

# U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD PAKISTAN

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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MAY 12, 2009  
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## **U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD PAKISTAN**

**TUESDAY, MAY 12, 2009**

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Feingold, Menendez, Casey, Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Gillibrand, Lugar, Corker, Isakson, Risch, DeMint, and Wicker.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS**

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. This hearing will come to order.

We were going to have the business meeting as rapidly as possible at the beginning, but until we have requisite 10 Senators, we are not able to do that. So, what we'll do is start the hearing component, and as soon as we have 10 Senators here, we'll do the business-meeting component and then move on.

And, Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you for your willingness to indulge us and allow us to do that.

With its nuclear arsenal, its terrorist safe havens, Taliban sanctuaries, and a growing insurgency, Pakistan has emerged as one of the most difficult foreign policy challenges that we face. We're fortunate to have with us today to share his views one of America's most accomplished diplomats, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who will share with us the results of the now-two trilateral meetings that have taken place, as well as his own travels to the region and efforts to revitalize America policy in the region.

Last Thursday, this committee hosted Pakistani President Asif Zardari along with Afghan President Karzai for a working lunch. And the trilateral meetings that were held in Washington last week I think provided the basis of increased cooperation of some progress.

For most of the past 8 years, just getting Pakistani and Afghan officials in the same room required, frankly, a herculean effort. Committee members during this luncheon asked some very tough questions. It was a very frank exchange; I must say, a unique exchange, in my experience at luncheons with two Presidents of countries with different interests, and they were both very gracious in taking those questions and in providing the committee and the guests who were there an important opportunity to be able to

really examine American policy and to hear the leaders of those countries express their views.

We're not looking for perfection, but we do have a need to make progress and to redefine some aspects of the policy, and we need to work together—Congress, the administration, the Pakistanis, the Afghans. And the stakes are really much too high for anything less than our maximum cooperative effort.

Pakistan today, frankly, has the potential either to be crippled by the Taliban or to serve as a bulwark against everything that the Taliban represents. For many of us in Congress and the administration, recent events have only reaffirmed our belief that we need a bold new strategy. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, which I've introduced with Senator Lugar, is the centerpiece of a new approach designed to redefine, not only America's policy toward Pakistan, but also our relations with the Pakistani people. I'm pleased that the President has asked Congress to pass it.

Ultimately, it will be the Pakistani people, not Americans, who will determine their nation's future. The good news is that, for all of its current troubles, Pakistan remains a nation whose 170 million citizens are overwhelmingly moderate, whose own soldiers and police have died fighting terrorism and insurgency, a country that has committed itself to a very difficult democratic transition, even at a moment of enormous strain.

I look forward to hearing Ambassador Holbrooke's thoughts on how we can empower those Pakistanis fighting to steer the world's second largest Muslim country on to a path of moderation, stability, and regional cooperation.

Since President Obama called on Congress to pass a Pakistan aid bill, the dangers of inaction have risen almost by the day. The government has struck an ill-advised deal that effectively surrendered the Swat Valley to the Taliban. Predictably, this emboldened the Taliban to extend their reach ever closer to the country's heartland. In recent days, we've seen encouraging signs that Pakistan's Army is finally taking the fight to the enemy, but much remains to be done.

Even as we help Pakistan's Government to respond to an acute crisis, we also need to mend a broken relationship with the Pakistani people. For decades, America sought Pakistani cooperation through military aid, while paying scant attention to the wishes and needs of the population itself. This arrangement is rapidly disintegrating. Today, an alarming number of Pakistanis actually view America as a greater threat than al-Qaeda.

Until this changes, there is, frankly, little chance of ending tolerance for terrorist groups or for persuading any Pakistani Government to devote the political capital necessary to deny such groups sanctuary and covert material support.

I've seen, firsthand, how American aid can, in fact, have a transformative effect. After the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, America spent nearly \$1 billion on relief efforts. I can personally attest that the sight of American service men and women saving the lives of Pakistani citizens in places like Mansehra and Muzaffarabad was invaluable in changing perceptions of America. Now we have to recreate this success on a broader scale.

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act is an important first step. On the economic side, it triples nonmilitary aid to \$1.5 billion annually for 5 years and urges an additional 5 years of funding. These funds will build schools, roads, clinics; in other words, undertake those kinds of projects on a regular basis to achieve the kind of connection with the Pakistani people that we did in the course of the earthquake relief.

Of course our aid to Pakistan aims to achieve more than just good deeds. It will empower the civilian government to show that it can deliver its citizens a better life, but at the center of any strategy—and I'm sure Ambassador Holbrooke will underscore this—at the center of any strategy is the effort by the Government of Pakistan itself to build its own relationship with its own people.

To do this right, we believe that we have to make a long-term commitment. Most Pakistani's feel that America has used and abandoned their country in the past; most notably, after the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It is this history and this fear that causes Pakistan and many Pakistanis to hedge their bets. If we ever expect Pakistan to break decisively with the Taliban and other extremist groups, then they need to know that we're not merely momentary friends.

On the security side—and they also need to know, I might add, unlike the last 8 years, that we are not principally focused on a relationship with the leader of the country, as opposed to the people of the country—on the security side, the bill places reasonable conditions on military aid. It asks the administration to certify that Pakistan's Army and spy services have been partners in the struggle against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their affiliates, and also partners in the effort to solidify democratic governance and the rules of law in Pakistan.

As important as the economic and military components of our aid to Pakistan are, it is also important how they fit together. An unequivocal commitment to the Pakistan people will enable us to calibrate our military assistance more effectively. For too long, the Pakistani military has felt that we were simply bluffing when we threatened to cut funding for a particular weapon system or an expensive piece of hardware. And up to now, they have been right. But, if our economic aid is significantly larger—i.e., tripled, as Senator Lugar and I have proposed—we will finally be able to make these choices on the basis of both our national interests rather than the institutional interests of the Pakistani security forces.

Even as we take bold steps, we should realize that our aid package to Pakistan is not a silver bullet. This bill aims to increase our leverage significantly, but we need to be realistic about what we can accomplish. Americans can influence events in Pakistan, but we cannot, and should not, decide them. Ultimately, the true decisionmakers are the people of Pakistan and the leaders of Pakistan, and that's the way it will be, going forward.

Ask a resident, not even an elderly one, of Lahore or Karachi or Peshawar, what these places used to be like, and you will hear reveries of a time that now seems a world away. We need to help Pakistan once again become a nation of stability, security, and prosperity, enjoying peace at home and abroad, a nation, in short,

that older Pakistanis remember from their childhoods. It's this nation that most Pakistanis desperately want to reclaim.

I'm eager to hear Ambassador Holbrooke's thoughts on how we encourage the Pakistan people to choose a peaceful, stable future and offer them the best that we can offer, which is a helping hand in the effort to get there.

With Senator Lugar's indulgence, I'd now ask that we open the business meeting portion of the morning.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,  
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming Ambassador Holbrooke. We're grateful that he's come today to share his insights on Pakistan and the Kerry-Lugar legislation.

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 sustains the objectives outlined in the bill I introduced last year with then-Senator Biden. Senator Kerry and I have listened carefully to those conducting a strategic review of United States policy in South Asia, and we've tried to ensure consistency with the President's goals.

This hearing gives members an opportunity to review the situation in Pakistan, as well as United States policy options and the resources that may be required to achieve them.

The United States has an intense strategic interest in Pakistan and the surrounding region. The U.S. National Intelligence Estimate last year painted a bleak picture of the converging crises in Pakistan. A growing al-Qaeda sanctuary and expanding Taliban insurgency, political brinksmanship, a failing economy, are intensifying turmoil and violence in that country, and these circumstances are a threat to Pakistan, the region, and the United States.

Our legislation is intended to take advantage of the opportunity for revitalizing our relationship through greater diplomatic engagement, as well as a commitment to economic and political development. It calls for significant increases in United States and international economic support alongside relevant military assistance linked to Pakistani performance against terrorism. We seek strong cooperation with the Pakistan Government, the continued improvement in Indo-Pak relations, the secure management of Pakistan's nuclear program, and the development of Afghanistan as a free and stable country governed by the rule of law.

While our bill envisions sustained economic and political cooperation with Pakistan, it is not a blank check. The bill subjects our security assistance to a certification that the Pakistani Government is meeting—or, is using the money for its intended purpose; namely, to combat the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

The bill also calls for tangible progress in governance, including an independent judiciary, greater accountability by the central government, respect for human rights, and civilian control over the military and intelligence agencies.

Our bill also contains provisions to help ensure that development funds are spent effectively and efficiently. It stipulates that the administration must provide Congress with a comprehensive assist-



ance strategy before additional assistance is made available. And once money begins to flow, the administration must report, every 6 months, on how the money is spent and what impact it's having.

In addition, the bill provides that, before the administration spends more than half of the \$1.5 billion authorized in any fiscal year, it must certify that the assistance provided to that date is making substantial progress toward the principal objectives contained in the administration's strategy report.

We also have asked the Government Accountability Office to review, annually, the administration's progress on stated goals, and we authorize \$20 million each year for audits and programs, reviews by the inspector general of the State Department, USAID, and other relevant agencies, in addition. The United States should make clear to the people of Pakistan that our interests are focused, not on supporting a particular leader or party, but on democracy, pluralism, stability, the fight against violence and extremism. These are values supported by a large majority of the Pakistani people.

As I noted when we introduced the Kerry-Lugar bill last week, any United States policy related to Pakistan will require the cooperation and active support of both the executive and legislative branches of our Government. Senator Kerry and I are trying to play a constructive role in facilitating a consensus position between branches that will undergird the rational approach to the region with the best chances of success. With this in mind, it is vital the administration's message on Pakistan be clear and consistent. The administration also must continue to actively consult with Congress on elements of strategy, not simply lobby us for funds.

The administration has conducted some bipartisan outreach on this topic already, and I encourage the President to build on this so we have a truly bipartisan consensus as we grapple with the spectrum of security challenges the region presents.

I look forward to working with President Obama's administration and congressional colleagues on a policy toward Pakistan that builds our relationship with that nation and protects vital United States interests.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar, and thank you for your partnership in this effort to try to weave together a solid policy.

Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you very much for joining us today, and, I think, more particularly, thank you for taking on this difficult task. It's complicated, and we're very appreciative that you're bringing your talents to bear here.

If you could perhaps summarize testimony, and then we can maximize the amount of time Senators will have to ask questions, and we'd appreciate it. Your full testimony will be placed in the record as if read in full.

Let me just mention one thing, to all my colleagues. On the issue that I know is of concern to everybody on nuclear weapons, that is the one topic we're going to have to take up in a classified session. So, those questions, if I could ask you to hold them, we will schedule a classified session with appropriate folks in order to talk about that.

Ambassador.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD HOLBROOKE, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC**

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is an enormous personal honor and privilege to testify before you for the first time as chairman of this committee. You are the seventh chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee I've had the privilege of testifying before since I was first confirmed in this very room by Senator John Sparkman in 1977.

Your leadership and that of Senator Lugar is absolutely critical in the highly important issue we're here to discuss today.

I would like to submit my statement for the record and make a few brief comments.

And I do want to start with the lunch you referred to at the beginning. I've been to a lot of lunches up here for foreign leaders over the last 30 years, but I've never seen one like that. That was really a lunch that moved policy. Neither man had ever done that before. By pulling the two men together—President Zardari and President Karzai—in a serious forum in which they were required to answer tough, tough questions, tougher, in many ways, than those asked at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue in the State Department, you encouraged them in the very goal of the trilateral summit, which is to work with each other.

It is axiomatic that success in Afghanistan, however you define it, is not possible if Pakistan's western areas remain a sanctuary for rest, recuperation, recruitment, and then attacking Afghanistan again. And cooperation between Islamabad and Kabul is notoriously bad. That goes back into history. And it's an enormously complicated problem. And, by holding that lunch and simultaneously make them talk to each other in front of 27 Senators, and also to hear your views, was, in my experience on the Hill, unprecedented and unique. And I thank you and Senator Lugar and your colleagues for it.

That lunch was the last event of a very effective week, and I wanted to give you a sense, beyond my written statement, of what we were trying to do and where we think we are.

This was not just a photo-op, it was not just one meeting between two Presidents. As you saw in the room, you had ministers in that room from both countries. Most notably, three of the matched pairs—the Ministers of Agriculture, the Ministers of Interior, and the Ministers of Finance—had never met each other. So, we were playing the kind of leadership role that I think is what the United States, both branches, should do.

As a result of those meetings—we've agreed to hold four sets of meetings like this a year, and this was the second, but the first at the chief-of-state level—as a result of those meetings, we have set up working groups and task forces on a whole range of issues, stretching from water resource management, an issue of enormous political sensitivity, of course, to negotiating the trade transit agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan—a team of ours is on its way to Islamabad right now to push those negotiations—to perhaps most the difficult of all issues, intelligence cooperation.

You saw, firsthand, in the room, when you called on General Pasha, the head of ISA—ISI—the immense complexity in that area. So, we think that this trilateral process will improve our chances of achieving our objectives.

But, I would not want to mislead you. What happens in Washington is only as good as its reactivation on the ground in the field. We can sit here and pledge and shake hands and sign agreements, but it only matters if it happens on the ground.

The situation in Pakistan is extremely difficult. And I was pleased to see, Mr. Chairman, that you began by saying, and I quote your words because I hope to use them repeatedly, “We’re not looking for perfection.” You’re not going to find any in our policies in this part of the world. This is one tough issue.

For those of us—and I see at least two people on this podium who served in another war in a distant land, in another—long ago—this is as tough as anything I’ve ever seen before, anything I’ve ever worked on.

We are in Afghanistan and Pakistan because of 9/11, because al-Qaeda and its allies are camped out in western Pakistan and have pledged and promised and predicted and threatened to do it again to us and other countries. These are the men who killed Benazir, who did Mumbai, who attacked the cricket team in Lahore, who attacked the United States. They are—the epicenter of this area is in western Pakistan.

If it were not for that fact, Mr. Chairman, we would not be sitting here today asking—supporting your very visionary proposal to triple aid, nonmilitary aid, and we would not be having this kind of colloquy. Pakistan would still be a huge issue, for many other reasons, including the nuclear weapons. Pakistan would also be an immensely important country because of its size and its role in the Muslim world. But, the reason we consider it one of, if not the, highest strategic priority of this administration is because they directly threaten us.

People ask me if this is another Vietnam, and I would say, quite frankly to you, that structurally there are many similarities, including the sanctuaries, including the problems of governance, including problems of corruption, including problems of inefficiencies and inadequacies in strategy, including sometimes our own strategies. That’s part of the job I was given by the President and Secretary of State, is to work on the civilian side of that problem.

But, I want to underscore the core difference between Vietnam and Afghanistan-Pakistan. And it is 9/11. There was no threat from the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army to the homeland of the United States. They had no interest, no intentions, and no capabilities. Our enemies now include people that do—and that’s why we’re here today—in this historically troubled area.

The bill you have presented corrects a longstanding imbalance in our economic assistance. It was too heavily weighted to the wrong issues, the wrong areas, and too heavily military. But, I know there are military components to this that you wish to discuss.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will stop and be honored to respond to your questions and say, once again, because there are more friends of mine on this committee than any other in the Congress, how pleased I am to appear before you.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Holbrooke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, and distinguished members of the committee: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor to appear before your committee again.

When I last testified before you, it was as a private citizen offering personal views on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today, I appear before you as the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I deeply appreciate the President's and Secretary Clinton's confidence in appointing me to this position.

A stable, secure, democratic Pakistan is vital to U.S. national security interests. We must support and strengthen the democratic Government of Pakistan in order to eliminate once and for all the extremist threat from al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups.

Yet relations between the United States and Pakistan have been inconsistent over the years. In Pakistan, many believe that we are not a reliable long-term partner and that we will abandon them after achieving our counterterrorism objectives. Many in the United States question the dedication of some elements of the Pakistani Government to ending safe haven for terrorists on Pakistani soil. But our engagement has to be aimed at putting our relationship on a better long-term footing.

To assure a strong partnership in the fight against extremists, constancy and consistency must be the hallmarks of our engagement with Pakistan. This engagement must be conducted in a way that respects and enhances democratic civilian authority while also engaging the Pakistani people in our commitment to help them pursue a prosperous economy, a stronger democracy, and a vibrant civil society.

#### ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY

In March, President Obama announced the new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan which reflected unprecedented input from both governments. The President's core strategic goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qaeda and to eliminate the safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The President's strategy makes clear the importance of Pakistan's future and stability to the United States and the rest of the world, and the need for increased security, governance, and development assistance to Pakistan.

#### TRILATERAL ENGAGEMENT

Last week in Washington, we completed the second round United States-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral engagement, this time at the summit level. Through this trilateral mechanism, we have advanced unprecedented cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. All parties involved reaffirmed their shared commitment to combat the spread of terrorism and extremism and underscored the priority placed on this. United States Cabinet members also met with their Pakistani and Afghan counterparts in a broad-based interagency approach to explore new areas of cooperation on foreign policy, economic policy, agriculture, police and prison reform, and intelligence. In five high-level breakout consultation sessions, officials from the State Department, FBI, Department of Agriculture, USAID, Defense Department, National Security Council, intelligence community, Treasury, Commerce, and USTR met with their Afghan and Pakistani counterparts. Through these substantive discussions, the following practical and concrete initiatives were delivered.

- Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a memorandum of understanding committing their countries to achieving a transit trade agreement by the end of this year.
- Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to continue the cross-border Jirga process to be held after the Afghan elections.
- Afghanistan and Pakistan committed to opening two Border Coordination Centers in 2009, one in Afghanistan and the other in Pakistan.
- The United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan plan to increase cooperation on agricultural development and research, as well as launching a Regional Infrastructure and Trade Development initiative to accelerate needed infrastructure development.
- Afghanistan and Pakistan plan to pursue, with U.S. support, a Joint Action Plan outlining areas of common concern on issues of law enforcement, border security and management, and rule of law.
- The next Trilateral Consultations is planned to take place this fall.

## INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

A critical objective of the administration's new strategy is to forge an international consensus to support Pakistan. We will involve the international community to actively assist in addressing security, governance, and development goals in Pakistan.

We have already made progress.

- At the April 3–4 NATO Summit, allied leaders agreed to build a broader political and practical relationship between NATO and Pakistan.
- On April 17, the World Bank and the Japanese Government cochaired a successful Pakistan Donors' Conference in Tokyo where the international community pledged more than \$5 billion in new support, well above the \$4 billion requirement identified by the International Monetary Fund.
- We are also urging allies to work closely with us both bilaterally and through the Friends of Democratic Pakistan to coordinate development assistance. The Friends held a successful ministerial meeting in parallel with the Tokyo Donors Conference, at which Pakistan's international partners affirmed their political support for the democratically elected government.

## STRENGTHENING PAKISTANI CIVILIAN AND GOVERNMENT CAPACITY

A key aspect to the new strategy is to put more attention and resources toward Pakistan's economic and governance challenges. By increasing economic and educational opportunities, expanding the reach of quality health care, reinforcing human rights—particularly women's rights—and empowering civil society, life for millions of average Pakistanis will improve. Toward this end, the President has voiced his support for the congressional efforts to increase nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan to \$1.5 billion per year for 5 years. Introduction of bills in both Houses demonstrates Congress's support of our long-term commitment to helping the Pakistani people.

It is vital that we devote some of these resources to target the economic and social roots of extremism in western Pakistan with more economic aid. There have often been rebellions in that area historically, but this is the first time they have been tied to an international terror movement. Our assistance should support Pakistani efforts to “hold and build” in western Pakistan as part of its counterinsurgency efforts so extremists do not return to fill the vacuum once military operations have ended.

We must also do our part to enhance bilateral and regional trade possibilities by implementing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) and encouraging foreign investment in vital sectors, such as energy. The administration supports congressional passage of ROZ legislation as a key way to boost private investment and sustainable economic development in targeted areas of Afghanistan and border areas of Pakistan. I ask for your support in expediting this crucial legislation.

## BUILDING COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPACITY

Successfully shutting down the Pakistani safe haven for extremists will require consistent and intensive strategic engagement with Pakistan's civilian and military leadership. It is vital to strengthen our efforts to both develop and enable Pakistani security forces—both the military and law enforcement—so they are capable of carrying out sustained counterinsurgency operations. The Pakistani Army has traditionally been arrayed in a conventional deployment in the east, against India. We must work with Pakistan so that it has the resources and training to recalibrate from its current conventional threat posture to one that addresses the insurgent threat on its Western frontier.

## STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

We are developing a strategic communications plan to counter the terror information campaign, based in part on a strategy that proved successful in Iraq. This is an area that has been woefully under-resourced. The strategic communications plan—including electronic media, telecom, and radio—will include options on how best to counter the propaganda that is key to the insurgency's terror campaign.

## SUPPORTING LEGISLATION FOR ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

Security assistance for Pakistan has to show results. In the President's words, “We must focus our military assistance on the tools, training and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists” but “we will not, and cannot provide a blank

check.” Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al-Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders.

The administration intends to implement measures of performance in its economic, social, and military assistance to Pakistan. We must ensure, however, that such tools do not impede the effectiveness of our assistance or play to the “trust deficit” that plagues our bilateral relationship and promotes distrust among the Pakistani people. Any legislation should engender the greatest level of cooperation by winning the trust of our civilian and military partners in Pakistan.

The administration is committed to working closely with the members of this committee, and Congress, to ensure that together we are able to provide the resources necessary to carry out our new strategy in Pakistan.

All of our efforts in Pakistan are geared toward creating the vibrant, modern, and democratic state that Pakistanis desire and U.S. policy envisions as a partner in advancing stability and development in a key region of the world.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Holbrooke. Again, we’re delighted to have you here, and delighted you’re tackling this, complicated as it is. And I agree with you that it’s tough.

Why don’t we try to sort of establish a baseline, here, with respect to what we’re dealing with. A lot of the news stories lately have been implying Pakistan is on the brink of becoming a failed state, or in some of the news reporting you get a sense that there may be an imminent takeover, so forth, by the Taliban. My personal view is that both of those judgments are overblown, that it is not about to be a failed state and they’re not about to take over the whole country. Nevertheless, they have made very significant gains, and if the situation remains the way it has been for these last years, they will continue to.

That said, would you share with us your view about, sort of, what are we looking at here, in terms of the governance capacity within Pakistan and the state of the insurgency itself? Or, insurgencies, because there are criminal efforts, there are various indigenous-focused insurgencies, and then, of course, Lashkar-e-Taiba, which took its effort to Mumbai. Perhaps you could just sort of lay the baseline for the committee, if you would.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I agree with you, Pakistan is not a failed state. But, from its birth, Pakistan has been under pressure from—based on the ethnic diversity of its nation and because, although everybody’s Muslim, they have very strong identities with their—Pashtun, Punjabi, Sindh, and so on. And so, I share your view.

Your question addresses the current situation on the ground politically? Is that what you’d like me to address?

The CHAIRMAN. Politically and the insurgency—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. OK.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Militarily.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Politically, I think the facts are pretty well known. We have a democratically elected government, after a decade of military rule which was excessively supported, in my view, by the United States. We need, in my view, to strengthen the democracy in Pakistan. That should be our core objective.

Another military coup, another military takeover, another military intervention would be very much against the interests of the United States, and, above all, the people of Pakistan. And every public opinion poll shows overwhelming desire for democracy to succeed, but when you drill down to the next level, you come up

with an anomaly, which is a sharp division between the two leading political forces, the PPP of President Zardari, ruling party, and the party of Nawaz Sharif and his brother, the chief minister in the Punjab. They had formed a government together, as we all know, in the period that led to the removal of Musharraf, and then they split apart.

I am very pleased to bring to your attention again a fact which got relatively little attention in the United States until recently, and that was that, last week, the week before last, in the Punjab, the two parties formed a coalition government. Punjab's 60 percent of the population. I think that's a big step forward toward the kind of national unity that's wanted.

I would also draw your attention to the extremely important statements of Prime Minister Gilani, who, in the last few days, made a major speech calling for an all-parties conference on national security, and other leading political figures from other parties have also endorsed that.

So, before we throw up our hands and assume that Pakistan is, "falling apart," let's recognize that, with a lot of encouragement from their friends, including this committee and other people who were at the lunch last week, you can see the signs that Pakistan's political effort is knitting together somewhat, compared to where it was a few weeks ago.

On the insurgency issues, we all know that your characterization of the Swat deal is one that I also made publicly, so I'm completely on the same wavelength as you. The Pakistani people supported that deal very strongly; something like 74 percent of the population, in a poll taken by the IRI, the International Republican Institute, and published this morning—I don't have the exact figure, but I think that poll is well worth putting into your record—something like 74 percent of the IRI respondents supported that poll when it was taken. But, the Taliban, as you predicted, as many of your colleagues predicted, as we predicted—the Taliban violated it, used it as an excuse to keep moving east, and that created a kind of a near panic, among some people, that led to the current attention. Of course, your bill—and it should be long noted—long preceded that crisis and was not as a result of it.

So, the Pakistani Army began their military operations just in the last few days. The military operations—I'm not in a position this morning, Mr. Chairman, to report to you on how they're going, because the only information I have is fragmentary; it's more journalist than intelligence. I don't really—frankly, I don't really trust what I hear, from a situation like that, until the dust of battle is settled. But, one thing is clear, 900,000 refugees have been registered with the U.N. in that area, and we have a major, major refugee crisis. The executive branch is meeting steadily on this. I think there's a meeting going on right now about this, downtown. So far, the United States has provided over \$57 million for this crisis, from emergency funds. I would welcome any suggestions or advice you have on this, because, since our national security interests are so at stake and we look like we're heading for about 1 million to 1,300,000 refugees, we should not ignore that.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, if I can—last question—What makes you—well, let me go back.

When Pakistan was created, the Pakistanis themselves, and the British, agreed to create this area called the Federally Tribal Administered Areas, and they did it in acknowledgment of the complications of the Pashtun and tribal presence there. Sir Mortimer Durand drew a line right smack through the Pashtun, sort of, dividing them, partly in Afghanistan, partly in Pakistan. And, in effect, the Pakistanis acknowledged, by omission and commission over the years, what they chose not to do, that they were sort of happy to leave it be tribally administered and not essentially integrated into Pakistan.

I remember meeting with President Musharraf a few years ago and pressing him on the issue of why they didn't go in and begin to deal with the extremism and, you know, the insurgencies then. And he talked about the complications and how difficult it was, and so on, and sort of underscored to me the reticence on behalf of some folks to deal with that.

Obviously, Alexander the Great, the British, and the Soviets all found enormous difficulty in trying to tame that part of the world. Now we are sort of at this crucible, if you will, where we're trying to get them to do the very thing that they've never been willing to do and no one's been able to do.

Share with us your thoughts about that. What is needed to be achieved, here, in order to protect the United States and our interests? And how do we keep our interests from being extended beyond what they really are or what is achievable?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, you know, Mr. Chairman, when I asked people what books I should read about Pakistan, a lot of them suggested Rudyard Kipling's "Kim," which is set in what is now called the FATA. The British set this area up as their western buffer against the wilds of Afghanistan. Your historical description is exactly correct. It was—we are—as in so many other parts of the world—think of Yugoslavia and Sudan—we've inherited boundaries—the world has inherited boundaries which leave a perpetual dissatisfaction. The international boundary is disputed.

Many of us believe that one thing that should be done is to take the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and incorporate them into the full political life of Pakistan. President Zardari has said he'd like to do that. Nawaz Sharif says he would favor it. I would hope the Pakistani Government would consider moving on this. It's been out there for many years.

This arrangement you describe began under the British at the end of the 19th century, and, while it's very romantic for readers of Flashman novels, it's not a good way to run that area.

And it has—but, you see, until 9/11, that—the tribal system kind of ran itself. Then the United States drove the Taliban east, they nested in this area. The United States and the government in Islamabad ignored what was happening. And, as they nested, they festered. And they realized that, not only did they have a nice sanctuary to counterattack Afghanistan, they had a nice place from which to recruit and focus on the east, as well.

Your bill provides more funds in one bill than the United States has spent in that area since 9/11. That is one of the reasons we are so enthusiastic about it. It's long overdue. And I cannot offer



you solutions today, Mr. Chairman, but I can offer you a significant redirection in American emphasis and focus.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Holbrooke, I want to discuss the legislation with you for a moment, because it encompasses 5 years. Obviously, today we are talking about the crisis of today and the next few weeks, and 5 years seems like a long time away, through the entire administration, through several different elections of Congress. This is why, in the bill, we tried to set up, first of all, the thought that the administration should have a plan for the 5 years.

Now, as the American people take a look at \$7.5 billion over 5 years for Pakistan, and given the description we've already heard today of the military activity and the chaotic difficulties of refugees and so forth, there is not a very distinct image of what anyone does with the \$1.5 billion in any particular year, quite apart from over 5 years. There's the thought that somehow, for the first time, schools and health and civil governments and reform of this sort might be our objective, as opposed to an in-and-out business with the military. But, that almost begs the question of who in the administration sets up some parameters of how the money will flow, who administers it, and how the interface occurs between our United States administrators and those in Pakistan. Further, how the Pakistani administration will, we hope, take hold of the proper administration to bring about Pakistani objectives?

And I just add, as a final thought to that question, that we've asked for a 6-month review—that is a report each 6 months during this 5 years—for a total of 10 reports—reviewing the progress made as it relates to the original administration plan provided for in our legislation—asking as to how effective were the expenditures in meeting what we thought were our goals. That will require some doing, likewise, by various persons who come along and who hopefully understand the whole ethos of the situation.

So, describe the formation of the plan and how quickly that can occur, given the time limits, as you pointed out, and the need. And then, it would help if you could provide some description of what sort of personnel are available, in a country as large as Pakistan, to begin to implement the plan.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, thank you, Senator Lugar.

First of all, this—the money—if you're asking exactly how the money will be allocated, I would like to submit in writing to you a more precise outline of the—of how we would propose to allocate it.

I think it's a very important question; I don't want to do it off the top of my head. And we're still—

Senator LUGAR. And, furthermore, there's flexibility given by the bill—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Depending upon the exigencies of the time.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. But, second, in regard to the tribal areas, the previous commitment from the executive branch was \$750 million over 5 years. As a private citizen, I was briefed on this in Islamabad, and I, quite honestly, said, and I wrote at the time

in the Washington Post, that I thought it was a pathetic amount of money, given the importance of this area. That discussion took place about 14 months ago.

You are now offering us a very significant increase. According to the notes handed to me, in FY08 there was \$187 million provided to FATA. In 2009, the number will increase to \$600 million.

Now, what are we going to do with it? You mentioned development. Roads are important. Microcredit. I met, yesterday, with the people from FINCA, a wonderful NGO that specializes in microcredit and has a terrific program in Afghanistan. They have nothing in Pakistan. We're going to allocate some of the money, if you approve it, to FINCA, but ask them to start working out of Peshawar, because women's microcredit addresses so many different needs at once—health, education, livelihoods, the agricultural program I mentioned earlier, law enforcement.

Quite honestly, although the money sounds like a lot, it isn't; it isn't, in my view, as much as the problem needs. Some people worry about capacity, but the Pakistanis have a well-developed NGO system, they have a government out there, they need resources. The country is extremely poor. Over half the people live on less than \$2 a day. And, by the way, every time I go to Islamabad, people say to me, "Fine to give money to FATA, but that's only 4 or 5 million people out of 175 million in the country"—18 million people in Karachi alone, the world's largest Muslim city, and they have 4 hours of electricity a day, which is one of the reasons the water resource management program and the dam—the program for the Joint Afghanistan/Pakistan Dam, which was just signed in front of Bob Zoellick last week during the summit—are so important. The needs there are enormous, and the history of United States relations with Pakistan has emphasized the wrong kinds of assistance.

So, with your permission, I will submit a more precise answer.

[The information was supplied in the written responses to questions submitted by Senator Lugar. See page 41 in the "Additional Material Submitted for the Record" section.]

Senator LUGAR. That would be helpful. And, likewise, would you provide some idea of this plan that the bill calls for. In other words, the answers you're going to give will be very helpful, in terms of your on-the-spot view, but I think what we're going to be looking at regularly is this plan, because we're going to be coming back to it every 6 months for how much of it's being fulfilled.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We would welcome, Senator Lugar, a continual dialogue, not just every 6 months, but whenever you want. I would be delighted to travel with you and any of your colleagues to the region so that we can start with the same experiential base.

But, let me make a point about the military side of things. It has been pointed out by a lot of observers that the army is overwhelming Punjabi and this is a Pashtun area. When Admiral Mullen and I met with people from the Waziristan area, on our last trip to Afghanistan—Pakistan—and I wish to emphasize that those people met with us at the risk of their lives. It was really dangerous to come into Islamabad. When we met with them, they told

us that Punjabi military coming into a Pashtun area are as alien as it would be if they were NATO troops. And we take that point.

So, where do we come out on the security side? There is this ancient group called the Frontier Corps; again, Kiplingesque, Kipling-era stuff, very colorful group. We believe that they can be strengthened into a serious counterinsurgency force.

Mr. Chairman, I'm just responding on a point I know is of particular interest to you. The upgrading of the Frontier Corps.

Senator LUGAR. Right.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. A lot of the money we're asking you for is going to go to seriously upgrading their weaponry. Maybe we think the time for Enfield rifles is over. They still use them. And, by the way, they still work. We're going to try to give them better counterinsurgency training. And we think their size can be increased. We have a very, very small American contingent out there, doing advice only. And we want to give them some means.

One last point, Mr. Chairman, and this is the one I feel most strongly about. Concurrent with the insurgency is an information war. We are losing that war. The Taliban have unrestricted, unchallenged access to the radio, which is the main means of communication in an area where literacy is around 10 percent for men and less than 5 percent for women. And radio is broadcast from the backs of pickup trucks and motorcycles, it's from mosques. It's low-wattage FM radio stations. They broadcast the names of people they're going to behead, just like Rwanda. And for reasons that are hard to explain, we have no counter-programming efforts that existed when we took office. We have a—we don't have jamming, we don't try to override, we don't do counter-programming.

