

**NOMINATIONS OF THE 112TH
CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION**

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

—————
MARCH 16 THROUGH DECEMBER 8, 2011
—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
112TH CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION

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NOMINATIONS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 2011

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Derek J. Mitchell, of Connecticut, to be Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma, with the rank of Ambassador
Frankie Annette Reed, of Maryland, to be Ambassador to the Republic of the Fiji Islands, and to serve concurrently as Ambassador to the Republic of Nauru, the Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Kiribati

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jim Webb presiding.
Present: Senator Webb.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

Senator WEBB. Good morning. The hearing will come to order.

Today the committee will consider the nominations of Derek J. Mitchell to be U.S. Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma; and Frankie A. Reed to be U.S. Ambassador to the Fiji Islands, and the Republic of Nauru, the Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Kiribati.

In 2008, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act established the position of the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma. The Special Representative is charged, among other responsibilities, with promoting a comprehensive international effort to support democracy in Burma and address the humanitarian needs of its people.

I believe this position can play a key role in bringing together the various voices on Burma policy in striving to develop a more coherent, effective policy. However, to date, the position has not been filled, and we should not delay this any longer.

In 2009, after a great deal of coordination, I became the first Member of Congress to travel to Burma in 10 years. There I had the opportunity to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi, and was also the first and only American official ever to meet with General Than Shwe.

Following this visit, there were, in my view, many opportunities for follow-on activities by others in our Government and in theirs that could bring about a change in our policy toward Burma.

Our sanctions-led approach had produced no meaningful results in the country, except to further isolate the people, and I believe that we need to find a way to break this cycle.

Soon thereafter, following its own policy review, the administration agreed with this position and announced a new dual-track policy guided by direct engagement with the Government in Burma and the continued policy of economic sanctions.

Since this shift, the administration has taken some limited steps toward direct engagement, but given the strategic importance of Burma and the critical humanitarian needs in that country, more can and should be done.

Fixed between two powers—India and China—and bridging two subcontinents, Burma has been wrecked by internal conflict, led in part by the desire of the previous military government to enforce national unity among a diverse ethnic population. In the past few weeks, this conflict has flared up in a serious way, particularly in the Kachin areas near the Chinese border.

Despite this enduring violence, the Burmese people have steadily pursued a transition toward civilian government and, hopefully, toward eventual democracy.

On November 7, 2010, Burma held its first election in 20 years. With limited international observation, most will argue that the election was neither free nor fair, with the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, USDP, winning the majority of open seats in the new Parliament.

Coupled with the military's automatic holding of 25 percent of the seats in Parliament, this bloc will carry a supermajority.

Yet numerous independent reports indicate that the election process has created the potential for a new political dynamic in the country, with candidates participating from more than 37 different political parties. The National League for Democracy did not register as a political party and, therefore, was unable to participate in the election. But other democratic and ethnic minority parties did participate, and their candidates won seats in the national and regional Parliaments.

This was a step—albeit an incomplete one—toward forming a representative government, and it is a greater step than many other countries in the region can claim.

This spring, we have observed the convening of the Parliament and the appointment of new government officials. By all indications, a transition of some sort is occurring. My colleague, Senator John McCain, in his visit to Burma earlier this month, noted that “this new government represents some change from the past,” and that the new government wants a better relationship with the United States.

The release of Aung San Suu Kyi after the election was an important benchmark in this process, and her continued freedom of movement may serve as a bellwether for the development of a more vibrant civil society.

I believe these changes yield promise for improving accountability and transparency in Burma. The International Crisis Group, a well-respected nonprofit organization committed to preventing conflict, concurs. Their March 2011 report notes “this moment of relative change in a situation that has been deadlocked for

20 years provides a chance for the international community to encourage the Government to move in the direction of greater openness and reform.”

However, it also important to realize that this transition is not guaranteed, either domestically or because of foreign influence. China, the second largest economy in the world with a decidedly nondemocratic political system, wields a great and continuing influence in Burma. With the construction of gas and oil pipelines, hydropower development, and additional assistance, China has attempted to purchase influence through investments that support the Burmese Government and provide China with strategic access to the Indian Ocean. Chinese leaders may be concerned with the ethnic conflict on their border, but they have yet to take constructive steps to encourage a meaningful political reconciliation with Burma.

Even more troubling has been China’s role as a transshipment point for illicit exports from North Korea, which many observers believe may be bound for Burma. While there are legitimate concerns about Burma’s relationship with North Korea, the administration has yet to question China’s role in these exports.

I believe we should be more consistent and responsible in our rhetoric, particularly on an issue of such importance.

With this political and regional complexity, the Special Representative faces a difficult task. Yet this position has the opportunity to play a positive and continuing role in ending the isolation of the Burmese people and promoting democratic development through deeper, more sustained direct engagement with the Government and civil society.

Historian and scholar Thant Myint-U testified in 2009 before this committee that “there can be no grand strategy on Burma from the outside, only efforts to use and build on opportunities as they come along. And seeing these opportunities depends on being more present on the ground, in direct contact with the Burmese people.” And I encourage our nominee today to consider this approach.

Today we are also considering our policy toward Fiji, Nauru, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Kiribati. That distance that spans these locales is a challenge, only to be matched by the requirement that our Ambassador represent the United States simultaneously to five different countries with varied political systems and domestic challenges.

The largest among these, Fiji, is an important political, educational, and economic center in the western Pacific. It is also a country of significant ethnic tensions—particularly between indigenous Fijians and Fijians of Indian ancestry—that have affected its political stability.

In 2006, Fiji’s military chief sponsored a coup that nullified contentious elections in the name of national unity. Since this time, United States relations with Fiji have been strained.

The military chief, now interim Prime Minister, has further postponed elections until 2014. It is interesting to note that our response to this undemocratic action has appeared softer than our response to other military coups in Asia, such as those in Burma.

For example, while we cut bilateral military assistance to Fiji following the coup, the U.S. Agency for International Development

will be opening an office there this year. I look forward to examining this decision and exploring the prospects for United States-Fiji relations as we go forward.

In closing, I look forward to the testimony of our nominees, and before their remarks, I would like introduce them and invite them to recognize those who have come to support their nomination today.

And to begin the introductions, I would like to welcome Congressman Faleomavaega, the U.S. Representative from American Samoa and ranking member on the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.

Congressman Faleomavaega is a fellow veteran and has recently been reelected to his twelfth term in the Congress this year. Throughout his service, he has been a vital voice on the importance of the Asia Pacific region and the value of our relationships there.

And he's joined us today to introduce Frankie Reed, our nominee to be U.S. Ambassador to Fiji.

And, Congressman, welcome, and the floor is yours, sir.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, U.S.
DELEGATE FROM AMERICAN SAMOA**

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With due respect, I did not have the opportunity to meet Mr. Mitchell, but I'm sure that President Obama has made a very wise decision in terms of this position that is going to be so important to establish a bilateral dialogue between us and the state of Myanmar.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very much for the opportunity that I have. I voluntarily offered myself to come here not only to introduce my very dear friend, but someone whom I have respected over the years. I would say among the very few Foreign Service officers who knows anything about the Pacific region. And I felt it so important that I wanted to come here to do this and to share with you some of my observations in the 20 years that I've served as a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, specifically also as a member of the Asia Pacific Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs for the past 20 years.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, it's a real honor and a humbling experience for me to introduce a dear friend. Although I don't represent her and her constituency in the great State of Maryland, I feel like I know her, and in terms of the close working relationship that we've had and her efforts as she had served previously as the Deputy Chief of Mission in the Independent State of Samoa.

I'm sure you already have the biography of Ms. Frankie Reed, Secretary Reed. And I just wanted to reiterate some of the highlights of her career and how much to the extent that I totally support President Obama's nomination of her to serve as our Ambassador not only to Fiji but to the Republics of Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru, and also the Kingdom of Tonga.

Ms. Reed is a graduate of Howard University and got her degree in journalism. And then she also received her law degree at the University of California, Berkeley; became a Peace Corps Volunteer; served also as a member of the California Bar; and before becoming a Foreign Service officer, she was initially assigned as a

desk officer for the Bureau of African and Western Hemisphere. She later held posts Kenya and also in Cameroon and Senegal, and then became the deputy director of the Office of Australia and New Zealand and the Pacific Islands.

She then became the Deputy Chief of Mission to the Independent State of Samoa for about 3 years. Then she went off again to Guinea and then later became Consul General and Deputy U.S. Observer to the Council of Europe and the European Council for Human Rights in Strasbourg, France.

And returning from that assignment, she became a diplomat in residence at her alma mater at U.C.-Berkeley and lectured there and conducted several outreach programs to universities in the Pacific Northwest.

She was then assigned as Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of East Asian Affairs and Pacific Affairs. And then to this point now in her brilliant career, she is nominated by President Obama to serve as Ambassador.

And my reason for wanting to do this very much, Mr. Chairman, is the fact that we do have some very serious issues and problems affecting the Pacific region. I think I've been very vocal for all these 20 years. As I recall, when I first became a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, interestingly enough, nobody wanted to talk about Asian-Pacific issues 20 years ago. I think the entire mentality here in Washington, DC, was Europe and the Middle East. And if we talked about any issue affecting the Asian-Pacific region, it was really nothing that we could really take interest in. And I wondered myself why we have not really taken a more serious interest in this very important region of the world.

