

**NOMINATIONS OF THE 110TH
CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION**

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

—————
JANUARY 30 THROUGH DECEMBER 19, 2007
—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
110TH CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION

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KENNETH A. MYERS, Jr., *Republican Staff Director*

*Note: Reassigned to Committee on Finance January 24, 2008.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
110TH CONGRESS—SECOND SESSION

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ANTONY J. BLINKEN, *Staff Director*

KENNETH A. MYERS, Jr., *Republican Staff Director*

*Note: Appointed February 12, 2008.

**NOMINATION OF HON. ZALMAY KHALILZAD
TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED
NATIONS, WITH THE RANK AND STATUS OF
AMBASSADOR, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, AND TO BE REPRESENTA-
TIVE TO THE SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS DUR-
ING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS REP-
RESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Khalilzad, Zalmay, to be Representative to the United Nations, with the rank and status of Ambassador, and the Representative in the Security Council on the United Nations, and to be Representative to the Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations during his tenure of service as Representative to the United Nations

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson presiding.

Present: Senators Nelson, Kerry, Feingold, Obama, Menendez, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Voinovich, DeMint, and Isakson.

Also present: Senator Lieberman.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA**

Senator NELSON. Welcome to the nomination hearing for Ambassador Khalilzad to assume the extremely important post of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

We want to welcome you, Mr. Ambassador, and your family. He's again being called by his country to serve in a critical post at a critical time. The United Nations is so important that we have the best and the brightest to represent us. With all of the international challenges that we have today, his diplomacy will be essential as

we tackle all of the things that are facing us in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan, as well as the transnational threats of terrorism, poverty, global warming, and you can go on down the list.

We've moved quickly to fill this post that he is vacating in Baghdad. Ambassador Crocker is assuming that. In the meantime, we're going to turn our attention to the United Nations, now in its 61st year under the leadership of the new Secretary General. And this Ambassador is going to be at the forefront of our efforts to defuse international crises, not the least of which are the challenges facing us with a nuclearized North Korea, and a nuclear-ascendant, Iran. The Security Council's actions contributed to North Korea's recent decision to return to the negotiating table. We're finally seeing progress in these negotiations.

Iran is a huge challenge, but it's essential that we are successful, and it's going to take a round of tougher sanctions from the Security Council, and our Ambassador's going to be right in the middle of that, with all his diplomatic skill, bringing pressure on Iran to come to their senses.

Recent controversies, such as the Iraq Oil-for-Food Programme, the allegations of sexual abuse by U.N. peacekeepers, the instances of waste, fraud, and abuse by U.N. staff, have led many in the international community to support reforms in the United Nations. Progress has been slow, but I expect this Ambassador to continue that push for a reform agenda as an urgent priority. The United Nations is limited by its own internal inefficiencies and failures. And, until these are corrected and reformed, the U.N. is going to be hampered.

We are the No. 1 contributor to the United Nations, paying 22 percent of the regular budget. It's just under a half a billion dollars in fiscal year 2008. Obviously, our voice should carry significant weight. We have a big responsibility to the American taxpayer to ensure that that money is spent wisely. And that's just another one of the challenges, Mr. Ambassador, that you will assume.

There are currently 100,000 U.N. peacekeepers deployed in more than 18 countries, and despite this presence, the U.N. peacekeeping operations face serious challenges. I just returned from Haiti, where we have another one. It is finally having some of the success that we wanted, but it's taken a long time. It's been over a year with that U.N. peacekeeping force. And we expect you, Mr. Ambassador, to focus on improving the quality of those peacekeepers and furthering their effort to be successful in this time of crisis. I believe that you are the best and the brightest to be representing us in this world community of nations. And I think you're a nominee that we can be proud of.

We want to have a thorough discussion of the nominee. I want to turn to our ranking member before we turn to our colleagues who will make the introduction.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in, once again, welcoming our friend, Zalmay Khalilzad, who's been nominated by President Bush to be our Ambassador to the United Nations.

This post is unique among diplomatic assignments, in that its occupant is responsible not only for conducting diplomacy on many of the most critical foreign policy issues of the day, but also for U.S. stewardship of a multilateral institution, and plays a central role in global affairs.

This committee and others in Congress have spent much time examining how the United States can work cooperatively with partners at the U.N. to streamline its bureaucracy, to improve its transparency, make it more efficient as it undertakes vital missions. We all hope for a United Nations that can fulfill its potential as a forum for international problem solving and dispute resolution.

Often, the United Nations has fallen short of our hopes, but we cannot afford to be discouraged. The new Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, of South Korea, has an opportunity to implement reforms outlined by the Gingrich-Mitchell report and countless other studies. To date, Secretary General Ban has put forward some important reforms that would raise the accountability of the organization and better enable the United Nations to shift resources and personnel to initiatives requiring immediate attention. Additionally, he has set an early example of transparency by releasing his personal financial documents. But, as the Foreign Relations Committee knows well, United Nations reform is not an easy task, and many diplomats and bureaucrats in New York see almost any structural reform of the U.N. as an attempt to diminish their prerogatives. The next U.S. Ambassador must be dedicated to building on President Bush's efforts to support meaningful reform at the U.N.

Performance of the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva continues to be a source of concern in the Congress and among the American people. Regrettably, recent sessions of the Council have focused almost exclusively on Israel. The United States rightfully continues to seek modifications to the Human Rights Council. Much less well-known is the role of the United Nations Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Affairs Committee in New York, which has voted to condemn the deplorable human rights situations in Iran, North Korea, Belarus, and Burma, countries which the Human Rights Council in Geneva has inexplicably ignored. I would be interested in knowing what options the nominee sees at this stage for improving the structure and the credibility of human rights advocacy at the United Nations.

Even with these difficulties, the United Nations remains a key component of U.S. foreign policy. In particular, United States peacekeeping missions are a cost-effective method of enforcing peace and helping shattered nations rebuild. The ability of U.N. peacekeeping missions to be a force-multiplier was underscored by a 2006 Government Accountability Office analysis of the U.N.'s peacekeeping mission in Haiti. The GAO concluded, and I quote, "The U.N. budgeted \$428 million for the first 14 months of that mission. A U.S. operation of the same size and duration would have cost an estimated \$876 million." The report noted that the United States' contribution to the Haiti peacekeeping mission was, in fact, \$116 million, roughly one-eighth the cost of a unilateral American operation.

With this in mind, I was perplexed to see that the administration's fiscal year 2008 budget request for approximately \$300 million less for peacekeeping than in the previous year has been put forward. Little evidence was presented to explain why the current 16 missions would suddenly require less funding than in previous years. Moreover, additional peacekeeping missions may arise in Chad and Darfur, further straining the peacekeeping budget. I would welcome the nominee's thoughts on this situation, which require further explanation by the administration.

The diplomatic challenges that face our nominee include the nuclear confrontations with Iran and North Korea, the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases, refugee crises related to Iraq, to Darfur and other locations, and numerous problems that confront the United Nations every day. I am pleased, and I join the Chairman in saying, that the President has nominated a diplomat with such wide experience to be our next Ambassador to the United Nations. Ambassador Khalilzad has been in charge of two of the toughest assignments in American diplomacy, our embassies in Kabul and Baghdad. His experiences in these posts will enhance our ability to work with the United Nations on issues pertaining to Afghanistan, Iraq, and bolster our international diplomacy aimed at stabilizing those nations.

I welcome the nominee and thank him for his continued distinguished service to our country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. I'd like our two colleagues to introduce the nominee, and since Senator Hagel is also a member of the committee, Senator Hagel, you go first, and then we'll have Senator Lieberman.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA**

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and to you and all of my colleagues on the committee.

It is my privilege to introduce Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, along with my friend and colleague Senator Lieberman. This time, for me, is a third time to introduce Ambassador Khalilzad. In October 2003, I introduced the Ambassador as the President's nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. In June 2005, I introduced him as the President's nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq. As has been noted, two easy jobs. Today, following his distinguished service in Kabul and Baghdad, Ambassador Khalilzad returns to the committee as the President's nominee to be the next U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

It is not surprising that the President has chosen Ambassador Khalilzad to lead our efforts at the United Nations at this most critical time. In recent years, he has filled two of the most difficult diplomatic posts in our Nation's history. As Ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan, Ambassador Khalilzad served under conditions that could have easily overwhelmed even the most gifted diplomat. Instead, he has earned a reputation as an agile and credible mediator in a region complicated by tribal, religious, and sectarian divisions. His deep understanding of the Middle East has been a vital

asset to this country and the world, and we are grateful for that past service.

Though the challenges of Iraq today are daunting and in—its future still deeply uncertain, Ambassador Khalilzad's tenure in Iraq was marked by important milestones. And I think, Mr. Chairman, it is important that we review a couple of those accomplishments.

After arriving in Baghdad in June of 2005, Ambassador Khalilzad led our efforts to help the fledgling Iraqi Government move forward in the political reconciliation process. He was central in facilitating the tough compromises that led to the ratification of Iraq's constitution in October of 2005, and a successful national election in December of that same year.

At the end of his tenure, Iraq's Council of Ministers approved a national oil law that, if adopted by the Iraqi Council of Representatives, will play a key role in Iraq's future. Ambassador Khalilzad's accomplishments in Afghanistan were equally impressive. During his tenure, Afghanistan held its first national free and fair elections in the nation's history and established a new government. He led United States efforts to help establish Afghan security forces and oversaw United States reconstruction assistance, allowing the Afghan people hope for new economic opportunities.

Ambassador Khalilzad will now fill a critical role as Ambassador to the United Nations. As members of this committee are much aware, having been noted already this morning, the United Nations has its limitations and is imperfect. Over the past year, some improvements, such as stronger internal oversight capacity and the establishment of a U.N. Ethics Office, have been made. But further reform is needed. Institutional reform, with the goal of making the U.N. more effective and credible, should be one of the top priorities of our new Ambassador. It will require building durable consensus among member states. This is difficult. It's hard work, and it takes time. But it will not be accomplished without strong, wise, determined, and respected U.S. leadership.

Mr. Chairman, I am also very proud of the fact that the Ambassador's oldest son is here today, and he will be introduced by the Ambassador, I'm sure, but I take some pride and personal privilege in recognizing him, as well, since he served as an intern in my office a few years ago, and he has gone off to do astounding things. I take no credit for his shaping and molding. I think his parents had much more to do with that than any of us here.

But I am proud of this nominee, as we all are. I am proud of his family. I am proud of his accomplishments. We are also pleased that his living conditions will be significantly improved—

[Laughter.]

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. As to the new position he takes in New York.

So, Mr. Chairman and my fellow committee members, I strongly, enthusiastically endorse Ambassador Khalilzad's nomination to be the next U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and enthusiastically recommend him to this committee.

Thank you.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Senator Lieberman, we welcome you to the committee. Thank you very much for taking the time to offer your comments.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT**

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee.

It really is a great personal honor and privilege to join my friend and colleague Chuck Hagel in introducing Ambassador Zal Khalilzad to this committee and to urge the committee to favorably consider President Bush's nomination of Zal to be our Ambassador to the United Nations.

It has been said that the American Ambassador to the United Nations is, in effect, America's Ambassador to the world. And I cannot think of anyone more qualified or more appropriate to serve in that role than Ambassador Khalilzad, because he represents the best of America. He is a true American-Dream success story. Born in Afghanistan, in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif. When he finished 8th grade, his family moved to Kabul. By the 10th grade, so I hear from reliable sources, he was the top student in his class. I have not been able to personally verify that, but—[Laughter.]—I have it on pretty good source.

He was given, as a result, a chance to be an exchange student in a small town in California, not far from Modesto. He went back home, and eventually enrolled in Kabul University. He, while there, attended a Fourth of July party at the home of the American Ambassador to Afghanistan, and was urged to take a test to enter the American University in Beirut. He claims that he did that partly as a prank, and intended not to go. He took the test, he was accepted, and completed his undergraduate education in Beirut, at the American University. He then went from there to pursue a doctorate in political science at the University of Chicago. Quite a remarkable story. Stayed in America, and became an American citizen in 1984, going on to serve with great distinction and effect. This is in the Reagan administration. Zal is no stranger to difficult assignments. While serving in the Reagan administration, he had an important role in American policy, both with regard to the Iran-Iraq war and with regard to the war going on in Afghanistan as a result of the Soviet invasion, and managed both with remarkable skill. He then spent some period of time at RAND, and then was called back into public service.

Over the 5 years since the September 11 attacks, Ambassador Khalilzad has been, in my opinion, quite literally America's indispensable diplomat. In assignment after assignment, he has demonstrated that diplomacy is about more than just talk. It is about building personal relationships of trust that lead to concrete accomplishments that advance America's security and American ideals.

I have heard it said very often that, in the struggle that we are involved in today in the world against Islamist extremism, ultimately our best weapon is America, is the American ideal, American values, the American way of life. And Zal, as a Muslim American, as an immigrant who came here, and, by virtue of his own extraordinary skills and hard work, has achieved such success, is

the personalization of the best response to the challenge we face today, and, if I may also add, is a shining example of the increasingly important role that Muslim Americans are playing in all phases of American society.

He has shown, in the words that Ben Bradley once used to describe President Kennedy, "special grace," which is to say courage under pressure and under fire, performing, as has been said, in two of the most difficult and most dangerous diplomatic assignments in the world today, in Kabul and in Baghdad. At the time of—at this time, in our country, of bipartisan divisions and disagreement over America's role in the world, Ambassador Khalilzad has won the respect and admiration of foreign policy doers and thinkers and politicians across the political spectrum. He is quite a remarkable human being, a great intellect, an informed sense of history, tremendous interpersonal skills, and on top of all that, a wonderful sense of humor, which, believe it or not, is occasionally necessary in the life of a diplomat.

I just leave you with this impression that I share. The last time I was in Baghdad with a congressional delegation, we were honored at a dinner hosted by President Talibani. There are the dinner were representatives of all the various factions of Iraqi Government and political and societal life. And it was quite something to watch Zal, if I may use a term from our political world, as opposed to the diplomatic world, "work the room." It was obvious that, not only did everybody know him, everybody trusted him, everybody liked him, everybody was glad to interact with him, as America's Ambassador, quite a remarkable range of talents that he will now bring to the United Nations. I hope that the President and the administration will keep Zal as he—when he goes to the U.N., at the center of the administration's foreign policy operation and occasionally, if I may respectfully offer some counsel, which I probably don't have to offer, call on him to perform special missions, because he has developed a range of personal contacts and trusting relationships around the world, and particularly in the most significant and combative parts of the world today, that I don't think any other American has.

So, it is really a great honor, and with a sense of gratitude to Zal Khalilzad for all that he has contributed to our country, and a sense of confidence about all that he will contribute to America in the years ahead, that I proudly urge this committee to confirm him as our Ambassador to the United Nations.

Thank you very much.

Senator NELSON. Thanks to you, Senator Lieberman and Senator Hagel, for your personal comments.

Mr. Ambassador, we have your statement. We will enter it as a part of the record. We would, of course, prefer that you give us a condensed version, so that we can get right to the questions. I understand you have a member of your family here, and I'd like you to introduce that member.

Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF HON. ZALMAY KHALILZAD, NOMINEE TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH THE RANK AND STATUS OF AMBASSADOR, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members. Good morning.

I would like to introduce my older son, Alex. Alex is my joy and pride. He is a law student at Stanford, second year. Unfortunately, my wife, Cheryl, and my other son, Max, could not be here with us today. But I'm delighted that Alex could make it.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, it's a great honor to come before you as the President's nominee to serve as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I want to thank the President for his confidence in nominating me for this mission. I wish to thank Secretary Rice, and look forward to continuing to work with her, should I be confirmed.

I also want to take a moment to express my deep gratitude to the many great Americans, civilian and military, and coalition partners, who have served at all levels in our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. I have been inspired by them. I wish to honor their sacrifice, particularly of those who have been wounded or lost their lives.

Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Cheryl, and my two sons, Alex and Max, for their love and support, as well as their patience during the past 4 years that I've spent abroad.

