

**NOMINATIONS OF THE 112TH
CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION**

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

—————
MARCH 16 THROUGH DECEMBER 8, 2011
—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



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S. HRG. 112-399

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

74-273 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2012

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
112TH CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION

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*Note: WILLIAM C. DANVERS (assumed *Staff Director* position as of October 3, 2011)

NOMINATIONS

TUESDAY, JUNE 21, 2011

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Hon. Anne W. Patterson, of Virginia, to be Ambassador to the Arab Republic of Egypt
Michael H. Corbin, of California, to be Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates
Matthew H. Tueller, of Utah, to be Ambassador to the State of Kuwait
Kenneth J. Fairfax, of Kentucky, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Kazakhstan
Susan L. Ziadeh, of Washington, to be Ambassador to the State of Qatar

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Lugar, and Corker.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order. Thank you all for being here.

I need to go to the floor at about 10:15 on Libya with Senator McCain. And during the time I'm not here, Senator Lugar will continue the hearing. I hope to get back here as soon as I can.

We're here this morning to consider the ambassadorial nominations to five important countries, and we're going to divide the hearing into two panels, beginning with Anne Patterson, the President's choice to represent the United States in Egypt.

As all of us know, Egypt has historically been the region's most important incubator of ideas, and now it is at the forefront of the new Arab Awakening. How Egypt manages its transition from dictatorship to democracy, and how it restructures its economy, will affect not only the country's 80 million citizens, but it's also going to affect millions of others throughout the region.

I've said a number of times in various speeches and other public fora that the fact that Egypt represents a quarter of the world's Arab population, and that it is not as torn apart by sectarian divi-

sions as some other countries in the region, and also has always had a very strong civic society, has always been a place where even under the Mubarak regime there was this current of civic engagement, discussion, all of those things, I think, contribute significantly to the possibilities for Egypt's contribution as we go forward.

Needless to say, its importance to regional strategic issues, particularly to the peace process with Israel and Palestine, can't be overstated. And so it is very, very important that this process go forward as effectively as possible.

Anne Patterson is one of our Nation's finest public servants, and I've had the privilege of working with her very, very closely when she served as Ambassador to Pakistan. Many late-night meetings with various hot issues on the table, and I watched her calm, professional approach to those challenges on many different occasions.

I am greatly encouraged that the President has nominated somebody of her caliber for the critical assignment of Ambassador to Egypt at this obviously critical moment.

Egypt does face significant challenges as it tries to build a new political order that is democratic and tolerant. I was there about a month and a half ago now, I guess. I held a town meeting. I was quite struck by the diversity of the people who came to the town meeting: young women in traditional covered garb and some in much more Western dress. Men in traditional garb, men in Western suits. Some bearded, some not. Very different backgrounds, but all with a very common sense of the possibilities of this moment and of the future, all wanting to express their citizenship and to be able to enjoy their rights and freedom.

So this is an exciting moment, but a very, very challenging one. I think when I was there, there was 2 percent occupancy in the hotel we were in. I think that was true of almost every hotel in the city. So there's been an enormous retrenchment with respect to one of the main sources of revenue and currency in the country.

There's little time to organize political parties before this fall's elections. And those elections, obviously, need to be fair and carefully monitored, or we may see a return to Tahrir Square anyway, unless there is positive progress. But certainly, the lack of a fair and accountable election would be cause for such a redux.

The Egyptian Government needs to become more transparent yet and more responsive to its citizens' needs. And questions remain about the role of religious parties in Egyptian politics, the stability of Muslim-Christian relations, and the future of Egypt's approach to Israel.

Egypt is also wrestling with considerable economic hardship. Forty percent of Egyptians live below the poverty line, and the revolution has dealt a serious short-term blow to the economy in other sectors than just tourism. One person there mentioned to me how many businesspeople have simply not returned or have left, some for fear of retribution, and that affects the flow of capital.

Food and oil prices are up. Foreign investors have yet to sense the confidence necessary to come back and invest. And the Government has significantly depleted its reserves of hard currency.

There is news, however, on the upside. There's positive news. Assistance from the World Bank and the IMF, and the United States and other countries, is starting to arrive. And Egypt's economy ac-

tually does, notwithstanding these challenges, appear to be beginning to stabilize. With prudent policies, a return to higher GDP growth is possible in the near term, certainly in the next year or two.

But the policies that are put in place need to benefit all Egyptians. And as Egypt changes, our approach to aid must change also.

Promoting economic recovery is not enough. International assistance needs to also address Egypt's socioeconomic divisions, expand its political space, and promote transparency, legitimacy, and accountability.

To that end, the Obama administration has provided funds to spur economic growth and assist with political transition. I've introduced legislation with Senators McCain, Lieberman, and Lugar that will promote entrepreneurship and job creation by channeling investment directly to the private sector.

I've also been working with Senator McCain and others to develop a creative public-private partnership that would encourage United States corporations and others to invest in Egypt.

In fact, this weekend, Senator McCain and I will travel to Egypt, together with Jeff Immelt, the CEO of GE, and a group of other chief executives, and we will meet with Egyptians in an effort to try to help further develop this initiative.

And I appreciate Ambassador Patterson's help, which has been significant leading up to this initiative. And certainly, the sooner we can get her on the ground to help implement, the better.

Obviously, we need to be realistic. Consolidating Egypt's democratic advances and addressing its economic woes is probably going to take a generation or so. But a recent poll found that nearly 90 percent of Egyptians think their country is headed in the right direction. And during my visit in March, as I mentioned, the spirit of ordinary Egyptians that I met in Tahrir Square and at other places was really contagious. I hope that spirit can propel them through what may be turbulent, difficult times ahead.

Ambassador Patterson, I'd like to just raise one last issue with you before I recognize Senator Lugar.

Nearly 2 years ago, a Massachusetts constituent of mine, Colin Bower, who I believe is somewhere here at this hearing, had his sons, Noor and Ramsay, abducted from the United States, from Massachusetts to Egypt, abducted by their mother, even though he had full legal custody of those children, even though our courts had already ruled, and, I might add, were abducted with false visas, false passports, entered their country, Egypt, under false pretense.

He has not even been able to see his children, Ambassador, and he's had a couple of visitations prior to the Tahrir Square. Since Tahrir Square gatherings, he has not seen them.

And I will tell you, I have raised this at any number of levels with the Egyptians. It's no small fact that the last conversation I had with President Mubarak, a relatively lengthy conversation, was almost exclusively on this topic.

And I raised with him the legalities, the inhumanity, the unfairness of what has happened, that a father would be separated from his children, that a country would not care enough to allow the father to be able to be part of those children's lives. And I think all

of us, you know, can understand the frustrations that Colin and a lot of his friends and family and others are feeling.

So my hope is that you can do what you can when you get there to emphasize the importance of this. In a new Egypt, hopefully the attitudes that allowed Colin to be stifled, literally, time and again, and to be maltreated and those kids to be deprived of a father, I think, hopefully, can achieve a higher order of priority.

So this morning we also welcome a second panel of nominees. And I don't mean in any way to diminish the importance of any of their countries in the time that we have spent on Egypt. Each of them is going to be representing areas that are of enormous consequence to the United States, where we have critical relationships.

Michael Corbin, nominated to serve as Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, critical to a whole set of relationships that we have, some of which will have an impact on Egypt and some of which have an impact on our strategic presence in the region.

Matthew Tueller, nominated to serve as Ambassador to Kuwait, again a key player in our relationships and our strategic interests in other countries in the region.

Susan Ziadeh, nominated to serve as Ambassador to Qatar. The Emir was here recently. We had good meetings with him, and he is deeply involved in these efforts with respect to Egypt. And we hope to have positive things to announce with respect to that in the short term. In fact, we may be stopping in Qatar Sunday night with Senator McCain in order to discuss these prospects.

And finally, Kenneth Fairfax, nominated to serve as Ambassador to Kazakhstan.

All four extremely qualified nominees, and we congratulate each of you and welcome you here today.

Senator LUGAR.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, may I have your permission to yield briefly to Senator Corker?

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, Mr. Ranking Member, I appreciate it.

I'm here out of total respect for the nominee and just to thank her for her commitment to public service. I don't know of a Foreign Service person who I respect more than the nominee for this position. And I welcome her and look forward to her doing great work in Egypt, as she has in so many other countries.

And with that, I'm going to go do something else.

Thank you.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Ambassador Patterson and our second panel of distinguished nominees.

Americans were moved by the power and speed of Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution and by the resolve of Egyptians to change the course of their history.

We celebrated the calls for greater political participation, the protection of basic human rights, and a more inclusive economy. We

were heartened that protests in Tunisia and Egypt had such an impact in many parts of the Middle East.

At the same time, it is clear that decisive improvements in governance in the Middle East will not be simple or automatic. The past few months have demonstrated that the countries of the region are all on very different paths and timelines.

We should not overgeneralize about what is occurring in Middle Eastern societies or expect changing attitudes to solve American national security problems in the region. We should recognize that the genuine opportunities in the long run for the advancement of democratic values and the broadening of prosperity are accompanied by short-term risks and dangerous uncertainties.

We are witnessing civil war in Libya and ongoing suppression of popular upheaval in Syria. In Yemen, we have seen a highly fractured society that appears to lack national institutions or a common identity around which to coalesce. In Bahrain, we have seen sectarian tensions and violence against peaceful protesters.

The challenge for our nominees is to protect and advance American interests in the midst of this rapidly changing and diverse landscape. It is essential that we redouble our efforts to engage in the Middle East. We must be creative in using the full scope of American power and influence to support a more peaceful future for the region.

This is important to our own fundamental national security, the global economy, and the security of our close ally, Israel.

Recognizing the diversity of the region does not mean shying away from promoting real reform and more inclusive government—even if that process looks different in Egypt than it does in the United Arab Emirates.

We have been encouraging more representative and tolerant governance throughout the region for many years. As Americans, we should honor those in the region who are speaking out in defense of values that we hold dear.

I believe that a key part of this process must be the encouragement of more transparent and inclusive economies that are more securely tied to the global market. We need to build more meaningful trade and investment relationships in the region.

Our nominees also should leverage the leadership of American universities, cultural institutions, and civil society to generate deeper and more sustainable linkages.

Protests started in Tunisia, but it seems clear that the test of this process will be in Egypt. We have a shared interest with the people of Egypt to build a more secure and prosperous future. This will not be a short process. But I believe Americans now expect a different relationship with this and future Egyptian governments.

We respect what was born in Tahrir Square and want to see it flourish into a partnership that goes beyond the top levels of our governments.

It is vital that the transition in Egypt not be hijacked by extremist groups who would undermine the fundamental civil liberties at the heart of the revolution and threaten U.S. and allied interests in the region.

In addition, during this moment of turmoil, the desire for more inclusive government must not be manipulated by those seeking to

deflect attention from their own failures, including the regimes in Iran and Syria.

I appreciate the commitment of our nominees and their willingness to take on these difficult assignments for our country.

We welcome you, again, Ambassador Patterson, and ask for your testimony at this point.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE W. PATTERSON, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Lugar, Senator Casey, and members of the committee. Thank you for the honor of appearing before you today.

I wish to thank the President for nominating me as Ambassador to Egypt and the confidence he and the Secretary have shown in me.

With your permission, could I introduce my family?

Senator LUGAR. Yes, that would be very, very nice of you.

Ambassador PATTERSON. My husband, David, who is retired from the Foreign Service.

Senator LUGAR. Welcome.

Ambassador PATTERSON. And my stepdaughter, Jessica, who is on her way to Afghanistan.

Senator LUGAR. Jessica.

Ambassador PATTERSON. And my son, Andrew, who is about to be commissioned in the Marines. And our other two children, unfortunately, aren't here today.

If confirmed, I look forward to leading the professionals from all agencies who serve in Cairo. Serving with so many dedicated people over the years, often under difficult circumstances, has been the highlight of my career.

Should I be confirmed, I am under no illusions about the responsibility and challenges of serving as Ambassador to Egypt, which is now the epicenter of enormous promising changes in the Arab world.

People everywhere were inspired by the events of Tahrir Square and Egyptian citizens' desire for freedom and democracy. But we should remember that transitions to democracy are difficult and long, that there will be reverses and surprises along the way, and that the Egyptians will find their own unique path.

When thinking about Egypt, I think we should be heartened by what has taken place in Latin America and Eastern Europe over the past 40 years. While in Latin America, the path to prosperity and democracy has hardly been a straight one, this hemisphere now has democratic governments in most countries and a degree of economic prosperity unimaginable 40 years ago. The Arab world will be no different.

If confirmed, I will be firmly committed to backing Egypt's democratic transition, which will reinforce much-needed respect for human rights, with all the support the United States Government can muster.

Let me outline the strategy that the administration has developed and which, if confirmed, I will pursue in Cairo. The first priority will be to encourage and support, to the extent that Egyptians desire it, an election process which is free and fair.

Polling suggests that many Egyptians will have the first opportunity in their lifetimes to vote in a free election, so enthusiasm is understandably high. And as we do in hundreds of other countries, the United States will support nongovernmental and civil society organizations who wish to enhance their organizational skills and play a more prominent role in public life. These groups are always essential ingredients in a successful political system.

The strengthened democratic process should lead to increased respect for human rights in Egypt since newly empowered citizens will demand it. We welcome the commitment of the interim Government to repeal the emergency law. We are concerned about arbitrary arrests, overly rapid and nontransparent trials, and attacks on religious groups.

Some particularly disgusting abuses against women demonstrators have taken place, and we have called on the authorities to prosecute those who committed them.

Second, it is clear that the need for a job was just as strong a motivator for demonstrators in Tahrir Square as the desire for freedom and justice. Egypt has to generate over 750,000 jobs a year to absorb young people into its labor force. These young people are often not well-prepared with skills needed for a modern economy, yet they have high expectations.

In fact, the International Republican Institute has just come out with a poll which indicates that Egyptians overwhelmingly believe that next year they will be better off economically. The current economic trends are headed in the other direction, and most Egyptians are barely making ends meet.

Egypt's military leadership has played a key role in stabilizing the situation, but Egypt's economy has suffered from the unrest, tourism has declined, and investors are sitting on the sidelines. So expectations for the new government will be unrealistically high.

As a result, a key part of our strategy, both bilaterally and working with the international community, will be to strengthen Egypt's private sector so that it can generate jobs and broaden the benefits of economic growth. Increased economic engagement with Egypt will also offer opportunities for American businesses to invest in and export to Egypt.

All Americans should be proud of what United States assistance has achieved in Egypt over the past 30 years, but we are now refocusing our assistance on projects that are directly linked with private sector growth and sustainable jobs.

As the President said in his May 19 speech, we are leading the effort in the international community to provide short-term stabilization for Egypt's economy. Egypt is discussing a program with the IMF and the World Bank, and other international lenders will provide the short-term resources that Egypt needs. We are seeking legislation which will allow us to forgive \$1 billion of Egypt's debt and ask Egypt to invest the local currency equivalent in an activity we mutually select.

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation is working to expand lending to small- and medium-size businesses.

Senator Kerry and, you, Senator Lugar have introduced legislation to authorize an enterprise fund for Egypt to spur private sector growth.

Our third priority is to ensure that Egypt plays a strong and positive role in the region. As one of only two Arab States to sign a peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has been a powerful ally for a two-state solution and a comprehensive Middle East peace agreement. Egypt has also been a valuable partner in fighting terrorism, reintegrating Iraq into the region, and providing assistance to refugees fleeing Libya.

Egyptian officials have said repeatedly that they will abide by the peace treaty with Israel. We take these commitments seriously. The vast majority of Egyptians have no interest in regional conflict and want to move forward on their own democratic path. Our close defense cooperation with Egypt serves United States interests and promotes regional security.

Let me say that democracies can often be loud and bumptious, and I am sure that Egypt will be no different. During Egypt's transition, we will hear many voices that are not to our liking, and Egypt's democratic process will be difficult at times, because of the newness and fragility of its democratic institutions.

If confirmed, I will do everything I can to support the aspirations of the Egyptian people during this period of transition. A credible transition in Egypt matters to the United States and our allies, and it will serve as a model for the rest of the Arab world.

Let me say in closing that I am particularly grateful for the critical role that members of this committee played in my last post. If confirmed, I know that members of this committee will play a similar role in the months ahead in Egypt.

Thank you very much. And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Patterson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ANNE W. PATTERSON

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee, thank you for the honor of appearing before you today. I wish to thank the President for nominating me to serve as Ambassador to Egypt, and for the confidence that he and the Secretary have shown in me.

I would also like to recognize my husband, David, who is retired from the Foreign Service, my stepdaughter, Jessica, who is off to Afghanistan soon, and my son, Andrew, who is shortly to be commissioned in the Marines. Our other children, Edward and Rachel, are not here today.

If confirmed, I look forward to leading the professionals from all agencies who serve in our mission in Cairo. Serving with so many competent and dedicated people, over the years, often under difficult circumstances, has been the highlight of my career.

Should I be confirmed, I am under no illusions about the responsibility and challenges of serving as Ambassador to Egypt. This 5,000-year-old society that has been a cradle of civilization and a longstanding regional leader is now the epicenter of enormous, promising changes in the Arab world. People everywhere were inspired by the events of Tahrir Square and Egyptian citizens' desire for freedom and democracy. But we should remember that transitions to democracy are difficult and long; that there will be reverses and surprises along the way; and that the Egyptians will find their own, unique path.

When thinking about Egypt, I think we should be heartened by what has taken place in Latin America and Eastern Europe over the past 40 years. While in Latin America the path to democracy and prosperity has hardly been a straight one, this hemisphere now has democratic governments in most countries and a degree of economic prosperity unimaginable 40 years ago.

I am sure the Arab world will be no different. So let me say at the outset of this hearing that, if confirmed, I am firmly committed to supporting Egypt's democratic transition, which will reinforce much-needed respect for human rights, with all the moral, economic, and political support that the United States Government can muster.

Let me outline the strategy that the administration has developed and which I will pursue in Cairo, if confirmed.

The first priority will be to encourage and support, to the extent that Egyptians desire it, an election process which is free and fair. Polling suggests that many Egyptians will have the first opportunity in their lifetimes to vote in a free election, so enthusiasm is understandably high. Just as we do in the United States, we anticipate that the Egyptian Government would invite international observers to witness this historic occasion. And as we do in hundreds of other countries, the United States will support nongovernmental and civil society organizations who wish to enhance their organizational skills and play a more prominent role in public life. These groups are always essential ingredients in an open and successful participatory political system.

The strengthened democratic process should lead to increased respect for human rights in Egypt, since newly empowered citizens will demand it. We welcome the commitment of the interim government to repeal the emergency law, which has been used for years to justify widespread human rights abuses. We are concerned about arbitrary arrests, overly rapid and nontransparent trials, and attacks on religious groups, primarily but not exclusively, against Christians. Some particularly disgusting abuses against women demonstrators have taken place, and we have called on the authorities to prosecute those who committed them.

Second, it is clear that the need for a job was just as strong a motivator for demonstrators in Tahrir Square as a desire for freedom and justice. Egypt has to generate over 750,000 jobs a year to absorb young people coming into the labor force.

These young people are often not well prepared with skills needed for a modern economy, yet they have high expectations. Many of these young people have historically been employed by the public sector, but this is no longer practical given Egypt's shortage of resources.

In fact, the International Republican Institute has just come out with a poll which indicates that Egyptians overwhelmingly believe that next year they will be better off economically. But current economic trends are headed in the other direction, and most Egyptians are barely making ends meet. During this critical transition period, the military leadership has played a role in stabilizing the situation, but Egypt's economy has suffered from the unrest; tourism has declined; and investors are sitting on the sidelines as attacks on the private sector seem to have proliferated in the aftermath of the revolution. So, expectations for the new government will be unrealistically high.

As a result, a key part of our strategy, both bilaterally and working with the international community, will be to strengthen Egypt's private sector so that it can generate economic stability and broaden the benefits of economic growth to all Egyptians. It is keenly in our interests to promote economic recovery in Egypt. Young people who have jobs are more likely to be productive members of society and contribute fully in the democratic transition. Importantly, increased economic engagement with Egypt will also offer opportunities for American businesses by investing in and exporting to Egypt.

All Americans should be proud of what United States assistance has achieved in Egypt over the past 30 years, particularly dramatic advances in reducing infant and maternal mortality and promoting education. USAID built the Cairo sewage system, the world's biggest construction project at the time, with predictable results for developing professional skills in Egypt and sharply increasing health conditions in one of the most crowded cities on the planet. We are now refocusing our assistance on projects that are directly linked with private sector growth and sustainable jobs. Let me describe some of this to you.

As the President said in his May 19 speech, we are leading the effort in the international community to provide short-term stabilization for Egypt's economy. Egypt and the IMF have reached staff-level agreement on new financing and the World Bank and other international lenders will provide short-term resources that Egypt needs.

We are seeking legislation which will allow us to forgive \$1 billion of Egypt's debt and ask Egypt to invest the local currency equivalent into an activity we mutually select. We intend it to be a major project that makes clear America's contribution to the Egyptian people. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation is working to expand lending to small- and medium-size businesses, which in any economy are the engine of job growth. OPIC is building on a very successful model in the West Bank. Chairman Kerry has introduced legislation to authorize enterprise funds for Egypt and the United States is working to reorient the EBRD to enable lending to Egypt. These have spurred private sector growth in Eastern Europe, and they will also spur private sector growth in Egypt. So, I believe that we have a sound plan going

forward, along with other members of the international community, to encourage stability in Egypt by widening opportunities for both American and Egyptian firms.

Our third priority is to ensure that Egypt plays a strong and positive role in the region and that our interests continue to align. As one of only two Arab States to sign a peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has been a powerful ally for a two-state solution and a comprehensive Middle East peace agreement. Egypt has also been a valuable partner in fighting terrorism, reintegrating Iraq into the region, and providing assistance to refugees fleeing Libya. Egyptian officials have said repeatedly that they will abide by the peace treaty with Israel. We take those commitments seriously. The vast majority of Egyptians have no interest in regional conflict and want to move forward on their own democratic path. Our close defense cooperation with Egypt serves United States interests and is influential in promoting regional security.

Let me say that democracies can often be loud and bumptious, and I am sure that Egypt will be no different. During Egypt's transition we will hear many voices that are not to our liking, and Egypt's democratic process will be difficult at times because of the newness and fragility of its democratic institutions. If confirmed, I will do everything I can to support the aspirations of the Egyptian people during this period of transition. A successful, democratic transition in Egypt matters to the United States strategically; it matters to our allies; and it will serve as a model for the rest of the Arab world.

Let me say in closing that I am particularly grateful for the critical role members of this committee played in my last post. If confirmed, I know that this committee will play a similar role in maintaining our bilateral relationship with Egypt and in ensuring a credible democratic transition.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador. We'll have a round with 7 minutes for each Senator.

And I'll commence the questioning by simply commenting how much admiration I have not only for your performance in your last assignment, but also your remarkable career on behalf of our country.

We also appreciate the members of your family being here. They exemplify, likewise, the service to our country that's a part of your family.

Let me start by saying that the Washington Post on June 19 talked about a problem that has been often discussed in this committee as to what role the United States ought to play in support of the political transition in Egypt. It's been suggested, for example, that perhaps the election that is now scheduled for September should be delayed. This is a point of contention, obviously, in Egypt, quite apart from our discussions going on here in the United States.

The dilemma comes down to the fact that those who are trying to put together political parties find themselves involved in a lengthy enterprise. This would include not only those who were in Tahrir Square, but other people in Egypt. Thus, the fear is that the Muslim Brotherhood, which is apparently better organized than most other political movements, might play a dominant role in the upcoming election, with results that would not exemplify the best in terms of Egyptian democracy or Egypt's relationship with the United States.

In the past 2 or 3 days, there was a story in the press of a young Egyptian who was one of those who was attempting to rally for democracy in Tahrir Square, and who has subsequently gone out into the countryside to try to encourage people to sign a petition to establish a new political party, which apparently requires 5,000 signatures. He had gotten up to 1,000 signatures but was finding it to be very difficult going, because the citizens he encountered want-

ed to talk primarily about fundamental issues such as their lack of food and their lack of employment.