I do want to say that I honestly believe that Secretary Reed will do a fantastic job for the simple reason that she knows the Pacific. I've often said that President Obama is the first President of the United States that at least knows where the Pacific Ocean is. For the simple reason that when we talk about Asian Pacific, it's almost like a foreign language to many of our policymakers here in Washington, DC.

I say this with interest, Mr. Chairman, because both you and I as Vietnam veterans, I know we've taken a lot deeper understanding of the fact that many times the policies that we enunciate toward Asian-Pacific region have not been very positive, out of the fact that I think we don't know the complexity of the region, and for the simple reason that we just have not had a very positive experience in dealing with the peoples of the Asian-Pacific region.

I do appreciate the fact that this administration and President Obama and Secretary Clinton, in the initiatives that they've taken for the past 2 years, I think it's positive. And yet, we need to do more.

And I believe that you have hit it right on the nail in terms of the challenges that Secretary Reed is going to have when she becomes Ambassador to these five different countries. Even though by way of population that seems to be sometimes the way we operate as a matter of policy—if the country is not heavily populated, we don't seem to take much interest in it. And we see this in the Pacific region as a classic example.

And my basic criticism, Mr. Chairman, of our policy toward the Pacific region is that we have no policy. Our policy toward the Pacific region has only been toward Australia and New Zealand, and all the other countries are only incidental to this policy.

And I sincerely hope that Secretary Reed, and I know from her given experience, that it's going to become a lot more positive, more engaging, and I really believe that we ought not neglect the needs of these 14 island countries, sovereignties, and we should pay more attention to the problems of the Pacific.

And you and I could not agree more of the fact that we should pay more attention to Asia, as well. Despite the fact that President Obama has taken the initiative—a lot of meetings, a lot of conferences, a lot of this, but we need to be a little more substantive in terms of what we really mean we should do, we ought to do, when dealing with the Asian-Pacific region.

So with that, Mr. Chairman, again, I want to thank you for giving me this opportunity to comment on the distinguished nominees that we have here, especially my good friend Secretary Frankie Reed. And I sincerely hope that the committee will approve her nomination as Ambassador to Fiji.

I will not go into the crisis or the problems we're dealing with Fiji at this point in time. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if you have questions, I would be more than happy to assist in that regard. But again, I want to thank you for this opportunity and I yield back.

Senator WEBB. Congressman, thank you very much for taking the walk to the other side of the Capitol and being with us this morning, and for your long years of service to our country and to Congress. We very much appreciate you coming and expressing your support for Ambassador-to-be Reed.

Thank you again for being with us. And I know you probably have things waiting for you on the House side this morning.

At this time, I'd like to introduce Derek Mitchell, who has been nominated to be Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma, with the rank of Ambassador. Currently, he is Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. Prior to this position, Mr. Mitchell was a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; special assistant at the Department of Defense; and a senior program officer at the National Democratic Institute. He has a master's degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, a bachelor's degree from the University of Virginia.

Welcome, Mr. Mitchell. I know you would like to introduce those who are here today to support your nomination, and please do that.

We welcome your wife. I had a chance to say hello to her before we came up here, but please do so, and then we'll look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF DEREK J. MITCHELL, OF CONNECTICUT, TO BE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND POLICY COORDINATOR FOR BURMA, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me, indeed, introduce my wife first, Min Lee, who is right behind me. She is a reporter. We used to work in Taiwan. She's originally from Taiwan and now works for a cable station in Hong

Kong. But I want to welcome Min, who is sitting right behind me, so thank you very much for the opportunity.

Senator WEBB. Welcome.

You may proceed.

Excuse me, I neglected to say that Senator Kerry has a statement he would like to have introduced into the record, and it will be included at this point.

[The prepared statement of Senator Kerry follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY, CHAIRMAN,
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Today, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee convenes to consider the nominations of Derek Mitchell to be Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma, with the rank of Ambassador, and Frankie Reed to be Ambassador to the Republic of the Fiji Islands, the Republic of Nauru, the Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Kiribati.

Both the nominees before the committee today have distinguished records, and they are well qualified to represent the United States overseas in these important posts.

Given the moral imperative of fashioning a wise policy that benefits Burma's long-suffering people, I would like to take a moment to discuss the opportunities and challenges that await one of our nominees: Mr. Mitchell, our current Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, and the President's deserving choice to be his special envoy for Burma.

If confirmed, I have every confidence that Mr. Mitchell will faithfully implement the Obama administration's "dual-track" approach toward Burma. After years of a one-sided, "sanctions only" policy that did not produce change, the administration is seeking to combine pressure with principled engagement to encourage the Burmese Government to embrace reforms and make a genuine transition to civilian, democratic rule. Let me be clear: The special envoy position's mandate is to undertake a comprehensive international effort that includes both engagement with Burma's leaders and working with Burma's neighbors and international organizations to coordinate more effectively pressure for change. This holistic approach holds the best chance of achieving real results.

When he arrives in Naypyidaw for the first time early in his tenure, the President's envoy will need to assess the implications of recent developments in Burma, including the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, the controversial 2010 elections, and the formation of a government led by a former top regime general and now President, Thein Sein.

Many questions linger about Burma's new Parliament and its "civilian" government. The elections that produced them reflected a deeply flawed process with highly restrictive rules that excluded the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). All the while, the NLD's longstanding leader Daw Suu remained sidelined under house arrest. Members affiliated with the old regime and military appointees occupy almost 90 percent of all positions in the legislatures. While many former military officers now wear civilian clothes, Senior General Than Shwe's role in daily affairs is not readily apparent. It is similarly unclear how much power various institutions such as the Presidency, Vice Presidencies, the Cabinet, the Parliament, the United Solidarity and Development Party and the Tatmadaw (the military) will wield over time.

If confirmed, I expect Mr. Mitchell will test and probe in principled ways to understand the new political dynamics inside Burma and see if there is a possibly changing environment that is more amenable to calls for reform. This will require him to consult broadly with various stakeholders, including the government; Daw Suu and other current and future NLD leaders; other legitimate democratic groups; civil society; ethnic groups; and, of course, the international community. While creatively exploring how best to encourage political change, our envoy will also need to search for ways to help Burma's people today, including through more effective implementation of humanitarian programs that can empower them.

The Burmese Government could take some tangible steps to show it is sincere about making real progress: Releasing political prisoners, easing media and speech restrictions, making good on President Thein Sein's recent promises of economic reforms, devoting more resources to education and health, as well as allowing greater space for international and nongovernmental organizations to help meet the critical needs of the Burmese people would be a good start. Minimal concrete steps to date

in these areas combined with deeply troubling reports of sensitive military technology transfers from North Korea and renewed violence in Kachin state and other ethnic regions make fair-minded observers wonder whether Burma is still conducting “business as usual.”

I believe the administration is prepared to improve ties with Burma’s Government if it breaks from the policies of the past. For their part, Burmese diplomats have repeatedly expressed a desire for better relations. In fact, they recently asked for a few modest U.S. measures to build confidence such as calling the country by its current name—Myanmar—and removing travel restrictions on visitors to its United Nations Mission in New York, who have to adhere to a 25-mile limitation. Yet, there has been very little progress by Naypyidaw on either core human rights concerns or an inclusive dialogue that leads toward national reconciliation.

In the months ahead, both sides should explore taking carefully calibrated measures independent of each other to begin a process that encourages constructive change inside Burma and could lead to serious talk on tough issues. Burma could grant the ICRC access to prisoners, for example, while the United States could allow it observer status in a signature, new U.S. program focused on environmental, health, education, and infrastructure development in mainland Southeast Asia called the Lower Mekong Initiative.

Make no mistake, U.S. efforts to encourage democratic reform and progress on human rights will get more traction if our envoy is able to forge greater multilateral cooperation on all facets of U.S. Burma policy. Other Southeast Asian countries can send a message about their own expectations by linking Burma’s chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014 to tangible political progress. Burma’s giant neighbors, China and India, are also indispensable partners in this equation.

My experience working to improve relations with Vietnam taught me that clear-eyed diplomacy, combining elements of pressure and engagement, can encourage even an authoritarian regime to change course, particularly if Washington works in concert with like-minded members of the international community.

I and others will be watching closely to see whether Burma’s Government is interested in a path toward peace and democracy or whether it remains anchored to the failed policies of the past.

The appointment of a U.S. Presidential envoy dedicated to Burma will afford its leaders an important, new opportunity to pursue policies that benefit their people, can improve relations with the United States, and begin to repair their international reputation.

Senator WEBB. Go ahead, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to serve as the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma with the rank of Ambassador. I am truly humbled by the confidence that President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have shown in me by this nomination.

As you are well aware, Mr. Chairman, Burma is a nation rich in history, rich in culture, and rich in possibility. At the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, Burma sits on sea lanes, natural resources, and fertile soil that create the conditions for potentially unlimited development.