Mr. Chairman, the United Nations is an important and valuable institution. It has been the most successful collective security body in history. Standing up to aggression in Korea in 1950, undertaking scores of peacekeeping operations, endorsing decisions—endorsing decisive action to liberate Kuwait in 1991, and supporting the toppling of the Taliban Government after the attacks of September 11. An effective United Nations is in America's interest.

From my experience as U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan, I personally know that the United Nations can make a profoundly positive impact if it has the right mandate and if it is properly employed. Our partnership with the United Nations supported the Afghans as they created an interim government at the Bonn Conference, convened two Loya Jirgas, adopted a sound and enlightened constitution, and held national elections for president and parliament. None of this was easy, yet all of it was under—all of it was made easier by working in partnership with the United Nations.

Compared to its role in Afghanistan, where it ran the Bonn process to establish the new government, the United Nations played a more limited role in the political reconstitution of Iraq. Nevertheless, when I arrived as U.S. Ambassador, in 2005, I consulted with the U.N. Special Representative, starting during the drafting of the Iraqi constitution, and extending through the national elections in 2005, the formation of the Government of National Unity and the negotiations of key internal agreements on the path toward na-

tional reconciliation. I believe that changing circumstances are creating opportunities for the United Nations to play a larger role in contributing to progress in Iraq.

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, the United Nations has limitations. When members of the Security Council cannot come to agreement, action is stymied or watered-down. The United Nations has struggled to cope with new realities that put respect for state sovereignty in tension with the imperative to address security threats emanating from failed states or transnational networks or the humanitarian consequences of massive violations of human rights by the governments on their own people. There has been a lack of appropriate dealings, with massive human rights violations, by the United Nations Human Rights Council. Also, the United Nations itself has had recent failures, including the Oil-for-Food scandal, instances of peacekeeping forces sexually abusing members of the local population that they are supposed to protect, and weaknesses in management and accountability.

The challenge for the international community is to strengthen the United Nations in those areas where it has proven effective, and to address shortcomings in the areas where its performance has been poor. If confirmed, I will work with the representatives of other countries and the new Secretary General to increase the contributions of the United Nations, to addressing the central security issues of our time, and to make the U.N. itself a more effective institution through much-needed reforms.

The United States, like all countries, faces the challenge of how best to make common cause with others in support of our goals. No one should doubt the legitimacy of U.S. decisions to act unilaterally when taken through our own democratic processes and in accordance with our rights under international law. Yet, collective action is often the preferable course to take, particularly to achieve burden sharing. Also, we can enhance the legitimacy of our actions in the eyes of others by enlisting friends and allies to work with us and/or by securing endorsement of our actions through the United Nations.

Though events will drive a good deal of the work of the United Nations, I will place priority on five key issues, Mr. Chairman.

First, increasing efforts to stabilize and strengthen Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon as immediate objectives in the longer-term transformation of the broader Middle East, which is the defining challenge of our time.

Second, achieving compliance with Security Council actions with respect to Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs.

Third, ending the massive humanitarian crisis in Darfur in order to save the lives of innocents and fulfill the commitment of the United States and the international community to a responsibility to protect peoples from atrocities and genocide.

Fourth, strengthening the capability of the United Nations to undertake and manage peacekeeping operations effectively.

And fifth, promoting effective approaches to address climate and clean energy objectives in a way that supports economic growth in the coming decades.

If confirmed, I will pursue these objectives through two means. The first is through the formal channels of U.N. decision making.

I believe that there is great scope for constructive, collaborative action through results-oriented partnership involving allies and other countries, as well as the U.N. Secretariat. I will explore ways to increase cooperation among the world's democracies through the Democracy Caucus. I will also reach out to friends, as well as encourage like-minded countries to reach out to their friends, in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 to discuss how we might make common cause on issues of mutual importance.

The second means to advance our national security goals with regard to these issues comes by the virtue of the presence of the representatives from around the world, a setting that enables extensive informal engagement in an opportunity that I will take advantage of to work selected key issues proactively.

I would now like to turn to the issue of U.N. reform. If confirmed, one of my principal goals will be to promote effective, efficient, transparent, accountable, and ethical management of the United Nations. I wish to applaud the key role that members of this committee, as well as members of the House of Representatives, have played in identifying needed reforms and in supporting our mission at the United Nations as it pursues change. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you in pursuing further reform.

It is vital for the U.S. taxpayers to have confidence that we are receiving value for the money we pay in dues and assessments. I believe that the United States should pay its dues in full and on time. However, unless the United Nations takes affirmative steps to overcome the legacy of corruption from the Oil-for-Food scandals, and improves its accountability and transparency, the U.N. will lose support among the American people. Reform is imperative.

I am gratified that the Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, has pledged to make U.N. reform its prime goal. We should support him to make the changes he believes are necessary. I look forward to working with him in partnership to advance an ambitious reform agenda.

I will also, Mr. Chairman, take a fresh look at our mission, the USUN mission, and come back to you for assistance for the changes that might be needed to make our mission an effective partner in multilateral discussions and negotiations to advance our interests in the United Nations. If confirmed, I'll take an approach at the United Nations that's similar to the way I've worked in Kabul and subsequently in Baghdad. I'll focus sharply on the interests of the United States; at the same time, I am ready to engage, to listen, and to work with others in a cooperative spirit. I will pursue our goals by understanding the interests and the concerns of others and by working patiently and persistently and in common to find a way forward. I will be results-oriented, and I will give it my all.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Khalilzad follows.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ZALMAY KHALILZAD, NOMINEE TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH THE RANK AND STATUS OF AMBASSADOR, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee, it is a great honor to come before you as the President's nominee to serve as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I want to thank the President for his confidence in nominating me for this mission. I wish to thank Secretary Rice and look forward to continuing to work with her, should I be confirmed. I would like to express my appreciation to the leaders of Afghanistan and Iraq, with whom I have worked during the past 4 years in the pursuit of our common interests.

I also want to take a moment to express my deep gratitude to the many great Americans, civilian and military, and coalition partners who have served at all levels in our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. I wish to honor their sacrifices, particularly of those who have lost their lives or have been wounded. I also want to recognize the sacrifices of their families, who have to endure long separations and the worries of having their loved ones deployed in dangerous circumstances.

Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Cheryl, and my two sons, Alex and Max, for their support, as well as their patience, during the past 4 years that I have spent abroad.

THE VITAL ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations is an important and valuable institution. Historically, the challenge of creating an effective collective security organization has bedeviled mankind. The United Nations, which was a signal achievement in the great period of international institution building after the Second World War, stands as the most successful collective security body in history. No other such organization has been able to undertake peace enforcement actions comparable to the one in Korea in 1950, to lead scores of peacekeeping missions over the course of decades, to achieve consensus on endorsing such strong actions as the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 or the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. In light of this record, I agree with the view of the Gingrich-Mitchell report that an effective United Nations is in America's interest. As one of the principal architects of the United Nations, the United States placed at the foundation of the U.N. certain fundamental purposes and values—preserving peace, promoting progress, and advocacy of human rights. It is therefore vital for the United States to enable this institution to make the greatest possible contribution to advance those founding objectives.

From my experiences as U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan, I personally know that the United Nations can make a profoundly positive impact if it has the right mandate and if it is properly employed. I worked closely with the U.N. Special Representative for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, and his successor, Jean Arnault. We continuously consulted and worked out common approaches as we advanced an ambitious agenda, with the United Nations supporting our interests in stabilizing Afghanistan and helping Afghans set out on a path toward democracy. Our partnership supported the Afghans as they created an interim government at the Bonn Conference, convened two Loya Jirgas, adopted a sound and enlightened constitution, and held national elections for president and parliament. We worked with the Afghan Government on such key steps as the disarming and reintegrating of militias. The United Nations played a central role in enabling the return of millions of Afghans to their homeland in what has become the largest voluntary repatriation of refugees in history. It also helped Afghans establish a human rights commission. None of this was easy. Yet, all of it was made easier by working in partnership with the United Nations.

In Iraq, the United Nations played a more limited role, due to the history of the United Nations and the Iraq issue—rooted in disagreements among the members of the Security Council—and the resulting narrow mandate for U.N. operations in Iraq. Nevertheless, when I arrived as U.S. Ambassador in 2005, I frequently consulted with the U.N. Special Representative, Ashraf Qazi, starting during the drafting of the Iraqi constitution and extending through the national election in 2005, the formation of the government of national unity, and the negotiation of key internal agreements on the path toward national reconciliation. Tomorrow, the Iraqi Government and the United Nations will take another step toward concluding the International Compact for Iraq, an agreement under which Iraq commits itself to key reforms and international donors commit to needed support. I believe that

changing circumstances are creating opportunities for the United Nations to play a larger role in contributing to progress in Iraq.

At the same time, the United Nations has limitations, resulting from the nature of the U.N. Charter, the failure of the members of the Security Council to come to agreements on all issues, and the unwillingness or inability of the U.N. system to confront the problems of corruption and inefficiency. When members of the Security Council cannot come to agreement, action is stymied or watered down. The organization, formed at a time when direct aggression was the principal security concern, has not always found effective means to deal with aggression undertaken through insurgency or terrorism. It has also struggled to cope with new realities that put respect for state sovereignty in tension with the imperative to address security threats emanating from failed states or transnational networks or the humanitarian consequences of massive violations of human rights inflicted by governments on their own peoples. The U.N.'s actions have sometimes been driven by coalitions with a myopic focus on a single issue or applying double-standards in judging the actions of states, particularly in the area of human rights. Also, the United Nations itself has had recent internal failures, including the Oil-for-Food scandal, instances of peacekeeping forces sexually abusing members of the local populations that they are supposed to protect, and weaknesses in management and accountability.

The challenge for the international community is to strengthen the United Nations in those areas where it has proven effective and to address the shortcomings in areas where its performance has been poor. If confirmed, I will put the weight of U.S. influence toward this end. Working with the representatives of other countries and the Secretary General, I will seek to increase the contribution of the United Nations to addressing the central security issues of our times and to make the U.N. itself a more effective institution through needed reforms.

EFFECTIVELY ADVANCING U.S. OBJECTIVES THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS

The United States, like all countries, faces the challenge of how best to make common cause with others in support of our goals. No one should doubt the legitimacy of U.S. decisions to act unilaterally, when taken through our own democratic processes and in accordance with our rights under international law. Yet, collective action is often the preferable course to take. Some problems cannot be solved alone. Others are too costly to solve alone. In still other cases, when we could act alone, we can take advantage of the possibility for burden sharing. Also, we can enhance the legitimacy of our actions in the eyes of others by enlisting friends and allies to work with us. We can strengthen this legitimacy still further if decisions taken through the United Nations endorse our actions.

Though events will drive a good deal of the work of the United Nations, I will place priority on several political and security issues:

- Increasing efforts to stabilize and strengthen Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon as immediate objectives in the transformation of the Middle East, which is the defining challenge of our time.
- Achieving Iran's compliance with Security Council and IAEA requirements regarding its nuclear programs and supporting international efforts to achieve the complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment by North Korea of its nuclear programs, thereby preventing the spread of dangerous weapons and associated technologies to other state or non-state actors.
- Ending the massive humanitarian crisis in Darfur in order not only to save the lives of innocents but also to fulfill the commitment of the United States and the international community to a "responsibility to protect" peoples from large-scale atrocities and genocide.
- Strengthening the capability of the United Nations to undertake and manage peacekeeping operations effectively.
- Refocusing the U.N. commitment to human rights—one of its core precepts enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—to address the most egregious cases of human rights violations.
- Promoting effective approaches to address climate and clean energy objectives in a way that supports economic growth in the coming decades.

If confirmed, I will pursue these objectives through two means. The first is through the formal channels of U.N. decision making in the Security Council and other fora. I believe that there is great scope for constructive, collaborative action through results-oriented partnership, involving allies and other countries as well as the U.N. Secretariat. I will also explore the possibilities of new ways of working within the United Nations. The world's democracies could increase their influence if they work more closely together through the Democracy Caucus. I will engage those democratic countries that see promise in this approach and develop with their

representatives a common agenda and political strategy to achieve our shared goals. I will also reach out to friends, as well as encourage like-minded countries to reach out to their friends, in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 to discuss how we might make common cause on issues of mutual importance. Finding new ways of working with the countries in these blocs will be a priority during my tenure.

The second means to advance our national security goals with regard to these issues comes by virtue of the presence of representatives from around the world—a setting that enables extensive informal engagement and that represents an opportunity that I will take advantage of to work selected key issues proactively. Because most countries send senior representatives who have substantial authority to transact business, we can engage in discussions at the United Nations in ways that the obstacles of time and distance make more difficult in other channels, particularly when resolving issues requires regional approaches. I will seize the opportunity inherent in the setting of the U.N. to explore how we might make progress on these issues.

INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.N. THROUGH REFORM

As we discuss the need for reform, it is important to recognize that many organizations and agencies within the United Nations system carry out vital work and produce results. U.N. vaccination programs have helped to stem the spread of diseases such as polio and measles. The World Health Program led the global effort to eradicate smallpox, helped contain SARS, and focused early on the threat of a human pandemic of avian flu. The World Food Program is at the forefront of combating hunger and malnutrition and was instrumental in providing relief supplies to millions of victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami and the earthquakes that have recently struck South Asia. In Darfur, U.N. agencies are providing food, water, shelter, and healthcare. The U.N. Democracy Fund has made a promising start in supporting democracy promotion and civic society organizations.

At the same time, we should recognize that every organization needs to adapt in response to a dynamic environment. This typically requires adjustments to ensure that the organization maintains mastery of its core business, which involves defining the mission in the right way and keeping a sharp focus on performance. It also means ensuring that the organization has the right means to achieve its mission, particularly in terms of personnel, management practices, decision making processes, and creating an appropriate balance between ends and means. Only then can an organization produce the expected results and use resources in the most efficient possible manner. In this regard, the United Nations is no exception: It needs to evolve in order to keep its focus on the most pressing challenges and to reform internally to improve its efficiency and effectiveness.

Adapting to a changing environment. The world has changed tremendously since the founding of the United Nations. While the core mission continues to be security, the nature of the principal security challenges has changed. Today's threats emanate less from the risk of wars among the great powers but rather from instability in the Middle East, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the consequences of state failure, and the rise of non-state actors. Though the United Nations has made significant adaptations to meet these challenges, its evolution must continue to ensure its relevance to the most pressing challenges of the day. In terms of structural change, the United States is open-minded about considering adjustments in U.N. structures to ensure that these reflect current realities, particularly in terms of the distribution of effective power.

Reforming internal processes. If confirmed, one of my principal goals will be to promote effective, efficient, transparent, accountable, and ethical management of the United Nations. In preparing for this appointment, I have read many well-documented and -reasoned critiques of the United Nations. These highlighted problems in its personnel system, ethics and internal oversight, management structure, mission as expressed in mandates, and professionalism and discipline in the area of peacekeeping. I wish to applaud the key role that members of this committee, as well as members of the House of Representatives, have played in identifying needed reforms and in supporting our mission at the U.N. as it pursued change. If I am confirmed, I look forward to working with you in pursuing further reform.

It is vital for the U.S. taxpayer to have confidence that we are receiving value for the money we pay in dues and assessments. I believe that the United States should pay its dues in full and on time. However, unless the United Nations takes affirmative steps to overcome the legacy of corruption from the Oil-for-Food scandals and improves its accountability and transparency, the U.N. will lose support among

the American people. In turn, this will understandably erode their willingness to remain one of the principal funders of the organization. Reform is imperative.

The optimal approach, in my view, is to focus on two or three discrete but meaningful reforms, build consensus for these changes, and implement them before moving on to the next ones, rather than to pursue a long list of major changes all at once. If confirmed, I would seek to consult with interested members of this committee with respect to the best starting point and would continue to seek your advice as we proceed. In this sense, reform should be viewed as a continuing, rolling process, not an action taken at a single point in time.