They, to use our political jargon presently, were involved in the jobs issue, and were not as interested to discuss what seemed to them to be more abstract issues such as the political transition or the formation of a political party.

What is your general comment on this? Because as you accede, and I think you will be confirmed for this role, you're going to be there during much of this formative period, prior to September, in which there are going to be intense discussions regarding the need to ensure there are competitors in a free and fair election that really makes some difference.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar, and thank you for the kind words about me and my family.

Let me first address what we're doing as the U.S. Government to try and advance this process. And I think I, for one, am very heartened at the receptivity of some of our groups, like the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute and IFES, have had in Egypt, because their job is precisely the one that you have suggested, which is try and teach politicians, nascent politicians who have very little experience in a democratic political system, how to do basic things like organize and hold debates and do polling.

And so we have invested quite a few resources, close to \$40 million, in these organizations over the past few weeks. And they're very active on the ground in Egypt, and, as I mentioned, have been very well received.

We've also tried to support smaller organizations. And through our Middle East Partnership Initiative, we've given out, I think, 35 grants since the unrest in Tahrir Square to small civil society organizations, and many of them in rural areas who are doing just what you say, trying to connect the people's grievances with their political desires.

And we're not alone in this process, Senator. Other members of the international community are doing the same.

But certainly with the fragility of institutions, it's going to be a long, hard slog.

And as you mentioned, the issue of the timing of the elections has been a controversial one in Egypt, and I think there are voices on many sides of that issue. But we will do our best in whatever time remains before the election to promote this democratic transition through our organizations, to the extent that Egyptians are willing to engage with us.

Senator LUGAR. We have had some difficulty, as I understand, not just with our assistance pertaining to the elections, but likewise with economic assistance.

Some in the Egyptian Government—I wouldn't characterize this more broadly—have protested that somehow their sovereignty is being compromised by our economic assistance. At the same time, it's been noted that around USAID headquarters there, there are long lines of people trying to avail themselves of our assistance programs.

What is your reading, as you prepare for this assignment, of how our aid is being accepted? And to what extent will you be able to

monitor our assistance on behalf of the taxpayers in the United States, who may fear that our assistance is going to uncooperative or corrupt governments who fail to use it for its stated intent even as we are attempting to do good?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, Senator Lugar. I think on what we call the money to promote democracy, which is about \$65 million, and the money to promote economic growth, there has been a very large outpouring from the public. And hundreds of people, I think something like 600 organizations, came to the information sessions for how to apply to these grants. And so there is a lot of interest on the part of Egyptian civil society.

Let me take this opportunity to say that by no means is this an affront to Egyptian sovereignty. We do these programs, as you well know, sir, in hundreds of countries in the world. And they're always, almost always, well received by the governments as support for their own democratic institutions.

On the monitoring issue, Senator Lugar, monitoring of small grants is always problematic. And I have already looked into this issue with the Middle East Partnership Initiative, and I think they have a good auditing program on the ground.

And regarding our larger aid program, there is an office of the AID inspector general in Cairo, and I think they have long-established controls and rigorous procedures in effect.

But please rest assured that this will be a very high priority for me, to be sure that our money is used for the best value for the taxpayer.

Senator LUGAR. That's an important reassurance.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, thank you.

Senator LUGAR. I'd like to recognize Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Patterson, it's great to see you.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you, sir.

Senator CASEY. And let me say, I think I can speak for a lot of people, but for purposes of today, just speak for myself in thanking you for taking on yet another difficult assignment. And I really can't say enough about your extraordinary work in Pakistan, along with your other postings over many years.

I thought when you appeared before us for your next assignment that it would be kind of an easy one, that you'd be assigned to the Sea of Tranquility, but you've decided to take on another tough assignment.

We are grateful, because you've been so effective and so capable, but also, I think, in a word, a great patriot. And we're eternally grateful for that.

And I want to thank your family, as well. We often note that families help the public official or the Ambassador or whoever else comes before our committee. And this is an extraordinary commitment by a family. But in this case, I guess, individually, they're doing their own public service of one kind or another. And we're grateful, grateful for that commitment.

So we'll miss you in Islamabad and other places in the country, but we'll look forward to seeing you in Egypt.

I wanted to ask you about the recent approach that Egypt broadly—and this is generalizing a bit, but I think more broadly—what

I would argue is a more confrontational approach now to Israel, whether it's the opening up of the Rafah border crossing; whether it's the Hamas-Fatah unity government, the work that was done there and Egypt's role in that; and then finally the question of the gas lines to Israel.

When you think about those three examples, and more broadly, I wanted to get your sense of that, just in terms of the approach itself, but also in terms of our policy. What are the United States redlines, so to speak, as it relates to how Egypt will approach its relationship with Israel? I think it's an issue that not just the Israelis are concerned about, but we are as well.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you. Thank you. And, again, thanks for the kind words about my family, particularly.

Let me sort of take this in sequence, Senator Casey.

Let me first say that Egypt is the bedrock of our regional policy. And Egypt has been at peace with Israel for many years, and the current Government has committed to abiding by all international agreements with Israel. And, as I said, we take those commitments seriously, and we do not think it's in Egypt's interest to promote confrontation with Israel in any way.

And if I might mention these specific issues, on the Rafah border crossing, that's for people and limited humanitarian goods. There are security incidents there. The smuggling is of very considerable concern to us. We know that the Israeli and Egyptian security authorities have been working together on this and have been in close contact, and that the Egyptians, with Israeli permission, have put additional military forces into the Sinai to address some of these issues. But there certainly have been increased law and order issues out there. We understand the police are beginning to return now.

On the Hamas-Fatah agreement, Egypt served as a facilitator. Our understanding is it was at the instigation of Hamas, who, perhaps because of other activities, incidents in the region, was anxious to come to some kind of arrangement with Fatah. We're not necessarily opposed to reconciliation; what we are very concerned about that, that it promote regional peace and the two-state solution. Our understanding is that the reconciliation has sort of slowed at this point, because President Abbas is very concerned about it and very concerned that the assistance for the West Bank and the support that's been given to the P.A. continue.

And, finally, the gas lines to Israel, we certainly know that this has been a concern. The gas has started to flow again. The pipeline was attacked twice in recent months, again because of lack of law and order out there and banditry. But it has started to flow again. And there are some pricing disputes that will be addressed between the vendor and the purchaser.

But, yes, Senator, these are issues of concern to us. And, again, nothing is more important to the United States than regional peace and Egypt's peace with Israel. And we'll do everything we possibly can to pursue that.

But if I might conclude, again, the Government has reiterated at every turn its respect for these peace agreements, and we know that on many of these issues that the Israelis and the Egyptians are talking directly.

Senator CASEY. Thank you. And I want to ask you about some of the economic relief promises that have been made.

Egyptian officials emphasize the need for that kind of relief. And as you know, our President—President Obama announced \$1 billion in debt relief and \$1 billion in U.S.-backed loan guarantees.

But there have been calls for conditioning that kind of assistance, and I wanted to get your sense on how do we—if there is a commitment to somehow conditioning that aid or at least taking their actions into consideration as it relates to our aid, what are the benchmarks that we should use, if we can just simply call them democratic benchmarks or democratic reform benchmarks? How do you approach that as an incoming Ambassador?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, thank you.

On the debt relief, sir, we'll be presenting legislation shortly to the Hill that will build on previous legislation for some of these debt relief and debt swap, I think—let me say that one of our goals and the reason it has taken awhile to develop is we're trying to find a worthy recipient for the local currency that will be generated by these funds, and one that is transformational and addresses some of Egypt's underlying problems. The Secretary feels very strongly that we should have a transformational project.

But certainly, the draft legislation that we've considered that builds on some of this previous legislation does have—I wouldn't call it "conditions." There would be the standard issues that are in this legislation about democracy, about various human rights observations, observation of human rights. And again, we would expect them, as we do in all economic agreements, to abide by the provisions of the IMF agreement. And most aid agreements contain quite specific conditions on health reform or education reform that aren't too onerous, but we expect our aid to be used to promote a reform process.

So I would certainly, if confirmed, expect to continue that tradition and enhance it.

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Casey.

Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And let me join in not only welcoming, but thanking Ms. Patterson for your service, and thank your family for your continued willingness to help our country.

This is a critically important position, as my colleagues have pointed out. And we all wish you well representing the United States in this transitional country, as well as in a part of the world where there's great hope for democracy.

We have found, by the Arab Spring, that the desire for human rights and democracy is universal, and the United States is looked upon as a facilitator to bring that about. And your role will be very important in that regard.

Egypt, obviously, is a critically important country to United States strategic interests, their role in regards to the Middle East, as Senator Casey has pointed out. They're important for moving forward with Israel, and one of the key points is whether they will continue to honor the agreements reached with Israel. They're very important in our campaign against extremists.

But here's the dilemma we face. There are some who believe that we have to be bolder in our development assistance in Egypt, that the main trigger for the revolution was basically economics, that the people were being denied the basic economic growth of their country, and they wanted to do better for their families. That will require more attention by the international community to make significant progress in Egypt's economic growth.

There are others that believe that we have to make sure that there's accountability on U.S. aid. I fall into both camps. I think we have to be bolder, and we have to have accountability. We have responsibility to make sure that aid is used for its intended purpose. And to me, there is a requirement that that aid go to nations who support our basic goals with peace with Israel and will maintain that relationship with Israel, that they will fight extremists, and that they'll provide basic human rights to its citizens.

But there have been some disturbing trends in Egypt. We're not clear as to whether Hamas is getting a stronger footing within that country. We don't know whether there is effort being made to fund extremists through Egypt. We're not exactly clear on the trafficking of weapons that may very well end up being used to attack Israel.

And we look to you as our eyes and ears in Egypt to be able to give us the best advice as we have to sort through these issues. I would like to get your general view as to how you see your role advising us as to how we can move forward with the strategic partnership with Egypt, but using the tools at our disposal to make that more of a reality.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you, Senator Cardin.

First of all, let me say that I would entirely expect and, frankly, look forward to interaction with members of this committee, if I am confirmed as Ambassador to Egypt. And if confirmed, I would also look forward to visits on the ground, where you could see for yourself how we're progressing on these issues. So I would very much look forward to working with members of this committee and keeping you advised.

Let me say that I think the dilemma that you've laid out is a real one and one we're going to have to struggle with over the next few months.

Now I think on the stabilization and have we been bold enough, let me say that I think we've tried to take a leadership role in the international community and encourage burden-sharing, where other members and other countries and other organizations can come forward with the short-term resources that Egypt needs, because there's no question that this big youth bulge, this unemployed youth bulge and all these kids getting out of colleges with essentially no skills and second-rate educations, and soaring food prices, and declining tourism, these are all going to be very difficult issues to maneuver over the next few months.

But we've tried. The IMF is working with the Government. The World Bank is prepared to lend very considerable funds. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and some of Egypt's allies in the gulf that Senator Kerry has been working with are also prepared to provide short-term stabilization funds. So I think that will begin to stabilize in a few months.

From our standpoint, we're going to focus on democracy in governance and private-sector growth, because that's where the future is in Egypt, I think. This youth bulge could turn into a very significant demographic dividend, as they have a lot of young people in productive jobs. And as I mentioned, we will do everything possible through AID and through various inspectors general to monitor this aid and to be sure that it's usefully used.

And I was, as I mentioned earlier, we certainly share your concern about Hamas and some of these other—there's no evidence, I might add, Senator, that Hamas has a closer relationship with the Egyptians. They have facilitated this reconciliation with Fatah.

But I think, to reiterate again, we are going to hold Egypt to its commitments about peace with Israel. And those commitments are in Egypt's interest. There seems to be certainly no inclination within the current government to do anything to undermine these commitments that they've made.

Senator CARDIN. Let me just underscore one point in regards to the normalization of the relationship between Israel and Egypt.

It was very frustrating under the Mubarak administration to see the government condoning such anti-Semitic activities, particularly in their schools with the textbooks, et cetera. We brought that to the attention frequently of the Egyptian Government.

And I would hope that we've learned a lesson that, if there's going to be lasting stability in the region, that democracy, human rights, and understanding need to be part of that, which means that we should have expectations that the Egyptians will facilitate, rather than fuel discriminatory-type views.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Sir, this issue of textbooks is, frankly, an issue in many Islamic countries. It was certainly an issue in my previous post, and it's one we work on. And it's sort of, if I might say, below the radar a little in many countries.

And I was very interested to read some of the conditions on our assistance program in Egypt, and one of them is to transform these textbooks into something that is more broadly acceptable.

But, yes, the anti-Semitism, actually, Senator, seems to have increased recently, because they've sort of taken the lid off a lot of this in Egypt. But again, it's critically important. This is why the building of democratic institutions is so critically important, so people have a voice.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin.

Senator Coons.

Senator COONS. Thank you.

I'd like to join the other members of the committee in saying that I'm thrilled to welcome Ambassador Patterson. I've had a number of conversations with you before about your service in Islamabad and was very impressed with your grasp of the political nuances and the intricacies of diplomacy. Over your nearly four decades of service to our Nation, you've clearly amassed a remarkable background in many challenging posts in El Salvador and Colombia and Pakistan.

And I'd like to join other members of the committee in thanking David and Jessica and Andrew for your willingness to serve this Nation in the past and in the future.

I'll remark that my predecessor in this seat, Senator Kaufman, chose to highlight your service to our Nation by recognizing you as a great Federal employee on the Senate floor, something which he did with great effect and enthusiasm. And I know I've come to share his respect and admiration for you and for your service.

I think, if I could, I'd like to start by focusing on that recent experience in Islamabad and your understanding of the difficulties of sort of the rough and tumble of a relatively new democracy. You mentioned in your testimony that, during Egypt's transition, you're sure that we will hear many voices that are not to our liking, and that Egypt's democratic process will be difficult at times because of its newness and fragility.

I'll just associate myself with Senator Casey's expressed concerns about the Israeli-Egyptian relationship, the security at the border, the relationship with Hamas, recent incidents in terms of bombing the gas pipeline, and security is really one of my principal concerns as well.

Senator Cardin referenced history of incitement and some challenges there, and I appreciate your reassurance to the committee that this is a primary concern for you.

Senator Casey raised the question about putting conditions on assistance, possibly. And as someone who was charged with overseeing the first round of Kerry-Lugar-Berman assistance to Pakistan, and who saw how difficult and uneven that process has been, particularly as at times unwelcome voices caused reactions in this Chamber, I'd be interested in your views.

Should we condition assistance to Egypt? How can we be most effective in encouraging private sector development and growth? Should we look at a similar multiyear structure that has sustained investment in a sort of primary area of engagement?

And we have great confidence in you. How do we retain confidence in the commitments of the Egyptian Government as it changes and evolves to recognizing the Camp David Accords, and being determined to stay on course in terms of respecting Israel's right to self-defense and right to existence, and continuing to be a constructive force in the recognition of Israel?

A brief and focused question, I know. [Laughter.]

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you.

On conditioning assistance, yes, certainly in Pakistan that was a huge issue with the assistance there. But, first of all, there are already conditions in the Foreign Assistance Act across a broad range.

And I think my own view is that conditions are sometimes useful to focus the attention of the host government on what they need to do. And that's why it's very important, also, for government officials to meet with you when they come here and for you to meet with them when you travel abroad, to reiterate this.

So I don't think we can sort of give out the taxpayers' money willy-nilly without demanding certain conditions, not the least of which is the money be used for the purpose for which it was appropriated.

On private sector growth, Senator, we're going to have to refocus a lot of our aid program to promote this. I think, again, we should be very proud, particularly in the health and education field, for what aid has achieved. But we have a lot less money than we used to in Egypt. And so to begin to focus this on something that builds up the private sector, we have, for instance, a little program on entrepreneurship, which engages young people and promotes angel investing.

That sort of thing we need to do a lot more of over the next few years, and generally to encourage trade with the U.S. through trade facilitation and other things like this.

On retaining confidence in the Camp David Accords and peace with Israel, again, the Government so far—and our military assistance over the years, which is very substantial, \$1.3 billion a year, has certainly, I think, enhanced regional stability. And we have a program, a multiyear program for that military assistance.

And, yes, generally speaking, I think it would be good to have multiyear programs for civilian assistance as well, because it gives more certainty and more steadiness to our planning and our disbursements.

But we'll have to see what the new elected government does. I mean, I don't really have any better answer than that. We'll have to see how this evolves with an elected government.

Again, there is no evidence that people in Egypt—there's no evidence that Egyptian Government officials or the leading politicians don't see peace with Israel is in their interest. Many of them want to get on with their own democratic and economic path, and I think the politicians to be elected will have to focus on these burning economic issues.

Certainly, in Tahrir Square, we saw no anti-Americanism and no anti-Israeli statements. It was all about Egypt's domestic politics.

Senator COONS. Last question, in terms of path forward. I'm chair of the African Affairs Subcommittee, and Egypt has played a role in Sudan, sometimes constructive, sometimes not so much. They've received a lot of Sudanese refugees. Egypt is one of the continent's largest, fastest growing economies, populations, has a lot of potential.

How do you think we can encourage a constructive role that Egypt might play in the future in Sudan?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, I think that's a very accurate characterization. Sometimes they've played a positive role, and sometimes they haven't. But we'll just have to engage with them on all levels.

And one of the reasons we're having these outreach programs with the nascent political parties is not only to engage on political party formation, but also to discuss—and our Embassy has been very active in this—also to discuss the issues of the day, which would include issues like Sudan, regional engagement, economic reform. So we'll be talking these issues up over the next few months.

Senator COONS. Thank you very much.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Senator Coons.

Senator Udall.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Chairman Lugar.

And I think all of our Senators on this panel have done a brilliant job here at outlining your remarkable career, and I'd just like to thank you for your remarkable service to our country and thank your family members. Each of them, I think, are serving or have served at key places around the world, and we also appreciate that service.

Ambassador, you hit on one of the things that is so prevalent throughout the Middle East, this whole issue of jobs. And there is a young population and a need to create significant jobs. And I think you highlighted in your testimony 750,000 jobs a year, which is a big feat to be able to do that.

And we all know, and I think we feel, that the lack of jobs then creates a fertile ground for violence and for terrorism and things like that.

So my question I wanted to ask goes to—and you've touched on this a bit, in terms of how we're using our money. But I understand recently that Secretary Clinton has done reprogramming, in terms of the funds that were available for Egypt, and she's moving funds from one category to the other. And I was wondering if you could outline for us where we've taken money away from, and then why we're doing that, and then what areas we're targeting.

I know that you mentioned angel investors and other kinds of programs, but I think it would be helpful to the committee to kind of have an idea of where do we think are the key—with the scarce resources we have, where do we think are the best places to invest?

And I know you've said in a broad, general way that it's important to invest in good governance and also in the development of the private sector.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you, Senator.

Let me say this job creation and, frankly, these youth bulge issues are really rather frightening, but they can have a huge upside. Pakistan, for instance, had to generate 2 million jobs a year for new entrants to the labor force.

But in Latin America, what happened was that this became a huge demographic benefit, because there were all these people in the labor force that had fewer children and didn't have to support the elderly, like many of our developed societies, so it was a huge impetus for economic growth. And I don't see any reason that, properly handled, that Egypt's economy can't do the same thing.

But let me outline more specifically what we're trying to do. The Secretary did reprogram funds, and she took it what I would call out of Egypt's pipeline, economic assistance pipeline, which was not disbursing very rapidly, because Egypt had not met the conditions for disbursement of this pipeline.

So we took \$150 million out of that pipeline, and we allocated \$65 million of it to democracy and governance, and that's the funding source, as I mentioned, for some of our prestigious organizations.

And we're going to put \$100 million in, essentially, job creation, issues like, in the short run, cash for work, which is not sustainable but will, I think, solve some short-term problems.

So we have, Senator, we have the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, which has a very sophisticated program for lending. We have our debt swap programs. Again, the whole AID program

will be refocused to promote economic reform and to do such varied things as work with think tanks and political parties to help them develop platforms on economic reform, to do job creation, to do trade facilitation.

There are issues, and this was actually a very important issue in my other post. To increase trade, you need a certain amount of infrastructure. What's the infrastructure that you can build that will most efficiently promote trade flows? And as we go into more trade liberalization with Egypt and North Africa, this will be important, too.

So we're looking at that. That's a fairly high-cost and long-term project, but that's the sort of thing we're looking at to promote jobs.

Senator UDALL. Ambassador, when you say cash for work, how does that program work?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Essentially, and we're trying not to do too much of this, because it's not sustainable, but it takes young people, mostly young men, off the streets, and it pays them to do, basically, manual labor.

And we try not to do very much of this in our assistance programs, because it's not sustainable. But sometimes it's necessary in some of these countries, because it does put cash in people's pockets.

Senator UDALL. Yes, and it's showing that I think there's a feeling that we're kind of in an, maybe not to put it too dramatically, emergency situation. But we are in a situation where there's serious unemployment, and that creates all of the other problems.

If I could, just shifting direction, just briefly here, on water usage and increasing concerns about the Nile River and water shortages in the region, I know that many countries are increasingly concerned about Egypt's especially upstream users of the high rate of water usage.

What role can the United States play and what role will you help to play to facilitate water conservation, so the region avoids conflicts over the water resource?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, and then related to your previous question, I should have mentioned this, that we do have projects, certainly, to promote agricultural efficiency, because most of these countries are rather—they don't have very good water management systems, so we are working on that, too, as part of our agricultural project.

But on the Nile Basin Initiative, the department has been very active in trying to encourage the countries to come together, as has the World Bank, and work out a settlement among themselves.

Senator UDALL. Great. Thank you very much, and thank you again for your service.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Udall.

Senator MENENDEZ.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador, thank you for your long service to our country. You've had a distinguished career, and you have been nominated for an exceptionally important assignment at this time in history.

In between my meetings, I was glancing at the TV in my office trying to capture your answers to Senator Casey's questions, but I want to pursue them a little bit more.

I want to know your views on what we will tell Egypt about the state of relations between our countries, in terms of its adherence to the Camp David peace treaty with Israel?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Senator Menendez, I don't think there could be the slightest doubt about our views about Egypt's adherence to the Camp David peace treaty with Israel.

And, as I mentioned before, I think the Egyptian Government at all levels has made utterly clear its commitment to that treaty, which is in its interests.

Senator MENENDEZ. And yet, there are a series of actions that we have seen that are unsettling to some of us who believe that that is a cornerstone of United States foreign assistance to Egypt.

Is Egypt's adherence to its international obligations, including the peace treaty with Israel, a prerequisite for United States assistance?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, let me put it this way, Senator: We entirely anticipate that Egypt will abide by its international agreements, and the assistance to Egypt is, of course, based on those agreements from many years ago.

Senator MENENDEZ. If we were to come to the conclusion that we do not believe that Egypt is pursuing its international obligations to that agreement, then we would expect that we would not be forthcoming in terms of the \$1.5 billion that we give Egypt?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Senator, I don't think we have any reason to expect that Egypt is not going to abide by its commitments with Israel. But, again, as I said, I think this is widely known, that the assistance to Egypt is essentially as a result and tied for many years to the Camp David Accords.

Senator MENENDEZ. So the reopening of the Rafah border crossing, which has been closed since 2007, due to concerns about Hamas using that to bring weapons and fighters into Gaza; some of the gas disruptions that have taken place, and additional actions, you're not concerned?

Ambassador PATTERSON. I didn't say that, Senator Menendez. I think what I told Senator Casey was, in fact, we were concerned about these issues and, in fact, that the Egyptians and Israeli security forces are working on these issues, that there is a very serious concern about smuggling, of course. And the Egyptians with Israeli concurrence have put additional troops into the Sinai to confront this.

The gas is flowing again. There were two attacks on the pipeline. The law and order situation is bad there, but the gas is flowing again.

There are some pricing disputes, but this is an issue that we think the Egyptians and Israelis can work out between themselves.

Senator MENENDEZ. Many of us have and had and have still high hopes for a transition in Egypt that is both more democratic and continuingly secular, but many of us also have concerns about recent actions and where we're headed.

And our support, certainly this Senator's support, for assistance to Egypt at the levels that we have been supporting it is predicated on a continuing relationship with a major ally of the United States important to our national security and our national interest. And so I hope you understand that there are those of us here who are

not ready to sign a blank check because of a long-term relationship, and we will be expecting our next U.S. Ambassador to make that very clear.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Senator, I don't think anyone expects the Congress of the United States to write a blank check anymore. Our financial conditions would not permit it.

