

NATO: ENLARGEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS

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BEFORE THE

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TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2008

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Menendez, Casey, Lugar, Hagel, Voinovich, and Isakson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Assistant Secretary, welcome back. It's been only about a couple of days since you've been here. It's good to have you back. And, General Craddock, welcome. And thank you both for being here today.

Next month, the 26 Member States of the NATO Alliance will gather in Bucharest, Romania. And central to the discussions will be the questions of Ukraine and Georgia, bringing them closer to the Alliance, and Croatia, Albania, and FYROM—or Macedonia, as our Government refers to it—into the Alliance. The other major issues that will be front and center is the effectiveness of NATO in its first out-of-area military commitment in the ongoing war in Afghanistan.

Summits have a tendency to force events and a time for actual decisions on hard issues, so it's no surprise that, in the runup to this summit, disagreements among allies sometimes get the spotlight. Even so, I am deeply concerned that, on the eve of this summit, the Alliance is especially fractured and incoherent. And, quite frankly, Senator Lugar and I have been here a long time. I don't know how many conferences I've attended about whether NATO will survive? I know we always have these discussions, but this is a particularly difficult moment.

First, there appears to be a total lack of clarity on how to respond to the applications of Ukraine and Georgia for Membership Action Plans, or MAP. I believe—speaking for myself only, that we should encourage Ukraine and Georgia by granting their requests for MAP. Both countries have made substantial progress toward consolidating gains of the Orange and Rose Revolutions, and have made substantive contributions to NATO operations. A Membership Action Plan, as you both know better than anyone, is not an irrevocable step for either the applicant state or for the Alliance.

The decision on an invitation to join the Alliance can take as long as NATO wants or the applicant state requires.

Second, there is no apparent consensus on the three countries who are candidates for actual membership. During the 1990s, NATO became a force for promotion of a Europe whole and free in ways that its founders, I don't think, ever fully imagined. The prospect of membership encouraged Europe's newly liberated countries to settle longstanding disputes, to deep-root democracy and human rights, and, of course, to build competent militaries. I am proud, along with Senator Lugar and my deceased colleague Senator Roth and others, to have played a part in helping the initial enlargement of NATO after the wall came down. It remains my conviction that we should extend an offer of NATO membership to any country that applies and meets the criteria.

As a strategic matter, the admission of Croatia and Albania and Macedonia to NATO would bring the Balkans closer to the European future its people deserve, and it would strengthen, in my view, regional security. But, that doesn't mean these three candidates, in my view, must enter as a block. Each country should be judged against the established criteria and on its own merits. Of course, NATO's current members must still agree on the decision to invite new ones, period.

I've strongly urged Greece and FYROM, or Macedonia, to find a reasonable compromise to the name dispute that stands as a bar to Macedonia's membership. If they're unable to do so in time for the summit, that failure should not, in my view, penalize the prospects of Croatia or Albania. I expect our witnesses to address the readiness of these three countries to join NATO, and our second panel includes two prominent experts who disagree on whether these countries are ready. And it's important, I think, to hear this debate here in the Foreign Relations Committee.

And finally, the other critical issue in this summit is Afghanistan—the forgotten war, in my view. I was there, along with Senator Lugar and Senator Kerry, just a few weeks ago. Each of us has spoken to our deep concern that, while Afghanistan remains winnable, we are not winning. In my view, we need a new strategy for success and a new NATO commitment, in terms of the individual countries and their rules of engagement. This should not be America's fight, alone. Our allies joined this war from the very start. This was not a war of choice; this was a war of necessity. And they have as much at stake as we do, I'd respectfully suggest.

Since 9/11, Europe has been repeatedly targeted for terror, and virtually every attack can be traced back to the Afghan-Pakistan border regions. The heroin Afghanistan produces winds up in the streets of Madrid and Berlin, not in New York. In fact, since 2001 far more Brits have lost their lives to Afghan drugs than to Taliban arms. Many of our NATO allies thought they were signing up for a peacekeeping mission, not a counterinsurgency operation. And many are fighting like it is a peacekeeping operation: Not fighting. Some are fighting with incredible bravery, particularly in the south. But, the so-called national caveats are making a mockery, in my view, of NATO and the notion of a unified mission. One ally can fight here, but not another place; another ally can do this, but not that. In my view, you're either in this fight or not you're not,

and it's time for NATO to be fully in the fight. I believe that the future of NATO is at stake in Afghanistan.

The NATO summit must bring these issues to a head. We are right to expect more from our allies and from NATO, but they are also right to expect more from us. When I first went to Afghanistan, right after the Taliban fell, in January 2002, I asked the commander of British Forces how long his people would allow him to stay in Afghanistan, and I'll never forget what he told me. He said, "We Brits have an expression, Senator. As long as the big dog is in the pen, the small dogs will stay. When the big dog leaves, the small dogs will go home." Well, the big dog left, in my view, in 2002. The big dog left, and we diverted so much of our attention and so many of our resources to Iraq, there wasn't a lot left for Afghanistan. Instead of finishing the war of necessity, we started a war of choice. I'm not here to debate that war of choice. I'm here just to make the point that we—and interesting to me, and I don't know whether my colleague from Nebraska found the same thing—whether we were talking to diplomats, military personnel, or NGOs, they all, when we asked them about the situation in Afghanistan, they'd all say something to the effect of, "It is true, from 2002 to 2006 we didn't do much, but we began to change policy and make—regain some ground in 2006—late 2006," an interesting admission that we heard uniformly, across the board.

I commend Secretary Gates, who acknowledged, last month, that the Europeans tend to project the hostility they feel for the war in Iraq onto the fight in Afghanistan. I would also point out, I think that's happening here in the United States. The hostility toward the war in Iraq is being—coloring the attitude of Americans toward the war in Afghanistan.

I think this represents a fundamental misreading of the facts. But, we have done a poor job in distinguishing the case for one war from the other. And I'm glad Secretary Gates has dedicated himself to correcting the record.

We always say that the summit is critical, but I think this one really is; it's critical for the construction of Europe, for the war in Afghanistan, and, I think, the future of the Alliance, itself.

So, I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses, particularly our colleagues sitting before us, and I would now yield to my colleague Chairman Lugar.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR
FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate this opportunity for the committee to once again talk about and examine the future of NATO, and I join you in welcoming our very distinguished witnesses.

The NATO Alliance is preparing for an historic summit in Bucharest, Romania, next month. And the Bucharest summit finds NATO facing new challenges, adjusting to new priorities. Much attention is being focused on NATO's role in Afghanistan, which is, as you pointed out, the most demanding and defining combat operation in Alliance history. European troop contributions to the Afghanistan operation and the removal of caveats restricting how

troops are employed will be the subject of intense discussions, surely, at the summit.

But, even as we work through the important issues related to Afghanistan, I would urge the administration to bring an even broader vision to deliberations in Bucharest. The recent announcement of independence by Kosovo; President Putin's statements that we are in the midst of a new arms race; Russian threats against Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine; and Moscow's intransigence on issues ranging from the shutting down of British cultural affairs offices to abandonment of the CFE Treaty, require strategic leadership from the United States and close cooperation with NATO allies.

At the summit, I believe the Alliance must invite Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO. Each is working hard to meet the specified requirements for membership. They occupy critical geostrategic locations, and are best situated to deter any efforts by any party to destabilize the Balkans through violence. These three candidate countries also have proven their commitment to making meaningful contributions to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

NATO also must extend Membership Action Plans to Georgia and Ukraine. The governments of both countries have clearly stated their desire to join NATO, and both have made remarkable progress in meeting Alliance standards. Both countries have made as much progress on democratic, economic, and military reform as Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Albania had made when they received MAPs in 1999.

I understand that Georgia and Ukraine must accomplish much more before they can be offered NATO membership, but extension of these MAPs is an important symbol of Alliance intent.

In January, I traveled to both Georgia and Ukraine. And during my visit in Georgia, President Saakashvili reiterated his hopes for a MAP. In Ukraine, President Yushchenko, Prime Minister Tymoshenko, and the Speaker of the Parliament signed a letter to the NATO Secretary General signifying the unity of purpose behind their MAP request. If NATO is to continue to be the preeminent security alliance and serve the defense interests of its members, it must continue to evolve, and that evolution must include enlargement. Potential NATO membership motivates emerging democracies to make important advances in areas such as the rule of law and civil society. A closer relationship with NATO will promote these values and contribute to our mutual security.

In addition to membership issues, we must ensure that meaningful progress is made on energy security. Today, the denial of energy resources is a weapon that can cripple a state as effectively as traditional armies. NATO must recognize the risks we face and begin to implement a strategy to prepare us for future energy contingencies.

Ukraine, Georgia, Estonia, and Lithuania have all faced hostile energy supply actions from Russia. Today, Germany, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Hungary, and others have signed bilateral deals with Russia that could have serious implications for European energy security and for the NATO Alliance. In my judgment, NATO is the only institution capable of uniting the transatlantic community

under a common energy policy with the urgency that this threat warrants.

Three years ago, the U.S. Senate unanimously voted to invite seven countries to join NATO. Today, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are making important contributions to NATO, and are among our closest allies in the global war on terrorism. It is time again for the United States to take the lead in urging its allies to recognize the important efforts underway in Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Georgia, and Ukraine, and offer them membership and Membership Actions Plans, accordingly.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, thank you very much. I'll suggest, Mr. Chairman, we have 7-minute rounds when the testimony is finished. We have good attendance here.

Let me begin with you, Mr. Secretary. Why don't you begin your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL FRIED, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. FRIED. Thank you, Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee. I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the world's most successful alliance.

NATO is more than a military alliance, it is an alliance of values. NATO's mission remains the same: The defense of its members. But, how NATO fulfills this mission is evolving.

During the cold war, NATO was superbly prepared to face the Soviet Army across the Fulda Gap. It never fired a shot in anger, but, by maintaining the peace in Europe, the Alliance provided time for the internal decay of the Soviet system.

NATO's other historic achievement is also important, though sometimes less remarked. It was the security umbrella under which Europeans settled centuries-old national rivalries. On September 12, 2001, NATO invoked, for the first time, the Washington Treaty's Article V Clause of Collective Defense. I was in the White House on September 11 and 12. I remember, and greatly appreciate, NATO's solidarity, as did all of us there on that day.

But, let me be frank, in 2001 NATO lacked the capacity to respond to the challenge of September 11; yet, within months, several allies had joined us in Afghanistan, and by August 2003, NATO took over the U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force, the ISAF mission, in Kabul. This accelerated NATO's geographic and capabilities transformation.

NATO has also tried to build a new kind of relationship with Russia, although we've been disappointed that the NATO-Russia Council has not yet fulfilled its potential. President Putin's plan to attend the summit in Bucharest next month represents both an opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity is to renew efforts to work together with Russia. The challenge is to make sure that NATO takes decisions on issues based on what is good for the Alliance, not based on a veto by outside actors. Whether on enlarge-

ment, missile defense, or granting aspirants a Membership Action Plan, NATO must make its own decisions, for the right reasons.

Mr. Chairman, Senators, you will find in my written statement a section on how NATO has strengthened, and is strengthening, its capabilities. This includes ongoing work in two areas where this committee has provided leadership: A NATO Cyber Defense policy and a new focus on energy security.

Today, I will report to you about NATO's ongoing transformation, and indicate how we believe this can be addressed in Bucharest and beyond: First, how NATO is bringing its new capabilities to bear in ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo; and, second, about enlargement.

NATO is in action in two major operations: Afghanistan, through ISAF, and in Kosovo, through KFOR. More than anywhere else, Afghanistan is the place where our new capabilities are being developed and tested.

Now, let me be blunt. The Alliance faces real challenges there. Levels of violence are up, particularly in the south. The border areas with Pakistan provide a haven for terrorists. Civil/military cooperation does not work as well as it should. We welcome, in this regard, the appointment of Kai Eide, a special representative of the U.N. Secretary General for Afghanistan, which will help. Narcotics remains a serious problem. Efforts to counter this challenge, this scourge, are working in some, but not all, parts of the country.

There is good news, also. Operationally, NATO has had real successes. It's worth recalling that 6 million Afghan children now go to school, one-third of them girls; that's 2 million girls in school, when, under the Taliban, there were none. Zero. Afghan soldiers are increasingly at the forefront of operations. And the number we have trained and equipped has swelled to almost 50,000. This spring, we will send an additional 3,500 Marines to capitalize on these gains and support the momentum.

NATO commanders, with strong U.S. support, are looking at force contributions, and hope to have more forces identified at Bucharest. In addition, we must give allied commanders on the ground more flexibility.

I had the privilege of testifying on Kosovo before this committee last week, and so I'll keep my remarks on this topic brief.

I was there last Friday, and I found the Kosovo leadership rightly focused on building their country and reaching out to the Kosovar-served community. I also met with Serbian community leaders, including two members of the Kosovo Government. They said they intend to remain in Kosovo. They hope their communities will remain in Kosovo. And this is good news.

NATO, through KFOR, is continuing to provide security, freedom of movement, and protection for minorities and religious and cultural sites in the world's newest state. Almost 90 percent of the KFOR forces are European, and I am happy to report to this committee that, so far, the security situation in the country is as good as we expected, and much, much better than we had feared.

Let me turn to NATO enlargement. Now that Kosovo is independent, we need to look at how to help the entire Balkans region leave behind the crises of the 1990s and strengthen, stabilize, secure, and democratize their societies in the 21st century. To com-

plete this job, the administration strongly supports the aspirations of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO. They have made significant progress in their reforms. All three have shown a clear commitment to bearing the responsibilities of membership; for example, by sending troops to Afghanistan and supporting NATO's mission in Kosovo. Supporting their aspirations following Kosovo's independence helps us take the Balkans into the 21st century and demonstrates to the world that NATO's enlargement process, a great success, is still running.

Albania has made steady progress on combating corruption, with arrests of high-level government officials, substantial progress on judicial reform, and progress on laws to increase judicial transparency.

Croatia has a proven track record of political and economic maturity, and is also an important partner on the battlefield. Significant progress on military reforms has created a more modern armed forces.

Macedonia has made strides since 2001 in building a multiethnic democracy. It has taken strong steps on the rule of law by implementing critical laws on its courts and police, and by taking action against trafficking in persons.

One issue threatens Macedonia's candidacy: The dispute with Greece over Macedonia's name. Without a resolution, Greece has said that it will block an invitation for Macedonia to join NATO. The administration is urging both parties to work together, and with U.N. negotiator Matt Nimetz, to come to a solution before Bucharest. And if we can do so—if our Government can help these countries on a national basis, we are also prepared to do so.

All three aspirants have work to do, but they've already done significant work, and, critically, they have put themselves on a trajectory for success. The United States and our allies need to consider whether it is better for the security of the Alliance and the stability of the Balkans to invite these countries in or to keep them out. We know, from experience, that countries who join NATO continue to reform.

Ukraine and Georgia have expressed an interest in joining NATO. They are not ready to be members now, as they recognize. But, we can help them help themselves and prepare themselves through NATO's Membership Action plan, as they have requested. The timing of that step will be a key issue at the Bucharest summit.

Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia were invited to join NATO's Partnership for Peace in November 2006. While it was a controversial issue then, I think the doubters now see that it was the right decision. NATO's door must remain open. The Alliance's decision to invite a country must be made according to that country's performance, willingness, and ability to contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and its desire to join. No country outside of NATO has the right to decide these questions for them.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lugar, other members of the committee, several administrations have worked to build a Europe whole, free, and at peace. NATO has been an indispensable instrument of this noble objective, and NATO is becoming a multilateral instrument

of transatlantic security for the 21st century. This administration will strive to hand over to the next this great undertaking.

Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fried follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL FRIED, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, members of this committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most successful political-military alliance the world has ever known.

NATO is not just a military alliance; it is an alliance of values, and NATO's success in the past and promise for the future reflect its fusion of strength and democratic values. I will speak today about how the alliance is transforming itself to address global security challenges; its current missions and challenges, including ongoing operations in Afghanistan; and our goals for the Bucharest summit and beyond.

NATO provided a foundation for freedom's victory in the cold war. It is now evolving into its 21st century role: Defending the transatlantic community against new threats and meeting challenges to our security and values that are often global in scope.

NATO's mission remains the same: The defense of its members. But how NATO fulfills this mission is evolving. Much of what I discuss today has to do with this important ongoing adaptation.

During the cold war, NATO was superbly prepared to face the Soviet Army across the Fulda Gap, but never fired a shot. Yet, by maintaining the peace in Europe, the alliance provided time and space for the internal decay of the Soviet system and the Warsaw Pact, and for forces of freedom in Warsaw, Vilnius, Budapest, Prague, Bucharest, Kyiv, and even Moscow to prevail.

NATO's other historic achievement is not mentioned often, but is no less important: It served as the security umbrella under which centuries-old rivalries within Europe were settled. NATO provided an essential precondition for the European Union, a united Europe, to take shape. Since 1945, Western Europe has enjoyed its longest period of internal peace since Roman times.

After the end of the cold war, NATO faced two fundamental challenges: First, should it remain fixed in its cold-war-era membership? Second, should it remain fixed in its cold-war activities?

Three successive American administrations—those of President George W. Bush, President Bill Clinton, and President George H.W. Bush—have demonstrated leadership in helping transform NATO from a cold war to a 21st century profile. Members of this committee played, and continue to play, a major part in that bipartisan policy effort.

In the 1990s, under American leadership, NATO enlarged its membership for the first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall. It did so again in 2002.

Also in the 1990s, NATO engaged in its first military combat operations to force an end to ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. NATO's operational role has continued to grow since then.

On September 12, 2001, a day after the attacks on New York and Washington, NATO invoked for the first time the Washington treaty's critical article 5 clause of collective defense. In the 52 years of NATO's existence prior to that date, no one ever expected that article 5 would be invoked in response to a terrorist attack; an attack on the United States rather than Europe; and an attack plotted in Afghanistan, planned in Pakistan, Malaysia, and Germany, carried out inside the United States, and financed through al-Qaeda's fund-raising network.

I was in the White House on September 11 and 12; I remember and greatly appreciate NATO's act of solidarity. That decision, and its implications, eventually brought an end to NATO's now seemingly "quaint" debate about going "out of area."

But let me be frank: In 2001, despite this decision, NATO lacked the capability of responding to the challenge of September 11. And, to be even franker, at that time the United States had not thought through how to work within NATO so far afield as Afghanistan. But within months, several individual allies had joined us in Afghanistan, and on August 11, 2003, NATO took over the U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Kabul. From that moment, NATO had crossed into a new world, and transformation became an operational as well as a strategic necessity.

NATO has come far since the cold war. In the early 1990s, NATO was an alliance of 16 countries, which had never conducted a military operation and had no partner relationships. By the middle of this decade, NATO had become an alliance of 26 members. And its soldiers and sailors had experienced:

- Bringing security and stability to Afghanistan;
- Maintaining security in Kosovo and Bosnia;
- Supporting and training peacekeepers in Africa;
- Training the Iraqi security forces;
- Delivering humanitarian aid in Pakistan after the earthquake and in Louisiana after Katrina; and
- Patrolling shipping in the Mediterranean to prevent terrorism.

NATO also has established partner relationships with over 20 countries in Europe and Eurasia, seven in North Africa and the Middle East, four in the Persian Gulf, and has global partners such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore, which are working with NATO in Afghanistan.

I should also add that one of the transformations we have tried to make at NATO is to build a new kind of relationship with Russia—one where NATO and Russia can work together to address common interests. This was the thinking behind the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, and the NATO-Russia Council, created in 2002. I must admit that we have been disappointed that the NATO-Russia Council still has not lived up to its potential.

The Russian Foreign Ministry has announced that President Putin plans to attend the meeting in Bucharest. This represents both an opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity is to renew efforts to work together on issues where NATO and Russia really do have common interests—from nonproliferation, counterterrorism, to border controls and counternarcotics with respect to Afghanistan. The challenge, however, is to make sure that NATO takes decisions on issues on their own merits—based on what is good for the alliance and good for the issues at hand—without undue pressure from any outside actors. Whether on enlargement, missile defense, or a Membership Action Plan, NATO must make its own decisions for the right reasons.

Fifteen years ago, no one would have predicted such far-reaching changes for NATO. So we must be modest about predicting the future challenges NATO will face, and the way NATO will adapt to them.

But I can report to you about NATO's ongoing transformation to address global security challenges, and indicate how we believe this will be addressed at NATO's summit in Bucharest next month and beyond.

- First, I will deal with capabilities NATO must build in this new era. NATO is making progress, but this task is not done.
- The second issue is how NATO is bringing these new capabilities to bear in ongoing operations, particularly:
 - In Afghanistan, where NATO is helping establish security and stability, to enable reconstruction, development, and good governance.
 - And in Kosovo, where NATO is maintaining peace and freedom of movement in a now independent and sovereign country.
- Third, I will speak about enlargement. NATO is taking on new members and helping others prepare to become members in the future if they so desire.

CAPABILITIES

NATO must strengthen its capacity in three key areas: An expeditionary capacity to operate at strategic distance against new and diverse threats; a comprehensive capability to better integrate military and civilian activities; and a missile defense capacity to protect alliance territory and populations against emerging missile threats.

First on hard capabilities. NATO is developing these step by step. NATO has established:

- A NATO Special Operations Coordination Center in Mons, Belgium, that boosts the effectiveness of allies' special operations forces by increasing interoperability between nations, sharing key lessons learned, and expanding and improving training, all of which are yielding concrete gains on battlefields in Afghanistan.
- A NATO Response Force that is being "updated" to make it more usable and deployable if the need arises.
- A strategic airlift consortium to allow interested allies and partners a mechanism to pool limited resources to own and operate C-17s.
- An initiative to enhance NATO helicopter capacity, first in Afghanistan, to lease private helicopters for nonmilitary transport. In the medium- and long-term, we

are examining ways to pool support and maintenance functions and to acquire additional helicopters.

- A NATO Cyber Defense Policy, to be endorsed at Bucharest, will enhance our ability to protect our sensitive infrastructure, allow allies to pool resources, and permit NATO to come to the assistance of an ally whose infrastructure is under threat. I thank the Senators on this committee for focusing attention on this issue following the cyber attacks against Estonia.
- A new focus on Energy Security, for example, by reviewing how NATO can help mitigate the most immediate risks and threats to energy infrastructure. I appreciate the leadership of Senators on this committee for their involvement in energy security and believe NATO is building a response to the concerns you have raised.
- A Defense Against Terrorism Initiative, in which allies have improved their precision air-drop systems and enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies to detect terrorists. The allies have also equipped large aircraft to defend against Man-Portable Air Defense (MANPADs) weapons, and worked together on technologies to detect and counter improvised explosive devices.
- A NATO Maritime Situational Awareness initiative, to ensure Information Superiority in the maritime environment, thus increasing NATO's effectiveness in planning and conducting operations.

I could go on. But let me stop here just to note that, notwithstanding all the concerns we have about levels of defense spending among the allies, and allies' need to develop and field more expeditionary forces for NATO operations, NATO's military capabilities are better off than they were 7 years ago. We are continuing to work to make them better still.

Many of these new capabilities are being tested in Afghanistan—which is also where we are learning how to better integrate civilian and military efforts. With each passing month, all of us allies learn more about what it takes to wage a 21st century counterinsurgency effort—a combined civil-military effort that puts soldiers side by side with development workers, diplomats, and police trainers. Whether flying helicopters across the desert at night, embedding trainers with the Afghan military and police, conducting tribal councils with village elders, or running joint civilian-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams, our institutions are reinventing the way we do our jobs.

As Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said, this requires new training, new equipment, a new doctrine and new flexibility in combining civil and military efforts in a truly comprehensive approach to security.

And a final point on capabilities is missile defense. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty says NATO allies will provide for collective defense. It does not allow for exceptions when the threat comes on a missile. NATO has been studying missile defense for years, and we expect that at the Bucharest summit, NATO will take further steps to acknowledge growing missile threats, welcome U.S. contributions to the defense of alliance territory, and task further work in strengthening NATO's defenses against these new threats. We have taken on board advice from some in Congress, and some of our allies, as we have advanced a more NATO-integrated approach to missile defense.

NATO's work is focused on the short-range missile threat, technical work regarding future decisions on possible long-range threats, and possible opportunities for cooperation with Russia. The United States and NATO efforts are complementary and could work together to form a more effective defense for Europe.

AFGHANISTAN

NATO is in action in two major operations, ISAF in Afghanistan, and KFOR in Kosovo.

More than anywhere else, Afghanistan is the place where our new capabilities are being developed and tested. Allies are fighting and doing good work there, but NATO—all of us—have much more to do and much more to learn.

Let me be blunt: We still face real challenges in Afghanistan. Levels of violence are up, particularly in the south, where the insurgency has strengthened. Public confidence in government is shaky because of rising concerns about corruption and tribalism. And the border areas in Pakistan provide a haven for terrorists and Taliban who wage attacks in Afghanistan.

Civilian-military cooperation does not work as well as it should, and civilian reconstruction and governance do not follow quickly enough behind military operations. In this regard, we welcome the appointment of Kai Eide as Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General for Afghanistan. In this capacity, Amba-

sador Eide will coordinate the international donor community and raise the profile of the U.N.'s role in Afghanistan, in supporting the Government of Afghanistan. The United States will lend its strongest support to Ambassador Eide's efforts. It will be critical to ensure that he is empowered to work in concert with NATO and to coordinate broad civilian efforts—and go back to capitals for more resources—in support of the sovereign Government of Afghanistan. We look forward to Ambassador Eide's confirmation by the U.N. Security Council later this week and hope he will be present at the Bucharest summit in April.