Senator Kerry and I, in particular, have talked about this, and I want to state, in front of the full committee, that Senator Kerry wrote into his bill a special section on this issue. That's very helpful to us in our internal dialogue, which is going on as we speak. President Obama has personally expressed a desire to deal with this. And we shall do so.

And I want to bring to your attention that this particular issue—we cannot win the war; however you define "win," we can't succeed, however you define "success"—if we cede the airwaves to people whose—who are—who present themselves as false messengers of the prophet, which is what they do. And we need to combat it. And I thank you for bringing—for highlighting that issue in the bill that you and the chairman have put forward.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you. I appreciate, as always, your testimony. But, as I say, please get back to us with the plan, because that will be important, not only for us, but, likewise, for our colleagues and for those in the public who are going to be following this for some time.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I will, Senator Lugar. And I certainly will be responsive, as I've tried to be to you ever since we first started working together in the 1970s. But, I would like to underscore that we are—that we did a strategic review, but that was an overview. We are now drilling down to the deepest levels.

General Petraeus and I have now operationalized most of the Afghanistan part. He and I are now turning to Pakistan. As you know, there's been a very important command change in Afghani-

stan yesterday. That doesn't apply directly to Pakistan, but anything that happens in one country affects the other.

We are in the—we have upgraded our Embassy in Afghanistan enormously in the last few weeks, not only with Carl Eikenberry as our new Ambassador, but with Ambassador Frank Ricciardone as the deputy ambassador, Ambassador Tony Wayne, from Argentina, former Assistant Secretary of State for Economics, going to be the field—the boss of the field operations. We now have to do the same thing in Islamabad. Ambassador Patterson and I have talked about it, and we welcome your support on that, as well.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Let me just say quickly, as I turn to Senator Feingold, that the Frontier Corps has been doing some interesting and surprisingly capable things, and I think there is promise there. And second, that small unit that you've talked about, there is just some exceptional people who have a terrific sense of what reality is on the ground, and we need to listen to them closely as we go forward

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank the chairman very much for holding this hearing.

And, Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you for coming before the committee. As you know, I was just delighted when the President and the Secretary of State had the wisdom to select you to be the special envoy on this issue. And I give the chairman enormous credit for that lunch the other day. It was one of the most unique things in the mere 17 years that I've been watching these things. And I saw fingerprints of Dick Holbrooke all over that very unique event that I thought was just excellent.

Now, it has been nearly 8 years since al-Qaeda attacked the United States. And, while I'm very pleased that President Obama has unequivocally recognized the need to refocus the government's attention and resources on this threat, I do remain concerned that the plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan has the potential to escalate, rather than diminish, the threat.

Since 2001, as you pointed out, Pakistan has received billions of dollars from the United States in assistance packages and reimbursements for security-related counterterrorism initiatives, and yet, al-Qaeda has actually reconstituted itself along the border region, primarily because the last administration focused its attention on Iraq and relied on a partner in Pakistan who lacked popular support and whose commitment to fighting extremism was questionable. Fortunately, President Obama wants to reverse the previous administration's failed policies.

Good intentions are not enough, however. As the President and the Secretary of State have made clear, security in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and even for us here at home, are inextricably linked. Adding 21,000 new troops in Afghanistan, I fear, could further destabilize Pakistan without providing substantial, lasting security improvements in Afghanistan. Your very words here this morning, Mr. Ambassador, were, "We pushed them to the east." The question here is, Are we going to continue to push more people to the east who may be more able to do us harm in Pakistan than they're able to do us harm in Afghanistan?

So, obviously, as you know better than anyone, to succeed, we must ensure that we have an equal partner in the Pakistani Government. If we're serious about fighting al-Qaeda and preventing another generation of bin Ladens from emerging, we must also ensure that any expanded support for development, rule of law, human rights, and anticorruption is met with equal dedication by the Pakistani Government.

And along these lines, Mr. Ambassador, I'm interested to hear from you today about how we can help ensure a coordinated and effective response to the rising numbers of displaced people that have resulted from the recent military offensive in the western part of Pakistan, which, of course, we all know we're not talking here about the FATA; we're talking about Pakistan proper, we're talking about internally displaced people. And, as you know from our previous conversations, less than a year ago I had the opportunity to see the good effects of American aid in both the North West Frontier Province and in Pakistani Kashmir after the earthquake.

Now, we can't have a foreign policy based on waiting for natural disasters. However, when one does occur—we've seen, both in the tsunami incident in Indonesia, in that region, and also here in Pakistan—that that is something we can do, and do quickly, that can make a difference. So, I urge you to consult with people in the administration to help make that happen.

I'm also pleased that Senators Kerry and Lugar have reintroduced and updated legislation to strengthen Pakistan's civilian government. That is overdue. And I'm also pleased to see that the legislation will require the Secretary of State to be forthcoming on what progress is occurring as a part of our oversight. After all, this does, obviously, involve taxpayer dollars.

Now, back to the issue, Ambassador, of what you just said, that everything that happens in Afghanistan affects Pakistan. Well, that gets at the core of some of my concerns.

Is the proposed policy sufficiently considering the—what I like to call the “balloon effect” of “whatever happens in Afghanistan affects Pakistan,” or vice versa? You've said that the impact of our troops in Afghanistan will mean the Taliban will, “go east into Pakistan toward the Baluchistan area—an issue that has to be addressed.” So, I'm curious, Do you believe the Pakistani Government is doing everything it can to capture Taliban leaders, particularly in Baluchistan? And are we sure that when we put 21,000 more troops in Afghanistan, and get up to a level of 70,000 troops—are we sure that that isn't making the situation in Pakistan potentially worse? Or is it actually making it better? Could it—is it possible that it's going to be having the kind of negative effect that you've actually alluded to in your remarks?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Senator Feingold.

On your first point—

The CHAIRMAN. Is your mike on?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Senator Feingold. On your first point, you are absolutely correct that an additional amount of American troops, and particularly if they're successful, in Helmand and Kandahar, could end up creating a pressure in Pakistan which would add to the instability. I raised that issue as soon as the troop

discussions began at the White House, and I was not alone in raising it.

The United States military command, under GEN David Petraeus, who I think is a great American military leader, is well aware of it. They have been conducting, and are conducting as we speak, very intense discussions with the Pakistani Army to work with them so that they will be prepared this time, as they were not prepared in 2002 for what happened.

On your key question, Is Pakistan doing everything it can to capture Taliban leaders, al-Qaeda, and so on?—you heard, as I did, General Pasha’s reply, in closed session, to that question, in the lunch we discussed earlier. I don’t know the answer to that, because I don’t know what it is they’re not doing that they could be doing. They have captured over—and killed and eliminated over the years a good number of the leaders of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. But, others have been under no—under less pressure.

There is a history here, which General Pasha spoke very frankly about at our lunch, when he said, quite bluntly to the Senators assembled and those of us who were privileged to be there, that we have to remember that this had originally been a joint Pakistani-American intelligence operation in the 1980s, and when the United States walked out on Afghanistan in 1989, which history will record as a very serious error, the Pakistanis were left with a situation which required them, from their own point of view, to continue some of these relationships. It made sense in 1989, it made no sense after 9/11, from our point of view, but many people think the Pakistanis are still ambivalent about it. And many people in the region—indeed, the bulk of the people in the region, as all of you know—believe the United States will abandon them again, because of the history.

One of the things that this administration has tried to do is say, “We’re not going to walk out, this time.” But, words have to be measured against history, and the history has left them skeptical. And we need to show the region, which is, again, why this legislation has become so important—I mean, I want to be very frank with you, the phrase “Kerry-Lugar” has a talismanic quality in the Pakistani press now. It’s not just the amount of money, it’s the fact that it is now read as a symbol of our intentions to stick around and be serious about it. And, of course, the troop commitment in Afghanistan speaks for itself.

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Ambassador, my time is out. I just want to make sure I get an answer to the larger question. Are you sure that the troop buildup in Afghanistan will not be counterproductive, vis-a-vis Pakistan?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No, I am only sure that we are aware of the problem, that we are working intensely with the Pakistani Army, that they are aware of it, that the lesson of 2001–02 is—been absorbed. But, everyone who’s observed the situation from the outside has come to the same conclusion, Senator Feingold, and that is that there are not enough forces in the west. And this offensive will drive pressure into Baluchistan, where the fighting now is to the north and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. We hope that the Pakistanis will move more troops into the west, improve the training of the Frontier Corps. We’re ready to assist with

all of this. It is imperative that it be done. It is an extraordinarily complicated equation.

Why, then, would I still support the troop buildup in Afghanistan, which I strongly support? For the simplest of reasons. You could not leave the American, the NATO, and the ISAF forces in the deployment structure which was inherited on January 20. We did not have enough forces, ourselves, to do our own job, so the recommendation of General Petraeus and General McKiernan for an additional 17,000 troops and 4,000 trainers was, in my view, absolutely critical.

But, yes, we're aware of the consequence. And I would say, quite candidly, that wasn't true 7 years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. An honest answer. Thank you.

Senator CORKER.

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And, Ambassador, thank you for your testimony. And I, too, want to thank you for the lunch meeting that took place last week. I will tell you that what struck me about it was, it was the last event with two leaders that were here, and I think it's very intelligent that you all are having these trilateral meetings. I thank you for that.

What struck me, though, was, after having these ministerial breakouts and having days of meetings—and I'm going to ask some questions about Afghanistan, since it—your term “AfPak” is one that's been part of the vernacular here in Washington now—I was struck by the fact that the President of Afghanistan could not, in a coherent way, relay what our mission in Afghanistan ought to be.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And may interrupt to say—

Senator CORKER. And then—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. To say—

Senator CORKER. Well, not—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. Interrupt to say that—

Senator CORKER. Well, let me finish.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. The President was—

Senator CORKER. Let me finish.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. Struck by your response.

Senator CORKER. Well, his nonresponse—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. He was very—

Senator CORKER [continuing]. His nonresponse was pretty stunning to, I think, most people in the meeting. And when I pushed back in—at his eloquent, long-winded nonresponse, he then said, “This is your mission,” OK? And I was also struck—I was glad to see the good relations between him and President Zardari. That was good to see.

But, I guess what I'd like to ask you one more time, because I've said before, your explanation of our mission there has sort of rung hollow—and you're a very knowledgeable person, you're our person as it relates to foreign relations there—What is our mission in Afghanistan, in your words?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, first let me just clarify my interjection. You made a big impact on President Zardari. I don't dispute your characterization of the exchange, but it was one of the most memorable moments of last week, and he got your message, which was that you, as a senior member of this committee, were

not satisfied with his answer. And I think it had exactly the desired effect.

Will it produce the desired outcome? That's another issue. This dealing with the Pakistani Government, with its complexities—after all, the Prime Minister has a lot of power, too—is difficult.

Now, on the question of our mission; our mission was clearly stated by the President in his speech at the end of March. It is to defeat, dismantle, and disable al-Qaeda and the enemies of the United States who directly threaten us.

Now, since those—since the al-Qaeda is overwhelmingly in Pakistan, not Afghanistan, the question legitimately arises, Well, why are we fighting in Afghanistan, when the enemy is in Pakistan? And we spent a lot of time discussing this. And the answer is, the Taliban and al-Qaeda are so interrelated that Taliban—you might envisage it as the cordon which surrounds the hard core. Taliban does the local jihad, al-Qaeda does the global jihad, and they interact. And we believe strongly—and I believe all observers would agree—that the enemies of the United States—Taliban, al-Qaeda, Baitullah Mehsud, and others—who also are enemies of the Pakistan democracy—are people we must deal with.

I stress again, Senator, the enemies of Pakistan are the same as the enemies of the United States. Some of them are in Afghanistan, some of them are in Pakistan. We must help them win.

Senator CORKER. OK.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And by “win,” I mean stabilize the Government in Pakistan and give the Afghans the capacity to defend themselves.

Senator CORKER. So—I have shown support for our efforts in Afghanistan and our efforts, certainly, in Iraq. You all have just gone through a strategic review. We are asked to vote on a supplemental next week. I have to tell you that there is a lot of moving parts, from my perspective, and I do not think that we have coherently laid out to this body what our strategy is, overall. I mean, Senator Feingold had some questions. There are issues that I think that need to be discussed.

And before I move on to this bill, I would just say that I really think that it's a mistake to bring the supplemental up next week. We've talked to the Army; they're not going to be out of funds until July 1. We just talked with them within the last hour. And I think, for Members of this body, on both sides of the aisle, to have the questions that we all have, especially after meeting with the leaders of these two countries last week, I think it is a mistake, and I think we are potentially embarking on a monumental mistake, whether we end up doing the right things or not, by this body not discussing this in the way that it should and being fully bought into something that I think is going to be a part of our country's efforts for years to come, especially since we are, in fact, doubling down, if you will, in Afghanistan.

And so, to me, this is something that we should discuss much more fully, should not rush out a supplemental today.

So, let me just—and especially—I'd love to talk about just the little things, like corruption. I mean, your administration has alluded to the fact that, in the poppy-crop areas, that you feel the government is actually taking more of the illegal moneys than the Taliban



is, that we're supporting an illegal government action there, that that is of greater concern than the poppy crop actually going to the Taliban. OK?

In Pakistan, you know, I hate to be pejorative here, but, I mean, the Leader was formerly called "Mr. Ten Percent." I know that that may be unfair. But, I do think we need to understand how these moneys are going to be circulated through these countries in such a way that they don't end up in a bank account in Switzerland. I think those are important things to talk about.

But, let me just say, this bill—to come down to this piece of legislation, since I have 29 seconds left—

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, this is important enough—happy to give you a little extra time, if colleagues—you know, this is an important discussion. We're here to have the discussion, so now is the time to get at it.

Senator CORKER. Well, I appreciate the phone call that we had yesterday, but I really believe that this administration is making a large mistake asking for this supplemental today, when our engagement there is going to be multiyear. You all have just come in—I'm not criticizing you; you're a man of extreme knowledge—but, we have not hashed out what's happening, and we are going to be engaged there for many, many, many years. Many men and women will lose their lives. We're doubling down—and we haven't debated this yet. OK? So, I'm going to stop there.

But, on this legislation, just to get to the menial issues of the day, I appreciate the leadership of our two Senators in offering this. I do find it similar to what I'm saying about the supplemental. We are asking you to tell us what you're going to do with this money after we pass the bill. I just find that to be really odd. It seems to me that the administration would come tell us what it is they want to achieve in Pakistan, and tell us what the benchmarks are; we would look at the intelligence community's efforts, which I know that is occurring, and we would look at what we ought to be doing in regard to that, after you have laid out to us what those benchmarks are. For us to pass a large amount of funding, and yet, then ask, later, for you to tell us what you're going to do with it, to me, seems backward. And I would love a response to that.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, I agree it's complicated, and I agree it's tough, and I think every Senator on all sides of this issue has made that point, no more eloquently than our chairman, here, and Senator Lugar.

But, I do not feel that it's quite fair to say that we haven't outlined what we do with it. I responded to Senator Lugar's question by listing health, education, livelihoods, women's microcredit, capacity-building, the Frontier Corps. We have changed the focus. None of this happened in the past. And, on your points about corruption and counternarcotics, I'm on the record as agreeing fully with what you just said.

So, why, then, do I, respectfully—and I mean the "respectfully" sincerely—why, then, do I disagree with you on the issue of delaying? First of all, we're not asking for money and then we'll decide how to spend it. We're asking for emergency money at this moment. But, I need to underscore the following point, particularly given the very high visibility of this bill in Pakistan.

Senator CORKER. We're mixing messages. The supplemental and this bill are two separate issues, right?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I understand the difference.

Senator CORKER. OK.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I understand the—I've testified before the supplemental people, too. But, the—and this is an anomaly of the way the press covers it, but the words "Kerry-Lugar" have become a symbol of American support for Pakistan in the emergency, not something called "the supplemental," which contains a lot of other things. I understand that the supplemental is necessary for the money. I'm just telling you facts on the ground.

But, the point I want to underscore, Senator, with great respect, is simple. The only beneficiary of a delay in this bill is the enemies of our Nation, the people who are trying to have the next 9/11, because they will use it, on that radio that I was talking about earlier, to mislead people as to our true commitments in the area. So, while I agree with you about the supplemental—

Senator CORKER. That we should put it off?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Sir?

Senator CORKER. That we should put the supplemental off and at least—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No, sir.

Senator CORKER [continuing]. Us—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No, sir. I'm in favor—I've supported the supplemental, as well. But, that—but, we're here to testify in behalf of your bill, as I—that's why I'm here. And I—

Senator CORKER. Well, the supplemental's coming up next week. I know my time is up.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. But, you're talking—

Senator CORKER [continuing]. The—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You asking me about—

Senator CORKER. The supplemental's what—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. Delaying the supplemental?

Senator CORKER. Yes. I mean, this bill is a—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Oh.