My initial thinking is that we should select our first priorities for action from the following areas:

- Ensuring that professional merit is the standard by which candidates are chosen within the personnel selection processes, while continuing to ensure geographic diversity;
- Strengthening ethics rules and oversight to root out and deter corruption and to establish accountability and transparency;
- Bringing U.N. management practices up to modern standards, particularly in terms of structuring decision making, strategic planning, and measuring and assessing performance;
- Streamlining U.N. mandates to focus the organization on its core missions and to avoid diffusion of effort and resources; and
- Strengthening professionalism and discipline in U.N. peacekeeping forces, particularly by building on the preliminary steps taken over the past 2 years to eliminate the sexual abuse of members of local populations by soldiers serving in those forces.

I am gratified that Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has pledged to make U.N. reform his prime goal. He has made welcome initial statements, including his willingness to make a personal financial disclosure and his intent to authorize an external audit of U.N. funds and programs. He will have a particularly good chance to follow up on these statements with strong actions during the first months of his tenure. We should support him to make the changes he believes are necessary. I look forward to working in partnership to advance an ambitious reform agenda.

If confirmed, I will engage like-minded countries to develop political strategies that will achieve results. We should examine the lessons, or underlying logic, behind the successful performance of many U.N. agencies and explore how these might be carried over in other areas. We should examine the reasons motivating some countries to oppose needed changes and explore ways that their legitimate interests can be addressed in the context of reform. Progress will require persistent efforts at persuasion and coalition-building, as well as a willingness to bargain for incremental steps.

The question will inevitably arise about whether and how we should use the leverage we have as a major contributor to the U.N. budget. There is a tension here. On the one hand, there are missions that we wish the U.N. to perform, which means that paying our dues is not only our obligation but in our interest. On the other hand, we cannot be indifferent to a failure to step up to needed reforms. This is particularly true because the support of the American people for funding the U.N. will diminish unless changes take place. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to examine how we can best use our leverage, financial and otherwise. I will also work to find the right balance between supporting U.N. activities through assessed and voluntary contributions.

INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. MISSION

If I am confirmed, I will take a fresh look at how we conduct business at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations—how well we are organized to engage in multilateral diplomacy, what priorities we have set, whether we are attracting the most talented personnel, and other issues. I will ensure that we are setting clear goals, prioritizing among them, developing realistic strategies, and funding those strategies adequately. I may need the help of the committee, as well as your counterparts in the House of Representatives, to take steps that make service at the United Nations more attractive, thus ensuring that we get the best possible personnel for the mission.

If confirmed, I will take an approach at the United Nations that is similar to the way I worked in Kabul and Baghdad. I will focus sharply on the interests of the United States. At the same time, I am ready to engage, to listen, and to work with others in a cooperative spirit. I will pursue our goals by understanding the interests and concerns of others and by working patiently and persistently—and in common—

to find a way forward. I am hopeful that this approach can also produce results at the U.N.

If confirmed, I will work hard to advance the values of the American people. In my previous assignments, I have found that while cultures differ, people around the world yearn for certain universal values. I will seek to advance an agenda to promote those common interests—a world in which we can take collective action against threats to security, in which freedom and democracy are expanding, in which the rule of law becomes more widespread, and in which all nations enjoy economic prosperity. I will seek to make the United Nations as effective as possible in this mission. I will be results-oriented and give it my all.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

As a courtesy to my colleagues, I will defer my questions until the end.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, could I just—I can't—I don't—I'm not able to stay and ask any questions. Could I just have 60 seconds?

Senator NELSON. Of course.

Senator KERRY. I appreciate it.

I just wanted to welcome Ambassador Khalilzad. I wanted to thank him and congratulate him on his service in two, now, of the toughest posts in the diplomatic service. And, while I can't stay to ask questions, I appreciate the time he took to come and visit personally. I think he is going to be a terrific representative of our country at the United Nations. For all of us who have traveled to Iraq, and it's most of the people on this committee, I'm confident my colleagues have had the same experience I've had. He was always direct, up front, candid about the difficulties, honest about his assessments. And I think that's exactly what we need in the Diplomatic Corps in our representatives abroad. So, I'm very grateful to you for that.

Yet, while we disagreed, in many cases, on policies that you have to implement, I think you did a very skilled and able job of carrying out those policies, and we look forward to working with you at the United Nations. And I thank you for your service, sir.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator. I very much appreciate that.

Senator NELSON. Let's do 7 minutes in the first round.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador, I want to ask you to discuss what is reasonable to expect that the U.N. can do in playing a role in Iraq, Afghanistan—and as you have mentioned, also, the importance of the U.N. in Lebanon? And, although the Security Council is still wrestling with Darfur, that seems to be on the horizon. Four extraordinarily difficult situations in which the U.N., for a variety of reasons, has not been a major factor, although you, from your experience, could probably illuminate the role that it's played, and you—give credit to that. But just following along your term, "results-oriented partnership," and you will be engaged with the members of a Security Council, the Group of 77, with others. One of the great hopes, I think, of all of us for your ambassadorship is your unique experience as our Ambassador in Afghanistan, and Iraq, most recently—but, likewise, the engagement that you have had in thoughts about Lebanon and the rest of the Middle East, and, increasingly, as we take a look at Africa—that your diplomacy here may fulfill numerous roles. As has been suggested, we already have you out doing

special diplomacy, well beyond this ambassadorship, simply because of your unique qualifications.

Now, having said all of that, I added, in my opening comment, that our Government, at least initially, appears to be calling for less money for the peacekeeping budget, at the very moment that we're discussing with you how the United Nations might become more successfully engaged. The peacekeeping budget also then raises the question, once again, of how rapidly we pay our bills to the U.N., what kinds of disputes you have behind the scenes among others who you're calling upon to become engaged in ways they have not been, multilaterally, and their suggestion that it would be very helpful if, in fact, we paid on time, or we paid more. And that, of course, intersects in the business of management. But I'll not go into that, for the moment. I think the American people would also like to know if more nations would be involved in the stability of Iraq and Afghanistan and likewise in Lebanon and Darfur. While you're trying to get to that situation, what kind of budget support are you going to require? And if you want budget support, are you prepared to come to us, to help as advocates of this? In other words, how, within the administration, can you make these foreign policy goals real, but, at the same time, have the resources to be convincing with your colleagues?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, with regard to resources, I believe that in order to be successful, not only we need to have clear goals, not only we need to have a strategy, and not only we need to have a plan, but we need the resources to be able to be successful. And with regard to the United Nations peacekeeping operations that you mentioned, we vote for those. Without our support, affirmative support, they cannot go forward, given our role in the Security Council. So, therefore, I believe that we ought to take a close look at each of the proposed—looking to the future—peacekeeping operations, making sure that the goals are clear, that there is a good strategy, there is a good plan, that the tasks that need to be performed are clearly identified, and then that there is a good relationship between the means and the end. And I believe that we want—we should pay our fair share of that.

And, therefore, I favor the removal of the cap, of the 25-percent cap that has been imposed, and I favor asking for the resources by the administration in relation to those peacekeeping operations, since we have supported them.

So, I will be careful about selection of the operations. I'll be careful about how the plans are being put together. But I also, once we support that, I'll be an advocate for the resources that are needed.

Now, with regard to Iraq—of the other issues that you mentioned, I will comment on Iraq—I think there is great opportunity for the U.N. to do more. I want to point out that tomorrow the United Nations is hosting a meeting, along with the Iraqi Government, of the Iraqi International Compact, bringing people—countries together to move forward with the International Compact, where the Iraqis are committed—committing themselves to a set of reforms on the economic, political, and security track in exchange

for support from the international community. I applaud the U.N. for that.

But I think they could do more, in the coming weeks and months, with regard to the constitution. There was an agreement on a frontloaded amendment process. The U.N., based on its experience in Afghanistan and elsewhere, can bring Iraqis together. They need to make progress on the constitution to make that constitution a true national compact for success in Iraq. And the U.N. is, I think, the right instrument to assist with that. They are already involved. I think they could do more. They can do more on the issue of the local elections. They can do more with regard to dealing with militias. They have a lot of experience. I worked with them in Afghanistan in a decommissioning demobilization and reintegration program there. They can also, with the agreement of others, play an important role in the area of Kirkuk, which is an important issue, and the constitution recognizes a potential role.

So, I believe the circumstances are moving in the direction where they can play an important role. And, if I have the opportunity, I will comment on some of the other issues that you raised, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much. My time is consumed, but I just thank you for your answer, because, in my illustration at the beginning, we're paying about one-eighth of the cost of Haiti. If we did not have international partners, it would be eight-eighths, \$700 million more. Now, that's—could be applied again and again in these basic situations. And the burdens upon our taxpayers, if we are involved in a unilateral situation, are going to be exorbitant. And to the extent to that your diplomacy is able to bring others to help us, that could be a significant difference.

Thank you very much.

Senator NELSON. Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, as you know, this is an enormously busy time in the Congress right now, and many of us do have other hearings we have to go to, but I wanted to make sure that I was present here to convey my congratulations to you for this appointment, and my appreciation for all the service that you have given. You're truly a national asset, with your background and with the positions that you've held.

I was also really gratified to hear your comments about your commitment to bringing a more positive tone to our representation at the United Nations, and also the way that you described your approach to advancing national security goals through constructive, cooperative acts, along with other national leaders. Given your two positions, one thing that occurred to me as you were talking was the difference in the diplomatic approaches that have been taken immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan, as opposed to Iraq. In Afghanistan, we did convene regional consortia, including the participation of Iran; but we postponed this for quite some time, in the Iraqi situation. And mindful of your experience in both areas, and also that we did make what I was gratified to see as some of the first efforts with respect to dialog, bringing in Iran and Syria in this conference last week in Baghdad, how you see the difference

in approaches that we made, and what your thoughts are about the follow-on to the conference that took place last week.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, thank you, Senator. I appreciate what you said about me.

With regard to the two approaches, in the case of Afghanistan, as you know—and I was involved right from the beginning—after the overthrow of the Taliban, we supported the effort to form a government, an Afghan Government, immediately. And I was there, in Bonn, and worked closely with the U.N. Representative to bring the various Afghan factions together, as well as interested countries with influence and concern with regard to Afghanistan. And within a couple of weeks of that—convening that meeting in Bonn, we succeeded—the Afghans succeeded, with our support, to form an interim government led by President Karzai. And I think the Afghans selected well. President Karzai played a—and continues to play—a very important role in unifying Afghanistan, and at representing Afghanistan well. And so, that was the approach that was taken.

With regard to Iraq, I was involved there at the beginning, as well, and I convened a set of meetings in London, in Salah al-Din, in Iraq, and then in—right after our forces went to Baghdad and Iraq, arranged for meetings in Nazariah, and then in Baghdad. But then, of course, a decision was made that, rather than going for an interim government form, to go for an alternative model, declaring our presence/occupation, and sending Ambassador Bremer as the CPA, Coalition Provisional Authority; in effect, us becoming the government for a period, making decisions. So, that was a different model, and I was then, before—when Ambassador Bremer was appointed, I was sent as—nominated to go to Afghanistan as Ambassador, since I was heavily engaged in the—with the effort there, as well.

With regard to the conference that we had a few days ago, and I participated in that, it was a good conference, from my perspective, as a conference, with the Permanent 5, neighbors, U.N. And three committees were formed, as you know, working groups to prepare for a ministerial meeting. We have concerns with regard to the behavior of some of the neighbors. We'll have to see, on the ground, what happens. I was frank with regard to our concerns. But I believe that a combination of pressure with regard to issues of concern, with an openness to engage, with the intent to change behavior, to affect behavior, is the right mix, and those two elements of pressure and engagement don't have to be equal in weight. They can vary, depending on the circumstances that is available. But I believe those are among—in the toolbox of diplomacy, and we need to have as many tools as we can have, so I believe that engagement is one tool. And, as I said, doesn't have to be tools to other tools, but it can be—I don't think it needs to be taken off the table.

Senator WEBB. Well, I would agree with you that engagement is one tool, but I would also venture that, in that particular situation, you can have a lot of tools in your toolbox, but if you don't have that one, we are never going to have harmony in that region, and we're never going to get our combat troops out of Iraq. It's sort of the ultimate tool, in my opinion.

I'm running out of time. I want to wish you the best. And I hope that we can, in fact, have the right kind of cooperative and harmonious relationships in the United Nations from this point forward that are equal to the way that our reputation has historically been around the world.

Thank you very much, and good luck.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator.

Senator NELSON. Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And, again, Mr. Ambassador, welcome. I have expressed myself earlier, on my feelings about your nomination, and about your service to our country, and my enthusiastic support of this nomination, and thank you again.

I'd like to pursue the line of conversation you were having with Senator Webb on the regional security conference last week. What can you tell the committee specifically about interaction that you, representatives of our Government—Ambassador Satterfield, anyone else who represented us at that conference—interaction with Iran and Syria?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

We did have across-the-table discussions on issues, the agenda of the conference, with the Iranian representatives. We did shake hand and had short conversation with them, in—conversation of a general nature. We did—there were groups of representatives at informal discussions when there was a disagreement on the issue of the next set of meetings that—the language of the final statement, or the Chairman's statement, we—the Iranians were there, as well as our representatives, myself and others, saying, "What about this?" kind of considering different options. So, my overall comment is that, as a meeting—as far as a meeting goes, a first meeting, it was a good first step.

But I want to emphasize that, while this was a good first step, what we will be looking for is—in terms of the impact of the conference and subsequent meetings, is the impact on the ground. Will they stop supplying EFPs to Iraqis, extremists who use those against our forces? Will they stop supporting militias, training them, providing them with resources? Will they encourage the groups that they have influence over towards reconciliation? Those will be the kind of indicators that I would look to, in terms of the real impact.

But, I think, at the meeting, I think, it was a good first step.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Where do we go from here with Iran and Syria, as to the follow-on from that conference? Are we looking at bilateral follow-on meetings? I know we are looking at a ministerial level, a follow-on conference, which, if you have some specifics on where we are on that, we would welcome that information. But I'm particularly interested in where we go now, in context of Syria and Iran.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, with regard to Iran, as you know, Senator, the President granted me the authority that I had in Afghanistan last year, which is to engage Iran in discussions bilaterally in the presence of, perhaps, Iraqis, if we thought it was going to be useful to advance the agenda for success in Iraq. And we are

open-minded on that issue. If we think it would be useful, we're willing to consider that.

With regard to the conference itself, the next step is the ministerial meeting, in a formal sense. But there will be preparatory steps before the ministerial conference, in terms of the meetings of the working groups to prepare for issues—with regard to security, borders, with regard to energy, oil and electricity, with regard to refugees—for the ministers, so there will be discussions among the neighbors and—who are the statutory members, if you like, of this group, and we could get invited to participate in those by them. But the next step is the working groups.

Senator HAGEL. What about Syria?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, on Syria, we did talk with them, as well.

Senator HAGEL. Did they indicate that they had interest in a follow-on or a follow-up—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. They did express—they did express—of course, they're a member of the regional grouping—they did express an interest, should we be interested, in a bilateral set of discussions, as well.

Senator HAGEL. And are we?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, that—I have not had an opportunity to discuss this issue with the President and with the Secretary of State. I mentioned the issue of Iran, because that is an issue that was dealt with last year, when I asked for the authority, and that authority has been there.

Senator HAGEL. Do you believe it's important that we see the—whether it's bilateral or multilateral—engagement in a complete arc, a comprehensive arc, of interests in Syria, Iran, the regional concept, when we are talking about Iraq?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, yeah, I—I know the Secretary of State—

Senator HAGEL. Which would include Syria.

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. And the President approved this regional engagement in the follow-up to the Hamilton-Baker recommendations to do this regional conference with P5, plus, now, in the next one, the possibility of adding some—the G-8 countries to it, as well, and to engage with neighbors, other regional countries, other P5 countries, U.N., and G-8, with regard to helping Iraq succeed.

Senator HAGEL. But you're saying that that would include the Syrian area and Iran—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes, they are—

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Relationship.