Narcotics remain a serious problem. Efforts to counter this scourge are working in some but certainly not all parts of the country. The Taliban are using the profits from drug revenues and the instability spread by corruption and lawlessness to fund their insurgent activities. Helmand province continues to be the epicenter, with fully 53 percent of total cultivation, and our eradication efforts there have had insufficient traction, significantly due to the absence of adequate force protection for our eradication force. Yet there is good news too. In much of the north and east, poppy cultivation is down. In a secure environment, farmers can more easily exercise alternatives and are not subject to the same threats and intimidation by insurgents. According to U.N. data, we expect that this year 22 of 34 provinces are likely to be either poppy free or cultivating fewer than 1,000 hectares of poppies. With improved governance and security conditions, we believe it will be possible to achieve reductions in cultivation in the remaining provinces in coming years.

NATO is working hard, but needs to focus on counterinsurgency tactics, provide both more forces in order to facilitate increased and faster reconstruction assistance and improve performance in supporting robust Afghan counternarcotics efforts. Fundamentally, NATO needs to show greater political solidarity and greater operational flexibility for deployed forces.

But while we are sober about the challenges, we also must recognize our achievements. There is good news. NATO had some real operational successes last year with our Afghan partners. Despite dire predictions, the Taliban's much-vaunted spring offensive never materialized in 2007. Think back to a year ago, when the Taliban were on a media blitz threatening to take Kandahar. Today we hear no such claims because we stood together—Afghans, Americans, allies, and our partners—to stare down that threat.

We pursued the enemy last year, and over the winter we maintained NATO's operational tempo, capturing or killing insurgent leaders and reducing the Taliban's ability to rest and recoup. Some districts and villages throughout eastern and southern Afghanistan are more secure today than they have been in years or decades.

Roads, schools, markets, and clinics have been built all over the country. Six million Afghan children now go to school, one third of them girls. That is 2 million girls in school when under the Taliban there were none—zero. Some 80 percent of Afghans have access to health care—under the Taliban it was only 8 percent. Afghan soldiers are increasingly at the forefront of operations and the number we have trained and equipped has swelled from 35,000 to almost 50,000 in the last year. This spring, the United States will send an additional 3,200 marines for about 7 months to capitalize on these gains and support the momentum. Of this number, 2,000 marines will be added to ISAF combat missions in the south and 1,200 more trainers for the U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan. We are urging allies to match these contributions so they can take on the same roles when our Marines leave this autumn.

Afghanistan is issue No. 1 for NATO's Bucharest summit next month. NATO is preparing a common strategy document on Afghanistan that will help explain to publics the reasons we are fighting in Afghanistan, and how we are going to succeed.

We will also look at force contributions, and hope to have more forces identified at Bucharest. All contributions are valuable—from all 26 allies and the 14 partners there with us.

Some allies deserve special praise for taking on the hardest missions in the south—particularly the Canadians, British, Dutch, Danes, Australians, Romanians, and Estonians.

Others deserve recognition for increased contributions over the past year. Top of that list is Poland, a new and committed ally that has twice sent in more troops to eastern Afghanistan—first in fall 2006 when it added 1,000 and then again in this winter with a pledge for 400 more troops and eight vital helicopters. Australia more than doubled its forces in 2007, to a total of 1,000 in the southern province of Uruzgan. The U.K. has added over 1,400 troops in Helmand province since late 2006 to meet increased security needs, while Denmark added 300 to double its contribution in the same area. France meanwhile has moved six fighter and reconnaissance aircraft to Kandahar, and pledged four training teams.

Do we need more allies fighting? Yes. With this in mind, we very much welcome President Sarkozy's pledge that "France will stay engaged in Afghanistan for as long as necessary because what is at stake there is the future of our values and that of our Atlantic alliance."

We also need allies and partners to do more to train and equip the Afghan national security forces—the Army and the police. NATO is providing small embedded teams directly into Afghan forces to serve as coaches, trainers, and mentors to the Afghan Army units. Currently, there are 34 NATO training and mentoring teams (called Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams—OMLTs) deployed in Afghanistan. But we need at least 22 more by this time next year and we are asking all of our allies and partners to step up and do more.

In addition to more troops, we need to give allied commanders on the ground more flexibility so they can use their forces most effectively. We understand the political constraints under which our allies operate, but less flexibility requires more troops and prolongs the mission.

At the same time that we build a more capable NATO, we also want to see a stronger and more capable EU. If Afghanistan has taught us anything, it is that we need a better, more seamless relationship between the two. Bureaucratic hurdles should not put soldiers' lives on the line. We can't keep showing up side by side in far flung parts of the world and play a pickup game. We must work together to develop better NATO–EU cooperation.

KOSOVO

Let me now turn to Kosovo, NATO's second largest operation after Afghanistan. We all know the history. In fact, I was there a few days ago. As I had the privilege of testifying on Kosovo before this committee last week, I will keep my remarks brief.

Kosovo's declaration of independence ends one chapter but our work is not yet done. We must deal with short-term challenges of security and longer term challenges of Kosovo's development. These are serious. But the status quo was unsustainable; and seeking to sustain it would have led to even greater challenges.

NATO, through KFOR, continues to provide security, freedom of movement, and protection for minorities and religious and cultural sites in this, the world's newest state. There has been no significant interethnic violence, no refugees or internally displaced persons, and no trouble at patrimonial sites. KFOR remains authorized to operate in Kosovo under UNSCR 1244. Almost 90 percent of the KFOR forces are European.

We expect that NATO will also play a key role in the establishment of a new, multiethnic Kosovo Security Force and a civilian agency to oversee it, as well as in the dissolution of the Kosovo Protection Corps. Kosovo is eager to contribute to NATO, the organization that intervened to save the people of Kosovo during their darkest hour.

Our current challenge is dealing with Serbian extremists who seek to foment violence, chaos, and perhaps de facto partition of Kosovo. NATO and UNMIK are responding to this challenge firmly, defusing conflicts before they escalate, and KFOR deserves credit for its prompt, effective actions thus far. KFOR however is just one piece of the puzzle, and we are working closely with the U.N., EU, and the Kosovo Government itself.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

Now, let me speak about NATO enlargement, a major part of the Bucharest summit.

NATO enlargement has been a major success, thanks to the work of many on this committee. The administration strongly supports the aspirations of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO. They have all made substantial progress, especially over the past 1 to 2 years. Their forces serve with us in Afghanistan and other global peacekeeping operations. They continue to play important roles on Kosovo. In short, they have shown a clear commitment to bearing the responsibilities of NATO membership.

Albania has made steady progress on combating corruption, with arrests of high-level government officials among others, substantial progress on judicial reform, and progress on laws to increase transparency and efficiency within the court system. In addition to the strong support and leadership on Kosovo, Albania is the greatest per-capita contributor to NATO and coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Croatia has a proven track record of political and economic maturity and is also an important partner on the battlefield. Significant progress on military reforms has

created more modern and deployable armed forces, in addition to Croatia's support in promoting regional stability.

Macedonia has made significant strides since 2001 in building a multiethnic democracy. The government has taken strong steps on rule of law by implementing several critical laws on its courts and police and taking action against trafficking in persons. Macedonia, like the other aspirants, is punching above its weight in operations, and its progress on defense reforms has been impressive.

One issue threatens Macedonia's NATO candidacy—the dispute between Greece and Macedonia over Macedonia's name. Without a resolution of this issue, Greece has said it would block an invitation for Macedonia to join NATO. The administration repeatedly has emphasized its support for the ongoing U.N.-facilitated talks on the name issue. It has urged both parties to work together and with U.N. negotiator Matt Nimetz to use the time remaining before Bucharest to come to a win-win solution—and not to allow this issue to prevent Macedonia from being invited to join NATO.

Are the aspirants perfect? No. Have they done significant work and put themselves on a trajectory for success? Yes. The United States and our allies need to consider whether it is better for the security of the alliance and the stability of the Balkans to have these countries in or to keep them out. We know from experience that countries who join NATO continue to address remaining reforms, and build security in their region and the world. An invitation for membership is not a finish line and these countries know that.

Ukraine and Georgia have expressed an interest in joining NATO. We have always supported their aspirations. They are not ready to be NATO members now, as they themselves recognize. We can help them to help themselves, as they are asking, just as we have helped others, through the Membership Action Plan (MAP). MAP is the next step for them, and the timing of that step will be a key issue for the Bucharest summit.

Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia joined NATO's Partnerships for Peace in November 2006. While it was a controversial issue at the time, I think that doubters now see that it was the right decision. These countries are also members of the Euro-Atlantic community and must be supported in their efforts to join its institutions, to the degree they are prepared and seek to. Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina have expressed interest in beginning an Intensified Dialogue (ID) on membership issues with NATO, and we believe that NATO should extend those offers at Bucharest. And when the day comes and Serbia is prepared to take up its European future, make further reforms, and seek closer cooperation with NATO, we will welcome that as well.

NATO's door to enlargement must remain open. Every country has the right to choose its relationship with NATO, and the alliance's decision to invite a country to become a member will be made according to its performance, willingness, and ability to contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, and desire to join. No country outside of NATO has a right to decide that question for them. No amount of outside pressure or intimidation should sway allies from doing what is in NATO's best interests.

Depending on the decision at Bucharest, we look forward to working with the Senate to ratify additional protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty for each state's new membership.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lugar, and other members of the committee, several administrations have worked assiduously to help build a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace. NATO has been an indispensable instrument of this noble objective and NATO is becoming a multilateral instrument of transatlantic security for the 21st century—far afield but closely tied to its original purposes and values. We will strive to hand over to the 44th President of the United States in 2009, whoever he or she may be, this great undertaking.

The CHAIRMAN. General.

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN CRADDOCK, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE, NATO HEADQUARTERS, MONS, BELGIUM

General CRADDOCK. Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear

before you today to discuss NATO's operation in Afghanistan, NATO enlargement, and the future of NATO.

I have submitted a written statement, Chairman, and I ask that it be inserted into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be, without objection.

General CRADDOCK. Thank you.

I am especially fortunate to be here today with Secretary Dan Fried. I couldn't ask for a more capable wingman, and I am grateful for the opportunity. We have appeared at other times in the past, in other committees.

Dan, thank you.

The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan—ISAF—remains NATO's most important and challenging mission, one that includes more than 47,000 forces from 40 nations, including some 19,000 from the United States.

The security situation remains difficult, especially in the southern and eastern parts of the country. Our metrics highlight that 70 percent of the recorded security incidents in 2007 occurred in only 10 percent—or 40—of the 398 districts in Afghanistan. These 40 districts are home to approximately 6 percent of Afghanistan's population. The Afghan National Army, the ANA, continues to grow in size, in combat capability, and will exceed the size of ISAF in 2008. We are seeing an increase in the number and complexity of operations led and executed by the ANA; and in the most hotly contested regions, it participates in more than 90 percent of all ISAF operations, that is in the east and the south.

The Afghan National Police Force has grown quickly in numbers, but it continues to lag significantly behind the ANA. Police performance needs to be urgently enhanced. Recent pay and structural reforms will help, but corruption, criminality, and lack of qualified leadership remain the most pressing issues.

In the development area, the World Bank reported some 32,000 projects are underway, with some 15,000 completed. Phone usage has increased from just 25,000 land lines in 2001 to nearly 4 million cell phones today. The child mortality rates have decreased by 25 percent since 2001. And 7 million children have been immunized against polio. The education of Afghanistan's children continues to move forward. Enrollment now exceeds 6 million students, including more female students than ever before.

Security progress in Afghanistan is slowed by force shortfalls in some key locations and capabilities. We are at a critical juncture in Afghanistan, and the ISAF mission needs its military requirements filled immediately. Our opponents in Afghanistan operate and sustain their opposition against the international community within the gap that exists between the forces we need and the forces we have in theater.

Additionally, the numerous national caveats restricting the use of NATO forces limit the employment of forces both among and within regional commands. These caveats, like shortfalls, increase the risk to every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine deployed in theater.

Having said that, I still remain firm in my conviction that NATO's efforts in Afghanistan are making a difference. We are succeeding, but, indeed, not as fast as we, the international commu-

nity, are capable of succeeding, but I believe we are making progress. We are improving the lives of many Afghan citizens. We are creating the conditions for a better future. But, the reality today is, NATO and its partners throughout the international community can, and must, do more.

Turning to the subject of enlargement, I believe that NATO enlargement has been a historic success, strengthening our alliance and serving as a powerful incentive to promote democratic reforms among expiring members. I believe the process of NATO enlargement is not complete. NATO's door must remain open. Candidate nations must provide added value to the Alliance. They must be contributors to security, not consumers of it.

In this transitional period, I'm concerned about the Alliance's collective ability to match its political will to its level of ambition. Forces in ongoing operations, the command structure, theater and strategic reserves, and the NATO response force are demands on the NATO force pool, demands that, arguably, may be draining the force pool into a puddle. Key capability resourcing is crucial to ensuring NATO's ability to simultaneously execute its main task: Respond to crises and transform to meet future challenges.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Craddock follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN BANTZ J. CRADDOCK, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE, NATO HEADQUARTERS, MONS, BELGIUM

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today in order to provide an update on NATO enlargement, NATO's operations in Afghanistan, and the future of NATO as it pertains to military activities. I intend to devote the majority of my testimony to NATO's operations in Afghanistan, but I would like to comment briefly on NATO enlargement and the future of NATO.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

To fully appreciate the NATO enlargement decision, it is important to provide the committee a context for the decisions under consideration. NATO has an open-door policy on enlargement. Any European country in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area can become a member of the alliance, when invited by the existing member countries. At the 2006 Riga summit, NATO heads of state and government declared that the alliance intends to extend further invitations to countries that meet NATO standards to join NATO during its summit in 2008.

Aspirant countries are expected to participate in the Membership Action Plan to prepare for potential membership and demonstrate their ability to meet the obligations and commitments of possible future membership. In particular, countries seeking NATO membership must be able to demonstrate that they are in a position to further the principles of the 1949 Washington treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. They are also expected to meet certain political, economic, and military goals, which are laid out in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement. These include:

- Each nation possesses a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy;
- Each nation treats minority populations in accordance with the guidelines of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE);
- Each nation works to resolve outstanding disputes with neighbors and makes an overall commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes;
- Each nation has the capability and willingness to make a military contribution to the alliance and to achieve interoperability with other members' forces;

- Each nation commits to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures.

Accession talks follow the formal invitation. They are the dominion of NATO headquarters in Brussels and bring together teams of NATO experts and representatives of the nations pursuing the Membership Action Plan. Their aim is to obtain formal confirmation from the candidate nations of their willingness and ability to meet the political, legal, and military obligations and commitments of NATO membership, as laid out in the Washington treaty and in the aforementioned Study on NATO Enlargement.

As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe I believe NATO enlargement has been a historic success, strengthening our alliance and serving as a powerful incentive to promote democratic reforms among aspiring members. The process of NATO enlargement is not complete, and NATO's door must remain open. I also believe that candidate nations must provide added value to the alliance. They must be contributors to security, not only consumers of security. At present, three countries—Albania, Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are members of NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP). While there is a military component of MAP, and while Allied Command Operations has been working with the three nations in MAP on defense and military reforms, enlargement is a political decision under the control of the 26 NATO members. It is not a strategic military decision, nor is it a political decision in which I participate. Since the Riga summit, the 26 NATO nations have discussed and assessed the progress of these three countries in the MAP process. I have been asked to provide my input in the enlargement process at this time, and I confirmed that the security of NATO members will continue to be maintained with the inclusion of these nations into the alliance. In Bucharest, heads of state and government will provide an authoritative statement with respect to invitations for membership or continue to encourage the nations to make more progress.

NATO IN AFGHANISTAN

While NATO enlargement is a critical aspect of the alliance's adaptation to the evolution of security in Europe, NATO's role in Afghanistan is a vital security mission and critical to enhancing security at the national, regional, and strategic levels in the 21st century. It is also critical to demonstrate NATO's ability to operate and provide security at strategic distance, and to address the important challenges we face in the 21st century. NATO's approach in Afghanistan is three-pronged:

- First, NATO provides leadership of the U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), an international force of more than 47,000 troops (including National Support Elements) that assists the Afghan authorities in extending and exercising its authority and influence across the country, creating the conditions for stabilization and reconstruction;
- Second, NATO has a Senior Civilian Representative, responsible for advancing the political-military aspects of the alliance's commitment to the country, who works closely with ISAF, liaises with the Afghan Government and other international organizations, and maintains contacts with neighboring countries; and
- Third, NATO has a substantial program of cooperation with Afghanistan, concentrating on defense reform, defense institution-building, and the military aspects of security sector reform.

I would like to focus my comments on NATO's ISAF operation. The International Security Assistance Force remains NATO's most important and challenging mission. With over 47,000 forces from 40 nations, including 19,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines from the United States, the alliance has responsibility for ISAF operations throughout Afghanistan. Working alongside an additional 11,500 U.S.-led coalition forces of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and other international actors, ISAF's role is to provide a secure and stable environment in which Afghan institutions can develop and expand their influence, while simultaneously developing an enduring Afghan capability to provide for its own security. The mission in Afghanistan is a complex one, involving the cooperation of NATO and non-NATO nations, the Afghan Government, and many international and nongovernmental organizations. The opposing militant forces (OMF) consist of disparate groups, including the Taliban, Haqanni, and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), tribal warlords, drug traffickers, and other extremists. While in most cases the OMF does not work in an organized fashion, they do work toward a common goal—that of preventing the democratically elected Government of Afghanistan from extending its control and reach throughout the nation. In addition to the ISAF forces conducting security and stability missions across the country, the 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) under ISAF are at the leading edge of NATO's efforts for security and recon-

struction, and are an important component of a comprehensive approach that works with local and national authorities and the various organizations of the international community to achieve our goals as stated in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions and NATO OPLAN 10403(rev).

ISAF UPDATE: CAMPAIGN PROGRESS

Progress in Afghanistan continues. NATO has three lines of operation: Security and stability; enhancing governance; and facilitating reconstruction and development. Over the past 6 months, NATO has adopted Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) to assess its performance in Afghanistan. Our intent is to more accurately provide objective trend analysis to inform our assessment of progress. We developed 63 metrics to measure progress toward our three stated campaign objectives from the operational plan approved by NATO's North Atlantic Council. As we gain fidelity over time, we expect to see trends develop. I will now provide a look into our advancement on these three objectives.

Our first objective is the extension of the Afghan Government's authority across the country. ISAF's high operational tempo and focused, intelligence-led operations, have forced the OMF to resort to terrorist tactics to pursue their strategic objectives. Their indiscriminate but calculated attacks are designed to strike at the resolve of the Afghan people and those committed to progress in Afghanistan. While the security situation remains difficult, especially in the southern and the eastern parts of the country, our metrics highlight that IED incidents and numbers killed and wounded are decreasing. The increased attacks aimed at ISAF and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) does not reflect a deterioration of the security situation but are a consequence of our successful tactical activity. Seventy percent of recorded security incidents in 2007 occurred in only 10 percent, or 40, of the 398 districts in Afghanistan. These 40 districts are home to only 6 percent of Afghanistan's population.

Despite this analysis, recent surveys have indicated a decrease in the perception of security amongst the population of Afghanistan. I offer three reasons for this. First, by its nature, terrorism aims to incite fear in the population—while actual attacks are not far-reaching, the fear of a potential attack remains. NATO works diligently toward timely and relevant communications to mitigate the information-based effects of OMF tactics. Second, NATO's inability to fill its stated military requirements in order to deny the OMF freedom to operate and to better create the conditions for reconstruction and development undermines the confidence of the local population. Third, widespread corruption, especially amongst the Afghan police, and the pervasive influence of the narcotics industry further serves to instill doubt in the local populace. Public perceptions will change when it becomes clear that good governance is a better choice than tyranny, and the rule of law a better choice than terror. NATO's strategy is sound, but it will only prevail if it has the forces needed without caveats that constrain its use. Closing the gap between what we have and what we need will deny the OMF the space it needs to operate against us.

Our second objective is the development of the structures necessary to maintain security in Afghanistan without the assistance of international forces. The Afghan National Army (ANA) continues to grow in size and combat capability. The successful operation to retake Musa Qala, an operation planned and controlled by the ANA with ISAF in support, was evidence of its increased effectiveness. In support of this objective, NATO aims to deploy more than 70 Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) across the country. These teams provide mentoring, training, and a liaison capability between the Afghan National Army and ISAF, coordinating the planning of operations and ensuring the Afghan units receive vital enabling support. The Afghan National Police has grown quickly in numbers but continues to lag significantly behind the Afghan National Army in professional ability. Collectively, therefore, the Afghan National Security Forces still lack the capacity to hold and stabilize areas that ISAF has secured. Unquestionably, this slows progress toward a safe and secure environment and has an adverse effect on the public's perception of progress.

Our third and final objective is the development and maintenance of a country-wide stable and secure environment by Afghan authorities, in which sustainable reconstruction and development efforts have taken hold. NATO, however, is not the lead organization for most aspects of Afghanistan's nation-building. The tasks of stabilizing and rebuilding the country include development of democratic institutions, which extend effective governance and rule of law throughout the country, in a manner developed by, and acceptable to, the Afghan people. These tasks include many key subtasks: Training of government officials at all levels, reduction of corruption,

effective counternarcotics efforts, and delivery of social services and economic infrastructure. Although many major projects are underway, measuring advancement is difficult, as the periodicity of reporting differs among the agencies involved. Nonetheless, it is clear we are experiencing progress, as evidenced by projects such as the ring road and the Kajaki dam. The World Bank reported some 32,000 projects underway and 15,000 completed.

Macroeconomic reporting indicates that the Afghan economy has recovered to 1978/1979 prewar levels. Phone usage has increased from the 25,000 landlines in 2001 to nearly 4 million cell phones today with a current growth of 150,000 cell phones per month. Additionally, we have seen an increased medical capacity as well as improved health care. Child mortality rates have been reduced by 25 percent since 2001 and 7 million children have been immunized against polio. The education of Afghanistan's children continues to move forward in most regions. Enrollment exceeds 6 million students, including more female students than ever before. Although NATO does not have the lead for those efforts, what NATO does, or does not do, has a far-reaching impact. The unique value of NATO's network of partnership with the Afghan Government and the international community is that it allows like-minded countries that have a shared responsibility for international peace and stability to unite efforts and pool resources.

ISAF UPDATE: OPERATIONS

ISAF operational tempo throughout 2007 was high. In 2007, 144 members of ISAF were killed in action; 970 more were wounded. Casualties amongst Afghan forces rose as their involvement became more significant. A heavy price is being paid to achieve the alliance's and our national security objectives.

ISAF has developed a series of rolling, theaterwide operations designed to maximize the impact of our effort in building a secure and stable environment. For example, in late fall of 2007, ISAF initiated Operation PAMIR, a theaterwide operation that was designed to maintain the initiative through the winter and into the spring. The operation exploited the historical migration of the opposing militant forces to their winter sanctuaries, both inside and outside of Afghanistan. ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces have conducted intelligence-driven operations oriented toward interdicting logistical support, disrupting command, control and communications, and degrading OMF leadership, while simultaneously supporting the Afghan Government's winter outreach efforts. Targeted Information Operations were designed to enhance public confidence in the Afghan Government, Afghan National Security Forces, and ISAF. These efforts were focused on strengthening the support of the loyal, gaining the support of the uncommitted, and undermining the will of those left behind to fight during the winter. Particular emphasis was given to publicizing the authority, capability, and effectiveness of the Afghan Government, as well as supporting the promotion of reconstruction and development. By demonstrating the linkage between security and the government's ability to deliver development, ISAF seeks to drive a wedge between opposing militant forces and the Afghan population.

The trend toward more complex, rolling, theaterwide operations is having a positive impact on the security situation. Operations this spring will exploit the success of Operation PAMIR with focused operations against the OMF where their influence and freedom of movement is greatest. We are already witnessing an increase in the number and complexity of operations led and executed by the Afghan National Army. Improved security will allow for improved governance at district and provincial levels and set the conditions for coordinated, focused reconstruction and development into the summer and beyond.

Local liaison between Pakistan, ANSF, and ISAF in the border area is increasingly effective, and at a higher level, the Tri-Partite Commission remains an effective mechanism for coordination. The situation in Pakistan could have an impact on the stability and security in Afghanistan and we continue to work closely in all these forums with the Pakistani military to enhance our mutual understanding and advance ISAF military operations.

ISAF UPDATE: CJSOR AND NATIONAL CAVEATS

Contrary to some reporting, the number of NATO troops in Afghanistan including some retained under national control has risen by more than 8,700 over the past year and continues to increase. It is also not well-recognized that ISAF exceeds requirements in many areas. Yet, ISAF still has shortfalls against the minimum military requirement in some key locations and in certain key capabilities. Specifically, a major shortcoming in the ISAF Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) is the deficit in Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams. The absence of

OMLTs undermines the development of the Afghan National Security Forces, largely because U.S. Embedded Training Teams that could be supporting police development are compensating for OMLT deficiencies. ISAF's stated strategy is to secure, and where and when necessary, hold until competent, capable ANA forces are able to take over. Competent ANA forces are essential in order to move to the transition phase of the ISAF operation. We will need to field 22 OMLTs between now and the end of the year to keep pace with ANA growth. In addition, the absence of two Provincial Reconstruction Teams, three infantry battalions, shortcomings in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities, shortfalls in rotary wing aircraft for lift, medical evacuation, air support, as well as the need for forcewide enhancements in Counter-Improvised Explosive Device measures are the key unfilled elements of ISAF's minimum military requirements as stated in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements.