Senator CORKER [continuing]. Is a—the Army does not need those funds until—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes—

Senator CORKER [continuing]. July 1.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The—

Senator CORKER. And we have not, in any—you've had a strategic review. We had two leaders come up here that had no earthly idea what our mission is in their countries. OK? And the fact is that I don't think we, as a body, have talked about Afghanistan in the proper way yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me—can I intervene here, just if I can, because I want to—I want to give you some leeway, but I also—we have colleagues who are waiting. But, I want to try to—let me cover a couple of things quickly.

First of all, Senator, I think it is entirely appropriate, particularly given the change of command that has just taken place, in our Secretary of Defense's own judgment that there needs to be a transition, it's very appropriate to be asking some questions about

Afghanistan and the supplemental. I think a lot of us have some questions.

But, let's separate that out for a moment from this, and also separate out the—I want to speak to this question of the two Presidents' definitions. You and I heard that answer differently. I heard President Karzai very clear say that, "If your definition of the mission was what the prior administration said it was"—i.e., the building of a government, democracy, you know, putting in place X, Y, Z, schools, et cetera—he tipped his hat to that administration and basically absolved us of that responsibility for that, saying, "You've accomplished it. You gave us a national government, you gave us a process. We have an election coming up. We've built X number of schools. We have X number of women going to school," as he described it. I forget the percentage. He was very clear about that part of it. But, he said, what is unfinished—he was very clear—"Your mission is to fight al-Qaeda and to prevent them from retaking over the—you know, the areas of Afghanistan where they can then launch strikes against the rest of the world." That's what he said. Now, that is, you know, basically what President Obama and others have defined it.

Now, I still think we need to flesh out the how of some of that, personally. And we're doing that, here. I mean, the fact is that, when I was in Peshawar just a few weeks ago, and the Frontier Corps was telling me how they went into Bajaur, cleared it out, but it had been 7 weeks and nothing, absolutely nothing, had come in underneath it. That's the purpose of this bill. I mean, the whole purpose of this is to empower the civic, both in FATA and nationwide, that provides an alternative to what the Taliban are offering.

What's interesting is, the Taliban, unlike Hezbollah or Hamas, who have mastered providing services and directly engaging in the, sort of, day-to-day life of citizens, Taliban don't do much in the way of service apart from meting out their rough version of justice; they just scare people and kill people and intimidate them. And so, they've actually left open an enormous opportunity, which is what the urgency of this bill is, is to be able to come in and empower some governance that actually makes a difference in the lives of people. That's the only way that we have a prayer, here. We, they, whoever—however you link it.

And so, I'd say to the Senator, we're happy to spend a lot of time on this, and we're going to spend some time on Afghanistan, because it's a tricky, long-term deal. And we need to do that. But, I do not think it's fair to say that President Karzai didn't define the mission in—as he sees it, in Afghanistan. And I said, afterward, that he, in effect, has given us a very much more limited, narrower mission than we've had for the previous 7 years.

Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador, thank you for your long-term service to our country, and this present assignment, as well.

You know, I have supported, both in the House and the Senate, these efforts with Pakistan, but I have real concerns. I have to be honest with you. It's those concerns that led Senator Harkin and myself to ask for a Government Accountability report that came out that's called "Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan's

Border Area with Afghanistan.” And basically, that report said that, after 6 years of efforts by the United States and Pakistani Governments, and over \$12 billion in military and development assistance, al-Qaeda had, “regenerated its ability to attack the United States, continues to maintain a safe haven in the FATA region.” It noted that an integrated, comprehensive plan, including all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, development, economic, and law enforcement—had not yet been developed for the FATA, despite that fact that it was called for in the 2003 national strategy for combating terrorism, the 9/11 Commission report, and the implementing legislation of the 9/11 Commission.

So, the question is, one: Do we not need a comprehensive strategy, as the Government Accountability Office called for? And second, What is it? And third, Do we not, after—you know, the Pakistanis have, in my mind, a series of one step forward, two steps backward. The Pakistanis rush their troops to the Indian border when their own sovereignty is being besieged by the elements within their country. They make a deal in the Swat region, which I believe is in their interest, not ours. You have our Director of the CIA going in what was supposed to be a private, secret meeting, having a videotape released of him. You wonder whether the Pakistanis are on the same page as us, or they’re only there when, in fact, pressure is exerted, in their own national interests, as well as ours.

So, do we need a comprehensive plan? What is it? What is our strategy—our comprehensive strategy? And should we not have benchmarks to make sure that we don’t continue in the one-step-forward two-steps-back?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Senator.

I believe we do have a comprehensive strategy.

Senator MENENDEZ. What is it?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And we have—the President laid it out in his speech, in the end of March. We laid it out to our allies. We’ve briefed the Hill repeatedly and in detail.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, what is it? Give me the elements of it.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The key elements are, No. 1, to defeat the people who pose a direct threat to our homeland—al-Qaeda and its supporters; to stabilize the Government of Afghanistan and give it the ability to be self-sufficient in defense of its—in its own security so that eventually the American combat troops and the NATO combat troops can leave; to—

Senator MENENDEZ. I’m talking about Pakistan, though, for the moment.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, these two are completely related, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. But, when you’re asking money—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And in—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. When you’re asking money for Pakistan, specific, I’d like to understand what our strategy is in the context of Pakistan.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I need to stress again, as I have for years as a private citizen and in the government, that the ignoring of Pakistan, the complete ignoring of Pakistan, in terms of these

issues over the last few years, significantly contributed to the current crisis in Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan.

As for Pakistan itself, how can we ignore that area of western Pakistan which contains the people sworn to destroy America? So, we need to strengthen and help stabilize this government.

It begins with strengthening democracy. After a 10-year military rule which was very bad for our strategic interests and, I believe, for Pakistani people, particularly the latter part of it.

There are many parts—the previous Senator spoke about the many moving parts here; there are many moving parts, and I'd be happy to go back over them again at any time you wish. But, I want to underscore that to strengthen Pakistani democracy will take resources, which is why we strongly support this bill.

We need to—before you came in, we had extended colloquy on the Frontier Corps. Well, the Frontier Corps are from the local areas of the west, whereas the regular army are mainly Punjabis. It's been pointed out repeatedly that Punjabis are regarded as an alien force in the western areas. So, we want to strengthen the Frontier Corps.

We want to build roads, help them build roads, clinics, education, jobs. There's another bill in the Congress on the opportunity zones, sponsored in the Senate by Senator Cantwell, which is a very important job-creation bill, which I hope will also get passed.

Our role here—we can't run Pakistan; it's the second largest Muslim country in the world, it's a vast and complicated country. But, we can do more to help the civilian development and economic issues and help them strengthen democracy.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me say that I don't believe that—\$12 billion later, that we are ignoring or have been ignoring Pakistan. If, \$12 billion later, you were telling a United States taxpayer that we have been ignoring Pakistan, they would probably bristle at the idea. The reality is, is that when I talk about strategy—and I appreciate the development efforts that you just talked about; I support those—but, I'm talking about a strategy that brings in the military element, that brings in the diplomatic element, that brings in the economic element, that brings in the intelligence element, that brings in the law enforcement element, that brings in the rule-of-law element. And I don't get the sense that we have that.

Now, as someone who has continuously voted for this, I'm reticent to continuously vote without knowing that there is a strategic plan. I don't have the sense of that. And so, I'd like—you know, I look at what the GAO report said about our ability to validate funds that have gone there in the past. I don't know that we have a better structure today to validate the funds; we don't even know where significant parts of this money went to. That's \$12 billion later. You're asking us to vote for a whole new set of money without knowing whether there are going to be benchmarks, without knowing whether we have a better system of accountability. I personally can't continue down that road, as much as I think this is critical.

So, there's going to have to be some give-and-take here if you want the support of some of us, who have been supportive along the way, but are just not here for a blank check. I said that in the

previous administration; and, as much as I respect this one, I believe the same standards have to be applied.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, Senator, I am deeply troubled by what you said, because that—

Senator MENENDEZ. I'm deeply—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. The GAO—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Troubled by where we're at.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well—

Senator MENENDEZ. I'm deeply troubled by where we're at—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. And I get no sense of reassurance, from what I hear so far.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, I'm sorry you don't get a sense of reassurance, but let me say that that GAO report arrived on my desk as I arrived at my job, and let me share with you a fact. The people who were in the Department wanted to write a point-by-point rebuttal to it, and I put a complete hold on that and said, "On the contrary, that's going to be one of our guides for our policy." And if you feel that you should penalize this administration for the mismanagement that you've described accurately in the GAO report, I can't do anything about it. But if—

Senator MENENDEZ. No, I don't want to penalize—Mr. Ambassador, I don't want to penalize this administration for anything that, in the past, happened. But, I do believe that the past is prologue, unless we change it.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, we are changing.

Senator MENENDEZ. And so, what I'm looking for is a sense—a certainty of a strategy that will take this money and put it to good use between both the Kerry-Lugar bill and the supplemental and future moneys, as well as a sense of accountability and benchmarks, so that we don't continue the history that we've seen here. And so, I don't want to belabor the point. I would be happy to talk to you at length in my office at some point, if you want my support, because right now it is not there, based upon what I—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I would be honored to come to your office and talk to you about it. We do have benchmarks. The Congress has asked for them. They're being worked out in detail now, in conjunction with the staffs in both houses, under the direction of Admiral Blair, the Director of National Intelligence. We are going to respond to any requests you have for benchmarks and metrics. We agree with everything you've just said.

Having said that, I believe very strongly that the Pakistani people and their new democratic government deserve to have our support. You talked about the waste of the \$12 billion. I wrote about that, as a private citizen. I thought it was a waste, a lot of it, because it went to conventional military support. And I'm not going to detract what I said as a private citizen, but I'm here today, Senator, to underscore to you that we have a different strategy. We've laid it out in public, we've laid it out in private. I would be happy to come up to the Hill with General Petraeus, if you wish, and we'll come up and have more private meetings. I've met with—I would say I've met with half the Senators in this body personally since I started this job, in only 3 months, and—probably more than any-

one else except Secretary Clinton—and I am committed to working with you.

But, we do have a strategy, and it is still being refined at the tactical and operational level. We discussed a lot of this earlier this morning here. And if there's any specific issue you want to cover, I'd be delighted to do so.

But, we cannot walk away from Pakistan now without damaging our own most vital national security interests.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Menendez, if I can just—first of all, your questions refer to the Coalition Support Funds rather than programs run through State. These questions are very well put and important, and—we have a record here of not having had that accountability. And again, we're not trying to go backward, but we did find out where the money went in the last years, because we thought it was going in one place, and, in fact, regrettably, it went to the general treasury of Pakistan. That's where it was spent. So, we gave significant billions of dollars to Pakistan for one purpose, and it was spent for another.

Now, with that knowledge, we drafted this legislation, and this legislation is very specific in saying that the President has to submit to us, as well as to the Appropriations Committee, the amounts of funds that are going to specific projects and programs, a description of the specific projects for which the money is going to go, a list of the criteria used to measure the effectiveness of those projects, systemic qualitative basis for assessing whether the outcomes are achieved, a timeline for each project and program, a description of the role played by the Pakistani national, regional, and local officials in identifying and implementing each of those programs, and all of the amounts of money that are going through it. So, those are some of the benchmarks and requirements that we've set out here specifically in response to what's promoting your concerns, and the administration has worked with us very closely in laying those out.

So, we, I think, are going to have a direct track on each and every dollar here, which is the intent and purpose of this—

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may, very briefly, because I know my colleagues—

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator MENENDEZ. I just—I appreciate what you're trying to do in the bill. And what I want to see is, even giving those metrics, which I applaud, how does that fit into the strategy, which I'm still not quite sure is—

The CHAIRMAN. That's fair. And I think that Ambassador Holbrooke has said he's spent time—and we'll have another hearing, if we need to, in the next days in order to make sure that we thoroughly answer all these things.

Ambassador Holbrooke.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. May I add one more point before the Senator leaves, and that is that the Congress created, I think, a year or two ago, the special inspector general for Afghan Reconstruction, SIGAR, which is now headed by a retired major general named General Fields, Cyrus Fields. We have been working very closely with them. Their responsibility, of course, is solely to the Congress, and we understand that and respect it. But, I want to

say that I believe they have tremendous potential, Mr. Chairman, to help in the fight against corruption if you would consider—and I'm speaking way out of previously thought-through guidelines here, but I wanted to bring it to your attention—the Afghan Government and the—has specifically asked SIGAR to help it in the anticorruption efforts. And I think this would be very valuable. It may require some consultations or legislative adjustment.

And I also think that, as we expand our efforts in Pakistan, you may wish to consider whether they have an oversight role. There are something like six different inspectors general and oversight committees in the executive branch and reporting to the Hill. You mentioned one of the most important: GAO. But, there are also the SIGAR group, there's the inspector general of the State Department, there's the inspector general of AID, and there are several other oversight committees. SIGAR is the one that seems to be most actively on the ground, because of the authority you gave them. And I wanted that to—I wanted you to reflect in the record how much we value them, while respecting their independence. And to the extent you wish to expand their mandate or expand their resources, we would strongly support that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that's something we should talk about in the next days.

And, Senator Menendez, we might add, there's a GAO report required here within 1 year of the strategy report being submitted to us. So, within 1 year of that, we have an independent assessment of everything that the strategy report laid out. So, we're working at it, and we'll work closely with everybody here to do it.

Senator Risch.

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you for coming today. And let me say, you can put me in the same column as Senator Corker and Senator Menendez, as being less than enthusiastic at this point. I'm really concerned about Afghanistan. It seems to me, in Iraq, we're winding down, there's going to be problems there as we leave; we're going to have to deal with those as we leave.

Pakistan, you know, you've got the government—the people themselves fighting for control of their government. We've chosen sides. I think it's going to be somewhat easier to make decisions there as to how we support the side that we've chosen.

The Afghanistan problem—I was there last month. I've met with the President. I was at the same lunch. And, Mr. Chairman, I can tell you, I think you were a lot more articulate than the President was about describing the progress there.

I've got to tell you, I was—I have been stunned by the lack of progress in Afghanistan. When you go there and you look at what's happening, and you look at what has happened, it is just breathtaking the amount of money, the American lives we've spent there, and you have a government that has control maybe to the outskirts of the capital. You've got a population that has, really, no sense of nationalism. You've got an economy that's based on a product that is illegal in virtually every country in the world. And the corruption, everybody admits that nothing happens without bribery and corruption there. It is terribly depressing.



And this—to me, until somebody gets a handle on stopping the poppy production, all of this stuff is—goes by the by. To me, trying to say, “Well, we don’t want any corruption in the country” is kind of like telling the Mafia, “Well, OK, you’re in charge of prostitution, gambling, and drugs, but we don’t want any corruption with you.”

You stand on the abyss and look into that black hole, and that’s about all you see, is a black hole. You just don’t see a bottom.

Now, I just heard you articulate what our objectives are there, and that is to decimate the bad guys. You just don’t have the country itself having the willpower, the political willpower, to join us in that. In fact, I heard the President say—and he didn’t say it directly, but if you read between the lines—that, yes, we stood up their government; yes, we’ve stood up their military; yes, we’ve stood up their police, “But you guys—America—need to continue this fight with the Taliban and al-Qaeda.” You know, I wanted to jump at that point and say, “Well, what are you going to do about this?” because that enthusiasm—I just don’t see it.

And I’ve got to tell you, the Afghanistan thing is very, very depressing. And I’d like to—with the money we’re putting in there, we need to have—we need to have something much, much more concrete than what we have. I’d like to see an end game, but I don’t know who’s smart enough to develop an end game for us in that country. It’s very depressing.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Risch.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. That’s pretty close to the view I had when we entered the government. I don’t mean to be facetious about it, but your description is—I would quibble with some of the details. There are areas of progress, real areas of progress. But, the overall situation has deteriorated since 2004—there’s no question about it—in Afghanistan. And that, in turn, has increased the pressure in Pakistan, and vice versa. We all understand that, Senator. That’s why we’re here. We’re trying to turn around the situation, which was clearly in decline when the administrations changed. And I’m very grateful to the support—for the support and advice of this committee, and of the Senate in general, because we have a common enemy and a common threat and a common mission here.

And I really don’t agree with the previous Senator that we don’t have a strategy, but I do agree with you that the situation is extraordinarily serious, and that’s why we sent additional troops, that’s why we’re asking for additional funds, and that’s why we want to work with you to fashion a bipartisan policy that can be sustained in our national security interests. And I welcome comments like yours, although I think we could quibble on some of the details of what you said.

Senator RISCH. Well, Ambassador, one of the difficulties I have is, you like to see a political will amongst the people, or a—some willpower, some “We can get this done.” And the difficulty I’m having is, I’m just wondering whether we have enough troops and whether we have enough money to convince the general populace in that country that they need to change the way they’ve been living for centuries. And that—you just don’t hear it.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Here's an interesting statistic from this morning's International Republican Institute, IRI, poll. In June 2008, 9 percent of the Pakistani people wanted to cooperate with the United States against terrorism. In March, the number had gone up to 37 percent. I would wager a great deal that today that number is even higher, because there's a huge backlash going on against the Taliban.

