and some rebel groups have operated with Eritrean support. Several months ago, Eritrea made overtures seeking improved bilateral relations with Khartoum, and the United States has urged Eritrea to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and to advance the peace process in Darfur. Eritrea's relationship with Sudan has long been complicated by Sudan's close ties with Ethiopia. Nevertheless, we will continue to push Eritrea to be constructive.

You also mention Uganda's involvement in southern Sudan. As you know, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has long operated in the far southern part of Sudan, seeking refuge from the Ugandan military. I have personally raised this problem with President Museveni of Uganda. We have urged closer cooperation between Khartoum, the SPLA, and Uganda to pursue the LRA in southern Sudan, and to prevent the LRA from further incursions into neighboring countries.

Several of Sudan's neighbors have a constructive role to play in the Darfur peace process and CPA implementation. For example, when I met with Egypt's President Mubarak, I emphasized the importance of us working closely together on Sudan. Egypt could have a major influence on the Sudanese government and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the coalition of northern opposition parties led by DUP head Mirghani.

On Darfur, we are working with the African Union (AU), the United Nations, the European Union, Chad, Libya, and Egypt to put pressure on rebel groups and the government to reach a peace accord. Chad shares the AU mediator role with Nigeria and Special Envoy Salim Salim for the Darfur peace process. I recently met with the Foreign Minister of Chad to get a better sense of how we can work together on peace in Darfur and on humanitarian support to the approximately 200,000 Darfuran refugees in some 12 camps in Chad.

We will continue to work with Sudan's neighbors, as well as other bilateral and multilateral partners, including the AU, UN, EU, and NATO, to provide support to CPA implementation and work towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Darfur.

Question. Mr. Secretary, my understanding is that there are three areas, in particular, that are pivotal to a successful North-South peace agreement: the South Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains, and Abyei. Experts have suggested that the people of these regions will need to see tangible results to be invested in the peace process.

What are we doing in these three critical areas? Is it enough?

Answer. The three areas of Southern Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains, and Abyei are areas north of the traditional border of Southern Sudan that have been deeply affected by the 21-year North-South civil war. The United States has led international efforts to bring peace, stability and humanitarian relief to these areas.

For example, the United States helped broker a successful ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains that built confidence among the parties. In Abyei, the United States sent retired Ambassador Don Petterson to serve as an expert on the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC). Petterson was selected to chair the Commission and it issued its report in early July 2005, determining that the area should receive special administrative status during an interim period. The United States is also funding programs in all three areas targeted to prevent the recurrence of conflict and build governance capacity. We are assisting in the state constitutional drafting processes, local government capacity building, teacher training, school construction, internally displaced persons/refugee return, resettlement and reintegration, and land reform.

The return of traditional land is potentially one of the greatest peace dividends. The United States funded a pilot land project in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile focused on identification of community land areas, and ensuring legal recognition and protection of customary land rights.

There are multiple problems with the current education system. Extremely low literacy rates, too few schools, and poorly trained teachers are just some of the challenges facing the three zones. The United States supports programs to improve basic and secondary education in all three transition areas.

There are more than one million displaced people in and around the three transitional areas. The United States is providing food aid and relief commodities to returnee families, as well as community training in hygiene and sanitation management.

Question. Mr. Secretary, let me ask about peacekeeping and intervention forces more generally. We are increasingly seeing a dichotomy between those nations that send troops as part of U.N. and other similar types of multi-national missions and those who pay the bills.

I realize that after the experiences of the 1990's, fewer countries—many for legitimate reasons—are willing to put troops under U.N. auspices. And, I am not suggesting that we start “blue-helmeting” U.S. troops.

However, the problem we face is that nations in the “pay the bills category” often bring tools—such as air assault capabilities, intelligence, and logistics—that are essential to the success of peacekeeping and other military operations.

Is there a way to start bridging this dangerous, and seemingly growing gap, between one set of nations that pay the bills and another set of nations that deploy troops?

Answer. When peacekeeping missions rely heavily on troops from developing countries, an important key to success is to pair the logistics and airlift capabilities of other donor countries and organizations with the troops on the ground. We have done exactly that with the African Union Mission to Sudan (AMIS). For example, in areas where AU capacity is lacking—such as in strategic airlift—organizations NATO and the EU have moved to rapidly fill the void. We made an effort to get NATO to take on this unprecedented role and also persuaded the Government of Sudan to support this effort. The United States, through our Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), and NATO have also taken the lead in providing AMIS troops with logistical support and pre-deployment peacekeeping training. Under GPOI, the United States is providing training, communications equipment, and advisors for the headquarters of the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This assistance will help improve the AU and ECOWAS' ability to plan and conduct operations and is an investment in their future ability to bear more of the peacekeeping burden.

This approach allows us to support and enable an African solution to an African problem, with peacekeepers who are from the region directly affected by the crisis. By intelligently combining the resources of the United States, NATO, and our European and Canadian allies, we can provide the logistical and other support to make the African Union's mission a success.

Question. Mr. Deputy Secretary, let me take a step back for a moment and ask a bigger question.

Over the last decade—from Kosovo to Afghanistan to Darfur—the question frequently arises: what are the principles that guide the United States, as well as the international community, when determining when to use force to intervene in the affairs of a sovereign nation—be it to stop genocide, international terrorism, ethnic cleansing, or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?

Mr. Deputy Secretary, what are the Bush administration's principles in that regard? When should the United States and the international community use force to intervene in these types of situations? When should other instruments of U.S. and international power, such as sanctions, be used?

Answer. There are no simple tests that can be mechanically applied in determining when to use force. The United States stands for the expansion of liberty. No people on earth want to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police. The United States must stand firmly for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.

Given our commitment to these principles, the United States must weigh the costs and benefits of intervention in light of all the circumstances that we face at a given time. At the same time, we should also weigh different strategies to advance our principles, not always involving the use of force. Each attempt at stopping genocide, international terrorism, ethnic cleansing, or proliferation of weapons of mass de-

struction presents very different strategies to advance our principles, not always involving the use of force. Each attempt at stopping genocide, international terrorism, ethnic cleansing, or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents very different considerations.

Obviously, first and foremost, the United States must be prepared to use force when necessary for self-defense. The international community enshrined this principle in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Situations outside of self-defense, including genocide or ethnic cleansing, may constitute appropriate circumstances for the international community to intervene to protect local populations from government that are perpetrating such atrocities. Each case must be evaluated on its own merits, with a response correlated to that evaluation.

When the United States determines that intervention is necessary, we have a series of tools available to create positive action. Diplomatic pressure and sanctions are two of these tools. Sanctions represent a middle ground in international politics, being more severe than verbal condemnation, but less severe than the use of force. The use of sanctions is limited to maintain or restore international peace and security, but the effectiveness of this tool depends on close cooperation with others. We seek to impose sanctions on governments or other entities that are capable of being a threat to international peace or security or that are in fact threatening international peace and security.

Finally, we also have the obligation to the American people to be careful and judicious in the deployment of U.S. troops and putting U.S. lives at risk. We need to consider carefully how force relates to the objective. And, we need to ensure the support of the support of the American people and to adhere to our Constitutional obligations.

Question. Mr. Secretary, I realize that comparisons between historical examples are less than perfect, but I can't help be reminded of the haunting comparisons between today's situation in Darfur and what happened just before the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995.

In both situations, there were large, relatively concentrated numbers of highly vulnerable IDPs. In both cases, there was a lull in violence. In both cases, there was a peacekeeping force that was undermanned with a flawed mandate. We know all too well the tragedy that was Srebrenica.

Given the problems with the AU force structure and mandate, is this something we need to be vigilant of in Darfur? What can we do to prevent this from happening in Darfur?

Answer. We must certainly remain vigilant. Though acts of violence and banditry still occur in Darfur, the UN and international observers agree that the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has been critical to improving the conditions for the people of Darfur in the areas where it operates. We and other international donors are working hard to ensure that AMIS continues to have what it needs to prevent and respond to violence. While AMIS has had success in stopping large-scale violence in Darfur, the upsurge in violence between October and December highlights the limits of AMIS's capability. We judge we have arrived at the logical point where we should consider a transition to a UN force. Even if the UN and key partners agree to a transition to a UN force, a transition would take time. Any change to a UN operation should be coupled with steps to strengthen AMIS. In the interim, we are working hard to fund and strengthen the current AMIS operation.