There are over 80 restrictions or constraints, or caveats, on the use of NATO forces imposed on national contributions by national authorities. These are political constraints, which limit the employment of forces both among and within regional commands. ISAF needs the freedom to make the most effective use of its forces if NATO is to prevail. In particular, national caveats constrain ISAF's freedom to concentrate force and prevent it from compensating, where necessary, for CJSOR shortfalls. Caveats, like shortfalls to the CJSOR, increase the risk to every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine the alliance deploys as part of ISAF. Our Nations' forces are exceptional, but they need as much flexibility as possible to be effective on this asymmetric, irregular battlefield.

ISAF UPDATE: AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

The development of the Afghan structures necessary to maintain security in Afghanistan without the assistance of international forces is a strategic objective of ISAF. Capacity-building is central to the long-term success of Afghanistan and to reaching NATO's end state. The Afghan National Army continues to grow in size and combat capability and will likely exceed the size of ISAF in 2008. To reiterate, the successful operation to retake Musa Qala, planned and controlled by the ANA with ISAF in support, was clear evidence of increased effectiveness and a template for the future. Today, in the most hotly contested regions, the ANA participates in more than 90 percent of all ISAF operations—this is certainly a positive trend. It is important to note that OMLTs have played a critical role in nurturing this capability and have been a critical link to ISAF assets in operations. They are our most important military contribution to Afghanistan's long-term future.

Leaders across Afghanistan agree that improved policing would lead to improved security overall. The Afghan National Police has grown quickly in numbers, but continues to lag significantly behind the Afghan National Army in professional ability. This distracts the ANA who are required to take on police tasks. Collectively, therefore, the Afghan National Security Forces still lack the capacity to hold and stabilize areas that ISAF has secured. This sets back advancement toward security and has an adverse effect on the public's perception of progress. In the longer term, slower capacity-building in a more fragile security environment delays the point at which we can hand responsibility for security to the Afghans. Consequently, police performance needs to be urgently enhanced. Recent pay and structural reforms will help, but corruption, criminality, and a lack of qualified leadership remain the most pressing issues. In an effort to address these concerns, a focused and intensive training program was recently implemented by the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a program which holds promise in facilitating more rapid police reform. Finally, the lack of police mentors below provincial level is a significant impediment. I again point out that, by providing more OMLTs, the coalition can divert more of its teams to develop the police force. In sum, while there are positive indications, there is much more work to be done toward building an indigenous security capacity.

ISAF UPDATE: SUPPORTING RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

ISAF is also focused on the strategic objective of establishing a countrywide stable and secure environment by Afghan authorities, in which sustainable reconstruction and development efforts have taken hold. NATO does not compete with other organizations for the humanitarian and development space. Our efforts to establish security and assist with capacity-building allow other international and nongovernmental organizations to work more effectively in this complex environment. This is, in effect, the comprehensive approach undertaken by NATO and its partners. NATO policy recognizes the essential requirement to work with Afghan national authorities and numerous organizations in the international community to deliver human

security in a coordinated way. The North Atlantic Council's approved Operations Plan articulates the need for a comprehensive approach. Our Provincial Reconstruction Teams spearhead this effort on a daily basis. Their impact is significant at the tactical level and we are now seeing progress in the implementation of a cohesive approach at the operational and strategic levels with Afghan authorities and the international community.

As I mentioned earlier, it is clear we are experiencing progress, as evidenced by numerous nation-building projects, the positive indications of macroeconomic activity, improved health care, and advances in the reach of education. The Afghan National Development Strategy is Afghanistan's chosen path for the future. It is an important next step which must be supported by robust implementation at all levels. The international community needs to make every effort to assist the Afghan Government in achieving its objectives in national development. Regardless of military success, we will struggle to succeed in Afghanistan unless others meet their responsibility to build governance and stimulate sustained development in a coordinated manner. The international community moves into the space created by our security operations to commence work. Lack of progress in reconstruction and development undermines public opinion at home, erodes support within Afghanistan for ISAF, and jeopardizes hard-fought security.

ISAF UPDATE: COUNTERNARCOTICS

Eliminating the illicit production of opium in Afghanistan is vital to the long-term security, development, and effective governance of Afghanistan. Poppy cultivation continues to be a problem in areas where there is a relative lack of strong governance. The narcotics trade, encouraged and supported by Taliban extremists, funds and supports the insurgency, drains the legal economy, promotes corruption, and undermines public support.

NATO does not have the lead for the counternarcotics effort. The Afghan Government, supported by the international community and in particular, the United Kingdom as the lead G-8-nation, has the primary responsibility for counternarcotics efforts.

While supporting the Afghan government counternarcotics programs is an ISAF key supporting task, ISAF is not directly involved in poppy eradication. ISAF is not a direct action force in counternarcotics and it is not resourced for this role. When requested by the Afghan Government, ISAF's support consists of the sharing of information, the conduct of an efficient public information campaign, and the provision of in-extremis support to the Afghan National Security Forces conducting counternarcotics operations. ISAF also assists the training of Afghan National Security Forces in counternarcotics related activities and provides logistic support, when requested, for the delivery of alternative livelihood programs.

ISAF is committed to the full implementation of its counternarcotics tasks as outlined in the current ISAF mandate. NATO, at the strategic political level, must do what it can to support and encourage those in the lead and to ensure ISAF is resourced to perform assigned counternarcotics tasks. At the operational and tactical level, ISAF is effectively coordinating its support efforts with the Afghan Government's counternarcotics forces as well as other CN actors from the international community. ISAF is operating at the limit of its existing authority to synchronize and coordinate its actions with those of Afghan counternarcotics efforts as provided for in the OPLAN.

UPDATE: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

NATO's action plan on strategic communications reflects a growing recognition that we still have much room to improve in this area, an area that comes with a significant resource bill for nations. To ensure that we are properly supporting NATO and national strategic communications we need to ensure our public affairs capabilities are effective and relevant for the 21st century. We need action at two levels. In theater, nations need to ensure we have the right caliber people, properly trained and with appropriate equipment and resources for the job. The appointment of a General Officer spokesman in ISAF is a positive step. I asked Chiefs of Defense to ensure they now place talented people at every level of our public affairs organization. Nations need to make significant investment to build and sustain these capabilities.

At the strategic level, we have made some progress in public affairs but have a way to go. We need to invest more effort now to ensure we are able to take the information provided from theater and to use it to support our common messaging themes. In the end, strategic communications is more about what we do as an alliance than about what we say. Our inability to resource the CJSOR, the effect of

national caveats, and other issues play into the hands of our opponents in Afghanistan. We need to avoid the consequences of losing the information war with the Taliban, and we cannot afford to lose the support of our public. An integrated, harmonized strategic communications plan, both in and outside of the operational theater, is vital.

UPDATE: CONCLUSION

A recurring theme in my testimony is NATO's inability to completely fill our agreed upon statement of requirements for forces in Afghanistan. We are still short key capabilities and enablers; enablers such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, communications, engineering, and air support. It is noteworthy that none of today's priority shortfalls are the result of nations reneging on an agreement to provide resources. Rather, offers against those stated requirements have never been made. Each nation has its own internal issues that it must address, but a completely resourced force sends a clear message to our adversary and the Afghan people—the message that NATO is committed to achieving success. We are at a critical juncture in Afghanistan, and the ISAF mission fundamentally needs minimum military requirements as outlined in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements filled immediately. Our opponents in Afghanistan operate and sustain their opposition against the International Community within the gap that exists between the forces we need in-theater and the forces we have in-theater. In particular, the aforementioned Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams are an urgent priority. By January 2009, we need NATO nations to provide 22 additional OMLTs to train and mentor the Afghan National Army in order for it to more rapidly and successfully assume responsibility for security. At every opportunity, I continue to encourage the NATO nations to make their offers to fill the remaining OMLTs before the Bucharest summit to provide for timely and effective deployment to theater by January 2009.

To conclude, I remain firm in my conviction that NATO's efforts in Afghanistan are making a difference. We are succeeding, indeed not as fast as we, the international community, are capable of succeeding, but we are making progress. We are improving the lives of the vast majority of Afghans and we are creating the conditions for a better future. Yet, NATO and our partners throughout the international community can and must do more. Success in Afghanistan will never be attributed to operational military victories alone. It is only through a comprehensive approach that true success can be realized. NATO, the military, will set the conditions to allow the people of Afghanistan, the governments, whether they are provincial or national, to provide infrastructure to create jobs. It is the long-term investment and development by the international community and the growth of commercial activity that will, in the end, make the real difference. It is an endeavor in which the international community must succeed in integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing its efforts. It cannot afford to fail or appear to be failing. Finally, everything we do must be seen in the context of how it helps the Government of Afghanistan achieve its good governance mandate. We need to work diligently with the Government of Afghanistan, at all levels, to reduce corruption and enable better governance.

FUTURE OF NATO

With respect to NATO's future, heads of state and government endorsed its "Comprehensive Political Guidance" at the Riga summit, laying out broad parameters for how NATO should develop in response to the challenges of the 21st century. The document captures the future direction of the alliance and I highlight for the committee the following key points from the document:

- The alliance will continue to follow the broad approach to security of the 1999 Strategic Concept and perform the fundamental security tasks it set out, namely security, consultation, deterrence and defense, crisis management, and partnership.
- The alliance will remain ready, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including through non-Article 5 crisis response operations. A premium will be placed on NATO's ability to cooperate with partners, relevant international organizations and, as appropriate, nongovernmental organizations in order to collaborate more effectively in planning and conducting operations.
- The alliance must have the capability to launch and sustain concurrent major joint operations and smaller operations for collective defense and crisis response on and beyond alliance territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance.
- Among qualitative force requirements, the following have been identified as NATO's top priorities:

- Joint expeditionary forces and the capability to deploy and sustain them;
- High-readiness forces;
- The ability to deal with asymmetric threats;
- Information superiority; and
- The ability to draw together the various instruments of the alliance brought to bear in a crisis and its resolution to the best effect, as well as the ability to coordinate with other actors. In this context, the NATO Response Force (NRF) is a fundamental military tool in support of the alliance and a catalyst for further transformation and will have the top priority together with operational requirements.

CHALLENGES AHEAD

NATO has demonstrated a remarkable capability to adjust to the rapid changes confronting North American, European, and global security since the end of the cold war. The alliance has been confronted with instability, humanitarian crises, regional conflict, and terrorism on a multinational scale. Simultaneously, we witnessed an increase in the speed of global change, the emergence of new threats and risks to our collective security, and the direct impact of second and third order effects of these types of threats from events around the world. In my view, human insecurity knows no borders in this interdependent, interconnected world. This is the reality of the 21st century and NATO has responded with capabilities at hand and has developed new capabilities, new policies, and new partnerships to meet these challenges beyond the expectations of the 2002 Prague summit.

NATO is now entering its most challenging period of transformation, adapting not only to the realities of a changed Europe, but also to those of a changed world. This is essential if we are to affirm the alliance's role as a modern instrument of security and stability for its members. NATO is taking important steps to complete its transformation from a static, reactive alliance focused on territorial defense to an expeditionary, proactive one that works with nations to deter and defeat the spectrum of 21st century threats confronting our collective security. The alliance is overcoming institutional inertia, out-dated business practices, and a cold-war-era stereotype understanding of its role, thereby eliminating self-imposed limits that directly reduce the security of its members and partners, both individually and collectively. At the same time, the alliance is assessing the threats we face, understanding better their interaction, and developing new capabilities and partnerships to successfully address these threats.

NATO has a narrow margin for error in this new world. We must balance a cross section of global interests, 21st century threats, and the asymmetric warfare utilized by terrorists. At the same time, NATO cannot ignore the challenge of dealing with the unresolved problems of 20th century Europe in order to realize the fundamental objective of a "Europe whole and free." These 20th century legacy security problems are difficult, real, and impact on the sense of security of the alliance and its members. As we assume new roles and new capabilities to deal with new problems, we must continue to devote our efforts to resolve those legacy issues such as Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, frozen conflicts, uncompleted economic, social, and political reforms in the former Soviet Union, nationalism, and ethnic conflict.

Consequently, alliance transformation reflects the requirements of this transitional period. Most significantly, it retains the commitment between its members on mutual defense and maintains the alliance as a Trans-Atlantic Forum for strategic dialogue on an ever-expanding array of security challenges, while simultaneously operating at strategic distance to address direct and indirect challenges to our collective security. The 60,000 deployed NATO military forces on three continents under my command as Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, are a visible and effective demonstration of NATO's resolve to collectively meet global security challenges. The men and women of the alliance plus other non-NATO troop-contributing nations are essentially redefining the role of NATO by their actions in operations.

The alliance is adapting, will continue to adapt, and will successfully meet the diverse and complex challenges in the future. However, in this transitional period, I am concerned about the shortcomings that directly impact on the alliance's collective ability to respond and react to crises. NATO's adoption of a crisis management role at the Brussels summit in 1994 opened a new chapter in the alliance's history, with capabilities, policies, and operations evolving over the last 14 years. Forces in ongoing operations, the command structure, theater and strategic reserves, and the NATO Response Force (NRF) are the force pool to meet current responsibilities and unforeseen crises. By not resourcing these key elements of the alliance's overall military capability, we place at risk NATO's transformation to meet future chal-

lenges, as well as its ability to execute its main tasks while simultaneously responding to crises.

During the cold war, NATO did not conduct any combat operations, but today it is involved in six operations on three continents performing a variety of missions—the NATO military structure is operating at an unprecedented operational tempo. The delta between our political will to take on missions and our political will to resource them translates into a delta between success and nonsuccess. It is the linkage between under-resourced operations at the tactical level, under-resourced theater and strategic reserves, under-resourced NRF, and under-resourced manning in the command structure that combine to place enormous limitations on the ability of the alliance to prosecute its missions at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. I continue to encourage NATO nations to further examine their ability to resource adequately all NATO operations and the NATO Response Force in order to minimize the risk to ongoing operations and secure the alliance's crisis management capabilities for current and future challenges.

It is my view that the alliance also continues to be questioned about its political will to meet both new 21st century challenges and unresolved 20th century challenges. Demonstrating political resolve and reaffirming NATO's unity of purpose and mission in addressing challenges to our security are vital requirements. At the end of the day, this cannot be demonstrated in words, but can only be demonstrated in the commitment made by nations, the leadership provided by nations, and the resources allocated by all nations to NATO's ongoing operations. NATO's role and credibility as a security provider in the post-cold-war era will be determined and judged by how the alliance performs in its military operations.

The overarching agenda for the alliance in the 21st century is deeply rooted in its operations, how the alliance functions and performs vis-a-vis current and future challenges and how our publics judge our success or lack of success. We must ensure at the highest political and strategic level that the "State of the Alliance" to defend and secure our vital interests is strong, that our strategy is correct, and that our resources flow in support of our vital interests and priorities.

In shaping the NATO of the future, we also need to ensure that we forge a common strategic perspective on the security environment, on our operations with strategic impact, and on the implications of success and failure. Strategically communicating these views to our publics is vitally important. Much is at stake. In this context, there is no strategic message to communicate about NATO's future absent strategic success. Success depends on adequate resourcing.

NATO operations should be the beneficiaries of a resource system that accords its top priority to deployed forces. Quite simply, NATO's deployed forces need to be fully resourced. It is the single most important means to demonstrate political will and symbolize our collective accountability to the servicemen and servicewomen put in harm's way. It is clear that absent real progress in resourcing the alliance's mission, our message will remain hollow with our publics and critics. I strongly encourage NATO nations to reinvigorate their political commitment to sustaining alliance operations. In so doing, we protect the tactical and operational successes in multiple theaters in order to achieve the strategic successes we desire in the context of a challenging security environment.

I am convinced that the alliance will successfully meet the diverse and complex challenges of the future. As we prepare for that future, it is important to remember that in the same way our opponents in Afghanistan operate and sustain their activities in the gap between the forces we have in-theater and the forces we need in-theater, our future opponents will operate and sustain their activities against the alliance in the gap between the capabilities and policies we have and the capabilities and policies we need.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General, let me start where you left off, the forces we need and the forces we have, as it relates to Afghanistan. How big is that gap?

General CRADDOCK. Chairman, it is a moving gap, and it's—it deals with assignment of forces against the minimum military requirement. NATO has a combined joint statement of requirements for every operation they do, and they have one for ISAF. In terms of numbers, I don't know the numbers. We talk capabilities—battalions, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, aircraft, things like that.

We have, over the past year, increased the number in Afghanistan upward of 12–13,000, but not all of those forces have been assigned against this CJSOR. So, they come in under national control, essentially working for the commander at ISAF—some with, some without constraints—the caveats. So, the shortfall, right now, is—against the CJSOR is about three infantry battalions, it's some heavy-lift helicopters, medium-lift helicopters, and some significant numbers of enablers, such as intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, streaming full-motion video, things like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that's exactly what the ISAF commander told us when we were there a couple of weeks ago. He said—I'm not quoting him, but the way I read it, he needs 10,000 folks that can shoot straight and kill people if they have to, and—and are willing to shoot—and which leads me to—I have been a strong proponent, as the Secretary knows and my colleagues know, along with those up here, of the expansion of NATO. I don't think there's any argument about the political rationale for the expansion. I mean, it's overwhelming. But, if I can be devil's advocate for a moment, some have suggested that the political aspect of it, or, to use your phrase, a slightly different way of saying it, that we have more consumers than contributors, that we may build this so big that it can't function, it becomes a jerry-rigged operation. As you expand it to 30, or heading toward 30, it becomes more cumbersome. If you look at the GDP of most of our European allies—I'm not even talking about the aspirants, their allocation of resources, percent of their GDP to their defense budgets, in relative terms, is embarrassing. And so, how do you respond to the notion that bringing in three countries—potentially, three countries—who have strong political rationale for it—how is that really going to enhance or further drain NATO's resources in trying to integrate them and actually make up for some obvious shortcomings?

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Chairman. I think if one looks at the aspirants today and what they are contributing to, for—let me use Afghanistan as an example—ISAF—if we look at those three nations in the context of the 14 non-NATO troop-contributing nations, in terms of the numbers of personnel they are providing, they rank number 3, 4, and 5 of 14. If you look at the 26 NATO nations who are participating, they rank ahead of five. We are—we've looked at, through the MAP process over time, their security-sector processes, reforms, innovations, transformation, and all the aspirants have made progress to the standard that we believe is acceptable. Because they are contributing now and we find them continuing to do so in a larger manner, we think that's a positive signal.

The downside for membership would be air defense. There is a requirement in NATO to provide for your own national air defense. We have assessed that they are not capable of doing that. One nation has some MIG–21s, but they are not operationally ready. So, that would be a burden assumed to NATO. There is precedent for that. We are doing that now in the Baltic nations and Iceland. So, we don't see that as an overwhelming burden. It's manageable for the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the first time around, the administration, in 1996, concluded that Romania wasn't ready for mem-

bership, and it held off the invitation at the Madrid summit. Romania used that decision to redouble its efforts to get prepared; and a few years later, it got an invitation to join. Did the Alliance make the right decision, in 1996, with Romania?

Mr. FRIED. It certainly turned out well; that is, Romania has been a good NATO member, a contributing member. And we saw that, both before the invitation, in 2002, which was then they got it, and afterward, they've continued their reforms.

In retrospect, could we have invited them in 1997? Possibly. They made good time. They did well, over the next 5 years, getting ready. Had we known then what we know now, we might have invited them. But, the honest truth is that we've seen NATO enlargement in practice, and we have the track record, and we now know, with great confidence, that NATO enlargement does work, both in theory and in practice, and that when nations are invited to join the Alliance, and do join, their reforms continue.

The CHAIRMAN. General, in 2007, the Secretary General of NATO wrote about the need for better integration in the Alliance and more reform in NATO headquarters. In an article, he claimed that there are still too many vestiges of the cold war in the way in which NATO's structure is organized. I know that's probably—actually, it's unfair to ask you that one, only 20 seconds left in my time, but what kind of success have we had with NATO reform? And what's on the agenda for 2009?

General CRADDOCK. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can't speak for 2009, at this point. I think that's work in progress. I absolutely agree with the Secretary General, we are still hidebound into the cold war, planning and preparing for something that never happened, thank goodness. And we must transition to the 21st century fact of life, which is fast-paced operations, requirements for support of the soldiers, the commanders in the field, and break through this enormous number of committees and this bureaucracy, that it just beats us back all the time with a never-ending set of questions. At the end of the day, it doesn't make any difference anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I wish you luck.

Let me, with the permission of my colleague, point out one thing to the Secretary. In 1998, in the context of giving its advice and consent, the Senate, with regard to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—the Senate required the President to submit reports to the appropriate congressional committees on states being considered for NATO membership prior to an invitation to such states being—to begin accession talks and prior to conclusion of any protocol providing for such accession. To date, we've not received the required report for this proposed round of enlargement. Is it due to anything we don't understand? Because it's due prior to the invitations being extended in Bucharest. Are you planning on submitting that?

Mr. FRIED. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. OK, good. Thank you. Some parts of the administration don't think they have to respond to us. It's nice to know you think you should.

Mr. FRIED. We look forward to sending it before Bucharest.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much.

I yield to my colleague.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Fried, just along the same line, you've indicated, in your testimony, the administration favors accession of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, and MAP programs for Georgia and Ukraine, but what kind of personal dialogue or advocacy is the President of the United States prepared to give to this effort? In other words, as many of us read press accounts, quite apart from your testimony, it would appear that there are several—in fact, maybe a couple of major European countries—that have grave doubts about these proposals. Is there a danger that we could all go to Bucharest and sit down around the table, and suddenly we learn that we're not all on the same page at all. So, I'm simply asking, between now and early April, what is the President prepared to do? What sort of program are you going to prescribe for him, if he hasn't made up his mind?

Mr. FRIED. Senator, we are working within the Alliance on this issue. Secretary Rice discussed this at last week's NATO ministerial at length. The case we're making, that you already are aware of, is roughly as follows: MAP is not the same as membership; Ukraine and Georgia have a long way to go before they would qualify for membership; at the same time, no country outside the Alliance, should have a veto; these countries have to be considered for MAP according to their own merits and the interests of the Alliance; and, quite honestly, it's hard to say no to young democracies. A compelling case can be made for MAP for both of them. We're consulting with our allies, and discussing the best timing and the best way to move ahead.

As you know, and as you pointed out, there is not yet a consensus. We're working within the Alliance to try to find one.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that's reassuring. And, you know, we obviously wish you success, because, otherwise, it's likely to be an, unfortunately, unsuccessful meeting, at least in my judgment.

Now, let me just add this thought, to be provocative. Many people writing about Europe, as a whole, would say that the continent does not anticipate a war; does not anticipate aggression against its Member States. And, therefore, rationally, parliaments do not support spending additional money on defense that they might have, because they don't see the threat in light of other priorities—social programs, subsidies, safety nets, economic advancements. They believe the rational thing to do is spend money there, and they're doing so.

Likewise, although we talk about Afghanistan, and we discuss various potential threats to Europe, as well as the United States, European capitals do not feel the urgency of the terrorist threats as we do here in the United States. European colleagues do not see this as a worldwide war. There are unfortunate incidents but those are perhaps better addressed by immigration policies, diplomacy, and developmental assistance.

Now, under those circumstances, NATO has invited President Putin to the summit meeting at Bucharest, after the heads of state have met for a day or so. It would be a wonderful thing if President Putin came in as a European and suggested how we all might work together. But, most recently, President Putin held a press conference with President Yushchenko of Ukraine, in which Yush-

chenko went to Moscow to solve an energy crisis regarding debts that Russia alleges are owed to Gazprom. During the press conference, the President of Russia indicated that, because Yushchenko has written a letter to NATO, Russia may target nuclear-tipped missiles at Ukraine to ensure the defense of Russia. President Putin made similar threats to the Czech Republic and Poland, who have been discussing missile defense cooperation with the United States. This occurred even as Secretaries Gates and Rice are visiting Russia to meet with President Putin about how we all might work together in a more comprehensive missile defense situation, as opposed to threats to the Poles and the Czechs for having the temerity to discuss such a thing.

And my point is, given the indecision, right now, of major European countries as to whether we should invite new members to join NATO, extend Membership Action Plans to two new governments, increase defense spending, or increase expeditionary forces, to invite President Putin into this situation is, I suspect, to give him a meeting in which he intimidates them further. Now, they will say, "We're not intimidated," but, the fact is, on energy issues, they have been, and they are in a box because of it.

If you were a European President, and you faced dire economic circumstances, granted you don't face an invasion, but you're in trouble. What would you do in such a situation? as a result, I question the strategy, at this particular moment. I'm certainly for one of visiting with President Putin at every opportunity, but, in this context, this seems to me to be very dubious.

Now, what thought do you have about all that?

Mr. FRIED. Secretary Rice responded, I believe, in testimony, or to questions afterward, about President Putin's reference to targeting Ukraine with nuclear weapons, and she responded very strongly and rightly.