It is, therefore, particularly unfortunate that while much of Southeast Asia has become more free, prosperous, and globally interconnected in recent decades, Burma has been the outlier.

Burma remains a country at war with itself and distrustful of others. With a Government that has chosen for several decades to distance itself from the outside world, Burma now is the poorest country in Southeast Asia and a source of great concern and potential instability in the region.

Although rich in natural and human resources, nearly a third of Burma’s population lives in poverty. Hundreds of thousands of its citizens are internally displaced and thousands more continue to seek refuge and asylum in neighboring countries, largely due to the

central authority's longstanding conflicts with and systematic repression of the country's ethnic minority populations.

Over 2,000 political prisoners languish in detention, even as Burma's military continues to routinely violate international standards of human rights.

And although the Burmese Government has claimed a successful transition to a "disciplined, flourishing democracy," a political system that exhibits anything close to recognizable standards of representative democracy remains to be seen.

As a result, United States relations with Burma have been strained. Over the past 2 decades, however, international policies of either pressure or engagement, as you have suggested yourself, Mr. Chairman, alone have not produced the change in Burma that we and the rest of the international community seek.

In September 2009, the Obama administration completed its Burma policy review and announced its intention to pursue a more flexible U.S. policy approach that integrated both sanctions and engagement, a dual-track approach fully consistent with President Obama's call for "principled engagement" with nations around the world.

Congress' establishment of a Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma was meant, in my view, to enable a more focused, sustained, coordinated, and ultimately effective attention on Burma by the U.S. Government.

Although United States policy toward Burma has evolved, the overriding objective has and, I believe, should not: The United States still seeks a peaceful, prosperous, open, and democratic Burma that respects the rights of all its citizens and that adheres to its international obligations. The United States remains prepared to establish a positive relationship, based on mutual respect and mutual benefit, with a Burmese leadership that adheres to and advances these principles.

If I am confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will seek opportunities for direct and candid dialogue with the regime concerning a path forward for our relationship with Burma that is consistent with our values and broader national interests, and contributes to Burma's own development as a secure and prosperous nation at peace with itself. I will report regularly, including to the U.S. Congress, on the results of this engagement, so we may calibrate our dual-track policy appropriately.

I believe we should be prepared to respond flexibly and with agility to opportunities as they arise in Burma, according to evolving conditions on the ground.

If confirmed, I will also conduct extensive consultations with key stakeholders inside and outside government, at home and abroad. My objective will be to implement U.S. law faithfully and coordinate efforts to advance our common objectives.

To date, in my view, the inability of key members of the Burma-interested community around the world to coordinate their approach to Burma has only undermined the effective realization of our shared objectives.

Mr. Chairman, I believe I have the right mix of skills, experience, and regional expertise to carry out fully the congressional mandate for this position. I currently serve, as you said, as the

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, where I have been responsible for overseeing U.S. security policy and strategy throughout East, Southeast, South, and Central Asia.

I have more than 20 years of experience studying and working on Asia from various perspectives, both inside and outside of government, from within the United States and in Asia itself.

Mr. Chairman, I know you take a particularly keen personal interest in the situation in Burma, as do many others in Congress, throughout our country, and around the world. It is a country of unique interest to me as well. It would be a great privilege to serve my country as the first Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma.

If confirmed, I will bring the full weight of my diverse experience, personal contacts, understanding of Asia, and strategic instincts to this position. I will consult closely with you and other members of this committee in Congress to fulfill the mandate of this position in the interests of the United States and toward the betterment of the people of Burma.

Thank you for considering my nomination. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEREK MITCHELL

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as the President's nominee to serve as the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma with the rank of Ambassador. I appreciate the confidence that President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have shown in me by this nomination.

As you are well aware, Burma is a nation rich in history, rich in culture, and rich in possibility. At the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, Burma sits on sea lanes, natural resources, and fertile soil that create the conditions for potentially unlimited development.

It is therefore particularly unfortunate that while much of Southeast Asia has become more free, prosperous, and globally interconnected in recent decades, Burma has been the outlier. Burma remains a country at war with itself and distrustful of others. With a government that has chosen for several decades to distance itself from the outside world, Burma now is the poorest country in Southeast Asia and a source of great concern and potential instability in the region. Although rich in natural and human resources, nearly a third of Burma's population lives in poverty. Hundreds of thousands of its citizens are internally displaced and thousands more continue to seek refuge and asylum in neighboring countries largely due to the central authority's longstanding conflicts with and systematic repression of the country's ethnic minority populations. Over 2,000 political prisoners languish in detention, while Burma's military continues to routinely violate international human rights.

Overall, the average Burmese citizen lacks fundamental freedoms and civil rights. Although the Burmese Government has claimed a successful transition to a "disciplined, flourishing democracy," a political system that exhibits anything close to recognizable standards of representative democracy remains to be seen. I am encouraged that the new President of Burma speaks of reform and change, but the pathway to real national reconciliation, unity among its diverse peoples, and sustainable development requires concrete action to protect human rights and to promote representative and responsive governance.

As a result, U.S. relations with Burma have been strained. Over the past two decades, international policies of either pressure or engagement alone have not produced the change in Burma that we and the rest of the international community seek. In 2008, Congress directed the establishment of a Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma to enable more focused, sustained, and coordinated attention on Burma by the U.S. Government. Consistent with this directive, in September 2009, the Obama administration completed its Burma policy review and announced its intention to pursue a more flexible U.S. policy approach that inte-

grated both sanctions and engagement to achieve results in Burma. This dual-track approach is fully consistent with President Obama's call for "principled engagement" with nations around the world.

Although U.S. policy toward Burma has evolved, our overriding objective has not: the United States still seeks a peaceful, prosperous, open, and democratic Burma that respects the rights of all its citizens and adheres to its international obligations. The United States remains prepared to establish a positive relationship, based on mutual respect and mutual benefit, with a Burmese leadership that advances these principles.

If I am confirmed, my role as "Special Representative and Policy Coordinator" will be to work closely with and build upon the excellent foundation established by Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Yun in implementing Burma policy. I will seek opportunities for direct and candid dialogue with the regime concerning a path forward for Burma that promotes our values and broader national interests, and contributes to Burma's own development as a secure and prosperous nation. Of course, engagement is not an end in itself or the single measure of success: engagement must be time-bound, results-based, and accompanied by meaningful progress. If confirmed, I will report regularly to the White House, Secretary of State Clinton, and the U.S. Congress on the results of our dialogue and evidence of such progress so we may calibrate our dual-track policy appropriately. I believe we should be prepared to respond flexibly and with agility to opportunities available in Burma and according to evolving conditions on the ground.

If confirmed, I will also conduct extensive consultations with key stakeholders both inside and outside government, at home and abroad. My objective will be to implement U.S. law faithfully and coordinate efforts to advance the common international objectives of bringing about in Burma the unconditional release of all political prisoners, respect for human rights, an inclusive dialogue between the regime and the political opposition, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and ethnic groups that would lead to national reconciliation, and Burma's adherence to its international obligations, including all U.N. Security Council resolutions on nonproliferation. To date, in my view, the inability of key members of the international community to coordinate their approach to Burma has undermined the effective realization of our shared objectives.

Mr. Chairman, I believe I have the right mix of skills, experience, and regional expertise to carry out fully the congressional mandate for this position. My first job in Washington was in the foreign policy office of the late Senator Ted Kennedy, where I learned the importance of congressional oversight, particularly on international issues of unique interest to Members and the American people. I have more than 20 years of experience studying and working on Asia from various perspectives both inside and outside of government, from within the United States and in Asia itself. For 8 years, I led the Asia division at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) International Security Program and established CSIS' Southeast Asia Initiative. I currently serve as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, where I have been responsible for overseeing U.S. security policy and strategy throughout East, Southeast, South, and Central Asia.

My first visit to Burma was in 1995, when I traveled to Rangoon with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and met with government officials, international NGO representatives, and political party leaders, including the remarkable Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. I made subsequent visits, which solidified my appreciation for the richness of the country's history and culture as well as the tragic limitations of its political and economic development. I retained a keen interest in Burma's affairs in the years since, and cowrote an article in the journal *Foreign Affairs* in 2007 that outlines a new U.S. policy approach to the country not dissimilar to results of the Obama administration's 2009 policy review.

Mr. Chairman, I know you take a particularly keen personal interest in the situation in Burma, as do many others in Congress, throughout our country, and around the world. It is a country of unique interest to me as well. It would be a great privilege to serve my country as the first Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma. If confirmed, I will bring the full weight of my diverse experience, personal contacts, understanding of Asia, and strategic instincts to this position. I will consult closely with you and other members of this committee and in the Congress to fulfill the mandate of this position in the interest of the United States and toward the betterment of the people of Burma.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Mr. Mitchell.
And, Ms. Reed, welcome.

Let me first mention that, as the congressman noted in his introduction, Frankie A. Reed is a career Foreign Service officer. She served in Cameroon, Kenya, Senegal, Samoa, Guinea, and France. Currently, she's Deputy Assistant Secretary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs for Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. She has a law degree from the University of California at Berkeley, a bachelor's degree in journalism from Howard University. Prior to joining the Department of State, Ms. Reed practiced law, worked in print journalism, spent 2 years as a Peace Corps Volunteer.