But ending the violence in Darfur will take more than just changing the composition and capabilities of peacekeeping forces. We are working hard to augment the AU's capabilities to deter and, when necessary, respond to ceasefire violations by any side. But we and the AU believe the ultimate solution to violence in Darfur is a peace agreement in Abuja. For this reason, we continue to support the AU mediation with technical experts, work closely with all the parties at the peace talks, and keep the pressure on the government and rebel groups to move them to reach a swift settlement.

Question. Mr. Deputy Secretary, we know that the Chinese, in some ways, have been impediments to the work of the international community's efforts to pressure the Government of Sudan to end the violence in Darfur. We also know that this is largely due to the strategic calculations that Beijing has made concerning access to energy resources.

Some China watchers have suggested that the Chinese have recently become more sensitive to the diplomatic pressure and outcry that has occurred with respect to their military build-up in the Taiwan Strait area.

Is there any evidence to suggest that the Chinese are feeling any similar pressure with respect to their relationship with Khartoum?

Answer. The United States believes Beijing should play a more responsible role in Sudan. As I said recently in a speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, China must do more than take oil from Sudan. It should take some responsibility for resolving Sudan's violence and humanitarian crisis, and work with the United States and others to do so. This past summer, I discussed Sudan at length during my Senior Dialogue meetings in Beijing with Executive Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo. I stressed that China's unquestioning support of the Khartoum regime does not serve Beijing's own long-term interests and damages China's reputation. China has legitimate energy concerns, but these would be better met by policies to support open, efficient energy markets, rather than attempts to "lock up" energy resources. Moreover, China's role in Sudan—as well as Iran, Burma, and Zimbabwe—causes other countries to question China's motives. We have been encouraging the Chinese to act as a responsible stakeholder in the international system; Sudan is one area where China could clearly demonstrate its willingness to play such a role.

Appendix III.—Prepared Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC, Commander, United States European Command

I. INTRODUCTION

MR. CHAIRMAN, SENATOR BIDEN, AND DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan. In addition to discussing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's mission to support the African Union's Mission in Sudan, I also want to share U.S. European Command's broader strategy for Africa that is designed to protect U.S. interests in the region while developing the capacities of nations to more effectively address security and stability challenges.

On behalf of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen and Department of Defense Civil Servants of EUCOM, and their family members, I want to express our gratitude for your continued support.

Our history of bringing stability to areas plagued by ethnic and cultural conflict has prepared us to broaden our focus to the east and south. Instability in Africa is generally caused by variations on a consistent theme: weak political institutions and security structures lack the ability to address extremist influences and illegal activities. Our goal is to assist nations to build effective, responsive governments and to develop security structures supportive of emerging democratic governments. Our success depends on maintaining relevant, focused, and complementary security cooperation, tailored to the political, social, economic, and military realities in Africa.

As we work together to improve our capabilities and to advance U.S. policy objectives, we must also recognize that today's complex security environment requires a greater degree of coordination within our own government and among our allies. EUCOM's plan to promote cooperative security relationships, enhance the capacity of foreign partners, and expand cohesion amongst government agencies is consistent with these goals. We must leverage the full spectrum of diplomatic, economic, information, and military options to advance our national interests and improve our ability to bring peace to areas of current conflict, prevent future conflict and achieve post-conflict stability where necessary.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains our most important strategic partnership. The extended period of peace and prosperity in Europe is the result of our engagement within the Alliance. The United States is a direct beneficiary of this stability. The economic, social, and security ties between the United States and the countries of Europe are long-standing and firmly rooted in shared ideals. Just as our presence in Europe since the end of the Second World War helped create the conditions for security, prosperity and multinational cooperation to flourish, it is my firm belief that a transformed U.S. military posture in an expanded NATO alliance can broaden this sphere of stability beyond the borders of Western Europe. It is a strategic imperative that the United States remains engaged in Europe and maintains its influential role within the NATO framework. We will share in the benefits of a transformed alliance that has the political will and sustainable expeditionary military capability to act beyond the boundaries of its member states.

NATO's mission to Darfur is especially significant. It shows how the Alliance is shouldering the burden of 21st century security challenges, even when they are radically different from Cold War challenges and located far beyond its traditional area of action. NATO's involvement in Darfur will help create relationships between key regional security organizations as NATO works with the African Union (AU) mission. Most importantly, this engagement will ameliorate one of the world's worst humanitarian crises.

II. NATO MISSION TO DARFUR

Background

The Darfur region became the scene of a bloody rebellion in 2003 when two local rebel groups—the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudanese Liberation Army—attacked a number of government installations and forces, accusing the Sudanese government of oppressing non-Arabs in favor of Arabs. In response, the government mounted a campaign of aerial bombardment supporting ground attacks by

an Arab militia, the Janjaweed.¹ The government in Khartoum set the downward spiral in motion by providing significant support to the Janjaweed. Following those attacks, the Janjaweed were accused of committing human rights violations, including mass killing, looting and rape of the non-Arab population of Darfur. By the summer of 2004, it was estimated that 50,000 to 80,000 people had been killed and at least a million driven from their homes, leading to a major humanitarian crisis. In response, on 28 May 04, the African Union established a military mission in Sudan (the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)) and deployed a small monitoring force over the summer. The aim of AMIS is to improve security and political stability in order to permit the government of Sudan to provide for the needs of its people.

Situation / Security Assessment

Since the deployment of the small monitoring force, the African Union has twice expanded the size and scope of AMIS and consequently had some success in improving security in Darfur. Nevertheless, different agencies now estimate that between 180,000 and 300,000 have died and more than 1.8 million people have been displaced from their homes. Some 200,000 refugees are estimated to have fled westward to neighboring Chad, while the vast majority of refugees remain trapped in Darfur camps and settlements. Many of these refugees live on the edge of survival, hostage to Janjaweed abuses.

The African Union and donors have expressed a desire to further improve the impact of security operations by enhancing capabilities and substantially increasing the size of the military and police components. On 26 April 2005, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konaré, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, wrote to the NATO Secretary General, among others, requesting logistical support to assist with this expansion of the AU Military Mission.

Support to African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)

Over the period 26–27 May 2005 the NATO Secretary General, myself, and supporting staff attended an international donors' conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. From that conference African nations pledged to provide military units to enable AMIS to expand its mission. Rwanda offered three+ battalions,² Nigeria offered three battalions, South Africa offered one+ battalion³ and Senegal offered one battalion.

Following discussions on 1 June 2005 with relevant authorities in the African Union, United Nations and the European Union, specific proposals for NATO support to AMIS were forwarded to HQ NATO—the proposals took into account assistance provided by other organizations. On 22 June 2005 the North Atlantic Council approved NATO's support for the African Union's Mission in Sudan. NATO's support is being offered gratis to the African Union; NATO will not be reimbursed.

Though logistics support (predominantly airlift) is needed by the African Union, the principal challenges to delivering AMIS improvements stem from AMIS' current inability to both command and control an enhanced mission and co-ordinate the deployment of the additional forces. The African Union Headquarters running AMIS are generally effective and competent but they are small in number and stretched.⁴ Conscious of this, NATO's proposals balance the sensitivities of the African Union and the desire for "African solutions to African problems." They also emphasized NATO's supporting role to the African Union and co-operation with other international players, notably the European Union.

As the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, I have appointed a Senior Military Liaison Officer to act on my behalf with the African Union and other organizations. This Liaison Officer is the single NATO military point of contact for the African Union and representatives from African troop contributing nations, donor nations pledging support to the African Union, the United Nations and embassies.

Concept of Support

The unifying purpose of NATO's support to AMIS has been to enable the African Union to expand its mission in Darfur as smoothly and successfully as possible, in

¹ The Sudanese government had very few regular soldiers in proportion of the Sudanese soldiers were of Darfur origin, distrusted many of its own units; the government therefore used the Janjaweed as a proxy militia force.

² The plus represents a Kenyan Military Police Company and a Force HQ Company from Gambia.

³ The plus represents an Engineering Company and Explosive Company and Explosive Ordnance Disposal team.

⁴ The African Union Headquarters (in Addis Ababa) are running several concurrent AU missions spread across Africa.

line with their plan and the defined limits of our support. Against this background, two key factors have underpinned all of NATO's efforts: NATO acts in support of the African Union and in coordination with the European Union, troop contributing nations and all other donors; and NATO personnel work closely with the appropriate African Union officials in order to facilitate logistical support to the African Union Mission in Sudan.