President Putin's presence at the NATO summit is going to be, as I said, a challenge. And it will be a challenge for the allies to find the right balance of willingness to work with Russia on a common agenda, which is in our interests, and determination to conduct the Alliance's business without reference to threats from Russia, such as the threat to target Alliance members, such as Poland, with nuclear weapons. Finding that balance is easier to articulate than it is to do in practice, but I'm convinced the Alliance can do it. It means that the Alliance has to work hard on decisions like—for example, on missile defense or Georgia-Ukraine MAP—and to do so for the right reasons. I think the Alliance can handle this, and it will be one of the more interesting summits, I'm sure.

Senator LUGAR. Well, best of luck. You know, I hope that—

[Laughter.]

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. You and the Secretary are well prepared, because at least this hearing will have had an early warning signal that there is a challenge.

Mr. FRIED. We are aware of that, and you outlined the challenge accurately.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, sir.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Senator Lugar.

Thank you both for your testimony.

Mr. Secretary, one of NATO's fundamental successes is its commitment of its membership to that core mission. That's how it was created, 60 years ago, it's what's made it successful. And, in that respect, I want to focus on one country's dedication, in particular, because it's at the core of whether this enlargement takes place, at least as it relates to one of the countries under consideration, and that is Greece. You know, whether it has been staffing NATO operations, contributing to NATO's defense efforts, or providing vital operational logistical support, Greece has been a vital member of NATO. And last year alone, it supplied nearly 2,000 soldiers, between Kosovo and Afghanistan, in NATO and U.N.-led efforts. In terms of our own interests in a bilateral context, it has, in Operations Desert Storm, Desert Shield, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, provided some critical aircraft refueling support and provided for military transiting and free passage. It has made one of the most significant investments in the Balkans, with nearly \$20 billion, created over 200,000 jobs, and contributes over \$750 million in development aid to the region. So, it's been a very significant ally. And, as we speak, and you referenced it in your opening statement, these negotiations between Athens and Skopje are going on.

And over the issue of the use of the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, this administration announced that it would use the name of the Republic of Macedonia. NATO and the United Nations continue to refer to the country as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Some think that this is just semantics. Obviously, it's not, as it relates to this process. It's about history and territorial integrity. It's about a whole host of things. I'm sure the United States would be alarmed if, all of a sudden, our neighbor to the north or the south would call themselves the United States of America.

So, my question is, Where are we in terms of the negotiations? What role are we playing, if any, in this regard, to move this to a successful conclusion?

Mr. FRIED. Senator, you're certainly right that the issue of Macedonia's name is not just a semantic issue; it resonates deeply with the people of Greece and the people of Macedonia. So, it's laden with emotion and complication.

You're also right that Greece has been a good ally in NATO. We all recognize this, and we appreciate Greece's contribution to the Alliance.

The United States has supported, and continues to support, the efforts by Matt Nimetz, who's the U.N. negotiator, on the issue of the name. In addition to that, we stand ready, because we have good relations with both governments, to facilitate progress that they may want to make.

I should add that on Friday night I was in Skopje. I met with the leadership of Macedonia, the President and the Prime Minister. I encouraged them to work to try to resolve this issue in a fair way before Bucharest, and made clear that the United States was willing to do what it could to help.

Senator MENENDEZ. What's your sense of it, at this point in time? Do you think it's going to resolve before—

Mr. FRIED. I honestly don't know. I think that the Macedonians are thinking very hard about the prospect of a NATO membership

invitation and how good this would be for their country, how this would help them. I think their point of view is one of frustration. The Greeks have a point of view, also, I suppose, of frustration. But, we have encouraged both governments to look to a future in which this is resolved, which will be better for everyone in the region.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, clearly, we start off with those who are NATO members presently. And I doubt very much that Greece wants to use its veto, or its lack of invitation; but, at the same time, if it comes to such a high standing in their government that this is an issue, I would hope that we would be looking at how we are responding in this respect, outside of just simply saying, "Well, we stand ready to be helpful." If we think that the inclusion of Skopje is that important, then I would hope that we are more than just a passive bystander—

Mr. FRIED. Well, that—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. At the end of the day.

Mr. FRIED [continuing]. That's why I went down to Skopje on Friday night.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me just shift gears for one moment and ask General Craddock, Why are some governments reluctant or unable to send combat forces to fight in southern and eastern Afghanistan? And what's been the response to Secretary Gates's letter appealing for another 7,000 troops for ISAF?

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Senator. The second question first. I don't know the response, because those letters were sent on a bilateral basis, and, as a NATO commander, I just don't have the view of that.

Senator MENENDEZ. It hasn't been shared with you, a response?

General CRADDOCK. No; it has not.

First, "Why are nations reluctant to do that?"—I think there are a few reasons. I think there is, as stated earlier, some positions being held by nations, that they didn't fully appreciate what they were getting into. They thought it was peacekeeping, though it was never billed that.

Second, I think that there are sensitive political coalitions that watch very carefully where the winds are blowing, and they do not want to commit to unfavorable positions that could topple a government, so they don't want to push out, even at the request of NATO to do so.

And, last, I think that there is some hesitancy because their forces, while wanting to do all they can, lack some of the capabilities of their neighbors, because they're not yet fully transformed into these agile, capable formations. Too often, they are still heavy territorial forces, not like what's needed in Afghanistan. They don't go with the enablers. An infantry battalion shows up with no helicopters, no transportation, no international capability, and these are things, then, we have to add on. So, we have—we are building that; it's getting better, but it takes time, and it's expensive.

The 26 nations, right now, NATO benchmarks 2 percent of GDP for their security forces, for their Ministries of Defense. Six of the twenty-six are meeting the benchmark. And, when you talk about the cost of deploying forces, it's very expensive, the cost of transformation is—

Senator MENENDEZ. General, one very quick question, because—

General CRADDOCK. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. My time is up. I appreciate your answer. Isn't the first part of your answer a dangerous precedent? The political will and decisionmaking that you describe, which I accept, isn't that a dangerous precedent for NATO, in terms of when members of the Alliance decide they will or will not participate based upon those considerations?

General CRADDOCK. Indeed it is. I don't dispute that at all. I think, as I have said, that NATO's level of ambition has exceeded its—has exceeded its political will to support. I will say that in a blanket statement. Indeed.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HAGEL.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Welcome, gentlemen.

Secretary Fried, you noted, in your statement, the appointment of Kai Eide as the new Special Envoy, United Nations Special Envoy for Afghanistan. And my question is, Can you tell this committee what authorities he will have, what flexibilities he will have, within his portfolio as the Special Envoy for Afghanistan representing the United Nations? More coordination? What will he do? What will be his role?

Mr. FRIED. His role will be to pull together the international effort in—the international civilian effort in Afghanistan, and help link up the civil and military efforts by liaison with the ISAF commanders. He will formally report—he will formally have only a U.N. hat. He won't be triple-hatted. But, he will have—he will have an ability to coordinate the international effort.

We have learned, and learned the hard way, that success in Afghanistan will come if, and as, we're able to observe and practice the theory of combined civil/military operations, which is a bit of a jargon-laden way of saying that you have to get the security right, and you have to get the development right, just about district by district in Afghanistan. And when you have the United Nations, the European Union, the United States, other bilateral donors, all playing, if there's going to be a successful effort, it has to be coherent, it has to be focused, and there has to be somebody—someone at the end of the telephone with whom you can work to bring to bear our resources in a focused way. That's really his job. And, of course, paramount is his ability to work with the Afghan Government. It's their country, their development strategy that he is supporting.

Senator HAGEL. Any additional authorities, would you say, as opposed to past U.N. Special Envoys, in situations like this?

Mr. FRIED. We have a lot of experience with Special Envoys—with similar cases. His position will not—he's—he is a—an actor in support of the Afghan Government and pulling together the international effort. He's not any kind of viceroy. It looks as—it looks, now, as if his powers are sufficient, but I'm saying that in advance of the launch of his mission. I think that the relationships he cre-

ates on the ground are going to be more important than the pieces of paper that give him various authorities.

Senator HAGEL. Let me ask you this, Mr. Secretary, because I want to get to a couple of other questions. One last question on this. Would his authorities, his presence, be the same as would have been the situation with Paddy Ashdown?

Mr. FRIED. No; because Paddy Ashdown was, in a sense, had a kind of overseer role. And in Afghanistan, you have a government which is in charge, so he doesn't have the Paddy Ashdown role. I understand the question. It is a little different than that. He will—he's supposed to bring to bear the international community, focus it, work with the Afghan Government, and then make this work, help us make it work on the ground, where it's needed.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Also, in your testimony, you singled out allies that deserve special praise—in your words, “for taking on the hardest missions in the south, particularly the Canadians, the British, Dutch, Danes, Australians, Romanians, Estonians.” What can you tell us about where the Canadians are in—with their force in the south, especially in regard to comments they have made over the last few weeks? If they don't get some help and replacements in the south, then they may well—my understanding is—replace those troops, or bring those troops out.

Mr. FRIED. I should also add to that list the Poles, who have stepped up with some very significant contributions of combat forces, without caveats, plus combat helicopters. So, they have—they have really stepped in—since we've talked about NATO enlargement, they're really pulling their weight and more.

With respect to the Canadians, they have made it clear that they want more Alliance help, about a battalion strength, down in Kandahar. They've said that they need that politically, but also militarily. And I'll defer to General Craddock, but we've been working diplomatically to see what can be done. They have done a terrific job, suffered casualties, and, frankly, we think they deserve the help.

Senator HAGEL. But, so far, unless General Craddock has anything to add, nothing new, as far as any replacements for the Canadians or anyone stepping up to take on some of that role?

General CRADDOCK. Senator, I do not have any hard, positive answers, at this point. There's a lot of give-and-take machinations, “What if,” “Could you then”—but we don't have a solid commitment, at this point.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Let me ask another manpower issue of you, Mr. Secretary. You also note, on the same page of your testimony, that the new President of France has pledged that France will stay engaged in Afghanistan for as long as necessary, so on. What does that mean? Are they adding troops, or have they committed new troops?

Mr. FRIED. Obviously, I don't want to speak for a foreign government, but it is clear that the French are thinking through their contributions in Afghanistan. President Sarkozy is looking at his options, and we're working with the French.

Senator HAGEL. General, you want to add anything to that?

General CRADDOCK. We have been engaged with the French for the last 15 months that I've been the SACEUR. Obviously, they've added a few helicopters. We think there's a possibility for some movement of forces in-country, and we're always prodding and poking to try to get additional forces. We, again, don't have anything firm, at this time.

Senator HAGEL. So, nothing in addition to what the President said, that he'll stay engaged.

General CRADDOCK. Yes, sir.

Senator HAGEL. OK.

One last manpower issue. This is for both of you. It was noted here in your testimony, as well, Mr. Secretary, that the 3,200 marines that will be soon moving into Afghanistan. Your testimony notes that about 2,000 will be added to the ISAF combat missions in the south. When Senators Biden and Kerry and I were there a couple of weeks ago, the same time General Craddock was there—in Afghanistan—a senior general told us that he believed that it would require another two combat brigades in the south, in addition to the 3,200 marines going in—2,000 to the south is what he felt he really needed. I'm going to ask each of you to comment on that, because I doubt if he's going to find two more combat brigades, at least from the American Army or Marines. And if he doesn't get this, which is probably unlikely, but I would like for each of you to respond to that, then what might be the consequences?

General, let's start with you.

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Senator.

We periodically review the CJSOR. I've asked COMISAF to assess his requirements and forward whatever revisions are required. That is in process now; I should have it by the end of this week. We'll review it. It may well show two combat brigades for the south. The likelihood? As you said, probably unlikely. What's the impact? It will take longer. It will cost more, in terms of fiscal resources. It will cost more in terms of national treasure, in terms of sons and daughters who will get banged up in the fight. Eventually, we will prevail, but I think it will take much longer and at greater cost.

Senator HAGEL. May I add—Mr. Chairman, I know I'm a little over on—but, I—for me, this is an important point, because if I understand what the General is saying, that means more American casualties.

General CRADDOCK. That is correct.

Senator HAGEL. If we don't find the kind of force structure required to do the job that this senior general thinks that we can do, but it—what would be required by additional manpower.

General CRADDOCK. More American, more British, more Canadian, all in the regional command south.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary.

Mr. FRIED. You're rightly focused on the job that has yet to be done, but I want to point out that, since we started pushing for additional forces in late 2006, non-U.S. NATO and other contributions have accounted for about 6,500 troops in Afghanistan since late 2006. So, it's right to focus on what's undone, but we should keep

in mind that those 6,500 troops are 6,500 troops that would otherwise not be there, or be filled by Americans. So, that's important. The U.K.'s put in an extra 1,800; Italy, an extra 1,000; Poland, an extra 1,000, with another 400 on the way; Canada, 800—you get the—

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Secretary, my time's up. Let me ask you just this very simple question. How many American forces are in Iraq?

Mr. FRIED. Now? 165,000.

Senator HAGEL. And how many American forces in Afghanistan?

Mr. FRIED. 25.

General CRADDOCK. About 29, 30. I've got 19—

Mr. FRIED. OK.

General CRADDOCK [continuing]. In ISAF—19,000.

Mr. FRIED. All right. Forgot the Marines. Sorry.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Can I—a point of clarification. The additional 6,500 troops you referred to from various nations, do they have national caveats in their participation, those troops you referenced, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. FRIED. Some do, some don't. The British—the largest contributions—the U.K., 1,800—do not. The Poles do not. The Canadians and Australians are in the south, where the fighting is. Others do. I think the Italians do, in the west. But, someone has to be in the west, someone has to be in the north. There are over 3,000 German troops in the north. And, while we would obviously like the caveats to be gone, they are doing a good job. And if they weren't doing it, somebody else would have to be.

The CHAIRMAN. Well—thank you.

Senator Dodd is prepared to yield, Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. He said, "Let's not make this a habit, Mr. Chairman." [Laughter.]

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Dodd. Thank you, again, Senator Dodd. [Laughter.]

He's also a chairman, the Banking Committee. [Laughter.]

Which I'm on.

But, first of all, General and Mr. Assistant Secretary, we appreciate your presence here, your testimony, and your service.

This weekend, I'm going to be chairing the United States Congressional Delegation visit to the Brussels forum. And, among other things that I want to say, if our budget gets through and we can actually make opening remarks, is to remind all of us there, especially our European friends, about the importance of Afghanistan. A topic that we've already spoken of, today, and, really the central nature of that battle against the terrorists, not just there, but around the world. And I think—you know the history—both of you know the history better than I do, of NATO—it's been successful over all these generations because of the unity of purpose. And, in this case, if there was ever an example of that—of what we have to do—it's the unity of purpose with regard to Afghanistan.

And there will be some there who are friends of ours who will say, "Well, look, you're part of the American Government, and all we hear from the American Government, in terms of rhetoric in this administration, is that the President often refers to Iraq as the

leading front against the terrorists, the leading front on the war against the terrorists.” The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently said, “In Afghanistan, we do what we can; in Iraq, we do what we must.” So, it’s the impression conveyed, intended or not, is the downgrading of the importance of Afghanistan, and, frankly, classifying as ranking of second; at least that’s the impression that’s conveyed to too many people around the world, too many nations.

So, I would ask you, not just in the context of what I might hear this weekend, but in the more important context of what we tell the world, the message we’re sending to the world, especially our allies, when they interpret some of the rhetoric by the administration, as I just outlined. What do we tell them? What’s the response from the administration when that charge is made?

Mr. FRIED. We respond that the mission in Afghanistan was an immediate response to the attack on the United States on September 11, that it is, as the chairman quite rightly pointed out, a war and a fight of necessity, not of choice; it is a struggle we have to win; and that it is a struggle whose outcome will affect the security, not just of the United States, but of Europe. And that—and I believe it important to make that case to the Europeans. And, in that context, I wish you all luck and godspeed at the Brussels forum, a very good place to make that case.

Secretary Gates certainly made clear that—in his Munich speech last month—that Afghanistan is not a secondary or forgotten theater, it is much on his mind. It is a struggle we’ve got to—that we are getting better at, and have to get right. And it is something that the Alliance, as a whole, has to learn to get right. It is, as I said, where the Alliance’s new challenges are being met directly, and where the Alliance is learning, and has to learn, new skills and adopt new capabilities.

Senator CASEY. Mr. Secretary, would you agree with what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said, when he said that, “In Afghanistan, we do what we can; in Iraq, we do what we must”?

Mr. FRIED. I wouldn’t want to differ with my colleague. I would put it this way. Both Iraq and Afghanistan are separate fights, but we must succeed in both of them. The solution in both of them will be found through the right combination of political efforts, security and military efforts, and development. The challenges are different, but it is in our national interest to prevail in both cases. And we have to.

Senator CASEY. And I would argue—and I want to move to another question, but I would argue that—in your testimony, when you say that—and we all know we need more help there. When you list the countries that have helped most recently—but, as you and the General just pointed out, our contribution far exceeds even the recent help in—when some countries are adding 1,000 or a couple of hundred, we’re still at current force—American forces total is what?

General CRADDOCK. Assigned against NATO, 19,000, out of about 47,000. We’ll be at 44 percent of the force when the Marines get there, of the NATO—

Senator CASEY. Forty-four percent.

But, in light of that—and then, Mr. Secretary, you say, on page 8, “Do we need more allies fighting?” You say, “Yes.” And you both assert that. But, I think it would be helpful for the administration, and especially for the President, when he’s talking about the battle for the ages, not the battle for 2008—in this administration or the next—the battle for the ages is against the terrorists. And I think it would be helpful to improve our relations with our European friends and other allies specifically in terms of seeking their help in Afghanistan, to include Afghanistan in rhetoric about what’s most important, or what’s the central front against the terrorists. So, I would urge you to reiterate that—iterate or reiterate that to those in the administration, because rhetoric, I think—as you know better than I—rhetoric, in the international context, has consequences, especially when it comes to the grave question of war and the fight that we’re in.

I’m almost out of time—but, General, I wanted to ask you for a brief assessment of where you think we are—and a good bit of this is in your testimony—nonetheless a brief assessment of where we are on the ground in Afghanistan, militarily.

General CRADDOCK. I think we’re making progress in the security area, but not near fast enough. We’ve localized, essentially, the fight to the insurgents, the Taliban in the south, some of the other groups—Agakhani in the east. I think if one now looks at that, you find that the rest of the country is pretty secure. The desire would be for the rest of the countries’ NATO forces, then, to pile on, south and east—has yet to happen. We’ll work it. But, I think, also, if you overlay the poppy cultivation areas, you’ll find—where we still have the hard fight is where those areas are. That’s the next focal point.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, as you know, I’ve been a very, very strong advocate of NATO expansion. One of the great days of my life was during the Prague summit of November 2002, when I was in the room with Secretary Fried and others, and then Secretary General of NATO Lord Robertson announced that Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were going to join NATO. I think some people have forgotten that in 2001 the President made it clear, in a very important speech in Poland, that he was not going to negotiate NATO expansion on the altar of working out his differences on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. And I’m pleased that, more recently, he has said he supports granting full NATO membership to Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia, and offering Membership Action Plan status to Ukraine and Georgia.

I agree with Senator Lugar that securing President Putin’s cooperation in extending MAP status to Ukraine and Georgia is going to be a bit difficult. It also seems that some of the preliminarily work for the 2002 Prague summit was handled more aggressively than preparations for the Bucharest summit next month, specifically in terms of the countries that are going to be invited.

I’d like to know where Georgia and the Ukraine stand today in relationship to where Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Albania

stood when those countries received their MAP status in 1999. How do they compare, from an objective point of view?

Mr. FRIED. In terms of their military, political, economic accomplishments, a bottom-line judgment would have to be that they're in roughly the zone of Macedonia and Albania—when they received their MAP invitations. They are obviously very different countries, so it's hard to compare. Georgia has progressed in its reforms extraordinarily fast since the Rose Revolution. Its political consolidation and the strengthening of democratic institutions has a way to go. We saw that, last November. Its economy is moving ahead. Its military is reforming. So, it's on a good trajectory. It isn't nearly ready for NATO membership.

Ukraine is a far more developed country. It's had free and fair elections. Within Ukrainian society, there is not yet a strong consensus for NATO membership. However, we've learned from experience that the prospect of NATO membership—that a Membership Action Plan can help crystalize a pro-Western consensus.

And, as I said earlier, the Alliance is debating and working through the issues of when is the best time to offer a Membership Action Plan to these countries? And that debate, I think, as you all know, is going on. These are legitimately tough issues.

Senator VOINOVICH. Where do you think our allies are on this?

Mr. FRIED. I think—

Senator VOINOVICH. The other members of NATO.

Mr. FRIED [continuing]. Different countries have different views. Some are more forward-leaning, some are not. And the discussion within the Alliance is continuing, which is where the bulk of our efforts now are. We're working with our allies, and consulting rather closely with them, about all of these issues.

And, as I said, the criteria ought to be with respect to Georgia and Ukraine and the interests of the Alliance, not having to do with an outside veto.

Senator VOINOVICH. General, prior to NATO granting MAP status, we usually discuss niche capabilities with the respective countries. While I was able to visit MAP candidates several years ago, I have not had a chance to visit Georgia or the Ukraine this time around. Where are Georgia and the Ukraine in terms of their niche capabilities, as potential members of NATO?

General CRADDOCK. With regard to the aspirants, I don't think that there is a developed niche capability, like, for example, the Czech Republic, with the chemical capability that they have. They have focused—the aspirants, by and large—on providing support to designated operations, because this is a new area. In the past, we were not focused on operations, to the extent that we are today, in Afghanistan. We had some in Kosovo, but of a different nature. The aspirants are providing quite a bit of support, based upon the size of their militaries. And we are satisfied with what we see their capacity and capability in Afghanistan.

With regard to the MAP countries, we've had several exercises—FPF exercises—I think, six to eight for each country over the last year, and about the same number in this coming year. Ukraine, for the first time, is in Active Endeavor, a maritime operation in the Med. They've joined that. Very proud to have them there with us. So, Georgia is preparing to send Special Ops to ISAF. It's in train-

ing now. And, you know, they've got an enormous contribution in other coalition operations.

Senator VOINOVICH. Switching subjects, Kai Eide, the former Norwegian Permanent Representative to NATO, is heading to Afghanistan as U.N. Special Representative. I'm familiar with his work. In fact, he laid out the blueprint for the issue of the status of Kosovo, and as the Secretary knows, I've been underscoring how important the suggestions in his reports are to the future of stability in Kosovo. Hopefully we will find out whether the EU and others can implement them. Will one of Ambassador Eide's new responsibilities be to try to talk NATO International Security Assistance Force members into taking a more active role and getting rid of national caveats, so that NATO is a more effective force there in Afghanistan?

Mr. FRIED. He won't be working directly on the military and NATO side. He will have, let us say, his hands full pulling together the international civilian efforts, getting the different international actors in the civilian side to pull together, and working with the Afghan Government to advance their development plans. So, he's more on the civilian side and the coordination side, working the politics of the caveat issue, but he will have a very busy portfolio.

Senator VOINOVICH. My point is that if NATO operations are enhanced with more work on the civilian side, then maybe NATO allies will understand how important Afghanistan is to the Alliance and international community, particularly to the NATO forces that need reinforcements. Not fully appreciating Afghanistan's importance is a big problem. Secretary Gates made a real pitch for our NATO allies to become more involved. And I think that unless a very aggressive effort is undertaken toward that end, I will be really concerned about the future of our NATO relationship.

Mr. FRIED. I agree with that. And one of our objectives in the Bucharest summit is to pull the alliance together behind a strategy of success in Afghanistan, to make sure that if there is any lingering impression that it is not a front-burner international priority, that is dispelled, because it is a front-burner priority.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank our witnesses, as well. And, I, like other members, will be in Brussels on Monday, as well, and looking forward to some meetings there. And let me join in thanking you for your service, as well, and those who are with you here.

Let me pick up on the question that Senator Voinovich has asked. And it occurs to me, this question of who's going to lead in setting policy. Is it going to be the European Union or NATO? And what plans do we have to try and ease the tensions that exist between the European members of NATO and the European Union? It seems to me that—the European Union looks at U.S. foreign policy in terms of one word: Iraq. And it seems like their political reactions are based on their views of our policy in Iraq. At least, it strikes me as that. I don't want to oversimplify this, but the difficulty, politically, in getting the European Union to be more supportive of a NATO presence in Afghanistan is contingent upon the ability to see beyond just the Iraq issue.

And I think the question that Bob Casey raised, and that Senator Voinovich was talking about—this question of the war in Iraq—is a question of what we must do, and, in Afghanistan, of what we can do. Again, I don't want to hang a lot on one phrase or two, but whether or not that is a political reality in Europe, and that's how they see it. And, second, whether or not some of the language we use and the sense that we're questioning the European community's willingness to be tough enough, to stand up and willing to be go into harm's way. And I wonder if that language, in some ways—or at least that impression—is contributing to some of the political reaction that is affecting the European membership in NATO's reaction to all of this. Does that make any sense?

Mr. FRIED. There are several—I have to answer it in a couple of ways, because you've raised some separate and interesting issues.

First, you mentioned the relationship between NATO and the European Union. We all—that is, we, Americans—

Senator DODD. I should have asked you, Do you accept that there's a tension there?