Similarly, on the question of democracy, in today's IRI poll, 77 percent of the Pakistani people are prodemocracy, but 81 percent think the country's headed in the wrong direction. So, there's a clear indicator of what has to be done. Seventy-four percent think religious extremism is a very serious problem for Pakistan, but the government is not very popular.

So, I think the ingredients of a strategy are there, but the military—the Pakistan military has to take back the west. And that's where we are today as we hold this important hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me—I'm sorry, go ahead, Senator Risch.

Senator RISCH. No, thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I was just going to suggest, Ambassador Holbrooke, I think the administration has a tremendous opportunity staring it in the face, with these tens of thousands of people being displaced as a consequence of Taliban excess. There is an opportunity, actually, to provide services, much as we did with the earthquake relief, which had a profound impact on the perception of America. And I would urge us to take advantage of that in the next days, because that can help to rapidly change opinion and, in fact, provide you with an opportunity we haven't had in Swat, North West Frontier Province, et cetera. If we did that, and did it well, it could change the game for the government, too, I think. So, I would urge that.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I am—I could not agree more. I'm glad you said it in public. Many of us have been saying it for the last few days, in private. We are looking for how to act on that. And we will—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I'd bump it—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. Carry your—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Into part of the—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We will—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Supplemental or do something. But, I think the administration's got to come up here and seize this opportunity—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. The strategy that's been written for it.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I share your view, and I will relay your views immediately to the executive, my colleagues.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for appearing today.

The CHAIRMAN. Can I just interrupt you for 1 second?

Senator CASEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I have President Carter coming in, because he's coming to testify to us this afternoon. I need to go to meet with him. But, if, Senator Kaufman, you could close out again? You're getting good at that. I appreciate it.

Thank you very much, and I appreciate it.

And, Ambassador, if we could follow up, perhaps afterward, we can detail how we approach some of the issues that have been raised here today.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving us this opportunity to lay out our strategy.

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks so much for coming today. Very important. Appreciate it.

Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, we're honored by your presence here. I didn't realize the first time that you appeared here was 1977. Through the work you did in the 1970s, the 1980s, the Dayton Accords, and the conversation we have had, you have a great sense of the gravity of the challenge, the gravity, in terms of our national security ahead of us.

So, these are difficult issues, but I was struck by a line from your written testimony, when discussing the overarching priorities of the Kerry-Lugar bill. And I think this one sentence sums up why, not only it's a good piece of legislation that I and others have co-sponsored, but that we need to move quickly to get it passed. And I'm quoting, "By increasing economic and educational opportunities, expanding the reach of quality health care, reinforcing human rights, particularly women's rights, and empowering civil society, life for millions of average Pakistanis will improve."

Just by way of a statement, a good summation of why we need to pass the legislation.

And then, finally, one other statement, and then I want to get to at least one major question. I was struck by a statement in yesterday's New York Times story about al-Qaeda and the threat posed in Pakistan, by Bruce Riedel—a man you have worked so closely with—who led the administration's review of the policy. I was struck by the intensity or the gravity of this statement. Bruce Reidel said, "They"—meaning al-Qaeda—"They smell blood and they are intoxicated by the idea of a jihadist takeover in Pakistan."

When I read a statement by Bruce Reidel, and the threat posed in Pakistan by al-Qaeda, and juxtapose that information with the supplemental request for not only the \$497 million in emergency funds that Department of State has asked for, but also with the \$400 million requested for the Pakistan counterinsurgency capabilities fund asked for Secretary Gates and General Petraeus, Secretary Gates noting that these funds are needed to be in place by Memorial Day to ensure that we don't run out of funding for counterinsurgency prior to September 30—when I juxtapose those two, I have to say, we need to not only pass the supplemental, but act with a sense of urgency and dispatch. This is needed right now.

I also believe we should attach the same sense of urgency to the Kerry-Lugar legislation. I say that by way of—just by way of a statement. But—I don't know if you want to add to that. And I want to get to a fundamental question.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Hard to add to answer that. I agree with it completely. Thank you for that statement.

Senator CASEY. With regard to what a lot of us know, and it's not written about as much, but it underlies all these discussions when we talk about just Pakistan for a moment, but it obviously affects the strategy for—in both countries—and that is India. We know that there is an obsession there with regard to the Pakistani military. I think most Americans can understand or appreciate some of that obsession. Every country has its focus. We had a threat, over many generations, posed by the Soviet Union. We understand that.

But, it's becoming an increasingly difficult problem to solve, because if the Pakistani Government and their military forces are focused only, or largely, on India, it's going to be very difficult to make it work, militarily.

I ask you this, and I say this as someone who was in all three countries last May, and, at one point, sitting with the national security adviser of India, I said in reference of Iran, "Look, I know that India has a lot of ties to Iran, and I know that you have some—you have strong relationships. But, you've got to help us with this nuclear threat posed by Iran." We've asked a lot of countries, and countries have asked us, to set aside, or to move to one side temporarily, a rivalry or a concern.

I ask you this—and I know it's a long lead-up—I ask you this with regard to India. Are there steps that India can take, in the context of this whole discussion, to help lower the temperature or create an environment where Pakistan can ease up a little bit, as they have already? I know; they've moved some of their military forces from the border, but are there efforts that India can undertake, not just on its own, but by our urging, that would help, here?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, I appreciate the question. It's of the highest importance. With great respect, since we're in the final days and hours of an election in India, where 700 million people are voting, and since any comment I would make might be misunderstood in that context, I would rather just simply restrict myself to saying that my job is Afghanistan and Pakistan, but at all steps in the process, we keep the Indians fully informed. They are not only an interested party, they are arguably the interested party, although many other countries, including most notably China and Iran, have borders with Afghanistan and also have interests.

But, India's interests are very high. India is the great regional power. And I have great personal respect and affection for India. And I keep Indian—India—they have a new ambassador, who just arrived; I met with her as soon as she was in Washington. And we will keep India fully informed. And the issues you raise are of great concern to us, but I'd—if you'll permit me, I'd like to stop at that point.

Senator CASEY. Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you very much.

Senator KAUFMAN [presiding]. Mr. Ambassador, I've made it a policy, since I've been here, not to have long statements, but to just ask questions, but I think I've got to break that policy. Every policy should be broken. I think your patience, to listen to my colleagues this morning, has been exemplary. I mean, just absolutely exem-

plary. I think, to sit here and criticize what's gone on, the last 8 years, as if you were responsible for it, and how much time you and the President spent articulating what the plan is in Afghanistan and what the plan is in Pakistan, shows patience of Job, frankly, to do it. I think it's quite clear what's going on, and that's what I'd like to confirm some of this.

No. 1, we had—in Afghanistan, I don't know how we could have a more specific plan in what it is that we're going to be doing, in terms of—I agree with the comments about—there could be problems with the Taliban and al-Qaeda moving over to Pakistan, but we have to go into Helmand and Kandahar provinces in order to do it, and we have a plan to do it. So, I think the plan that you and David Petraeus—and when Ambassador Eikenberry gets there—I think we've got the right people on the ground, new people on the ground, to do that job.

Pakistan, I think people are not reading the newspaper the last month. I really think that—and I—you know, I just don't think they've read what's happened in the Pakistan—I was in Pakistan, and it was quite clear to me that there was a sea change going on over there. Essentially, in the past we've gone to them and said, "Would you please help us in the FATA areas? Would you please help us, because it's in our interest?" I think what's happened in the Swat Valley is, they now understand it's in their interest to do this, they now are the ones challenged. That is a world-class difference. And to talk about Pakistan without realizing or discussing the fact that there's been a change of will in the government, I think, just doesn't deal with the reality of the situation on the ground.

So, the first thing I want to say is, my discussions with President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani, I came in with a much altered understanding of what their problem is and what their will was to actually deal with that problem. Is that a fair summation?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes, it is. And I appreciate your comments about patience.

I've testified a lot, and I'm perfectly comfortable receiving the views of the people elected by the population to represent them. But, what is frustrating, frankly, is to be held accountable for a GAO report which I happen to agree with. That is—that's a little bit difficult, because we're using that GAO report as one of our guides, and because I stopped a kind of an automatic pilot. They—when I came into office, that was the first issue that came to me, Senator Kaufman, "Hey, we've got—we have this terrible GAO report. We've got to rebut it, point by point." I said, "Why? Why should we rebut it? Why don't we learn from it?" And that happened on the second day I was in the job. So, I want to put that on the record, because we want to work with you.

And I want to reiterate my strong view that SIGAR, a very little-known creation of the Congress, either last year or 2007, I don't remember when, is a great potential tool for us to work together in an organization which is essentially the legislative branch's presence in Afghanistan. And if you expand its geographic scope or you expand its mandate to help the Afghans fight corruption, you will be helping our nation and—while keeping the separation of powers. I want to respect that, because every time I see General

Fields, he says, "I don't work for you." And I said, "I know, but we all are Americans." He's a retired major general. He's a very patriotic man. But, I hope you will look carefully at SIGAR.

Senator KAUFMAN. The other question is, when I went to Pakistan, 3 weeks ago, I was concerned about their will, that basically, you know, they had the troops up along the Indian border, FATA had never been an area they were concerned about, it doesn't really affect them, their lives, it hasn't affected them for hundreds and hundreds of years. The people in the FATA have further been difficult to control. So, I went with kind of a will problem. After the—what occurred in the Swat Valley, I became concerned about a capability problem.

What do you think the capability of the Pakistan military to actually deal with the Taliban is and what the Taliban is doing now?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We don't think they have enough forces in the west. We've said so publicly. We're glad that they're starting to focus on that issue, but it's not enough, it's not fast enough.

Second, their training has been excessively for a conventional war against the east, and not enough for counterinsurgency.

Third, the ethnic issue I addressed earlier is a concern.

Fourth, we think the Frontier Corps deserves much more attention, and I think your chairman made it clear he shares that view.

So, we have a lot of work to do here.

But, I do want to address one point that was stated earlier by one of your colleagues. I don't think we're looking at a takeover of Pakistan by religious extremists from the Pashtun belt. The Pashtun are a minority in Pakistan, and the overwhelming majority of people do not want that to happen. It would be much more dangerous if the militancy became embedded among the Punjabis.

Senator KAUFMAN. I traveled up to the FATA and met with the—and saw what—the training for the Frontier Corps. How—if we appropriate this money, how soon do you think we can actually have an effect on the Frontier Corps, expanding the Frontier Corps and increasing their training?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Immediately, because it would be our highest priority to get that money through the pipeline and into the hands of the Americans and the Pakistanis on the front lines in Peshawar and west of Peshawar.

Senator KAUFMAN. Finally, I served on the Broadcasting Board of Governors for 13 years, and, the answer to your question about strategic broadcasting, I can't pass by saying—without saying—we have a 71-percent listenership in Iraq to Broadcasting Board of Governor broadcasts. We have a 56-percent listenership in Afghanistan, and we have about 10 percent in Pakistan. The biggest single problem is getting the government, which I now think is ready to do it, and you could help, allowing us to be on the air on the services—the distribution of what our programming is.

So, I was in the FATA. I know about—we're putting FM stations in there. The big problem you're going to find, which we found out in Kosovo, we found out in Serbia, is finding programming that will really affect the people. We threw away a considerable amount of money in Iraq trying to do what I hear the Defense Department's trying to do now in Pakistan. You might want to go back and see

how that worked. And, as I say, we've ended up now with a 76-percent broadcasting.

So, I say—I would look to the Broadcasting Board of Governors as a way to—what they're doing, and see how we can expand the programming and the distribution in Pakistan.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you for that. I did not know you served on the BBG—

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. And I'm very pleased to hear it. I believe that a meeting is going on right now at the White House about this subject. The BBG was in the list of items I sent down there to be discussed. What I'd like to do is—if you would agree, Senator, would be to send our team up here to the Hill to talk to you about how you think we could get this going. It's very important. And it also involves Voice of America.

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. But, in the end, the primary vehicle should not be American radio, it should be local radio. But, Americans should support it.

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. The problem you're going to find with local radio is getting the programming.

Anyway, thank you very much for your comments.

And, with that, I will adjourn the hearing today.

[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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#### ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

##### RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN KERRY

###### OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

*Question.* Is the amount of funding authorized in S. 962 for operational and auditing expenses (\$10 million per year and \$20 million per year, respectively) adequate to the expanded scope of the mission? If additional resources are required—particularly in the area of operating expenses—please provide a detailed explanation of how the additional funds will be used. [Note: If any adjustment from the figures contained in the bill is deemed necessary by the administration, it is very important that this explanation be as complete and transparent as possible.]

*Answer.* The best way to ensure that the Department of State and Mission Pakistan will have the operational and auditing resources for administering and implementing Foreign Assistance programs would be for Congress to enact the Pakistan FY 2010 request of \$76.2 million for State operating expenses and the request of \$30.8 million for USAID operating expenses for Pakistan. We hope that Congress will also move expeditiously to approve the FY 2009 supplemental including the requested amounts for State and USAID Operating Expenses, as well as \$806.2 million requested by State for secure and upgraded facilities, all of which will enhance the capacity of our diplomatic and development efforts in Pakistan.

That said, the authorization to use up to \$30 million of Foreign Assistance annually to cover unexpected or incremental operating and auditing costs associated with S. 962 would seem sufficient.

Separately, I reiterate our support for the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). SIGAR is Congress's representative on the ground and we would like to see SIGAR deployed in every province in Afghanistan to assist with oversight of our assistance programs. We value SIGAR and respect its independence. To the extent that Congress is willing to expand its mandate and responsibilities, I have made clear we would very strongly support that.

## LINKING MILITARY AND NONMILITARY AID

*Question.* Do you believe (as advocated by President Obama in his championing of the Kerry-Lugar bill, and his cosponsorship of S. 3263 in 2008) that military aid should be de-linked from development aid—with development aid as a long-term commitment to the Pakistani people, and military aid carefully calibrated to the requirements and the will of the Pakistani military? Or do you believe that military and nonmilitary aid should be authorized in the same piece of legislation?

*Answer.* Our development and security assistance programs are two pieces of the same strategic goal—to help Pakistan become a secure, stable democratic partner. Both types of assistance are crucial to support the people of Pakistan and defeat al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Our development assistance and our military assistance must be integrated and complementary.

I agree that development aid should be a long-term commitment to the Pakistani people. Development programs to enhance Pakistan's capacity to provide improved health, education, and other basic services to the Pakistani people will require patience and commitment to have an impact. Our military assistance to Pakistan demonstrates our long-term commitment to helping Pakistan confront the threat of terrorism and extremism. Both are necessary tools but should not be limited by being inappropriately tied together.

The question of whether authorization for development and military aid should be in the same piece of legislation is for Congress to determine.

What we seek is the flexibility to be able to apply the appropriate resources at the appropriate time depending on specific needs or unique opportunities.

## LEVELS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

*Question.* Do you believe that the level of military assistance channeled through the State Department should be locked in place now for the next 5 years, or (as advocated by President Obama in his championing of the Kerry-Lugar bill, and cosponsorship of S. 3263) that it should be authorized on an annual basis, depending on the actions, needs, and commitment of the Pakistani military?

*Answer.* The President expressed support for the Kerry-Lugar bill as originally proposed. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan perceive the United States as having previously abandoned them during their times of need and so it is important that our military assistance to Pakistan demonstrate our long-term commitment to helping Pakistan confront the threat of terrorism and extremism, and also include mechanisms to maximize effectiveness.

The situation on the ground in Pakistan is quite fluid, with the needs of the Pakistani military evolving with its response to the threat posed by insurgents. Locking in specific levels of authorized military assistance would limit our flexibility in response to the situation on the ground. A strategic commitment to provide ongoing assistance is, however, important.

*Question.* Do you believe that the Pakistani military will be more cooperative with U.S. efforts or less cooperative if they know that they will receive exactly the same military aid authorization every year for the next half-decade, regardless of their actions?

*Answer.* Again, year-to-year authorization levels are appropriate to the fluid nature of the security situation in Pakistan. However, a strategic commitment to provide ongoing assistance is important. That said, better cooperation with Pakistan is not contingent exclusively on funding levels, but also depends on building relationships and breaking down misconceptions. These efforts help overcome the trust deficit and help Pakistan follow through on the changes needed to confront our common threat.

## LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE

*Question.* Do you consider the limitations on military assistance contained in section 6 of S. 962 (and the waivers provided) to be a reasonable compromise between setting no conditions on security aid and setting overly restrictive limitations on such assistance?

*Answer.* We agree with Congress that an increase in security assistance for Pakistan should take into account Pakistan's progress in preventing al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups from operating in Pakistan and using Pakistan as a safe haven to launch attacks. We are committed to providing Pakistan with the assistance it



needs to wage the counterinsurgency campaign, as long as its concerted efforts toward these goals continue.

While we are committed to accountability and partnering with the Congress in our efforts to ensure that assistance is used effectively and is making progress, we appreciate ensuring that flexibility be preserved to provide economic assistance, as needed, on a continuous basis, and also appreciate efforts to facilitate the accountability as well as flexibility with regard to furnishing military assistance.