And I know that you have people who have come to support your nomination, so I'd like to give you the chance to welcome them, and then we'll go to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF FRANKIE ANNETTE REED, OF MARYLAND, TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE FIJI ISLANDS, AND TO SERVE CONCURRENTLY AS AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU, THE KINGDOM OF TONGA, TUVALU, AND THE REPUBLIC OF KIRIBATI

Ms. REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have my cousin, Susan Reed Slocum, and her husband here today.

Senator WEBB. Welcome.

You may take such time as you care.

Ms. REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am deeply honored that the President has nominated me to be the United States Ambassador to the Republic of the Fiji Islands, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of Nauru, the Kingdom of Tonga, and Tuvalu. I want to thank the President and Secretary Clinton for nominating me for this position, and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and this committee today.

The United States Ambassador resident in Fiji, as we have noted, is responsible for the bilateral relationships with five independent nations.

Embassy Suva is a busy hub of American activity in the Pacific. The staff collaborates with multilateral organizations, including the Pacific Island Forum. In addition, the Embassy also has consular and commercial responsibilities for French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna, making it the largest geographic consular district in the world, one which attracts over 150,000 Americans annually.

Fiji, in the heart of the Pacific region, is a diverse country of some 850,000 people. It is a regional transport and communications hub, as well as the site of the University of the South Pacific and the regional headquarters of many foreign aid organizations.

In December 2006, as we also noted, the Fijian military, led by Commodore Bainimarama, overthrew the country's lawfully elected government. This event has created a prolonged political and economic crisis in Fiji.

In accordance with the foreign operations assistance act, the United States suspended military and other foreign assistance programs in Fiji and will maintain these sanctions on Fiji until a return to a civilian government. That return must be signaled by a transparent, inclusive process that includes all elements of Fijian society.

We look forward to working with the Fijian Government on continued law enforcement training with police and port security officials, however. And, if confirmed, we also look forward to a deepened cooperation on disaster preparedness with the Pacific Command Center for Excellence.

If confirmed, I will work with the Fijian people, the government, and other regional partners to push for early elections, elections restoring Fiji to the path of democracy.

The Pacific Islands face many of the same global issues that other countries face, but in this particular region, the repercussions can be more acute.

These countries, many of them low-lying atolls, will be the first to experience the effects of climate change and environmental degradation.

Tuvalu, one of the world's smallest nations, has nine atolls only a few feet above sea level. Nauru's once bountiful phosphate mines are almost exhausted. The problem of overfishing and threatened marine resources hits hard in the Pacific, since island states are dependent upon fish stocks not only for the sustenance of their people, but also as a major source of government revenue.

If confirmed, I will work with these nations and regional partners like the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, as well as our Australia and New Zealand partners, to address these pressing global issues.

Despite these challenges at home, these Pacific islands are our partners in fostering both regional and global stability. Tonga and Tuvalu became early members of the coalition to liberate Iraq. Tongan troops are currently serving in Afghanistan. Fiji contributes 600 soldiers to peacekeeping operations in Iraq, the Middle East, Sudan, and Liberia.

Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu occupy a strategically important part of the Pacific. They are our partners in addressing critical global and regional issues.

If confirmed, I will do my best to continue to strengthen relations between the United States and each of these five countries. Working together, we can achieve our common goals for a stable, peaceful, and prosperous region.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Reed follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANKIE REED

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am deeply honored that the President has nominated me to be United States Ambassador to the Republic of the Fiji Islands, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of Nauru, the Kingdom of Tonga, and Tuvalu. I want to thank the President and the Secretary for nominating me for this position and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

Currently, I serve as the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs responsible for relations with Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Island posts (Fiji, Tonga, Kiribati, Samoa, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau), the Consul General and Deputy U.S. Observer to the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, the Deputy Chief of Mission in Guinea and in Samoa, and as the Deputy Director in the Office of Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Island Affairs. My service outside of the Department of State includes that of Diplomat in Residence at the University of California and as a Pearson Congressional Fellow.

The U.S. Ambassador resident in Fiji is responsible for the bilateral relationships with five independent nations. Embassy Suva is a busy hub of American activity in the Pacific. Some 26 American employees and 80 Foreign Nationals work to advance U.S. interests over a stretch of the Pacific Ocean. The dedicated staff members collaborate with multilateral organizations, and promote regional public diplomacy activities, environmental programs and policies, the National Export Initiative, and defense-related relationships on a daily basis. If confirmed, I will engage closely with the Pacific Islands Forum continuing the good work of my predecessor, who was designated as the first U.S. Representative to the PIF. The Embassy also has consular and commercial responsibilities for French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna, making this geographically the largest consular district in the world, spanning across 3,000 miles and attracting approximately 55,000 Americans annually.

Fiji, located in the heart of the Pacific region, is an ethnically and religiously diverse country of 850,000 people. It is a regional transport and communications hub, as well as the site of the University of the South Pacific and the regional headquarters of many foreign aid organizations, NGOs, and multilateral organizations, including the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. The New Embassy Compound in Suva, opened in June this year, serves four other U.S. Embassies in the region as the hub for our Regional Environmental, Labor, Law Enforcement, Public Diplomacy, and Defense offices.

Fiji's unique position in the Pacific makes it a key focal point for our larger regional engagement with the South Pacific. In comparison with other small Pacific Island nations, Fiji has a fairly diversified economy. It remains a developing country with a large subsistence agriculture sector, and Fiji is rich in natural resources including gold, timber, and marine fisheries. For many years, sugar and textile exports drove Fiji's economy. However, neither industry is currently competing effectively in globalized markets. Additionally, remittances from Fijians working abroad, and a growing tourist industry—with 400,000 to 500,000 tourists annually—are the major sources of foreign exchange. However, Fiji's tourism industry as well remains damaged by the coup and continues to face an uncertain recovery time.

In December 2006, the Fijian military, led by Commodore Voreqe (Frank) Bainimarama, overthrew the country's lawfully elected government creating a prolonged political and economic crisis in Fiji. Fiji's coup leaders have not taken any credible steps to restore democratic institutions. The public emergency regulations remain in place; the press remains heavily censored and the right to assembly is severely restricted. The United States has consistently advocated for the Fijian regime to take steps to return democracy to the Fijian people by holding free and fair elections and an end to Fiji's Public Emergency Restrictions (PER). A promise to hold in 2009 did not materialize and the government has now said it will hold elections in 2014.

A key feature of our engagement with Fiji is close consultation and coordination with Australia, New Zealand, and other regional players. We seek more direct engagement with Fiji's Government and encourage it to take the necessary steps to restore democracy and freedom. By taking credible steps toward an increased civilian role in government, lifting of the PERs and other democratic reforms, Fiji can work toward reintegrating into international institutions and restoring its former international role. Assistant Secretary Campbell is in the region now continuing our engagement with our friends in the Pacific; and if confirmed, I will do the same. Also, we look forward to discussing Fiji at the upcoming September Pacific Island Forum Leaders meeting in Auckland.

Following the 2006 coup, the United States suspended military and other assistance to Fiji under section 7008 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. This suspension applies to foreign military financing, International Military Education and Training grants, peacekeeping operations, and military aid that falls under section 1206 of the 2006 Defense Authorization law. The United States will maintain these sanctions on Fiji until a return to civilian government, signaled by a transparent, inclusive, open-ended process including all elements of Fijian society. U.S. foreign assistance to Fiji has been suspended due to the coup. If it resumes due to a return to a democratically elected government, assistance will remain focused on security for Fiji.

On occasion the United States cooperates with civilian police authorities and, if confirmed, I will continue to work with the Fijian Government on law enforcement training with police and port security officials. The United States also plans to provide substantive technical assistance toward an elections process once Fiji's Public Emergency Restrictions are lifted and credible democratization timetables are implemented. Fiji's Strategic Framework for Change envisions a timeline for elections in 2014, but inclusive national dialogue and concrete steps to restore a democratic

process should begin as early as possible. If confirmed, I am prepared to meet with all levels of government, civil society, and other regional partners, to push for early elections and restoring democracy in Fiji.

Pacific Island nations face many of the same global issues that other countries face, but in this particular region, the repercussions can be more acute. These countries, many of them low-lying atolls, will be the first to experience the effects of climate change and environmental degradation. Tuvalu, one of the world's smallest nations, has nine atolls only a few feet above sea level. Nauru's once bountiful phosphate mines are almost exhausted. HIV/AIDS, drug smuggling, and human trafficking are also growing concerns. The problem of overfishing and threatened marine resources, another global problem, hits hard in the Pacific, since Island states are dependent upon fish stocks not only for the sustenance of their people, but also as a major source of government revenue. Non communicable diseases like diabetes and heart disease among the Pacific Island population are also an area of increasing concern. Kiribati participates in regular consultations based on our 1979 Treaty of Friendship.