NATO's support has fallen into three areas, each limited in scope and time:

- Coordinating the provision of airlift donations with African Union troop deployment plans. The deployment of African battalions and reserves/support elements was originally approved by the North Atlantic Council to take place between 1 July and 30 September 2005. Following severe weather in Darfur in early August, the African Union's local transport contractors have been unable to secure the spares and fuel required to move African Battalions out from the airheads to their assigned sectors in Darfur as quickly as NATO can bring troops in. On 30 August, the African Union formally approached NATO requesting an extension of the mission. With the support of airlift donors this has now been approved and the airlift will conclude on 22 Oct 05.
- Supporting the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping in the planning and conduct of a map exercise, whose primary training audience has been the staff at the AMIS Force HQ at El Fasher.
- Temporarily establishing a small facility to offer capacity building for staff officers drawn from, or destined for, the AMIS HQs in Sudan or Addis Ababa.

A further offer was made by NATO to act as a clearing-house to assist the African Union in de-conflicting offers of equipment, but this was declined as unnecessary.

Individual nations have offered airlift support through NATO and the European Union, and the alignment of these offers to African Union requirements has been crucial to the success of African Union troop deployments. Alignment has and continues to be achieved through close coordination between the Joint Administration Control and Management Centre in Addis Ababa, the NATO Allied Movement Co-ordination Center at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the multilateral European Airlift Centre in Eindhoven (which is working on behalf of the European Union). Airlift support offered by NATO nations includes: strategic airlift (that required to get troops from donating African nations near to the AMIS theater of operations), tactical airlift (that required to transport donated troops inside the AMIS theater of operations) and funding to finance commercial airlift. Some strategic aircraft will be constrained on the airfields they can use and will land at air transfer points outside Sudan. Tactical aircraft will then lift people and assets forward into Sudan.

NATO supported the United Nations-led map exercise that concluded on 27 Aug 05 by providing military personnel and expertise to the team that wrote the exercise. This writing team consisted of military and non-military organizations (African Union, United Nations, European Union, and humanitarian relief agencies). The exercise focused on creating opportunities for the African Union staff to practice and perfect their procedures in the areas of: command and control, integration of effort between military and civilian components, and coordination with humanitarian relief agencies. The African Union benefited from this exercise, showing great interest and commitment. All participants are now taking part in the lessons learned process.

Staff capacity building has been delivered through a series of seminars and workshops. The content of these seminars and workshops focused on providing training to address real-Darfur issues, drawing where possible from lessons learned during the map exercise. NATO's staff capacity building activities will be complementary to both a Canadian offer to help the African Union develop an information management capability and a United Nations/European Union initiative to enhance staff building capacity in the field of logistics. The NATO support team is based in the African Union's training Center of Excellence in Nairobi.

NATO has approached this mission in a spirit of openness and transparency, seeking to complement and cooperate with the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations. In our dealings with these bodies, this approach has been reciprocated.

Coordination with the European Union

The European Union views its support to the African Union mission in Sudan as a packaged assistance mission, coordinated with other International Organizations, and tailored to support the operational needs identified by the African Union with the African Union retaining leadership responsibility. The European Union Military

Committee considers the key challenge ahead to be the matching of African Union requirements including movement and equipment, with offers from international organizations and donors.

The legal status of NATO and European Union military personnel supporting AMIS took time to finalize but did not impede the mission. An existing AU/Sudan Status of Mission Agreement was discussed (along NATO Status of Forces Agreement lines) at an AU Conference in Tripoli on 5 Jul 05 but not formally amended for several weeks. Further delays in securing Exchanges of Letters with the AU and individual African donor nations meant early deployments were conducted on a bilateral basis with nations. Status of Forces was finally secured late August. Force protection for NATO and European Union personnel is provided by the African Union.

Medical support for the deployed NATO personnel is being delivered through a civilian contractor currently providing to the African Union. This arrangement was agreed upon following a European Union medical reconnaissance of the contractor's facilities and capabilities in the region. The region's medical capabilities include both Role 1 and Role 2 facilities and rotary wing aeromedical evacuation assets. Role 3 medical support is provided through a private clinic in Khartoum. Strategic aeromedical evacuation may be conducted directly from the Role 2 facility at El Fasher airfield or from Khartoum. Should it be necessary, arrangements are in place for casualties to be transferred for treatment within the French military medical facilities in Djibouti or N'Djamena, Chad.

While this effort does not involve the EU drawing on NATO assets under the Berlin Plus⁵ arrangements, co-ordination with the European Union has been particularly close. Regular meetings have been held in Europe and a close link has been forged between the Allied Movements Co-ordination Centre at SHAPE and the European Airlift Centre in Eindhoven. NATO and European Union Staff work together in the Joint Administration Control and Management Centre in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and have overall responsibility for strategic movement planning, control and coordination. In addition, European Union military personnel join NATO, UN, AU and Aid Agency personnel on the United Nations-led map exercise.

Contributions of Member Nations

Confirmed airlift contributions under the NATO banner:

- *Canada.* Canada has offered an aircraft in July or September 2005. As this offer consisted of strategic airlift that could not operate directly into the Darfur region, thus necessitating the provision of tactical airlift by another donor nation, the Canadian offer was declined.
- *Denmark.* Denmark offered an aircraft from 20–29 September 2005 to provide tactical movement capability; this offer is expected to remain in place during the three-week pause requested by the AU.
- *Italy.* Italy has offered an aircraft in September for a limited number of sorties.
- *The Netherlands.* The Netherlands originally offered an aircraft from 20–29 September 2005. Ministry of Defence officials have confirmed that aircraft and aircrew remain available for the revised deployment dates resulting from the three-week deployment pause.
- *Turkey.* Turkey has offered an aircraft from 20–29 September. This offer is expected to remain valid for the three week pause requested by the AU.
- *United Kingdom.* The United Kingdom has offered financial support to Nigeria for either costs associated with a Nigerian aircraft move or civilian charter (up to £1 million or €1.4 million).
- *United States.* The United States has offered the capability to move 1800 Rwandan troops, including their ammunition and cargo. To date, approximately 1200 personnel have been moved to the Darfur region, the remaining 600 are scheduled to be airlifted in late-September 2005.
- *The Ukraine (a non-NATO member but a member of the Partnership for Peace program).* The Ukraine has offered a variety of commercial charter aircraft under reimbursement arrangements for operational costs.

Confirmed airlift contributions under a European Union banner:

⁵Berlin Plus derives from NATO's 1999 Washington Summit, and is based on the intention to facilitate the conduct of European Union operations using NATO asset and capabilities "for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance."

- *France.* France has offered the capability to move a complete Senegalese battalion, including rotation of forces, with military strategic and tactical assets.
- *Germany.* Germany has offered six aircraft, to include rotation of African Union forces. Due to a variety of other airlift offers for the movement of the eight battalions, the German offer has been applied to the movement of approximately 380 Civilian Police personnel in the fall of 2005 (dates to be confirmed).
- *Greece.* Greece has offered two aircraft in August 2005. They have been used for transportation of the Senegal battalion from Dakar to Sudan, but under EU umbrella.
- *Luxembourg.* Luxembourg has offered €75,000 for contracted airlift or purchase of tickets on scheduled commercial flights.

Timeline

A member of the SHAPE planning staff first deployed to the African Union's Mission in Sudan HQ, Addis Ababa on 23 May 2005. On 19 June 2005 SACEUR's senior military liaison officer deployed to the AMIS HQ in Addis Abab, Ethiopia. Personnel to support the map exercise began to deploy on 9 July 2005 and the task was completed by 27 August 2005. Personnel conducting the staff capacity building deployed on 27 July 2005 and will complete their tasks by the end of September 2005. The airlift started on 01 July 2005. All NATO staff will withdraw from Africa on 30 Sep 05 less two movements staff who will remain to support the activities of the SHAPE Allied Movements Coordination Centre's effort. This is expected to continue until 22 October 2005.

U.S. Financial Assistance to Sudan and the Darfur Crisis

The U.S. continues to be viewed as an influential leader in NATO and in the world and has already provided much to alleviate the complex problems involved in the Darfur Crisis, both unilaterally and multilaterally. To date, the U.S. has given \$637 million dollars in humanitarian aid to the region and provided approximately \$150 million in support of the African Union's (AU) military mission in Sudan.