*Question.* What do you think would be the impact of conditioning military aid on issues of great political sensitivity in Pakistan, such as F-16 transfers and the fate of A.Q. Khan? What would be the impact of providing the President with only a highly restrictive level of waiver (“vital to the national security”)?

*Answer.* Our security assistance to Pakistan, which has included support for Pakistan’s F-16 program, is a tangible symbol of the United States-Pakistan relationship. Pakistan cannot regain control of its border region absent a robust counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capability, which includes the use of a targeted close air support capability. Upgraded F-16s, in conjunction with appropriate training, provide Pakistan with this capability. Thus, overly restrictive conditionality on military aid to Pakistan could compromise our efforts to assist the Government of Pakistan as it seeks to dismantle terrorist networks in Pakistan. The highly restrictive waiver of “vital to the national security” would limit the President’s authority and flexibility.

However, we are not considering the use of additional foreign military financing (FMF) for the Pakistan F-16 program at this time. To date, the Government of Pakistan is current on its F-16 payments for the new aircraft and for related weapons systems.

Regarding A.Q. Khan, we believe that conditionality of military aid would not be an effective or appropriate means of influencing the fate of A.Q. Khan. We appreciate Pakistan’s efforts in shutting down the proliferation network led by A.Q. Khan as well as the cooperation Pakistan has provided the United States and the IAEA to investigate the Khan network. Key people involved with the network have been put out of business or are facing prosecution. We believe diplomatic means are a more effective tool in this case.

#### EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. AID: ENSURING WE DO NOT REPEAT MISTAKES OF AFGHANISTAN

Secretary Clinton has been forthright about the unacceptable levels of waste and mismanagement in United States aid to Afghanistan over the past 7 years. Critics charge that USAID’s contracting system relies too much on private contractors, there is a tendency for measuring outputs instead of outcomes, security restrictions distance U.S. aid practitioners from the locals they hope to support, and development projects often do not fit into a larger, comprehensive strategy. For both Afghanistan and Pakistan, concerns have been raised about the absorptive capacity and security challenges—particularly (in Pakistan) in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and parts of Baluchistan and NWFP.

*Question.* Given the Secretary’s concerns, how will the administration assure us that a tripling of nonmilitary aid to Pakistan will be well spent and directly used to serve the interests of the Pakistani people?

*Answer.* I have committed to reviewing every USAID contract and program in Afghanistan and Pakistan to ensure that our reinvigorated assistance is aligned with the President’s new strategy and that assistance is reaching the Afghan and Pakistani people, instead of foreign contractors. USAID is revisiting its operational models and hiring additional staff in Afghanistan and Pakistan to implement much larger development assistance programs. Specifically, USAID is expected to increase staffing in Pakistan, as well as support staff in Washington, to allow more rapid and effective implementation of assistance, by permitting USAID to effectively manage greater numbers and larger development assistance programs. The State Department will also boost support staff, primarily in Washington, in order to increase its reporting and coordination capacity for Pakistan.

USAID has designed a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system specifically for the nonpermissive environment in the frontier region, which can be applied to other parts of the country. USAID’s M&E system uses overlapping, multitiered checks and balances which reinforce the Government of Pakistan’s (GOP) own M&E efforts. The system utilizes a range of actors including local program staff, GOP interlocutors at the FATA Secretariat, community members, and independent monitors to follow the process from project development through implementation to provide overlapping layers of oversight. Oversight feedback is provided back to U.S. personnel and

implementing partners from a variety of sources allowing them to identify and verify where there might be issues.

*Question.* How will the administration use the funds for nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan—as laid out in the Kerry-Lugar bill (S. 962)? Please be as specific as possible.

*Answer.* Nonmilitary assistance funds will go to a wide array of projects. These include: Law enforcement reform, training, and equipment provision; law enforcement aviation support; judicial reform; antimoney laundering efforts; counter-narcotics alternative development projects; interdiction; and drug demand reduction programs. In terms of governance and human rights projects, we will: Educate the public about and develop Election Commission of Pakistan adjudication procedures; build the capacity of the independent media; increase voting and civic participation among women; consult residents of the FATA on their political future; train journalists in the FATA, NWFP and Balochistan; and combat gender-based violence.

USAID assistance will focus on: Rehabilitation of water and irrigation systems, bridges, roads, markets, health clinics and schools; improving rural electrification/power distribution; strengthening health and education services; improving community infrastructure; providing job skills training; and generating employment.

For areas where poverty, disease, and unemployment are creating breeding grounds for radicalism, we will improve the Pakistani Government's ability to provide basic services, fair and efficient governance to its citizens, and economic opportunities for young people—all of which increase satisfaction with civilian government and decrease the appeal of extremist groups.

We will target agricultural interventions at both unstable and vulnerable areas. Programs will help small producers organize into groups which will be integrated into commercial value chains generating substantial income gains. We will make women's participation a priority in all agricultural activities. Our priority goals in basic education are to dramatically increase access to schools, significantly raise chronically low enrollment rates, especially for girls, and improve educational quality. We will dramatically strengthen primary health care services, concentrating on priority geographic areas. A focus will be placed on maternal and child health, and prevention and treatment of major infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS.

#### DISPLACED CIVILIANS

The latest wave of violence in the Swat Valley is expected to displace up to 800,000 people—which would put the total number of IDPs in the North West Frontier Province at 1.3 million people. As you noted at the hearing, the U.S. Government may have an opportunity to demonstrate our commitment to the Pakistani people by stepping up our humanitarian efforts: Such as the humanitarian aid following the Kashmir earthquake of 2005 was seen as a vital sign of friendship and support.

*Question.* What is the U.S. humanitarian response in terms of financial and human resources? What additional resources do you envision bringing to the table in the near future—and would the funding authorized by S. 962 facilitate such efforts?

*Answer.* We are closely following developments in conflicts around the world. Based on current assessments, our budget request includes the funding needs we anticipate for FY 2010. The United States is building the Government of Pakistan's capacity to respond immediately to the growing crisis by providing direct assistance, supporting the local economy through indirect purchases and helping the Pakistani Government publicize its ability to protect its own citizens. As Secretary Clinton has frequently noted, we are continuously reassessing the need for additional assistance and will help lead diplomatic efforts to encourage greater international assistance for Pakistanis displaced during the crisis.

We have already mobilized several agencies and bureaus to respond to this crisis. USAID has deployed a six-person Disaster Assistance Response Team to Pakistan to lead our efforts on the ground. In FY 2008 and to date in FY 2009, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has provided nearly \$60 million in humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected populations in Pakistan. USAID/OFDA is supporting health, nutrition, humanitarian coordination and information management, economy and market systems, risk reduction, shelter and settlements, and water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions, as well as the provision of relief supplies and logistical support. To date in FY 2009, USAID's Office of Food for Peace has provided 39,670 MT of Public Law 480 Title II emergency food assistance, valued at more than \$36 million, to World Food Programme (WFP) emergency oper-

ations. USAID has also provided 20 generators and 20 transformer sets for pumping water and providing lighting.

The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has contributed \$14.6 million to address the crisis, in addition to over \$50 million in regional humanitarian assistance, with additional contributions to follow. State/PRM contributions to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross support camp management, protection, shelter, water and sanitation, and health interventions conducted by these two organizations. In response to State's request for assistance, DOD approved \$10 million in aid and dispatched three C-17 flights to deliver 50 tents and 120,000 halal meals to Islamabad. U.S. Central Command purchased 2 water trucks, 50 environmental control units for tents, and 25 generators. To bolster the U.N.'s capabilities to coordinate the aid effort, Ambassador Rice is urging senior U.N. officials to deploy a permanent humanitarian coordinator. The State Department has also spearheaded a campaign for donations from the international community.

Due to the ongoing military operations we do not have a full damage assessment and rebuilding estimate. We are continuing to monitor the situation and are in constant consultations with the Pakistani Government and donor countries. The displaced population could reach 3 million or more should the Pakistan military proceed with operations in Waziristan, as they have stated they will do in the coming weeks. Our response to this humanitarian crisis will require significant resources.

*Question.* What is the administration doing to ensure that the Government of Pakistan is taking every precaution to minimize civilian casualties and displacement?

*Answer.* The Department of State and the Department of Defense have strongly urged the Pakistan military to avoid civilian casualties. We are developing a longer term assistance package to help facilitate the "build" and "hold" phases. Pakistani political and military officials have repeatedly assured us that holding areas and facilitating reconstruction so that people displaced during this crisis can return home is a top priority.

Relatedly, the Pakistani Government has attempted to mitigate civilian casualties by encouraging the population in affected areas to evacuate their homes prior to commencement of operations. Also, the Pakistan military has taken the lead to provide relief support with the appointment of Lt. Gen. Nadeem Ahmad and his use of 1st Corps as the command element for humanitarian operations.

*Question.* In recent months, we have seen a growing number militant attacks on law enforcement targets, including the April 5 bombing in Chakwal, the seizure of the police academy on the outskirts of Lahore, and the ambush on the Sri Lankan cricket team and its police escort in Lahore. The primary victims of these attacks were Pakistan's undermanned and underequipped police, a militant strategy that appears designed to expose state institutions as weak. I am particularly concerned about the Pakistani police and have allocated up to \$100 million in the Kerry-Lugar bill (S. 962) for police reform, equipping, and training.

- What type of strategy would the administration pursue to help the Pakistani Government enact serious and comprehensive reform of the police and law enforcement agencies? How much money and time will it take?

*Answer.* Supporting civilian law enforcement and security organizations is critical to our comprehensive strategy to support Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts; this is particularly the case as conflict has spread from tribal areas to settled areas of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and cities across Pakistan. We must assist in ensuring that the police have the tools to detect, investigate, and arrest insurgents and build their abilities to deter and, where necessary, confront and defeat these elements. The Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) FY 2010 budget request reflects our growing support for the important role of civilian law enforcement, representing more than five times the FY 2009 INCLE request.

Moving forward, we have several ongoing law enforcement assistance programs that we seek to expand. The first is INL's Law Enforcement Reform program, which was established in 2002 and has trained over 8,000 law enforcement officers nationwide in a variety of law enforcement competencies, including management, investigations, human rights, and tactical training in improvised explosive device recognition, post-blast investigation, and civil disturbance management. This year, new courses will be added in crime and intelligence analysis, police command and control, and police communications management.

If approved, INL's FY 2009 supplemental and FY 2010 funding requests will advance efforts to build more capable police and SWAT-like capabilities in the most

vulnerable areas, starting with the NWFP Police Elite Force and continuing in Balochistan. This training and equipping effort aims to prepare these forces to prevent and respond to the types of contingencies they face on a routine basis, including suicide bombings, improvised explosive device detonations, kidnappings, and targeted killings.

To serve as a force multiplier, INL seeks to increase its helicopter fleet to help civilian security elements under Ministry of Interior (MOI) authority, including provincial police and the Frontier Corps, to conduct surveillance, reconnaissance, resupply, and transport of law enforcement personnel to remote areas quickly and safely. Additional air assets will allow MOI personnel to more efficiently launch operations that support the “hold” mission of law enforcement in areas along the border with Afghanistan. The operational tempo of INL’s air assets in 2008 and early 2009 was the highest in the history of the INL aviation program in Pakistan and will continue to increase as law enforcement capabilities improve.

While improving the capabilities and equipment of law enforcement personnel is of critical importance, public trust in the police must also be addressed. We are currently consulting with the Government of Pakistan on proposals for pilot projects that can improve the delivery of policing services and improve public perception of civilian law enforcement. The administration has requested \$155.2 million in FY 2010 INCLE in order to address these challenges.

#### COALITION SUPPORT FUNDS (CSF)

*Question.* Congress has appropriated billions of dollars in CSF to reimburse Pakistan and other countries for their operational and logistical support of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations. Much of this money appears to have gone for purposes other than those intended by Congress, and this committee has yet to receive a full and current information on the CSF program.

- Do you consider existing oversight and accountability procedures for Coalition Support Funds to be adequate?
- Will you insure that this committee is, in future, given full access (in classified or unclassified form) to all documents necessary to understand and evaluate the effectiveness of the CSF program in Pakistan?
- In rough terms, what percentage of CSF payments over the past 7 years have reimbursed costs incurred in the battle against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as opposed to other missions of the Pakistani military or redirection to the general budget?

*Answer.* Coalition Support Funds are administered by the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD would be in a better position to provide specific details regarding CSF procedures.

#### IMPROVING PAKISTAN’S COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITIES

The administration has requested \$400 million for PCCF in the FY09 supplemental to build the capacity of Pakistan’s security forces to combat insurgents in Pakistan. The traditional State Department-guided security assistance framework has built up protections to prevent the supply of U.S. arms and training to military forces that have engaged in human rights violations, to help ensure that the system is not abused by bribery or other procurement irregularities, and to prevent the diversion of equipment to unauthorized recipients. Many of the purchases envisioned for the PCCF seem compatible with that traditional security assistance framework.

*Question.* What are the specific constraints imposed by the traditional security assistance framework that would hinder the work you think is needed in Pakistan?

*Answer.* The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) was not requested because of specific constraints on the security assistance framework, but rather to address the exceptional situation in Pakistan where there is an urgent need to allow the Combatant Commander to accelerate, enhance, and resource Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operations and capabilities.

*Question.* If PCCF is routed through the Department of Defense (either for 1 year, or longer), what steps will you take to ensure that the safeguards of the traditional security assistance framework are used to prevent predictable problems from arising in the PCCF?

*Answer.* State and DOD have a strong, longstanding relationship as DOD is the executive agent for State’s security assistance programs. The implementation of PCCF will build upon this framework. PCCF requires Secretary of State concur-

rence and both State and DOD are committed to working closely together to ensure that this concurrence is exercised in a meaningful and substantive way.

COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY

You noted the need for a communications strategy, particularly in FATA and parts of Baluchistan and NWFP.

*Question.* Do you feel that there is a role for the Broadcasting Board of Governors' services, such as VOA and RFE/RL in Pakistan? If so, what is that role, and how are you cooperating with the BBG to incorporate their broadcasting services into your overall strategy in Pakistan? Do you feel that BBG is sufficiently resourced to accomplish the mission?

*Answer.* Winning the information war is critical to the success of our overall effort. To that end, I am working closely with General Petraeus, Ambassador Eikenberry, and my interagency team here in Washington to overhaul our strategic communications efforts and form a fully integrated, civilian-military effort that will broadcast our message.

BBG's services have an important role to play in Pakistan. Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, where the scope of government and commercial radio broadcasts is extremely limited, and where extremist groups actively utilize the airwaves to propagate their message, developing credible, accurate, moderate broadcast alternatives is essential. The BBG and the State Department have cooperated in organizing a series of strategic communications research seminars on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the BBG participates in interagency strategic communication planning sessions.

*Question.* Please provide as much detail as you wish on the communications strategy you envision, particularly in the areas of provision of cell phone coverage, radio broadcasting (equipment vs. content), and possible distinctions between activities traditionally conducted by the State Department (public diplomacy) vs. those conducted by the military or intelligence agencies (jamming of hostile broadcasts).

*Answer.* We must undertake a major new integrated civilian-military program on strategic communications in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Three simultaneous projects are essential: We must redefine our message; we must connect to the people on the ground through cell phones, radio, and other means; and we must identify and support key communicators who are able, through local narratives, to counter the militants' fear-mongering, propaganda and information domination. Additional personnel and structures in Kabul and Islamabad/Peshawar are essential.

Mobile phones are a vital tool for counterinsurgency and a mobile-equipped population is one that can be more effectively engaged and empowered to circumvent and challenge the militants. In FATA, we must push for greater cell phone penetration throughout the different agencies.

Radio is a particularly effective means of reaching tribal populations because it is the most pervasive media. We propose to: (1) Expand radio production capacity through a training and on-the-job mentoring program for local radio staff members; (2) support locally developed, cross-border radio programming; (3) help to develop community-based radio stations; (4) establish public-private partnerships; and (5) develop programming that fosters interaction and participation.

Broad interagency participation will be key to developing and implementing our communications strategy. In April, we cohosted with DOD an interagency meeting attended by over 50 representatives from State, DOD, USAID, and the intelligence community, to discuss current strategic communication activities within Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the urgent need for a comprehensive and coordinated Strategic Communications plan for the region. It is also vital that we bring in experts and engage the private sector. We are actively engaged with a variety of partners.

We are currently in the process of identifying resources for these various elements in support of our strategy and will remain in close consultation with the Congress on this effort.

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RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED  
BY SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR

LEGISLATION—S. 962, THE ENHANCED PARTNERSHIP WITH PAKISTAN ACT OF 2009

*Question.* You stressed on several occasions during your testimony the administration's strong support for the Kerry-Lugar legislation, S. 962.

- How does S. 962 specifically support or encumber U.S. policy initiatives and goals in Pakistan and in the region?