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. If you like, statutory members of the regional—the neighbors group. Yes, Mr. Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Okay. If you wouldn't mind—and I know you are going to be focusing on other interests, but, for the time being, as we all know, you're still our Ambassador to Iraq, and you have a most capable successor coming behind you—but if it would be—if it would be important to you—and I think it is to the committee—if you could provide the committee an answer to the question on where we are with follow-up on Syria, especially in regard to my particular question, "Did the Syrians ask us for bilaterals for fol-

low-ups?" And you mentioned you had not yet had an opportunity to visit with the President on this. But we would appreciate a follow-up, when you have that.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes, sir. But I can tell you right now that they did express an interest in a bilateral, should we be interested.

Senator HAGEL. No, I—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I can say that.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. But I'm interested in what our response is.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. Yes, sir. Yes, Senator.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Senator NELSON. When was that talk with Syria that you just mentioned to Senator Hagel?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. This was on Saturday, last Saturday, Senator, in Baghdad, in a—the conference that was at the initiative of the Iraqis, inviting the neighbors, plus regional countries. The reason I say "regional," because Egypt was also there, and, as you know, Egypt is not an immediate neighbor. And Bahrain was also there, and Bahrain is not an immediate neighbor. So—and the Permanent 5—permanent members of the Security Council and the United Nations, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, they were all there. And, in that context, the discussions involving us and others, including Syria and Iran, took place with regard to helping Iraq succeed. And the three committees that I mentioned were agreed to working groups on those three issues that I mentioned.

Senator NELSON. Was that the first time that you or your office had had contact with Syria?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. With regard to Iraq, since I've been Ambassador to Iraq, in a—in Baghdad, yes, that is—that's right.

Senator NELSON. Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to applaud the President for offering this nomination. Ambassador, you have provided this country with tremendous service, skilled service. You have a unique ability to generate, I think, kind of, the highest level of credibility for America in dealing with a very tough region. And I've watched you in action in Baghdad, and I've been with you at the United Nations. And I've—strongly support this nomination and look forward to working with you when you are confirmed.

I have three areas, during the short time I have, that I want to touch upon. One is U.N. reform, which—I think the steam has gone out of that. Second has been Darfur, in which the U.N. has been rather toothless in the face of genocide, and we need to move forward more aggressively. And third is the question of Iran and how we deal with that.

Both at the U.N., and perhaps in addition to the U.N., are there other, kind of, layers or avenues in which we can deal with the Iranian situation? You mentioned, for instance, Egypt being at the conference. Clearly, a number of the Sunni countries in the region have as deep a concern about Iran's hegemony and their activities as we do, as anyone else does. And so, in addition to the United Nations, are there other avenues?

Let me just touch upon the U.N. reform. First, I appreciate your strong statement in—opening statement, where you said, “Unless the United Nations takes affirmative steps to overcome the legacy of corruption from the Oil-for-Food scandals and improve its accountability and transparency, the U.N. will lose support among the American people. In turn, this will understandably erode their willingness to remain one of the principal funders of the organization. Reform is imperative.” Yet reform doesn’t seem to be happening. The Secretary General has stepped forward, but the G77 does not—at this point, is clearly not committed to reform. So, when you have an organization structurally which has that one country, one vote, but G77 has great power, and they have consistently resisted a vote that Secretary General Annan’s as well as Secretary General Ban’s efforts to reform, can you move them forward without the hammer of funding? And, second—two questions—should we be clear about the hammer of funding, to say what you just said, so that the G77 understands that, whether it’s us or the Brits or others, that unless reform takes place, there are going to be consequences?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, first, Senator, I will work very hard with the Secretary General, who—as the new Secretary General has an opportunity to persuade members, this period of honeymoon and—it could be—it should be, in my view, used to advance the reform agenda. Two, I will work with the like-minded nations, especially the democratic allies, the democratic Caucus, to see how we can work together to influence the Group of 77, and work with friends within the Group of 77—not only our friends, but friends of the other democracies—to use their influence, as well as the Secretary General, to advance the agenda of reform. I believe absence of reform is a mortal threat to the United Nations, and United Nations is a common interest to all of its members. I believe that the issue of funding, based on analysis, facts of the situation with regard to the American people, if there is no reform, the attitude could change in a way that will make funding increasingly difficult, and that’s not in the interest of the institution. And, therefore, I believe the issue of funding had to be on the table, but it has to be, in my judgment, a kind of last resort, to—but the reality of the connection between reform and funding is a reality that I will be pointing to and making use of in my interactions with others. But, as I said, this is something that I would look at as a kind of a last-resort issue.

Senator COLEMAN. Well, I agree with the ranking member, of the cost-effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping. We need multilateral support. The U.N. should be a forum for doing that, but—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. We haven’t done anything, and mandate review—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. A thousand U.N. mandates, and move forward on that—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Oversight accountability, procurement—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Sure.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. You've got a full plate, Ambassador.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Sure. May I say something?

Senator COLEMAN. Please.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I'm sorry to interrupt. But I do think that, while quite a long list of reforms have been identified, I also will do one other thing. And I will be very much in touch with you, Senator, in particular, on this issue. If we could choose two or three to go after first, and, having accomplished those, then to agree to another two or three that we ought to go after, might also be useful as part of our approach to advance the reform agenda. Sorry to interrupt you.

Senator COLEMAN. No, I appreciate it. And I do believe, by the way, Secretary Ban is a breath of fresh air. And I'm hopeful that his intentions can be converted into action.

Short time left. Talk to me about Darfur. It is very frustrating. Genocide is going on. We've said that. The Secretary of State has said that. And the U.N. seems incapable of overcoming Darfur—Sudan's resistance. Can we get something done? What's it going to take?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, it may take other—additional more coercive measures, vis-a-vis the Government in Khartoum, to get it to cooperate. I think it is unacceptable, the position that government has taken, the back-and-forth with regard to its commitment to cooperate. So, I believe that this is very important that progress is made on this front. And I will—should I be confirmed, will work with the Secretary of State and others here, as well as other nations and—to look at options for increasing the pressure with the intent to change the attitude of the government.

Senator COLEMAN. My time is just about expired. Just one comment, and that is, the prospect—I believe that the prospect of Iran getting a nuclear weapon is the single greatest threat to peace, to stability in the Middle East and the world. And they keep moving in that direction, and the U.N., at least, is one form, Security Council. But, if not, there needs—we cannot allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. So, I—at some other time and some other place, we need to have that conversation.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes, sir. I look forward to that.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you.

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. What are some of those pressures that you can place on the Government of Sudan with regard to Darfur?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, the range of options, of course, is considerable. There are the sanctions with regard to the people in the government, sanctions with regard to institutions in the government, as—sanctions with regard—more broadly, and so on. We can slice it in a variety of ways. But I don't want to be too specific, in terms of which ones I will work for, because, as you know, I've been very focused on Iraq. I just got back. And, if I am confirmed, I'd like to have the opportunity to go up there and talk to others, consult with others. But I think, having said that, there is absolute need to consider additional options to bring about a change in the

attitude. And that is my judgment with regard to the situation, Senator.

Senator NELSON. In your opinion, why haven't we done that before?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I—as I said, in that—from what I have read, the State Department, the Secretary of State and others, have stated that we need to look at additional options to bring about a change in behavior. And the government has been, sometimes, sending positive signals, the Khartoum Government, and, therefore, delaying the consideration of additional options. And I think now the signals are going in the opposite direction, pointing to going back on commitments made before. So, I think, we, in turn, need to look at our options for increased pressure to bring about compliance.

Senator NELSON. Senator Corker.

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.

And I want to say, it was quite an opportunity for me to meet with you and Deputy Prime Minister Salih in Iraq, about 3½ weeks ago. And, upon hearing that you were going to the United Nations, I will say that, on one hand, I knew we were going to be represented very, very well; at the same time, I kind of hated to see you leave, when you were actually causing things to happen. I know you're entering a different arena where that may be a little bit more difficult.

So, I have two questions. The first is, we're focusing a lot right now on General Petraeus and what's happening in Baghdad. And there have been a lot of dates talked about. Midsummer we'll know whether we've been able to turn what has been a downward spiral into an upward spiral. And yet, so much of that is dependent upon what happens by the government there, by Maliki, Salih, al Zawbai, what happens there on the ground. I'm wondering if you could help us think through, with the tremendous experience you've had on the ground there, just what the timetables you think are—what the realistic timetables are, as far as the actual implementation of the hydrocarbons agreement and money actually hitting the streets, if you will, the actual spreading around of the \$10 billion that's going to help create jobs there, and the actual real final agreements on de-Baathification reform.

And then, second, if we have time, I'd love for you to talk about—you're obviously going into a different arena, much like I've just done, and—talk a little bit about how you truly cause, as one representative going to the U.N., the type of things to occur there. You've been in a different position, where you've been able to hands-on negotiate and really create the energy behind the things that are happening in Iraq on the ground. Talk to us a little bit about how you actually go about implementing some of the changes that my colleagues at the U.N. have referred to.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator, for what you said about me. I appreciate that.

With regard to the decisions by the Iraqi leaders, I think one of the challenges that remain is how to incentivize them to do the right thing for themselves. And I know that they are facing very, very big and difficult issues. And their sense of time is not the same as ours, really. We tend to be very impatient. And these proc-

esses and issues that they are dealing with, by historic standards, takes—take a long time. If you look at the history of other nations, Europe, when you've had different groups coming together for the first time to try to figure out how to put a nation and a state together. So, while I appreciate the difficulties—the enormity of the challenges that the Iraqi leaders face, I do believe that we need to continue to incentivize them to move at a faster pace.

Now, on—there have been, in recent weeks, some progress. I think the budget was passed by the Assembly, of \$40 billion. This is one of the good things about Iraq. They have a lot of resources. Where, in Afghanistan, unfortunately, where I served beforehand, they didn't have that, the amount of resources that Iraq has. They have put \$10 billion into the development account. They have given, I am advised, the—10 percent of the budget already has been disbursed, I am advised. They have—we are helping them to do better, in terms of budget execution. They have been good at executing the budget with regard to paying salaries and retirement and subsidies, but not as good with regard to investing in projects and—in development projects.

Now, on the hydrocarbon law, they have agreed, in the Cabinet—it was a very important agreement, and it was a—it's a good law, in my view. They have—the Assembly has to approve it. And I believe the timeline for that is the next—they have said until May 31 is the timeline they have given themselves for approval. So, our encouragement that they are setting deadlines and targets to be—to incentivize them to move forward.

De-Baathification, that's the issue I was working on with them when I left, to get them to—the presidency representing Kurd, Shia, and Sunni—the president, two vice presidents—to come to a compromise agreement to balance reconciliation with accountability, and to adjust the de-Baathification law that Ambassador Bremer had imposed, was—which was, in my judgment, too draconian and too broad to refer those who have committed crimes to a judicial process, and then to turn and—to reconciliation with regard to the rest. And I hope that, in the coming couple of weeks, the presidency will offer that compromise agreement. But it will require us to work with them, continue to encourage them to make the compromises that they need to make with each other. And ultimately, of course, it's the constitution and issues such as what to do with militias—those are also critical issues that remain for the government and the Iraqi leaders to deal with. And, as I said, it will take effort to continue to incentivize them to move in the direction that they need to move.

Senator CORKER. Do the people on the ground in Iraq feel a sense of forward movement that's causing them to be encouraged that their government is actually going to deliver on making these things happen?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe that there is some optimism—increased optimism in recent weeks with the combination of the new security plan for Baghdad—the indications are, in the conversations from others talking to Iraqis from the mission, and my own conversation with some of the leaders, that there is a more positive attitude. And if the security situation improves, if the government makes the decision that they need to make, that would ob-

viously further increase optimism. But people are wary and uncertain, and they've heard a lot of declarations before, so they want to see changes on the ground. So, I don't think one can say there is a groundswell of optimism that has happened, but there is increased—I think I would say, compared to 2 months ago or 3 months ago, there is greater optimism on the streets in parts of Baghdad than was the case earlier.

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Senator Feingold, I understand you have a time problem?

Senator FEINGOLD. I certainly appreciate being—having the chance to speak, and I'll try to be brief.

Thank you, Ambassador Khalilzad, for your service and for your willingness to work in some of the most challenging and difficult positions in the U.S. Government. I am pleased that the administration has chosen such a qualified and talented candidate for this position.

As you are well aware, should you be confirmed, you'll be taking one of the most visible ambassadorships in the United States and the world. Your leadership in the U.N. not only affects how the American public views the U.N., but how the world perceives the United States.

Unfortunately, I fear that your predecessor did little to advance international understanding of the United States or American of the U.N. The U.N. is facing major challenges right now as it tries to reform itself to meet new global objectives and overcome emerging threats that are beyond the reach of any single country. At this pivotal time, strong leadership from the United States is more important than ever. I had hoped that the Human Rights Council could bring about a new era of accountability for human rights crimes and abuses, and I have been disappointed in the lack of U.S. commitment to ensuring that it is robust and effective. We are also failing to provide adequate financial support for U.N. peacekeeping missions at a time when the United States is relying more and more on multilateral cooperation to act as a force multiplier in ending and resolving conflicts throughout the world. So, it strikes me as contradictory that the United States should call for more and stronger U.N. peacekeeping missions, but fail to provide the necessary financial resources to ensure that these missions, which are in our national interest, are successful.

So, I strongly encourage you, Ambassador, to make these issues a priority as soon as you are confirmed. Of course, these are only a few of the many issues facing you that are important to the long-term security of the United States. I do look forward to working with you again in this context to improve the U.N. while protecting U.S. foreign policy and our national security interests.

Ambassador, as the long-time chairman and ranking member of the Africa Affairs Subcommittee, I've been—become increasingly aware of the impact that developments in Africa can have on American interests and national security, as well as regional security there. Recognizing that your focus has been on the middle—on Middle East issues, I would like to hear what you, at this point,

consider to be the U.N.'s top immediate and longer-term priorities on—in the African continent.

Ambassador.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, thank you, Senator Feingold, for your comments about me.

With regard to Africa, the immediate focus will be on, dealing with the situation in Darfur and connected with Chad and Central African Republic, to bring about a change in the behavior of the Government in Khartoum to allow for the U.N., the hybrid force that has been discussed to be deployed to stop the killing of the innocent in Darfur and to contain the conflict from spreading.

There are other priorities, as well, of course. We need to, based on our conversation yesterday, look at the mandate for Congo and see how that needs to be adjusted. There is issues with regard to—HIV/AIDS issues that some U.N. organizations—international organizations are involved with. That remains a consistent concern, as does the whole issue of development of the continent.

But, security-wise, I would think that the two immediate areas of focus, with Somalia also being there very much, is Sudan, Somalia, and the post-election period in Congo, whether, and how, the mandate and the presence of the forces might change. So, those would be—

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. My response, Senator.

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you for that answer, Ambassador.

You've already mentioned, a couple of times, the U.N.-sponsored 2001 Bonn Agreement that established a framework for post-Taliban Afghanistan, that included Iran, Russia, Pakistan, and India, as well as the United States. Doesn't Bonn provide lessons about how, through diplomacy rather than bluster, we can get the U.N. to act in our best interests?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I think that the U.N., as I said in my statement, can play, and has played, an important role, in several crises, that have served our interests. So, I believe that it's in our interest for the U.N. to be effective and for us to strengthen the U.N. and to work with it in dealing with problems. I mentioned—

Senator FEINGOLD. But specifically on Bonn, though, were United States interests compromised by negotiating with Iran at Bonn?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. No, they were not.

Senator FEINGOLD. How did the U.N. framework for post-Taliban Afghanistan help you as U.S. Ambassador?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Oh, I—we were—along with the U.N., the architect of the Bonn framework—I was, myself, in Bonn at that time, from the National Security Council, there, working with Lakhdar Brahimi. So, it was very much of a good road map that was developed, a good interim authority, led by a good leader, President Karzai was selected in Bonn. And the U.N. played a very, very positive role—

Senator FEINGOLD. So, it helped you, it did not hinder you.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. It helped me—

Senator FEINGOLD. Well—

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. It helped the United States a great deal, yes.