And I think the military assistance, in particular, as well as the civilian assistance, but particularly the military assistance, the very significant amount that you all have appropriated over the years, has really been a source for stability and encourages stability in the region.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, financial circumstances certainly create pressures on all of our assistance abroad. But, in my mind, this relationship, in terms of whatever continuing assistance the United States might produce, is beyond even the financial circumstances of the country. It is also about whether or not Egypt is living up to our expectations, for which we are willing to assist it in moving in the right direction.

So I think I've made my case. I will leave it at that.

I want to talk about one other thing, and it is something I am seriously concerned about. It's how Coptic Christians are treated inside of Egypt. It is totally unacceptable. You know, we have seen an Egyptian court have 16 suspects that were found not guilty. The two who were convicted were released on bail.

I heard of a recent peaceful sit-in by Coptic Christians trying to get churches reopened that was attacked by a group of men using firearms, knives, stones, Molotov cocktails. Over 78 people were wounded.

What progress do you see being made by the military council to end sectarian violence and tension? And what are the prospects for constitutional changes in laws that would address sectarian violence and ease restrictions, for example, on building churches?

I have a tremendously productive Coptic Christian community in my State of New Jersey, and they are a very peaceful people. They're very entrepreneurial.

I don't understand this continuing violence against them. And I would hope the United States makes it very clear to Egypt that the continuing attacks on people, simply because of the altar that they choose to worship at, is not acceptable.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, thank you, Senator Menendez.

Yes, we've made this absolutely clear to the Egyptian Government on many levels. And this has certainly flared up after the unrest in Tahrir Square, and I think it's gotten worse. I don't think there is any question about that.

That said, the military government has reconstructed the church that was destroyed and has arrested people that have attacked Coptic Christians. There was just a draft law the other day, and, frankly, we've gotten very mixed reports on this about the construction of these churches or mosques. It may not be satisfactory to the Coptic community. We just don't know yet.

But we certainly expect this Government and the new Egyptian Government to observe freedom of religion, which is in their constitution and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of which, of course, Egypt is a signatory.

So that is certainly one of our expectations of this Government and any new government.

Senator MENENDEZ. And my final question, as the next Ambassador, can I rely upon you to vigorously raise this question with the Egyptian Government?

Ambassador PATTERSON. You certainly can, Senator Menendez. Absolutely.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Menendez.

If there are no more questions of Senators, we thank Ambassador Patterson once again for her testimony and wish you well. And I know the committee will be taking action very soon.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you very much, Senator.

Thank you, members. Thank you.

Senator LUGAR. The chairman has asked Senator Casey to chair the second panel, and I'm delighted to relinquish the chair to my colleague. And we'll call the second panel to come forward, please.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA**

Senator CASEY [presiding]. Well, thank you. We want to welcome our second panel.

I'll have a brief opening statement, then I'll turn the microphone over to our ranking member, Senator Lugar, and then we'll go with each of the witnesses' opening statements.

Let me say first, with regard to the United Arab Emirates, the UAE sits at a strategic location in the Persian Gulf and has taken an active role in the region during the unprecedented period of political change that we're living through today.

The UAE has been constructive in the Gulf Cooperation Council's mediation effort in Yemen, and has taken positive steps to monitor and combat terrorism and extremism in the region.

The UAE is also an important partner in Afghanistan. Since 2004, it has deployed 250 troops to southern Afghanistan, making it the only Arab country to contribute combat forces to the NATO mission. The Government has also pledged \$323 million in economic assistance to Afghanistan.

There are concerns, however, about the UAE's ongoing relationship with Iran. While the government has been responsive to some United States concern over the reexport of U.S. technology to Iran, we need to encourage—or, I should say, need to continue to encourage the UAE to vigorously enforce international sanctions on Iran.

I look forward to hearing how Mr. Corbin intends to work with the UAE Government to address these serious concerns.

Mr. Corbin is a career senior Foreign Service officer currently serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near-Eastern Affairs. His experience working in our Embassies in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt will undoubtedly serve him well in this position, if confirmed.

Welcome, sir.

Kuwait is another key ally in the gulf region and has been pivotal in 2 decades of United States efforts to reduce the threat posed by Iraq. With Iraq largely stabilized, Kuwait now serves as the key

route for the drawdown of United States troops and equipment. Thousands of United States soldiers continue to pass through Camp Arifjan, a military logistics hub south of Kuwait City, whose importance I witnessed firsthand during a visit to Kuwait in 2010.

While Kuwait has been a leader in the gulf on democratization issues, as evidenced by the election of four women to Parliament in 2009, there is still progress to be made, particularly in human trafficking. And for the fourth year in a row, the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report ranked Kuwait as a "Tier Three" country, the lowest level, for failing to make sufficient efforts to comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.

The United States must continue to engage Kuwait on this serious issue, including the full prosecution—full prosecution—of all cases, including Kuwaiti citizens.

Mr. Tueller is a career senior Foreign Service officer currently serving as Deputy Chief of Mission in Egypt. If confirmed, he will bring a total of 6 years of experience in Kuwait, first as a political counselor from 1991 to 1994; then as Deputy Chief of Mission from 2004 to 2007.

And I'd also like to take this opportunity to welcome Mr. Tueller's two sisters, Dianne and Betsy, and his nephew, Eli, who have traveled here from Belmont, MA, today.

That just happens to be my wife's hometown, so I'm happy to be able to mention that. My mother- and father-in-law would want me to mention Belmont in this hearing today. [Laughter.]

Kazakhstan has played a key role in the transportation of non-lethal supplies for our troops in Afghanistan through its participation in the Northern Distribution Network, the so-called NDN. As Pakistani supply lines have become increasingly precarious, the NDN has become even more vital to our security interests in the region.

Kazakhstan can also play a key role in European energy diversification efforts, particularly through its participation in the Nabucco pipeline.

Despite hope that Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE chairmanship would usher in long-awaited democratic reforms, serious human rights abuses persist, including severe limits on free speech and assembly, discrimination against women, and the ongoing detention of political activists.

The United States must continue to encourage democratic openness and respect for human rights through engagement with civil society and ongoing diplomatic exchanges.

I welcome Mr. Fairfax's insight into these complex set of issues.

Mr. Fairfax is a career senior Foreign Service officer who has served in challenging posts around the world. He currently served as Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs at the United States Embassy in Iraq and has served in our overseas posts in Vietnam, Poland, Ukraine, Canada, and South Korea.

I'd also like to welcome his wife, Nyetta, who is here with us today.

So we're grateful for your work and for her presence here.

And finally, Qatar is another important United States partner in the gulf and host to the former headquarters of U.S. CENTCOM. It has taken an active role in response to the recent unrest in the

region, and it was the first Arab State to recognize Libya's Transitional National Council, one of two Arab countries to do that, along with the UAE, to contribute military aircraft to NATO's Operation Unified Protector in Libya.

Its policy of engagement with Iran and Hamas has been a cause for great concern for the United States and Israel, and there are reports that Hamas may be seeking to relocate to Doha due to political turmoil in Syria.

Human rights groups continue to criticize Qatar's ban on political parties and restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion. Moreover, its large population of foreign residents and temporary laborers enjoy no political rights, and unskilled laborers continue to live in hazardous conditions.

Ms. Ziadeh is a career senior Foreign Service officer as well, currently serving as Deputy Chief of Mission in Saudi Arabia. Prior to this, she was Deputy Chief of Mission in Bahrain from 2004 to 2007, and has also served at our Embassies in Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, and Israel.

I'd like to welcome her sister, Rhonda, who is here with us today.

With that, I would turn to our ranking member, Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Casey. I appreciate very much the tributes that you have given to each of our four distinguished nominees. I join you in welcoming them, and we look forward to their service.

I really want to take this opportunity, as a point of personal privilege, to make some comments about Kenneth Fairfax, who has been nominated by President Obama to serve as United States Ambassador to Kazakhstan.

I was encouraged to read in a recent piece in *Foreign Policy* magazine by David Hoffman, entitled, "The Loose Nuke Cable That Shook the World," details based on declassified cables of Mr. Fairfax's long history in observing and reporting on very disturbing nuclear security threats in parts of the former Soviet Union during his service in Moscow in the mid-1990s.

These same concerns prompted my own involvement in these matters, having worked with Senator Sam Nunn to craft the Nunn-Lugar legislation in 1991, which continues to safeguard WMD materials and components throughout the former Soviet Union and now worldwide.

I expect that Mr. Fairfax's background will serve him well in Astana, given Kazakhstan's central role in nonproliferation endeavors over the past decades.

The United States and Kazakhstan have been cooperating closely on nonproliferation matters now for over 18 years through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. At the time of the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in December 1991, Kazakhstan possessed 1,410 nuclear warheads. On December 13, 1993, the Government of Kazakhstan signed the Safe and Secure Dismantlement Act and five Nunn-Lugar implementing agreements with the United States.

Upon the removal of the last nuclear warhead from Kazakhstan in 1995, Kazakhstan acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 as a nonnuclear weapon state.

Other successes in Kazakhstan include the closure of the former Soviet Union's nuclear test site; the elimination of a biological weapons production facility; and the securing of dangerous nuclear, biological, and radiological materials. This past year, the United States and Kazakhstan completed a major nonproliferation program to provide secure storage for the spent fuel from Kazakhstan's BN-350 plutonium production reactor.

In a large-scale effort over the last year, the spent fuel, enough material to fabricate 775 nuclear weapons, was transported in a series of 12 secure shipments over 1,800 miles from Aktau near the Caspian Sea to a secure location in eastern Kazakhstan.

The completion of this decade-long effort to secure the BN-350 spent fuel provides yet another example of the progress on nuclear security and nonproliferation through concerted United States diplomacy and global security engagement.

I look forward to working with Mr. Fairfax, and I look forward to working with each of the nominees on the panel, should they be confirmed, and we have some confidence that you will be. We are grateful for your service.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Ranking Member Senator Lugar.

And we'll now do opening statements. We'll plead with you to stay within the limits of your time.

And, of course, if you want to summarize your testimony as best you can, that would be preferable, and your full statements will be made part of the record.

I think we'll start with Mr. Corbin.

**STATEMENT OF MICHAEL H. CORBIN, OF CALIFORNIA, TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES**

Mr. CORBIN. Thank you very much, Senator Casey, Senator Lugar.

I'm honored to appear before you as the President's nominee to be the United States Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. I'm extremely grateful to President Obama and to Secretary Clinton for their confidence in me. And if confirmed, I look forward to representing the American people and to working with this committee and other interested Members of Congress to advance U.S. goals in the UAE.

It has been an honor to serve as a Foreign Service officer since 1985, mostly in the Arab world, and to use regional experience and the Arab language in a wide variety of assignments.

The Foreign Service brought my Foreign Service spouse, Mary Ellen Hickey, and me together. As a tandem couple, we have been blessed to serve together in most of our assignments. My two children have learned much from living overseas, and I'm gratified they have joined me here today, along with my parents, my mother-in-law, and my extended family.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the UAE plays an influential and growing role in the Middle East and is a key partner for the United States in areas such as defense, nonproliferation, trade, law enforcement, energy policy, and educational and cultural exchange.

Regionally, the UAE is a leader. For example, the UAE has had troops in Afghanistan since 2004, actively participates in the Libyan Operation Unified Protector, and is a founding member of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan, with over \$300 million in direct assistance.

Our bilateral cooperation is strong. On defense, the Port of Jebel Ali in Dubai is the United States Navy's busiest overseas port of call, and the UAE is our largest Foreign Military Sales cash customer.

On nonproliferation, we work together. The UAE takes its international obligations seriously and has fully implemented international sanctions targeting Iran and North Korea. Most recently, in May, the UAE coordinated with us on the sanctioning of two UAE-based entities for supplying Iran with prohibited amounts of refined fuel.

The UAE seeks to prevent use of its open trade environment and is implementing a comprehensive export control law. Our trade cooperation is excellent, and for the past 2 years, the UAE has been the largest export market for U.S. goods in the Middle East.

For example, Dubai's Emirates Airlines is the single largest customer for Boeing's 777 aircraft, and more than 700 United States companies have regional headquarters in the UAE.

The UAE is a partner in building UAE's law enforcement capabilities, particularly to counter money laundering and terrorist financing, and we work with the UAE on energy policy.

Holding nearly 8 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and nearly 5 percent of its proven gas reserves, the UAE supports U.S. energy goals, and joined other GCC states on June 8 in pushing for an increase in OPEC oil production in line for U.S. goals for the global economy.

Finally, in cultural and educational cooperation, the UAE has partnered with major U.S. institutions, such as the Guggenheim and New York University, on major programs in that country.

The United States is focused on human rights, trafficking in persons, and the rights of women in the UAE. For example, this year the UAE established a special court in Dubai to hear human trafficking cases and is taking steps to train its police and customs officials to aid trafficking victims. But more must be done, particularly with regard to labor issues.

Our comprehensive dialogue with the UAE has included a frank, productive discussion on historic changes brought about by the Arab Spring. If confirmed as United States Ambassador, I would work to see that the UAE's legitimate interest in trade with its neighbors is not put to inappropriate uses, especially with respect to Iran. I would work to strengthen our trade relationship, promote U.S. exports, and assist the U.S. businesses using the UAE as a hub.

We have a clear dialogue with the UAE on the universal right of free expression, and Secretary Clinton has demonstrated the priority we place on this with her Internet Freedom Initiative.

If confirmed as Ambassador, I will continue to highlight our commitment to this principle and work with our partners in the UAE.

With 36 different United States Government agencies and departments in the UAE, my first priority, if confirmed, would be to

the safety and security of our personnel, as well as all Americans living and working or traveling to the United Arab Emirates.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, if confirmed, I would welcome your views and insights on the UAE and the region and welcome any questions you might have for me today. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Corbin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL H. CORBIN

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you as the President's nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. I am extremely grateful to President Obama and to Secretary Clinton for their confidence in me. If confirmed, I look forward to representing the American people, and to working with this committee and other interested Members of Congress to advance U.S. goals in the UAE.

It has been an honor to serve as a Foreign Service officer since 1985, mostly in the Arab World, and to use regional experience and the Arabic language in a wide variety of assignments. The Foreign Service brought my Foreign Service spouse, Mary Ellen Hickey, and me together. As a tandem couple we have been blessed to serve together in most of our assignments. My two children have learned much from living overseas and I am gratified to have my family, parents, and extended family here in the audience today.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the UAE plays an influential and growing role in the Middle East, and is a key partner for the United States. The United States and the UAE enjoy strong bilateral cooperation on a full range of issues including defense, nonproliferation, trade, law enforcement, energy policy, and cultural exchange.

As a member of the International Security Assistance Force, the UAE has had troops in Afghanistan since 2003. It has been a leader as current president of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Yemen mediation; participates in the Libya Operation Unified Protector; provided several million dollars in humanitarian aid to assist those affected by the Libyan crisis; contributed almost \$50 million in 2010 to rebuilding Afghanistan; and is a founding member of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan with over \$300 million in direct assistance.

Defense cooperation is a central pillar of our partnership and is reflected in regular bilateral strategic security discussions. The port of Jebel Ali in Dubai is the U.S. Navy's busiest overseas port-of-call and the UAE is our largest Foreign Military Sales cash customer. The UAE has actively participated in international operations to police the gulf, and organized an international conference on countering piracy March 18–19 of this year.

In the area of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the UAE takes its international obligations seriously and has fully implemented international sanctions targeting Iran and North Korea for their pursuit of nuclear weapons. Our active dialogue with Abu Dhabi on these and other nonproliferation issues supports the enforcement of U.S. laws and most recently, in May, the UAE coordinated with us on the sanctioning of two UAE-based entities for supplying Iran with prohibited amounts of refined fuel. The UAE seeks to prevent use of its open trade environment to import and export items and funds that assist in the development of weapons of mass destruction and is implementing a comprehensive export control law to take action against noncomplying companies. The UAE participates in the U.S. Export Control and Border Security program, hosts a bilateral Counter Proliferation Task Force, and is a member of the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative. The UAE's Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the United States (signed in May 2009) is a positive example for the peaceful development of a nuclear energy program.

For the past 2 years the UAE has been the largest export market for U.S. goods in the Middle East, and 21st in the world. It has developed a leading role in business services, including finance and logistics, and has emerged as the preeminent business hub between Asia and Europe. Dubai's Emirates Airlines is the single largest customer for Boeing's 777 aircraft. With its infrastructure and business and logistical services, the UAE has become the regional headquarters for over 700 American companies active in the petroleum, defense, services, education, and health care sectors.

The United States is a partner in building UAE's law enforcement capabilities, particularly to counter money laundering and terrorist financing and to provide training to enable the UAE to disrupt illicit cash flows.

The UAE is also a partner on energy policy. Holding nearly 8 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and nearly 5 percent of its proven gas reserves, the UAE joined other GCC states on June 8 in pushing for an increase in OPEC oil production. The UAE has sought U.S. assistance to pursue renewable energy and plays a leadership role on renewable energy technologies. Finally, on cultural and educational exchange, the UAE has partnered with major U.S. institutions such as the Guggenheim and New York University.

The United States works closely with the UAE on human rights, trafficking in persons, and the rights of women. The UAE is committed to the education of its people and is working to ensure that the female half of its citizenry receives a complete, high-quality education. This year, the UAE established a special court in Dubai to hear human trafficking cases and is taking steps to train its police and customs officials to aid trafficking victims. As these policies develop, we are continuing to work closely with the Emirati leadership to improve its response to forced labor, particularly among the foreign migrant worker population the country hosts. Finally, the UAE and the United States have maintained a productive dialogue throughout the recent historic changes brought about by the "Arab Spring."

If confirmed as U.S. Ambassador I would work to see that the UAE's legitimate interest in trade with its neighbors is not put to inappropriate uses, especially with respect to Iran. I would work to continue to strengthen our trade partnership, promote U.S. exports and assist U.S. businesses using the UAE as a hub.

We have a clear dialogue with the UAE on the universal right of free expression and Secretary Clinton has demonstrated the priority we place on this with her Internet Freedom Initiative. If confirmed as Ambassador, I will continue to highlight our commitment to this principle in my work with our partners in the UAE.

At a U.S. mission comprising employees from 36 different U.S. Government agencies and departments, my first priority, if confirmed, would remain at all times protecting the safety and security of the dedicated men and women at our mission as well as of all Americans living and working or traveling in the United Arab Emirates.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if confirmed, I would welcome your views and insights on the UAE and the region and welcome any questions you might have for me today. Thank you.

Senator CASEY. Thanks, Mr. Corbin. You had time left. You had 40 seconds. [Laughter.]

Ms. Ziadeh, thank you.

STATEMENT OF SUSAN L. ZIADEH, OF WASHINGTON, TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE STATE OF QATAR

Ms. ZIADEH. Senator Casey, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

I'm honored to be President Obama's nominee to serve as United States Ambassador to Qatar. I deeply appreciate the confidence President Obama and Secretary Clinton have shown in me by making this nomination.

If confirmed by the Senate, I will exercise the full range of our diplomatic tools to promote regional security cooperation, expand commercial ties, and develop stronger educational partnerships between the United States and Qatar.

With your permission, I'd like to introduce my sister, Rhonda, her husband, George, and their daughter, Gihan, here today representing their Ziadeh family.

I would also like to thank my family for their encouragement as I've pursued graduate studies in Egypt and Lebanon, where Middle East issues became my lifelong intellectual and professional pursuit. Through seven tours in the Middle East, including Iraq, their support continues.

The United States and Qatar enjoy an excellent military-to-military relationship. Qatar's Al Udeid Air Base hosts the United

States Air Force's 379th Air Expeditionary Wing, as well as the Combined Air Operations Center, critical to United States military operations in the CENTCOM AOR, including Afghanistan.

If confirmed, I will work to expand our counterterrorism and regional security cooperation with Qatar.

From the United Nations to the Gulf Cooperation Council, Qatar has played an active and helpful role in multilateral diplomacy. In Libya, Qatar was the first Arab country to dedicate military sources to the international coalition and has pledged significant financial support to the Transitional National Council.

In Egypt, Qatar has announced plans to invest \$10 billion to strengthen the economy. The Emir of Qatar has set a positive example by reinforcing the need for political, social, and economic reforms across the Arab world, and he has also focused on the need for better and inclusive governance.

Qatar recently held municipal council elections and has pledged to hold advisory council elections soon. These are important steps and demonstrate Qatar's commitment to representative government.

Recognizing that each country will follow its own particular form of representative democracy, if confirmed, I pledge to work with our Qatari friends and speak out for the core values and principles that define America.

Qatar also represents tremendous economic opportunity for American business. With the third-largest proven gas reserves in the world, Qatar is the leading supplier of liquified natural gas. Oil and gas account for more than 60 percent of GDP and 70 percent of Government revenues. Qatar is using these revenues to invest in its infrastructure and its people, while diversifying its economy.

If confirmed, I will advocate aggressively for U.S. companies competing for the more than 70 billion dollars' worth of major infrastructure projects to be awarded between now and 2022. I will also work tirelessly to find new export opportunities for American goods and services in Qatar.

Qatar has made great strides in education, overhauling its schools. Through the Qatar Foundation and initiatives such as Education City, Qatar is building the intellectual infrastructure necessary for Qataris to compete in a knowledge-based economy.

U.S. universities are at the forefront of this process, cooperating on educational services. As a former Fulbright Scholar myself, I know firsthand the value of educational exchanges. If confirmed, I will strongly support these growing institutional ties and promote long-term partnerships.

A top priority as Ambassador will be, if confirmed, to protect the welfare, security, and interests of American citizens, as well as our personnel at Embassy Doha.

If confirmed, I will dedicate myself to supporting the American community and helping it to succeed in Qatar. If confirmed, I look forward to welcoming the committee's members and staff to Doha.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to address the committee. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ziadeh follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUSAN L. ZIADEH

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

I am honored to be President Obama's nominee to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Qatar. I deeply appreciate the confidence President Obama and Secretary Clinton have shown in me. If confirmed by the Senate, I will exercise the full range of our diplomatic tools to promote regional security cooperation, expand commercial ties, and develop stronger educational partnerships between the United States and Qatar.

With your permission, I would like to introduce my sister, Rhonda, here today representing the Ziaideh family. I would like to thank my family for their encouragement as I pursued graduate studies in Egypt and Lebanon, where Middle East issues became my lifelong intellectual and professional pursuit. Through seven tours in the Middle East, including Iraq, their support continues.

The United States and Qatar enjoy an excellent military-to-military relationship. Qatar's Al Udayd Air Base hosts the U.S. Air Force's 379th Air Expeditionary Wing as well as the Combined Air Operations Center, critical to U.S. military operations in the CENTCOM AOR, including Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will work to expand our counterterrorism and regional security cooperation.

From the United Nations to the Gulf Cooperation Council, Qatar has played an active and helpful role in multilateral diplomacy. In Libya, Qatar was the first Arab country to dedicate military resources to the international coalition and has pledged significant financial support to the Transitional National Council. In Egypt, Qatar announced plans to invest \$10 billion to strengthen the economy. The Amir of Qatar has set a positive example by reinforcing the need for political, social, and economic reforms across the Arab world.

He has also focused on the need for better and inclusive governance. Qatar recently held municipal council elections and has pledged to hold advisory council elections soon. These are important steps and demonstrate Qatar's commitment to representative government. Recognizing that each country will follow its own particular form of representative democracy, if confirmed, I pledge to work with our Qatari friends and speak out for the core values and principles that define America.

Qatar presents tremendous economic opportunity for American business. With the third-largest proven gas reserves in the world, Qatar is the leading supplier of Liquid Natural Gas. Oil and gas account for more than 60 percent of GDP and 70 percent of government revenues. Qatar is using these revenues to invest in its infrastructure and its people while diversifying its economy. If confirmed, I will advocate aggressively for U.S. companies competing for the more than 70 billion dollars' worth of major infrastructure projects to be awarded between now and 2022; I will also work tirelessly to find new export opportunities for American goods and services in Qatar.