III. THE GROWING STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA

African security issues will continue to directly affect our homeland security. The growing use of the Trans-Sahara region in Africa by terrorists threatens the security of the United States and our European allies. The spawning grounds for future terrorists share several common characteristics: vast ungoverned spaces offering sanctuary; governments unable or unwilling to provide for even the most basic of human needs; and social unrest where populist clarion calls to extremism find fertile soil. The transnational nature of these dangers undermines our ability to foster a broader and lasting stability in the region.

Violence from numerous crises has created areas of lawlessness that transcend state borders and cause instability. High population growth rates, poor land management, desertification and agricultural disruptions caused by economic shifts, internal conflicts, and refugee influxes are making it increasingly difficult for several countries to feed themselves. This is especially true in Chad, where drought and refugees from the conflict in Darfur have created a humanitarian catastrophe.

Fragile democracies are having to combat serious challenges to include security concerns, social pressures, teachings of radical fundamentalism, disease, and criminality that imperil the future hopes for the people of Africa. The broad expanses of ungoverned or poorly as the proximity and ease of movement to population increasingly attractive to transnational terrorists governed regions, as well centers in Europe, are interested in exploiting the region for recruiting, logistics, and safe havens. The breeding grounds of terrorism and illicit activity on the continent of Africa require our attention at both the national and regional security level. It is against this backdrop of current and impending crises that we focus our attention, efforts, and investment.

IV. SHAPING THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Failed or failing states, instability, and ethnic conflict lead to humanitarian catastrophes such as the situation in Darfur. In a progressively interdependent world, it is imperative that the U.S. address the circumstances which lead to these crises with the full range of political, economic, information, and military tools, synchronized with our international partners. The complexity of today's security environment requires new methodologies to promote conflict prevention and conduct post-conflict operations. A military approach alone will not deliver the desired outcome in countries and regions where there is little or no experience in responsible

governance. Integrated interagency and international action is necessary to achieve long-term strategic goals.

Institutions that are adequately equipped or organized to confront a fluid and diverse geo-strategic landscape will be successful in protecting U.S. interests. The application of national power must include the widest array of resources and capabilities. The determination of requirements, the development of policies, and the implementation of strategies require the synchronization of all U.S. Government organizations that have a stake in the outcome.

The very nature of today's international climate dictates that policies, national policy objectives, and the execution of operations are fundamentally interagency in scope and purpose. With this understanding, and given the level of authority and responsibility of the Geographic Combatant Commanders to carry out our national security activities, it is imperative that these strategically focused staffs be organized in a manner that reflects the interagency process. The instruments of national power are most effective when applied in concert with one another. They must not only be synchronized in their application, they must also be complementary and structured in a manner that ensures unity of effort between the various agencies.

EUCOM has been working with the Department of Defense (DoD) to improve our approach to developing, sourcing, and implementing a fully integrated security cooperation strategy. DoD's Security Cooperation is an important instrument for executing U.S. Defense Strategy by building defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access and en route infrastructure. Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), an element of DoD Security Cooperation, involves those activities undertaken by Combatant Commands to implement this guidance. There are number of security cooperation activities EUCOM is capable of directly targeting toward TSC priorities and objectives. There are also a number of activities that occur in our area of responsibility that the Geographic Combatant Commander has some degree of visibility, but has no direct influence over and other activities in which we have neither visibility nor influence.

Our aim is to eliminate competition for limited resources that produce overlapping programs that create unnecessary redundancies. We must also ensure our efforts generate a cohesive, interactive link with other U.S. Government agencies that will enable seamless execution. To achieve this, there must be transparency between the agencies to encourage cooperation and the sharing of ideas and information. Congressional support will be essential as the Department of Defense, together with other Executive departments and agencies seek to create greater harmonies and transform our policy making and resource allocation processes to become more agile and responsive.

The construct we currently employ to achieve our nation's security objectives is essentially a cold-war era model designed principally to face a defined and predictable threat. To achieve our goals we must be willing to embrace institutional change and a shift from our previously understood paradigms. We need to create a methodology that recognizes the interdependency of our national powers in order to become more strategically effective.

Integration of EUCOM and other U.S. agency activities throughout our area of responsibility will be necessary to achieve our stated strategic goals. Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) have been created at Geographic Combatant Commands to establish connections between civilian and military departments that will improve planning and coordination within the government. This advisory element facilitates information sharing and collaboration by providing day-to-day working relationships between military and civilian planners. At EUCOM, we have already begun to modify our Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) to better integrate all the elements of national power. We envision expanding the EUCOM JIACG to include representation from all the departments and agencies necessary to coordinate the myriad activities that take place in the theater. We must attain unity of effort in order to minimize redundancy and maximize the use of resources.

Current crisis-driven activity focusing on limited, short-term solutions is no longer adequate for dealing with the major challenges in Africa. The United States, in association with partner nations, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations, must assist African leaders to strengthen their states, revitalize their civilian institutions, and rebuild traumatized societies and economies to restore stability and security. While Africans themselves must ultimately achieve these objectives the United States needs a comprehensive, multinational, interagency approach to help make them successful.

NATO Engagement in Africa

MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE: Mediterranean Security is becoming increasingly important as an integral part of the overall European Security environment. NATO, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have clearly recognized the reality that efforts to enhance the security of the Mediterranean region, including the countries of North Africa and the Near East, are critical missions.

Launched by NATO in 1994, the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) has successfully contributed to achieving better cooperation and understanding between NATO and the seven MD partners: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania,⁶ Morocco and Tunisia. In 2004, NATO leaders and the MD countries agreed to elevate the MD to a genuine partnership. The enhanced MD will contribute to regional security and stability by enhancing the existing political dialogue; achieving interoperability; assisting in defense reform; and contributing to the fight against terrorism. It will also prepare partners' forces to contribute to non-Article 5 NATO-led operations.

MD countries have already started the first steps towards an enhanced relationship: Morocco participates in NATO operations in Kosovo and both Israel and Algeria have demonstrated their interest in contributing to Operation Active Endeavor (which might also include information and intelligence sharing). Jordan's medical facility in Afghanistan, although integrated in a non-NATO operation (Op Enduring Freedom), is providing a very useful contribution to NATO operations in that country.

OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR: Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE) is NATO's only Article 5 operation. It began on 26 October 2001 as surveillance and monitoring operation in response to a US request for counter-terrorism support in the eastern Mediterranean. OAE has since been expanded to embrace new strategic objectives to include compliant boardings, Straits of Gibraltar (STROG) escort operations (currently suspended), and an expanded Area of Operations to include the entire Mediterranean Sea. To date, more than 66,000 ships have been hailed, 90+ suspect vessels have been compliantly boarded, and 488 ships have been safely escorted through the STROG. NATO and the AU share a clear and common interest in limiting illicit activity within the Mediterranean Sea.

Following the Istanbul summit in June 2004, NATO leaders recognized the need to enhance the partnership with Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) Nations, to include Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia from the African continent. High-level staff talks are planned for July 05 in which senior members from all MD Nations are invited to SHAPE to discuss a variety of cooperation initiatives. Recognizing the effectiveness and further potential of OAE, several Partner Nations have already expressed an interest in participating with NATO in the form of information exchange or contribution of military assets. Of the MD Nations, both Algeria and Israel have each initiated formal discussions with NATO towards an ultimate goal of participating in OAE. Overall regional security and cooperation are greatly enhanced with the involvement of NATO's MD Partners.

NATO RESPONSE FORCE EXERCISE (LIVEX 06): A live exercise (LIVEX) to test the NATO Response Force's full operational capability will take place in Cape Verde in 2006. The exercise will demonstrate the NATO Response Force's expeditionary capability and stretch national and NATO deployment procedures and our ability to sustain a large deployed force. Approximately 6,500 troops will deploy for 14 days to conduct selected missions and remain self-sustained due to the lack of local capability, limited local resources, and Cape Verde's minimal supporting infrastructure. Command and control of the deployed force will be executed from the Joint Force Command HQ at Brunssum, Holland. Air, Land and Maritime forces will be provided by the Air Component Command HQ at Ramstein, Germany, the Spanish Maritime Force HQ and the Eurocorps HQ, France.

An initial reconnaissance (21–27 May 05) to nine of Cape Verde's islands is complete. The team was warmly welcomed. Senior government officials were eager to assist the exercise, offering open access to ports, hospitals, airports, military establishments, etc. Cape Verde Government (GoCV) suggested expansion of the exercise scope to include counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-human trafficking, anti-smuggling, and illegal immigration themes, indicating the local population would be happy to act as role players! GoCV will provide one company of troops as participants and requested NATO extend invitations to their African neighbors (es-

⁶Due to the August 2005 Coup, all bilateral assistance programs (except for non-humanitarian assistance) have been suspended with Mauritania.

pecially Senegal and Angola) to observe the exercise. Indications are the GoCV are willing to expand the scenario to meet as many NRF training objectives as possible.