Senator FEINGOLD. I hope that your involvement in these efforts in Afghanistan mean that you will—that you understand, as I think you do, that we can negotiate with Iran and other nations with which we have serious disagreements, and that, notwithstanding what the administration told us in the lead-up to the war in Iraq, our national security interests are often best served through multilateral efforts.

As you know, we held a hearing on Afghanistan last week and examined United States efforts to stabilize the country. And, given your tremendous familiarity with Afghanistan, which I've seen in person in Afghanistan, I would like to hear your thoughts as to whether the United States is providing enough assistance, and where the U.N. needs to increase its security, stabilization, and reconstruction assistance. What do we need to do?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I believe success in Afghanistan is critical. And I believe we—along with our European allies, particularly the NATO allies, who will also now have a lot at stake, with their own forces being engaged, and their reputation and, one might say, even the future of NATO being engaged, do all that we can to help the Afghan Government succeed, not only in the military domain, but also in terms of building their economic and—situation improving that—building the capacity of the government, rule of law, extending the authority of the government. But, at the same time, I think it's critical for success that we work together to improve relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to pursue that in a persistent way. I think that's in our interest.

With regard to details of how much we ought to do more of, if you would permit me, I will be glad to come back after I've had time to reengage. I've been focused on Iraq, and I've not followed, in detail, the level of our assistance in—with regard to particular areas in the budget. So, I'll be more than happy to get back to you on that.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, again, Mr. Ambassador, and good luck.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, we want to thank you for your testimony today, and especially for your public service. You've taken on tough assignments, and we're grateful for that commitment to the country and to public service.

When you were in my office the other day, we had a chance to cover a couple of different areas, one of them being a question, which I guess speaks more to the person and the environment within which they're working—in any field of government, at any level—and that was the question of personal leadership style and how you approach the opportunity that you'll have to serve as U.N. Ambassador. The question I have is, even as you—in that position—even as you support, obviously, and uphold, broad principles of American foreign policy and our diplomatic strategy and tactics, I would hope that you'd also remain flexible to be able to implement a strategy that'll be best for the country, even if it deviates from a preordained or even an ideological point of view. And I think we've had, in the past, unfortunately, too much of the latter,

more of a unilateral go-it-alone approach. And I think it's high time those days end and that we have a different approach.

And I know, from your experience, and from your service, that you've approached problems that way, and I just wanted to have you comment on that, in terms of leadership style, especially with regard to this important position, which is on a world stage, in more ways than one. If you could just comment on that, and how you approach that.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, thank you, Senator.

Based on on-the-ground experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, I believe, to achieve our goals, engagement with others, finding common ground to advance our agenda, and listening to others, being in the mode of seeking to solve problems that we face, not assuming that we always have the answers, that others may come up with approaches that can also work, have been the guideline for my—the way I operate. As you say, very much committed to the objectives that we seek. And that would be my style in the United Nations, as well. I'm going there to—with the aim of making progress on issues of concern, both in terms of dealing with real security problems of this new era, but also to help the institution be more effective in carrying out its mission, and to engage together with others, be respectful, and to listen, but also not shy away from pointing out why we think the way we do, and to be persistent, not to give up, not to be discouraged in the face of complexity and difficulty. And I hope to have a team with me—because, you know, I'm just one person—to—that would be able to be effective contributors, along with me, in advancing our agenda, and that's why I would come back to you, as I mentioned to you when we met, and that I would like to go take a look at our mission and see how we could organize ourselves or attract the kind of talent that we need to attract to be as effective as possible, because I think there is a great opportunity, if we are effective in the United Nations, to advance our agenda, generally.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

And with regard to your two previous assignments, both in Iraq and Afghanistan—first of all, Iraq, when you look forward—and I know—you're looking to be confirmed and to be at the United Nations, but I'd ask you to look forward, in terms of Iraq, and, in the next 6 months to the next year—what do you think is the main diplomatic objective when it comes to doing everything possible, not just to have a military strategy that works, but all—and a political strategy—but also just in terms of diplomacy? What would—if you were remaining the next 6 months or the next year—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Senator, it's critical that we can incentivize the Iraqis to do the right thing, to make progress on the political issues that divide the Iraqis. The agenda will be completing the oil law, because we're talking about trillions of dollars of resources which Iraq has. How would they share that, develop that in a way that unites the various communities? I think a positive step was taken in the Cabinet's approval. That needs to be brought to completion within the timeframe that you talked about.

There has to be a good reform of de-Baathification, accountability, and reconciliation—accountability going to a judicial process, taking away from a political process, which is—which it is

now—to a judicial process, but also reconciliation, welcoming people who have not committed crimes and were not very senior in the hierarchy of the Baath Party, into the fold. Also, to deal with—to have a demobilization, decommissioning, reintegration plan put forward by the government with regard to militias, and set a date for the election of—provincial elections, and amend the—to be ready with amendments to be voted on in the constitution, to make the constitution a true national compact.

Each of the other things that I talked about, the—if they are done, that will make the constitutional referendum—making the constitution a compact will be made a lot easier, because those are the issues that the Iraqis, with additional one or two issues, are the key issues on which they are divided. So, I would think that is very important.

Also, I believe we have—another diplomatic challenge is how to get the neighbors to play a positive role, to be helpful to Iraq, not to seeing the difficulties of one's neighbor opportunities, but, rather, to think in new way with them pursuing common—developing a set of relationship where they are more helpful than some of them have been. And that will be the other big challenge, I think, a diplomatic challenge for us.

Senator CASEY. I am over time, but, just very quickly, if you can address this briefly. In light of what you just said about Iraq, going forward, what do you think, if any—of an expanded role by the U.N., what should that be, if you can define that quickly?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I think the U.N. can play an important role with regard to the constitution, with regard to elections, with regard to the issue of Kirkuk, I mentioned, that's also a timeline beyond the 6 months. I think it's—by the end of the year, there has to be a referendum, see the preparations with that referendum, that it takes place in a way that is successful, in terms of keeping Iraqis together, that that doesn't become another fault line, this one between Arabs and Kurds. So, I think the situation is evolving in Iraq, in terms of issues that are becoming important, that is a great opportunity for enhanced U.N. role, and that will be one of my objectives, if I am confirmed, when I go up to New York.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, welcome, and thank you for your service to our country. You have taken on some tough assignments, and we appreciate that.

I'd like to lay out my questions and then hear your answers, so I can get them all in. There are four different ones.

One is about Iraq. It seems to me that unless we have a date—certain that the Iraqis understand that they have to make the hard choices, compromises, negotiations necessary for a Government of National Unity to be achieved, that it is possible—and the rest other world understands that we are not there indefinitely; it continues to be seen as America's war, not the world's interest—and so, in your new role that you will hopefully have, the question is, How do we get—the tipping point has not seemed to come in which other countries believe that they have to be engaged, in meaningful

ways, in trying to create stability in Iraq, both regionally and beyond the region—how will you pursue that, as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations?

Second, with reference to Iran, I am glad to see that among your priorities is compliance with Security Council actions. You know, the greater the success that you and we have at the United Nations, through the multilateral efforts, the less likely that we will ever have to consider military options. The less success that we have at the United Nations, the greater the chances come for that. The question is, How do we move other countries to more fully enforce the existing Security Council actions? And, as we try to make those actions more pervasive, how do you intend to try to use all of the resources—your diplomatic skills, of course, whatever persuasiveness, showing other countries their own interests in pursuing this, but also other options we have; we have economic levers here to pull, as well—how do we get them to understand that containing Iran's nuclear ambitions is one in which there is common cause and we have greater success in its enforcement?

Third, last year I was successful in working with others—Senator Obama and others—at getting—Senator Brownback—an additional \$60 million included in the supplemental appropriations to fund a peacekeeping mission in Darfur. I've heard some of the answers you've given to that previously. But I'd like to see how do you intend to, again, and use the wide array of options that exist for us to actually get President al-Bashir to submit to what he has gone back on, which is a hybrid A.U./U.N. peacekeeping force. People continue to die. We talk about it, we anguish about it, but we seem to not be able to move forward. I find it incredible.

And then, lastly, we haven't had a lot of discussion on this, but this is one of my major concerns, and that is the Human Rights Council. I know that the Council was supposed to be an element of reform. When Cuba and China, some of the biggest human rights abusers, are on the Council, I just quite can't understand it. But I am concerned that our absence from it at the same time, while a statement that we don't believe it has reformed the way it should, also leaves—cedes the ground to others in some of the most consequential issues, people who languish in countries in the world, who look to the United States as a beacon of light, of freedom and democracy, and of respect for human rights—when that voice is absent in that respect, I'm not quite sure that we're promoting our interests or giving those people who we want to see take the chance to struggle in their own countries to move toward democracy in their own countries, and human rights, a type of hope and opportunity that they want. And so, I'd like to hear how you're going to be pursuing that course, as well.

It's a big agenda, but that's what the U.N. job is all about, and I look forward to your answers on those four topics.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator.

With regard to Iraq, I believe that that is a delicate balancing that—in our approach—that needs to be considered, in my view. On the one hand, I think it's imperative that we incentivize Iraqis to move forward, to take on more responsibility and to make the decisions that they need to make. And that means there are benchmarks. On the other hand, I also believe we need to be careful that

we don't do things that could unravel the situation altogether. And, therefore, not to tie our force levels to a particular event happening, or not, in a particular time. So, impatience and—a sense of direction, I think, is good. Timeline with regard to benchmark is good. But I believe that some flexibility so that we—whether we can judge that this—if a timeline has not been met, it's not because of a set of other things that brings us to a judgment that they are not going to make the decisions that are needed, and, therefore, that will lead one to one conclusion, that perhaps we ought to be looking at some other way of doing business with them. But if, on the other hand, they are making progress, but yet, they have missed a deadline because of good reasons—I mean, we all are familiar with missing deadlines—because of the complexities of the process, because the issues are difficult, then I wouldn't, sort of, judge that we ought to enforce what we said we would do because we have set a deadline earlier. So, I would like to give the people who are in a position of responsibility, such as yourselves, a sense of why the progress has not been made. Is it on a single item, or is it part of a pattern?

And I also want you to—want us to be aware that—and take into account—that if we—we shouldn't do something that gives control to people who want us to fail, and they say, "Aha. If we can cause a particular deadline not to be met, then the United States will do certain thing that brings about a less desirable situation."

I appreciate the—what you all have to go through and—to balance things, as political leaders, representing our people, and the impatience of our people out there. So, I appreciate that. But from my experience, I'd like to also think—for your consideration, I would put forward that the complexity, in terms of the balancing that needs to be taken into account.

Now, I'm sorry I've taken a long time on your first question.

Senator MENENDEZ. Actually, you commented on what was a comment. My question was, How do you get other countries in the world—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. To understand that it is their interest to engage in Iraq.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Oh. I'm sorry. I thought you said in setting a date-certain—

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I—

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. So I was—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Mentioned that—

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. I was talking to—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. As an observation—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Of my own.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ. But my question was—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. How do you get other people—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. In the world—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, other—I think we have to engage them. We have to take their interests into account. We have to use our friends that work with us to also engage on our behalf. That's why, within the U.N., I'm very much—the preparations that I've done in the past few days has intrigued me with the concept of working and operationalizing the Democratic Caucus there. I will be very focused on how we can get that caucus to be effective. And I believe that we ought to also use our friends and relationship of our friends with—our friends in the NAM and G7. I will engage with them. I think the engagement is a tool. It's not an end in itself, but it's a tool that can shape behavior. But you have to take interests of others into account. And in Iraq, I believe, in particular, there is a lot that we—of countries that should have common interests with us there, because Iraq is a rich country in a critical region of the world, and its oil resources is of a global interest for the future of energy security. And making sure that Iraq doesn't become a place where terrorists can use to operate against the world is a common interest of everyone. Keeping Iraq together as a single nation is a common interest of others. So—and this Shia/Sunni conflict, not spreading to engulf the entire region, is a common interest of others and ourselves. So, I think what we have done, in terms of this regional conference with P5 and now bringing G-8, is a—it's a good adjustment to engage others. And I will, in the United Nations, work through the Security Council, with other colleagues, and with the regional states, to continue to seek cooperation of others, based on common interests, but also listening to others' ideas and suggestions, as well.

Senator MENENDEZ. Very good.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Ambassador, you talk about—

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may, could I—

Senator NELSON. Yes. I want to follow up on that point.

Senator MENENDEZ. Sure.

Senator NELSON. You talk about the engagement with the other nations, but we have been hearing this for 4 years. So, what are you going to do different for engagement?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I told you one, in that I'll try to—with—in the U.N., should I be confirmed—work proactively with the Secretary General, the new one. He's new, and I will be new, and we both have a task of looking around, seeing what's wrong, what's working, how do we move forward on fixing things that are not right.

Two, to get the group of democracies that are there to activate that, to make it an effective instrument.

And, three, to also engage with the NAM and Group of 77.

I also believe that the presence of the diplomats from around the world, and many of whom come very well regarded and well connected, provide an opportunity not only to deal with issues in a formal sense with—that are on the agenda of the U.N., but, otherwise, also provide an opportunity to advance our agenda, otherwise. For example, on how to help the Afghan/Pakistan relationship, because that's critical for success of Afghanistan; or how to get the regional countries to be more positively engaged in Iraq.

These are ideas, at this point, Mr. Chairman. And, should I be confirmed, I'll go and see which ones I think, of these options, will

be the most effective. And I have promised that, if you will give me the opportunity, that, after I spend a bit of time there and I've had my mind engaging the problems and tactics and the strategy that work, that I'd be more than happy to come back, should I be confirmed, a month or 6 weeks later, to tell you, now, based on kicking the tires around, talking to people, what I think is going to be likely to be more effective. At this point, I—

Senator NELSON. We'll take you up on that, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I know I asked the Ambassador four questions. And I know Senator Obama's waiting. So, if you could give us, in writing, your answers to the other three I asked you about Iran, Darfur, and the U.N. Human Rights Council—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I'd be happy to.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. In an expeditious fashion, so—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I'll do it right away.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Before I have to cast a vote. But I—

Senator NELSON. Senator Menendez, if you want to, let's let Senator Obama go, and we'll continue with your questions.

Senator MENENDEZ. If I can, Mr. Chairman—I have a Budget Committee markup that's marking up the budget, and I may have to be there to cast some votes, so I will hang as long as I can.

Thank you.

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ambassador, good to see you again. I'll try to be relatively brief. I know a lot of the issues that I was interested in have already been discussed, and I won't have you repeat them. I'll look at the transcript of the hearings.

Senator Menendez, who's been very active on issues of human rights, has raised some important questions about Darfur. There actually is, right now, an unfolding crisis. It's a—it's been an ongoing crisis, but one that's been in the news recently, and that's the situation in Zimbabwe. You know, President Mugabe's regime has been repressive for some time, has been divisive for some time, but, since Sunday, what we've seen is not even the pretense of respecting the rights of opposition leaders. You've got 50 Zimbabweans, who were attending a peaceful prayer meeting outside Harare, being brutalized; a protester, shot and killed. You've got the leader of the Movement for Democratic Change being badly beaten and severe head injuries. So, I'm wondering whether the administration has some plan in the United Nations, what other countries are thinking about how we might put more pressure on the Mugabe regime. And this speaks, I think, to a larger question, and that is, you know, what's the appropriate role for the United States in advancing human rights issues at a time when our stock around the world appears to have fallen?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator. It's great to see you again.

One, with regard to human rights, generally, this is one of the core missions of the United Nations. Security, conflict prevention, being number one. Number two being progress, economic development. And third being human rights. And I said, before you came, with regard to Darfur, that we need to look at options for incentivizing the government in Khartoum to cooperate, including more forceful options, from sanctions against elements in the—people in the regime, to institutions, to government as a whole, to other issues. Which ones of those I would favor, again, if you would allow me, Senator, I've been back 3 or 4 days from Iraq, I promise to get back with you, if I am confirmed, as to, among the options, talking to our experts, see what would produce the desired results, and which ones we can do effectively, because some of these will require cooperation from others, as well.