Mr. FRIED. No; I accept that there has been, historically, a sense that a strong NATO means a weak EU, a strong EU must mean a weak NATO. And that's not good for either organization.

Senator DODD. I agree.

Mr. FRIED. It's not good for the United States. We need to get past this. And we and the Europeans need to think of NATO and the European Union being able to work together seamlessly, because future challenges are not going to be purely military, they're not going to be purely civilian. NATO and the EU need to work to develop a spectrum of capabilities. We talk about civil/military. That's an easy phrase to throw around. What it means is that the European Union and NATO and other organizations need to work together on the ground. It means that we, Americans, have to be ready to work with the European Union as an organization, and the European Union needs not to be defensive about NATO. If we can get past this, we can strengthen the transatlantic capability of working together.

We've come a long way, actually. We have more to do. But, the theory of what you're talking about is now more accepted and far better understood than it was 10 years ago. So, that's good.

The issue of, you know, "war of necessity, war of choice, do what we can, do what we must," I think, is—I think, as you suggest, is a bit of a distraction. We have to succeed in Afghanistan, we have to succeed in Iraq. There is a whole political history of both of these issues, which is—I really can't get into, or pointless to get into—but, we need to succeed in Afghanistan. We are doing better in Iraq.

And the language we use has to be forward-looking. That's easy to say and hard to do. President Bush spoke about Afghanistan, I think, today, and, I think, spoke to—spoke in a way which reflects the common view that this is a critical fight, not a second-order one. So, I think we are getting there.

Senator DODD. General, do you have any comments on this?

General CRADDOCK. Well, "what we can" and "what we must," I think, resonates in a way that's not helpful. However, I think the fact of the matter is that what we can do ought to be matched by

our allies, and it is not. What we can do is put billions of dollars to build an Afghan National Army, and the European Union is putting 250 police trainers in, we're putting thousands in—2,500–3,000. What we can do is put all these forces in, to include 3,200 more marines in the south. Let's see if we can get our allies to at least match what we can do, and see if they can do that.

Senator DODD. Yes. Well, I agree with that. And I'm not disagreeing with your conclusion. The question is, What plans do we have to try and exactly get to the point that the Secretary talked about, recognizing this tension, and, to the extent that because of our language, there is some problem here. Because the question of how we approach the political problem within the European Union to gather the support that you accurately describe here in NATO, is serious and I wonder if we're creating more obstacles to that because of the language we're using and how the European Union is reacting?

General CRADDOCK. If I could, Senator—I can't speak—and I'll let my colleague speak to the political aspect of it—but, I think there is, as he stated, a bit of an awakening, a renaissance, a realization that NATO and the European Union must find areas for cooperation, not continue areas of competition.

Senator DODD. I agree with that.

General CRADDOCK. And we are—we are—NATO—a military—big military, little civil organization. They are a big civil, little military.

Senator DODD. Right.

General CRADDOCK. We've got to find the space and the Venn diagram to take the challenge and leverage it.

Senator DODD. Yes. Well, that's the heart of the question.

Let me ask a couple of specific questions that, in some ways, relate to this very issue. And it has to do with—in fact, there are two questions; I'll ask them as one question and give you a chance to respond.

There appears to be an almost inevitable political battle emerging—I'll address this to you, Mr. Secretary, first—between Musharraf and the Pakistani Parliament. It seems almost inevitable. And I wonder if you can speak about the impact that these elections and this conflict, and what impact it's going to have on our operations in Afghanistan.

And, second, I was intrigued, recently, to see where the Russian Ambassador to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin, I think is how you pronounce the name—

Mr. FRIED. Rogozin.

Senator DODD [continuing]. Rogozin—has indicated that the Russians would be willing to open its borders to nonmilitary materials bound for NATO operations in Afghanistan. I wonder how that will impact the ISAF's ability to operate in Afghanistan. And how is the State Department planning to build upon this seeming thaw in the Russian-NATO relations? And maybe I'm overstating the case in a "thaw," but I found it intriguing—that offer—in light of some of the hostility that we've heard in years past about NATO expansion.

I wonder if you could respond to both those questions.

And, General, I'd invite you to respond, as well, if you'd care to.

Mr. FRIED. We would welcome greater cooperation between NATO and Russia, including on Afghanistan. They have a role—they could play a role, particularly in transit, as you suggested.

I'll take a look at Ambassador Rogozin's comments, and if this is an offer of cooperation with NATO, we will welcome it and look into it.

Senator DODD. Are you familiar with him?

Mr. FRIED. I'm familiar with him. I wasn't familiar with the details of this particular offer. And so, I need to look at this, and I thank you for raising it.

With respect to Pakistan, there are others more qualified than I to get it—to deal with the complexities and discuss the complexities there, but let me say that there was an election in Pakistan, it was a credible election. We now in a—we're watching a political process, affirming a new government. We hope that however this comes out, there is a political leadership in Pakistan with credibility, legitimacy through an election, and an effective leadership with which we can work. Clearly, Afghanistan isn't an island. We have—success there will require also success in working with Pakistan. So, we're following that situation very closely.

Senator DODD. Yes.

General, any comments on that?

General CRADDOCK. Just very quickly, Senator.

Diversification of enroute infrastructure to move personnel and goods is always important. Right now, NATO moves, basically, by the southern route, through Pakistan. We need to look at this. This may provide alternatives that are very helpful.

Second, with regard to Pakistan, the commander in Afghanistan, COMISAF, tells me he expects to have a stiffer, tougher fight this year in the east because of the lack of control yet established, maybe lessening control, in the border area.

Senator DODD. So, you're anticipating an increase in problems in the border area.

General CRADDOCK. His indication is, right now, we'll see more foreign fighters.

Senator DODD. Yes.

General CRADDOCK. Yes.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General, that's exactly what he told us last week in—it's interesting—it's interesting what the ISI's take on it was, when we met them.

But—then, let me go back to one thing before—and I'll ask my colleague—

Dick, do you have any additional questions?

Senator LUGAR. No, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. When Senator Dodd was going into some detail about, quote, "the tension between the EU and NATO"—and it's real, it's been around since the EU emerged—but, it seems to me that the, really, basic, basic problem we have here—and I'm wondering if you would each be willing to tell me how your civilian and your military comrades in NATO talk about what I'm about to raise—and that is, the lack of political will among the European population to actually support their militaries. I mean, when we cut through it all, my observation, of all the years of working with

NATO, has been that you probably have less pushback from your military colleagues. I don't know many German military officers who don't want to fight if they're put in a position where there's a fight. I don't know many of our NATO allies who, when they sit around the table with you, aren't prepared to shed the caveats. Maybe I'm wrong. Maybe I'm missing something. But, when we go and have the meetings with the civilian representatives—as you all know, obviously, the ambassadors represent the civilian side of NATO and their governments—they're not getting that signal from their Parliaments, they're not getting the signal from their Prime Ministers or their Presidents, because they're not getting it from their publics. And I get the sense, when I'm there, that there is no distinction made between America's war in Iraq and America's war in Afghanistan. You know, it's all about terror, and "Americans aren't fighting terror the right way." I mean, when you sit in the coffee shops, or you walk the streets, you talk to people, this is what you hear. Am I missing something? Isn't all this, you know, much ado about nothing? Until there's the political will to actually pull the economic—pull the budget trigger, you know, in each of these Parliaments to say, "We're actually going to support the military." I mean, isn't that the lack of resources from our allies the bottom-line problem?

Mr. FRIED. There is, as you rightly point out, an issue in Europe of support for militaries, in general, and military operations, specifically. Europeans have lived in—for two generations in a Europe of general peace, the longest period of general peace in Europe since Roman times. And it's thanks to NATO, in large part. It's a great irony. Thanks to a military alliance, and, under the alliance umbrella, the European Union formed. That's known, and that's part of the reality.

So, you're not missing something. But, it is true that, nevertheless, even given those politics, there are thousands of non-U.S. NATO troops in Afghanistan. Over half the forces are European. They are there in the south.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, if I could interrupt you, because I think the point you're making is valid, but, let me ask you, Do you get a sense, when you talk to your colleagues, your civilian counterparts or your—I don't get a sense that there are many citizens walking the streets of, you know, any capital in Europe who think they're threatened by what's going on in Afghanistan. I don't get a sense any average people think that their well-being will be affected by success or failure in Afghanistan. I don't get that.

I don't want to belabor the point, but it seems to me, until they get to the point where there's strong enough political leadership to connect that this affects their well-being, until that happens, it's kind of hard to get a lot of this done which raises the question: Has NATO become a political organization, primarily? Or, was it always just a political organization? I mean, the expansion of NATO—when I speak to people in those countries—they want to join NATO because it's, sort of, the ticket to membership to the West. It's not about, "By the way, we're going to join NATO, and I'm going to send my son to Afghanistan."

Mr. FRIED. The countries that joined NATO after 1989 wanted to be in NATO for hard security reasons, and for good ones. And those

countries have contributed their forces, their soldiers to missions far afield.

You're obviously right that there are—that European publics are much more ambivalent about military missions than the American public, on average. But, given that, it's interesting that Parliaments in Europe regularly reauthorize their contingents in Afghanistan—not as much as we'd like; we've talked about the caveats, which we think should be eliminated; they're not as capable, they're not as numerous, but they are, nevertheless, there. The Dutch are in Uruzgan. The Canadians are in Kandahar. So, there are European NATO members in the hot fights. That doesn't mean the problem doesn't exist; it means that, even given that—some of the political challenges we face, NATO is in action. After all, during the cold war, that we all look back on and say it was the Golden Age of NATO, NATO actually didn't ever fire a shot in anger. Now it's engaged in operations all over the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you—I thank you both. I personally think there's a need for a change in the political climate there that generates greater confidence there. I'm not referring to the military, General, per se.

Well, look, we could talk about this for a long while, and I—we have a very talented panel that comes up behind you fellows. And I want to thank you both very, very much for being here, and we look forward to continuing to work with you both. And hopefully this expansion can be rational and effective.

I thank you both very much.

Mr. FRIED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next panel is a very distinguished panel, every one of whom we are accustomed to having before us, and we've listened to with great interest: Ron Asmus, Bruce Jackson, Phil Gordon, and Jim Townsend. Would you all, when you get a shot, come to the witness table?

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. You're all very familiar with the committee; we're familiar with you, and happy you're here.

I will submit, for the record, a little bit about each one of you, but there's been many, many times you've been here.

Let's start in the order that you were called up—start with you, Ron, if you would. Welcome, and thank you for being here.

**STATEMENT OF RONALD D. ASMUS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
TRANSATLANTIC CENTER, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND, BRUSSELS,
BELGIUM**

Dr. ASMUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Senator Dodd.

I've submitted my longer statement for the record. I want to associate myself with many of the comments each of you has made about the overall health of the Alliance in Afghanistan. I share those. But, I think you've invited me here largely to focus on NATO enlargement; and, in my very brief comments, I'll focus on that.

I'm in the unusual position of having—of being one of the long-time supporters of NATO enlargement who, in a sense, is the skeptic-

tic up here today on this panel. My skepticism is not about NATO enlargement, which I think has been a great success, and I want to be clear that I want these countries we're talking about today to succeed and be in the Alliance.

I have three concerns that I'd like to briefly touch upon today.

My first concern is the integrity of the process of NATO enlargement. A decade ago, we wrestled with this question of, How do we ensure that as NATO gets bigger, it doesn't become weaker?—one of the questions we've been talking about. And we came to the compromise that, as we enlarge, we had to be tough on performance and set standards that we would stick to, in an attempt to incentivize these countries to do their homework as they came in, recognizing full well that these were often poor, weaker countries who had a long ways to go.

And if we ask ourselves, "Why was performance so important?" it was both to keep NATO strong, but also because we understood that reform in these countries was a contribution to stability, that it would resolve nationalism, the residual historical conflicts, et cetera, et cetera. And I think what we're seeing is that, if I can call them the Class of 1997, the Class of 2002, and what will be the Class of 2008; each class is a bit weaker, each of the classes we've seen thus far has some success stories, but, if we're honest, has some nonsuccess stories. And we're wrestling with this dilemma, is—are we gradually lowering the bar, or are we keeping it high? And I want to raise my hand and say we need to focus on that question, because I'm not convinced that the countries we're talking about today, the Adriatic three—Albania, Croatia, Macedonia—who I want to see succeed, have all received the same level of scrutiny and are being asked to meet the same standards as in the past. If they are, I'm in favor of them. I'm not convinced, as of today, that they have met those standards.

My second concern—and I'm going to recall a conversation we had, Senator Biden—is—

The CHAIRMAN. That's unfair. [Laughter.]

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. It's a good conversation, though—and it's this issue of—because of Kosovo, we have to do this now, because we now need to stabilize this region; otherwise, it will fall apart. And you may remember, in 1997 you made a visit to one of the countries that was trying to get in then, that we considered to be unqualified. You spoke to the President of that country, and he, in my words now, not his, more or less said to you, "If you don't bring us in at Madrid, we're going to commit political suicide. We will fail. It'll be the end of reform, and you will be to blame, you Americans." And my recollection is that you said to him, "That's the worst argument I ever heard for NATO enlargement, and please don't make it ever again, because that is not why we want to bring countries into NATO. We want strong, confident, successful countries be coming to NATO, not countries that think they're on the edge of failure."

And there's a little bit of that in this debate today, if we're honest, that just gives me pause. I, too, want to stabilize the Balkans after Kosovo, but I want to make sure we do it right.

And my third concern, very briefly, is Ukraine and Georgia, because, I believe, if there are any countries out there that are truly

vulnerable today, it's much more Georgia and Ukraine than the three Adriatic countries in the Balkans. And I think success in Bucharest is both doing the right thing in the Balkans and doing the right thing for these countries. And my concern has always been that we will have underperforming weak rounds of enlargement in the Balkans and get nothing on Ukraine and Georgia. And if you ask me today, that is the most likely outcome of the summit, unless we see a very serious, high-level, Presidential effort to turn this around, and I don't believe that would be a definition of success as any of us would understand it.

I'm also—you know, so my idea was that we should wait and do a bigger round of enlargement later, but I'm also a realist, and I realize this administration—and living in Brussels, I can say, except for the Greek-Macedonia issue, there is a consensus to do A3—A2 or A3, depending on this issue—so, I think it is going to happen—raises the question of, How do we ensure that this round is successful, that these countries do perform, and that we keep the door open? And I just want to mention three things, very briefly, that I think we should be thinking about.

The first one—Senator Biden, you mentioned it—I'm very glad you recalled that resolution of ratification and the reports that the administration was required to write, having written a number of those reports. They are a good test of forcing the administration to put down in writing, on paper, where these countries qualify, and don't. So, let's get an objective benchmark.

I happen to disagree with a couple of things that my friend Dan Fried said in his assessment of some of these countries, that we can go back to; but maybe he's right, and maybe I'm wrong; maybe I'm right. We don't have a baseline that we all agree on, at the moment, where these countries truly are.

Second, if I look at the calendar, when are we going to vote on these countries? I think—I defer to your judgment on this—it may not happen in this administration, it may be something that slips over into the next President's term. So, we're going to have 18 months. I think our leverage over these countries is at its highest when they think they're going to get in, but they're not quite sure. So, we should use these 18 months to identify their weaknesses, incentive them to as much homework as possible, and maybe take another hard look at where they are before you actually vote in the U.S. Senate on accession, and let's try to get as much additional homework done before we come to that vote.

Last and finally, I think we need to consider, if we understand that the countries coming in are—have further to go, because—not their own fault, but they're coming from a different place. Georgia was a failed state. Georgia has made huge progress, but Georgia is nowhere near where the countries that received MAP in 1999 were. Georgia needs help. Maybe it should get MAP. But, you know, they have such a long way to go, they more guidance. But, let's understand that, when we bring them in, 70 percent of their homework still needs to be done. And we, sort of, bring them in, check the box, and think that everything's going to work smoothly.

And, again, I think you can see two classes of new members: Those who have succeeded and are working hard to be first-tier allies, and those that aren't. So, I think we—we need to think

through whether we come up—I suggest an amendment, in my testimony. There may be other ways to do this. We need clear benchmarks to guide these countries, even after they accede to the Alliance, and to incentive them and put a little bit more scrutiny and publicity on some of the shortcomings that are there, to help them stay on track. And I will tell you that I truly believe, from talking to their ambassadors and to reformers in these countries, they want you to pay attention to them, because that attention helps the people, who truly want to reform in these countries, succeed, and they will welcome the attention of the U.S. Senate and of the U.S. Government to how these reforms are doing, the people who truly want to change these countries.

I'll limit my opening remarks to that.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Asmus follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD D. ASMUS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
TRANSATLANTIC CENTER, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to testify today before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the state of the NATO alliance in the run up to the Bucharest summit April 2–4, 2008. It has been a privilege to working closely with you as well as Senator Lugar and the committee more generally on NATO enlargement issues since the early 1990s. Your leadership on these issues has been essential. Bucharest looks like it could become an exciting and potentially controversial summit. The agenda is full and includes difficult issues such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, NATO enlargement, missile defense and relations with Russia. While I will focus my comments today on NATO enlargement, I would first like to touch briefly on two other critical issues—the overall health of the alliance and Afghanistan.

NATO'S OVERALL HEALTH

The first is the overall health of this alliance and the trans-Atlantic relationship more generally. To be honest, it is not good. NATO today is weaker and less central and relevant than it was a decade ago. That is disturbing because I believe the need for trans-Atlantic cooperation is actually going up, not down. As I look out at the world we face, I see more challenges and problems where the U.S. and Europe need to find a common approach. They don't all involve NATO but many do, at least in part. That is why I am worried about the very real dramatic decline in public support for the alliance and the United States more generally, especially in countries that have historically been among our closest allies. As an American currently living in Brussels, NATO's relative marginalization and decline are striking. I know full well that I am not the first person to testify before this committee that NATO is in crisis. But reversing the decline in support for the United States and the alliance will be a key challenge facing the next President. I am glad you are holding this hearing so we can start to shed some light on what is wrong and what needs to be done.

AFGHANISTAN

The second issue is Afghanistan. Mr. Chairman, I know you recently returned from a trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan. I have had the chance to read your thoughts on that trip. I, too, had the chance to visit Afghanistan for a week last fall with NATO. I came away with three impressions I would like to share as well, in part to reinforce the message that a number of Senators on this committee have been trying to send.

The first one is that this is indeed a make or break issue for this alliance and for the Western world more generally. This conflict was not a war of choice, but of necessity. It has every conceivable form of international and multilateral legitimacy. My impression is that the vast majority of the Afghan population wants the international community, including NATO, to be there helping them end this conflict and rebuild their country. In short, many of the prerequisites that were or perhaps still are not in place in Iraq do exist in Afghanistan. Yet, one cannot help but come away from a visit there feeling that we are fighting this war with one hand tied behind our back, without sufficient attention, priority or resources. If we were to fail in Afghanistan—especially if such a letdown were to follow on the heels of failure in

Iraq—the consequences for Western security would be devastating. So the stakes are extremely high.

Second, the fate of Afghanistan and Pakistan are linked. They are two sides of the same conflict. That means we need a much more integrated strategy—and not just for the border region but more generally. We are currently not set up to do that well. NATO is deeply involved in Afghanistan, for example, but it has little knowledge of, and no role in, Pakistan—even though events there play a key role in determining the alliance’s success or failure. Our own policies vis-a-vis both countries need to be better integrated and then coordinated with our closest allies.

Third, NATO can do everything right as a military alliance but we can still lose this war. As important as military and security forces are, NATO and the Afghan Army cannot by themselves prevail in this conflict for the simple reason that the equation determining success is not just, or even primarily, a military one. The key challenge is providing better governance. That is how we will eventually defeat the Taliban. Visiting Afghanistan, I think we are all struck by the vast discrepancy between our ability as Western governments to marshal and deploy military power on the one hand, and our limited ability to do the same when it comes to the task of reconstruction and helping to provide better governance. Yet the latter are essential to winning the peace in Afghanistan. Our armed services are doing a terrific job but where we are falling down is in our ability to organize and deploy experts to help in areas like development, agriculture, narcotics, etc.

Mr. Chairman, I know that you and others have proposed legislation to strengthen our national capacity to do so and I strongly support such steps.

Last, but not least, I want to offer a thought on why it has been so hard to get our allies to increase their commitment to Afghanistan. Clearly we missed the chance to forge a new coalition and common strategy after September 11 when NATO declared article 5. While we eventually realized we had made a mistake, we have been playing catchup ever since. Allies have come on board in a piecemeal fashion with different understandings of their mission they were signing up for. Making the shift from peacekeeping to a counterinsurgency mission is a political difficult step for many allies.

But I think the fundamental problem we face is that our allies do not really believe the United States has a strategy to win this conflict—and thus are reluctant to take the political risks involved in doing more. If they were convinced the U.S. was serious and had a credible comprehensive strategy to prevail, and if the President of the United States was directly involved in personally selling this to his counterparts, then I believe we would be having a different and more productive conversation. With all due respect to Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, who has been working hard to increase allied contributions in Europe, in Europe this issue requires Presidential engagement with his counterparts. But I suspect that task will unfortunately fall to the next administration.

GETTING NATO ENLARGEMENT RIGHT

This brings me to the focus of my testimony today which is NATO enlargement and effectiveness. I have been a strong supporter of NATO enlargement dating back to the early 1990s. It has been one of our great success stories of the last decade. After the Iron Curtain lifted, Western leaders seized a historic opportunity to open the doors of NATO and the European Union (EU) to Central and Eastern Europe. By consolidating democracy and ensuring stability from the Baltics to the Black Sea, we redrew the map of Europe for the better. As a result, the continent today is more peaceful, democratic, and free. All one need do is imagine what Europe today would look like today if NATO had not enlarged. I suspect there would be instability in Central and Eastern Europe and more tension with Russia. The continent would be even more self-absorbed with its own problems and we would thus have even fewer allies willing and able to work with us to address crises around the world.

That success came about because a lot of people worked hard to make sure we got NATO enlargement right. That brings us to the question we are here to discuss today—what does it mean to get NATO enlargement right at the upcoming summit in Bucharest? In my mind, there are two central questions we need to answer. The first is whether this is the right time to extend invitations to the so-called Adriatic 3—Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—to join NATO. That requires us to assess whether these countries are qualified and meet the minimal standards we set for new members a decade ago in NATO and in close consultations with the U.S. Senate, as well as to decide whether such a move now would enhance the stability of the Western Balkans and serve NATO’s interest in further consolidating stability in Europe.

The second key question we need to address at Bucharest is the future of our vision of enlargement. Do we, as an alliance have a consensus to go beyond the original vision of the 1990s—an expanded NATO from the Baltic in the north to the western edge of the Black Sea in the south—and take real and meaningful steps to extend the alliance deeper into Eurasia to Ukraine and across the Black Sea to the southern Caucasus by reaching out to Georgia? Bucharest can either be the last enlargement summit which addresses the Western Balkans and completes the vision of the 1990s, or the summit where NATO takes the first real step in sketching out a new and bigger vision of enlargement for the next decade. We need to be clear that taking such a step, which I support, will have far-reaching political and strategic ramifications for NATO, Europe, and our relations with Russia. It is not just “more of the same” but a bold new strategic move that would again redraw the map of Europe. In my view, the potential strategic benefits of such a step would be considerable. But we should have no illusions. It will be difficult and require a new strategic narrative, sustained U.S. political attention and diplomatic heavy lifting by this country with close allies and with Moscow if it is to succeed.

WHY PERFORMANCE MATTERS

Mr. Chairman, in an op-ed in the Washington Post last month entitled “A Better Way to Grow NATO,” I expressed my skepticism about the administration’s current approach on enlargement for Bucharest. That skepticism was and still is rooted in three factors. The first is performance. As a veteran of these NATO enlargement debates, I am worried about how performance has become less and less of a factor in our deliberations. I am not yet convinced the Adriatic 3—Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—are qualified for membership. While I do not claim to be the world’s leading expert on these countries, I am skeptical whether they really meet the minimal standards we set a decade ago. I have spoken to experts in and outside the alliance who share that skepticism. If we are honest, these countries are probably weaker and have received less scrutiny than any of the new members we have brought into the alliance since the end of the cold war. I therefore commend the committee for holding this hearing and insisting that the administration report on these countries’ qualifications before the President makes a final decision on enlargement.

I am often asked why I am so focused on performance. Can’t or shouldn’t we just bring these countries in “as is” and fix their problems later? Isn’t that the job of the State Department, OSD, and JCS—to fix those problems? Unfortunately, the real world is a bit more complicated. A decade ago we debated how high or low we should set the bar for new members. We consciously set the performance bar higher than it had been during the cold war. We adopted this “tough love” approach because we felt that their internal reform was an essential building block of European security and because there was no immediate external threat to these countries. Nowhere is this more true than in the Western Balkans today where the real risks to instability are largely internal and due to the lack of reform. That is why I believe strongly that it would be a mistake to lower NATO’s bar for these countries. We should ask no more but also no less of them than we did for previous countries like Poland, the Baltic States, or Romania.

BALKAN STABILITY

This brings me my second concern with the administration’s approach to Bucharest. It seems to me that the crux of the administration’s argument is that we need to do this round of enlargement now to shore up Western Balkan stability in the wake of Kosova independence. I agree with the administration on the need for Balkan stability. If anything, I fault this administration for not paying enough attention to the Western Balkans earlier. I feel the administration is trying to compensate for its past inattention by now accelerating the enlargement debate. But I am not convinced by the argument that we should lower our performance standards because of the potential instability generated by Kosova.