Qatar has made great strides in education, overhauling its schools. Through the Qatar Foundation and initiatives such as Education City, Qatar is building the intellectual infrastructure necessary for Qataris to compete in a knowledge-based economy. U.S. universities are at the forefront of this process, cooperating on educational services. As a former Fulbright scholar, I know firsthand the value of educational exchanges. If confirmed, I will strongly support these growing institutional ties and promote long-term partnerships.

A top priority is to protect the welfare, security, and interests of American citizens as well as our personnel at Embassy Doha. If confirmed, I will dedicate myself to supporting the American community and helping it succeed in Qatar.

If confirmed, I look forward to welcoming the committee's members and staff to Doha. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to address the committee. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have. Thank you.

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much.
Mr. Tueller.

**STATEMENT OF MATTHEW H. TUELLER, OF UTAH, TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE STATE OF KUWAIT**

Mr. TUELLER. Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before you today as President Obama's nominee to serve as Ambassador to the State of Kuwait.

I'm grateful to the President for the nomination and to Secretary Clinton for her confidence in me and for her leadership of the Department of State.

If confirmed by the Senate, I will do my best to live up to their trust and to work closely with this committee and others in Congress to continue to advance the vital interests of the United States in Kuwait.

Senator Casey, you very kindly welcomed my two sisters. With your permission, I'd like to note that my wife, Denise, and son, Christian, had to remain in Cairo while I came here.

But my two sisters, who represent eight of my sisters and my one brother, with whom we grew up in the Foreign Service, were kind enough to join me today. And my five children refer to those aunts as "the entourage," so I'm happy to have their support here.

Mr. Chairman, the State of Kuwait has been a reliable partner and friend in a region of utmost importance to U.S. interests. Since 1991, U.S. military forces and our coalition partners have relied heavily on Kuwait's support for our regional policy priorities. If confirmed, I would work to expand that support into broader political, social, and economic arenas.

If confirmed, I will seek to focus intensively on ensuring that Kuwait continues to act as a full partner with the United States in regional security efforts.

Kuwait is playing an essential role in the repositioning of our forces from Iraq. Continuing to foster improved Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations in coordination with Embassy Baghdad will help speed Iraq's regional reintegration and create an atmosphere in which political and trade ties can prosper.

We share with the Government of Kuwait a common interest in combating the spread of extremist ideology and rooting out terrorist elements. If confirmed, I will seek to build strong counterterrorism cooperation, to include increased information sharing and intensified training efforts.

As states in the region today face popular demands to close the often yawning gaps between governments and the people, Kuwait's traditions of open political discourse and constitutional sharing of power have put the country in a relatively advantageous position to meet the challenges of this new era in the Middle East.

Recent parliamentary elections have led to a gradually increasing role for women in parliamentary and political life. If confirmed, I will endeavor to help Kuwait to consolidate and expand those democratic gains.

Mr. Chairman, I have had the privilege of serving my country as a Foreign Service officer for more than 25 years, most recently as Deputy Chief of Mission at our Embassy in Cairo during the turbulent, but inspiring events of the January 25 revolution. My Foreign Service career has included overseas service in Baghdad, Riyadh, London, Doha, Amman, and Yemen.

As you noted, I've served twice before in Kuwait. The Ambassadors under whom I served in Kuwait were Edward Gnehm, Ryan Crocker, and Richard LeBaron. Under their leadership, I was able to play some part in laying the foundation upon which the United States-Kuwaiti relationship rests today.

If confirmed, I believe I can make a substantial contribution of service to the American people as the next United States Ambassador to Kuwait.

If confirmed to this position, I will work to protect American citizens and promote U.S. interests, while consolidating and augmenting the close ties between our governments' leaders and our peoples.

Again, I'm honored, Mr. Chairman, by this nomination and the opportunity to appear before you today, and look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tueller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MATTHEW H. TUELLER

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as President Obama's nominee to serve as Ambassador to the State of Kuwait. I am grateful to the President for the nomination and to Secretary Clinton for her confidence in me and for her leadership of the Department of State. If confirmed by the Senate, I will do my best to live up to their trust and to work closely with this committee, and others in Congress, to continue to advance the vital interests of the United States in Kuwait and in the region.

Mr. Chairman, the State of Kuwait has been a reliable partner and friend in a region of utmost importance to U.S. interests. Since Kuwait's 1991 liberation from Saddam Hussein's brutal occupation, U.S. military forces and our coalition partners have relied heavily on Kuwait's support for our policy priorities in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, and in countering terrorist threats. If confirmed, I will work to expand that support into broader political, social, and economic arenas to build and sustain a partnership that will advance key American interests in a region that today is undergoing rapid and profound change.

If confirmed, I will seek to focus intensively on ensuring that Kuwait continues to act as a full partner with the U.S. in regional security efforts. Sustaining and further strengthening our security partnership will be important to meeting our shared broader regional strategic objectives. Kuwait is playing an essential role in the repositioning of our forces from Iraq. Continuing to foster improved Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations in coordination with Embassy Baghdad will help speed Iraq's regional reintegration and create an atmosphere in which political and trade ties can prosper.

We share with the Government of Kuwait a common interest in combating the spread of extremist ideology and rooting out terrorist elements that threaten peace and security in the region. If confirmed, I will seek to build strong counterterrorism cooperation to include increased information-sharing and intensified training efforts to ensure the best possible force protection for our troops in Kuwait, as well as our mission employees, family members, and the larger American community while continuing to build on the cooperation essential to countering terrorist threats.

As states in the region today face an unprecedented wave of popular demands to close the often yawning gaps between governments and the people, Kuwait's traditions of open political discourse and constitutional sharing of power have put the country in a relatively advantageous position to meet the challenges of this dawning era in the Middle East. Parliamentary elections in 2009 once again gave opposition voices a significant platform from which to influence and oversee government policies. The participation of women in elections since 2005 has led to a gradually increasing role for women in parliamentary and political life. Four women were elected to seats in Parliament in 2009. If confirmed, I will endeavor to help Kuwait consolidate and expand those democratic gains, to include supporting the development of grassroots women's organizations, civil society groups, youth and other activists, and advancing the rights and protections of vulnerable populations living within Kuwait's borders.

In addition to deepening our security cooperation and advancing the strength of civil society, we must seek with our Kuwaiti partners to create new opportunities for economic partnership, both within and beyond the energy sphere. Kuwait's objective to become a regional commercial center, including passing a 5-year \$104 billion development plan, will create commercial opportunities for U.S. companies and provide us the opportunity to work with the Kuwaiti Government and with the private sector to promote economic reform and private sector growth, and create opportunities for aspiring entrepreneurs. The potential for dynamic synergies between Kuwait

and the United States, combining capital, technology, and expertise to advance global development, is enormous. Constructive bilateral engagement on trade and investment-related issues, through tools such as the Trade and Investment Framework (TIFA), will help support needed reforms and cement our partnership. If confirmed, I will pursue ongoing policies that promote increased investment, trade, and project development between our two countries.

Finally, if confirmed, I will work energetically in reaching out to Kuwaiti youth via U.S.-sponsored exchange and English language programs and through Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) programming to highlight common interests and emphasize strong bonds of friendship based on shared core values. Forty-five percent of Kuwait's population is under the age of 25, and many Kuwaiti youth have no direct experience regarding the U.S. role in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait. While heavily exposed to commercial Western media and cultural influences, the United States must play an active role in exposing them to the fundamentals of participatory civil society with values of tolerance and nonviolence. This will ensure stronger bilateral ties and thus counter the negative extremist influences found all too often in regional media.

Mr. Chairman, I have had the extraordinary privilege of serving my country as a Foreign Service officer for more than 25 years, most recently as Deputy Chief of Mission at our Embassy in Cairo during the turbulent but inspiring events of the January 25th Revolution. I was in Egypt as a graduate student taking advanced Arabic classes in October 1981 when President Sadat was assassinated and President Mubarak began his 29 years of rule. My first exposure to the Middle East was as a dependent of a Foreign Service officer when my father was assigned to study Arabic in Tangier from 1965-67 followed by his assignment as Consul in Tangier from 1967-69. My Foreign Service career has included service in Washington as Egypt desk officer and Deputy Director of the Office of Northern Gulf Affairs. Overseas I have served in Baghdad, twice in Riyadh, in London, Doha, Amman, and Yemen. I have served twice before in Kuwait, first as Political Counselor following the reopening of our Embassy in 1991 and then more recently in 2004-07 as Deputy Chief of Mission. The Ambassadors under whom I served in Kuwait include Edward Gnehm, Ryan Crocker, and Richard LeBaron and, if confirmed, I would strive to live up to the examples they set as outstanding U.S. diplomats. Under their leadership, I was able to play some part in laying the foundation upon which the United States-Kuwaiti relationship rests today. I believe I can make a substantial contribution of service to the American people as Ambassador to Kuwait.

If confirmed as Ambassador, I will work with persistence, enthusiasm, and stamina to protect American citizens and promote U.S. interests, while consolidating and augmenting the close ties between our governments' leaders and our peoples. Again, I am honored, Mr. Chairman, by this nomination and the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much.

Mr. Fairfax.

**STATEMENT OF KENNETH J. FAIRFAX, OF KENTUCKY, TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN**

Mr. FAIRFAX. Mr. Chairman, first, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. And I would like to thank Senator Lugar for his very kind words.

I am deeply honored by the confidence that President Obama and Secretary Clinton have shown in me by nominating me as the United States Ambassador to Kazakhstan.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank my wife, Nyetta Yarkin, who is with me here today, as she has been continuously for the last 25 years, including during my current assignment at United States Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq.

Last year, President Obama and Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev reaffirmed the strategic partnership between our two countries, declaring our commitment to a shared vision of stability, prosperity, and democratic reform in Central Asia and beyond.

If confirmed by the Senate, I will work faithfully to deepen this strategic partnership and I look forward to working with Congress in pursuit of this goal.

United States interests in Kazakhstan can be grouped into three strategic areas.

First, we seek to advance sound democratic and economic reforms. Kazakhstan has had consistently outstanding economic performance. While it took a short hiatus due to the 2008 financial crisis, already by 2010, growth had returned to 7 percent, and this year it looks to be even stronger.

This economic growth also means that Kazakhstan is a growing market for American goods and services. And if confirmed, I intend to lead a concerted effort to cooperate with and support United States businesses as they expand their presence in Kazakhstan.

Despite these positive economic achievements, democratic political institutions in Kazakhstan remain underdeveloped. The Presidency dominates the political system and the President's party is the only party represented in Parliament.

The 2010 Human Rights Report highlights other problematic issues relating to rule of law, freedom of speech, freedom from arbitrary detention, and other universally recognized human rights.

If confirmed, I will work with all branches of the United States Government, as well as with the international community, to address these issues and to ensure that Kazakhstan fulfills its commitments to political reform as it prepares for the 2012 parliamentary elections, the first that will result in multiparty representation.

The second area of United States strategic interest in Kazakhstan is strengthening global and regional security. With its courageous decision to renounce nuclear weapons shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan demonstrated its commitment to international security and nonproliferation, a commitment that it continues to build upon today through its active participation in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the IAEA, and other international organizations.

The United States and Kazakhstan also share a common interest in bolstering Central Asian security, fighting terrorism, and stemming narcotics trafficking.

Kazakhstan is supporting efforts in Afghanistan through expanded overflight rights and through active participation in the Northern Distribution Network.

Kazakhstan is also dedicating its own resources to the effort in Afghanistan through a \$50 million program to educate the next generation of Afghan leaders, as well as through humanitarian assistance.

Our third area of strategic focus in Kazakhstan is world resource security, particularly energy and food. With a potential to rank among the world's top 10 oil exporters within the next several years, Kazakhstan plays an important role in advancing international energy security at the same time it builds a basis for its own economic future.

Similarly, Kazakhstan ranks as the world's sixth-largest grain exporter and is, thus, critical to food security. Cooperating to further improve Kazakhstan's performance in these and other areas

represents a win-win-win situation for the United States, Kazakhstan, and the world community. All three sets of interests—democratic and economic development, our joint security cooperation, and our shared commitment to world resource security—are interrelated and must advance together.

Mr. Chairman, I have spent nearly my entire career serving in countries in transition, from centrally planned to market economies, and from authoritarian to representative governments. I believe that there is an inextricable link between the growth of an open democratic system of government and the development of an open, market-based economy. Both are fueled by the universal desire of people to build a better, safer, and more prosperous future and together they constitute the best route toward long-term security and stability.

If confirmed, this belief in the power of an open, democratic system will guide me as I work to ensure that the already strong United States-Kazakhstan partnership continues to grow and strengthen.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fairfax follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH J. FAIRFAX

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. I am deeply honored by the confidence with which President Obama, by nominating me for the post of Ambassador of the United States to Kazakhstan, and Secretary Clinton have entrusted me. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank my wife, Nyetta Yarkin, who is here with me today, as she has been with me continuously for the past 25 years as my work has taken me around the globe, including to my current posting in Baghdad, Iraq.

If confirmed by the Senate, I will work diligently and faithfully on behalf of the American people to pursue U.S. foreign policy goals and to deepen the strategic partnership between the United States and Kazakhstan. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Congress in pursuit of those goals.

Mr. Chairman, Central Asia is a region of significant importance to U.S. national interests. U.S. policy in the region supports the development of independent, stable, democratic nations, integrated into the world economy, that cooperate with one another, the United States, and our partners to advance regional and global security.

Kazakhstan is an important regional and international partner. It is geographically strategic, ethnically diverse, and resource rich. It is the ninth-largest country in the world by land mass, or roughly the size of Western Europe. The population is 15.6 million people, 59.2 percent of whom are ethnically Kazakh, 25.6 percent ethnically Russian with the remainder divided among many ethnic minorities. The largely secular population is 65 percent Muslim, 30 percent Russian Orthodox with the remainder divided among many smaller faiths. Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia and bordered by Russia, China, and the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan's size, location, and resources make it strategically important and key to regional stability. If plans are approved to expand production at its three largest oil fields, Kazakhstan's hydrocarbon reserves should, by 2018, rank it as one of the top 10 world oil producers.

As the first country to renounce its nuclear weapons voluntarily following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan established early its commitment to international security and credentials for leadership. Since that debut on the international stage, Kazakhstan has continued to pursue a policy of active engagement with the global community, with chairmanships of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2010 and Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 2011, as well as hosting the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit on June 14–15 of this year.

Kazakhstan is providing significant support to our stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The United States and Kazakhstan have had an overflight agreement in place since 2001 that has facilitated over 9,000 overflights and over 85 divers. Kazakhstan actively participates in the Northern Distribution Network—which entails commercial shipment through Kazakhstan of supplies for U.S.

and international forces in Afghanistan. The recent expansion of the 2001 overflight agreement to include new polar routes will significantly increase the efficiency of operations. In addition to facilitating U.S. and international efforts to stabilize and strengthen Afghanistan, Kazakhstan is directly investing in Afghanistan's future development through a \$50 million program to educate the next generation of Afghan leaders in Kazakhstan's universities. Over time, we hope Kazakhstan will be part of a revitalized regional economic system encompassing Central Asia, Afghanistan, and South Asia.

Starting with its voluntary renouncement of nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan has been and continues to be a key partner on nonproliferation. Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, Kazakhstan has cooperated extensively with the United States for over a decade on a host of projects to eliminate its Soviet-legacy Weapons of Mass Destruction infrastructure, secure materials of proliferation concern, and redirect former Weapons of Mass Destruction scientists to peaceful purposes. In 2009, Kazakhstan ratified a 7-year extension to the umbrella agreement for our bilateral Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The United States provided significant assistance to decommission a Soviet-era nuclear reactor designed to produce weapons-grade plutonium and to manage the safe and secure disposal of fuel from that reactor in 2010. Ongoing CTR program activities include the construction of a state-of-the-art Central Reference Laboratory to consolidate Kazakhstan's collection of pathogens. The Kazakhstani Government continues to seek opportunities to remain actively engaged in nonproliferation cooperation, both bilaterally and via its pursuit of a more active role in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Economically, Kazakhstan has laid a solid foundation for its market economy and future prosperity. Financial reform has created a modern, full-service banking system. Kazakhstan's natural resource-driven economy averaged over 9 percent annual growth during the 2001-07, before dropping to 3 percent in 2008 and 1 percent in 2009 amid the global financial crisis. Kazakhstan's economy rebounded strongly in 2010, however, posting 7 percent growth, and growth in 2011 is predicted to be between 7 and 10 percent. Thanks to its strong economic policies and oil wealth, Kazakhstan has dramatically reduced the percentage of its population living below the level of subsistence from 28.4 percent in 2001, to 13.8 percent in 2007.

Thanks to Kazakhstan's tremendous natural resource wealth, Customs Union with Russia and Belarus, and imminent accession to the World Trade Organization, U.S. companies are recognizing Kazakhstan's potential. We have the opportunity to export more with the assistance of the U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service Office in Almaty. U.S. oil companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and ConocoPhillips, hold major stakes in Kazakhstan's largest oil and gas projects, Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan. U.S. companies do face difficulties, however, including aggressive tax audits and work permit restrictions. Despite these concerns, it is clear that U.S. companies and the Government of Kazakhstan are committed to a long-term partnership.

Exchange programs are effectively strengthening the core of the United States-Kazakhstan strategic partnership. Via the free exchange of information and ideas, academic, cultural, and professional exchanges are one of the most effective tools to promote long-term relations, as well as economic and social development, and to increase mutual understanding between citizens of the United States and Kazakhstan. To promote these exchanges, we have 11 American Corners throughout the country, which currently reach over 50,000 people annually. In addition, the Future Leaders Exchange, Hubert Humphrey Fellowship, Muskie Graduate Fellowship and Fulbright Fellowship programs all support students from Kazakhstan to pursue studies in the United States. The Government of Kazakhstan also understands the strategic importance of both education and exchanges. Since 1994, Kazakhstan's Presidential Scholarship Program, "Bolashak," has sent almost 8,000 students to universities in the United States and many other countries around the world. The newly inaugurated Nazarbayev University, which will have a Western-style curriculum taught in English, is partnering with several American universities, including Duke, University of Wisconsin, Carnegie Mellon, University of Pennsylvania, University of Pittsburgh, and Harvard Medical School.

In 2010 the United States and Kazakhstan concluded a new Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement. Both President Barak Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have advocated the inclusion of science in diplomacy and "science diplomacy" has become an important component of U.S. foreign policy. Through the Bolashak program and Kazakhstan's investments in research and education Kazakhstan has adopted the goal of building an innovation focused economy and will broaden its cooperation areas with the United States.

Democratic political institutions, civil society, and the independent media remain underdeveloped in Kazakhstan, the Presidency dominates the political system, and the Parliament elected in 2007 has representation from only one political party—the President's. The 2010 Human Rights Report highlights other problematic issues, including arbitrary arrest and detention, lack of an independent judiciary, restrictions on freedom of speech, the press, and assembly. We regularly encourage the government to move forward by taking concrete steps toward reform, and we have assistance programs that promote democratic reform and the development of civil society and independent media.

If I am confirmed, I will work with Kazakhstan's Government and civil society partners as the nation prepares for parliamentary elections scheduled in 2012; the first elections that will be governed by a new law guaranteeing that at least two parties will be represented in the Parliament. It remains to be seen how representative this new party system will be, and we will work to encourage a competitive, pluralistic party system. Kazakhstan has expressed its commitment to reform its election and media laws and to liberalize its political party registration requirements. It has also committed to reform the media law in line with recommendations from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Freedom of Media Representative, which include, among others, to reduce criminal liability for defamation in the media and to liberalize registration procedures for media outlets. We will hold Kazakhstan to these commitments.

Recognizing Kazakhstan's important role in Central Asia, in April 2010, President Obama and Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev reaffirmed the strategic partnership between our two countries, declaring our commitment to a shared vision of stability, prosperity, and democratic reform in Central Asia and the broader region.

If confirmed, I would continue to promote the United States-Kazakhstan strategic partnership's three primary interests. First, we seek to advance democratic and market economic reforms through diplomacy and development, including an innovative partnership model with the Government of Kazakhstan. Economic reform attracts and sustains foreign investment while democratic reforms will improve opportunities for Kazakhstanis to participate openly in civic life. Together these are the only reliable ways to establish long-term stability. Second, our common security interests include bolstering Central Asian sovereignty and independence, fighting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and stemming narcotics trafficking. Third, we have a strategic interest in fostering the development of Central Asia's very significant natural resources. The region's resources can substantially advance international energy security, provided they have a reliable path to global markets via multiple routes that avoid geographic chokepoints or transportation monopolies. Energy can also form the basis of long-term economic growth and prosperity. Kazakhstan has the potential to be an agricultural power, and, as the world's sixth-largest exporter of grain, is critical to global food security. All three sets of interests—democratic development, security cooperation, economic reform and energy—are interrelated and must advance together.

Mr. Chairman, I have spent nearly my entire career serving in countries in transition from centrally planned to market economies and from authoritarian to representative government. From more than two decades of experience working in countries in Asia, the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe and, most recently, Iraq, I firmly believe that there is an inextricable link between the growth of an open, democratic system of government and the development of an open, market-based economy. Both are fueled by the universal desire of people to build a better, safer and more prosperous future. If confirmed, I will draw on my many years of experience in countries in transition to work with the Government of Kazakhstan and to reach out to the people of Kazakhstan to ensure that the already strong United States-Kazakhstan partnership continues to grow and strengthen. Kazakhstan is an important country with a promising future.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much. Each of you stayed within your limits, and that's a record, maybe, for our committee. Thanks very much.

I'll try, in the time that we have, which is about 20 minutes, to get in as many questions as we can. And of course, I and other members will likely submit questions for the record, and that should be said at the outset.

Mr. Corbin, I wanted to start with you. One of the major concerns that our Government has had, and I think it's shared widely in the region, is the threat posed by the Iranian regime.

Last summer, when I was in the Middle East on a great trip where we got to see a lot of places in about 9 or 10 days, my perception of the consensus in that region at the time was a real consensus and focus on Iran, and in particular, obviously, the threat posed by the Iranian regime, even in the absence, but especially in light of, the potential nuclear threat.

But just the activity of Iran in the region supporting and being, in my words here, the banker for bad guys in the region. And that consensus I thought was very helpful to our own strategy, because even countries that were disagreeing on other things could come around to agree on the threat posed by the regime.

In my judgment, that consensus, or at least that focus, has been degraded because of the changes taking place. People's attention is focused elsewhere and other crises and issues have arisen, and that is not good when we take our, in my judgment, when we take our focus off of Iran.

So I wanted to ask you, with regard to a question about export controls in the UAE, we know that the UAE's record on preventing reexport of advanced technology to Iran is reportedly mixed, and get your thoughts about that. But we know that numerous Iranian entities involved in Iran's energy sector and WMD programs have offices in the UAE, and the Iran-Dubai trade is currently estimated at \$10 billion per year.

There are reports that the UAE-based companies Crescent Petroleum, Dragon Oil, and National Petroleum Construction Corporation continue to engage in business with Iran, in potential violation of United States sanctions.

I'd ask you first, as Ambassador, what steps you'd take to encourage the UAE to improve its export controls and to take action against their companies who continue to engage in business with Iran, in potential violation of United States sanctions.

Mr. CORBIN. Thank you, Senator.

And I think our strong dialogue with the UAE, including most recently the visit of the crown prince to meet with President Obama earlier this month, provides an opportunity for the kind of dialogue on Iran that's so important to our Middle East policy.

On the specifics on export control, the UAE has a law that they are implementing that seeks to protect their open economy, which is their hallmark and is a positive indicator for the region, from being exploited by those who would transship prohibited items to Iran. We have a strong U.S. agency presence in the UAE that is cooperating with the Emirati Government in many areas, including the financial aspects of this transshipment, and we have strong cooperation on many levels.

If confirmed as Ambassador, I would work to support those agencies, to support the dialogue that we have on these issues, and to look for every opportunity to increase the technical capacities of the Emirati services as they work against this threat.

Senator CASEY. And I'd say the obvious concern we have broadly in the United States Government, with regard to the Iranian regime, has a particular significance, I think, within the Congress.