On Zimbabwe, I believe that there is important human rights and other considerations with regard to Zimbabwe. As to what the administration is doing, if you permit me, I—to provide that for the record, as to what the approach is at the present time, and if you permit, again—

Senator OBAMA. I'm going to be—

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. I have been—I go up there, and engage my own mind, and then I look forward to having a conversation with you.

Senator OBAMA. I'm happy to get responses in writing to those questions, after you've conferred with the State Department and others in the administration.

Senator OBAMA. You may feel the same way about this next question, because it's a broad one, but, I think, one that's vital and that touches on the other—one of the other core missions of the United Nations, one you've mentioned, and that's security. It's my view that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the structure that we've set up in the past, is fraying rather badly. I think everybody's in agreement that the NPT needs updating. We've got regional proliferation problems, like Iran and North Korea, but we've also got some broader questions arising out of the treaty with India, the desire for a variety of nations to look at nuclear power as an option to deal with their energy needs. We still need to make more progress on securing nuclear materials and enhancing international interdiction efforts. So, I'm just wondering, do you have, at this stage, any thoughts, in terms of how the administration would approach strengthening that regime? Is it something that you've already discussed? Is it something that you'd like to get back to us on?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I would like to get back to you with regard to initiatives that the administration may be considering. But I believe that the issue of proliferation is one of the defining—another defining challenge of our time. And the relationship between peaceful nuclear activity—civilian nuclear program and military nuclear program, is an issue that I have had a lot of experience with earlier in my career. I worked a lot on how to prevent countries to get legitimately very close to nuclear weapons without violating any rules, because of our earlier Atoms for Peace programs. And I think some adjustments were made in our approach, on a bipartisan basis. But, moving forward from here on with adjustments

to the NPT or other nonproliferation regimes on the nuclear issue, in terms of the administration's thinking or approaches, if you don't mind, I will provide that for the record, Senator.

Senator NELSON. And when you do, Mr. Ambassador, give us information on your opinion of China and Russia, supportive of your efforts in the U.N. Security Council on sanctions.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe—with regard to Iran, I will do that, but I was briefed that good progress has been made in the last 24 to 48 hours with regard to the next step in relation to Iran, in New York. But I'll be happy, Mr. Chairman, to provide a more detailed answer for the record.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, sir.

Senator NELSON. Well, speaking of that, do you support the agreement recently reached with North Korea on the steps toward lessening proliferation?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I know that the administration supports it, and—I know that the administration, Chairman, supports it, and I have not examined the document in detail, but I don't see any reason why I would not support it. Yes, I associate myself with the administration, of course.

Senator NELSON. Why would the former Ambassador be opposed to it?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I'm—I wanted to make sure that you know that I have not read the details of the agreement, but the administration supports it, and, therefore, of course, I support it, as well.

Senator NELSON. Well, I think it's just curious that the former Ambassador to the United Nations is now coming out opposing the very agreement that the administration has reached.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I—you will have to ask him, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. Let me quote—you had made reference to the Iraq Study Group Report that had been embraced by the administration in a answer to a previous question. And let me quote from page 16 of the executive summary, "By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection should be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special-operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid-reaction and special-operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al Qaeda in Iraq."

Do you generally support that statement by the Iraq Study Group?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. In my view, Mr. Chairman, the desire to get the U.S. role in combat, sectarian combat between Iraqi groups, and to have Iraqis to take on more of a responsibility in that area, is a desirable goal, but it has to be done in a way that is workable. And, therefore, while I support the sentiment, my concern is that not making that condition-based, but making it absolute, is potentially risky, because the circumstances may be such

that they're—that the Iraqis might not be able to do that, and I'd rather give our leaders the flexibility to see—to evaluate the circumstances. But the—but I know what's motivating them, is to provide incentives for Iraqis to increase their capability in this area as quickly as possible. As the recommendation of a study group, I appreciate that. But, as a policy embraced by the President, and by our congressional leaders and the administration together, I would want, in my judgment at least, for it to—there has to be some flexibility for evaluating, rather than sort of tying our hands a year ahead of time, in terms of circumstances that we may not be able to anticipate at this time.

Senator NELSON. And, of course, that was one of the qualifiers that I just read—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yeah.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Here. But, as a general road map, that's a pretty good road map.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. To—as I said before, it's very important for us to continue to incentivize Iraqis to take on more responsibilities, to do the things that they need to do. I'm—as a diplomat, being in Baghdad, I have often made use of such recommendations and statements by congressional leaders, to communicate to the Iraqis that they need to move. But, as I said, at the same time, I would like to maintain the flexibility for the—for our military leaders—of course, the Commander in Chief—to be able to make decisions, adjustments, based on the circumstances.

Senator NELSON. Well, as a diplomat, you have a unique background and experience with which to advise us.

Reflect upon the United States entry and subsequent withdrawal, in the early 1980s, in Lebanon, as to how we may draw upon that experience in what we are experiencing now in Iraq.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I believe, Senator, that that was not handled well—Lebanon—as a student of the history of that region, and a student of strategy. On the one hand, I believe we declared Lebanon to be vital, which meant that we would do whatever is necessary to succeed; and, on the other, in face of terrorist attacks, we were—we had to withdraw—we decided to withdraw, which, unfortunately, encouraged some of our opponents in that region to assume that we cannot take casualties, and, therefore, behave in a way that made our diplomacy less effective, and, therefore, had to cause the use of force, because they miscalculated, thinking we would not use force, that we would not be—given the pattern in Lebanon. So, I believe it's very important that we are careful in how we pronounce ourselves, and that when we—that that is a—objectives are clear and there is a good relationship between ends and means, and the strategy is a good one, and the planning is good one, tasks are specified, the resources, political resolve, and all that, is there. So, I regard the Lebanon incident as a—as having had a very negative effect, in terms of subsequent developments, in terms of assessment of U.S. resolve and staying power in that region.

Senator NELSON. So, the experience of the U.S. in Lebanon, back in the early 1980s, we did not succeed.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe that defining in the way that I did, it—I would say that that was not a successful exercise and use of force on our part, I agree with that.

Senator NELSON. Would your conclusion be drawn, in part, from the fact that the United States was perceived to have sided with one faction, one sector, in the use of its force? In Lebanon.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I will have to provide that for the record, now, because so long ago. But I was just—what remains with me as a kind of a—as an overall strategic sense was the declaration of Lebanon as being vital for us, and then the attacks and the withdrawal that happened, and the perception that I—as it clearly remains with me, around that region, that we cannot take casualties, we cannot sustain. And, therefore, I think, encouraging people to draw the wrong lessons that—I think that's the one that I recall. But, in terms of in the politics of Lebanon at that time, how we were perceived with the—and the role of Syria and Israel and the various Lebanese factions, if you don't mind, I don't want to say something without checking on the situation at that time, so I'll be happy to provide that for the record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. Well, I think that the reading of history would show that it was when we started using our firepower on behalf of one particular group, it was—I can't remember the name of the group—that the perception of the United States as being a neutral party went out the window in Lebanon. And I would be curious about your ideas, from the experience of that, in and around 1984 Lebanon. Are we getting into a situation now, in Iraq, where we're being perceived of basically doing the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis for the dominant Shiites?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I understand your point, Mr. Chairman. You have to know—I think I agree with your point, if I understand it correctly, that you know—you have to know what is the situation, what's the mission. And if the mission is one—as it is, in significant part, now in Iraq—one of sectarian conflict, particularly in Baghdad and some of the other areas, that we understand that they are sectarian, and I think we do, because that, we think, is the biggest issue, competition over political and economic power with regard to the future of that region, of that—of Iraq. We understand that. And if we didn't understand that, in a situation that that existed, and we thought it was a situation of extremism versus moderation, but, while, in fact, it was a situation of sectarian and ethnic rivalry, then our remedy may be not the right remedy. But I think we understand, in the case of Iraq, that—that is not the exclusive issue, because it is also al Qaeda that continues as a problem, then there is the issue of insurgents who are against the presence of the coalition, then there is the issue of Shia-on-Shia issues. But I think a core—perhaps the most important issue is the sectarian issue. And that's why we're working very hard, during the period that I have been there, to get an agreement, that compact between them, on political and economic power, oil issue, as I've described, the constitution issue, the de-Baathification issue, and that we have got an agreement from the Prime Minister that he will be enforcing the law in a balanced way against all those who break the law. But this is an issue that's important, and I understand your point quite clearly, that we need to be very attentive

to and make sure that that complexity informs our objectives and our strategy and our plan. And I appreciate that.

Senator NELSON. With regard to the sectarian strife, you are uniquely qualified, by virtue of your background and experience, to explain to the committee how, given the schism that occurred in the battle of Karbala of 680 A.D. and the hostilities that have occurred over the centuries between Sunnis and Shiites, of which we see that playing out, as we speak, today, in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, how the United States is suddenly going to get all of these groups to lay down their arms and participate in democracy, when they've been at it for 1,327 years?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe, Senator, that, doctrinally, there has been, as you say, a difference, dating back over 1,000 years. And you're absolutely right about that. But I believe that Sunnis and Shias across the Middle East, for the most part in the history since Karbala, have lived relatively harmoniously, although there have been periods of discrimination of one by the other. And in recent past, there has been a period of Shias asserting themselves, and that has been linked with the rise of Iran. But, in the case of Iraq, Mr. Chairman, there has been a history of intermarriage between Sunni and Shia. There are tribes that are half Sunni, half Shia. But, in the current circumstances, there have been a concerted effort to exploit that fault line that exists, sectarian-wise, for political purposes. The terrorist al-Qaeda saw that as a fault line and exploited that successfully, especially after the attack on Samarra mosque, to increase sectarian tension, and then to offer itself as a protector of Sunnis. I believe the countries in the area are concerned, on the one hand, about the rise of Iran, but also worried about the sectarian tensions that exist, and that's one of the issues that could bring people together, because if they don't come together on this, there is a danger that it could destabilize and fragment the entire region, and that, I think, is an area for diplomacy on our part.

Working with others, I don't think this is something we can do alone, given what you mentioned. It's something that we can assist, but it has to be largely done by the leaders of the area and the sort of a regional engagement that takes into account Lebanon, takes into account Iraq, takes into account the other countries of the area we need to focus on. I believe, as I've said repeatedly, that what happens to this region is now the key issue for the shape of the future of the world, as the European balance of power was in the early 20th century, and the containment of the Soviets. So—and it's going to take time, and it's going to require a concerted effort on our part and on the part of others to assist this region that's going through a difficult crisis, to come out of it in a way that is good for them and good for the world, as Europe came out of its crises in a way that now it's good for them and good for the world. This is the issue that is the defining issue for us at the present time.

Senator NELSON. In other words, you're going to have to be Merlin the Magician—[Laughter.]—as Ambassador, to help bring this about. What do you think would happen if we had a phased redeployment out of the cities into a perimeter, say, more into the

countryside, still doing these things that the Iraq Study Commission—if we did that, and pulled out of Baghdad—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. As an example, what do you think would happen between the Sunnis and the Shiites?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, it depends in what context. If the Iraqi forces were able to control the situation, and all sides considered those forces to be neutral and enforcing the law, then that's a very natural adaptation and adjustment that you've described—in an orderly fashion, and that's what we ought to consider doing. But if the security forces are not able to control the situation, or—and they are seen as being motivated by a sectarian agenda, then what you described, should it happen in that context, it would escalate the level of violence. And, frankly, it's a personal observation that is at the—the risks of kind of things happening that I, frankly, do not know whether we and others would be able to look the other way to let it happen, in terms of humanitarian crises, the level of violence inflicted. Given our role, particularly in terms of the situation in Iraq with the change, I think we have geopolitical issues from an intensified sectarian violence regionally, but also I believe that we have a moral responsibility, given our role, that we do what we can to avoid that.

And so, I would say my comments would depend, in terms of the context, what's going on otherwise, Senator.

Senator NELSON. Well, as our Ambassador in Iraq, what is your observation of the Iraqi Government being able to be successful over the course of the next 6 to 9 months in such a redeployment out of the city?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I believe that within the next few months, I think the—it would be difficult for it to cope with it by itself. Now, I believe if they make the political decision that we discussed earlier in the next few months, and the Iraqi forces are— increase in numbers and capability, which is part of the plan, and the government continues with its commitment to treat all Iraqis the same and no preferences because of sectarian identity or political affiliation, then the prospects for implementing this plan that you talked about in a few months would improve. But it very much depends on what happens in the next few months, on the political calendar, and also in terms of the capabilities of Iraqis to make the improvements that we are committed to helping them make.

I am cautiously optimistic, but it's a very contingent optimism, assuming on these decisions that I talked about, that these decisions are made.

Senator NELSON. In your opinion, do you think there is political will in the Maliki government to get such a unanimity of purpose so that the various factions can come together? Do you think Maliki has the will?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe that he would like to do that— Mr. Maliki. I see an improvement in his approach in the last several months. And it's not only him, however, because it's a parliamentary system that they have, and the government's a unity government. Other leaders also have to rise to the occasion, and that's why I keep repeating our role, to keep incentivizing them to do the right thing, work with them. Ambassador Crocker will have

his work cut out for him to keep being very proactively engaged with them. And, at the same time, I think the regional role is important, because some of these groups are also influenced by some of the neighbors. And that's why I support this adjustment of the last week, to get a more active diplomatic engagement, keep pressing the neighbors to do what's needed, to be a forceful, encouraging compromise, rather than encouraging extremism, militancy, and sectarianism.

Senator NELSON. I don't want to belabor the point, and, of course, you're constrained on a number of things as to what you can say, but you bring a rich background of experience to the committee, and we appreciate it very much. You have said that you think, in the next few months, it would give us the indication of whether or not, to put it in the vernacular, the Maliki government is getting it together.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON. Now, that's what Secretary Gates said to us in his confirmation hearing, in January.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON. And now it is the middle of March.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON. He also said, and—not in January, in December, his confirmation hearings, and then his testimony to us again in January, as the Secretary of Defense—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. He said 2 months, that we ought to know. Well, we're at the 2-months point.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yeah.

Senator NELSON. And we keep hearing statements like yours and other people, "Well, in the next several months."

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON. So, when are we going to know?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well—

Senator NELSON. Against the backdrop—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Obviously, the American people are losing patience with the Iraqi Government getting it together.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. Right. I very much appreciate that factor, the patience, the lack of patience, patience running out. My message and response, Senator, is twofold. One, that the Iraqis are facing very difficult issues, and they're not an island, unfortunately; they're also in a very difficult neighborhood, where there are people who do not wish them well and do not want them to succeed. Second, that the last couple of months, things have improved politically, in my view, although big challenges remain. So, that's why I'm—I evaluate the last 2 months, positively. A key issue, the government decision to treat all sides on an evenhanded way, even allowing movement against Jaysh al-Madhi, which had been an issue, a problem, in an earlier phase. Second, the agreement on hydrocarbon among the political groups, this is a very big issue—as I said, trillions of dollars involved for them to agree. Passing the budget, a 40-billion-dollar-plus budget, 10 billion for economic reconstruction, spend—already, I am informed, spending—10-percent distribution of that. So, I—and I think if this momentum is main-

tained, and the decisions—the oil law is ratified by the Assembly next, de-Baathification is done. Constitutional amendment process is done. A date is set. Then, I think, we can build. But I think if there—if you wanted to take these 2 months, whether it's discouraging or encouraging, I would put the 2-months evaluation as encouraging, cautiously optimistic, and it's—again, I would also emphasize that it's not only Maliki, but others, too, have to be reminded, other leaders, because it's a parliamentary system, it's a unity government made of four or five different forces. We need to engage all of them, because sometimes we overstate how much Maliki alone can do, thinking perhaps it's like our system, with our President is—has got the kind of authority based on our political system. Their political system is a little different, and it—for him to succeed, it requires cooperation of some of the other key blocs in the government.