Answer. This legislation's authorization of \$1.5 billion in foreign assistance to Pakistan, every year for 5 fiscal years, underscores our long-term commitment to Pakistan and its people. Many Pakistanis believe that the United States is not a reliable long-term partner and will abandon Pakistan after achieving our counterterrorism objectives. Our engagement has to be aimed at building a long-term strategic partnership and must be conducted in a way that respects and enhances the Pakistani people's pursuit of a prosperous economy, a stronger democracy, and a vibrant civil society. If enacted, S. 962 would be a critical demonstration of our commitment.

The Kerry-Lugar legislation's emphasis on economic and governance challenges reinforces a key aspect to the President's new strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan. By increasing economic and educational opportunities, expanding the reach of quality health care, reinforcing human rights—particularly women's rights—and empowering civil society, we will increase the opportunities for millions of Pakistanis to improve their lives.

The administration shares Congress's concern that security assistance for Pakistan must show results. As the President has noted, "We must focus our military assistance on the tools, training, and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists" but "we will not, and cannot, provide a blank check." Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al-Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders.

We are committed to accountability and partnering with the Congress in our efforts to ensure that assistance is used effectively and is making progress. At the same time, we appreciate ensuring that flexibility be preserved to provide economic assistance, as needed, on a continuous basis, and also appreciate efforts to facilitate the accountability as well as flexibility with regard to furnishing military assistance.

#### STRATEGIC REVIEW AND OPERATIONAL PLAN

*Question.* Our legislation expects a fulsome operational plan for Pakistan and the cross-border region with Afghanistan to follow from the President's important "strategic review." This plan has certainly been under consideration since at least late last year given the Biden-Lugar Pakistan legislation introduced in July 2008 authorizing \$1.5 billion a year over 5 years in foreign assistance.

- When will the administration provide Congress with a broad, coherent, operational strategy for our engagement with Pakistan, which utilizes all of our foreign policy tools and provides a clear delineation of goals and expectations over time?
- The committee looks forward to the report you said you would provide on all intended allocations associated with the new policy approach to Pakistan. This will serve to inform Senators of a part of the operational plan as it is defined by allocations.

Answer. The Strategic Review approved on March 27 articulates not only the administration's core goal in Pakistan and Afghanistan—to disrupt and dismantle al-Qaeda and its safe havens, and prevent its return to either country—but also our supporting objectives and recommendations for action. Congress has been fully briefed on the review.

Through an interagency process, we are also developing comprehensive measures of effectiveness, which establish goals in Pakistan over time and indicators of our progress toward those goals. This process will be completed soon, at which time we will be pleased to brief Members of Congress.

To match our resources to our goals and objectives, we will provide the Congress a report—as you note—on all intended allocations associated with the new policy approach to Pakistan. The report will delineate how these allocations support our overarching objectives.

#### ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND 25 DISTRICTS PLAN

*Question.* Our legislation is intended to provide the Obama administration with the flexibility to add significant new economic assistance for Pakistan in order to enhance our bilateral partnership over the long term. Pakistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world and is confronting a daunting security threat.

- How will the bulk of the proposed assistance be used? What sectors will be prioritized?

Answer. Our economic assistance strategy for Pakistan focuses on areas where poverty, disease, and unemployment come together to create breeding grounds for

radicalism. We are focused on improving the Pakistani Government's ability to provide basic services, fair and efficient governance to its citizens, and economic opportunities for young people—all of which are intended to increase satisfaction with civilian government and decrease the appeal of extremist groups.

Our programs are designed to provide agricultural assistance to both unstable and vulnerable areas. Programs will help small producers organize into groups that will be integrated into commercial value chains generating substantial income gains. We are also making women's participation a priority in all agricultural activities.

Our economic development assistance will focus on providing job skills training; generating employment; rehabilitating water and irrigation systems, bridges, roads, and markets; improving rural electrification/power distribution; and improving community infrastructure.

In basic education, our priority goals are to dramatically increase access to schools, significantly raise chronically low enrollment rates, especially for girls, and improve educational quality.

Our priority in health is to strengthen primary health care services, concentrating on priority geographic areas. A focus will be placed on maternal and child health, and prevention and treatment of major infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS.

In terms of governance and human rights projects, we will: Educate the public about and develop adjudication procedures for the Election Commission of Pakistan; build the capacity of the independent media; increase voting and civic participation among women; consult residents of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on their political future; train journalists in the FATA, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan; and combat gender-based violence.

Finally, our rule-of-law programs will focus on: Law enforcement reform, training, and equipment provision; law enforcement aviation support; judicial reform; anti-money laundering efforts; counternarcotics alternative development projects; interdiction; and drug-demand reduction programs.

*Question.* Describe the intended regional plan, focused on some 25 districts, associated with your strategy.

*Answer.* Pakistan's needs exceed the capacity of even a significantly expanded U.S. assistance program. We intend to focus U.S. assistance on critical needs in specific geographic locations with the greatest poverty levels, making them most vulnerable to militant and extremist recruitment. Affected districts are in the North West Frontier Province, southern Punjab, northern Sindh, Baluchistan, and the city of Karachi, as well as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

We will provide assistance to unstable areas where there is active conflict with militants and vulnerable areas of extreme poverty and lack of opportunity that are fueling the growth of extremism. It will target the short- and medium-term needs of local communities, using quick-disbursing assistance linked to local governments. Assistance will involve local leaders and community organizations and include activities such as: Rehabilitation of water and irrigation systems, bridges, roads, markets, health clinics and schools, providing job skill training, and generating employment.

In vulnerable areas where poverty, disease, and unemployment are creating a breeding ground for radicalism, we will strengthen the Government of Pakistan's ability to provide basic services, fair and efficient governance to its citizens, and economic opportunities for young people. All these activities are intended to increase satisfaction with civilian government and decrease the appeal of extremist groups.

*Question.* How will U.S. assistance be used in a cross-border strategy to effectively engage homogenous populations on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border?

*Answer.* We strongly believe that a cross-border program is merited and necessary to carry out elements of the "one-theater" approach outlined in the President's Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. Such funding would allow us to plan regional development projects without being limited by the political boundary between the two countries.

The following are examples of areas that could be targeted with this funding:

- Border crossing points/transit corridors;
- Bilateral exchanges (i.e., government, educational, vocational, sporting, media, and cultural programs, etc.);
- Joint capacity-building exercises;
- Trans-boundary humanitarian assistance for refugees;
- Cross-border infrastructure (i.e., roads, irrigation/water, power, telecommunications, rail, etc.);
- Health initiatives (i.e., polio eradication, etc.).

In order to effectively implement a cross-border program that reflects a unique “one theater” approach, we would require adequate funding with adequate flexibility.

NUNN-LUGAR AND PAKISTAN WMD SECURITY COOPERATION

*Question.* In a May 9, 2009, Washington Post article, President Zardari indicated that no one in the U.S. Government had asked him for more information about the location and security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Given the evident concerns surrounding Pakistani stability and the limited effectiveness of the Pakistan military in counterinsurgency and counterterror operations, our cooperation in this area would appear to be an easy prospect for bilateral cooperation.

- What is the status of United States efforts with Pakistan on strengthening security cooperation?
- What funds has the administration requested in the supplemental or FY 2010 budget request to further assist Pakistan in securing the storage and accountability for its WMD?
- What assurance can you provide the Congress that Pakistan WMD elements and systems are secure from capture or control by militants?

*Answer.* Pakistan’s security forces are professional and highly motivated. They understand the importance of nuclear security and it is our understanding that they have taken significant steps to enhance it.

We welcome Pakistan’s efforts in this area. The President has said that he feels confident that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands.

The United States has provided assistance for these purposes, with the full cooperation of the Government of Pakistan. I cannot comment further on the details of this assistance in an unclassified setting.

*Question.* As the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan you control a significant number of resources and personnel on a limited time basis. It is important that the skills and mechanisms essential to effective USG response in emergent and ongoing crises globally are retained in the standing institutional structures at the State Department and USAID, as elsewhere, over the long term. It is also critical to exercise and build the capacity within our agencies to be more responsive and ensure efficiency.

- How will you ensure that your office does not make the mistake of so many previous offices on ad hoc assignments by building a parallel, one of organization in response to your mission?
- How do you intend to integrate your office’s work with existing State Department and USAID programs and offices directed toward Pakistan and Afghanistan?
- What steps does the Department plan to take to ensure that expertise and resources committed to your office are integrated into the Department’s permanent structures for responding to global crises?

*Answer.* My office is not a permanent organization, but rather is designed to respond to a unique foreign policy and national security challenge at a time of heightened engagement. I have been directed by the President and Secretary of State to lead a coordinated, civil-military effort to achieve our goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To do so, I have brought together experienced civil servants, Foreign Service officers, Intelligence officers, military officers, and well-known outside experts to create one unified team. My staff consists of senior representatives from the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Defense (Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense), Department of Agriculture, Department of Justice, the Intelligence Community and other agencies. They serve as key conduits to their home agencies and ensure that we remain connected and coordinated on an hourly basis. Virtually all have extensive field experience, including working closely with our military counterparts in various settings. Our outside experts provide essential advice and also help keep us connected to the NGO, think tank, and academic communities.

Far from a parallel organization, my office is fully integrated with key, permanent offices of the State Department and other agencies. My deputy, Paul Jones, is dual-hatted position both as the Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and also as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In this way, he serves as a critical coordination point between my office, the Afghanistan and Pakistan desks in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, and other offices in the State Department that work on aspects of the Afghanistan-Pakistan challenge. Additionally, we recently requested and received approval for five



new Foreign Service officer positions on each of the Afghanistan and Pakistan desks.

This new interagency model has already delivered excellent results. In numerous situations, we are able to move quicker and have better access to top level of multiple government agencies than if we were not collocated. We will continue to apply this whole-of-government approach to contingencies and our daily work, and we look forward to additional agencies—including Treasury and Homeland Security—sending representatives.

This is the most diverse team of experts that I have worked with during my government career and its agility in implementing policy will be critical to delivering the results that I know the President and Congress expects.

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

*Question.* The resources your office employs include civilians deploying to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Your staff has indicated that your office will coordinate such civilian deployment.

- How are you utilizing the longstanding, albeit still growing, capacity within the State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization?

*Answer.* S/CRS recently helped establish the Integrated Civilian Military Action Group (ICMAG) at Embassy Kabul. It facilitates joint planning and problem-solving at the national level and across specified lines of operation (e.g., rule of law), and also helps develop integrated civil-military guidance at the regional, provincial, and district levels. Through the ICMAG structure and processes, S/CRS planners have helped enable a whole-of-government approach. S/CRS also played a role in developing civil-military predeployment training for Regional commands, Brigade task forces, and PRTs. Further, newly offered courses offered at the Foreign Service Institute in Foundations of Reconstruction and Stabilization, hostile environments (security and medical), and whole-of-government planning for the Civilian Response Corps will provide additional training opportunities for personnel going to Afghanistan.

At my request, S/CRS has fielded an interagency team—led by Ambassador Tim Carney—to support the Afghan Government’s efforts to conduct free and fair elections in August.

The CRC “active component” will have over 100 interagency members by summer 2009, and by 2010 will become fully staffed at 250 with an additional 1,000 Standby Corps members identified from within the USG. I have asked that the CRC contribute to the civilian increase by nominating well-qualified individuals to serve for 1 year in the field. As the CRC grows, I expect its personnel to be in a position to support the significant increase in civilian deployments required for Afghanistan over the next few years to further ensure the whole of government planning, assessment and field operational capabilities required.

*Question.* How do you intend to build S/CRS institutional capacity for the long term?

*Answer.* The Secretary is committed to supporting the development of the Civilian Response Corps and to ensuring S/CRS has the capacity to provide core staff to key planning efforts for reconstruction and stabilization operations. S/CRS is able to provide support to regional bureaus and embassies with additional, trained personnel who can augment regional knowledge with planning and conflict specialties and who can assist in the management of coordination with the full range of USG actors required in R&S operations. This capacity is available to support Washington-based planning and operations management as well as field deployments.

This capacity is online and available and has been utilized in a range of operations including Sudan, Haiti, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. It is not in competition with the implementation bureaus and departments/agencies, indeed, it serves to ensure all capabilities are brought to the table, integrated and made available immediately to support foreign policy goals of the Secretary.

Long-term capacity development for surge operations will require continued congressional support for the involvement of partner agencies and for the baseline steady state staffing of State and USAID.

*Question.* The Office of the Inspector General for State Department, the Office of Inspector General for USAID, and other agency IG provide ongoing essential oversight of their respective agency programs and projects upon which the respective agencies and Congress greatly rely. Although Afghanistan and Iraq present massive cross-agency programming, the resident tools and authorities of standing IG offices are capable of incorporating the necessary means to meet expectations in such circumstances.

- What role do you see for the IGs at the State Department and USAID in promoting the effectiveness of your office's programs with regard to Pakistan and Afghanistan?

Answer. The State Department OIG has increased, and is planning a further increase in, oversight activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan. OIG is currently engaged in a number of reviews relevant to South Asia stabilization and to other department programs now underway in the South Central Asia region. State OIG is primarily responsible for oversight of State Department programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan and coordinates regularly with USAID OIG, the DOD OIG and the Special IG for Afghanistan Reconstruction for all aspects of oversight work in South Central Asia. The newly created Pak-Af Sub-working Group, formed by all of the relevant inspectors general working in the region, facilitates this effort.

*Question.* What recommendations do you have with regard to strengthening existing inspector general offices? Would you support providing additional authorities to State and USAID IG offices?

Answer. We urge the Congress to fund State Department OIG's current request in the FY 2009 supplemental bill and the FY 2010 appropriations request, both of which contain requests for additional oversight funding in South Central Asia. We also support the State Department OIG's request to the authorizing committees for additional hiring authorities which provide flexibility in the hiring of onsite oversight personnel in the South Central Asia. Finally, while we know State OIG has been conducting oversight in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we strongly support the September 2009 planned opening of the State OIG field office in Kabul and support their current effort to open a field office in Islamabad in the near future.

#### OPERATING EXPENSES

*Question.* S. 962 seeks to ensure that the executive branch will have the resources necessary to implement the expanded foreign assistance programs for Pakistan provided for in the bill. To this end, the bill authorizes \$10 million to be made available for administrative expenses of federal departments and agencies in connection with the provision of assistance authorized by the bill. This \$10 million would be in addition to other amounts already available to implement such assistance programs through the existing operating budgets of the Department of State, USAID, and other relevant agencies.

- What amount(s) are available from existing resources to implement and administer the programs authorized by S. 962? Does the administration believe that the \$10 million authorized will be sufficient to cover any additional administrative expenses it anticipates incurring to implement the expanded foreign assistance programs to Pakistan provided for in S. 962?

Answer. Funds appropriated for FY 2009 Operating Expenses, via the Omnibus Appropriations Act and pending supplemental legislation, will cover current funding gaps. We plan to implement and administer the programs authorized by S. 962 using funds appropriated for FY 2010.

The best way to ensure that the Department of State and Mission Pakistan will have the resources for administering and implementing Foreign Assistance programs would be for Congress to enact the Pakistan FY 2010 request of \$76.2 million for State operating expenses and the request of \$30.8 million for USAID operating expenses for Pakistan. We hope that Congress will also move expeditiously to approve the FY 2009 supplemental including the requested amounts for State and USAID operating expenses, as well as \$806.2 million requested by State for secure and upgraded facilities, all of which will enhance the capacity of our diplomatic and development efforts in Pakistan.

That said, the authorization to use up to \$10 million of Foreign Assistance annually to cover unexpected or incremental administrative costs associated with S. 962 would seem sufficient.

*Question.* If the administration believes that additional resources are needed beyond this extra \$10 million, please identify the additional costs the administration expects to incur and indicate how much additional money the administration believes is needed to meet them.

Answer. At this time we believe that the amounts requested in the President's FY09 supplemental and FY10 request are sufficient to meet our needs, but will consult closely with Congress if additional needs are identified by our Embassy teams in Kabul and Islamabad.

*Question.* Please explain in detail the nature of any such costs, why they are required, and why they cannot be met through the existing operating budgets of relevant federal agencies.

*Answer.* At this time we do not anticipate requiring additional resources beyond those amounts requested in the FY09 supplemental and FY10 request, but will consult closely with Congress if additional needs are identified by our Embassy teams in Kabul and Islamabad.

PAKISTAN COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND (PCCF)

*Question.* The President requested \$400 million in the supplemental appropriations request for the purposes of immediately supplying an effort to train and equip Pakistani security services for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.

- What agreements have been made with the Pakistan Government, and specifically with the military and security services, with regard to PCCF funding?

*Answer.* No formal agreements have been made with Pakistan about the PCCF since it has not yet been approved by Congress. Embassy Islamabad and U.S. Central Command have spoken with senior Pakistani officials about building Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities, as well as how the specific equipment/training that PCCF (if enacted) is intended to provide could be used to assist in current operations.

*Question.* What specific forces and what command and control structures will benefit from this program?