The challenges are many, but these small states are open to working with us, and we have learned that focused, timely engagement can have a large impact. If confirmed, I will work with all members of the U.S. Government and private sectors, as well as regional partners like Australia and New Zealand to try to address these pressing issues. Historically, Pacific Island nations have been our friends but others are increasing their profile in this strategic region, and we want to ensure that nothing gets in the way of our close mutually supportive cooperation.

Despite these challenges at home, these Pacific Islands are our partners in fostering both regional and global stability. In the recent November 2010 elections, Tonga has shown its commitment to the region in being consistent in its vision toward democratization in that country. Tonga and Tuvalu were early members of the coalition in Iraq. Tongan troops are currently serving in Afghanistan. Fiji contributes approximately 600 soldiers toward peacekeeping operations in Iraq, the Middle East, Sudan, and Liberia.

Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu occupy a strategically important portion of the Pacific. They are our partners in addressing critical global and regional issues. If confirmed, I will do my best to continue to strengthen relations between the United States and each of these five countries. Working together, we can achieve our common goals for a stable, peaceful and prosperous region.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much.

And I should point out that your full statements, if they vary at all from what you said, will be entered into the record at the conclusion of your oral statements. Also that there may be other members of the committee who have questions, and the record will be held open until tomorrow evening, in case they would like to submit those questions in writing and have them included as part of the record.

Let me start, Mr. Mitchell, with some questions for you.

First a technical one: Have you been informed as to how your position is going to fit into the hierarchy of the State Department? Who's going to be the lead person for policy toward Burma? And how are you going to fit into that?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, it is the first time someone will have this position, so it will need to be worked out over time and in practice.

I have been told that I will take a lead role on Burma policy but, obviously, in consultation with East Asia-Pacific office there, with Kurt Campbell, with Joe Yun, and obviously in close consultation with the Secretary. But I've been told that I'll be taking a leading role in consultation, in essence.

Senator WEBB. We haven't had an ambassador to Burma since 1990, how do you feel about this in terms of affecting your ability to engage the Government and the diplomatic representatives of other countries in Burma?

Mr. MITCHELL. I think we can engage effectively. This has been a longstanding issue. We haven't had an ambassador for a couple

decades now. But I think it's a matter of what we say and how we say it, as well. We need to take this a step at a time.

But I think we can engage effectively with the chargé there and with my position and other channels.

Senator WEBB. A key part of your role as defined by the JADE Act is to consult with regional partners and others to coordinate policy. What is your view of ASEAN's current policy toward Burma?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, ASEAN has traditionally taken a different approach. They have their ASEAN way of noninterference and very strict notions of sovereignty and such.

Things are changing. Things are evolving within ASEAN. There are some key members, including Indonesia, that have made the transition from a Burma-like system to a democracy.

So things are shifting there. They want to hold together, though, so there is a kind of consensus approach that limits the ability to take a more hard-line toward Burma.

They have sought engagement. They've pursued the constructive engagement approach for some time. I think they realize, as we have, as I said in my statement, that pure engagement, pure pressure is not necessarily getting the results we want.

And a key aspect of my job, a central aspect of my job, is going to be coordinating with ASEAN, coordinating with ASEAN nations to find a coordinated approach that gets us further down to where we both want to be.

Senator WEBB. As you know, there is some serious discussion that Burma may chair ASEAN in 2014 and that this prospect could actually incentivize the Government toward more rapid change. What is your view or has the State Department taken a view on this as of yet?

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't think the State Department has taken a view. This is for the ASEANS to determine themselves.

But I'm sure there's diplomatic outreach to ASEAN talking about this issue, but I can't comment about where they stand on that.

Senator WEBB. What are your thoughts about that prospect?

Mr. MITCHELL. About chairing ASEAN? I think, frankly, where Burma is today—I mean, ASEAN recognizes that Burma is an outlier, that Burma is somewhat of an embarrassment to the organization, that it is not moving in the direction that they want it to, even with the so-called elections and such that have happened late last year and the government now in Naypyidaw.

So I think they're wondering, they're debating themselves, whether this is the right time and whether Burma itself needs to prove that it deserves that kind of position within ASEAN, to be basically the face of ASEAN for a year. That's pretty substantial.

I mean, Burma has some work to do in order to make ASEAN nations comfortable with that, and the rest of the international community, I should say.

Senator WEBB. You mentioned something a minute ago about Indonesia having evolved from a military system. Vietnam and China have never held democratic elections, yet have opened up their economies to the outside world, have spurred regional economic development, and have transformed their domestic societies a great deal through that process, which is obviously not perfect.

But Indonesia was a system viewed as corrupt and controlled by the military. But over the course of decades, it's evolved into a fairly successful democracy and a leader in Southeast Asia.

What type of model do you see for Burma's political and economic transition?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, every country has its own model. There's no perfect cookie-cutter approach for countries. Burma will have its own path to development and progress.

Indonesia I think clearly provides a very, very useful model. They used to actually want to model themselves after Indonesia, before Indonesia changed. I would hope they would continue that talking point today, given how Indonesia has changed from being a military-dominated society to a democracy that is more stable than not and developing.

Burma hasn't made the choice that China and Vietnam have in terms of opening up, and economic reform and such. So I think they're very different situations, but we'll see how Burma proceeds.

Senator WEBB. Well, wouldn't you agree that one of the reasons that Burma hasn't made that choice is that they've had sanctions on them, and once sanctions were lifted—for instance, in Vietnam, once the trade embargo was lifted in 1994, it enabled a different type of interaction from the outside world, not only economic but on many different levels.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think Burma, traditionally, it's paranoia and it's xenophobia, and it's isolation. It's isolated itself for many decades.

And there's still that old thing there. There is a lot of concern about what this all will mean for the people in control of the system, including the economic system. They did that to themselves, and I think the sanctions were put in place in part because the sense was that the elites were doing well and the rest of the people were not. This was not a country that was seeking real change. It was maybe only enough change to benefit the few.

But we should watch how they develop. We should watch how they proceed and see if development can assist the people of Burma.

Senator WEBB. You would agree, would you not, that sanctions from the outside affect the ability of a country to evolve economically and in other ways? You can't just say that Burma did this to itself. I'm not defending the Burmese regime, but just the reality of how sanctions policies work.

Mr. MITCHELL. Sanctions certainly does affect our business investment and trade. There's no question about that.

But I think, fundamentally, the problem is not sanctions, when it comes to their economic development or where they are economically. I think, fundamentally, they have to make decisions about how they want to order their system in a way that really benefits the people of Burma.

Senator WEBB. Well, at a time when we have had these sanctions in place, Beijing has made well more than \$5 billion in direct investment without asking for any sort of political change inside the country.

And I know from personal experiences of American businesses that were in Burma that had to leave once the sanctions were put into place. And the comment at the time, this was 2001, was that

we were going to cut off our ability to help effect change inside the country.

So wouldn't you agree that a two-step approach, similar to what we have in place but taking advantage of signals from this newly formed government, would possibly include lowering sanctions?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, as I said in my testimony, as well, I think we do need to be flexible. We need to evolve according to conditions on the ground, if we see things are fundamentally changing.

I mean, I don't think there's an ideology of sanctions—it is the law, of course. I'm going to fulfill the law and it's up to Congress to lift these restrictions. It won't be up to me, necessarily.

But clearly, we need to watch what's going on there, and if we do find, as in our humanitarian assistance, that we are able to get in and help the people of Burma, truly help the people of Burma through our engagement in that way, then we ought to be considering that.

But right now, we're not necessarily seeing those signals, and I don't think we're seeing the change from the Burmese Government that makes that productive.

Senator WEBB. I hope you get your feet on the ground over there and maybe you can come back and have another discussion about what the signals are. Thant Myint-U, who I think is one of the most thoughtful and balanced observers of what's going on in Burma, is saying pretty strongly that there's a window here that could be taken advantage of, for the benefit of the United States position in that part of the world and also for the ability of the people inside the country to be able to reconnect with the international community.

And so, let's see if we can't get a really clear look at the signals that are being given off. And again, one of his comments to me was that this was a window. If we don't take advantage of it, it could very well go back the other way, and we certainly wouldn't want to see that.

Mr. MITCHELL. I should say, Mr. Chairman, he's a friend of mine. I've talked to him several times about this, and I've heard the same from him. And I certainly will keep my eyes and ears open. I'm not coming in with any preconceived notions in that regard.

Senator WEBB. You wrote an article in *Foreign Affairs* in 2007. One of the quotes was, "All parties have good reasons to make concessions. None of them can afford to watch Burma descend further into isolation and desperation and wait to act until another generation of its people is lost."

What are your thoughts about that now?

Mr. MITCHELL. I continue to believe that. That's why this position is meant to go out and coordinate and discuss with other partners around the world, with ASEAN, with India, with China, with Europe, and Japan, Korea, and others, about how we get a coordinated approach, where strict sanctions or strict engagement, which hasn't worked uncoordinated—maybe I think we can find ways that we can come together on a more coherent approach, even if we have different impulses.

Senator WEBB. Thank you.