Senator NELSON. Over and over, we hear the statement that, "It's going to take a political solution, not"—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. "A military solution."

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON. One of the items on the table is a political solution that the regional powers would all support—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Which would basically be to start segregating—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. The very—communities, and let them have autonomy in the conduct of their own affairs.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON. Kurds in the north, Sunnis in the middle, Shiites in the south. What do you—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. You think of that?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, the issue of federalism is an issue that is available as an option for Iraqis, based on their constitution. The Kurds have exercised that option. They have their—three provinces have become a region and a federal unit, and they have a—the constitution allows for substantial degree of authority at the regional level. It foresees for Iraq a decentralized system, a federal system. There is an issue between the Arabs—among the Arabs of Iraq. Some support the idea of federalizing the rest. Everyone agrees on decentralization, broadly. Some favor federalism, some do not. And this is one of the issues with regard to building this compact, and I think that's an option of federalizing the rest of Iraq for Iraqis to decide on.

Where I would be cautious, Mr. Chairman, would be that it shouldn't be seen as an American imposition for them, how to organize their units inside Iraq. There are some who see that are—that suspect our motives as having come in to divide Iraq, an important Arab country, into mini states. That's why I would be wary of us saying, "Well, this is what we think is the solution, and we're going to impose it." But this is an option that's available to them. They are talking about it. They're discussing it openly and behind the scene among the leaders as to where they will come out. I would

not rule that out as a possibility for them, assuming they come to that decision themselves.

Senator NELSON. For those who criticize that concept by saying, "Well, you can't do it. You have these mixed neighborhoods," as a practical matter, are the mixed neighborhoods now segregating because of the violence?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. There has been a degree of segregation that has happened, unfortunately, during the past several months. But the government is very much committed to bringing—encouraging people to come back to the areas from which they left. We will have to see what happens, but one of the key features of the new Baghdad security plan is to encourage a return of refugees to their homes.

Senator NELSON. You described the constitution as a "true national compact."

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Not yet. It has to become so. And for it to become so, I believe, Senator, these amendments that they are discussing among themselves, they are—has to be in agreement with regard to those.

Senator NELSON. And the amendments could accommodate the federalism that we have just been talking about—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. In general.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. An agreement on that.

Senator NELSON. Uh-huh.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. As one of the issues. And there is oil. I think that pillar of the amendment process has been agreed to now, at the Cabinet level. The constitution kicked the can down the road on that one, so—and left it to future agreements, and that's what we have.

Senator NELSON. I have a number of other questions which I'm not going to go into, and I'll submit them for the record, with regard to Venezuela, with regard to the United Nations peacekeeping force in Haiti. I would just suggest to you, as you go to your new post, that we just have a handful of American police officers who are Creole-speaking on that force, and they are as valuable as gold, and that there ought to be some increase of that capability in the MINUSTAH force there. I'll submit comments with regard to the peacekeeping forces in other parts of the world—and Darfur and so forth.

You've been very, very kind in all of your questions here, and very thorough, and I appreciate it. And I appreciate the delicacy of your answers, which have been most diplomatic, which our Representative in the United Nations has to be. So, I want to thank you very much.

The record is going to remain open for 2 business days so that members of the committee can submit additional questions. And, naturally, we would like for you to respond quickly to those.

Senator NELSON. Thank you very much. And the meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

Question. Did the Syrians approach the United States in the context of the March 10 regional conference in Baghdad? Did the Syrians indicate what issues they would like to discuss? What was the U.S. response at the time? Did any bilateral discussion occur during the conference? If so, what was the substance?

Answer. During the Iraq Neighbors Conference hosted by the Iraqis in Baghdad on March 10, the Syrians expressed interest in holding bilateral discussions with the United States in Damascus. There were no bilateral discussions during the conference itself. We responded that we would get back in touch regarding the possibility of bilateral meetings.

Question. What are the administration's intentions for following up on Syria's stated interest for bilateral discussions? When and at what level would such discussions occur?

Answer. Whether or not we will meet with the Syrians in a bilateral forum is yet to be determined. We have made clear that we wish to see the Syrian Government cease its destabilizing policies in the region and demonstrate a serious behavior change with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, terrorism, and domestic civil society.

Question. What would be the primary issues the United States would raise in such discussions?

Answer. No decisions have been made on the content of any such discussions. Our Charge and Embassy in Damascus communicate presently with the Syrian Government on a range of issues. Assistant Secretary of State Sauerbrey was recently in Damascus for bilateral discussions with the Syrians limited to the subject of assisting the Iraqi refugee population.

RESPONSES OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

Question. What, in your view, are the major factors influencing effective U.S. participation in the United Nations? What, in your view, is the perception of the U.S. at the U.N.? Can you talk about how you intend to build coalitions, and work with other member states to advance U.S. interests?

Answer. Collective action is often the preferable course to take, particularly to achieve burden sharing. Also, we can enhance the legitimacy of our actions in the eyes of others by enlisting friends and allies to work with us, or by securing endorsement of our actions through the United Nations. The United Nations offers a forum where diplomats from around the world are present, including many who are very well regarded and well connected. This provides an opportunity not only to deal with issues in a formal sense, if they are on the U.N. agenda, but also an opportunity to advance our agenda in a setting that enables extensive, informal engagement.

For the most part, other countries' perceptions of the United States at the U.N. reflect the nature of our relationships with those countries generally. There are exceptions to this, mainly involving countries that take leading roles in the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which claim to speak for a wide array of countries. I will make a point of working with like-minded nations, especially democratic allies, to see how we can work together to influence the Group of 77 and the NAM. Finding new ways of working with the countries in these blocs will be a priority during my tenure.

My guidelines for building coalitions and working with other member states to advance U.S. interests include: engaging with others to find common ground to advance our agenda, being respectful and listening to others, but not shying away from pointing out why we think the way we do, and being open to others who might come up with approaches that work. If we do this, we will be perceived accurately as offering leadership. I intend to be persistent, not to give up, and not to be discouraged in the face of complexity and difficulty. Specifically, I will engage democratic countries to increase their influence by working more closely together through the Democracy Caucus, and develop with their representatives a common agenda and political strategy to achieve our shared goals. I intend to try to help the U.N. be more effective in carrying out its mission, in ways that help us achieve our objectives.

Question. I recently visited Haiti and met with the leadership of the U.N. mission there—MINUSTAH. Will the United States continue to support MINUSTAH and its elevated force levels? How many Americans participate in MINUSTAH?

Answer. MINUSTAH remains critical to the establishment of a stable and secure environment in Haiti, one of the highest peacekeeping priorities for the United States. On February 15, 2007, the United States supported a United Nations Security Council Resolution renewing the mandate of the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for an 8-month period with no change in the authorized force levels of 7,200 troops and 1,951 U.N. police. Given the ambitious 5-year U.N. plan to reform the Haitian National Police (HNP) that commenced in December 2006, it is essential that we, along with the other 44 troop-contributing countries in MINUSTAH, continue to assess the mission's force level and mandate in accordance with Haiti's progress in assuming greater control over its security. Our goal and that of our international partners remains to field a credible U.N. force to assist Haiti in consolidating its restored democracy.

Fifty-three American military and police officers currently serve in MINUSTAH. Three U.S. military officers currently serve on the MINUSTAH military staff and 50 U.S. police officers serve as United Nations police. In addition, a number of American citizen civilians are hired directly by the U.N. to serve on the MINUSTAH staff.

Question. I would like to support more American participation in MINUSTAH—particularly Creole-speaking United States police officers. Will you support me in this effort?

Answer. The United States is committed to continued participation in the civilian, military, and police components of MINUSTAH and will continue to work to meet requests from the United Nations for candidates for any of these functions. Working through our contractor for the recruitment and deployment of U.S. police officials in U.N. peacekeeping operations, the United States would certainly welcome expressions of interest from qualified Creole-speaking officers.

Question. How does the United States leverage U.N. peacekeeping operations, such as MINUSTAH in Haiti, to address our foreign policy concerns? In your view, what is the value of U.N. peacekeeping missions to supporting U.S. interests? Could the U.N. do more in places like Haiti to promote stability and address humanitarian concerns?

Answer. U.N. peacekeeping can, and often does, serve U.S. national interests. We have a stake in the outcome of events in every region of the world. U.N. peacekeeping missions engage and commit the international community to seek solutions to violence and instability. They cost the United States a quarter of what we would pay if we were asked to deploy American forces. In the Security Council and through our contributions to the U.N., the United States ensures that U.N. peacekeeping mandates are clear, credible, and limited to what is achievable, and that peacekeepers are properly prepared. We use our voice and vote to ensure that these missions are consistent with U.S. national interests.

Demands for U.N. peacekeeping have grown substantially in recent years. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations is currently responsible for around 100,000 peacekeepers (military, civilian, and police) deployed in 16 peacekeeping operations and two political missions around the world. Since October 2003 the Security Council has authorized five major operations—Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti, Burundi, and Sudan—and has substantially expanded the missions in Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

During the same time we have seen increasing responsibilities for post-conflict programs built into peacekeeping mandates, with experts in elections, rule of law, human rights, disarmament, security sector reform, and other such critical elements being added to what were once mainly military operations in support of peace agreements. This multidimensional approach is in close step with the creation of the new Peacebuilding Commission. The mission in East Timor is a good example of the new integrated mission, bringing a number of U.N. functions under the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and serving a post-conflict need, which is a step farther than traditional peacekeeping responses to crisis. Mandates are often extended at least a year past elections to allow new governments to establish roots. There is a growing trend to following a peacekeeping mission with a political mission to ensure continuing international attention to countries emerging from crisis.

Question. In our March 13 meeting, you said you were not certain that all the forces dedicated to the surge would be used, but mentioned GEN Petraeus's preference to have them there.

(a) What do you think about the 20,000–30,000 additional troops we are talking about today?

(b) How long do you give the surge to succeed? What are the benchmarks or milestones that we should expect to be met in the next 2 months?

(c) How can we better leverage the interests of Iraq's neighbors?

Answer. (a) In addition to the build-up of 21,500 troops (approximately five brigades) announced by the President in January, Secretary of Defense Gates announced on March 7 his request for approximately 2,400 military support personnel and 2,200 additional U.S. military police to assist with detainee requirements. The last of nine additional Iraqi battalions and the second of the five U.S. brigades are now operating in Baghdad. These additional forces are needed to partner with Iraqi units in this Iraqi-led operation. The purpose of this partnership is to increase the capabilities of ISF through combined operations and mentoring. Over 45 Joint Security Stations are being established among the 10 security framework districts to facilitate cooperation between Coalition and Iraqi forces and to build trust and confidence with the local population. This Iraqi-led effort is clearing focus districts and, with Coalition support, is working to provide a 24-hour presence in the city to protect the population from hostile reinfiltration. This represents a critical shift away from operating out of forward-operating bases. We fully support the Department of Defense in its decisions about troop levels to ensure the success of Operation Fardh al-Qanoon.

(b) While some initial results from Operation Fardh al-Qanoon have been favorable, it is too soon to assess or extrapolate a timeline for the military operation only in its second month. We are closely monitoring Iraq's progress. Factors being assessed include trends in violence, whether Iraqi army units are showing up and performing in a nonsectarian manner, whether or not there is Iraqi political interference in military decisions, and whether or not Iraq is making progress on key political issues, such as passage of a national hydrocarbon law, preparations for provincial elections, and reform of the de-Baathification laws. We also are examining the extent to which Iraq is investing its resources in its own economic future and taking the steps necessary to effectively execute its budget.

While the United States Government will continue to help Iraq, we have made it clear to the Iraqi Government that our commitment is not open-ended. That said, while we expect to see progress in the aforementioned areas, we are not setting deadlines. To do so would in some cases give a veto power to political forces in Iraq that are opposed to progress in some of these areas. Thus, while we can encourage the Iraqi Government and make our views known about the importance of making continued progress, and we are confident progress will continue, we are not in a position to set arbitrary deadlines, nor should we.

(c) As part of the President's New Way Forward, and in line with the Iraq Study Group recommendations, we have been engaged in a robust "diplomatic offensive" to boost international and regional support for Iraq. To this end, the United States participated in the subministerial Neighbors Conference in Baghdad on March 10, and the Secretary intends to participate in a follow-on ministerial in the region in April. The March 10 Neighbors Conference established working groups, which will give the United States a seat at the table alongside Iraq's neighbors in negotiating concrete assistance to help Iraq deal with pressing issues such as refugees, fuel supplies, and security (including border security).

Furthermore, our diplomatic efforts include Secretary Rice's intensified dialog with the Gulf Cooperation Council through GCC+2 (Egypt and Jordan) at the Foreign Minister level. We have similarly stepped up our dialog with the Arab League to garner more support for the Iraqi Government. We also note our positive engagement and progress on the International Compact with Iraq, which the Iraqi Vice President finalized and presented to U.N. ambassadors on March 16 in New York. The Compact enables the Iraqi Government to work directly with its neighbors, the international community, the World Bank and U.N. institutions on a 5-year economic development plan that will bolster civilian reconstruction and development efforts crucial to Iraq's success. Finally, we continue to engage with Iraq's neighbors and other regional players to ensure that Iraq receives the support it needs to succeed.

Question. Venezuela barely lost its bid to win a seat on the U.N. Security Council. How can the United States increase our influence in the U.N. and counteract President Chavez's influence? What will you do to prevent him from derailing multilateral diplomatic efforts with his antics?

Answer. The best way to counteract the obstructionist policies of Venezuela is through constructive, collaborative, and results-oriented partnerships with allies and other countries as well as the U.N. Secretariat. I will work with other democ-

racies to increase our influence, and the influence of other responsible democracies, through a reinvigorated Democracy Caucus. I will work with representatives of democratic countries that see promise in this approach to develop a common agenda and political strategy to achieve our shared goals. I will also reach out to our friends and encourage like-minded countries to reach out to their friends in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 to discuss how we might make common cause on issues of mutual importance. Finding new ways of working with the countries in these blocs will be critical to minimizing the disruptions caused by Venezuelan antics.

Question. Do you support the agreement reached in February with North Korea? Why would your predecessor oppose the deal?

Answer. I support our North Korea policy. President Bush has said that the Six-Party Talks represent the best opportunity to use diplomacy to address North Korea's nuclear programs and reflect the common commitment of the participants to a Korean Peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons.

I am not in a position to speak for Mr. Bolton, except to note that as a private citizen he is entitled to his opinion.

Question. What is the status of negotiations at the U.N. Security Council on a new resolution with tougher sanctions? Are China and Russia supportive of these efforts?

Answer. Last week, the governments of the P-5 (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany reached agreement on a draft second sanctions resolution, which imposes additional sanctions on Iran. The resolution was introduced to the full U.N. Security Council for its consideration on March 15; member states are now consulting capitals. We look forward to the rapid adoption of the resolution by the full U.N. Security Council and are confident that the U.N. Security Council will continue to make clear to the Iranian regime that there are costs for its continued defiance.

As Secretary Rice has reiterated many times, the generous P5+1 package remains on the table, including the United States' offer to engage in direct discussions with Iran. Iran's continued refusal to suspend enrichment—despite the generous incentives package—is a missed opportunity. We urge the Iranian regime to abandon its current confrontational course, comply with its international obligations, cooperate fully with the IAEA, suspend its enrichment-related activities, and enter into constructive negotiations.

Question. You agreed that United States intervention in Lebanon in the 1980s was not a successful exercise. I suggested the failure was due to a perception of U.S. bias in siding with the Maronite Christians at the time.

What lessons can we take away from our historical experience in Lebanon? How can we avoid a similar situation in Iraq, as regards sectarian rivalries and allegations of United States complicity in ethnic cleansing?

Answer. While there are major differences between Lebanon in the 1980s and Iraq in the 21st Century, our Lebanon experience makes clear that while military intervention may sometimes be necessary in the face of a crisis, long-term stability can best be achieved through development of a strong, functioning democracy in which every individual has a voice. Applying that lesson to Iraq, it means that we must build on our military successes and press all sides to engage in meaningful reconciliation, compromise, and mutual understanding to ensure that the disaffected recognize the ability of Iraq's democratic system to secure their safety, rights, and legitimate participation in the political process. In this effort, the United States Government does not side with any sectarian or ethnic group in Iraq against any others, and is morally opposed to ethnic cleansing in all its forms, whether in Lebanon, in Iraq, or in any other country.