Mr. Chairman, I also want these countries to join NATO and the European Union. But I want them to do it in the right way when they are truly ready. Enlarging NATO entails logrolling. There are pressures to include more countries to keep all allies happy. The temptation to bend criteria is real. But what is good politically can be bad strategically. I get a bit nervous when I hear the argument that if we don’t bring this or that country in now, it or the region may be destabilized. I remember a conversation we had in the spring of 1997 in the runup to the Madrid summit. You had just met with the President of a country that was pushing hard for an invite but which we did not consider fully qualified. That country’s President

had told you that if it did not receive an invitation to join NATO, its government would fall and reform would fail.

In short, the argument was that if we did not invite them to join NATO, they would essentially commit political suicide. You told him—correctly in my view—that this was the worst argument you had ever heard for enlargement and that if the reform project in his country was that fragile you would oppose his country's candidacy. What happened? We stuck to our guns on the performance issue. That country survived not getting an invitation, it actually accelerated its reform efforts and when it joined NATO a few years later, it did so without controversy because it was a stronger candidate and with fewer doubts about its qualifications.

I also think we need to keep our eyes on the key strategic issue in the region which is the future of Serbia. As important as they are, it is not Albania, Croatia, or Macedonia which hold the key to future Balkan stability. That key lies in Belgrade. There is a real danger at the moment that Serbia is moving in an anti-Western direction. That is what we need to change but this enlargement move now could actually reinforce the wrong trend in Serbia. I worry that the administration's proposal is strategically shortsighted. Coming after a messy declaration of independence by Kosovo, the admittance of weak, not-yet-qualified candidates could actually bring regional instability into NATO rather than the other way around. It ignores the real prize—getting Serbia to embrace a westward course.

UKRAINE AND GEORGIA

Mr. Chairman, my third concern about the administration's approach at Bucharest has to do with Ukraine and Georgia. I am worried that the administration's approach does not connect the Western Balkans and the wider Black Sea region and countries like Ukraine and Georgia. I believe that how NATO addresses the aspirations of these countries is every bit as important as what it does in the Western Balkans. If we are honest, Ukraine and Georgia are more vulnerable strategically than the Adriatic 3 today. They are vulnerable not only because of their internal problems and the lack of reform but also because they are subject to external pressure from Moscow. They face repeated Russian efforts to interfere in their internal affairs and prevent them from anchoring themselves to the West.

As I mentioned earlier, the alliance is at a critical turning point in terms of our future vision of enlargement. The challenge of the past decade was to secure democracy in Europe's eastern half, from the Baltics in the north to the western edge of the Black Sea in the south. The challenge today is to extend security further east—into Ukraine and across the wider Black Sea to the southern Caucasus which is caught between an unstable Middle East and an increasingly assertive Russia. Bucharest can either be the last summit in completing the original vision of the 1990s or the first summit where the alliance embraces a bigger and more ambitious vision. In the current issue of foreign affairs, I have argued that NATO must make this second strategic leap. But I also underscore just how challenging it will be and what it will take.

My concern is that Bucharest will produce a round of enlargement to underqualified candidates in the Western Balkans along with little or nothing for Ukraine and Georgia.

Mr. Chairman, I know and applaud the fact this committee has sent an important signal to allies by passing Senate Resolution 342, which supports MAP for both Ukraine and Georgia. But I also think we need to be realistic. Many of our allies do not believe the enlargement process should be continued, or even if these countries are truly part of Europe. Many doubt the solidity of the democratic and Western orientation of Ukraine and the commitment of the leadership of that country to NATO. Others doubt the solidity of Georgia's democratic experiment or how we are going to resolve the so-called "frozen conflicts" on Georgian soil. Many have concerns about the reaction of Russia and whether we have a strategy to manage a more assertive Russia that is likely to be more determined in its opposition to further enlargement.

These are really issues and concerns that we need to address. The odds of sorting them out by Bucharest are low. Extending NATO to Ukraine and Georgia is not just more of the same process of enlargement as we have known it over the last decade. It would be a new and fundamental strategic move with potentially far-reaching consequences. Giving these countries MAO would not necessarily mean a commitment to full NATO membership but it certainly is an important step in that direction. We also have a complicated doctrinal debate within NATO as to what MAP actually means. Initially, MAP was indeed intended for countries that were only a few years away from an invitation and was designed to help them in essence complete their final round of preparations. Neither Ukraine or Georgia are at that point

today. But I think we can and should redefine MAP to loosen this linkage for countries like Ukraine and Georgia which still have a longer way to go but which clearly need a closer alliance embrace.

I believe that would such a result—enlargement to a weak set of Adriatic countries plus little or nothing for Ukraine and Georgia—would not be a policy success. I have argued that a better approach would be wait or to do a small round of enlargement, perhaps limited to Croatia, to give the other candidates more time to bolster their credentials, for the West to sort out regional security in the Balkans after Kosovo, and to work toward a second big bang round of enlargement down the road that would stretch from the Western Balkans and embrace Ukraine or Georgia.

I would point to the historical parallel with the Baltic States in the 1990s. The United States fought a dramatic political battle at the Madrid in 1997 summit to limit that initial round of enlargement, in part because we did not think that Romania and Slovenia were qualified but also to protect the Baltic States. We knew that some of our allies wanted to make this first round the last and to exclude the Baltic States. We wanted to keep the door open. The result: Romania and Slovenia, while disappointed, redoubled their reform efforts; the Baltic States grabbed their chance to catch up and qualify and did so; and we laid the foundation for a later but ultimately successful enlargement that redrew the map of Europe in 2002. Being firm on criteria and thinking strategically about the long term paid off.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, nothing has happened since I wrote my op-ed in the Washington Post a month ago to alleviate the concerns I expressed then. I remain concerned that we are going to invite countries from the Western Balkans that are not yet qualified, that such a step will not necessarily stabilize the region and that Bucharest will do too little to support Ukraine and Georgia or make the shift to this bigger vision of NATO that I am calling for. To be honest, I hope I am wrong. I hope that in the weeks and months ahead the administration can show that these candidates are better qualified than I think they are, and that allies will come together in Bucharest and in the end achieve a positive result on Ukraine and Georgia.

I am also a realist. This administration has made up its mind to go forward with invitations to the so-called Adriatic 3 countries at the Bucharest NATO summit in spite of the concerns people like me have raised. I am occasionally asked whether I will then oppose the accession of these countries. I have concluded that I will not for the simple reason that I do not want NATO or these countries to fail. For the U.S. Senate to vote down a candidate country that the administration has invited would, in my opinion, do grave damage to our standing in the alliance and potentially kill the enlargement process. But we do need to guard against the risks I have pointed to. Our Constitution envisions a key role for the U.S. Senate in this ratification process. I believe this committee should assume a leadership role to reduce those risks I have pointed to today by considering several steps.

First, we should actively use the period between possible invitations at the Bucharest summit and an eventual Senate accession vote to scrutinize these countries' performances and to maximize their incentives for making additional progress. These candidates have thus far received less scrutiny than any previous candidates since the 1990s, even though they are weaker and potentially less stable. We should ask no more, but also no less, of them than their predecessors. As in the past, the administration should be asked to testify and report—in open and classified hearings—on how well they are performing and whether they fulfill the requirements laid down for membership. I am glad that the administration has now been asked to report on these qualifications before a final decision on extending invitations is made, in accordance with previous Senate resolutions on ratification.

That final Senate vote should not be scheduled until this committee is confident they fulfill those requirements. If I look at the legislative calendar, it seems unlikely a Senate vote on enlargement will happen before the end of this administration. Thus, this vote is likely to take place under the next President. Given the time required for the next President to assemble his or her team, one could imagine it taking place in the summer or fall of 2009. We should use this delay to our advantage. It provides us with another 18 months to engage these countries, identify their weaknesses and maximize the incentives for them to address those weaknesses. In my view, the committee should ask for another progress report on these countries early on in the next administration before a final vote. Using this period in this manner can focus the attention of these countries and help ensure they will be effective allies. I would hope they would view this as an opportunity to strengthen their candidacies and erase any doubts about their qualifications. If they have done their homework and meet those standards, they have nothing to fear from such scrutiny.

Second, we should also consider establishing clearer benchmarks for new members to continue to meet after they joined the alliance. We need to understand that these countries joining NATO does not actually mean they are ready to be full members. We are asking them to meet a set of very minimal standards—with the expectation that the lion's share of reform and work will still take place after they join. It is increasingly clear that many of these countries continue to need guidance and support—as well as political scrutiny—after they have become members. While the NATO system seeks to provide that guidance, it doesn't work as well as it should. I am sometimes asked whether there are new members I regret seeing join the alliance. I do not. But I do also regret not having pushed some countries harder. And I am disappointed at how reform has dissipated in some new members. I know from talking to ambassadors and senior officials in these countries fighting for reform that they, too, have often wished we had at times been tougher with them—precisely because the voice from Washington can be so critical.

We should recognize this larger problem of the performance before it gets any worse. In part, it is the challenge of bringing in successive waves of new members who are weaker than their predecessors. But it is amplified by the disappointing performance of some new members from previous classes of enlargement. With the addition of these three new members in the Western Balkans, NATO will now have 30 members, nearly half of whom have been members for a decade or less. All of these countries are still going through difficult reform processes. There is clearly one group of countries who aspire to be premier allies and who have become real contributors in a very short period of time. But there is a second group of allies who are not where we want them to be and who seem content to do as little as possible. This of course undermines the credibility of the whole enlargement process.

Therefore, I would like to recommend that the committee call for a thorough assessment, of the political and military performance of the two enlargement classes of 1997 and 2002. Such an assessment should review the promises made by these countries as well as the testimony and estimates of our own Department of Defense—both the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We should compare those pledges and estimates with actual military capacities and performance. This would give us a clear baseline to determine the size of the gap between past pledges and actual subsequent contributions—and how well or poorly these members are doing. It will also help us determine realistic benchmarks for these countries as well as potential new members going forward.

The lessons from such an exercise should be incorporated into an amendment to this round of enlargement. Such an amendment could set clear benchmarks for these countries to fulfill after they join NATO. These benchmarks would augment the NATO system. Our goal would be to use the influence and expertise the United States enjoys to help ensure their reforms stay on track. We could set a time limit of, for example, 5 years, with an option for a further extension. I believe such an amendment will help those leaders in the region who are serious about reform. We also need to consider what we do about the poor performance of some of our poor performers from the enlargement classes of 1997 and 2002, as well as so-called older or traditional allies whose performance is also lacking.

Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to work with the committee to develop such an amendment to ensure that enlargement can continue to be a success story. Taking such steps now can help ensure that down the road we have more effective allies who can perform in places like Afghanistan and whose forces can fight without national caveats. I would also urge the committee to stay fully engaged in and providing leadership on the issues of Ukraine and Georgia. If the Bucharest summit produces a weak outcome on these issues, it will be of critical importance that we find other ways for the U.S. and NATO to step up our engagement with them to provide the kind of political and strategic reassurance that can reduce their vulnerability and send the signal that we are serious about our efforts to anchor them to the West over time.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good testimony.
Doctor.

**STATEMENT OF DR. PHILIP H. GORDON, SENIOR FELLOW FOR
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASH-
INGTON, DC**

Dr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's an honor to be back here, and nice to see you all.

I never thought I'd be at a hearing on NATO enlargement at which I was more forward-leaning than my friend Ron Asmus, but that's the position in which I find myself, and I'd like to suggest why, and then also share a few comments about Afghanistan.

On enlargement, I think, anytime we talk about enlargement the discussion has to begin with the overall strategic argument that the process of enlargement, that began in the early nineties and that you all supported so strongly, has contributed to security and prosperity in Europe. The incentive has led these countries to reform their economies and their military structures and resolve territorial disputes and improve human rights. And, once in, they've contributed to missions in places like the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. And, in turn, I think, NATO membership has reassured many of their populations of the political and military solidarity of the United States and the European Union, and that enables them to focus on the well-being of their people. All of that is a good thing, and it's in that context that I think that NATO should extend invitations, at this summit, to Albania, Croatia, and the Republic of Macedonia.

There is a debate, a legitimate debate, about how ready they are. I think at a certain point one has to decide that a line is crossed. You could—perhaps, in an ideal world—you would always have countries on the verge of getting into NATO, always with an incentive to do better. At some point, I think you have to say, 6, 8 years into a process, with significant progress made, that this is a credible process, and it actually does have an end point. I think it's time to do that with those three countries.

On the question of MAP for Georgia and Ukraine, which I think is even more controversial, for reasons that have been spelled out: There's Russian opposition, there's even more questions about their readiness. Despite those concerns, I also think that NATO should respond positively to their requests to join the MAP, and I'll tell you why. We can get into it in more detail. But, for me, the bottom line is that those requests have come from democratically elected, reform-minded governments that have pledged, in this context, to seek consensus within their countries—which is not yet there—and to continue the reforms to meet NATO standards. And I don't see how we can or why we should say no to that. I think that tendency should be encouraged rather than discouraged.

Again, we can elaborate on the reasons. But let me just address two of the main objections to the position that I have advocated here on MAP to Georgia and Ukraine.

The first is that it's premature because it would be a signal of imminent membership, for which they're not ready. I think Ron has suggested this concern; it's a legitimate one. We should be honest, we shouldn't kid ourselves. If we give them a Membership Action Plan, they're going to see it as a ticket to membership, and the Russians will see it that way, and their people will see it that way. It's a legitimate concern.

But, I think, as long as we are clear at the summit—and I would encourage summit leaders to be clear—that participation in this program, which is meant to facilitate their efforts to get ready for NATO, is not a guarantee of future membership. NATO, I think, is quite clear about that. And it is also clear that you only actually

cross that final bar of membership when you've met all of the important standards on territorial disputes, human rights, and so on.

So, I think that that very high bar should be in between the Membership Action Plan and actual membership, not in what I would consider to be an artificial place between an intensified dialogue for NATO and the MAP. That doesn't really make sense to me.

The second objection that one hears in the context of MAP to Georgia and Ukraine is about Russian opposition. I think Russian concerns should obviously be taken into account in any discussion of European security, but I also think that Moscow can't have a veto over the choices of neighboring democratic governments. NATO enlargement is not, and has never been, a threat to Russia, which should understand, actually, that it can benefit from security and prosperity in these countries.

Senator Lugar, you referenced President Putin's threat to target nuclear missiles at Ukraine, in the context of a NATO enlargement. I think that's simply unacceptable as part of European diplomacy in the 21st century, and perhaps more of a reason to extend NATO's links with Ukraine, rather than reject its hopes to get them.

The last point on this is in terms of timing. Because this is such a controversial issue, there may be something to be said for getting it off the table now, at this summit, before there's a new Russian President, and at the end of our own President's tenure, and then, hopefully, the new administration can start to develop positive relations with Russia, which I think are critically important.

Let me very briefly share just three points on Afghanistan, which, I think, is equally important and deserving of our attention. In my written testimony, I have provided detailed analysis of what the challenge is and what we should do about it, but here let me just underline three big themes.

The first is that, despite all of the challenges and deficiencies and failures we've heard about, some here today, some which have been outlined in some recent reports that I know have been briefed to you—rising violence, weakening resolve, opium, divisions among allies—despite all of those, I think we shouldn't forget, in a NATO context, how extraordinary this mission is when you put it in perspective.

Ten years ago, the idea that NATO would be running a major military operation halfway around the world was preposterous. Even 5 years ago, we all remember conversations with European allies about how this was beyond what NATO should even consider. And yet, today that theoretical debate is over. NATO's there. Every single member of the Alliance has forces there and is committed—42,000 troops, 28,000 of which are non-Americans. We shouldn't lose sight of that. And, even in the context of questions about Europeans losing faith in the mission—which are legitimate; I share those concerns—it is, nonetheless, the case that there are 5,000 more non-American troops in Afghanistan this year than there were last year. So, as we focus on the problems, I think we shouldn't lose sight of that.

Second, and related to that point, I do think NATO can succeed in Afghanistan, despite all of these problems. I reject the conclu-

sion that Afghanistan is lost. It's not lost in the United States, where more than 65 percent of Americans believe that overthrowing the Taliban was the right thing to do, and believe that we should stay, and that has bipartisan support. It's not lost in Europe, where, despite public apprehensions, every single NATO government still supports the mission. And, more importantly, it's not lost in Afghanistan, where more than 75 percent of Afghans say the overthrow of the Taliban was a good thing, and a majority still says they're grateful for the presence of foreign soldiers.

Everyone on this committee knows how important succeeding in Afghanistan is. I think one of our most important challenges is making sure that the American public, and, even more importantly, European publics, understand what is at stake.

And my final point—and, again, we can get into all sorts of details about troops, aid, strategies, drugs, Pakistan, and so on—I think, in all of that, we need to remember the most important thing is the sustainability of this mission. Our wish list for Bucharest will, frankly, not be entirely fulfilled on all of these scores. It's easy to hope for a quick fix, it's easy to dream that the Europeans will lift all their caveats and send 10,000 more troops. They won't. The author and British diplomat Rory Stewart, who now lives in Kabul, likes to say that if everything goes perfectly well in Afghanistan for the next 20 years, it will attain a level of development around that of Pakistan. It's a mountainous, landlocked, arid, and very poor and divided country, and we shouldn't expect to transform it overnight, but we also shouldn't lose faith when our efforts run into inevitable setbacks, and we shouldn't conclude that they're too difficult or costly. We've already seen the costs of abandoning Afghanistan, and I think those costs vastly exceed those we are experiencing in what we're trying to do today.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gordon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PHILIP H. GORDON, SENIOR FELLOW FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify today on the critical issues facing NATO on the eve of the Bucharest summit in April. This will be the final NATO summit of the Bush administration. It comes at a time when there are serious questions about NATO's vital mission in Afghanistan, and serious internal debates within the alliance about what to do about enlargement. Leaders in Bucharest will also have to address a number of other important issues, including Europe-based missile defense, the NATO Response Force, Kosovo, European Defense, and the NATO budget. But here I want to focus on the two that I believe are most essential to U.S. national security interests and the future of the alliance: Afghanistan and enlargement.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you, Senator Lugar, and the other members of the committee for the leadership you have shown on both of these critical issues and hope my comments can contribute to your ongoing work.

NATO'S MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

Several prominent reports on Afghanistan have been published in recent weeks. All underscored the serious and growing challenges to the NATO mission posed by rising violence, weakening international resolve, expanding opium production, divisions among allies, and daunting regional challenges. I will address these serious challenges, but before focusing on them and what NATO needs to do to meet them, I think it is worth putting NATO's Afghanistan mission into some perspective.

Ten years ago, the idea that NATO would be running a major military operation half way around the world would have seemed preposterous. Even 5 years ago, just after the U.S.-led ouster of the Taliban, I can still remember officials in many allied

countries questioning whether the alliance should take on such a challenging task so far beyond its original mission. Today that theoretical debate about missions is over—every one of NATO’s 26 members not only supports but has forces in Afghanistan. NATO has 42,000 troops in-country, 28,000 of which are from countries other than the United States. NATO’s mission began in 2003 with the provision of a single headquarters in Kabul alone, when no single country was willing to take on that task and it has gradually expanded to the north, west, south, and east so that it now covers all of Afghanistan. Despite the perception that European allies are losing faith in the mission—indeed a serious concern—it is none the less the case that there are 5,000 more non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan this year than there were last year, and there are decent prospects that more European (likely French and British) troops will be pledged at the Bucharest summit and deployed later this spring.

These facts in no way diminish the reality of the challenges NATO faces in Afghanistan today or the deficiencies in the alliance’s efforts to meet them. But they do remind us that the slow and difficult process of transforming NATO from a Europe-only defense alliance into an effective peacekeeping and global counterterrorism alliance is not destined to fail. As we focus on the challenges and even failures of the NATO mission in Afghanistan we should not forget how much worse the situation would be were NATO not involved there at all and if the United States had to bear all the burdens there alone.

That said, no one can deny that NATO is at a crossroads in Afghanistan. The challenges it faces in 2008—as serious as at any time since the mission was launched—include all the following:

Rising Suicide and IED Attacks. Prior to the overthrow of the Taliban, and despite the horrific violence that country experienced for decades, suicide bombings were virtually unheard of in Afghanistan. Even after the NATO mission began, the practice did not begin until 2005, when 17 suicide bombings took place. Since then, however, there have been 123 suicide bombings in 2006, 140 in 2007, and the number is rising further in 2008—a sign that the Taliban and al-Qaeda realize they cannot defeat NATO with conventional means and instead hope to undercut support for the mission in ways similar to those that were effective in Iraq. The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has also proliferated over the past several years. In January 2008, the Taliban in Afghanistan crossed a new line with a suicide attack on the Serena hotel in Kabul, a luxury hotel frequented by Western diplomats and journalists, which killed eight people. Many fear that the Taliban have been regrouping and will continue to expand their attacks on Western forces and civilians as the weather improves this spring.

Weakening Allied Resolve, and Growing Internal Divisions. Another threat to the NATO mission is the growing resentment over the vastly diverging military missions of different national forces. While all NATO members have soldiers in the country, national “caveats” place strict geographical or functional limitations on what those forces can do and where they can do it. Thus, whereas United States, British, Dutch, and Canadian forces often find themselves fighting and taking casualties in the more dangerous southern and eastern provinces, German, French, Italian, Spanish, and other troops are limited to relatively less dangerous duty in the north and west. Defense Secretary Gates provoked controversy in Europe recently when he made this point and appealed to allies to lift some of their caveats, but his central point cannot be denied: Allied forces are not bearing equal risks or burdens in Afghanistan. The inequality is exacerbated by NATO’s budgetary rules according to which the costs of any deployment are borne by the deploying country. The result is that a Member State that agrees to deploy additional troops or airplanes not only bears disproportionate risk but also has to pay for the new deployment—a further disincentive to new and badly needed force contributions.

It is important to understand why most NATO allies are so reluctant to send more forces to Afghanistan and so determined to limit the mandates of those that are there. For 50 years, with the exception of Britain and France, NATO militaries focused almost exclusively on a territorial defense role, leaving global missions to the United States and others. Their publics are not accustomed to coping with the challenges and costs of global security missions—causing and taking casualties. Some key European leaders are in fragile government coalitions, which constrains their ability to take controversial actions abroad. In addition, the unpopularity of the Bush administration and the psychological link in many European minds between the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq makes it difficult for European leaders to stand up in Parliament and make the case for supporting what is all too often (and wrongly) seen as an “American” war.

Growing Opium Production. Opium production, a major source of funding for the Taliban and a cause of much of the corruption of the Afghan Government, has also risen in each of the past several years. Today some 193,000 hectares are devoted

to poppy cultivation (up from 165,000 in 2006), and Afghanistan is providing 90 percent of the illicit global opium trade. NATO officials on the ground in Afghanistan insist that counternarcotics is the responsibility of the Afghan Government and not Western soldiers. Regardless of whose formal responsibility it is, however, the reality is that Afghanistan will never have a stable, functioning government, and the Taliban will never be defeated, unless the profits stemming from drug production are significantly curbed.

A Struggling Afghan Government. President Hamid Karzai, long seen as a model of the moderate, pro-Western yet authentic and legitimate leader needed in a place like Afghanistan, is increasingly unpopular after struggling to bring peace and prosperity to the country after 6 years in power. Seeking to position himself in advance of likely Presidential elections in 2009, he has alienated some key ethnic constituencies by trying to consolidate his Pushtun base. The Afghan police forces are riddled with corruption and despite real gains in well-being since the Taliban were overthrown (in areas like health care and education), many Afghans are becoming disenchanted with the lack of security and pace of social progress. NATO officials have challenged Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell's recent estimate that the Afghan Government only controls 30 percent of the country's territory, but what is certainly true is that Afghanistan's tribal, ethnic, and regional divisions make it difficult for the central government to extend its writ outside of Kabul. This makes Afghanistan even more susceptible to regional leaders willing and able to cut separate deals with warlords, drug barons, or the Taliban.

Instability in Pakistan. NATO of course has no role in Pakistan, but those responsible for the NATO mission must understand that no strategy for Afghanistan can succeed without a Pakistan strategy to accompany it. Pakistan, after all, is where Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other al-Qaeda leaders are likely hiding, where the Taliban and other insurgents receive financing, training, and sanctuary, and where the majority of Pushtuns—the ethnic group from which the Taliban draws its recruits—live. Frankly, even if Afghanistan could somehow magically be “solved” (which of course it cannot), the United States and its allies would still face a major terrorism challenge from the extremists based on the eastern side of the border. And Afghanistan certainly cannot be solved so long as Taliban and other insurgents can operate with impunity in the ungoverned Pakistani tribal areas, sadly the case today.