U.S. European Command Strategy

In light of the dynamic international security environment and newly emerging threats, both the European Command and NATO have embarked upon a process of comprehensive transformation to better prepare both organizations to face today's transnational threats. As you know, in 2001 the Secretary of Defense initiated a strategy-based review of the U.S. global defense posture, and subsequently directed all combatant commands to evaluate their structure, organization and processes in order to gain transformational efficiencies and develop new capabilities to meet emerging requirements. The efforts we are undertaking to meet the objectives laid out by the Secretary represent the most extensive adjustments to the European theater in its history. The changes contain broad and far-reaching implications for our nation, our allies, and our military.

As we embark upon this important mission we must be mindful of the leadership role we bear, and ensure that the measures we undertake will increase our strategic effectiveness. In a world full of uncertainty and unpredictable threats, the United States continues to be viewed as the leader in providing stability and security. As we map a course for the future we must remain cognizant of the key elements that enabled us to be successful in the last century and be wise enough to recognize the new security challenges we face.

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION: EUCOM's Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs are the centerpiece of our efforts to promote security and stability by building and strengthening relationships with our allies and regional partners and are an indispensable component of our overarching theater strategy. These programs are regionally focused to assist our allies in developing the capabilities required to conduct effective peacekeeping and contingency operations. Well-trained, disciplined forces help mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict, prepare the way for warfighting success, and ultimately reduce the burden on U.S. forces. Most importantly, Theater Security Cooperation efforts support the long-term strategic objectives of the Global War on Terrorism by building understanding and consensus on the terrorist threat; laying foundations for future "coalitions of the willing"; and extending our country's security perimeter. Within EUCOM, we have a variety of resources, programs, and policies available to aid us in developing and implementing our TSC strategy. The value of these strategic resources cannot be overstated.

STRATEGIC THEATER TRANSFORMATION: EUCOM's Strategic Theater Transformation (STT) Plan, which is a component of the Department of Defense's Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, will permit EUCOM to transform itself into a command better able to meet the diverse challenges of this new century. The objective of our plan is to increase EUCOM's strategic effectiveness through a fundamental realignment of basing concepts, access and force capabilities.

Essential to achieving this strategic effect are the development of basing and force manning models that support the principles of an expeditionary philosophy. To achieve the first, we envision a series of smaller forward operating sites (FOS) and cooperative security locations (CSL) strategically located throughout the AOR. Such bases will be anchored by several existing Main Operating Bases (MOB), which are of enduring strategic value and remain essential to theater force projection, throughput, and sustainment.

The U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) relies increasingly on EUCOM's en route infrastructure system to project U.S. forces to crises areas in the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus. Modest investments in these bases will ensure we maintain critical southern air mobility routes for TRANSCOM and an "air-bridge" to expand operational reach. As we look even further south, we envision expanding the EUCOM en route system so we can engage future threats in sub-Saharan Africa. This new system will consist of a series of cooperative security locations, located across Africa, enabling the rapid deployment of forces.

As EUCOM shapes the theater with forward operating sites and cooperative security locations, we must maintain leadership within NATO and across the AOR that is credible and capable. EUCOM must remain engaged regionally in order to build upon international relationships and strengthen the many institutions that can help manage crises when they occur or, ideally, before they occur. As such, the value of forward basing, forward presence, and focused commitment remains an essential cornerstone of our strategy for the future.

REGIONAL INITIATIVES AND PROGRAMS: EUCOM's TSC strategy is derived from regional priority and policy themes stated in the Secretary of Defense's Security Cooperation Guidance. EUCOM has taken a regional approach that links individual country objectives to broader theater goals.

The goal for Africa is stability, security, and prosperity. Working with the State Department, we are assisting the African Union and African regional organizations to develop their security structures. Stability programs targeting improvements in health, education, good governance, civil infrastructure are focused on countries with the greatest need. Security programs—military training and education, peace operations capabilities, resources and infrastructure—are focused on countries that possess the capability and show the desire to lead Africa into the future.

Development of effective security structures in Africa will lay the foundation for future success; however, they are dependent upon on commitment of manpower, financial, and institutional resources necessary to establish and sustain real progress. African security issues will continue to directly affect our homeland security. Modest near-term investments will enable us to avert crises that may require costly U.S. intervention in the future.

TRANS-SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVE: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) is the long-term interagency plan to combat terrorism in Trans-Saharan Africa. The goal of TSCTI is to counter terrorist influences in the region and assist governments to better control their territory and to prevent huge tracts of largely deserted African territory from becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups. TSCTI builds upon the successful Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) which, beginning in 2002, helped train and equip at least one rapid-reaction company, about 150 soldiers, in each of the four Sahel states: Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. TSCTI is more ambitious in both geographic and programmatic terms.

The overall approach is straightforward: build indigenous capacity and facilitate cooperation among governments in the region that are willing partners (Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia, with Libya possibly to follow later) in the struggle with Islamic extremism in the Sahel region. TSCTI helps to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhance and institutionalize cooperation among the region's security forces, promote democratic governance, foster development and education and ultimately benefit our bilateral relationships with each of these states. Key security-related aspects of the TSCTI include training in basic marksmanship, planning, communications, land navigation, patrolling and medical care. The military component of TSCTI, like the Pan Sahel Initiative, seeks to directly engage with participating nations and assist in protecting their borders and exploiting opportunities to detect and deter terrorists by providing basic training and equipment and train additional forces. TSCTI also engages more countries than PSI with a greater emphasis on helping to foster better information sharing and operational planning between regional states. We have briefed the Ambassadors and select Country Team members from all nine TSCTI countries and have received their support. We will continue to fully coordinate with the interagency and with U.S. Country Teams to ensure that the overall TSCTI is balanced, complements the total U.S. effort in the GWOT and is tailored to the unique conditions within each country in this region.

Programs such as TSCTI support U.S. national security interests in the Global War on Terrorism by enhancing African regional security and promote an Africa that is self-sufficient and stable. These programs also better prepare participating nations to stop the flow of illicit arms, goods, and people through the region helping focus nations to better protect their own vast borders and regions.

America's war on terrorism cannot be fought alone. Historically, proactive security costs with programs such as the Pan Sahel Initiative are significantly less expensive than reactive missions to the world's hotspots. Political instability in Africa that is left to fester could lead to repeated interventions at enormous costs. TSCTI is a proactive program that is a relatively small investment, but that will be a powerful inoculation against future terrorist activity, leading to an increasingly stable Africa. The Administration is working to integrate TSCTI into future budget and planning cycles. Long-term, continuous engagement will build bonds where few existed and strengthen those already established. The U.S. needs to continue security cooperation measures with nations that support regional initiatives leading to peace and stability.

GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE: The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), fully funded in its first year as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (PL 108-447), is designed to meet the world's growing need for well-trained peace operations forces by enabling the United States to work with lead nations and

selected international organizations to support, equip and train other countries' forces. In Africa, the U.S. will implement GPOI by expanding the existing Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program and expand exercise activity aimed at enhancing African capacity to conduct peace support operations.

We are grateful for the committee's support of this vital program, especially the \$114 million authorization recommended for fiscal year 2006 in section 2515 of the reported version of the Foreign Affairs Authorization Act. This authorization is the same as the President's budget request for fiscal year 2006 which will fund the second year of this important program.

COOPERATION WITH AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: EUCOM has aggressively worked with regional organizations, such as the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to develop a regional ability to respond to crises.

The African Union, formed in 2002, comprises more than 50 nations. EUCOM is helping the African Union develop a robust military planning and operational capability to deal with crises more effectively. We are also helping to establish the required command and control capabilities so that the AU can communicate with the five regional headquarters and these headquarters can communicate with the national militaries in their respective regions. Our investment in AU capabilities is reaping tremendous benefits by giving Africans the capability to deal with challenges like Darfur.

ECOWAS is a regional organization of 15 West African nations formed in 1975. Its military intervention in Liberia in 2003 proved to be a successful undertaking, but not without substantial multinational support. Working collectively with the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and several other countries, EUCOM has sought to help build ECOWAS' capacity for conducting peacekeeping operations to a level that requires limited U.S. and European logistic support, and no U.S. troop support. With coordinated support and encouragement from the United States, allied donor nations including non-governmental organizations and international corporations, ECOWAS has measurably improved its capacity to respond to regionally supported operations.