Ms. Reed, I'd say, listening to the Congressman's introduction, and talking about this part of the world, I've had the pleasure of,

I'd guess I would say bouncing around Pacific Asia over the years and wearing different hats. I worked in Guam and Micronesia, at one point, as a military planner. I was out in different spots as a journalist. Also had the very emotional opportunity to visit Kiribati and the Solomon Islands when I was Secretary of the Navy. And Kiribati, as you know, was the site of one of the bloodiest battles in Marine Corps history, the Battle of Tarawa.

It was an incredible experience to stand on that narrow beach and look out at the amphibious vehicles that were still in the water, and think about all the sacrifices that went on in that remote place.

And so there are some of us up here who actually have, at some level, been involved in those issues. I worked pretty hard on this Trust Territory of the Pacific transition into the political divisions that are now Micronesia.

I wish you the best, and the one thing I think about when I am in that part of the world or remembering it, I was back in Guam and Tinian just a couple months ago, is what the Australians call the tyranny of distance.

And of course, I'd be interested in your thoughts in terms of challenges of your position, with the remote locations of these different countries that you're going to represent, represent us to.

Ms. REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate your comments, particularly I had the opportunity to listen to some of your discussion on Federated States of Micronesia a little over a year ago, when we were here for a confirmation hearing for our Ambassadors to Australia, New Zealand, and the Federated States of Micronesia.

As we are speaking, we have a group led by the Assistant Secretary. This is an interagency group with Admiral Walsh. They are visiting nine islands in the Pacific and just left Kiribati and are participating in memorial ceremonies also at each of the stops. I believe they are just leaving Tonga, also, now.

But the tyranny of distance is exactly that. I just came back from Papua New Guinea, where we were launching a women's conference, Pacific women leaders. And having missed all of the connections, it was about 29 hours. And that is the challenge.

I think what is important, in terms of U.S. engagement, is an understanding of the economics of that engagement and why it does necessarily cost more in terms of time and people power to undertake this.

It's also important in understanding what the economies of these island states are like and why it may take a bit more in terms of generating strong economies.

But certainly, not only the historical connection, in terms of regional security, the role that some of these island states, all of them, in supporting the United States and the United Nations, it's a very valuable investment.

Senator WEBB. We have a term in military planning called strategic denial. There are two different ways you look at territories. One is strategically where you need to be involved, and the other is strategically where you don't want somebody else to be, because it will affect your ability to do things. And the Pacific Ocean area, particularly Micronesia, but also Kiribati, these areas, have always

been a concern to United States military planners, in terms of how other countries might operate in the region and affect our ability to communicate.

What do you see as the involvement of other major nations in this region right now that we should look at, whether it's economic or otherwise, just involvement of larger countries in this region?

Ms. REED. I guess in formulating my answer to that, I was recently here with the Energy and Resources Committee discussing Palau and we talked about strategic denial. And while the impact of U.S. resources is probably, and I'm phrasing this carefully, a bit more apparent in the freely associated states, for historical reasons, and the compacts, of course, it is closely watched by those others.

Again, another recent trip I made where one of the countries that does not have a compact said they wish they did, OK?

I find in the Pacific, in particular in the small island states, because of the tyranny of distance, there's a lot of room for other powers to come in, if there's a void. And in my view, and having spent a lot of time out there—we lived in Samoa, Apia, Samoa, western, for 3.5 years, a lot of investment that has come in, in between that period of time, from other powers, and a lot of that, in my view, has to do with the absence—and when I say absence, the United States didn't leave the Pacific, but sometimes we are not as physically present as many of these countries would like.

Senator WEBB. I would strongly agree with your summation on that.

And what is it, in the areas that you're going to represent, the most important for the United States Government to be doing?

Ms. REED. These five countries present an opportunity, an almost unique opportunity, in terms of the ability for the United States to make a big difference in support for democratic reform, not only in Fiji, but in the other four.

Some of these systems have made great headway, Tonga, for example. But at the same time, it's an occasion to show our support through various support for civil society.

Because of the distance, it's important to have a physical presence. Engagement means much more than being able to access electronic media, some of which is almost nonexistent in many of these places.

When we talk about economic empowerment, this is a place where small investment can make a difference, support for small-business institutions, exactly what the U.S. Agency for International Development is so good at.

The Peace Corps is very present in some of these countries but has withdrawn from three. And again, a missed opportunity. You have island leaders who still talk about their Peace Corps teachers from 30 years back. And it has one of the more successful re-upping rates; that is, Peace Corps Volunteers who decide to do a third year or fourth in these island states.

And in terms of simply regional stability, I think U.S. presence, much of what the Pacific Command has been able to do out there, Pacific Partnership bringing medical clinics to the outer islands of many of these states, many people who have never had an opportunity to see a U.S. physician or nurse, setting up clinics.

That just touches on it just briefly, but I think there's room for quite a bit.

Senator WEBB. Thank you.

Mr. Mitchell, in several instances over the past year, the State Department has issued statements calling for Burma to fulfill its nonproliferation obligations, particularly with regard to North Korea.

Last May, Assistant Secretary Campbell made the comment, "We have urged Burma's senior leadership to abide by its own commitment to fully comply with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874. Recent developments call into question that commitment."

Do we have evidence that Burma is noncompliant with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874?

Mr. MITCHELL. I can't comment on that, personally. I don't know if we have that.

Senator WEBB. As policy coordinator, what steps do you intend to take to examine Burma's military relationship with North Korea, in particular China's role as an enabler in terms of a point of transshipment in this relationship?

Mr. MITCHELL. This is an absolutely critical issue. This is a core concern of ours, because there are reports and there seems to be some evidence of this relationship at a number of levels between North Korea and Burma. And it's one reason for engagement, is to be very frank and up front face to face, and tell them what's at stake if we get evidence that there is this relationship and they're violating U.N. Security Council resolutions. It will have substantial impact on any possibility of a betterment of certainly our bilateral relationship and their relations with the outside world.

Senator WEBB. There's a recent news report regarding possible shipments from North Korea to Burma. And Gary Samore, Special Assistant to the President, stated in the Wall Street Journal that Burma was among the countries that agreed to apply pressure on North Korea, and that contrary to initial press reports implying the ship was bound for Burma, the final destination of the North Korean ship was not known. This was the Wall Street Journal report of a comment by the Special Assistant to the President.

What is your view of this? Is this a positive development? Do you think it portends anything for future cooperation on nonproliferation?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I'd have to defer. I don't know about that report. I can't substantiate it. I don't know anything about that, so I'd refer to the State Department and the White House on that. But if there is evidence, then—

Senator WEBB. If it were correct, you would view that as a positive development?

Mr. MITCHELL. If correct, obviously very positive.

Senator WEBB. OK.

As I said, any questions for the record from other members of the committee can be submitted until close of business tomorrow.

I thank both of you for your testimony today and for your willingness to continue serving our country and for this very useful exchange.

This hearing is now closed.

[Whereupon, at 11 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF DEREK MITCHELL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. You made clear in your prepared remarks that the Obama administration policy you will pursue, if confirmed, is based on a more flexible approach that integrates sanctions and engagement to achieve results in Burma. This “dual-track” policy, as you noted, is reflective of President Barack Obama’s broader call for “principled engagement” with countries worldwide. Thus far, the administration’s engagement with Burma has yielded only modest results, as U.S. officials themselves point out. But it was also understood that this process would require some time and patience. While U.S. policy has evolved, the goal of a more open, democratic, peaceful, and prosperous Burma remains much the same. How will you approach the Burmese Government to advance these principles, and what will be your message to senior Burmese officials when you first arrive in Naypyidaw?

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage in a direct dialogue with senior Burmese officials in Nay Pyi Taw—as well as a full range of other leading players in the country—to listen to their perspective on the future direction of Burma, plans for democratic change, national reconciliation, economic reform, and protection of human rights, and frankly relay the perspectives and principles of the U.S. Government as they will affect our Burma policy going forward. My message to the Government and people of Burma will be that the United States harbors no animosity toward Burma but rather is committed to advancing Burma’s own stated goal to become an open, just, democratic, and prosperous nation that adheres to international laws and principles, and serves as a responsible and respected member of the international community.

Question. Following last November’s highly controversial elections, Burma’s first Parliament in over 20 years completed its inaugural session from January to March 2011. Notwithstanding the fact that it is early and you have not had a chance to have first-hand conversations with relevant actors on the ground, what are your initial observations about how that institution is functioning? If confirmed, what principles would inform your consultations with opposition leaders, and based on those principles, with whom in the opposition would you most likely consult in addition to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi?

Answer. I was disappointed by media reports that noted Burma’s parliamentary sessions were short and scripted and that members had to submit questions in advance. A true democratic legislature should serve as a forum for genuine debate and a check on executive branch power.

If confirmed, my consultations with opposition leaders would affirm these principles while ensuring that I consult with a full range of stakeholders, including civil society leaders, ethnic minority representatives, and political parties, in addition to Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy and other groups, to enable me to understand the full range of thinking about Burma’s future.

Question. Allegations have recently resurfaced that the Tatmadaw is seeking to obtain assistance from North Korea to develop nuclear weapons and missile technology. How do you view such claims and, more generally, the political-military relationship between Burma and North Korea? What might be motivating any Burmese efforts to acquire sensitive technologies from overseas?