Despite these challenges and problems, and contrary to the impression given by much recent press reporting, Afghanistan is not “lost,” and the NATO mission there has not “failed.” It is not lost in the United States, where more than 65 percent of Americans believe that overthrowing the Taliban was the right thing to do, more than 60 percent believe we should keep our forces there, and leaders from across the political spectrum still see the mission as legitimate and necessary. It is not lost in Europe, where despite public apprehensions every single NATO government still supports the mission and is still contributing forces to it. And most importantly it is not lost in Afghanistan, where more than 75 percent of Afghans still say that the overthrow of the Taliban was a good thing and a majority says they are grateful for the presence of foreign soldiers—even if they are increasingly critical of the lack of a coherent international strategy for the country. Even amidst rising violence, the Afghan economy is growing and many Afghans remain hopeful. Succeeding in Afghanistan is not only essential to prevent it from again becoming the sort of failed state in which al-Qaeda could thrive, but it is possible if the United States and its allies accept what is at stake and step up to the challenge. I believe NATO needs to do all of following to increase the prospects for success of the NATO mission:

Deploy Additional Troops. NATO needs at least 5,000–10,000 additional troops in Afghanistan, to provide adequate security for the population and to avoid relying so extensively on airpower, which causes the civilian casualties that put the entire mission at stake. If NATO had as many troops per capita in Afghanistan today as it did in Bosnia in 1995, it would have some 400,000 (instead of 42,000). Even the current NATO mission in Kosovo today (17,000) would be over 270,000 if scaled to the size of Afghanistan. The point is not that such troop levels are realistic for Afghanistan or even necessary, but simply to put in perspective the relative commitment we have made to Afghanistan given the importance of the mission. The new U.S. contribution of 3,200 marines should give the United States the legitimacy to call on its European allies to make at least an equivalent new contribution and President Bush should challenge them to do so at the Bucharest summit. Collectively, the European NATO allies have several hundred thousand troops in their standing armed forces only a small percentage of which are deployed abroad, and they should be reminded not only that deploying them in Afghanistan is a common interest but that the American public's support for NATO is in many ways a function of European allies' willingness to bear a fair share of that burden.

Provide Increased and More Sustained Development Assistance. Improving the security and daily lives of the Afghan people is critical to defeating the Taliban—as former U.S. Commander General Karl Eikenberry used to say, “The Taliban begin where the roads end.” Yet we have not been building enough roads. Again to make the Balkan comparison, U.S. and European financial assistance to Afghanistan has over the past 6 years been less than one-tenth the level of funding provided to Bosnia and Kosovo. Ensuring stability in the Balkans is clearly in the United States and European national interest, but meeting the same goals in Afghanistan is arguably just as important. President Bush’s February 2007 request for \$11.8bn over 2 years was a belated but welcome step in right direction. It must be funded and sustained by Congress and matched by NATO allies.

Focus on Training and Resources for the Afghan National Army and Police. For many poor Afghans, the choice between supporting the Afghan Government and joining the Taliban has nothing to do with ideology, but is simply a matter of who will better help make ends meet. None the less, many Afghan soldiers are still paid only around \$100 per month, while admittedly imprecise reporting suggests that the Taliban pays many of its fighters around \$300 per month. (This can be compared with costs for each NATO soldier in Afghanistan of around \$4,000 per month.) At these rates, the monthly pay for all 57,000 members of the ANA could be doubled for \$5.7 million—roughly the cost of six of the Tomahawk cruise missiles we used to overthrow the Taliban in 2001. Tripling their pay would come to some \$137 million per year, a fraction of the \$1.5 billion annual NATO budget for Afghan operations or the more than \$15 billion in financial assistance we have provided since 2002. Strengthening the ANA is essential not only to build its capacity to fight alongside NATO, but to help NATO put an Afghan face on military operations, which is critical to their success.

Improving the effectiveness of the Afghan police forces will require more than just resources; it will also require a significant mentoring and monitoring effort. The Afghan police has reportedly reached 90 percent of its projected end strength of 82,000, but it is riddled with corruption and not trusted by the Afghan population. Police reform will have to be accompanied by greater efforts to establish the rule of law, including through greater training for Afghan judges and lawyers.

Crack Down on Drug Labs and Corrupt Officials. There is no easy solution to Afghanistan’s drug problem, but NATO cannot ignore it either. Large-scale spraying and eradication efforts are counterproductive, because they tend to turn poor poppy farmers—who polls suggest would prefer to grow licit crops but simply cannot afford to—against NATO and the United States. Rather, NATO should focus its efforts on helping the Afghan Government identify and punish corrupt officials who facilitate and benefit from the drug trade. This will require greater coordination between the international community’s counterinsurgency efforts and its counternarcotics efforts, which at present are disjointed. And while avoiding attacks on farmers, NATO forces should not hesitate to conduct operations against the labs that turn poppies into opium and the trade routes that carry opium to foreign markets, all of which generate profits that are used by the Taliban.

Adapt Our Strategy in Pakistan. The outcome of the recent election in Pakistan—where both President Musharraf’s party and the religious parties suffered major setbacks—provides an opportunity to develop a new relationship with Pakistan that will serve our mutual interest. I applaud Senator Biden’s proposals to triple our nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan and to sustain it for a decade and to provide a \$1 billion “democracy dividend” to the new Pakistani Government if it is formed and governs democratically. I spent a week in Pakistan last May and am going back there next week. My sense is that the Pakistani public is getting fed up with the growing al-Qaeda attacks against them and they will support efforts to fight al-Qaeda if we can demonstrate that we are prepared to help them do so. Pakistanis have long tended to view Americans as “fair weather friends” and have resented seeing too much of our assistance end up in the hands of the Pakistani military (who use it to buy high-tech weaponry) rather than be put to use for schools and hospitals and jobs. Standing with the Pakistani people will make our counterterrorism cooperation more palatable to the public and the government, and in the long run providing jobs and economic development in the tribal areas will make it easier to isolate and root out al-Qaeda.

A Public Relations Campaign in Europe. The weakening of European resolve in Afghanistan stems less from a lack of official good will than from the fact that European publics doubt that NATO’s mission can succeed and fail to see the mission’s direct relevance to them. To combat this perception, the United States and its NATO allies should sponsor a public relations campaign to draw attention to the good NATO is doing in the country and the consequences of abandoning Afghanistan to its fate. Europeans need to be reminded that our adversaries in Afghanistan are

the same ones not only who attacked the United States in 2001 but who killed 193 people on Spanish trains in Madrid in April 2004 and 54 London commuters in July 2005. U.S. and NATO governments should sponsor nonofficial speakers—from the United States, Europe, and Afghanistan—to talk to publics and the media about the situation in Afghanistan and the stakes. Europeans are often quick to dismiss the Afghan mission as an unnecessary part of President Bush’s “war on terror,” but I believe they can be persuaded that the mission is actually in Europe’s own strategic and humanitarian interest.

Better International Coordination. As in many international nation-building efforts, our efforts to stabilize Afghanistan suffer from the lack of coordination among various international agencies. Unfortunately, the recent proposal to send Lord Ashdown as a strong U.N. Special Representative tasked with eliminating redundancies and maximizing international assistance was vetoed by the Karzai government. The new U.N. Special Representative, Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide, will need strong backing from the United States and other NATO members if he is to succeed in his mission to better coordinate what is a currently disparate and disjointed international effort.

I realize that even with the best of intentions, not all of these recommendations can or will be implemented immediately. The United States and other NATO Member States have many competing priorities, and resources—both military and financial—are tight. The key to success, I believe, is to understand what is at stake and to do a better job of explaining those stakes to our own public and our NATO partners. While it would be nice to achieve all of these goals in the short term, what is truly essential is to commit to Afghanistan for the long-term, and to put our mission on a sustainable basis. The author and former British diplomat Rory Stewart—who now lives in Kabul—likes to say that if everything goes almost perfectly well in Afghanistan for the next 20 years, it will attain a level of development no higher than that of Pakistan. Afghanistan is a poor, arid, mountainous, and ethnically divided country that is emerging from 30 years of civil war and mismanagement. We should not expect to transform it overnight or lose faith when our efforts to help it run into inevitable setbacks. Nor, however, must we conclude that those efforts are simply too difficult or costly. We have already experienced the costs of abandoning Afghanistan, which exceed those required to satisfy its basic interests and keeping it from threatening ours.

ENLARGEMENT

NATO’s second major challenge at the summit is enlargement. At Bucharest, leaders must address two enlargement-related issues, a decision on current candidates (Albania, Croatia, and the Republic of Macedonia) and responses to requests to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) by Georgia and Ukraine.

I believe that the process of NATO enlargement, begun in the early 1990s, has contributed to security and prosperity in Europe. The incentive of NATO membership has led aspiring countries to reform their political systems, liberalize their economies, root out corruption, resolve territorial disputes with neighbors, rationalize their military establishments, and improve minority rights. Once in the alliance new members have contributed troops for vital NATO missions in the Balkans and in Afghanistan and many sent forces to join the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. In turn, NATO membership has reassured their populations of political and military solidarity with the United States and members of the European Union, enabling them to focus on improving the well-being of their citizens rather than worrying about the types of military threats they had lived with for centuries.

In this context, I support the entry into NATO of the current candidates, Albania, Croatia, and the Republic of Macedonia. Each has been part of NATO’s MAP process for 6 or more years and has made significant progress in reforming their political systems, economies, and military establishments. All have contributed troops to the NATO mission in Afghanistan and made progress toward other goals like civilian control of the military and respect for minority rights. None is yet a model democracy—but all are moving in the right direction and have made at least as much progress as those that have preceded them in the accession process. In the wake of the turbulence surrounding Kosovo’s declaration of independence, I believe that the extension of NATO membership to these neighboring countries will contribute to security in the Balkans and underscore NATO’s commitment to it. Their accession after years of preparation will also demonstrate the sincerity of NATO’s pledge that membership genuinely is open to those European democracies that meet its stringent criteria.

The question of MAP accession for Georgia and Ukraine is perhaps even more controversial. Russia is strongly opposed to their participation in the program, and

both countries have in recent years experienced the sort of political instability that suggests more progress must be made before membership should be considered. Despite these concerns, I believe NATO should respond positively to their requests to join the MAP. Those requests came to NATO from democratically elected governments which have pledged to seek to build consensus about NATO within their countries and to continue to work to meet NATO's rigorous standards. So long as NATO makes clear that a MAP is not a guarantee of future membership, which can only be granted when an aspirant meets all of NATO's criteria and a consensus exists among NATO members, there is no basis for rejecting their requests to participate in this program. The MAP is a logical extension of the Intensified Dialogues in which they already take part. Their reformist governments' desire to come closer to the West should be encouraged, not discouraged.

Despite its recent political problems, including the Saakashvili government's excessive use of force in response to street protests in November 2007, Georgia has made significant political progress since the "Rose Revolution" of November 2003. The elections that followed the November 2007 turbulence were seen to be free and fair, and were won easily by Saakashvili, who got 53 percent of the vote compared to 26 percent for his rival. In a referendum accompanying the Presidential vote, 73 percent of Georgians came out in support of eventual NATO membership. The World Bank has recently given Georgia good marks on economic reform and anticorruption efforts, even if the November 2007 protests were a warning shot that much of the population remains dissatisfied with perceived authoritarianism. A positive signal about the prospect of eventual NATO membership sent by MAP participation will help encourage positive political trends. It will also encourage Georgia to seek to resolve the "frozen conflicts" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that continue to plague its efforts to achieve national unity—a Georgia with realistic aspirations to join NATO is more likely to work energetically to resolve these conflicts than a Georgia with no hope of joining the alliance. Georgia has a long way to go—both in meeting NATO's democratic standards and in terms of resolving its internal conflicts—before it can seriously be seen as a near-term candidate for NATO membership. The question now is how best to keep it moving in the right direction.

Ukraine has also made significant political progress since its 2004 "Orange Revolution." Its parliamentary elections in March 2006 were judged to meet international standards and took place after free debate and without incident. While even eventual NATO membership is far from a matter of consensus among Ukrainians—indeed most are currently opposed to it—President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko have encouragingly pledged to work to foster national unity and to consult the Ukrainian people in a referendum prior to any move toward membership. The Ukrainian opposition itself once favored NATO membership and even sought to participate in the MAP but it now opposes NATO for apparent partisan political reasons. I believe that agreeing to allow Ukraine to participate in the MAP program at the Bucharest summit would encourage it to continue to move in the direction of democratic and peaceful reform.

Some would argue that giving a MAP to Georgia and Ukraine is premature because it would be a signal of imminent membership, for which they are not ready. But NATO's own literature on the MAP states that "participation in the MAP does not guarantee future membership . . . Decisions to invite aspirants to start accession talks will be taken within NATO by consensus and on a case-by-case basis." NATO also emphasizes that "aspirant countries are expected to achieve certain goals . . . [including] settling any international, ethnic or external territorial disputes by peaceful means; demonstrating a commitment to the rule of law and human rights; establishing democratic control of their armed forces; and promoting stability and well-being through economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility." These statements make clear that the real bar to NATO membership is and should be between the MAP and membership, not between the Intensified Dialogue and the MAP. NATO leaders should reiterate this point at the summit.

Others will argue that MAP for Georgia should be opposed because it is opposed by Russia. However, while Russian concerns should obviously be taken into account in any discussions of European security, Moscow cannot have a veto on the choices of neighboring democratic governments. NATO enlargement is not and has never been a threat to Russia, which should understand that it can benefit from democracy, stability, and prosperity in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. President Putin's threat to target Ukraine with nuclear missiles if it seeks to join NATO has no place in 21st century diplomatic relations and should be taken more as a reason to increase Ukraine's ties to NATO than to cut them off. Russia's opposition, then, is perhaps a further reason to act on MAP for Georgia and Ukraine at Bucharest rather than waiting. With a new Russian President taking office in May and a new U.S. administration to take office in January 2009, it makes sense to get this con-

troversial issue off the table now rather than to have to confront another MAP decision at NATO's planned 60th anniversary summit in spring 2009. That way the new U.S. administration could seek to make a fresh start in rebuilding relations with Russia, which should be one of its early priorities.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the Bucharest summit provides an important opportunity to advance U.S. interests by bolstering NATO's mission in Afghanistan and moving forward on enlargement. I commend your own leadership in both of these areas and thank the committee for inviting me to testify before you.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be a staggering transformation, to get to Pakistan.

Mr. Jackson.

**STATEMENT OF BRUCE JACKSON, PRESIDENT, PROJECT ON
TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me try to be equally succinct.

With regard to enlargement, let me put this in historical perspective. This is not the third enlargement. There have actually been five enlargements, up to this point. Your committee will be considering the sixth. Certainly, the three countries that may be in the sixth enlargement are more qualified than Greece and Turkey were, originally; have larger armies than Germany did in the fifties; and had more social work done on their behalf than Spain did after Franco. So, these countries are in a very strong position. I can discuss their qualities.

It's also important to remember that this is the smallest expansion this committee has ever been asked to consider. The total populations of these three countries are less than the Czech Republic, and they have been in a Membership Action Plan for 9 years. Instead of—in 1997, in the Visegrad expansion, the State Department looked at the credentials. One single country out of 26—at that time, 16—looked at these countries for a couple of years. Instead, now all 26 countries looked at them for 9 consecutive years—all 26 of them—and with much smaller countries. So, the scrutiny has been microscopic. And I think this committee really should get the annual reports on these countries, going back over the 9 years.

Just to put this in proportion, Macedonia is only 16 years old. It has spent 60 percent of its entire nation's history trying to be qualified for a Membership Action Plan. This is extraordinary, what they've done.

If we look at, basically, objective criteria—let's take, say, markets, because the—they say all of the information is the price. The real estate values around Dubrovnik went from \$20,000 per an apartment, to over \$2 million, in this last 10 years. The market is trying to tell us something. These countries are now, in development terms, on par with Slovenia, which is already in. And we're seeing this kind of convergence. Already, they're delivering security goods. There is no longer traffic in cigarettes running out of Albania across the Adriatic; as it was, earlier on. The sexual trafficking throughout has been arrested. And, frankly, they have done so well that Albanian troops, on one occasion, were basically protecting the perimeter of our forces in Baghdad. They had the outside mission. So, they're contributing. And that was years ago that they were doing it. On a per-capita basis, these countries are, as you just heard, contributing to a larger extent than some of our allies.

So, in terms of qualifications—and if we look at Macedonia, this country, which is barely an infant, in European terms, has implemented the Ohrid Framework Agreements, has basically—is reconciling its remaining bilateral issue, and has built a multiethnic society. This is nothing short of extraordinary. It seems to me that, in the objective criteria, these countries—as, I think the chairman and Senator Lugar have said—have performed the objective criteria.

I do think there's a danger, in my good friend Ron's remarks, that this process becomes essentially a social-work process, and we begin to regard NATO as, sort of, an engineer of European souls. I think that's a mistake. I think, you said in your opening statement, sir, that, basically, the Americans played a supporting role. The transformation of Europe is really a European responsibility. NATO can only support them.

As we turn to Ukraine and Georgia, it seems to me the greater danger of the Membership Action Plan is that they're overqualified. They've been left so long in the waiting room of Europe that they've completed the IPAP, they completed an intensified dialogue, and most military experts will tell you they've done most of the military reform and the interoperability reforms normally required of the countries which came through in the last round. Georgia, just to name one, has a rotating battalion system that goes into Iraq, and they're moving from three battalions to four battalions; and basically, they always have a battalion rotating into Iraq. That looks like interoperability to me. Also, when you look at airlift and the stuff the Ukrainians can contribute, they do contribute. We stack it up, hour for hour, we'll find that they contribute more than half of our European allies. So, they are delivering.

It seems to me what is being asked of us is, At what point do we have a dialogue with a country like that, where we're trying to discover its way? I don't think it's correct to say that Ukraine has basically asked for NATO membership. In fact, they've said that they need to have a referendum—a future referendum about it. They've asked for a dialogue.

And I'm sorry Senator Dodd has left, because I thought his question about EU and NATO was really kind of profound in this context. It's precisely—if you look back, the first piece, after 1949, was built largely by the wartime alliance. The second piece, after 1989, was built as Americans and members in this committee supporting the heroes at Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel. It was a cooperative piece with democracy in central and eastern Europe.

The third piece that you're now considering is basically a partnership that was forged in the Balkans, between the EU and NATO, that they had certain commitments. At the Thessaloniki summit, the EU said that they would have membership for all the Balkan countries. In those terms, it looks like NATO has fallen behind. Croatia is now on the cusp of a membership decision, and we're still making a membership decision. Commissioner Rehn is opening SAAs, perhaps with Serbia, with Macedonia, but NATO still doesn't know their membership status. It seems to me NATO needs to keep up with our European allies as they take over for us in Kosovo and they take security cognizance for southeast Europe.

Already, the European Union is ahead of us in eastern Europe, they have opened action plans with Ukraine and Georgia under the neighborhood policy. We have not. And we're starting to lose the complementarity with our partners on the other side of the Atlantic. If we want to solve Senator Dodd's question, we have to make decisions at Bucharest to keep the parallelism between these two great organizations, the security organization that this country has a defining role in, and the European political experiment that is actually beginning to build things in Brussels.

Finally, I would just express some reservations about the suggestion that the Senate would ever consider conditions, beyond, obviously, the powers that this company already has not to send things to the floor until they're ready, and to require the information to make an informed decision. But, having pressured the Europeans not to impose national caveats or any limitations on the soul of the Washington Treaty, it would be impossible if we did the same kind of thing, and avoid any suggestion that, "If you have a bad election, we may not honor our commitments." We did suffer through a period with Greece, in the sixties; with Portugal, in the seventies; occasionally, dare I say, with Turkey, on human rights, even today. These are—these may be handled by European courts, by foreign policy. We can handle those ruptures in our relations. But, we cannot place limitations which weaken the foundation that sits under the Transatlantic Alliance.

So, why don't I just stop there.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRUCE PITCAIRN JACKSON, PRESIDENT, PROJECT ON
TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on "NATO: Enlargement and Effectiveness" as we approach the NATO Summit in Bucharest, which is now less than 3 weeks away. The NATO allies face a range of decisions at Bucharest including missile defense and operations in Afghanistan, as well as the very important question of NATO expansion and the preparation for membership of potential candidates. I would like to offer some context for this complex expansion question confronting NATO heads of state, which, if it goes forward, requires the advice of this committee and consent of the entire Senate. I believe that the choices for the United States appear in sharper relief once we understand the role NATO expansion has played in the development of modern Europe so far.

For centuries, the Balkans and Europe's East have deserved their reputations for igniting wider European wars and have given to European history the place-names of genocide and mass starvation. In 1949, the creation of NATO secured the post-World-War-II peace in Western Europe. Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has played a transformational role in building a second peace—this time in Central and Eastern Europe.

Now NATO has an opportunity to lay the foundation for a third European peace—this time in the Balkans—and to open a dialogue that could lead to a fourth: A more constructive relationship between Europe and Russia.

The transatlantic allies will face two critical questions when they gather for their summit in Bucharest in April. The first is whether to invite Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO, a decision that is the culmination of a 15-year effort to end the wars that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia. The second is what relationship Ukraine and Georgia will have with NATO in the turbulent early years of their development: Will they be set on a course that could lead to eventual NATO membership, or will they be excluded?

Regarding the Balkans, critics say that Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia are not ready for NATO membership. Farther east, they worry about the fragility of democratic institutions in Georgia and Ukraine, and they have concerns about the effect that NATO's engagement with those countries would have on relations with Russia and on European publics skittish about further enlargement of the European Union.

These larger questions give rise to a series of interrelated questions which will shape the decisions of the 26 NATO leaders at the Bucharest summit on April 2–4, 2008.

(1) How have the two recent expansions of the alliance—in 1999 to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and in 2004 to include Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria—affected U.S. and European security and the integrity and capability of NATO? What does this experience tell us about the prospect of further enlargement?

(2) What are the qualifications of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, as measured against NATO standards and relative to previous candidates at the point of entering the alliance?

(3) Actually, what criteria does NATO use in making these important decisions? Are we moving the bar upward or downward?

(4) What is the status of the Western Balkans as a whole and how will the entry of three new NATO members affect the stability of Southeast Europe and the security of Europe more generally?

(5) Assuming that the alliance takes a major step forward in the Western Balkans, what is being done for the democracies of Europe's East, such as Ukraine and Georgia, which will not be considered for membership at Bucharest? Are they being left behind?

(6) What about Russia? How will the third expansion of NATO since 1989 and our engagement with Ukraine and Georgia affect Russia's perceptions of the West and its relations with our European allies?

(7) Finally, what are the implications of the Bucharest summit for the foundation of the Atlantic alliance, for how the United States and Europe share burdens, and for our effectiveness working together in global politics?

Although these questions are demanding, we have accumulated a great deal of experience since the fall of the Berlin Wall in the development and integration of newly freed European states. There is extensive empirical evidence informing us of how NATO expansion has helped build the Europe we see today on which we can base an assessment of the role further expansion will play in Europe's future.

BACKGROUND ON NATO EXPANSION

The post-cold-war expansions of NATO to the Visegrad countries (named for a 1991 summit in Visegrad, Hungary) of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary and then to the larger and more diverse Vilnius Group (named for a 2000 summit in Vilnius, Lithuania) were actually very different in terms of the process as it unfolded and its significance for Europe. In terms of process, particularly in the United States, an organized examination of the democratic credentials and institutions of the Visegrad countries took a back seat to issues the Senate (and this committee in particular) might focus on in the course of a ratification debate. The substantive debate turned on how expansion would affect relations with Russia and whether the United States needed to remain in Europe at all. Especially telling was the moral import of the struggle for freedom in the Visegrad states: The Hungarian uprising of 1956, the 1968 Prague spring, the birth of Solidarity in 1980—and the brutal Communist suppression of each.

Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were invited to join NATO in the first post-cold-war expansion because of the historical and moral claim they had to return to the community of European states from which they had been separated by 20th century totalitarianism. In addition to the moral claim, the Visegrad accession was the last step in ending the danger of war on the historically bloody north German plain, which stretches from Moscow through Poland and Germany into northern France. More than 10 years after this decision was taken in July 1997 at the Madrid summit, the NATO allies have every reason to be proud of their decision.

The second phase of expansion began at NATO's 50th anniversary Washington summit in April 1999, when the so-called Membership Action Plan (MAP) process was established for new aspirants in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The list of such aspirants soon grew to include Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia. The MAP process was a response to unwillingness of the NATO allies to go forward with invitations to Slovenia and Romania at the Madrid summit in July 1997. While many observers thought these rejections were unfair, NATO leaders believed that inadequate reform and weak democratic institutions, particularly in Romania, made the prospect of NATO accession premature for these countries. They reasoned that the next generation of NATO candidates would need a self-improvement course before invitations could be extended.

With this decision, NATO formally entered the business of democracy support. There were several immediate consequences of the creation of a class of candidate countries in the process of trying to qualify for membership. The class of countries granted a potential avenue toward membership through MAP but no specific date for invitation could be quite large. The process made it possible to sever the question of whether one was legitimately an aspirant for membership from the question of whether a country would actually be invited to join. Ten candidates came in virtually overnight, some with very weak credentials and a limited history as democracies. In addition, through MAP, the class of candidates could be diverse both historically and geographically, since the Vilnius Group was not claiming a single, overarching strategic rationale.

In essence, the Vilnius Group claimed to represent a social and political restoration of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe that would render "whole" a Europe divided in the 20th century. The unifying character of the second expansion can be seen in the frequent references to the concept of "a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace," as President George W. Bush put it in his speech at Warsaw University in 2001, in which he maintained that Europe must extend "from the Baltic to the Black Sea" to achieve this objective. The Vilnius Group did precisely that, and seven countries from the group, a self-help political club formed during a conference in Lithuania in May 2000, were invited to join NATO at the Prague summit in June 2002. Although both the process of qualification and the significance for Europe were different from the Visegrad round, the result has clearly strengthened the NATO alliance and Europe itself.