We have worked closely with Uganda in the prosecution of a local terrorist organization, resulting in a country more prepared to counter insurgencies that threaten internal and regional stability. Other nations in the region have not only expressed interest in similar activities, but also provide capabilities that are found only within their region.

Many other countries in Africa have shown both the willingness and the capability to support peacekeeping operations. Nigeria provided strategic airlift for crucial peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sudan. Gabon assumed a lead role in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) mission in the Central African Republic. South Africa has supported several international military missions. Although the African Union continues to improve its peace support operations capacity, the UN remains very active on the continent. For example, there are currently more than 43,000 UN military peacekeepers involved in operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi.

The U.S. needs to continue engagement with nations that are supportive of regional initiatives leading to peace and stability. Regional leaders like Senegal, Ghana and Uganda have not only been willing to support the Global War on Terrorism, but also have been proactive in facilitating dialogue between nations within their area of influence that were once in conflict. Their approach to curbing HIV/AIDS and providing economic stimulus are models that are proven to work in the African context for African nations.

STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: One of the most successful and influential programs employed by EUCOM is the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP). Under this program, professional military contacts build valuable, often lifelong relationships at all levels that serve to enhance cooperation and advance U.S. strategic interests. The SPP links U.S. states and territories with partner countries for the purpose of supporting EUCOM's security cooperation objectives and assists partner nations in making the transition from authoritarian to democratic governments. The unique civil-military nature of the Guard allows it to actively participate in a wide range of security cooperation activities that provide great flexibility in meeting our Theater Security Cooperation objectives.

This past year was extremely successful as National Guard Soldiers and Airmen conducted over 115 events with partner nations. Indeed, SPP has been so successful that EUCOM is planning to seek funding to expand the program in Africa. In the last two years, four partnerships have been added: South Africa–New York; Mo-

rocco-Utah; Ghana-North Dakota; Tunisia-Wyoming. Currently there are 25 states partnered with 23 foreign nations in the EUCOM AOR. SPP is a key Theater Security Cooperation tool that supports U.S. Government objectives by promoting access, bolstering capabilities, and enhancing interoperability.

CLEARINGHOUSE APPROACH: The regional TSC approach is being refined, in part, through clearinghouse initiatives. Clearinghouses, created for Africa, the South Caucasus, and Southeast Europe, allow the United States to coordinate its actions with other nations involved in security cooperation in the same region. Each serves as a multi-national forum for interested countries to share information about their security assistance programs for specific regions. The objective is to optimize the use of limited resources by merging the various security cooperation programs into a comprehensive, synchronized regional effort. Clearinghouses provide a medium for deconflicting programs, avoiding duplication and finding ways to collaborate and cooperate.

The Africa Clearinghouse has brought thirteen African countries together with NATO, the United Nations, and the European Union. The inaugural conference, held in May 2004, focused on West Africa and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The regional approach continued in December 2004 with a conference concentrated on east Africa.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: Security Cooperation Activities are managed programs planned and executed for the purpose of shaping the future security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests. Key among EUCOM's TSC tools are Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, Direct Commercial Sales, and International Military Education and Training. These programs provide access and influence, help build professional, capable militaries in allied and friendly nations, and promote interoperability with U.S. forces.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides critical resources to assist nations without the financial means to acquire U.S. military equipment and training. It is an essential instrument of influence; builds allied and coalition military capabilities; and improves interoperability between forces. The FY06 FMF request for African countries in the EUCOM AOR, included in the International Affairs (Function 150) account, totals \$38.5 million.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) demonstrate our nation's continued commitment to the security of our allies and friends by allowing them to acquire superior U.S. military equipment and training. FMS and DCS sales are vital to improving interoperability with U.S. forces, closing NATO capability gaps, and modernizing the military forces of our new allies and partners.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) including Expanded IMET (E-IMET) provides education and training opportunities for foreign military (IMET) and civilian personnel (E-IMET). These programs enhance coalition operations by improving military-to-military cooperation and interoperability; reinforcing civilian control of the military; advancing the principles of responsible governance; and supporting the stability of newly formed democracies. As a result of the relationships that develop from IMET, our return on investment in long-term access and influence is significantly enhanced. Today's IMET participants are tomorrow's senior foreign military and civilian leaders. In Africa, IMET and E-IMET have been the most successful programs in promoting professional militaries that respect democracy and human rights.

The political goodwill accrued from these programs far outweighs the small investment. Consequently, our interests are disproportionately injured if this program is reduced or sanctioned. The EUCOM portion of the fiscal year 2006 IMET request for African countries is \$12.935 million and, like FMF, is also included in the International Affairs (Function 150) account. We must continue to carry out and indeed intensify our IMET programs in order to help promote U.S. long-term objectives of democratic development and good governance.

V. CONCLUSION

It is a privilege to represent this proud nation as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe and Commander, U.S. European Command. The tasks we now face in Africa are enormous, but are not insurmountable. The indispensable influence attained by our forward presence, coupled with our Theater Security Cooperation programs provides the best chance for winning the Global War on Terrorism and meeting our national security goals. As we work together to improve our capabilities and to advance U.S. policy objectives, we must also recognize that today's complex secu-

rity environment requires a greater degree of coordination within our own government and among our allies.

As we support the African Union's efforts in the Darfur, NATO is determined to work in full transparency with the European Union, the United Nations, NGOs and individual nations. Although limited in scope and duration, the NATO response to the crisis in Darfur is consistent with the transformation of the Alliance in response to the new security environment. The willingness of the Alliance to engage in out-of-area operations, to now include Africa, underscores NATO's level of commitment to change and the recognition that new approaches are required.

At EUCOM we also continue to seek new and innovative ways to meet the challenges we face in Africa and throughout our entire area of operations. We will continue to reach out to multiple stakeholders in governmental, as well as non-governmental activities to maximize our ability to achieve our national objectives. Preparing for the urgent challenges before us will require institutional innovations and the creation of new capabilities, which will yield a more comprehensive security apparatus and enable greater coordination and cooperation throughout the United States government and the international community.

We look forward to working with the members of this committee as we continue to assist in the development of effective security structures in Africa that will lay the foundation for future success.

VI. LEXICON

A *Main Operating Base (MOB)* is an enduring strategic asset established in friendly territory with permanently stationed combat forces, command and control structures, and family support facilities. MOB's serve as the anchor points for throughput, training, engagement, and U.S. commitment to NATO. MOB's have: robust infrastructure; strategic access; established Command and Control; Forward Operating Sites and Cooperative Security Location support capability; and enduring family support facilities. As previously stated, these are already in existence.

A *Forward Operating Site (FOS)* is an expandable host-nation "warm site" with a limited U.S. military support presence and possibly prepositioned equipment. It can host rotational forces and be a focus for bilateral and regional training. These sites will be tailored to meet anticipated requirements and can be used for an extended time period. Backup support by a MOB may be required.

A *Cooperative Security Location (CSL)* is a host-nation facility with little or no permanent U.S. presence. CSLs will require periodic service, contractor and/or host nation support. CSLs provide contingency access and are a focal point for security cooperation activities. They may contain prepositioned equipment. CSLs are: rapidly scalable and located for tactical use, expandable to become a FOS, forward and expeditionary. They will have no family support system.

A *Preposition Site (PS)*, by definition, is a secure site containing pre-positioned war reserve materiel (Combat, Combat Support, Combat Service Support), tailored and strategically positioned to enable rotational and expeditionary forces. PS's are maintained at high readiness for immediate use, strategically located with guaranteed access. They are an important component to our transformation efforts.

"*En Route*" *Infrastructure (ERI)* is a strategically located, enduring asset with infrastructure that provides the ability to rapidly expand, project and sustain military power during times of crises and contingencies. ERI bases serve as anchor points for throughput, training, engagement and U.S. commitment. They may also be a MOB or FOS.

Appendix IV.—Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Members of the Committee to General James L. Jones, Jr.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BIDEN TO GENERAL JONES

AFRICAN UNION CAPABILITY

Question. When I was in Chad in May, I met with an African Union Sector Commander, a general, who was kind enough to come across the border from Sudan to meet with me. He told me point blank that he didn't have the mandate, men or equipment to stop the violence in Darfur. He also made two additional points: that the government continued to kill civilians and destroy of villages with impunity, and that the AU could not be effective in stopping violence without western soldiers on the ground with him. Speaking from a military perspective, do you agree with the Commander's assertion—does the AU, in your opinion, lack the personnel, equipment and mandate to improve security for the population of Darfur? What would it take, militarily, to improve security in Darfur?