Answer. I am troubled by reports of military-to-military ties between Burma and North Korea. If confirmed, I will monitor closely any reports or questions about illicit North Korea-Burma interaction and consult with the committee on any findings in an appropriate classified venue.

I will also raise our concerns about these reports in Nay Pyi Taw and urge the Burmese to be transparent in any dealings they have with North Korea and to comply with their international obligations, including full and transparent implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874.

Question. Burma’s Ministry of National Planning Development reports Burma received \$20 billion in inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the fiscal year ending March 11, compared to \$302 million in fiscal year 2010. The claim, if reasonably accurate, would seem to point to the challenges of coordinating international efforts to apply pressure on Burma. If confirmed, how would you try to address the growing

importance that Burma's neighbors seem to be placing on the country as an investment destination?

Answer. Burma is a country that is rich in natural resources, and I have seen reports that investment in the country is increasing, particularly in extractive industries. If confirmed, I will engage interested nations about the full range of interests and equities we share in genuine political and economic reform Burma, and our potential role in promoting that reform through coordinated and principled engagement. In addition, I would call upon the governments of Burma's neighboring countries to urge Burmese authorities to comply with international environmental, labor, and human rights norms.

Question. One of the responsibilities of the Special Representative is to consult with regional and international organizations and other countries to coordinate policies toward Burma. As you know, Burma is scheduled to chair ASEAN in 2014. Understanding that ASEAN's membership must ultimately reach their own decisions, how will you coordinate with them to leverage the ASEAN chairmanship to achieve improvement on human rights and more responsive governance?

Answer. If confirmed, I will coordinate and consult closely with ASEAN members individually and as an institution to encourage consideration of Burma's potential chairmanship in a manner consistent with ASEAN's own interests and reputation, and the ideals of ASEAN's own charter with respect to democratic principles, good governance, and respect for human rights. I believe the countries of ASEAN will have an essential role to play in assisting movement toward reform in Burma.

Question. If recent high-profile visits are instructive, China continues to exert considerable political and economic influence over Burma. China's ongoing practice is to shield Burma from criticism over its human rights record in global fora and to thwart international efforts to apply pressure on the Burmese Government that are intended to produce improvements in human rights and good governance. If confirmed, how would you approach China to coordinate our activities in ways that produce positive changes in Burma? Are there particular areas, for example, that you view as potentially ripe for cooperation with China?

Answer. If confirmed, I will pursue dialogue with Chinese officials to identify areas of shared concern and potential cooperation, and encourage China to consult not only with officials in Nay Pyi Taw but with a wide array of stakeholders. China's interest in stability on its borders provides an incentive for a common approach that encourages national reconciliation through dialogue with, rather than violence against, Burma's ethnic minorities. Likewise, China should understand that only through real political and economic reform will Burma achieve true stability, which in turn serves China's interests in the region.

Question. In recent years, India has shifted its approach on Burma to put a much greater emphasis on engagement with the Burmese Government. In New Delhi's view, a policy focused principally on engagement is more consistent with India's interests. Are there ways in which we can encourage India to conduct its engagement going forward so that it benefits a more diverse set of stakeholders in Burma and better prepares Burma for a transition to a more open, inclusive, and responsive political and economic order?

Answer. India could play a unique role in promoting genuine democratic reform in Burma, particularly as the largest democracy in the world and key regional player, but also due to close historical ties with Burma and a shared background as a former British colony. India's free press, flourishing civil society, and ethnic diversity offer a useful example for Burma's future. India has a wide range of national interests in Burma that affect its calculations in dealing with the country. I am convinced, however, that India and the United States have a mutual interest in national reconciliation, reform, and true stability in Burma based on democratic principles. If confirmed, I will consider it an important part of my job to engage India to determine how we can leverage our respective strengths and interests toward a coordinated international approach to Burma that achieves our common goals, promotes reform, and benefits the people of Burma.

RESPONSES OF DEREK MITCHELL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. The Governments of Thailand and Burma have a reciprocity agreement to return military personnel of the other country who have fled their country of origin. During the last 4 years, over 100 Burmese military personnel who fled to Thailand were reportedly returned to Burma. Some of these individuals were hoping to

defect to the United States. Will you work within the Obama administration to develop a strategy for approaching Thailand officials to reconsider the policy of returning fleeing military personnel from Burma, especially those who desire relocating to the United States?

Answer. If confirmed, I will consult closely with administration officials as well as Thai Government officials to help ensure appropriate protection for all Burmese fleeing the country, including former members of the military. We need to continue to emphasize to Thai authorities that any return of Burmese nationals to Burma be voluntary and in line with international norms. We will continue to work closely with UNHCR to assist Burmese refugees needing protection and durable solutions to their refugee circumstances, including through resettlement in the United States.

Question. Why have economic sanctions targeting Burma's junta not been fully implemented by the U.S. Government? For example, the U.S. Treasury Department has not terminated correspondent relationships between overseas financial institutions holding assets of key junta officials and U.S. financial institutions, as allowed under present U.S. law. When asked about this, Treasury officials advised that such action would require the approval of the Department of State, and was unlikely to be received.

Answer. Our sanctions against Burma are comprehensive and target senior government officials and their cronies, among others. As warranted by conditions on the ground and new information, our ability to tighten sanctions is an extremely important lever of pressure on the regime. We appreciate the authorities Congress has provided through the JADE Act.

If confirmed, I intend to thoroughly review implementation of all existing sanctions, including those authorized and imposed under the JADE Act, to ensure that our sanctions regime complies with the law and is implemented as effectively as possible.

Question. In 2009, a Burmese military official seeking to defect to the United States was turned away at the American Embassy in Bangkok. What are the instructions provided to U.S. embassies on how to respond to persons from Burma seeking asylum?

Answer. The Department issues annual guidance to all embassies on procedures for handling foreign national walk-ins. We have confirmed that our embassies in the region follow these procedures for any Burmese military personnel who may approach the embassy. Embassies are instructed to coordinate with UNHCR regarding persons seeking asylum. We will continue to monitor these types of situations closely and coordinate with the appropriate entities to respond to the needs of any Burmese asylum seekers, including military personnel, who may approach an embassy in the region.

Question. Please provide the dates and details of communications since 2008 inclusive, when U.S. officials based in the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon approached Burmese officials asking that officials of the International Red Cross be allowed to visit with imprisoned political prisoners?

Answer. At every opportunity, we call on the Government of Burma to release all political prisoners immediately and unconditionally. We are concerned by the International Committee of the Red Cross' lack of access to prisons in Burma. I am unable to address the specifics of this question at this time. However, if confirmed, I will do all I can to facilitate this inquiry and provide information through a classified briefing if you are still seeking this information at that time.

Question. What steps have been taken by the U.S. Government to encourage countries neighboring Burma to accommodate child soldiers seeking to escape from their forced service in Burma's military?

Answer. We consistently call on Burma's neighboring countries to provide safety and protection to all Burmese fleeing the country, including children seeking to escape involvement in military activities. We work with the international community, including at the United Nations, to continue to shed light on the deplorable human rights situation in Burma and to urge the Government of Burma to cease this practice and respect basic human rights of all its citizens. Together with the international community, we are urging the government to grant the United Nations access to areas where children are recruited.

Question. If confirmed, will you support Secretary Clinton's call for a Commission on Inquiry related to Burma?

Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support Secretary Clinton's commitment to seek accountability for the human rights violations that have occurred in Burma by

working to establish an international Commission of Inquiry through close consultations with our friends, allies, and other partners at the United Nations.

Question. In addition to the export of missiles to Burma from North Korea, are North Koreans assisting with the manufacture of missiles inside Burma?

Answer. I would refer you to the intelligence community for an answer to this question. If confirmed, I will monitor closely any reports or questions about illicit North Korea-Burma interaction and consult with the committee on any findings in an appropriate classified venue.

Question. What are the projected annual numbers of MANPADS exported to Burma from North Korea and what are the projected numbers of MANPADS reportedly manufactured inside Burma on an annual basis?

Answer. I am unable to provide answers to these questions at this time and would refer you to the intelligence community. If confirmed, I will do all I can to facilitate this inquiry and provide answers to the committee through a classified briefing, if you are still seeking this information at that time.

Question. What is the status of the nuclear reactor reportedly under construction in Pakokku Township, Magway Division, Burma? How many North Koreans are estimated to be working at this facility?

Answer. I am unable to provide answers to these questions at this time and would refer you to the intelligence community. If confirmed, I will do all I can to monitor reports of questionable Burmese activities and ensure the committee receives answers to its questions on this account in the appropriate classified venue.

Question. Is the reported collaboration between Burmese and North Korean officials in Pyin Oo Lwin connected to Burma's efforts to develop a nuclear weapons program?

Answer. I would refer you to the intelligence community for an answer to this question. I can say, however, that if confirmed I will monitor closely any reports of collaboration between Burma and North Korea, including but not limited to those that may violate U.N. Security Council resolutions, and will consult with the committee on this matter in the appropriate classified venue.

RESPONSES OF FRANKIE REED TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Please describe the objectives and efforts of U.S. IMET programs in the Pacific, particularly in countries that do not have their own defense forces.