Question. What will the United States do in the U.N. to help the people of Darfur?

Answer. The appointment of Special Envoy Natsios, intensified diplomatic engagement at the U.N. and in Khartoum, and our efforts to encourage a political solution in Darfur while working towards a more robust peacekeeping operation demonstrate continued United States commitment to Darfur. Our first objective in Darfur is to achieve a durable peace through a political settlement that is agreed to by all parties voluntarily, and then is actually implemented. The United States believes that the U.N. and the African Union, under Special Envoys, Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim, should take the lead in mediating a political agreement between the rebels and the Sudanese Government, and the United States will do everything possible to support them in this process. We also will continue to push for the deployment of the three-phase plan for U.N.-led peacekeeping in Darfur and also support the

potential deployment of U.N. peacekeepers in Chad and the Central African Republic.

The United States Government remains the leading international donor to Sudan and as of March 2007 has contributed over \$2 billion for humanitarian programs in Sudan and eastern Chad. In fiscal year 2007, the United States will provide more than \$1.2 billion in funds for the provision of humanitarian, development, and peacekeeping assistance to Sudan. In fiscal year 2008, we have requested a comparable level of funding, and thus look to provide more than \$2 billion in assistance over the next 2 years. We have contributed over \$350 million to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) since its inception, including base camp construction, equipment, logistics, and airlift, in addition to the provision of training and logistical support.

We will continue to impose domestic sanctions and support U.N. sanctions against the individuals (Government of Sudan and rebels) responsible for the violence or for impeding the peace in Darfur, and against the entities that are owned or controlled by the Government of Sudan. We are engaged diplomatically with the Sudanese Government to urge its full acceptance of the A.U.-U.N.-hybrid force under U.N. command and control, which the Government of Sudan agreed to in Addis Ababa. We have also continued discussions of "Plan B," which would be a series of more coercive measures aimed at pressuring the Government of Sudan, with our international partners, and made clear to the Sudanese Government that we are prepared to use stronger measures in the event the Government of Sudan continues to defy the will of the international community.

Question. How will the United States delegation deal with Chinese and Russian opposition to sanctions and denunciations against the Sudanese Government?

Answer. We have begun a dialog with Security Council members on next steps. We hope that President Bashir will, despite his March 6 letter to the Secretary General, back the heavy support package and the U.N.-led hybrid force in Darfur and cooperate with its deployment immediately. Absent such an indication, we believe President Bashir has made it clear to the international community that it is time to consider coercive actions to pressure Sudan to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and accept deployment of the vitally-needed U.N. peacekeeping operation in Sudan. We believe that Security Council members have found common ground, together with the A.U., in collective impatience with President Bashir's intransigence, to call for new measures. We will impose additional domestic targeted sanctions against those who are impeding the peace and encourage our international partners to speedily support U.N. sanctions against the offending parties until there is peace in Darfur. We will continue working with China and Russia to pursue tough and effective measures in Darfur, since they are aware that the international community and world opinion expect effective leadership from the Security Council and its members.

RESPONSES OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. And then last—and we haven't had a lot of discussion on this, but this is one of my major concerns, and that is the Human Rights Council. I know that the Council is supposed to be an element of reform. When Cuba and China, some of the biggest human rights abusers, are on the Council, I just quite can't understand it. But I am concerned that our absence from it at the same time, while a statement that we don't believe it has reformed the way it should, also leaves—cedes the ground to others on some of the most consequential issues. People who languish in countries in the world who look to the United States as a beacon of light, of freedom and democracy, and of respect for human rights—when that voice is absent in that respect, I'm not quite sure that we're promoting our interests or giving those people who we want to see take the chance to struggle in their own countries to move toward democracy in their own countries and human rights the type of hope and opportunity that they want. And so I'd like to hear how you're going to be pursuing that course as well.

Answer. We will continue to be a forceful advocate in the promotion of human rights around the world and will bring attention to those areas where respect for human rights is lacking. We will work to promote human rights in all U.N. bodies, such as the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) Third Committee, and where appropriate, the U.N. Security Council.

The Human Rights Council (HRC) has been a disappointment. The HRC has dealt repeatedly with the one issue of Israel, and only weakly with Sudan. The HRC has

not proven a capacity—as called for in UNGA resolution 60/251—to address urgent and serious human rights situations without bias. As you note, we did not run for the Council last year and recently announced we will not run again this year, but remain as a highly active observer in Geneva, led by our Permanent Representative, Warren Tichenor. We believe that the Council should expand its focus from beyond issues related to Israel and examine continuing situations of real concern, such as Sudan, Burma, North Korea, and Cuba, or the recently emerging crisis in Zimbabwe.

In the final months of its first year, we are committed to building a more effective institution. We will continue working with our democratic allies in Geneva to change the course of the Council. This means pushing firmly for: (1) a balanced agenda that does not include a permanent item singling out Israel and not any other nations; (2) any experts appointed to roles in the Council to be unbiased and chosen based on their qualifications and not elected by the HRC; (3) renewal of the mandates of all of the country-specific Special Rapporteurs; and, (4) increased emphasis on the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights' field activities rather than politicized conference work in Geneva.

Question. How do we move other countries to more fully enforce the existing Security Council actions? And as we try to make those actions more pervasive, how do you intend to try to use all of the resources—your diplomatic skills, of course, whatever persuasiveness, showing other countries their own interests in pursuing this, but also other options we have? We have economic levers here to pull as well. How do we get them to understand that containing Iran's nuclear ambitions is one in which there is common cause and we have greater success in its enforcement?

Answer. We are responding to Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, hegemonic aspirations, support for terrorism, and destabilizing activities with a comprehensive strategy that relies on American diplomatic leadership and a strong multilateral coalition. First and foremost, we have made clear to Tehran that its provocative and destabilizing policies will entail painful costs, including financial hardship for its leaders, diplomatic isolation, and long-term detriment to Iran's prestige and fundamental national interests. Second, and equally important, we have worked to alter the regime's behavior and to convince it that a cooperative, more constructive course that would better serve its interests is available.

In December 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1737, imposing Chapter VII sanctions targeting Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs and demanding that Iran completely and verifiably suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities, heavy water-related projects and cooperate fully with the IAEA. In light of the IAEA Director General's February 22, 2007 report confirming Iran's noncompliance with UNSCR 1737, we worked with the permanent five members of the UNSC and Germany on a second draft U.N. sanctions resolution to signal to Iran the costs of its defiance. That resolution is now before the full Security Council, with adoption expected soon.

We are also working bilaterally with major governments to curtail business transactions with Iranian companies and individuals tied to Iran's nuclear activities and support for terrorism. The Department of the Treasury has used its authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to sanction Iranian Bank Sepah for providing support and services to entities involved in Iran's missile programs. Additionally, the Department of the Treasury cut Iranian state-owned Bank Saderat off from all access to the United States financial system because of its support for terrorism. Banks worldwide have begun to recognize the serious risk associated with Iranian business with some beginning to scale back their Iran portfolios.

We are also working with France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and others to signal our strong support for Prime Minister Siniora's democratically elected government in Lebanon and to prevent Iran and Syria from rearming Hizballah. We have stationed two carrier battle groups in the Gulf to reassure our friends in the Arab world that it remains an area of vital importance to us. And at the regional level, Secretary Rice last autumn launched a series of ongoing discussions with our Gulf Cooperation Council partners, as well as Egypt and Jordan, regarding issues of shared concern, including Iran.

While we are acting vigorously to isolate the Iranian Government, we are also offering to it a diplomatic way forward. Secretary Rice has agreed to join her P5+1 colleagues in direct discussions with Iran regarding the nuclear and other issues "at any place and at any time," provided Iran verifiably suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

If we continue our skillful diplomatic course and have the patience to see it play out over the mid- to long-term, we are confident we can avoid conflict with Iran and

see our strategy succeed. Our strong hope is that Iran will accept the offer to negotiate with the United States and our P-5 partners so that we can achieve a peaceful end to Tehran's nuclear weapons ambitions.

Question. But I'd like to see how do you intend to, again, use the wide array of options that exist for us to actually get President al-Bashir to submit to what he has gone back on, which is a hybrid A.U.-U.N. peacekeeping force?

Answer. We are strongly encouraging the international community, including Sudan's major allies, to pressure Sudan for full acceptance of a hybrid A.U.-U.N. peacekeeping force. Sudan agreed to this force in November, although in a March 6 response to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's letter, President Bashir backed away from this commitment. The United States and other members of the international community found the response letter unacceptable and expect Sudan to honor its prior commitments. The letter is an affront to the A.U. and the U.N., as it reneges on agreements with both groups. We, therefore, are moving forward to implement additional sanctions against individuals and entities, and will continue to examine other coercive options. We will work closely with the international community to ensure maximum pressure on Khartoum. We continue to call on Sudan to immediately reverse its position on U.N. deployment, end bureaucratic constraints that hinder the critical efforts by international humanitarian workers, and fully cooperate with the A.U.-U.N. led political process.

RESPONSES OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR BARACK OBAMA

Question. I'm wondering whether the administration has some plan in the United Nations, whether other countries are thinking about how we might put more pressure on the Mugabe regime.

Answer. We are deeply concerned about the tragic events that are occurring in Zimbabwe. The United States has strongly condemned the recent atrocities committed by the Government of Zimbabwe against a leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change and other opposition activists.

We are seeking action on the Zimbabwe situation at the U.N. Human Rights Council and support the British request at the U.N. Security Council for the Secretariat to provide a report on Zimbabwe. We have discussed the issue with the African Union, which has issued a strong statement. We are encouraged that so many nations and organizations around the world have condemned the atrocities in Zimbabwe and have called on the Zimbabwean Government to respect the rights of its own people. We are also exploring means for broadening our financial and travel sanctions, which are targeted at those leaders who are oppressing the people of Zimbabwe.

Question. You may feel the same way about this next question, because it's a broad one, but I think one that's vital and that touches on the others. One of the other core missions of the United Nations—well, you mentioned—and that's security—it's my view that the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the structure that we've set up in the past is fraying rather badly. I think everybody's in agreement that the NPT needs updating. We've got regional proliferation problems like Iran and North Korea, but we've also got some broader questions arising out of the treaty with India, the desire for a variety of nations to look at nuclear power as an option to deal with their energy needs. We still need to make more progress on securing nuclear materials and enhancing international interdiction efforts. So I'm just wondering, do you have at this stage any thoughts in terms of how the administration would approach strengthening that regime? Is it something that you've already discussed?

Answer. President Bush has a broad strategy for nuclear nonproliferation, as set out in the National Strategy to Combat WMD Proliferation. The National Strategy to Combat WMD is the first of its kind—a broad strategy uniting all the elements of national power needed to counter the full spectrum of WMD threats. Previous U.S. approaches had focused almost exclusively on nonproliferation. The Bush administration has dramatically expanded U.S. nonproliferation efforts to prevent acquisition of WMD, related materials, and delivery systems by rogue states or terrorists. The three pillars in the National Strategy of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management do not stand alone, but rather come together as seamless elements of a comprehensive approach.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, provides the international legal basis for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons

and is the essential foundation for global nuclear nonproliferation. Additionally, the United States supports many programs to increase our ability to prevent, detect, and deter the proliferation of nuclear materials. U.S. assistance to other countries to reduce and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery vehicles—through DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the Department of Energy's nuclear nonproliferation programs, and the smaller but nonetheless important State Department programs—has been at record funding levels. The President has committed an average of \$1 billion a year to these critical efforts; we greatly welcome the consistent, strong support of the committee for these essential programs. Moreover, with the proposal in 2002 for the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the President successfully called on our foreign partners to commit their fair share to the effort to meet what is a global responsibility.

The United States also has led the way to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency's ability to detect nuclear proliferation. We instituted a successful effort to increase the IAEA's safeguards budget. We have strongly supported the IAEA Additional Protocol, to strengthen the agency's ability to uncover clandestine nuclear programs. The President also successfully urged the creation of a new special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors to examine ways to strengthen the agency's safeguards and verification capabilities.

In addition to the President's proposals to strengthen the IAEA institutionally, he challenged the international community to rectify the greatest weakness in the nuclear nonproliferation system: the ability of states to pursue nuclear weapons under the cover of peaceful energy programs. The lesson of Iran and North Korea is clear: Some states will cynically manipulate the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to acquire sensitive technologies to enable them to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities—the very capabilities the treaty is intended to deny. To close this loophole, the President has proposed that uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities—the two primary paths to acquiring fissile material for nuclear weapons—be limited to those states that already operate full-scale, fully-functioning facilities. In return, he called on the world's nuclear fuel suppliers to assure supply, in a reliable and cost effective manner, to those states which forego enrichment and reprocessing. We are working with other fuel provider states and with the IAEA to put in place assurances that will convince states with power reactors that their best economic interest is not to invest in expensive, and proliferation risky, fuel cycle capabilities.

The Department of Energy plays a critical part in developing these Presidential initiatives and working with other nations to bring them to fruition. The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), led by DOE, offers the promise for the longer term of enhancing global access to nuclear energy while strengthening nonproliferation. An important emphasis of the initiative is to provide a basis for states to benefit from civil nuclear power while avoiding the costs and challenges of enriching fresh fuel on the front end of the fuel cycle and disposing of spent fuel on the back end. The Department of State is working closely with DOE to engage international partners to participate actively in GNEP.

In addition, the United States has led the way in the U.N. Security Council to broaden the international requirements on nonproliferation. The United States spearheaded United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. In adopting UNSCR 1540, the Security Council—for only the second time since its founding—invoked its Chapter VII authorities to require nations to act against a general, as opposed to a specific, threat to international peace and security. In particular, UNSCR 1540 requires all states to prohibit WMD proliferation activities, such as we witnessed with the A.Q. Khan network. It further requires that states institute effective export controls, and enhance security for nuclear materials on their territory. We also have led the U.N. Security Council in adopting U.N. Chapter VII resolutions 1718 and 1737, targeting North Korea and Iran, respectively.

We have worked to strengthen our counterproliferation efforts to ensure that we have the capability to work with states around the world to interdict shipments of proliferation concern, and to impede the finances of proliferation. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003, has been endorsed by more than 80 nations. This global initiative seeks to have all nations use their existing legal authorities—national and international—to defeat proliferation and applies intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, and other tools at the disposal of nations to impede transfers of WMD-related items to countries and entities of concern.

Additionally, we have worked closely with the Department of Treasury to enhance our ability to prevent proliferators from accessing the international financial system. President Bush augmented U.S. efforts in this area when he issued in July 2005

a new Executive Order 13382, which authorizes the U.S. Government to freeze assets and block transactions of entities and persons, or their supporters, engaged in proliferation activities. Currently, entities from North Korea, Iran, and Syria have been the focus of our efforts under the Order. These actions have assisted in further isolating these regimes from the international community.

Another key effort of the United States has been the development of international cooperation to combat nuclear terrorism. President Bush has described this threat as the central national security challenge of our era. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, launched last year by Presidents Bush and Putin, is the first initiative of its kind, one that takes a comprehensive approach to dealing with all elements of the challenge. The initiative is consistent with, and builds on, existing legal frameworks such as the Nuclear Terrorism Convention and U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1373. It provides a flexible framework that will enable sustained international cooperation to prevent, detect, and respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism. The central objective of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is to establish a growing network of partner nations that are committed to taking effective measures to build a layered defense-in-depth that can continuously adapt to the changing nature of the threat. While many individual programs and efforts have approached one element or aspect of the nuclear terrorism threat, the Global Initiative provides a capacity building framework for establishing new partnerships with those nations that wish to take similar action. In carrying out this new initiative, we will also cooperate with the IAEA and invite them to participate.