Answer. The African Union (AU) Sector Commander is operating under a restricted set of rules of engagement. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed two resolutions (1556 and 1564) specifically endorsing the deployment of an AU force to monitor the April 2004 ceasefire agreement and then expanded the AU monitoring mission. The subsequent UNSC resolution (1574) failed to grant the AU authority to stop hostile actions unless engaged by either party. In other words, they can defend themselves, but not take offensive actions to prevent the killings and destruction.

In the past year, the AU has increased the number of deployed troops from 2,270 to over 6,100 and has requested more than \$700 million to purchase helicopters, armored personnel carriers and other equipment. The number of troops and personnel required are a function of three things: (1) the size of the area of operations (larger than Iraq); (2) the perception that military action will be effective to improve the security situation, and; (3) the willingness of the combatants to lay down their arms. A properly sized and equipped force with a clear mandate to use force against those initiating hostile actions will help set the conditions that can lead to a cessation of hostilities. However, a military solution will not in itself be sufficient to address the underlining causes that precipitate the violence.

NATO NO-FLY ZONE

Question. Could NATO, if a decision was taken at the political level, enforce a no-fly zone in Darfur—does it have the capacity to do so? What sorts of resources would it take?

Answer. Two key factors must underpin all of NATO's efforts: NATO acts in support of the African Union (AU) and NATO personnel work closely with the appropriate AU officials in order to facilitate support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). NATO's supporting role to the African Union must be emphasized. A NATO enforced no-fly zone is not being planned at this time. There is no guarantee that NATO flights into Sudan to enforce a no-fly zone would stop the violence and could undermine the peace process by diminishing the authority of the AU.

RECOMMENDED NATO ACTION

Question. What types of actions—if given the mandate—would you recommend that NATO take to help the African Union create a secure environment for civilians in Darfur?

Answer. NATO has asked the African Union (AU) to inform us where we can be helpful and, thus, the NATO mission has been carefully and intentionally executed to provide support to the African Union. If, at the request of the African Union, the alliance wanted to do more, it would be in the area of training and developing combat service support and the logistics that could assist the AU battalions that are operating at huge distances.

Beyond the airlift support provided, NATO's significant contribution to the African Union has been capacity-building for the staff officers of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Staff Capacity Building Seminars were held in September 2005. This initial effort was received positively by the AU headquarters and the AU

has formally requested additional training seminars. The North Atlantic Council has recently endorsed this request. Our training should endeavor to imbue them with the values of how militaries operate in a democracy and ensure that respect for human rights are included. This type of training will lay the foundation for the development of competent forces.

ASSISTANCE TO AFRICAN UNION TROOPS

Question. Given the constraints of the mandate under which the AU is currently operating, if you were asked by the NAC, what further assistance would you recommend that NATO provide to AU troops in order to enhance their ability to protect civilians in Darfur?

Answer. NATO's role is to contribute to strengthening the African Union's capability to significantly expand its presence in Darfur in an attempt to halt the continuing violence. Any further assistance would most likely be conducted in a manner that enhances the existing mission. NATO's military assistance could encompass training competent nations who wish to do capacity building. Training headquarters staff will enhance security to the civilians by focusing operational plans and logistical requirements in a more efficient way. Additionally, NATO's activities in Darfur must involve the participation of the African Union and conducted in a manner in which Africans can identify with as they develop the necessary skills and credibility to conduct these type of missions that are necessary to build their own future.

NATO ASSISTANCE TO AFRICAN UNION

Question. Humanitarian relief organizations operating in Darfur have said that the presence of the AU has made a difference, but there are some problems. Number one, the AU is ill-equipped. For example, one of the AU brigades in north Darfur has only two vehicles for nearly 150 soldiers, and one AK-47 rifle and two magazines of ammunition per soldier. Two, the AU lacks intelligence gathering capability—the soldiers have no idea where armed elements are going to strike next. These NGOs say that the rebels, janjaweed and bandits, know the AU is outgunned and cannot find out where the armed groups are operating. So basically, civilians are losing confidence in the AU's ability to improve security. What has NATO done to improve the capacity of the AU's intelligence gathering capability? Have you seen any results? Are the armaments described above—two vehicles for 144 soldiers, and one AK-47 rifle and two magazines of ammunition per soldier—adequate for the environment in Darfur? How should those soldiers be equipped? What about general operational tactics, such as not having a predictable schedule—are we helping with that? What have we done either through NATO or bilaterally to help equip the AU?

Answer. Regarding intelligence gathering capability, the African Union (AU) forces are fairly adept at this; however their ability to process that information into actionable intelligence is less effective. The U.S. has provided an intelligence expert from the U.S. Central Command to the Forward Headquarters in El Fasher, Sudan to assist with developing greater understanding and capacity for assessing available intelligence.

NATO is not engaged to provide tactical level instruction, nor assess the AU capabilities to conduct tactical-level operations. The NATO Strategic Military Mission Order, approved by the North Atlantic Council, authorized support along only three lines of operation: Airlift support of eight AU Battalions, support to United Nations (UN) led map exercise (MAPEX) for AU headquarters, and development/delivery of Staff Capacity Building workshops for AU headquarters.

To date, seven of the eight battalions, have been transported into theater by NATO and AU coordinated airlift. The AU is working to force generate one additional battalion following the Republic of South Africa's withdrawal of the final battalion. Final airlift activities are expected to be completed by the 31 October 2005. The UN-led map exercise was accomplished in August 2005 and the UN final report is in coordination at UN Headquarters for final release. The Staff Capacity Building Seminars were held in September 2005 and were received positively by the AU headquarters. NATO exposure to any other activities outside these operations is minimal.

NATO TROOP REPORTS

Question. What have NATO troops who are involved in the training reported back about the relative ability of (a) the ability of AU headquarters staff to carry out a multinational operation; and (b) the relative capabilities of the troop contingents—their ability to shoot, move and communicate with one another—that have been deployed to Darfur?

Answer. As approved by the North Atlantic Council, NATO military officers provided Staff Capacity Building Seminars both at the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Force Headquarter at El Fashir, Sudan. The African Union (AU) displayed a keen interest in this training and on average sent twice the expected personnel to each of the four seminars. This training focused on individual staff member procedures at the DITF and Force-level headquarters. The AU, recognizing their own training requirements and the opportunity that NATO provides, requested additional seminars. The NATO trainers confirmed the requirement for additional training. The North Atlantic Council has approved the extension of the mission until March 2006 and plans are underway to deliver more training through NATO Allied Command Transformation.

NATO is not engaged to provide tactical level instruction, nor are we engaged in the assessment of AU AMIS capabilities to conduct tactical-level operations.

AFRICAN UNION CAPABILITY

Question. In your opinion, has the African Union reached a stage in its development where it can successfully undertake a mission such as the one it's currently signed on to in Sudan?

Answer. The African Union (AU) is accomplishing the mission it was given—peacekeeping. However, with regard to the security situation, it appears that a stronger mandate with authority and expanded freedom to operate is required in order to satisfy expectations that the African Union presence will stop all of the violence.

The experience gained by conducting this mission and the confidence that will come if they reach a successful conclusion will greatly enhance their ability to undertake similar missions in the future. This is the first significant mission for the AU as an organization, which will undoubtedly expose a number of deficiencies and challenges that must be overcome in order to increase its overall effectiveness to accomplish this mission and those that will occur in the future. There are a few areas which the African Union is still developing, such as the ability to transport troops from member nations.

The viability of the AU is an important element in USEUCOM's overarching strategic goals in Africa. In concert with our State Department and OSD, EUCOM will continue to support the African Union (AU) and regional organizations to help ensure their success. In so doing we will help African regional organizations and their member countries develop the military capabilities they need to respond to regional problems and to protect their strategic resources, reduce destabilizing tensions, and further develop cooperative, mutually-beneficial relationships.

 RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR OBAMA
TO GENERAL JONES

PROBLEMS WITH AFRICAN UNION AIRLIFT

Question. Can you outline the problems that the African Union faces with mobility, specifically with airlift and why this is an important issue?