Answer. IMET is an important component of the administration's broader commitment to strengthen our engagement with the Pacific region at a time when other countries are intensifying their interactions with the Pacific Islands. Modest U.S. security assistance to the Pacific Islands provides local security personnel the necessary technical training to enhance their maritime security capabilities while improving their professionalism. The links we develop between our respective security forces have an important people-to-people component that help us maintain close relations across the generations and at all levels of society.

In particular, Tonga, despite its small size and isolated geography, has been a valuable and regular contributor to U.S. and international security—with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Solomon Islands. Nauru and Kiribati also support the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands.

Question. What is the nature of the relationship between U.S. officials in Fiji and Commodore Bainimarama? Please provide the committee with a copy of his biography.

Answer. The U.S. Ambassador has had over the past 3 years a cordial but distant working relationship with Commodore Bainimarama. Commodore Bainimarama has not always accepted the Ambassador's requests for meetings and one-on-one meetings between the two have been limited. Bainimarama has not welcomed the Ambassador's overtures to discuss specific ways that the United States could help Fiji return to civilian government and democracy. However, the Ambassador and Embassy officials have had an excellent working relationship with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his staff. Embassy officials work with Fiji Government officials at all levels and on areas of mutual concern, particularly law enforcement cooperation, disaster response and votes in the United Nations.

Question. During the last 2 years, what has been the nature of communication between U.S. and Chinese officials in Fiji?

Answer. Embassy officials have a friendly and constructive relationship. Embassy officials periodically meet to discuss possible mutual cooperation on development and humanitarian assistance as well as consular affairs to ensure better disaster preparedness for overseas American citizens and Chinese citizens.

Question. Please outline in detail, the U.S. export strategy for the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the other areas where you will represent the United States.

Answer. The Embassy seeks to use the National Export Initiative as a mechanism to increase exports from the United States to the region. Pacific Island countries would benefit from using U.S.-generated bioengineered agricultural products and techniques to increase food production. Exporting green technologies, particularly to reduce the burden of high fossil fuel costs, also would expand U.S. markets. Favorable exchange rates currently provide opportunities to export poultry, meat, and vegetables. The establishment of a Web-based American-Pacific Chamber of Commerce would strengthen trade ties and bolster economic activity. In addition, labor mobility strategies for Pacific Island countries largely dependent on wage remittances would greatly enhance their purchasing power.

Question. Please outline and compare U.S. and Chinese foreign assistance to the Republic of Fiji.

Answer. The United States does not provide traditional foreign assistance to Fiji. On occasion, our efforts focus on capacity-building, training, and technical assistance, particularly in law enforcement, disaster management, and leadership training for civilians. China still supports significant "brick and mortar" projects, such as roads, housing, and other facilities, using Chinese companies. Both countries allow for small numbers of Fijian students to attend colleges and universities in their respective countries.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEREK MITCHELL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

REPORTING LINES AND STAFFING PATTERN

In order for this position to be effective, the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator will need to be able to work across bureaus at State and across agencies, particularly with regard to the policy coordination mandate of the position. As the person in this position will be working on such complex interbureau and interagency efforts as the Commission of Inquiry, the disposition of banking and other targeted sanctions, and questions of aid and investment policy, it is important that they have the imprimatur of a direct reporting line to the Secretary of State and the interagency convening authority that comes with it. At the same time it is important to understand where the Special Representative/Coordinator will fit within the existing hierarchy and policy processes dealing with Burma, and what mechanisms will be put in place to ensure that the Special Representative's role is integrated effectively into those processes.

Question. Would you please provide all information regarding the expected reporting lines for the Special Representative and the Department's justification for its proposed arrangement; and additional information on the proposed reporting lines between the Special Representative and the EAP front and Burma offices, Embassy Rangoon, and other relevant officers?

Answer. We expect that the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma will report to East Asia and Pacific Affairs Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell and through him to the Secretary of State. The Department believes this reporting line will ensure that U.S. Burma policy is integrated with our overarching policy in Southeast Asia and East Asia more broadly. The Special Representative will consult closely with our Embassy in Rangoon and all offices in the Department that have equities in Burma, as well as across the interagency, to ensure that our policy on Burma is comprehensive and coordinated.

Question. Would you please provide the committee with additional information regarding the proposed staffing pattern for the office, including the anticipated number and type of staff that the Special Representative's office will be allocated to carry out its work?

Answer. The Special Representative will be supported by a Special Assistant and an Office Management Specialist. As needed, the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau will work to ensure that the Special Representative is adequately supported to ensure he can fulfill his mandate.

ASSISTANCE POLICY AND PROGRAMS

You noted that the U.S. Government has recently broadened the scope of its assistance programs inside Burma to assist directly the Burmese people through aid interventions. We are also seeing some other key donors moving to increase the nominal value of their aid programs in Burma and expand the types of activities in which they are engaged. Also, investment and aid from China in Burma varies widely. Some commentators have noted the deleterious effects of Chinese assistance to the Burmese Government as undermining the efforts of other donors to provide more responsible assistance.

Question. Could you elaborate on the current U.S. Government policy on humanitarian and development assistance in Burma, including examples of the types of activities that we consider to be possible at this time as well as those areas that remain outside the scope of current policy?

Answer. Current U.S. Government policy is to ensure all of our assistance programs are humanitarian or focused on democracy-building. Our assistance in Burma is designed to address the core problem of governance by empowering civil society to demand more responsive and democratic government, while also tackling the more immediate humanitarian issues that impede a democratic transition.

Burma is the poorest country in Southeast Asia and approximately one-third of Burma's people live in poverty. Our humanitarian assistance inside Burma combats public health threats, helps meet basic needs of refugees and migrants along Burma's borders, and addresses critical transnational challenges including infectious disease. Our democracy-building activities aim to develop and empower Burma's fragile civil society through training, education, and other civic capacity-building programs. The U.S. Government provides all humanitarian, health, and democracy assistance to Burma through U.N. agencies, international nongovernmental organization partners and local civil society organizations.

Any assistance activities that are outside of humanitarian or democracy assistance, flow through or to the Government of Burma at the national or local level, or support the Government of Burma are outside the scope of current policy. I believe that until we see evidence of genuine change inside Burma, we must continue to carry out our assistance programs independent of the government.

Question. Could you detail how assistance programs inside Burma are related to longstanding U.S. programs to assist refugees and political activists working from exile to support political reform in Burma, as well as how changes in European policies and programs have impacted USG policy and funding decisions in this area?

Answer. The overarching U.S. interest in Burma is a peaceful, prosperous, democratic country that respects human rights and the rule of law. Our assistance contributes to this objective by strengthening civil society; meeting the basic needs of the most vulnerable Burmese inside the country, along the Thai-Burma border, and elsewhere in the region; and addressing critical transnational issues. Assistance programs inside Burma complement ongoing programs to assist refugees and political activists working from exile to support political reform in Burma. To help meet the needs of people on both sides of the border, our assistance programs operate from both inside Burma and from the border regions.

In FY 2010, we provided significant cross-border assistance, totaling \$25.5 million for vulnerable Burmese along the Thai-Burma border and roughly 150,000 refugees residing in nine refugee camps in Thailand. In addition to humanitarian assistance programs inside Burma, democracy programs also operate from both sides of the border. Current programs inside Burma, for example, improve the operational ability of nascent civil society organizations, and provide grants for scholarships to Burmese citizens who return from overseas to provide social work within their communities. We have strict monitoring requirements in place to ensure none of our assistance flows to or through the government or military in any way and is delivered directly to the people of Burma.

The European Union's continued support for humanitarian assistance in Burma and Thailand is welcomed. In March 2011, the EU Commissioner announced its commitment to provide 22.25 million Euros in support of vulnerable Burmese communities in Burma and Burmese refugees in Thailand. We coordinate closely with the EU and other donor governments to ensure that adequate funding is sustained in order to meet the humanitarian needs of vulnerable Burmese.

Question. Would you please explain how you propose to engage both our fellow donors, multilateral aid agencies, and others like China on developing and implementing appropriate standards for assisting Burma? Is this an area where the

United States can engage directly with the National League for Democracy and others outside the ruling party to effect better programs and outcomes?

Answer, The U.S. Government has consistently sought to coordinate with and influence other countries and multilateral organizations on the provision of assistance to Burma. Our goal has been to ensure that any assistance, from U.S. taxpayer dollars or another source, benefits the people of Burma and does not enrich the Government of Burma or its supporters. This engagement has taken place not only with partners such as Australia and the European Union, but also with countries and organizations such as China, Japan, Canada, the Republic of Korea, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the U.N. and its agencies.

In addition to advocating appropriate parameters for assistance programs with the international community, we have engaged with an array of civil society groups including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, to solicit their views on assistance and effective methods to promote democracy and the growth of civil society inside the country.

Our engagement with the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi and other nongovernment entities has taken place both through our Embassy in Rangoon as well as through senior-level visits and correspondence from Washington officials. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that we continue the provision of assistance with the same philosophy and goals and that we remain focused on the betterment of the Burmese people.