We've worked very hard—I have and others have worked very hard—to develop consensus around sanctions, to pass legislation, to improve what we've passed, to add to it, and to encourage the administration to aggressively enforce them. So we need all the help that we can get, and obviously those export controls are part of that.

And I know there's more to explore, but I want to try to move to as many questions as we can.

Moving next to Kuwait, Mr. Tueller, the past 4 years, as I mentioned in my opening, Kuwait has been ranked a "Tier Three" country, the lowest level in United States Trafficking in Persons, in that report, for failing to make sufficient efforts to comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.

I'd ask you why you believe that's the case, why Kuwait has failed to make progress? And what steps can you take and can we take to encourage the Kuwaiti Government to enact the appropriate reforms to deal with this problem?

Mr. TUELLER. Senator, thank you very much for the question. I appreciate that you've raised this issue. I believe it's important that our allies around the world understand the importance of antitrafficking to Members of Congress and to the U.S. public.

As you note, Kuwait has a record that falls far short of what it should be. Secretary Clinton and other previous administrations have made clear how important it is to the United States that we combat this evil.

In Kuwait, the system of employment for guest workers lends itself to the possibility that employers can exploit workers. And this becomes particularly the case when it involves domestic workers who are inside a home, and if not sufficiently protected, can be deprived of wages, forced to work long hours, even subjected to physical and sexual abuse.

I know that the current Prime Minister and the Government of Kuwait abhor these practices and seek to try to counter them. At times, however, their system of laws has not proved up to the challenge.

So if confirmed as Ambassador, I will work both with the Kuwaiti Government and with Kuwaiti partners, NGOs, who have been very effective in advancing public awareness of this problem and seeking improvements in two specific areas.

One is taking the existing laws and ensuring that they are actually implemented, that there are prosecutions of the most egregious cases as an example and deterrent to others.

Second, ensuring that there is a more robust system of sheltering and protecting victims once they're identified, providing them safe places where they can be free from threat so that they can present testimony. They can be freed from whatever exploitation has taken place.

So with the support of Congress and the administration, I believe progress is possible, because I know that there are many Kuwaitis who understand the importance of making advances in this area.

Thank you.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

And one other question about democracy. Some of us observe that Kuwait has often been considered further along than some

other countries on democracy itself. But the recent demonstrations in the region and, therefore, the reaction by Kuwait has been the subject of some review. Reports of beatings of protesters, detentions of journalists, raise questions about the commitment to human rights and to the rule of law.

What can you tell us that you'll do to encourage a full commitment to those basic rights and those basic principles that we expect any government to not just respect, but to enforce?

Mr. TUELLER. Thank you, Senator.

As you note, I believe Kuwait starts from a relative position of strength, and that it has a long tradition of open debate, of tolerance for different opinions. And Kuwait has a constitution that genuinely provides for sharing of power.

The recent events in the Middle East have clearly had an impact on Kuwait. I believe they've had an impact on every country and will continue to have an impact as governments recognize the need to do better, to provide more opportunities for freedom of assembly; for freedom of opinion; and for people to have a stake in their futures politically, socially, and economically.

If confirmed, I will seek to work with the partners that we've already identified in Kuwait, in some cases members of Kuwaiti society, political figures, but also with nongovernmental organizations. Through our MEPI, Middle East Partnership Initiative, that we have been able to assist in training women candidates and promoting civic activism and creating greater civil society organizations.

So I'll be committed to working with those existing institutions and maintaining a close and candid dialogue with the Government about how Kuwait can build on its already great strengths in tolerance and openness in order to set a standard for the rest of the region.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much.

I move next to Ms. Ziadeh.

In the April 2011 visit to the White House, the Qatari Emir signaled support for President Obama's position on a two-state solution for Middle East peace. The country earned criticism in the West for its policy of engagement with Hamas, and there's been speculation—and it may just be, at this point, speculation—that Hamas might be seeking to establish a permanent office in Doha, due to the ongoing unrest in Syria.

How might the role of Qatar in the negotiations change the political situation and change—I should say change given the political situation in Egypt, as well as the unrest in Syria?

Can you speak to that? I know it's a broad and difficult question, but if you can speak to that, to the extent that you're able at this stage?

Ms. ZIADEH. Thank you very much for the question. With regards to Hamas, it is true that Qatar has had relations with Hamas. And in fact Hamas, at one point, did have an office with members of their leadership in Doha. And that relationship does continue, although that office is no longer there.

However, I would certainly, if confirmed, use my good offices as the Ambassador to encourage the Qatari Government to use their position as the Chair of the Arab League Peace Initiative followup

committee to call for more direct engagement between the parties, between the Palestinians and other parties, with Israel, in terms of solving the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

Make no mistake: We, as the U.S. Government, consider Hamas a terrorist organization. And, therefore, we would want to be able to push on the Qatari Government to work in its capacity as the Chair to look for direct engagement, direct negotiations, to bring a just and peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict.

Senator CASEY. And I would hope—you've pointed to this in what you've said, but I would hope you would reiterate in your direct discussions with the Qatari Government, when it comes to the conditions that we expect to be applied to any engagement with Hamas, that they renounce violence, that they recognize Israel's right to exist, and that they abide by agreements.

And that three-part test is conjunctive. And they should be reminded of that, that they've got to meet every condition.

And I know it's particularly complicated, as you would be assuming this position, but I would urge to you reiterate that as often as you can.

Ms. ZIADEH. Absolutely. That would have to be part of the discussion. Absolutely.

Senator CASEY. Do you have any sense of the—and I mentioned that it was speculation, but do you have anything you can report on that speculation?

Ms. ZIADEH. We have not heard any developments in that regard to date.

Senator CASEY. I would also ask, with regard to relations with other Gulf Cooperation Council states, what concerns, if any, does Qatar have about Iran's response to the regional unrest?

Because, as I mentioned before, the focus that we want to have on the Iranian regime's threat in the region, that focus, I think—or that consensus in the region has been, if it hasn't been degraded, it's at least not been as sharply focused as I would hope it would be because of the changes in the region.

But do you think they have concerns about Iran's response, or do you have any sense of that yet?

Ms. ZIADEH. Yes. Well, first of all, Qatar is very much a regional player, in terms of the GCC and the GCC overall assessment of regional security. And they have played a very important and leading role in that.

So they're part of the team effort in looking at the role of Iran in the region. I would note that the Qataris did send troops as part of the Peninsula Shield Force that went to Bahrain, in the face of unrest there and of threats from Iran on Bahrain. So that was indicative of their position.

It is true that Qatar has a unique relationship with Iran, due in part, obviously, to the geographic proximity, but more importantly their economic interests. Iran and Qatar share the North Dome/South Pars gas field, which is the world's largest non-associated gas field, and so, therefore, they have economic interests.

That said, I would note that the work on the fields and the derivative of the gas there is done independently. There are no joint ventures.

And in fact, when you look at the relationship in other economic terms, the amount of trade that Qatar has with Iran is less than 2 percent of its annual trade. It's negligible. And Iran, in terms of banking and other issues, it's also negligible where Qatar is concerned.

The flip side of that, I would note that they host a large U.S. military contingent there at Al Udeid, with over 10,000 uniformed service personnel. And they certainly do look to us as an important guarantor in terms of their regional security, along with other members of the GCC.

So that's how I would characterize the relationship with Iran.

But, for sure, if confirmed, I would take every opportunity to impress to the Government of Qatar the importance of our concerns on the issue of Iran and their growing aggressive role in the region.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much.

I know our time is limited now, but, Mr. Fairfax, I wanted to focus a little bit on the Northern Distribution Network, which we know has the key role of transit for nonlethal supplies to Afghanistan.

How would you work, if confirmed, to ensure that Kazakhstan's continued military cooperation with the U.S. and NATO is ensured? And if you can assess that broadly and specifically as well?

Mr. FAIRFAX. As you know, Kazakhstan has already started playing a role through the Northern Distribution Network, as well as through expanded overflights.

The key issue, if confirmed, I would plan on working with going forward is to work on this in a regional basis along with the other countries. One of the fundamental facts we face is that Kazakhstan does not border on Afghanistan, and so, it requires a multiple-step process of moving through Russia, moving through Kazakhstan, and then helping the process of Kazakhstan reaching agreement with its neighbors, which it has recently done, for example, with Uzbekistan, in opening up a second border crossing there, in order to facilitate the movement of goods through the Northern Distribution Network down into Afghanistan.

And I think this is an area where increased cooperation among the countries themselves and among U.S. missions in the region can play an important role in pushing forward U.S. interests.

Senator CASEY. One of the difficulties, not just with regard to Kazakhstan and our relationship there, but also in plenty of other places throughout the world, is getting that balance right, when we've got a strategic interest or a strategic priority like the distribution network is, but also balancing that with the concerns we have about human rights and so many other concerns.

With regard to Kazakhstan, that balance is basically between that strategic priority or interest and respect for universal human rights.

How do you approach that as an incoming Ambassador, to make sure that we ensure that we get that balance right?

Mr. FAIRFAX. Thank you, Senator, for that question, because, particularly, that's one that's personally important to me because of my belief that, ultimately, these are not two separate issues, but simply a question of short-term and long-term interests that need to be aligned.

As I said in my statement, I believe there is a strong relationship between security and stability, economic development, and political development.

Thus far, Kazakhstan's economic development and its cooperation with the United States on security have certainly been in the lead, but I think in order for that to continue in the decades in the future, the democratic development is important. And we have to continue, both through short-term actions, such as arguing on behalf of jailed activists, such as Mr. Zhovtis, but also long term, through public outreach, educational exchanges, and other efforts that help to bring Kazakhstan into the mainstream of world thinking and respect for human rights.

And I think this is actually a hopeful picture in Kazakhstan, if you look, not just at their willing acceptance of programs such as the Humphrey program or other exchange programs, but the fact that they finance, through Bolashak, 3,000 college students to go overseas, many to the United States, to learn about how the rest of the world operates; the fact that they are financing Nazarbayev University with participation of multiple leading U.S. universities and other international universities.

There is a long-term trajectory toward movement into internationally accepted norms, and I think those include not just economic norms but, ultimately, political and human rights. And that's what I would try to work for as Ambassador, if confirmed.

Thank you.

Senator CASEY. Thank you. And I want to thank every nominee for your testimony, the answers you gave to questions, the answers you'll provide by way of response to written questions that will be submitted.

We're out of time. One of the reasons is I have to vote in a few minutes, and I won't be able to do both, both stay and vote at the same time.

But one question I was going to ask and I'll submit it, a question for the record, because it's so significant, but we tend to overlook it when we're dealing with foreign policy, is just the basic question of the economy of the place within which you serve.

You could be a very capable diplomat, and we could have the right policy in place, but sometimes the economies of these places and the economic security of their people can be as important as any other consideration. So we'll ask you about that in writing.

But let me conclude on a note of gratitude for your public service already; your willingness to commit yourselves to a new assignment, and difficult assignments; and the commitment of your families at so many levels and at such a great sacrifice. We're grateful you're doing that, especially at a time of tension and danger throughout the world, but especially in many of the places that you serve. We're grateful for that.

And I wish we had more time, but we're limited. And we hope to see each of you not just confirmed, but also on the road somewhere, either in the places you'll serve or back here on Capitol Hill.

But thanks again for your service.

And we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ANNE W. PATTERSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question #1. While the Egyptian revolution has opened up political space, there is clearly a serious short-term economic problem. You said in your opening statement that Egypt must create 750,000 jobs a year just to keep up with the population growth.

- Can you elaborate on how U.S. assistance has been reoriented to address Egypt's current political and economic challenges?
- How can the United States best deploy its economic development assistance to meet the stated goals of the Egyptian people of creating sustainable jobs and beginning the process of long-term economic reform?

Answer. Our goal is to help Egypt's transitional government meet short-term economic stabilization requirements as well as longer term economic modernization needs. These two objectives are not mutually exclusive—rather we can direct our support now to help meet the future needs of the Egyptian people.

The United States has made available \$165 million of bilateral assistance to support Egypt's immediate needs. President Obama announced on May 19 that the administration will seek congressional authorization to provide Egypt up to \$1 billion in debt relief under a debt swap arrangement. The United States would implement this in three tranches over 3 years, forgiving about \$330 million of Egypt's debt each year. As principal and interest payments come due, we will work with the Government of Egypt to direct the equivalent amount of Egyptian pounds to mutually agreed projects that are high-impact, visible, and benefits Egyptians from all segments of society. This major effort will require reorienting previously appropriated funds to cover the budget cost.

Egypt will need to build a stronger private sector, which will increase entrepreneurial activity and generate new jobs. Developing Egypt's private sector will require that (1) small businesses have access to capital in order to start and expand; (2) firms adopt entrepreneurial approaches and take advantage of new opportunities; (3) workers' skills meet the actual needs of private sector employers; (4) the business and regulatory environment is conducive to small businesses and entrepreneurs; and (5) the U.S. and international private sector is engaged in this process.

To improve access to finance, we are working with Congress to establish an enterprise fund for Egypt which would be initiated with up to \$60 million from existing bilateral assistance funds to stimulate private sector investment, promote projects that support competitive markets, and encourage public/private partnerships. We are supporting the expansion of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to help catalyze Egypt's private sector during its transition. In addition, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) will create a 10-year loan guarantee facility in Egypt which could provide up to \$700 million in loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), supporting over 50,000 local jobs. OPIC will also seek to provide up to \$1 billion in guarantees and/or loans to public/private partnerships in order to promote growth in mutually agreed-upon sectors of the Egyptian economy.

To aid in the development of an entrepreneurial "ecosystem," the State Department's Global Entrepreneurship Program is pursuing multiple initiatives, including a USAID-funded, Cairo-based Entrepreneur-in-Residence (EIR). The EIR, in turn, is leading intensive educational modules—entrepreneur boot camps—that will teach promising entrepreneurs, women and men, the critical aspects of starting a new company. It is also facilitating angel capital networks in Egypt to ensure entrepreneurs, including women and minorities, have the means to get their ideas off the ground. Finally, the program is planning to help arrange temporary job placement for students and new entrepreneurs in U.S.-based startups, to help develop skills matched to market needs.

To encourage commercial networking, USTDA just concluded its "Egypt: Forward" forum and facilitated trade missions for the Egyptian delegates to cities across the United States. We are seeking every opportunity to leverage private sector activities for their public diplomacy value and their ability to interest more American companies in doing business with Egypt. One successful example of this sort of public-private partnership that is already paying dividends is Partners for a New Beginning (PNB).

To develop a local chapter for PNB in Egypt, the Aspen Institute PNB Secretariat will be working with the Egyptian counterparts of our PNB Steering Committee.

such as Cisco, Intel, ExxonMobil, Coca-Cola, Morgan Stanley, Dow Chemical, and others. The Aspen Institute PNB Secretariat is meeting with local leaders in Egypt about developing a locally driven, self-operational committee that will identify local priorities and implement targeted PNB projects to address those needs.

We will offer the Egyptian people concrete support for economic policy formulation alongside our democratization efforts. We have been using and will continue to use bilateral programs to support economic reform, including outreach and technical assistance from our government, universities, and think-tanks to individuals, and NGOs in Egypt. We are also prepared to begin robust discussions with Egypt and Tunisia and their regional counterparts on a set of strategic trade initiatives, including the possible expansion of Egypt's Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs).

Question #2. It is clear that corruption and a lack of transparency about the Egyptian economy were among the engines of the January 25 revolution.

- a. How can our assistance efforts be designed to ensure that they promote transparency and the rule of law?
- b. What lessons have we learned from our previous experience in Egypt in tackling corruption? What lessons have you learned from your time in Pakistan and elsewhere about the effective provision of foreign assistance?

Answer. It is a high priority to ensure U.S. taxpayer dollars are used wisely. USAID's Inspector General has an office in Cairo and there are controls and rigorous procedures in effect to ensure our funds are not wasted or diverted for other purposes. We will ensure that the monitoring procedures on all our grants are meticulous.

Tackling the issue of societal corruption was difficult during the Mubarak government. USAID/Egypt has run a number of rule of law and human rights, but political will to address corruption issues has been the key factor that determined whether our programs could translate to broad societal change. Experience in other transitional situations indicates that a newly elected government may be highly motivated to act on campaign promises and address grievances. We will work with the Egyptians to advance their goals to curb corruption, improve transparency, and strengthen the judicial system. Our efforts will benefit from Egypt's status as a party to shared international anticorruption standards in the U.N. Convention against Corruption, and the Convention's expert peer review process to assess compliance and implementation, which will bolster political will and guide reform.

With a portion of the \$165 million in transition assistance, we are already supporting reform in this area, primarily by focusing on how civil society can broaden public awareness of corruption and build demand for transparency and accountability. Transparency International, for example, is building a grassroots anticorruption network in Egypt, utilizing the U.N.'s checklist on implementation of the U.N. Convention against Corruption. We are also working with Egyptian and international organizations to focus on anticorruption campaigns and awareness, media reporting on transparency and corruption, and business ethics. A recent U.S.-sponsored regional conference in Rabat, with Egyptian participation, stressed the importance of these approaches and on the importance of engaging the full range of stakeholders—citizens, businesses, NGOs, government officials, the media—in reform. We will also leverage our regional and global anticorruption efforts to enhance the impact of our assistance in Egypt. For example, the State Department has supported the development in recent years of an Arab-led regional network of anticorruption officials and bodies, which will be a very useful, "locally owned" channel to share good practices with Egyptian officials and to engage in policy dialogue at the regional level on key anticorruption reform issues.

In Pakistan, we confronted multiple challenges in our own system and with the Government of Pakistan in implementing the assistance program. It required too much time to focus the program on specific projects. We did not develop quickly enough a convincing narrative about the meaning of our assistance. While I strongly believe that we made the right decision to funnel assistance money through the government—and thus build capacity within the government and encourage citizens to look to their government for services—it slowed implementation. Nonetheless, the long-term American commitment indicated by the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation was recognized by a broad range of Pakistanis, who realized it was a sea change in our bilateral relationship.

I am determined to avoid the same mistakes in Cairo. We will undertake a review of the program quickly and focus it on a limited number of activities, namely support for the private sector, economic growth, and democracy and governance. I have heard from think-tank experts that while we have made astonishing advances in (for instance) maternal and child health with U.S. assistance in Egypt, the capacity of the Egyptian Government to implement these programs without donor financing

and technical assistance is still limited. This is an issue I will look at carefully. I look forward to working with the committee on this issue.

Question #3 In the past, USAID funding has generally been allotted to NGOs registered with the Egyptian Government, thereby excluding many civil society groups that the government did not recognize, some of which played a role in the January 25 revolution. USAID representatives have said that this policy is being reevaluated and that going forward USAID and other USG granting institutions will work with both registered and nonregistered organizations. What is the status of that reevaluation and how do USAID and the Department of State plan to engage differently with Egyptian nongovernmental actors in the future?

Answer. We do not distinguish between registered and unregistered NGOs in our funding decisions. The United States provides funding to both types of organizations as a policy.

Question #4. What is the status of the initial \$150 million reprogrammed on February 17 to assist with transition and economic recovery in Egypt? What effects of and responses to that assistance have you seen thus far?

Answer. In addition to the \$150 million reprogrammed on February 17, the USG also repositioned \$15 million of previously appropriated democracy and governance funds designated for Egypt. Of the \$165 million, we have reserved \$65 million for democracy and governance and \$100 million for economic growth projects.

We have awarded \$59 million of the democracy funds, focusing on elections, labor rights, media freedom, and human rights. For example, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) has programmed \$4.5 million in small grants to Egyptian, Washington, DC-based, and international organizations working closely with Egyptian partners. These grants have provided support to Egyptian organizations in the preelection environment in the areas of human rights, inclusion, transparency, and networking/coalition-building. Thirty-two million dollars was provided to NDI and IRI; and \$5.6 million to IFES to support election administration, political party development strengthening, voter education, and election observation. Other activities supported by the democracy funds include:

- Support for expanding women's participation in the political and decision making processes.
- Building the capacity of independent worker organizations to advocate for workers' rights and participate in the democratic transition.
- Training to journalists to serve as a watchdog in the elections, including support for blogging, for female and youth citizen journalists.

For the economic growth funds—focusing on private sector, entrepreneurship, and job growth—we have awarded about \$15 million, with more proposals in negotiations. Another \$10 million of the economic growth funds were recently notified to Congress for transfer to OPIC to support a small and medium enterprise lending facility.

Question #5. Women protested alongside men during the revolution in Tahrir Square and played a key role in organizing the protests. How do U.S. assistance policies address the inclusion of women and minorities into mainstream decisions in a post-Mubarak Egypt?

Answer. Regrettably, the committee to draft revisions to Egypt's Constitution in March did not include any women, and the Ministry of Women's Affairs was abolished soon after the interim government was formed. Although some women have taken prominent roles in activist groups, more needs to be done to ensure women's voices are part of Egypt's transition. We will continue pressing the Egyptian Government to promote the participation of women in government and political parties. The United States promoted a conference on June 2 in Cairo, cosponsored by International IDEA and U.N. Women, to raise the profile of women's rights in democratic transitions. Chaired by U.N. Women Executive Director Michele Bachelet, this event advocated for robust women's political participation and empowerment, with special attention on Egypt, and has likely laid the groundwork for a ministerial-level gathering on the subject on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly.

Many of the civil society programs we support aim to empower women politically and economically, and we will monitor the drafting of Egypt's new constitution to ensure women's rights are protected. Support for women as political leaders and candidates will be an important part of the work NDI and IRI will undertake with U.S. funding. Additional programs under the \$165 million assistance package with America's Development Foundation, Vital Voices, and six Egyptian NGOs specifically aim to increase women's participation in elections, democratic processes and women's rights advocacy—whether as citizens, activists, or candidates.

Through its local grants program, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is funding 10 Egyptian NGOs to carry out innovative projects to break down barriers for women in the legal profession, raise awareness of women's rights among female students in Upper Egypt, train ordinary Egyptian women to become community leaders and business owners, and carry out voter education and corruption awareness campaigns targeting women, including in lesser developed regions of Egypt. MEPI also is preparing to fund new Egyptian local grants that focus on women's rights, economic opportunity, and participation during the transition.

Economic opportunity for women is a parallel theme, along with political participation. We will ensure our assistance provides women with economic opportunities and access to capital, as financial independence for women sets the groundwork for greater opportunity in other spheres of life as well. OPIC's projects in Egypt will give particular focus to women, and the Global Entrepreneurship Program will increase the number of women participants and match women entrepreneurs with women mentors. PNB member Coca-Cola is partnering with the MENA Businesswomen's Network to provide training and skills development courses for young professional women.

Looking forward, we will also focus more of our International Visitor Leadership Programs (IVLPs) on women, putting together projects in the fields of governance, sciences, business, and in economics. These include sectors in which women are underrepresented. In the 4th quarter of FY 2011, Egyptian women will take part in IVLP projects such as "Youth Leaders," "Women as Political Leaders" and "Science and Technology." In FY 2012, Egyptian women will participate in IVLP projects including "Global Economic Cooperation and Recovery," "Women's Innovations in Science and Engineering," "U.S. Political System: Background for Journalists," "Women as Political Leaders," "Women and Entrepreneurship," and "Small Business Development." In addition, State/ECA will expand programs like TechWomen, in which we provided six Egyptian women and colleagues from other parts of the NEA region the opportunity to participate in a professional mentorship exchange program for women engaged in technology. Additionally, in 2011, two Egyptian women leaders participated in the Fortune/ U.S. State Department Global Women's Mentorship Program, in which State/ECA offers emerging women leaders from around the world the opportunity to develop their leadership, management, and business skills through mentorships with senior female executives from the Fortune Most Powerful Women Summit.

Question #6. Many human rights groups have expressed concerns about ongoing human rights abuses in post-Mubarak Egypt. What is the most pressing human rights issue in Egypt today?

- What steps are being taken to enhance legal protections and access to due process, particularly in light of ongoing trials of civilians in military courts? What is the capacity of the civilian courts to handle the caseload?
- What is your interpretation of the tensions and in some cases, violence, between Copts and Muslims? What efforts are being made to foster collaboration and reconciliation between different religious groups within Egyptian society?
- In your assessment, how, if at all, have press freedoms changed in post-Mubarak Egypt and do you think that laws criminalizing certain journalistic acts will remain in place?