*Answer.* PCCF is intended to build the counterinsurgency capabilities of Pakistani security forces currently engaged in operations against extremists along their border with Afghanistan. It is implicit in the concept of PCCF that it remain flexible enough so the Combatant Commander—General Petraeus—can adapt our security assistance to changing circumstances, but at present we envision that the main entities that will benefit from PCCF will include: The regular forces of the Pakistan Army (including 11th Corps and 12th Corps); special forces of the Pakistan Army (including the Special Services Group commandos and their air-lift unit, the 21st Quick Reaction Squadron); Pakistan Army Aviation (including the helicopter units that fly Mi-17s, Bell-412s and Cobras); the paramilitary Frontier Corps; and other enabling units. Other entities will be considered on a case-by-case basis depending on the role that they play in meeting overall counterinsurgency objectives.

*Question.* Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton testified to the Appropriations Committee in April that the PCCF program would initially fall within DOD and move in a phased process over 2 years to State Department authority and control.

- What are the deficient elements of the current security assistance programs currently at State Department?
- How will the State Department develop the structures and capacity to manage this program?
- How will the State Department participate in the implementation of this program and in the administrative and review process associated with it in order to build the necessary capacity?

*Answer.* The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF) was requested as a Department of Defense authority to address the exceptional situation in Pakistan where there is an urgent need to allow the Combatant Commander to provide Pakistan with accelerated and enhanced counterinsurgency operational capabilities. The new fund provides for significant State Department input into implementation by requiring Secretary of State concurrence of DOD's provision of assistance, and of DOD's transfer of funds to other agencies to provide assistance. As the Chief of Mission, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan provides strategic direction to, and oversight of, the Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan for all of its efforts, including the PCCF. Embassy Islamabad is also structured to manage both the PCCG and Foreign Military Financing (FMF)—which will continue to be administered by the Department of State—to maximize the impact of U.S. military assistance in support of our policy objective of stabilizing Pakistan.

The State Department is currently undertaking a broad, strategic review of foreign assistance resources (including security assistance programs) in order to strengthen its ability to manage and coordinate programs, and improve the coherence and integration of our foreign aid programs to achieve unity of effort within the U.S. Government. Part of this review will include an examination of the appropriate balance of authorities vested between the Defense and State Departments, as well as the personnel and resources needed to execute these programs.

## REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

*Question.* The committee recognizes your efforts to encourage cooperation and participation of other countries in providing support for Pakistan and the region in a more responsible and coordinated manner.

- What other donor nations or organizations whose assistance and potential are you most encouraged by?

*Answer.* Fostering international dialogue and coordinating and integrating international assistance are critical components of the President's Afghanistan/Pakistan strategy. Our regional and international engagement furthers several objectives.

First, we seek to vastly improve coordination and integration of international assistance flowing to both Pakistan and Afghanistan. On Pakistan we are seeking to increase donations for urgent humanitarian needs and to begin a coordinated international dialogue on longer term reconstruction. On Afghanistan, we are working with the international donor community, increasingly under the auspices of UNAMA, to create a common assistance framework that can guide and integrate all donors' assistance to Afghanistan. We are also developing a comprehensive inventory of all donors' assistance to Afghanistan in anticipation of supporting UNAMA and the Minister of Finance in its efforts to map all foreign assistance.

The second element of regional and international engagement involves developing and strengthening strategic partnerships with the large number of regional and global stakeholders in a stable and secure Pakistan. Many of these partners share longstanding historical, political, and economic ties with Pakistan and recognize that a stable, secure, and democratic Pakistan is vital to our shared national interests. By harnessing the capabilities of these current and future partners, we will greatly increase our ability to address security, governance, and development goals in Pakistan coherently and comprehensively.

*Question.* Your travel to the region has included a number of trips to India as well. Notwithstanding your deferring comment at the hearing, how will the U.S. Government ensure India is properly engaged on the issue of improving relations with Pakistan? What steps does the administration feel India might make to diminish the perceived threat to Pakistan?

*Answer.* India plays a critical role in the region and we will continue to inform and consult the Indian Government on a regular basis to ensure that they are properly engaged on the issues. We will not be able to address regional challenges without India's full involvement. India is vitally affected by events in the region, and we want to consult closely with New Delhi as we go forward. The national security of India, Pakistan, and the United States is clearly at stake as all three countries now face a common threat from violent extremism.

## PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

*Question.* Our legislation provides a requirement for a comprehensive strategy to implement effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measures along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas that includes elements relating to the use of strategic communications.

- What are the parameters of the strategy for such an element of the assistance effort in Pakistan? What agencies will be involved in designing and implementing such an effort?

*Answer.* Under Special Representative Holbrooke's and General Pertaeus' leadership, we are implementing a new integrated civilian-military strategic communications effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This effort will focus on three simultaneous goals: Redefining our message; connecting to the people on the ground through cell phones, radio, and other means; and identifying and supporting key communicators who are able, through local narratives, to counter extremists' propaganda and present a positive alternative. Additional personnel and structures in Kabul and the Afghan provinces and in Islamabad/Peshawar will be necessary to implement this new program and Special Representative Holbrooke is working with our Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad to identify and address these needs.

Mobile phones are a vital tool for counterinsurgency and a mobile-equipped population is one that can be more effectively engaged and empowered to circumvent and challenge the militants. In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), we will push for greater cell phone penetration throughout the different agencies.

Radio is also a particularly effective means of reaching tribal populations because it is the most pervasive media. We will work to: (1) Expand radio production capacity through expanded training, and on-the-job mentoring programs for local radio staff members; (2) support locally developed, cross-border radio programming; (3)

expand our efforts to help develop community-based radio stations; (4) establish public-private partnerships; and (5) develop programming that fosters interaction and participation.

Broad interagency participation will be key to developing and implementing our new communications strategy. In April, Special Representative Holbrooke's office cohosted with DOD an interagency meeting attended by over 50 representatives from State, DOD, USAID, and the Intelligence Community, to discuss current strategic communication activities within Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the urgent need for a comprehensive and coordinated strategic communications plan for the region. We are also consulting with experts and engaging the private sector to develop new ideas. We have requested resources in support of our strategic communications efforts in the FY 2009 supplemental and FY 2010 budget and will remain in close consultation with Congress as we further define this effort.

*Question.* What has the Government of Pakistan agreed to with regard to our efforts to operate in the area of strategic communications?

*Answer.* Our strategic communications activities support Pakistani Government. This has included training programs to improve Pakistani Government communications capabilities, a media cell to support its Special Support Group for helping internal refugees, and development of an antiextremism media campaign. Most importantly, however, is our assistance to help the Pakistani Government empower local people to communicate messages that compete with extremist narratives. These have already included student radio programs, support for establishing radio stations in contested areas, and support for content produced by locals for broadcast. Going forward, we will seek greater collaboration with the Pakistani Government in implementing programs and in building its strategic communications capacity.

*Question.* Where will authority for such operations reside?

*Answer.* Authority for such operations will reside with Embassy Islamabad in the field and with the Secretary of State and me in Washington.

*Question.* What will be the role of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty?

*Answer.* The Broadcasting Board of Governors plays a vital role. The Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reach 10 million people weekly in Afghanistan and VOA reaches 11 million weekly in Pakistan. Research in the Afghan-Pakistan border region is very difficult, but according to available qualitative and quantitative research, VOA's Pashto-language Radio Deewa reaches sizable audiences in the FATA and NWFP. In the mix of U.S. communication initiatives, BBG's reliable news and information programs are vital to U.S. security interests, especially in tribal areas where Taliban propaganda is pervasive.

VOA in Pakistan broadcasts over AM transmitters and shortwave (SW) frequencies as well as on the Internet. FM broadcasts via a leased network of FM transmitters in Pakistan awaits ratification of a lease agreement by the Government of Pakistan. Use of an AM transmitter in Peshawar is pending ratification of a lease agreement by the Cabinet of Pakistan's President.

Transmitters based in Afghanistan also serve Pakistan. VOA has expanded from 6 to 9 hours of live programming daily via SW and three FM transmitters (in Khost, Asadabad, and Gardez), and on the Internet. A new, high-power AM transmitter in Khost, Afghanistan, is ready to come online pending resolution of final wording in agreements with the Afghan Government.

Under provisions of the pending FY 2009 supplemental request, funding would be available to further expand broadcasts in Pashto by VOA and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The two broadcasters would share frequencies and produce complementary programming, as they do in a joint programming stream now in Afghanistan. They would share a new bureau in Peshawar.

The single greatest challenge at this time is securing new delivery of programs on AM and FM to the border region and throughout Pakistan.

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RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED  
BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.

*Question.* As civilians flee the Pakistani Army offensive in the Swat Valley against Taliban extremists, the seeds of a future crisis are being planted. Since Thursday alone, 200,000 refugees are estimated to have poured into four camps set up by the United Nations and the local administrations of the city of Mardan. As many as 600,000 additional refugees are expected to arrive if fighting continues.

The effects of the crisis are somewhat mitigated as families in Mardan and surrounding area take in some of the refugees into their homes and guesthouses—an extension of traditional Pashtun hospitality. But at a certain point this hospitality will reach its limits.

- How is the United States Government working with the government of Pakistan and international organizations to address the potentially catastrophic effects of a large-scale refugee crisis inside Pakistan? We all recognize the potential for alienation and extremism that can arise when refugee populations endure for extended time periods.

Answer. As of June 18, Pakistan had verified 1.9 million displaced persons whom UNHCR had registered. The number is expected to grow to 2.5 million as people flee expected fighting in Waziristan and as more displaced persons are verified outside of the North West Frontier Province. UNHCR has raised its planning figure from 1.5 million displaced people (assumed in the U.N.'s May 19 Pakistan appeal) to 2.5 million. The U.S. Government has responded since early May by committing over \$300 million to relief and reconstruction efforts and by mobilizing an international response. Secretary Clinton and I have personally rallied the international community, most recently in Europe and the gulf, to provide assistance to relieve the suffering of those displaced in Pakistan.

Our assistance has brought food and nonfood items such as medical care, water, and sanitation to the internally displaced living in camps and host communities. On May 15, USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to Pakistan to support relief efforts, manage the humanitarian response, and coordinate with the humanitarian community. To support the return of those displaced, the Government of Pakistan is offering one-time cash payments of \$310 to each registered family. We will continue to work with U.N. agencies, nongovernmental organizations and the Government of Pakistan to provide humanitarian relief to those displaced and to enable their return as quickly and safely as possible so that they can begin the hard work of rebuilding their lives.

- Does the administration foresee the need for additional assistance in the FY 2009 supplemental bill that is working its way through the Congress to address this challenge?

Answer. The administration requested an additional \$200 million in the FY 2009 supplemental for displaced persons in Pakistan.

*Question.* In yesterday's Washington Post, Selig Harrison, an author and former journalist who is an expert on South Asia, wrote an op-ed contending that U.S. policymakers are misapprehending the conflict in Pakistan. Rather than viewing it as a conflict between moderates and religious extremists, Harrison argues what is happening today in the FATA and other border regions of Pakistan reflects the age-old struggle between the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and western Pakistan vs. the Punjabi elites of eastern Pakistan. The FATA and other regions along the border, including the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, have always enjoyed a degree of autonomy from central rule in Islamabad to account for the ethnic split.

Harrison thus argues that U.S. policy urging the Pakistan military to go into the Swat Valley and the broader regions with an all-out military assault is a prescription for disaster—it will only antagonize the ethnic strife between Pashtuns and Punjabis and bolster the rise of local Taliban extremists. Harrison urges the Obama administration to cease airstrikes in western Pakistan and instead encourage Islamabad to offer greater regional autonomy to these areas, thus providing an incentive for local Taliban to eject al-Qaeda figures and focus on their own regional development, as opposed to laying the seeds for a broader anti-Pakistani and anti-Western crusade.

- What do you make of Harrison's argument? Does current United States policy risk exacerbating ethnic tensions in Pakistan between Pashtuns and Punjabis?

Answer. We disagree with Harrison's premise that U.S. policy exacerbates ethnic tensions in Pakistan. The United States supports Pakistani military operations in the Swat Valley and other border regions as a critical step toward our strategic goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda in Pakistan. Pakistan and the United States face a common enemy, and military operations targeting violent extremists within its borders will demonstrate Pakistan's commitment to addressing the urgent security threat posed by extremist safe havens in Pakistan. Successfully neutralizing safe havens for extremists will require sustained counterinsurgency operations, followed by coordinated "hold and build efforts." It is also critical to note that the Pakistani security operations under way in the North West Frontier Province enjoy unprecedented national support across almost all political parties, including the main opposition parties.

We are urging Pakistani civilian and military leaders to develop a coordinated counterinsurgency strategy, which includes military operations followed by dedicated efforts to reach out to the local population and reestablish connections with the central government. The idea is to erase the perceived vacuum in which the extremists have been operating, so that they do not return once military operations have ended. It is critical that the current military operations in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) be followed by reestablishment of civilian security structures, and a major effort to return those who have been displaced, as well as help to reconstruct their homes and towns, as quickly as is feasible. We will support international organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and the U.N.'s OCHA, to conduct damage assessments and compile cost estimates. Already Pakistani civilians are returning to some areas including Lower Buner and Lower Dir, and the UNHCR will assist others to return by providing transportation and supplies of some basic needs.

We understand that ethnic strife has long been a problem in Pakistan—and that some groups continue to feel neglected, with the perception that others are more advantaged. We must work with the Pakistani leadership to ensure that the Pakistani Government provides security, economic stability and opportunity, and basic services for all Pakistani citizens. Through our bilateral assistance (security and nonsecurity), training, efforts to pass Reconstruction Opportunity Zone legislation, and engagement with Pakistani leaders across the political spectrum, we are endeavoring to assist our Pakistani partners toward those ends.

Initiatives like Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs), now pending in Congress, can provide incentives for the reconstruction and bring badly needed jobs in some of Pakistan's most vulnerable regions. We urge Congress to pass ROZ legislation very soon to help foster legitimate economic opportunity in an area where lack of positive alternatives has resulted in young men turning to illicit, destabilizing activities. We are also continuing to encourage other countries to come together to support Pakistan, as they did at the successful April 17 donors' conference in Tokyo that raised over \$5 billion in social safety net and development assistance. The stronger the Pakistani Government is, the stronger its capability to establish its writ in traditionally underserved parts of Pakistan, like the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

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RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED  
BY SENATOR JIM DEMINT

*Question.* The Millennium Challenge Corporation tracks 17 policy indicators and USAID uses 5 strategic goals and a series of subcomponents as performance indicators and ratings. Unfortunately, just using MCC's assessments, Pakistan has retreated on a number of key indicators. Please identify the specific metrics you intend to use in order to gauge success with the assistance provided to Pakistan under S. 962.

*Answer.* Finding the correct metrics to assess effectiveness is a vital element of policy implementation. Since the recent completion of the administration's Strategic Review of U.S. policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, there has been an interagency effort to develop specific plans for implementation, including the preparation of metrics and conditions.

The U.S. Government is moving forward urgently, but also deliberately. The administration requires a reasonable amount of time to assemble its team, get the appropriate people on the ground, assess the situation, and develop meaningful measures of effectiveness. The administration is seeking input from across government to reflect the interagency dimension—the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Departments of Defense, Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, to name a few. We also look forward to working with Congress on these measures.

*Question.* For roughly 10 years, United States sanctions suspended IMET funding for Pakistan. However, in our current relations with Pakistan we have relied on friendships that were established when Pakistan's future leaders were able to attend military schools in the United States. In order to confront al-Qeada and eliminate its ability to operate internationally, the United States must rely on the Pakistani military and intelligence services. How do you believe we should move forward with instilling American values and perspectives and rebuilding relationships with the Pakistani military? What role should IMET training play?

Answer. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is a critical element of our broad-based security relationships throughout the world. In addition to the high quality of the education and training the program provides for foreign military and civilian members, IMET also plays a vital role in the development of military-to-military relationships. IMET helps ensure that other nations' militaries have a cadre of personnel that have trained in the United States and are familiar with U.S. military doctrine, methods, and values. This has proven extremely useful over the years in forging strong military-to-military relationships and promoting key U.S. values such as human rights and civilian control of the military.

We are currently paying the price for the decade of sanctions against the Pakistani military under the Pressler amendment. During the 1990s, a generation of Pakistani military officers, who now hold senior leadership positions, were denied U.S. military education and training opportunities as well as the exposure to United States culture and values that such activities provide. A robust IMET program with the Pakistani military is one of the best tools we have to help shift the direction of the Pakistani military to a more pro-Western orientation in both outlook and doctrine, and to help reshape our bilateral security relationship. It is for this reason that the administration has almost doubled last year's requested amount for IMET funding for Pakistan.

*Question.* Going forward do you support, and will you commit to, providing a full and detailed list of all U.S. assistance to Pakistan—not just what may be authorized under S. 962—including a description of each program or project that receives any U.S. funding?

Answer. I will provide a full and detailed list of all U.S. assistance to Pakistan, including a description of each program and project receiving U.S. funding.

*Question.* After taking appropriate measures to ensure national security, are you willing to provide this information in a readily accessible format on the Internet?

Answer. We would be happy to provide such a list available in a readily accessible format. We would, of course, be required to make certain exceptions to protect national security and to ensure the safety and security of assistance recipients and program implementers. We would, in such instances, be glad to brief Congress on such programs.