Answer. Airlift is exceptionally important in Africa because of the enormous size of the continent, the often rough nature of the terrain, and the generally very poor condition of the infrastructure. To be credible, the African Union must be able to get its forces where they are needed on short notice, and airlift is the only way this can be done. A functioning airlift capability can be achieved only by a comprehensive process that addresses the availability of airframes; an effective maintenance system; training for pilots, maintainers, and other experts, such as air traffic controllers; and a reliable supply of consumables, most notably fuel. Currently, most African countries lack adequate strategic lift assets to provide airlift for deploying

to desired regions. The few nations that do have any airlift capacity are reluctant to use their assets due to deficient finances and inadequate maintenance. An example is Nigeria, which had only one of eight C-130s in a flyable condition during the airlift of their battalions.

The paucity of operational strategic lift within the African Union underscores the importance of U.S. European Command's Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs. A fundamental principle of our security cooperation efforts is to build military capacities, such as airlift and aircraft maintenance, that will enable organizations like the African Union to respond more efficiently and effectively to regional crises. In so doing we reduce the burden on U.S. forces and equipment and help build important security partners that advance our common interests.

BUILDING AFRICAN UNION AIRLIFT CAPACITY

Question. What has either NATO or the United States done to address this shortfall and what more can be done to build the airlift capacity of the African Union?

Answer. The United States European Command (EUCOM) is currently developing the "African Airlift Initiative," a promising proposal designed to focus EUCOM's energies in the effort to help Africans build airlift capacity.

While working to improve maintenance and logistical capabilities, this initiative will focus on fostering "regional thinking" among our African partners. This regional approach is important because it fosters cooperation by willing African partners while promoting an efficient and effective airlift force in the face of an austere fiscal environment.

In order to improve maintenance capability, the African Airlift Initiative proposes the establishment of several regional logistic and maintenance hubs on the African continent. These hubs should result in an overall improvement in aircraft reliability and effectiveness.

EUCOM proposes to act in partnership with the African Union (AU) and select "focus countries" to promote sponsorship and hosting of regional maintenance and training symposiums that would be open to surrounding countries.

As African airlift reliability improves and the requirement for U.S. airlift diminishes, this initiative proposes increased training with our African partners. These multinational training opportunities will help develop the skills of African air forces while providing the additional benefit of honing U.S. aircrew skills.

Finally, this initiative will pursue efforts to support the AU as it enhances and improves regional command and control structures. To this end, EUCOM proposes the creation of an African Airlift Center in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in partnership with the AU headquarters there. This facility would be responsible for scheduling African airlift to meet African requirements and for coordinating donor country contributions. It would include facilities necessary to provide both regional and continent-wide coordination, scheduling, and planning functions for African airlift missions.

The vision for the end state of the African Airlift Initiative is an African continent postured and ready to handle the airlift requirements for any humanitarian crisis or natural disaster. By assisting Africans to improve aircraft availability and reliability, the success of future African airlift operations should not hinge on U.S. or NATO involvement.

For its part, NATO has addressed this shortfall by coordinating the donation of strategic airlift from nations—NATO and non-NATO—as well as working with the European Union to avoid overwhelming the processing stations in theater. The United States, under the NATO banner, has provided strategic airlift and transported three of the eight battalions plus additional troops, including civilian police, to and from theatre. Finally, based on the AU's latest request for support, NATO's North Atlantic Council has approved the extension of the mission until March 31, 2006.

LIMITATIONS IN ADDRESSING THE AIRLIFT SHORTFALL

Question. What limitations do NATO or the U.S. European Command face in addressing the airlift shortfall?

Answer. The most significant limitation to the short-term fix—filling African shortfalls with NATO and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) airframes, crews, and equipment—is the availability of aircraft, personnel, and budget to address African shortfalls. There are competing priorities for these assets. Airlift support for

contingencies that exceed the capacity of available assets requires the reprioritization of theater support missions and often results in the cancellation of airlift missions supporting EUCOM service components' operations.

The predominantly poor infrastructure throughout Africa creates additional challenges. To ensure mission success, EUCOM must deploy more airlift assets, accompanying sustainment equipment and support personnel, than would be required at locations with robust infrastructure. This increases the demand for airlift assets that would otherwise be supporting EUCOM service component missions.

The most significant limitation to the proposed long-term fix—improving functioning African airlift capability—is that once an organic capability for airlift is established in a country, there is no guarantee that it will be used for the greater good of all Africa. EUCOM lacks appropriate tools to influence African nations to participate in humanitarian or peace operations. Unless the crisis at hand is demonstrably linked to the national interests of a particular country, their participation cannot be assured or even expected.

EFFECT OF FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES

Question. General Jones, all of us are well aware of the enormous U.S. military force structure changes underway in the European Command Area of Responsibility. Moreover, all of this is taking place in an environment where we are fighting a war in Iraq, conducting operations in Afghanistan, undergoing a BRAC round and responding to natural disasters here at home. How do these changes, in the middle of this challenging environment, effect your ability as either the Commander of U.S. forces, or as the Supreme Allied Commander, to influence the security situation in Africa?

Answer. Clearly, Africa's strategic importance is growing. The United States European Command's (EUCOM) efforts are focused on transforming our current force structure in Europe from a "cold-war" era heavy force to an agile, mobile, and tailorable force capable of rapid deployment into any one of a number of Forward Operating Sites or Cooperative Security Locations. Our objective is to increase strategic effectiveness through the realignment of bases and the improvement of access and force capabilities throughout EUCOM's area of responsibility. These transformational efforts will improve EUCOM's capability to maintain relevant, focused, and complementary security cooperation activities customized to the social, economic, and military realities in both Europe and Africa. A fundamental principle of our strategy is a proactive approach that will enhance regional security, mitigate potential conflict, and build military capacities of our allies and partners that can reduce the burden on U.S. forces.

EUCOM's more adaptive infrastructure and theater security cooperation activities will improve operational reach and tactical flexibility; increase responsiveness and cooperation with friendly nations to meet the objectives of the National Defense Strategy; and better promote U.S. interests in today's international security environment.

NATO PRAGUE SUMMIT

Question. Can you briefly outline how the decisions made at the NATO Prague Summit in 2002 helped prepare NATO to be more effective in responding to crises like the one in the Darfur?

Answer. NATO is putting into place a series of measures to increase the deployability and usability of its forces. NATO adopted a three-pronged approach at the 2002 Prague Summit: (1) launching the Prague Capabilities Commitment, (2) creation of the NATO Response Force, and (3) streamlining the military command structure.

Under the Prague Capabilities Commitment, member countries agreed to improve capabilities in more than 400 specific areas. In certain areas, such as strategic airlift, NATO countries are pooling resources to provide the Alliance with the required capabilities to respond to crises like Darfur.

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a highly ready and technological advanced force that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed. With over 20,000 troops, the NRF will be able to deploy after five days notice and sustain itself for 30 days of operations or more if re-supplied. The NRF gives NATO the means to respond swiftly to various types of crises anywhere in the world.

Finally, NATO has streamlined its military command arrangements to provide a leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable command structure. This reflects a fundamental shift in Alliance thinking. It has resulted in a significant reduction in headquarters and operations centers. This new command structure will be better able to conduct the full range of Alliance missions. This restructuring has proven beneficial to our support of the AU Mission in Sudan. With a more efficient decision-making cycle NATO's response to the AU request was extremely rapid, from first receipt of the original request to North Atlantic Council approval of the Strategic Mission Order, to deployment of personnel.

These measures are aimed at ensuring the Alliance can fulfill its present and future operational commitments and fight new threats such as terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This is particularly important as NATO takes on new missions in places such as Darfur and Afghanistan.

NATO OUT-OF-AREA MISSIONS

Question. What work remains to be done within NATO in order to better enable proper training, equipping, and organization of the alliance to conduct out-of-area missions and to respond to future contingencies in Africa that parallel the crisis in Darfur?

Answer. The full operating capability of the NATO Response Force (NRF) is the centerpiece of the near-term transformation of NATO to rapidly respond to crisis within NATO and outside of the alliance's boundaries. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a highly ready and technological advanced force that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed. With over 20,000 troops, the NRF will be able to deploy after five days notice and sustain itself for 30 days of operations or more if resupplied. The NRF gives NATO the means to respond swiftly to various types of crises anywhere in the world.

Elements of the NRF got their first significant test by providing significant humanitarian assistance to the United States after Hurricane Katrina. This kind of humanitarian assistance is continuing beyond the NRF context with NATO's assistance to Pakistan following their recent devastating earthquake. However, the transformation of NATO—on both the political and military levels—continues as we recognize and deal with each new challenge together.