Answer. Despite the fact that the Egyptian Government is committed to carrying out a democratic transition, serious concerns about human rights remain. We have raised at the highest levels the need for Egypt's military leadership to address transparently and inclusively the grievances of the Egyptian people, including lifting the state of emergency, protecting freedom of expression and assembly, reforming security institutions, investigating allegations of abuse by security forces, conducting trials in civilian, not military, courts, and transitioning to civilian control of the government through free and fair elections. Specifically regarding military courts, we have made clear to the Egyptians our belief that in spite of ongoing security concerns, criminals can and should be tried in civilian courts. The Egyptian Government has generally argued that the emergency law is necessary to maintain security during a volatile period, but in fact, the persistence of the state of emergency and the use of military courts have been key factors driving protesters to the streets on multiple occasions. We also believe that elections held under the emergency law may not be perceived as free, fair, and credible, particularly if the government attempts to restrict political parties and free expression. Although Egypt's court system could be made more efficient in terms of processing cases, capacity constraints are not the reason that suspects continue to face trial in military courts.

Sectarian violence remains a troubling problem in Egypt, and there is a gap between official statements and the security situation on the ground, as evidenced for

example by the violence that erupted in the Cairo neighborhood of Imbaba. On May 7, riots against two churches in Imbaba killed 15 and injured 232. Other incidents include the January 1 bombing of a church in Alexandria and the burning of churches in the village of Sol on March 4. On May 17, Field Marshal Tantawi, the head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) issued a strongly worded, public condemnation of sectarian attacks. The SCAF also stated that it would investigate and prosecute those responsible for the May 7 Imbaba clashes, and has referred 48 individuals to trial in conjunction with his case. On June 7, Prime Minister Sharaf attended the formal reopening of the Holy Virgin Church, one of two churches damaged during the May 7 riots. The Egyptian transitional government has also allowed the construction and repair of 17 churches that had previously not been granted permission to be built or repaired. Unfortunately, the Egyptian Government rarely refers perpetrators of sectarian violence to courts, but rather has sought to resolve sectarian tensions through extra-judicial reconciliation sessions between perpetrators and victims of violence. We have raised the issue of reconciliation sessions repeatedly with the Egyptian Government, and again have urged the Egyptian Government to abide by due process of law.

On May 14, Prime Minister Sharaf announced the formation of a National Justice Committee to draft an antidiscrimination law and consider a "unified places of worship law" within 30 days—two key Coptic Christian demands. On June 1, the Egyptian Cabinet announced that it had approved a draft "Unified Law for Organizing the Construction of Places of Worship." This draft law, which governs the building and renovation of churches and mosques, is currently under public review, and some Coptic leaders and human rights activists have raised concerns during this review process that the draft law does not free the approval process for church construction from political influence that has allowed for discrimination. We are closely following the development of this legislation and urging the Egyptian Government to pass and implement it, taking into account the concerns raised by religious leaders and human rights groups as the law moves forward.

We remain very concerned about incidents of sectarian violence in Egypt and will continue to monitor this issue closely. We will continue to impress upon the Egyptian Government the importance of taking steps to confront sectarian violence, including steps to reverse discriminatory laws and treatment, of holding perpetrators of violence accountable, and of fostering an environment that promotes religious tolerance. Following parliamentary elections in September, Egyptians will draft a new constitution, and we are working to ensure that the final document fully respects the rights of religious minorities.

We are aware of recent interrogations of journalists, bloggers, and judges critical of the SCAF and military and have made our concerns regarding such cases clear to the Egyptian Government and the SCAF. Freedom of expression is a critical component of any democratic state, and we have repeatedly stated that attempts to silence political opposition in Egypt are unacceptable. Following the revolution, many new television stations and newspapers have emerged, but the military remains highly sensitive to how it is depicted in the media. It is too soon to tell whether laws on freedom of expression will change once Egypt has completed its transition back to civilian rule.

Question #7. Has the State Department received any response or signal from the Egyptian Government regarding the presence of international monitors at the upcoming election? In your assessment what technical support is necessary to foster a robust electoral process and strong political parties? How might the United States and the international community address those needs, particularly in light of ambivalence in the face of democracy and governance assistance?

Answer. On July 20, 2011, the press reported that Major General Shahin, spokesman for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), announced that international observers would not be invited to monitor Egypt's elections. We have expressed disappointment that Egypt's transitional government has chosen not to invite international observers, but continue to encourage Egypt to accept monitors as it is a standard practice among democratic states.

The SCAF has begun clarifying procedures for September's parliamentary elections but much remains to be decided. Egypt's youth leaders and new political parties face the challenge of quickly organizing campaigns. Among the issues that the Egyptian Government must address are setting up and securing polling sites, safeguarding the transfer of ballot boxes, training poll workers, and educating the many new voters who will likely turn out in September. U.S. Government programs are helping to address some of these issues, and we are working with the Egyptian Government and international partners to provide additional assistance in this important area.

Question #8. Noor and Ramsay Bower, 8 and 10 years old respectively, were abducted by their Egyptian mother, Mirvat El Nady, in August 2009 and taken to Egypt without the knowledge or consent of their American father, Colin Bower.

On December 1, 2008, a U.S. court granted Mr. Bower sole legal custody and joint physical custody of the children. United States courts ruled again on August 28, 2009, granting Mr. Bower sole legal and physical custody of the children. A federal warrant and an Interpol Red Alert have been issued for the mother on charges of kidnapping.

- If confirmed, what will you do to ensure that Mr. Bower once again acquires custody of his children?
- In accordance with the "Memo of Understanding on Consular Cooperation in Cases Concerning Parental Access to Children," the U.S. Embassy in Cairo has liaised with the appropriate officials in Egypt in attempts to facilitate regular visitations for Mr. Bower, but to date, only three such visits have taken place. The most recent visit took place in early December 2010, and to my knowledge the mother has been unresponsive to requests for visitations since the January 25 Revolution. If confirmed, will you offer Colin the support of the U.S. Embassy to ensure that regular visitations resume as soon as possible and that they continue with necessary frequency until Noor and Ramsey return to their father?

Answer. Secretary Clinton and the Department have been in direct contact with Egyptian authorities at senior levels concerning this matter. I have met Mr. Bower and we will continue to raise this case with appropriate Egyptian authorities in the hope of seeing Noor and Ramsay returned to Mr. Bower. Both the Special Advisor for the Office of Children's Issues, Ambassador Susan Jacobs, and the U.S. Consul General in Cairo have, on multiple occasions, worked directly with Mr. Bower on this difficult matter. The Office of Children's Issues is very engaged on Mr. Bower's behalf. We will continue to press the Egyptian Government to sign the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

We will also continue to work with the Egyptian Ministry of Justice in order to support Mr. Bower in his efforts to visit with his children. A meeting between Mr. Bower and his children is currently scheduled in Cairo for July 9. An Egyptian court granted visitation rights to Colin Bower to see his children on the second and fourth Friday of each month. Mr. Bower's inability to visit regularly with the children has been exacerbated since the events of January 25. We will do all that we can to assist with Mr. Bower's efforts to obtain consistent access to his children.

RESPONSES OF MICHAEL H. CORBIN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. How has the recent regional political change and unrest of the Arab Spring affected the views of the leadership of the United Arab Emirates about their country's political system, including power-sharing between Emirates and the partially elected Federal National Council? What challenges, if any, has the recent political upheaval created for U.S.-UAE relations?

Answer. The UAE was as surprised as we all were by the suddenness of the popular uprisings and the speed with which they spread across the region. They have sought to maintain stability at home and abroad. Generally speaking, the UAE has remained stable and cohesive in the face of protests in surrounding countries.

The FNC serves in an entirely advisory capacity but is an important feature of the Emirati political landscape. The Emirati leadership recently announced various reforms expanding the electoral college vote in the FNC election ninefold, but this still amounts to only a small percentage of the citizenry. The UAE Government is gradually introducing reforms aimed at increasing political participation; most recently, the leadership announced it was developing plans to move toward universal suffrage as early as 2019.

We engage with the Emirati Government regularly and at all levels regarding the universal principles of freedom of expression, assembly, and association. The UAE and the United States do not always see eye to eye on the popular uprisings of the Arab Spring, but we have maintained a robust and productive dialogue throughout this period of historic change.

Question. What is the administration's view of the UAE's participation in the Peninsula Shield force deployed by the GCC to Bahrain during the recent unrest there? How does the UAE population view their involvement?

Answer. The Government of Bahrain invited the UAE to deploy forces and the UAE responded affirmatively to that request.

There has been no evidence of backlash within the Emirati population regarding the deployment of Peninsula Shield forces.

Question. How would you assess the strengths and weaknesses of the UAE economy? What prospects are there for increasing bilateral trade and investment flows? What is the status of Dubai's economy, 2½ years into the global economic crisis? How has the relationship between Dubai and Abu Dhabi shifted, if at all, since the beginning of the economic crisis?

Answer. The strengths of the UAE economy are its location, innovative leadership, and natural resources. In addition to having large natural gas and oil deposits, it is a transshipment hub and has made open trade and transport its hallmarks since before it existed as a nation. It is the No. 1 destination for U.S. exports in the Middle East, 2 years running.

The leadership of the UAE is acutely aware of the fact that its hydrocarbon resources will eventually run out. It has been seeking to diversify its economic base and compete in international markets in order to mitigate possible future negative economic effects. The UAE has become the regional headquarters for over 700 American companies active in the petroleum, defense, services, education, and health care sectors. It has developed a leading role in business services, including finance and logistics, and has emerged as the primary business hub between Asia and Europe. It is also seeking a leading role in the research and development of renewable energy.

Bolstered by strong oil revenues, Abu Dhabi has contributed significantly to stabilizing the Dubai economy following a real estate crash triggered by the 2008 global financial crisis. The Abu Dhabi leadership continues to work with the authorities in Dubai to strengthen the UAE's economic standing following the global financial crisis. Several of Dubai's Government-linked real estate development firms have successfully restructured debt and developed repayment plans for contractors, including a number of American companies.

Question. What is the perspective of the administration on the recent arrests of figures calling for political reform by the Emirati authorities?

Answer. We engage the Emirati Government regularly and at all levels regarding the universal principles of freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Our Embassy and senior Department officials have been reaching out to the Emirati Government regarding our concern that any trials be conducted in a transparent and open manner in accordance with international standards of due process. If confirmed, I will continue to make these points. We understand the lawyers for the five defendants have asked that the trial be closed to the public and the press. We will continue to monitor the situation to the best of our ability.

Question. How would you assess the UAE's level of cooperation in implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposes sanctions against Iran? Please describe any U.S. efforts to cooperate with the UAE on implementation of Iran sanctions.

Answer. The UAE takes seriously its international obligations to enforce sanctions against Iran. We have had excellent cooperation with the UAE on implementation of UNSCR 1929 and look forward to our continuing close efforts. The UAE has a strong track record of disrupting or preventing transfers to Iran of items of proliferation concern. It has also taken good steps in the area of proliferation finance.

The UAE has a national strategy to protect the reputation of its historically open trade environment against abuse by proliferators. In August 2007, the UAE passed comprehensive strategic trade control legislation providing the basis for an enforceable export control system. The law is currently being enforced and we have been working in close partnership with UAE authorities to halt attempts to divert sensitive dual-use technology, including U.S.-origin goods, from the UAE. With respect to enforcement and counter proliferation issues, the UAE is an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and hosted, in January 2010, a major multinational PSI exercise, LEADING EDGE. They also cohosted with the United States a Global Transshipment Conference in March 2011 designed to focus international attention on the problems of illicit transshipment and ways to address them.

If confirmed, I will continue to advance our policy of working with the UAE to ensure our continued cooperation as we seek the full implementation of sanctions on Iran. This has been a top priority and will continue to be one under my tenure, if confirmed. I will also continue our efforts to prevent the sale of refined petroleum products to Iran, with a focus on monitoring of and reporting on efforts by commercial entities to evade international and U.S. sanctions, including the CISADA refined petroleum sanctions.

Question. The UAE was listed as a Tier 2 country in the State Department's 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report. What are the most concerning aspects of government policy on this issue and what steps will you take as Ambassador to address the widespread problem of human trafficking, particularly on the issues of sex and labor trafficking? What steps has the government taken to regulate and protect its migrant domestic workers? Please describe any opportunities for public diplomacy activities related to trafficking in persons and any technical cooperation or other partnership initiatives being undertaken on this issue.

Answer. UAE's human trafficking problem is serious. We have witnessed strong efforts to tackle sex trafficking through punishing traffickers and expanding victim protection services. Over the past year, the UAE established a special court to hear human trafficking cases in Dubai and opened two new shelters for victims of trafficking. However, challenges remain for the UAE to combat its considerable and multifaceted problem of forced labor, including among its population of migrant domestic workers.

Our concerns about the forced labor of migrant workers and the trafficking of women and girls for prostitution in this region have been highlighted many times and at many levels—to governments, civil society, source countries, the media, and to victims. If confirmed, I will continue to urge the UAE to focus their attention on these serious issues and continue to prosecute trafficking offenses; identify and provide protection for victims of trafficking; and end labor practices such as the withholding of passports by employers that make foreign workers vulnerable to abuse.

Question. Can you describe the range of ways in which the UAE has supported and continues to support the Libyan Transitional National Council since the conflict in Libya began? What has been the UAE's role in supporting the temporary funding mechanism established by the Libya contact group?

Answer. The UAE is a key partner in NATO-led operations in Libya, and is providing pilots and aircraft to assist with the no-fly zone and civilian protection mission. The UAE is a leader in working to protect the Libyan people and stabilize the situation in that country, and has disbursed several million dollars in humanitarian aid to those affected by the crisis.

On June 9, the UAE hosted the most recent Libya Contact Group meeting in Abu Dhabi and is cochairing the July 15 meeting in Istanbul. The Abu Dhabi meeting built on the previous Contact Group meetings in Doha and Rome to solidify international resolve in ensuring the departure of Qadhafi from power. The Contact Group in Abu Dhabi also issued a statement which stressed that Qadhafi has lost legitimacy and must go, the use of force against civilians must cease, regime forces must withdraw from cities they have occupied, and a political transition must be based on the Transitional National Council's (TNC) inclusive approach expressed in its "Roadmap on Libya." Under UAE leadership, the Contact Group meeting in Abu Dhabi also announced the establishment of a temporary financial mechanism to channel financial support to the TNC. In the runup to that meeting, the UAE offered concrete suggestions that helped structure the Temporary Financing Mechanism (TFM) and build consensus in support of its establishment.

The UAE recognized the Transitional National Council on June 12 as "the sole legitimate representative for the Libyan people" on the occasion of an official visit to Abu Dhabi by TNC leader Mustaf Abdul Jalil. UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed noted in the wake of the visit that the UAE would "work toward helping our Libyan brothers out of this difficult situation." On June 13, the UAE expelled the pro-Qadhafi Libyan Ambassador from Abu Dhabi and committed to opening a representative office in Benghazi in the near future, which the Foreign Minister pointed to as a sign that it wanted to establish "government-to-government relations" with the TNC.

Question. How would you characterize the UAE's approach to Hamas and to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more broadly?

Answer. The UAE supports a two-state solution as well as the dual-track strategy of pursuing a vigorous political negotiation along with an equally vigorous and mutually reinforcing institution-building track. They have also helped shape the Arab League position on supporting direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

Among Arab partners, the UAE has a history of strong financial support to the Palestinian Authority's development of responsible institutions, which is imperative to maintaining a viable partner for peace talks: the UAE provided \$134 million in 2008, \$173 million in 2009, \$42 million in 2010, and thus far has contributed an additional \$43 million in 2011.

While the UAE supported Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, it shares our concerns about Islamist extremist groups such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Question. What is the status of U.S.-UAE defense cooperation? What are the major priorities of each side?

Answer. Cooperation on defense is a central pillar of our strategic partnership and is reflected in regular bilateral strategic security discussions. The port of Jebel Ali in Dubai is the U.S. Navy's busiest overseas port of call and the UAE is our largest Foreign Military Sales cash customer in the world. The Emirati Air Force annually hosts the United States and other air forces for "Iron Falcon," a training exercise at the UAE Air Warfare Center. The UAE has worked with international partners, including the United States, to limit illegal, destabilizing activities in the gulf and organized an international conference on countering piracy March 18-19 of this year. On May 19 the North Atlantic Council approved the establishment of a separate UAE mission to NATO making the UAE, along with Japan, one of the first two non-Partnership for Peace partner missions and the United States was highly supportive of this effort.

The major priorities of both the UAE and the United States are to continue our close security partnership and to promote peace and security in the region.

RESPONSES OF MATTHEW H. TUELLER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. How has the regional political change and unrest of the Arab Spring affected the political situation in Kuwait? To what do you attribute the fact that Kuwait has not been faced, to date, with mass popular unrest?

Answer. Kuwait is in a unique position, having long been one of the countries in the Middle East where political freedoms are embraced and upheld by the government and society. Well-defined democratic principles are enshrined in Kuwait's constitution, and reflected in free competitive legislative elections, a fully elected and empowered Parliament, a vibrant civil society, and relatively open press environment. Kuwait's Government also ensures that Kuwaiti citizens benefit from the country's wealth by subsidizing education and health care and at times taking steps to offset for citizens increases in the cost of living.

Kuwait has witnessed some peaceful, organized rallies this spring. Ongoing tensions between elements within Parliament and the Kuwaiti Government led to the Cabinet's decision to resign earlier this spring. There were some rallies in the leadup to that period, and also following the swearing in of the new Cabinet. Kuwait's bidoon or "stateless" residents also organized several rallies this spring to bring attention to the demands of their population, including in areas such as better access to health care, education, and job opportunities.

Question. Kuwait has been listed as a Tier 3 country in four consecutive State Department Trafficking in Persons Reports. Why, in the administration's view, has Kuwait failed to make progress to curb trafficking in persons? What are the most concerning government failures on this issue? Migrant workers working in domestic service face particular hardships that in some cases have caused them to flee back to their countries of origin. What is Kuwait doing to prevent these types of abuses? Please describe how you intend to press this issue as Ambassador.

Answer. The situation for migrant workers remains particularly precarious in light of the restrictive sponsorship system, which effectively gives sponsors power over the movement and activities of the migrants, making foreign workers extremely vulnerable to forced labor. Domestic workers are particularly vulnerable given their isolation within private homes.

Kuwait's victim protection structure and law enforcement efforts are fundamentally weak. While the GOK operates a shelter for victims of trafficking, it has not developed a procedure to identify and refer victims to the facility.

Currently, draft legislation prohibiting trafficking is stalled in the legislature. Although the Department has encouraged Kuwait for years to use existing laws to punish traffickers, the government remains reluctant to prosecute Kuwaiti citizens for trafficking offenses.

If confirmed, I would like to see and will encourage the Kuwaiti Government to actively prosecute and punish acts of forced labor, including against employers who use violence, threats, or restrictions on movement (such as withholding of passports and exit permits) to compel labor. Additionally, if confirmed, I would like to see and will encourage the Kuwaiti Government institute a formal identification procedure to adequately find and protect victims of TIP.

Question. How would you assess Kuwait's level of cooperation in implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposes sanctions against Iran? Please describe any U.S. efforts to cooperate with Kuwait on implementation of Iran sanctions.

Answer. Kuwait, which is increasingly concerned about Iran's disruptive influence in the region, is committed to full implementation of UNSCR 1929. Kuwait is alarmed by Iran's continued refusal to comply with its United Nations Security Council obligations and with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The Kuwaiti Government has publicly urged Iran to abide by IAEA and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations. Kuwait fears that the development of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability would have a destabilizing effect on the region as a whole and in particular for Kuwait, given the geographic proximity of the two countries, and therefore has urged Tehran to work with the international community to ensure full transparency of Iran's nuclear program. If I am confirmed as Ambassador, I will continue our candid dialogue with the Kuwaiti Government to use sanctions and other measures increase pressure on Iran and encourage it to engage on the nuclear issue.

Question. On January 12, 2011, the Prime Minister of Kuwait became the first Kuwaiti Prime Minister to visit Iraq since the August 2, 1990, invasion. To what extent has progress been made on Iraqi-Kuwaiti issues such as border demarcation, reparations, diplomatic and economic normalization, and the status of the missing Kuwaiti state archives? What role, if any, might the United States play in support of normalization between Iraq and Kuwait?

Answer. There have been positive developments in the Iraq-Kuwait relationship over the past several years, including the reestablishment of diplomatic ties. Kuwait sent an ambassador to Baghdad in 2008, and Iraq sent an ambassador to Kuwait in 2010. These steps reflect a shared desire to strengthen the bilateral relationship, and rebuild the trust that was destroyed by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.

We were encouraged to see Iraq and Kuwait launch a joint ministerial commission earlier this year. This commission provides a useful forum for the two sides to discuss cooperation and steps forward to achieve progress on all outstanding issues in the bilateral relationship.

Going forward, additional issues must be discussed. Iraq needs to quickly fulfill its remaining obligations under the relevant Chapter VII Security Council resolutions pertaining to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, including the resolutions on the Iraq-Kuwait border and efforts to locate Kuwaiti nationals and Kuwait's national archives missing from the first Gulf War. This will create a more positive atmosphere in which to address other outstanding issues.

Given the United States unique relationship with both Iraq and Kuwait, we are in an advantageous position to play a positive role in achieving progress on this issue. If confirmed, I will work toward strengthened dialogue between Iraq and Kuwait, utilizing existing channels such as the ICRC-led Tripartite Commission and Tripartite Subcommittee, and the newly established Iraq-Kuwait Joint Ministerial Commission.

Question. What is the view of the Kuwaiti Government on the Peninsula Shield operation? What are the views of the Kuwaiti people? How was the rejection of a Kuwaiti medical team in Bahrain in March perceived by the government? What is the potential for Kuwait to play a mediating role in the ongoing conflict in Bahrain?

Answer. Both the Government of Kuwait and Kuwaiti civil society have been playing an active role in trying to mediate between the Government of Bahrain and the opposition to find a political solution to the crisis. When the Government of Bahrain appealed to other GCC member states for assistance, the Government of Kuwait, concerned by a possible Iranian role in the unrest, responded to what it saw as its treaty obligations under the GCC mutual defense pact by deploying naval ships to protect Bahrain from external aggression. Kuwait's role in the Peninsula Shield intervention has been the subject of vigorous debate in the local media, within political society, and in the National Assembly, with some factions calling on the government to send ground forces to Bahrain and others urging their government not to participate at all. On March 31, the Cabinet—which was facing a number of interpellation motions, including some related to the Peninsula Shield operation and the Government of Bahrain's decision earlier that month to refuse entry to a team of Kuwaiti medics—resigned en masse. The Prime Minister himself, who was reappointed in early May, stood for interpellation on June 14 to defend his government's action on Bahrain; though some opposition MPs subsequently filed for a non-cooperation motion against him, the Prime Minister defeated that vote on June 23,

Question. Some Kuwaiti women viewed it as a major breakthrough that four women were elected to the National Assembly in 2009, without any quotas or set-asides. What is your assessment of their influence in the National Assembly and more broadly of women's political participation in Kuwait?

Answer. Kuwait's female parliamentarians, all of whom hold doctoral degrees from American universities, have proven to be among the most active and productive of all National Assembly members. In so doing, they have secured the admiration of some who were previously skeptical of women's abilities to succeed in this environment, and have even on occasion formed alliances with them on issues of cross-cutting concern. With the female MPs' assistance, the Cabinet and National Assembly have continued to chip away at legislation that discriminates against women, particularly in terms of benefits allocations. Now 6 years after gaining suffrage, women continue to play an important role in Kuwait, both inside and outside of Parliament. Traditionally, at least one woman has served in the Cabinet (currently, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Dr. Amani Khalid Buresli, is a woman) and women hold leadership positions in both the public and private sectors. Women also continue to play their historically active role in Kuwaiti civil society, advocating not only for women and children's rights, but for human rights more generally.

RESPONSES OF SUSAN L. ZIADEH TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. What impact does the recent Arab Spring have on Qatar's domestic politics and process of political liberalization? Has Qatar's economic situation helped the country weather the wave of popular unrest sweeping the region? If so, how? And how can the U.S. incentivize the Qataris to open up their political system more?

Answer. Qatar has not experienced domestic demonstrations or protests. The country's small, homogenous population and wealth insulate it from many of the factors that are driving protests in other countries. Qatar's unemployment rate is extremely low, it has the world's highest per capita GDP, and the country ranked 19th in the Transparency International's 2010 Corruption index. Nevertheless, Qatar has taken small but important steps to increase citizen participation in government. It held municipal council elections in May 2011 and announced that it will hold elections for its advisory council soon. This would be an important step forward and demonstrate Qatar's commitment to implementing meaningful reform. It is U.S. policy that governments need to be transparent, accountable, and responsive to their citizens. If confirmed, I will encourage Qatar to build on the steps it has already taken and advocate for government transparency, accountability, responsiveness and greater citizen participation in governance.

Question. What role does Qatar play in the Peninsula Shield forces sent to Bahrain in light of the ongoing unrest there?

Answer. Qatar is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the United States understands that Qatar contributed a small number of people to the Peninsula Shield Force. According to the GCC and the Government of Bahrain, the Peninsula Shield Force was used to protect government installations and critical infrastructure. The Government of Saudi Arabia has announced that some of their Peninsula Shield troops are leaving Bahrain; we have no reason to believe there are any Qatari forces currently in Bahrain.

Question. Please comment on Qatar's cooperation in implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposes sanctions against Iran. How has the decision to participate in the Peninsula Shield force deployed to Bahrain affect Qatar's bilateral relationship with Iran?

Answer. Qatar is an active participant in the Gulf Cooperation Council and it shares the same concerns as other gulf countries regarding Iran's interference in regional issues and its nuclear program. Qatar enforces U.N. sanctions on Iran. It does not appear that Qatar's decision to participate in the Peninsula Shield Force has had any effect on its bilateral relationship with Iran.

Question. Can you describe the range of ways in which Qatar has supported and continues to support the Libyan Transitional National Council since the conflict in Libya began? What has been Qatar's role in supporting the temporary funding mechanism established by the Libya contact group?

Answer. Qatar has taken an important leadership role in Libya. It was the first Arab country to join the coalition and provide military assets to Operation Unified

Protector. Qatar has sent significant amounts of humanitarian assistance to Libya. It helped establish an independent Libyan TV station to counter Qadhafi's propaganda and is marketing oil for the Transitional National Council (TNC). Qatar has also recognized the TNC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. Qatar has coordinated closely with several international partners, including the United States, France, and the U.K., to establish a Temporary Financing Mechanism (TFM) to facilitate contributions to the TNC. Qatar pledged \$100 million to the TNC at the June Libya Contact Group meeting in Abu Dhabi.

Question. The Qatari-funded Al Jazeera media outlet has received criticism for being selective in its coverage of the unrest across the Arab world. What impact does Al Jazeera have in the projection of Qatar's soft power in the region? How much influence does the Government of Qatar have on Al Jazeera's coverage?

Answer. Al Jazeera's coverage of the Arab Spring, especially in Tunisia and Egypt, has had a profound impact on events in the region. Al Jazeera's reach extends beyond the Arab world. The network, through its Arabic and English channels, has established itself as a global media platform that broadcasts across the world—from the Western Hemisphere to Europe, Asia, and Africa. The Qatari Government provides significant funding for Al Jazeera but has long maintained that Al Jazeera operates independently.

Question. Relations between Qatar and Egypt under President Mubarak were cold and tense. How do you see relations between the two countries evolving now that there is new leadership in Egypt? What is the status of Qatar's pledged financial assistance of \$10 billion to Egypt? How are the United States and Qatar coordinating efforts to offer Egypt financial assistance?

Answer. Qatar has welcomed the transition in Egypt and expressed interest in investing several billion dollars in Egypt. Qatari officials have made several trips to Egypt to explore areas for cooperation and investment. The United States is coordinating with Qatar and Egypt to identify investment opportunities, and to reduce duplication of effort and to maximize support for Egypt's economic recovery. The United States will continue to encourage Qatar to support Egypt as it undergoes its transition to democracy.

Question. Qatar has in recent years enjoyed close relations with Hamas, leading to some speculation that Hamas might relocate to Doha. How would you characterize Qatar's approach to Hamas and to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more broadly?

Answer. The Government of Qatar (GOQ) has a relationship with Hamas and there have been press reports that Hamas will relocate its headquarters. Doha has been mentioned as a possible location, but there have not been any announcements by Hamas or the GOQ about relocation of Hamas' headquarters to Doha. The United States considers Hamas a terrorist organization, and we continue to raise our concerns about Hamas with the GOQ. As head of the Arab League Peace Initiative Follow-Up Committee, Qatar can play a positive role in encouraging Middle East peace efforts. The committee issued a statement that welcomed President Obama's May 19 speech calling for a two-state solution.

The U.S. goal is to encourage direct engagement by the parties on the basis of President Obama's May 19 speech in order to try to reach an agreement that resolves the permanent status issues and brings an end to the conflict.

Question. Qatar was listed as a Tier 2 Watch List country in the State Department's 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report. What are the most concerning government failures on this issue and what steps will you take as Ambassador to address the widespread problem of human trafficking, particularly on the issues of sex and labor trafficking? What steps has the government taken to regulate and protect its migrant domestic workers? Please describe any opportunities for public diplomacy activities related to trafficking in persons and any technical cooperation or other partnership initiatives being undertaken on this issue.

Answer. Trafficking in persons (TIP) remains a serious problem in Qatar. The State Department continues to engage the Government of Qatar (GOQ) on the issue and helped push the GOQ to develop a comprehensive action plan to address TIP. In addition, the GOQ is close to enacting a TIP law that will significantly strengthen its ability to investigate and prosecute TIP. We have recommended to the Qataris that it improve its antitrafficking policies by increasing law enforcement against trafficking offenders and enhancing procedures to identify victims to ensure that they receive protection services. The current U.S. Ambassador to Qatar recently published an op-ed in a Qatari newspaper to highlight the 2011 Trafficking in Persons report. If confirmed, I will engage a variety of stakeholders, including the GOQ and civil society, to advocate for increased efforts to prosecute traffickers, protect victims, and prevent trafficking.

RESPONSES OF HON. ANNE W. PATTERSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. What instructions do our representatives at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have with regards to the need for political and economic reform "conditionalities" as part of any additional lending or assistance programs to Egypt?

Answer. We support ambitious reform benchmarks for international financial institution (IFI) assistance that reinforce the homegrown agenda of Egyptian reformers and civil society, including support for the democratic transition and a macroeconomic program that promotes economic stability and growth. Egyptian citizens are demanding greater accountability and equity, so we are supporting conditionality that fosters transparency and a level playing field, targets key measures that can be credibly implemented, and creates conditions for future reforms by catalyzing domestic pressures for good economic governance and sustainable and inclusive growth.

The Government of Egypt recently revised its budget to reduce public spending and external financing needs. We therefore believe it is unlikely that Egypt will begin a new lending program with the IMF prior to elections.

Question. I believe it is critical, given the dramatic changes in the Middle East, that the NEA bureau is able to staff all of its positions, both domestically and overseas, with at-grade personnel. This is particularly important with regard to senior positions at our Embassies. I am concerned, for instance, that there has been no Ambassador at post in Bahrain during this critical period, nor is there a nominee from the administration before the committee. I also note that at a number of critical posts, both the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission are changing this summer.

Please provide details about staffing in your Embassy. What percentage of positions are filled with at-grade personnel, with the appropriate language ability? Please list any position in the Political or Economic sections of your Embassy that has been vacant for more than 6 months as of June 1, and indicate whether an officer has been paneled for the position, and if so when he or she will arrive at post.

Answer. Ninety-three percent of personnel at Embassy Cairo are at grade or above. The percentage of personnel with minimum or higher language qualifications is 60 percent. No positions in the Economic and Political Section of Embassy Cairo have been vacant for more than 6 months as of June 1.

Question. Please identify any position at post which has been vacant for 3 months or longer over the past 2 years due to the incumbent's departure for service in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan.

Answer. The table that follows details individuals who departed for service in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan, and the length of time their positions at Embassy Cairo were vacant:

Office	Country (DOY)	From	To	Arrival date	GAP/vacant
RSO/WSU	Baghdad, Iraq	Aug-09	Jun-10	Apr-10	8 months.
RSO/WSU	Baghdad, Iraq	Oct-09	Mar-11	Jul-10	9 months.
RIMC	Baghdad, Iraq	Nov-09	Nov-10		Vacant
PAO	Baghdad, Iraq	Jun-08	Jun-09	Sep-09	15 months.
IMO	Baghdad, Iraq	Sep-08	Sep-09	Mar-10	18 months.
HR	Kabul, Afghanistan	Jun-10	Dec-10	Apr-11	10 months.
OBO	Kabul, Afghanistan	Aug-09	Aug-10		Vacant.
ECPO	Kabul, Afghanistan	Aug-09	Aug-12	Jul-10	11 months.
ECPO	Baghdad, Iraq	Mar-11	Present		Vacant.

Question. If the Ambassador and DCM positions at your Embassy are transitioning simultaneously this transfer cycle, please indicate steps taken to mitigate the potential for this to be necessary in future years.

Answer. It is the policy of the Department and the NEA Bureau to try and schedule the transfer of Ambassadors and DCMs so that transitions do not occur at the same time. Transfers are coordinated based on the needs of the service, foreign policy priorities, and the needs of our Foreign Service families. Given these often competing factors, it does happen that employees depart prior to the arrival of their replacements, and Ambassadors may not overlap for accreditation reasons. In most cases, either the Ambassador or the DCM is present at all times. Egypt is a foreign policy priority. As such, DCM Tueller will remain at post to have a few weeks of overlap with me if I am confirmed before taking up his new position (pending his own confirmation) in Kuwait. The staff in Cairo is very experienced. The Economic and Political Minister, the USAID Director, and the heads of other important agencies will not be transferring this summer.

RESPONSES OF MICHAEL H. CORBIN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Since the initiation of the NATO operation to enforce the arms embargo against Libya on 22 March, and the decision to initiate no-fly zone enforcement operations on March 24, please describe all U.S. transfers, sales, grants or leases of defense articles, defense services or technical data to the United Arab Emirates under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, direct commercial sales (DCS), or any other relevant authority or authorization to transfer, sell, grant or lease U.S. defense articles, defense services and technical data. Please provide aggregate dollar values, and provide a summary of the particular defense articles, defense services or technical data transferred, sold, granted or leased to date.

Answer. Arms Transfers to UAE since March 22, 2011:

FMS

UH-60 Blackhawks: On June 23, DSCA notified Congress of a possible FMS sale of five Blackhawk helicopters and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$217 million. The UAE will use these helicopters for intracountry transportation of UAE officials to militarily critical training and operation sites.

F-16 Program Support: On May 24, DSCA notified Congress of a possible FMS sale of support and maintenance of F-16 aircraft and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$100 million. The UAE Air Force and Air Defense have operated the F-16 Block 60 aircraft for over 10 years, including in current coalition operations in Libya. Munitions are not part of this possible sale, although the UAE continues to purchase munitions for these aircraft.

AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder missiles: On April 18, DSCA notified Congress of a possible \$251 million FMS sale of 218 AIM-9X short-range air-to-air missiles, which the UAE will use on its aircraft to support coalition operations in Libya and contingency operations with the United States.

In addition DOD has \$4.8 billion in total Foreign Military Sales for UAE pending. The bulk of this total reflects the offer for the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile system, a \$3.5 billion previously notified FMS case. These sales also include 54 GBU-12s (Guided Bomb Unit—12) for UAE's F-16s.

DCS

From March 22 to June 27, the U.S. Government adjudicated and approved or approved with provisos 375 direct commercial sales (DCS) licenses for defense articles and services involving the UAE, for an estimated value of \$1.3 billion. These figures do not necessarily represent actual exports, but the value of the approved licenses for potential sales and deliveries.

Question. Iran was viewed by many Gulf States as a counterweight to Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, although that view has shifted now that Iraq has a representative government and Saddam is gone. What is your assessment of the threat, if any, posed by Iran to the UAE?

Answer. The UAE shares our concerns about Iran's nuclear program and has taken a strong stance on its obligations under UNSCR 1929 in recognition of Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. The UAE also shares our concerns about Iranian meddling in the region. The UAE has a strategic interest in regional stability and is an active participant in the Gulf Cooperation Council. The UAE takes its national security very seriously and is building a strong military partnership with the United States and other Western partners.

The UAE maintains diplomatic and commercial ties with all its immediate neighbors, including Iran. This is necessitated by the UAE's geographical proximity, its historical ties with Iran that go back centuries, and the approximately 500,000 Iranians live in the UAE (about half the number of Emiratis).

Question. Each of the Gulf States have seen some political unrest, and each monarchy has dealt with it in a different manner. Each regime clearly prioritizes survival often at the sacrifice of human rights and democratic values we hold dear. What lessons do you take from Tunisia and Egypt going into your posting?

Answer. We regularly engage the Emirati Government at all levels regarding the universal principles of freedom of expression and association. While the UAE and the United States have not always seen eye to eye on the popular uprisings of the Arab Spring, we have maintained a robust and productive dialogue throughout this period of historic change. Following the events in Tunisia and Egypt, this engagement is more as important as ever.

As with any country in the region, we will continue to support and empower the democratic and reformist voices. And we will continue to do this by speaking honestly about the need to respect human rights and the legitimate aspirations of the people. We support the right to free expression, political participation, confidence in the rule of law, and governments that are transparent and responsive and accountable to their people.

Question. I believe it is critical, given the dramatic changes in the Middle East, that the NEA Bureau is able to staff all of its positions, both domestically and overseas, with at-grade personnel. This is particularly important with regard to senior positions at our Embassies. I am concerned, for instance, that there has been no Ambassador at post in Bahrain during this critical period, nor is there a nominee from the administration before the committee. I also note that at a number of critical posts, both the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission are changing this summer.

Please provide details about staffing in your Embassy. What percentage of positions are filled with at-grade personnel, with the appropriate language ability? Please list any position in the Political or Economic sections of your Embassy that has been vacant for more than 6 months as of June 1, and indicate whether an officer has been paneled for the position, and if so when he or she will arrive at post.

Answer. In UAE—Abu Dhabi the percentage of at-grade or above personnel is 72 percent, and the percentage of minimally or higher language qualified personnel is 73 percent. In UAE—Dubai the percentage of at-grade or above personnel is 86 percent, and the percentage of minimally or higher language qualified personnel is 70 percent.

There a total of 22 Political and Economic positions in Mission UAE. Seventy-three percent of these positions are filled with at-grade personnel with the appropriate language ability. No positions have been vacant for 6 months as of June 1.

Question. Please identify any position at post which has been vacant for 3 months or longer over the past 2 years due to the incumbent's departure for service in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan.

Answer. The mission has one position which will be vacant for 3 months or longer due to the incumbent's departure for service in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan. Dubai ECON FS-03 Departed 6/2011 replacement due 7/2012.

Question. If the Ambassador and DCM positions at your Embassy are transitioning simultaneously this transfer cycle, please indicate steps taken to mitigate the potential for this to be necessary in future years.

Answer. It is the policy of the Department and the NEA Bureau to try and schedule the transfer of Ambassadors and DCMs so that transitions do not occur at the same time. Transfers are coordinated based on the needs of the service, foreign policy priorities, and the needs of our Foreign Service families. Given these often competing factors, it does happen that employees depart prior to the arrival of their replacements; and, in the case of Ambassadors, they may not overlap for accreditation reasons. In most cases either the Ambassador or the DCM is present at all times. In the case of UAE, the DCM position is transferring this summer but the incoming DCM will arrive the end of July and will be in place prior to my arrival if I am confirmed.

RESPONSES OF SUSAN L. ZLADEH TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Since the initiation of the NATO operation to enforce the arms embargo against Libya on 22 March, and the decision to initiate no-fly zone enforcement operations on March 24, please describe all U.S. transfers, sales, grants or leases of defense articles, defense services or technical data to Qatar under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, direct commercial sales (DCS), or any other relevant authority or authorization to transfer, sell, grant or lease U.S. defense articles, defense services and technical data. Please provide aggregate dollar values, provide a summary of the particular defense articles, defense services, or technical data transferred sold, granted, or leased to date.

Answer. Foreign Military Sales: Since March 22, DOD has \$4.8 million in total Foreign Military Sales pending for Qatar. There have been no congressionally notified FMS cases for Qatar.

Direct Commercial Sales: From March 22-June 27, the U.S. Government adjudicated and approved or approved with provisos 102 direct commercial licenses (DCS) for defense-related technical data and spare parts to Qatar, for an estimated value of \$2.1 billion. These sales include four C-130 aircraft. These figures do not necessarily represent exports approved, but the value of the approved licenses for potential sales and deliveries.

Question. Iran was viewed by many Gulf States as a counterweight to Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, although that view has shifted now that Iraq has a representative government and Saddam is gone. What is your assessment of the threat, if any, posed by Iran to Qatar?

Answer. Qatar maintains a relationship with Iran primarily because of geographic proximity and shared economic interests. Qatar and Iran share the world's largest nonassociated gas field, and although Qatar develops its side of this field independently, maintaining a nonconfrontational relationship with Iran remains a priority for the Qatari Government. Qatar has a strategic interest in regional stability and it views any action that threatens regional security as a threat. Qatar is an active participant in the Gulf Cooperation Council and it shares the same concerns as other gulf countries regarding Iran's interference in regional issues and its nuclear program. Qatar enforces U.N. sanctions on Iran. Qatar's strong military partnership with the United States demonstrates its commitment to promoting regional security and countering regional threats.

Question. Each of the Gulf States have seen some political unrest, and each monarchy has dealt with it in a different manner. Each regime clearly prioritizes survival often at the sacrifice of human rights and democratic values we hold dear. What lessons do you take from Tunisia and Egypt going into your posting?

Answer. The Government of Qatar (GOQ) has reacted positively to the Arab Spring, and Qatar's leadership has publicly announced its support for reforms in the Middle East. Qatar has not experienced demonstrations or protests at home. The country's small, homogenous population and wealth insulate it from many of the fac-

tors that are driving protests in other countries. Nevertheless, the GOQ has taken small, but important steps to increase citizen participation in government. Qatar held municipal council elections in May 2011. The GOQ also announced that it will hold elections for its advisory council soon. This would be an important step forward and demonstrate Qatar's commitment to implementing meaningful reform. It is U.S. policy that governments need to be transparent, accountable, and responsive to their citizens. If confirmed, I will advocate for government transparency, accountability, responsiveness and greater citizen participation in governance. I will also emphasize the need to uphold universal rights.

Question. I believe it is critical, given the dramatic changes in the Middle East, that the NEA Bureau is able to staff all of its positions, both domestically and overseas, with at-grade personnel. This is particularly important with regard to senior positions at our Embassies. I am concerned, for instance, that there has been no Ambassador at post in Bahrain during this critical period, nor is there a nominee from the administration before the committee. I also note that at a number of critical posts, both the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission are changing this summer.

Please provide details about staffing in your Embassy. What percentage of positions are filled with at-grade personnel, with the appropriate language ability? Please list any position in the Political or Economic sections of your Embassy that has been vacant for more than 6 months as of June 1, and indicate whether an officer has been paneled for the position, and if so when he or she will arrive at post.

Answer. The Percentage of positions filled by at-grade or above personnel is 85 percent. The percentage of minimally or higher language qualified personnel is 80 percent. There have been no positions in the POL/ECON Section that have been vacant for more than 6 months as of June 1.

Question. Please identify any position at post which has been vacant for 3 months or longer over the past 2 years due to the incumbent's departure for service in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan.

Answer. There are no positions that have been vacant for more than 3 months due to AIP in the last 2 years.

Question. If the Ambassador and DCM positions at your Embassy are transitioning simultaneously this transfer cycle, please indicate steps taken to mitigate the potential for this to be necessary in future years.

Answer. It is the policy of the Department and the NEA Bureau to try and schedule the transfer of Ambassadors and DCMs so that transitions do not occur at the same time. Transfers are coordinated based on the needs of the service, foreign policy priorities and the needs of our Foreign Service families. Given these often competing factors, it does happen that employees depart prior to the arrival of their replacements; and, in the case of Ambassadors, they may not overlap for accreditation reasons. In most cases either the Ambassador or the DCM is present at all times. In the case of Doha, the DCM is not transferring this summer.

RESPONSES OF MATTHEW H. TUELLER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. The most recent U.S. State Department reports on terrorism criticize Kuwait for not enacting specific laws against terrorism support or terrorism financing. The State Department also reported in May 2010 that, "the provision of financial support to terrorist groups, both by charities and by individuals utilizing cash couriers continues to be a major concern." What is preventing enactment of such laws? To what extent would clear laws help the government reduce the potential for terrorist attacks in Kuwait? What is Embassy Kuwait advocating in this respect?

Answer. If confirmed, I will be fully committed to strengthening United States-Kuwait counterterrorism cooperation, including cooperation on combating the ability of terrorist networks to finance terrorist activities from Kuwaiti soil. Kuwait's relatively permissive environment renders the country vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist networks, who may find Kuwait to be a more attractive environment for raising and transmitting funds in comparison to other countries in the region. The fact that Kuwait does not have a law criminalizing the financing of terrorism is a serious impediment to the Kuwaiti Government's ability to pursue and prosecute individuals suspected of financing terrorist activities. However, over the past several years, there have been several encouraging examples of the Kuwaiti Government charging and prosecuting suspected terrorist financiers on related crimes, such as plotting an attack against a foreign country.

If confirmed, I will continue the U.S. Embassy's sustained engagement on this issue, pressing the Kuwaiti Government and Kuwait's Parliament to prioritize passage of an amended antimoney laundering/counterterrorism finance law. Last year, Kuwait's Parliament considered a draft amendment that would have specifically criminalized terror financing and returned it to the executive branch to draft two separate laws: an antimoney laundering law and an antiterror financing law.

Additionally, in 2010 Kuwait underwent a mutual evaluation by both the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) the international body for countering money laundering and terrorist financing, and the Middle East North Africa FATF, the regional body in the FATF network. The mutual evaluation and related discussions highlighted the vulnerabilities and reputational damage Kuwait faces without robust legislation in place criminalizing terrorism finance. If confirmed, I will lead strong U.S. engagement on this important issue, working closely with relevant U.S. Government agencies, and with international bodies such as the FATF to leverage the role of the international community in raising Kuwait's awareness of the need for progress in this area.

Question. Kuwait's relationship with Iraq remains rocky 20 years after you served there and helped reopen the Embassy in 1991, and 8 years after Saddam. Heading to Kuwait for now your third tour, and having served in Baghdad in the interim, what do you believe are the keys to putting that relationship on solid footing, what are the impediments, and how can the United States best facilitate a resolution of the deep-seated mistrust?

Answer. If confirmed, I will be fully committed to encouraging continued progress on rebuilding the relationship between Iraq and Kuwait. Having served in Kuwait directly following the liberation, I recognize the challenges associated with achieving progress on what are very sensitive, emotional, issues for both sides. I am encouraged by the positive developments we have seen over the past several years, including the restoration of diplomatic relations and several high-level visits in 2011, which I take as encouraging signs that both sides are committed to rebuilding the bilateral relationship.

Given the United States unique relationship with both Iraq and Kuwait, we are in an advantageous position to play a positive role in achieving progress on this issue. If confirmed by the Senate, I will lead sustained engagement by the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait, working in close coordination with the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and Member States of the U.N. Security Council. I am confident that Iraq and Kuwait recognize that both countries stand to benefit from closer ties between their two countries, particularly in areas such as trade and investment.

If confirmed, I will work toward strengthened dialogue between Iraq and Kuwait, utilizing existing channels such as the ICRC-led Tripartite Commission and Tripartite Subcommittee, and the newly established Iraq-Kuwait Joint Ministerial Commission. The United States, along with the United Nations, will continue to call on Iraq to abide by its U.N. obligations with regards to Iraq-Kuwait issues, which will create a more positive atmosphere in which to address other outstanding issues.

Question. Iran was viewed by many Gulf States as a counterweight to Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, although that view has shifted now that Iraq has a representative government and Saddam is gone. What is your assessment of the threat, if any, posed by Iran to Kuwait?

Answer. In recent years, the Kuwaiti Government has maintained mostly correct but not close relations with Iran. Ongoing concerns about disruptive Iranian influence in the region were exacerbated by the discovery of an Iranian spy ring in Kuwait and what they believe were clear signs of Iranian efforts to exploit the subsequent political unrest in Bahrain. Kuwait is also concerned about Iran's refusal to cooperate with international nuclear energy regimes, and the Kuwaiti Government has publicly urged Iran to abide by IAEA safeguards. Kuwait fears that any attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would have disastrous consequences for Kuwait, given the geographic proximity of the two countries, and therefore urges Iran to cooperate with the international community on ensuring full transparency of Iran's nuclear program. Kuwait has also enforced U.N. sanctions on Iran.

Question. Each of the Gulf States have seen some political unrest, and each monarchy has dealt with it in a different manner. Each regime clearly prioritizes survival often at the sacrifice of human rights and democratic values we hold dear. What lessons do you take from Tunisia and Egypt going into your postings?

Answer. I believe Kuwait is in a uniquely advantageous position amidst the wave of unrest sweeping across the region, having long been one of the countries in the Middle East where political freedoms are embraced and upheld by the government.

and society. Kuwait's well-defined democratic principles are enshrined in its constitution, and reflected in free competitive legislative elections, an elected and empowered Parliament, a vibrant civil society, and relatively open press environment. Kuwait's Government also ensures that Kuwaiti citizens benefit from the country's wealth, by subsidizing health care and education through the university level.

Kuwaitis enjoy a relatively high degree of freedom of expression. Kuwaitis are free to—and do—criticize senior members of the ruling family. In a move unique to the region, the Prime Minister has submitted to parliamentary questioning three times in the past 2 years, providing for parliamentary oversight of the government. Other ministers have also faced parliamentary questioning.

If confirmed, I am committed to strengthening U.S. support for Kuwait's democratic traditions and practices, including by supporting Kuwait's vibrant civil society through MEPI programming. Over the years, MEPI-sponsored activities have made notable contributions in Kuwait by encouraging and training women to be effective candidates, activists, and voters in future elections, and strengthening civil society organizations so that they can play a more positive role in Kuwait's political and democratic process.

Question. I believe it is critical, given the dramatic changes in the Middle East, that the NEA Bureau is able to staff all of its positions, both domestically and overseas, with at-grade personnel. This is particularly important with regard to senior positions at our Embassies. I am concerned, for instance, that there has been no Ambassador at post in Bahrain during this critical period, nor is there a nominee from the administration before the committee. I also note that at a number of critical posts, both the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission are changing this summer.

Please provide details about staffing in your Embassy. What percentage of positions are filled with at-grade personnel, with the appropriate language ability? Please list any position in the Political or Economic sections of your Embassy that has been vacant for more than 6 months as of June 1, and indicate whether an officer has been paneled for the position, and if so when he or she will arrive at post.

Answer, a. Staffing at Embassy Kuwait:

- Sixty percent at grade or above personnel.
- Eighty percent minimally or higher language qualified personnel.
- Twenty-one percent of Political and Economic positions are filled by employees one grade below the grade of the position (43 positions total, nine stretches). All are language qualified.
- All Political and Economic positions are filled.

Question. Please identify any position at post which has been vacant for 3 months or longer over the past 2 years due to the incumbent's departure for service in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan.

Answer. Post vacancies due to due to the incumbent's departure for service in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan:

- RSO departed April 2011, successor arrives August 2011.
- A/RSO departed April 2011, successor arrives July 2011.
- Facilities Maintenance departed April 2010, successor arrived January 2011.

Question. If the Ambassador and DCM positions at your Embassy are transitioning simultaneously this transfer cycle, please indicate steps taken to mitigate the potential for this to be necessary in future years.

Answer. It is the policy of the Department and the NEA Bureau to try and schedule the transfer of Ambassadors and DCMs so that transitions do not occur at the same time. Transfers are coordinated based on the needs of the service, foreign policy priorities and the needs of our Foreign Service families. Given these often competing factors, it does happen that employees depart prior to the arrival of their replacements; and, in the case of Ambassadors, they may not overlap for accreditation reasons. In most cases either the Ambassador or the DCM is present at all times. In the case of Kuwait, foreign policy priorities as well as family needs played a significant factor in the transition schedule. While both the Ambassador and the DCM positions will be vacant for a few weeks, we have full confidence in the designated Chargé. The incoming DCM will arrive in late August.

RESPONSES OF KENNETH J. FAIRFAX TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
 SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Kazakhstan's cooperation on nonproliferation has been a model example of U.S. security engagement. What do you see as the next steps in our relationship with Kazakhstan in the realm of nonproliferation and cooperative threat reduction?

Answer. Cooperation on nonproliferation has been a pillar of the United States-Kazakhstan bilateral relationship and is a model for U.S. security engagement. Kazakhstan has cooperated extensively with the United States to eliminate its Soviet-legacy weapons of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure, secure materials of proliferation concern, and redirect former WMD scientists to sustainable, non-military employment. The shutdown of the BN-350 reactor and shipment of enough nuclear material for 775 nuclear weapons to a secure location made a significant contribution to global security. Kazakhstan continues to build upon its commitment to international security and nonproliferation through its active participation in the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the IAEA, and more than 25 U.S. nonproliferation initiatives and programs currently active in Kazakhstan.

Cooperation on nonproliferation and cooperative threat reduction will remain a focus of our bilateral relations with Kazakhstan. Through our Biological Threat Reduction program, the United States is working with Kazakhstan to improve bio-safety and bio-security by consolidating and securing dangerous pathogen collections, and we continue to fund the redirecting of underemployed biological weapons experts to careers with peaceful purposes. We are also supporting Kazakhstan's efforts to combat bioterrorism and are enhancing its ability to detect, diagnose, and respond to disease outbreaks. Through Kazakhstan's participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Export Control and related Border Security assistance program, the United States is strengthening Kazakhstan's ability to prevent proliferation of WMD and related materials across its borders and reducing the risk of proliferation through training for and provision of equipment to licensing officials, border guards, and customs officials.

Our Annual Bilateral Consultations have provided another important mechanism through which to further our engagement with Kazakhstan on nonproliferation issues, including its interest in a more prominent role in the IAEA and its offer to host the IAEA low enriched uranium fuel bank.

Question. Kazakhstan could play an increasingly important role as a supplier to the development of a Southern Energy Corridor and already participates in trans-Caspian shipments to Azerbaijan. Do you see any prospect for Kazakhstan to enlarge its role in this project through trans-Caspian shipments?

Answer. As its oil production increases, Kazakhstan could increase its delivery of crude oil across the Caspian, most likely through enhanced tanker shipments. At this point, it is not clear that Kazakhstan will have substantial volumes of gas available for delivery into the Southern Energy Corridor. Most gas currently produced in Kazakhstan is utilized domestically or reinjected to enhance oil production. We also understand that Kazakhstan believes trans-Caspian oil and gas pipelines will be difficult to build without a five-country agreement on delimitation of the Caspian Sea.

Question. With regard to United States-Kazakhstan energy cooperation, what additional steps do you believe the United States should take to enlarge our relationship?

Answer. We have an ongoing and productive dialogue with Kazakhstan on ways to deepen energy cooperation. Our engagement with Kazakhstan has largely focused on the country's investment climate and its planning to increase oil production in the coming decade. The United States has a strategic interest in Kazakhstan's production moving forward and additional Kazakhstani crude reaching world markets.

Our engagement occurs during the U.S.-Kazakhstan Annual Bilateral Consultations and U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership. The second Annual Bilateral Consultation, which took place March 24-25 in Astana, included discussion of investment climate issues related to Kazakhstan's energy sector. We expect to have an ABC review session with the Kazakhstani Government in Washington in September 2011, where we will continue the discussion of deepening our economic and energy partnership. The Annual Bilateral Consultations include meetings with representatives of American and Kazakhstani energy companies.

The U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership has been active for 8 years and is an essential part of our relationship with this hydrocarbon-rich nation. The next U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership meeting is scheduled for November 2011 in Washington, and will include a visit by the Minister of Oil and Gas Suuat Mynbayev.

I also plan to work closely with private American companies active in the energy field in Kazakhstan, as well as those who would like to become involved in emerging markets such as alternative energy in Kazakhstan, in order to facilitate and encourage the growth of a long-term, mutually beneficial commercial relationship that benefits both Kazakhstan and the American people.

Question. In what areas do you believe Kazakhstan could expand its participation in the Northern Distribution Network?

Answer. Kazakhstan is providing significant support to our stabilization efforts in Afghanistan through its active participation in the Northern Distribution Network. We are also working with Kazakhstan's Government and private sector to increase local procurement of construction materials, supplies, and food products to support our operations in Afghanistan. Kazakhstan plays an important role in our efforts to build a stable, economically prosperous Afghanistan, reconnected with its region. Kazakhstan's participation in NDN demonstrates the potential for trade linking Central and South Asia via Afghanistan, and we are working with Kazakhstan to enact policies to speed the flow of trade through the region.

RESPONSES OF ANNE W. PATTERSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. An Egyptian court convicted two people for attacking a Coptic sit-in in Cairo last month, but 16 suspects were found not guilty. The two convicted men were reportedly released on bail. The court was reviewing accusations related to last month's attacks on a Coptic sit-in, which was staged in front of the state radio and television building. A group of unidentified men attacked the people participating in the sit-in, using firearms, knives, stones, and Molotov cocktails. At least 78 people were wounded. The protesters decided to end their sit-in 5 days later after authorities agreed to open three churches. Copts have faced discrimination, even on governmental levels, as their churches are sometimes closed, or require special permits for even minor renovations.

- What progress is being made by the military council to end sectarian violence and tension and what are the prospects for constitutional changes and laws that would address sectarian violence and ease restrictions on building churches? Can Egypt achieve a secular government that (1) respects the rights of its religious minorities; and (2) fosters the full integration of religious minorities in all levels of government?

Answer. Sectarian violence remains a troubling problem in Egypt, as evidenced by the May 7 violence that erupted in the Cairo neighborhood of Imbaba. On May 17, Field Marshal Tantawi, the head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and de facto leader of Egypt during this transition period, issued a strongly worded, public condemnation of sectarian attacks. The SCAF also stated that it would investigate and prosecute those responsible for the May 7 clashes, and has charged 48 individuals in conjunction with his case. On June 7, Prime Minister Sharaf attended the formal reopening of the Holy Virgin Church, one of two churches damaged during the May 7 riots. The Egyptian transitional government has also allowed the construction and repair of 16 churches that had previously not been granted permission to be built or repaired.

On May 14, Prime Minister Sharaf announced the formation of a National Justice Committee to draft an antidiscrimination law and consider a "unified places of worship" law within 30 days—two key Coptic Christian demands. On June 1, the Egyptian Cabinet announced that it had approved a draft "Unified Law for Organizing the Construction of Places of Worship." This draft law, which governs the building and renovation of churches and mosques, is currently under public review, and some religious and civil society leaders have raised concerns during this review process that the draft law does not sufficiently depoliticize the construction process.

We remain very concerned about the prospects of sectarian violence in Egypt and will continue to monitor this issue closely. We will also continue to impress upon the Egyptian Government the importance of taking steps to confront sectarian violence, including steps to reverse discriminatory laws and treatment, of holding perpetrators of violence accountable, and of fostering an environment that promotes religious tolerance.

Question. Your service in Cairo coincides with a unique moment on world history—a potential political sea change in the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt has many challenges and opportunities—this year will see parliamentary and Presi-

dential elections and early next year we expect Egyptians to begin drafting a new constitution.

- In the context of these changes, are you concerned about an erosion of the relationship between Israel and Egypt? Do recent actions, the facilitation of the talks that led to the declaration of Fatah-Hamas unity government—a step that may prove fatal to the negotiation process—and the reopening of the Rafah border crossing, which has been closed since 2007 due to concerns about Hamas using the crossing to bring weapons and fighters into Gaza foretell a different relationship between Egypt and Israel?
- If confirmed, will you make clear to Egypt that the state of relations between our countries is directly linked to its adherence to the Camp David Peace Treaty with Israel?
- The Egypt-Israel peace treaty formed the basis of our foreign assistance program to Egypt. Is Egyptian adherence to its international obligations, including the peace treaty with Israel, a prerequisite for U.S. assistance, including possible debt relief?

Answer. The current Egyptian Government has repeatedly expressed its commitment to adhere to past agreements, including its Treaty of Peace with Israel. The Department of State fully appreciates the significance of Egyptian-Israeli peace to our regional interests and those of our ally, Israel. In our discussions with Egyptian leadership across the political spectrum, we have and will continue to underscore the importance of upholding this and other international obligations. It is important that Egypt and Israel continue to strengthen their bilateral relationship and their lines of communication, particularly as Egypt moves through its transition. Egypt has maintained direct diplomatic and security engagement with Israel throughout the transition, and we continue to encourage such cooperation.

With regard to the reconciliation agreement between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, we want the agreement to be implemented in a manner that moves us closer to our common goal of comprehensive peace. We will work with Egypt toward this objective, as Egypt continues to play a leadership role in the peace process.

Question. Earlier this month Secretary Clinton said, “We are also troubled by reports of sexual violence used by governments to intimidate and punish protesters seeking democratic reforms across the Middle East and North Africa. Rape, physical intimidation, sexual harassment, and even so-called ‘virginity tests’ have taken place in countries throughout the region. These egregious acts are violations of basic human dignity and run contrary to the democratic aspirations so courageously expressed throughout the region.” The virginity tests utilized by security forces in Egypt are the most blatant violation of women’s rights, and a worrying sign that one of the goals of the Egyptian revolution—to secure civil liberties for women—is not being met. In contrast to the democratic transition in Tunisia, where women have been guaranteed parity with men in the party lists for the upcoming Constituent Assembly, women in Egypt have not been largely integrated into the transition process. Since the “Million Woman March” on March 8 in Cairo, most of the main complaints women have have not been addressed:

- (1) Women’s participation in the constitutional, legislative, and political future of Egypt;
 - (2) A new civil constitution which respects citizenship, equality and cancels all forms of discrimination;
 - (3) A change to all laws, including the personal status law to guarantee equality;
 - (4) Fundamental policy and legal changes to impose significant penalties on all forms of violence toward women.
- How will you continue to raise the issue of women’s rights with the military council in Egypt and the new government that will emerge this fall? What leverage does the United States have to pressure the integration of women into the democratic transition, and ensure women’s equality is safeguarded in Egypt?

Answer. We are disgusted by allegations of torture and “virginity tests” by military police in the Egyptian Museum on March 9. At the highest levels, we have called on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to investigate these reports and prosecute those who are culpable. The SCAF has publicly vowed to investigate allegations that protesters detained by the military on March 9 were tortured.

We share your concerns about the involvement of women in the political transition. Regrettably, the committee to draft revisions to Egypt’s Constitution in March did not include any women, and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs was abolished soon after the interim government was formed. Although some women have taken promi-

ment roles in activist groups, more needs to be done. If confirmed, I will continue pressing the Egyptian Government to promote the participation of women in government and political parties. The United States also promoted a conference on June 2 in Cairo, cosponsored by International IDEA and U.N. Women, to raise the profile of women's rights in democratic transitions. Chaired by U.N. Women Executive Director, Michele Bachelet, this event advocated for robust women's political participation and empowerment, with special attention on Egypt, and has likely laid the groundwork for a ministerial-level gathering on the subject on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly.

Many of the civil society programs we support also aim to empower women politically and economically, and we will monitor the drafting of Egypt's new Constitution to ensure women's rights are protected. As part of the \$165 million we have made available to meet urgent Egyptian needs, USAID is providing \$20 million in funding to support political party development through NDI and IRI, civil society development, election monitoring, and voter education. Support for women as political leaders and candidates will be an important part of these projects. In its regular assistance portfolio, USAID provides direct grants to enhance women's and girls' civic and political rights and participation, improve the operation of family courts, provide psychological counseling services to women and children, and combat violence against women by improving the capacity of Egypt's National Council for Women and National Council for Childhood and Motherhood to advocate for policy changes and provide services and legal assistance for battered and trafficked women.

Through its local grants program, MEPI is funding 10 Egyptian NGOs to carry out innovative projects to break down barriers for women in the legal profession, raise awareness of women's rights among female students in Upper Egypt, train ordinary Egyptian women to become community leaders and businessowners, and carry out voter education and corruption awareness campaigns targeting women, including in lesser developed regions of Egypt. MEPI also is preparing to fund new Egyptian local grants that focus on women's rights, economic opportunity, and participation during the transition.

Question. Our government has stated and restated the importance of peaceful, democratic transition in Egypt that includes respect for human rights, including expression, association and assembly, freedom of the press. However, recent reports from Egypt have estimated that between 5,000 and 10,000 people have been tried in military courts over the past 3 months. Activists believe the prosecutions are a scare tactic by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to intimidate Egyptians off the street, as they often specifically target protesters.

- How is the administration addressing this failure with the military council, to ensure that the transitional government is not backsliding and reverting to tactics reminiscent of the Mubarak era?

Answer. We have raised at the highest levels the need for Egypt's military leadership to address transparently and inclusively the grievances of the Egyptian people; including lifting the state of emergency; protecting freedom of expression and assembly; reforming security institutions; trying civilians in civilian, not military, courts; and transitioning to civilian control of the government through free and fair elections.

We are aware of recent interrogations of journalists, bloggers, and judges critical of the SCAF and military and have made our concerns regarding these cases clear to the Egyptian Government and the SCAF. Freedom of expression is a critical component of any democratic state, and we have made clear that attempts to silence political opposition in Egypt are unacceptable.

Question. Ambassador Patterson, I have been following Chairman Kerry's effort with respect to the Bower children who were wrongfully removed from the United States by their mother. As you are aware, their father, Colin Bower, has been trying unsuccessfully to secure the return of his children, Noor and Ramsay, to the United States. Pursuant to a 2008 decision by Probate and Family Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Mr. Bower has sole legal custody of Noor and Ramsay and joint physical custody with Mirvat El Nady. That ruling stipulated Mirvat el Nady was not to remove Noor and Ramsay from the Commonwealth. There are no international or bilateral treaties in force between Egypt and the United States dealing with international parental child abduction, and Egyptian law does not consider the removal of a child by the noncustodial parent to or within Egypt to be a crime.

- What efforts is the Department undertaking with the interim government to secure the return of Mr. Bower's children? What pressure do you believe would be helpful to motivate the Military Council or a future Egyptian Government to resolve this case favorably? In your role as Ambassador, what actions will

you take to encourage Egypt to sign the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction?

Answer. Secretary Clinton and the Department have been in direct contact with Egyptian authorities at senior levels concerning this matter. We will continue to raise this case with appropriate Egyptian authorities in the hope of seeing the children returned to Mr. Bower. Both the Special Advisor for the Office of Children's Issues, Ambassador Susan Jacobs, and the U.S. Consul General in Cairo have, on multiple occasions, worked directly with Mr. Bower on this difficult matter. The Office of Children's Issues is very engaged on Mr. Bower's behalf. We will continue to press the Egyptian Government to sign the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

RESPONSES OF MICHAEL CORBIN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

HUMAN RIGHTS/DEMOCRACY

Question. Five prodemocracy activists have been detained in the United Arab Emirates since April 18 without bail. According to Human Rights Watch, the activists were charged with "peaceful use of speech to criticize the UAE Government." The UAE Government said they were charged with harassment after the activists and other UAE nationals signed a petition in March that demanded constitutional and parliamentary changes in the Emirates, and free elections for all citizens. The detainees include a leading human rights activist and university lecturer. In his address on the Middle East and North Africa last month, President Obama declared that "it will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy."

- With the trial date of these prodemocracy activists set for July 18, how will the administration follow through on its promise of promoting reform and democracy including in the UAE? How will you as Ambassador pressure the Emirati Government to conduct the trial in a transparent and open manner, and preserve freedom of speech and assembly?

Answer. We engage the Emirati Government regularly and at all levels regarding the universal principles of freedom of expression and association. Our Embassy and senior Department officials have been reaching out to the Emirati Government regarding our concern that any trials be conducted in a transparent and open manner in accordance with international standards of due process. If confirmed, I will continue to make these points. We understand the lawyers for the five defendants have asked that the trial be closed to the public and the press. We will continue to monitor the situation to the best of our ability.

RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN

Question. The relationship between the United States and the UAE is multifaceted and reflects many complex issues that both countries face. At the top of our agenda for the past several years has been the issue of Iran and the important role the UAE must play in enforcing international sanctions. While we have seen a dramatic and positive shift in the UAE's behavior toward Iran in the past year, it can and must do much more. For example, the UAE should stop refined petroleum exports to Iran; they should further clamp down on illicit re-exports to Iran; and they should do more to cut banking ties with Tehran.

- Can you describe the UAE's compliance with international sanctions on Iran?
- If confirmed, will you make it a top priority to press the Government of the UAE, including the individual Emirates, to fully comply with U.N. and U.S. sanctions on Iran?
- The State Department recently sanctioned two UAE firms for their role in the export of refined petroleum products to Iran. If confirmed, will you ensure Embassy personnel investigate and report to Washington on companies involved in the export of refined petroleum to Iran in violation of U.S. law?

Answer. The UAE takes seriously its international obligations to enforce sanctions against Iran. To this end, it has a track record of disrupting or preventing transfers to Iran of items of proliferation concern. The UAE has a national strategy to protect the reputation of its historically open trade environment against abuse by proliferators. In August 2007 the UAE passed comprehensive strategic trade control legislation providing the basis for an enforceable export control system. The law is currently being enforced and we have been working in close partnership with UAE authorities to halt attempts to divert sensitive dual-use technology, including U.S.-

origin goods, from the UAE. With respect to enforcement and counterproliferation issues, the UAE is an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and hosted, in January 2010, a major multinational PSI exercise, LEADING EDGE. They also cohosted with the U.S. a Global Transshipment Conference in March 2011 designed to focus international attention on the problems of illicit transshipment and ways to address them.

If confirmed, I will continue in our policy of pressing the UAE including each of the Emirates, as we do all our partners, to fully comply with U.N. and U.S. sanctions on Iran. This has been a top priority and will continue to be one under my tenure, if confirmed.

If confirmed I will ensure that post continues our efforts on refined petroleum products to build on the work done so far. I will work to focus on monitoring of and reporting on efforts by commercial entities to evade international and U.S. sanctions, including the CISADA refined petroleum sanctions.

RESPONSE OF MATTHEW H. TUELLER TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Question. You have surely been briefed about the Kuwaiti detention without bond of a U.S. citizen in his seventies, Aliyar Dehghani. His family is deeply concerned that he is not being afforded normal, due legal process, and that his continued detention poses risks to his health given his age and heart condition.

Even though the circumstances surrounding the case are controversial, it is especially troubling if one of our allies ever were to single out an American citizen for discrimination, in violation of its own legal standards and process.

- Should you be confirmed, will you raise this case—and potentially any others like it—to ensure fair treatment under the law of American citizens in Kuwait?

Answer. If confirmed by the Senate, I will be fully committed to ensuring the protection and well-being of all U.S. citizens in Kuwait, including securing fair treatment under the law. I assure you that, if confirmed as Ambassador, I will raise with the Kuwaiti Government any cases in which we believe an individual is being discriminated against or mistreated because of his or her U.S. citizenship.

Regarding the specific situation of Mr. Aliyar Dehghani, a U.S.-citizen resident in Kuwait for many years, I understand that Mr. Dehghani was released from the Kuwait Central Prison on May 29 after he posted bond. The case is pending the outcome of the ongoing investigation into his role in connection to the 2009 failure of the Mishref Sewage Pumping Station.

The U.S. Embassy in Kuwait informs me there is no indication Mr. Dehghani is being targeted, disadvantaged, or discriminated against in any way because of his U.S. citizenship. After Mr. Dehghani was detained by Kuwaiti authorities on May 10, representatives of the Consular Section of the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait visited Mr. Dehghani on several occasions and were in regular contact with members of his family. The Department of State and the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait continue to closely follow Mr. Dehghani's situation and will continue to provide appropriate consular assistance.