QUALIFICATIONS OF ALBANIA, CROATIA, AND MACEDONIA

In terms of enlargement, the first question facing the NATO allies as they gear up for the Bucharest summit is whether 9 years into the Membership Action Plan, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia are qualified to enter NATO. Critics say that they are not. But the fact is that Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia have spent 6 more years in rigorous preparation for NATO membership than the seven other original members of the Vilnius Group, and it shows.

Today, Croatia has the most impressive all round economic performance of any country in southern Europe. In recent years, Albania has contributed more soldiers to missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and international peacekeeping than most NATO allies. And, since the end of the Balkan wars in 1999, Macedonia has arguably covered more ground in building an integrated, multiethnic society in a short time than any other European nation. We now have a chance to bring Catholic Croatia, secular-Islamic Albania, and multiethnic Orthodox Macedonia into the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies. If it remains the case that qualification for NATO is predominantly determined by the "social criteria" of democratic reform as well as military contributions to international peacekeeping, then the three so-called "Adriatic Charter" countries in the Western Balkans are fully qualified.

But since NATO has changed or adjusted its criteria for membership and its rationale for expansion in the recent past, perhaps a third expansion might be driven by different criteria and have unique characteristics.

In addition to democratic criteria, the NATO allies seem to view Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia strategically in terms of Southeast Europe, politically in terms of European integration, and geopolitically in terms of the partnership in the Balkans between the European Union and NATO.

Strategically, invitations to Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia bring the NATO security architecture inside the Western Balkans, which remains the last unstable region in Central and Eastern Europe. The Balkan candidates claim to be instituting a system of shared security that will contribute to reducing the political instability of the Western Balkans and thereby strengthening Southeast Europe, in both political and economic terms.

The strategic claim is closely linked with the political understanding of the question. NATO's early extension of a membership perspective to Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia and its tenacity in preparing the Adriatic Charter candidates for membership clearly reflects a political understanding of what the European Union decided at the EU summit in Thessaloniki. In the communiqué from Thessaloniki, the European Union "guaranteed" all the countries of the Western Balkans eventual membership in all of Europe's institutions. If it is the intention of the European Union to bring the Western Balkans into the political and market institutions of Europe, then it is only common sense for NATO to help strengthen these candidates where it can and to ensure that a security structure will be in place so that EU integration goes forward when its leaders see fit. Since Croatia is already closing

in on the final chapters of EU candidacy, NATO invitations are, if anything, somewhat behind schedule.

The complementarity of European Union and NATO objectives is even more pronounced if we look at the qualifications of the candidates in geopolitical terms. Since 1994, the Western Balkans, more than any other place in the world, has taught NATO and the European Union as well as the United States and Europe how to work effectively together across the entire spectrum of human rights, intervention, peacekeeping, reconstruction, capacity-building, and integration missions—to name but a few of the tasks that have been undertaken in this defining collaboration to rescue and rebuild the former Yugoslavia.

What NATO and the European Union achieve or fail to achieve in the Western Balkans may well define what we will undertake, or fail to address, in the future throughout the Euro-Atlantic. In this analysis, the NATO allies face an obligation to take any and all steps to ensure that the Western Balkans has the highest probability of success. The issuing of invitations to three qualified candidates is one of those steps, but the alliance should not stop there. Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia need the so-called “Intensified Dialogue” with NATO on membership issues. This is the preliminary dialogue anticipating formal adoption of a Membership Action Plan setting forth a path to membership invitation.

Viewed from the perspective of objective democratic, strategic, political, and geopolitical criteria—and viewed comparatively in relation to accessions in the two previous rounds of expansion—the candidates for invitation at the Bucharest summit have an overwhelming case in their favor. Moreover, a failure to decide exposes the alliance to significant risks and negative effects. Any further delay on the candidacies of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia would diminish regional stability just as Kosovo begins its extended period of supervised independence. Delay would also confuse and undercut the European Union as it takes over chief security responsibilities from the United States and NATO throughout the region. Finally, inability to close the book in the Balkans would also dangerously slow our engagement with Europe’s East, to which I now turn.

THE REMAINING QUESTION OF EUROPE’S EAST

Assuming that the Balkan accession goes forward at the Bucharest summit, there remains the question of Europe’s East—which might someday become the territory on which a fourth expansion will take place. Both Ukraine and Georgia have sent letters to the NATO Secretary General formally requesting entry into the Membership Action Plan process.

Both countries have long since completed the Individual Partnership Program, and they have breezed through the Intensified Dialogue on membership. Their senior officials argue, and Western military analysts broadly agree, that Ukraine and Georgia have been in NATO’s waiting room for so long that they have completed the majority of the technical military reform tasks usually delineated in the MAP process and are already interoperable with NATO forces. For Ukraine, the Bucharest summit is the second try for the Membership Action Plan. During the Istanbul summit in 2004, President Kuchma requested MAP, but the alliance refused on the grounds that Ukraine had sold radars to Iraq. Although that charge turned out to be false—we did not find Ukrainian radars in Iraq—the NATO allies undoubtedly made the right decision.

As we have seen from Poland to the Adriatic Charter countries, the processes of NATO accession and its purposes evolve over time. Looking at the requests of Ukraine and Georgia, we already know that military criteria play very little role in how we define our interest in the success of the two countries. In fact, these countries are not now asking for NATO membership, although they would be delighted if we treated them as prospective members. They are asking for the tools with which to complete their reforms and ultimately to qualify for membership consideration. In effect, the Membership Action Plan has become a preschool for countries seeking to improve their credentials for an EU perspective, or more extensive engagement with the European Union. In this respect, the MAP process runs parallel to (while remaining distinct from) the EU’s Neighborhood Policy.

What NATO must decide is how NATO should engage with Ukraine and Georgia in the course of an extended process of strengthening democratic institutions, resolving so-called “frozen conflicts,” and establishing their political orientation toward the West. To the degree that political and democratic criteria will determine the speed and extent of their integration into the EU and NATO, Ukraine and Georgia closely resemble Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia at the time the three entered the Membership Action Plan

Many NATO allies note that despite the astounding pace of reform since the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia stumbled in November 2007 when it cracked down on an opposition demonstration. Likewise, despite the vibrant political pluralism of Ukraine and its repeated free and fair elections, it seems that the country cannot maintain a governing coalition or reach a political decision without a fistfight in Parliament and a collapse of the government. But these are the familiar juvenile delinquencies of young democracies finding their way in the post-Soviet world. Helping them past this early fragility is an important reason for them to be offered a collaborative relationship with NATO.

As important as it is to understand that NATO's criteria on expansion are constantly changing, it is also important to understand what NATO's engagement and preaccession programs are not. A Membership Action Plan offers no guarantee of future membership in NATO, let alone in the European Union. To be precise, MAP would initiate an open-ended process that anticipates that Georgia and Ukraine will spend many years resolving critical national questions of stability, territorial integrity, institutional capacity, and the resolution of frozen conflicts before either NATO or the candidate country can make an informed political decision on NATO membership. In this sense, the first phase of engagement in Europe's East will be a process of discovery wherein Europe learns more about the character, capability and political intentions of Ukraine and Georgia—and these countries understand the evolving requirements of both NATO and the European Union.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUCHAREST SUMMIT FOR THE RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA

Critics of NATO often cite past expansions as a decisive factor in the deterioration of Russia's relationship with NATO, the United States and Europe. Although NATO has an influence on the security, integration, and engagement of Europe in the East and, therefore, an influence on Europe's relationship with Russia, it can be argued that NATO has exerted a positive influence on Russia over the longer term.

To the extent that NATO and the European Union succeed in the stabilization and integration of the Western Balkans, Serbian insecurities and historical anxieties may cease to be a neuralgic issue in Russia's relations with the international community. Similarly, closer relations with Ukraine and Georgia will remove the security concerns that make addressing "frozen conflicts" extremely difficult and will serve to further demilitarize the unstable regions of what Russia once regarded as its "Near Abroad."

Over time, Ukraine and Georgia will become more stable and undoubtedly more prosperous. Invariably, countries in the process of building closer relations with NATO find they can safely demilitarize and devote more of their energies to multilateral resolution of conflicts with neighbors. Ultimately, closer relations between Europe and Ukraine and Georgia would bring Russia closer to Europe and would make the needed dialogues with Russia on democracy and energy that much easier.

As a historical rule, the persistence of political vacuums between Europe and Russia and the isolation of the fearful, fragile states trapped within this belt of political instability are a danger to and a barrier to cooperation between Europe and Russia. Since the mid-1990s, NATO has done more than any institution to remove the physical insecurity and end the isolation of Europe's East and Russia. As a result of NATO's success in these areas, it is now possible to envision new kinds of relationships with Russia, of which the Russia-NATO Founding Act and the Russia-NATO Council are distant, cave-dwelling ancestors.

If the Bucharest summit succeeds, both in the completion of a Southeast European security system in the Balkans and a decisive, long-term engagement with Ukraine and Georgia, it is not too early to speculate about a new Russian relationship.

In the short term, the military dimension of the relationship between Russia and the West is likely to continue to decline. We are unlikely to find ourselves embarking on interminable negotiations on the levels of nuclear and conventional forces reminiscent of the late 1970s and 1980s. These issues are no longer central. The pretense of the last few years that Russia and the United States had found common cause in areas such as North Korea, Iran, and counterproliferation generally has generally proven false. Not only is the Russian Government reluctant to help Europe and the United States on problems of the potential development of an Iranian nuclear program, Russia seems to have even less influence with North Korea than does the United States. As a result, the Russia-NATO Council remains little more than a vehicle to allow the Russian President to appear at NATO summits.

By the same token, it is clear that Russia and the rest of the Euro-Atlantic community are not going to reach a common understanding on the nature of democracy, the standards of human rights, the protection of the press, the limitations on state

power, and many other political values that are the foundation of NATO and EU Member States.

However, the decisions at the Bucharest summit may set the stage for recognition that Russia and Europe have common economic interests and should begin to discuss the terms of trade. Already, the European Union is about to open free trade discussions with Ukraine, and NATO has put Europe's energy security on its agenda. While it is more likely that the European Union will take the leading role in whatever relationship develops on energy supply and related issues in trade and development, it may fairly be said that NATO created the conditions that made closer relations between Russia and Europe on economic matters possible—primarily by means of three expansions and a new engagement in Europe's East

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUMMIT FOR NATO

When the NATO allies met at Riga, Latvia, in November 2006, they described their next meeting in Bucharest as "an expansion summit." Since then, equally consequential issues concerning the success of NATO operations in Afghanistan and how missile defenses will work in the overall security architecture of Europe have been added to the agenda. Success or failure on any of these questions will affect the strength and integrity of NATO for years to come.

Still, it was the question of NATO membership that first signaled that the Bucharest summit is likely to be an historic event in the NATO alliance and in the development of modern Europe more generally. If the Bucharest summit does invite Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO, if the alliance formally invites Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia to start on the path to NATO and European integration, and if NATO invites Georgia and Ukraine to enter the Membership Action Plan, thus beginning a serious and sustained relationship with Europe's East, what affect will NATO have had on modern Europe?

Mr. Chairman, in my view:

- NATO membership for Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia would be a major step toward the complete integration of Southeast Europe into Euro-Atlantic institutions and would provide the security foundations for an enduring peace in the Western Balkans.
- Invitations to Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia to begin a dialogue on NATO would formally parallel the policies of the European Union toward the countries of the Central Balkans. This would be an important signal that NATO and Europe's Security and Defense Policy are equal partners in future challenges.
- Invitations to Georgia and Ukraine to enter NATO's Membership Action Plan would signal a breakthrough engagement with Europe's East which would strengthen the democratic and economic development of both countries and may, ultimately, set the stage for closer relations with Russia.
- Finally, the decisions at the Bucharest summit, taken as a whole, would announce that there is a new balance in burden-sharing between the European Union and NATO. In each affirmative decision at Bucharest, NATO will be either anticipating an EU decision (for Croatia, NATO membership would precede EU membership) or following appropriately on the lead of EU policy (Ukraine's MAP would follow the EU's Neighborhood Policy by 2 years).

In conclusion, NATO's adaptability to the changing needs and various objectives of Visegrad, Vilnius, the Adriatic Charter, the Western Balkan, and now the post-Soviet democracies in Europe's East is nothing short of extraordinary. The NATO allies seem quite agile in changing their mission from ending insecurity in the north German plain, to completing Central and Eastern Europe, to stabilizing and helping to integrate the Western Balkans, to strengthening democratic institutions where it can, and in providing the relationships with Ukraine and Georgia that may bring them to a political decision on NATO membership and an EU perspective. NATO's Open Door policy has clearly played a critical role in the development of modern Europe after 1989 and stands as one of the most clearheaded decisions made by the alliance since the Marshall Plan. Looking back on the history of NATO's initial engagements and expansions, there is no positive decision which the allies have had cause to subsequently regret. Each NATO dialogue, membership action plan, and NATO invitation has made the trans-Atlantic alliance more effective and has served to unite and strengthen the political order of modern Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Townsend.

STATEMENT OF JAMES J. TOWNSEND, JR., DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. TOWNSEND. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. And it's a great honor and privilege for me to appear before Senator Biden and Senator Lugar to talk about these very important issues.

I've also submitted a written testimony for the record, and that I'd like to have submitted there. Thank you very much.

The candidacies of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO bring with them both the strings that come with new members, as well as the complex issues reflecting their history and their geography. Drawing on the core of what is known as the "Perry Principles," after what Secretary of Defense Bill Perry identified as the standards for new members, these principles—civilian control of the military, civil societies based on democracy, rule of law, a market economy, and good relations with neighbors—still provide important guidelines for candidates to know what the Alliance is looking for, in terms of an ally, and it can also guide our own decisionmaking.

All three countries have reform efforts underway for years, shaped by the NATO Membership Action Plan and by EU criteria, as well. Strong majorities favor membership. Defense spending levels are close to or over 2 percent of GDP.

On the military side, NATO planners I have spoken with affirm that all three nations have enthusiastically met and implemented most of the military reform suggestions made to them through the MAP, and are in better shape militarily than most of the newest members were when they first entered the Alliance.

But, metrics alone do not provide the justification for why we may want these nations in NATO. To do that, we must consider their membership in the context of why we bring in new members and what our experience has been since 1999.

Since the end of the cold war, the Article 10 standards for new allies took on a new interpretation based on Alliance security considerations of a new time. Security was defined in a more broadly political/strategic way as assuring transatlantic security through the creation of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Bringing former adversaries into NATO and the EU became an important part of creating this more stable and integrated Europe. This led to NATO's largest period of enlargement, when 10 former adversaries entered the Alliance, beginning in 1999.

Now Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia are following in the train of those first 10. We have to consider their candidacy in the same context we used to consider the latest 10 new members. Will their membership help create a Europe whole, free, and at peace? The answer to that question is that NATO membership for these three is just as logical, just as consistent with past decisions, and just as important for Alliance security as was membership for the 10 newest allies, if not more so, given Alliance security concerns in their region, especially with Kosovo's declaration of independence.

Membership in such institutions as the EU and NATO brings peer pressure on members to act responsibly. Nations, if left on their own, are freer to exploit regional problems to their advantage. The pressure by peers and by the institutions will make it very dif-

difficult for members to engage in acts that contribute to regional instability.

This newest round of enlargement would also build upon the reasoning behind Slovenia's NATO and EU membership as the first nation from the former Yugoslavia to join these institutions, which was partially based on the importance of enhancing regional stability.

NATO membership for Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia will bring to bear that role of NATO as agent for regional stability, as described above. Membership will give these three nations a focus on regional stability and on the responsibility for security that comes with NATO membership, which will make these three nations regional activists.

Like with Slovenia, admission of these three nations to NATO will send an important signal to other nations in the region that the door to membership is open to those nations that accept the values and the institutions shared by the allies.

However, I am also concerned about the amount of work that remains to be done and the usefulness of a carrot of NATO membership in helping governments make decisions about reform. Therefore, I would like to recommend to the committee that, at the NATO summit in Bucharest, invitations for membership be extended to Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, but it should be recognized explicitly that each nation still must meet, or make credible progress toward meeting, an achievable, but essential, capability, goal, or goals in civil or military areas. If nations do not meet these goals, or if NATO planners cannot certify that significant progress is being made toward meeting them, then accession to NATO membership is postponed until such time as progress can be certified. I have no doubt that this committee and the full Senate will want to be assured of that progress.

As far as Georgia and Ukraine MAP are concerned, arguments are similarly strong for offering participation in NATO's Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest summit. But, I also share my colleagues' views that it must be understood that being given MAP participation does not mean membership in NATO is assured.

And in the case of Georgia, the Georgian people and government have made clear they would like to join the Alliance, and Georgia has made great strides in military and civil reform efforts, illustrated by Georgian forces deployed in Iraq and in Afghanistan, and especially by improvements in the Georgian economy.

The issue of MAP for Georgia should be an easy one. MAP should be extended to Georgia at the Bucharest summit. If, however, the events during last November's crackdown on political opposition has weakened allied consensus to extend MAP at Bucharest, I would like to offer a suggestion made by former Ambassador to Ukraine, Steven Pifer, that NATO Ministers or Ambassadors decide the question of MAP after the spring parliamentary elections.

However, in the minds of some observers, the questions surrounding MAP for Georgia is whether the offer of MAP is worth it if were to provoke a harsh reaction by Russia to what it sees as a hostile NATO penetrating into an area that some Russians consider a part of its sphere of influence. At its root, the issue is not

MAP, but what MAP represents: The ability of a sovereign Georgia to decide for itself whether it wants to join a transatlantic institution that Russia sees, at least here, as encroaching upon its own interests in a way it regards as unacceptable.

Russia has legitimate interest in the security policies of its neighbors, but has no legitimate reason for concern if those neighbors wish to join NATO.

For Ukraine, participation in MAP is a logical next step, and MAP should be extended to Ukraine at the Bucharest summit. Unlike Georgia, however, support for NATO membership by the Government of Ukraine has been inconsistent, and support for membership by the Ukrainian people is weak, reflecting the internal divisions in that country over the nature of its relationship with Russia and its Western neighbors. However, after years of indecision, in January of this year Ukraine's President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of the Parliament signed a letter to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer asking to participate in the MAP process. Low support by the public for NATO membership has not kept MAP from being extended to other aspirants in a similar situation. Those nations have used the MAP, and that time in the MAP process, to help build support in their country for NATO membership. Despite this weak support for NATO membership—and membership is not the issue here—MAP should be extended so that reforms can become sharper and more focused, while the Ukrainians sort out their future relationship with NATO.

But, there is a similarity with the Georgia case for MAP, and that is Russia. Ukraine represents both an emotional and strategic center of gravity for Russians, and Ukrainian membership in NATO raises, for Russians, not just misplaced fears of NATO encroachment on its borders, but a shrinking of what Russian strategists see as their sphere of influence. But, Russian pressure should have no control over the decisions that a sovereign nation like Ukraine should make about what institutions it wants to affiliate with.

Good relations with Russia are important for Georgia and for Ukraine and for NATO. One of the great disappointments of the past 10 years is the deterioration in the relations between Russia and many nations and institutions in the transatlantic community, even as democracy itself has deteriorated in Russia. Since Russia joined PFP, the NATO/Russia relationship has been based on practical cooperation, with NATO/Russia joint operations in the Balkans and in Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean. A Russian flag officer is even posted at SHAPE, and NATO-Russia Council II meets regularly. But, recently there has not been much movement on joint NATO/Russian initiatives. Just as the history of cooperation should demonstrate that Russian perceptions of NATO as a threat are misplaced, and there is a foundation of cooperation that can be built upon to help dispel this perception, one of the many challenges of the period ahead will be to renew and strengthen the NATO/Russia relationship. This will take hard work on both sides. Russia and the nations of NATO will have to want to make the relationship work, which we all have an interest in, given our—given that our security is bound up with each other.

The new President of Russia would be pushing on an open door at NATO if he chooses to pursue mutual trust and a new strategic partnership.

Thank you very much for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Townsend follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES J. TOWNSEND, JR., DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, it is a great honor and privilege for me to be invited to testify before you and this committee on NATO enlargement and other security issues impacting the broader Euro-Atlantic relationship, recognizing the fact that one cannot talk about NATO enlargement in isolation from other security issues which will also shape NATO's future direction.

The Chairman of the Atlantic Council, GEN James Jones, has brought together from the U.S. and Europe a group of well-regarded experts and former senior level government officials well-versed in transatlantic security that he calls his "Strategic Advisors Group." This group frequently comes together to work through these issues and to offer policy recommendations to NATO and allied governments. Many of the ideas in my testimony grow out of the work of this group. That said, the opinions expressed here are my own.

NATO Enlargement: Should Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia be invited to join NATO?

When the alliance began to enlarge again at the end of the cold war, we all knew the day would come when enlargement would present us with candidates whose histories, geography, and struggles with building democracies and establishing relations with neighbors would bring more complex issues into the debate than we had to address in the first rounds. The candidacies of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO bring with them both the strengths that come with new members as well as the complex issues reflecting their history and geography.

Many of the questions and issues about their candidacy are familiar:

- Have these nations successfully used the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to structure their armed forces to be able to work with allied forces and be "producers of security, not just consumers" and is there civilian control of those armed forces?
- Are the civil societies of these candidate nations based on democracy, rule of law, and do they have a market economy and civil institutions which foster these values—and is there broad support in their societies for NATO membership?
- Will all NATO nations be prepared to commit to come to these countries' aid if they are attacked militarily?
- Do the candidates have and can they maintain good relations with their neighbors?

Drawing on the core of what is known as the "Perry principles," after what Secretary of Defense Bill Perry identified as the standards for new members, these principles still provide important guidelines for candidates to know what the alliance is looking for in an ally and for allies to consider as they decide on accession. They also remind allies what those values are that we share and that make the transatlantic community more than just a treaty construct, but a real community strong enough to stand the tests of time and tensions, which we have seen in abundance over the past few years.

As we consider whether to invite Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join us as allies, how well these nations are doing in meeting these principles can guide our decisionmaking. All three countries have had reform efforts underway for years in both their civil and military sectors, shaped by their participation in NATO's Membership Action Plan, their efforts to meet EU Stabilization and Association Agreements as well as EU membership criteria, and by their work with the U.S. and other allied nations.

An important indicator of the readiness of these nations to join NATO is whether their people support membership: Strong majorities in all three countries favor membership, majorities that should withstand any changing political winds. Levels of defense spending are another indicator, with levels close to or over 2 percent of GDP being consistently maintained, which hits the NATO 2-percent target and is above the level of defense spending for most allies.

On the military side, NATO planners I have spoken with affirm that all three nations have enthusiastically met and implemented most of the military reform sug-

gestions made to them through MAP and are in better shape militarily than most of the newest members were when they entered the alliance. Their armed forces have been downsized and professionalized, obsolete equipment and facilities removed, and brigades reorganized. Croatia has particularly made great strides in building a deployable and interoperable force. Its Strategic Defense Review has set a goal of developing “usable forces” with 40 percent of its forces deployable, and 4 percent deployed at any one time. It even hosted a NATO Response Force exercise last year. All three nations have forces abroad as part of U.N., NATO, or EU missions, including ISAF operations in Afghanistan and operations with coalition forces in Iraq (Albania and Macedonia).

While such metrics show progress and a clearly positive reform trajectory, there remains work to do by all three nations, especially on the civil side. But metrics alone do not provide the justification for why we may want these nations in NATO. To do that, we must consider their membership in the context of why we bring in new members and what our experience has been with enlargement since 1999.

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty says that the parties may invite any other European states in a position to further the *principles* of the treaty and to contribute to the *security* of the North Atlantic area (emphasis added). I find the treaty drafters did a good job of using just a few words to describe what we want a new ally to be able to do, while leaving enough latitude for future decisionmakers to take into account the security requirements of their day as they consider new members.

Under article 10, NATO has steadily increased its ranks with nations’ allies concluded would further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to the security of the alliance. Each decision was made on the merits of the candidate nation, both their current capability and their future potential. Most importantly, each decision was shaped by how the decisionmakers of the day interpreted the security needs of the alliance and how that candidate could contribute.

In 1949, as the alliance was going through its first effort to bring in members, the priority for an allies’ contribution to the security of the alliance was primarily a military one, given the military threat the West was under from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. But even during the cold war, an allies’ contribution to the security of NATO did not require that each ally provide military forces, given that one of the first allies, Iceland, did not even have a military force. But despite this fact, Iceland was welcomed into the alliance because it contributed to alliance security in ways other than by providing military forces (such as political solidarity with the West and strategic geography).

Since the end of the cold war, the article 10 standards for new allies to be in a position to further the principles of the treaty and to contribute to the security of the alliance took on a new interpretation based on alliance security considerations of a new time. No longer was the security of the North Atlantic area seen in the context of facing off against the military threat from the Soviet Union; instead, security was defined in less immediate military/strategic terms but in a more broadly political/strategic way as assuring stability through the effort to create a Europe “whole, free, and at peace.”

Bringing former adversaries into NATO (and the EU) became an important part of creating this Europe “whole, free, and at peace” and thereby ensuring North Atlantic security. NATO membership provided assurance of security and hence provided the psychological underpinnings for countries to get on with the business of democratization and developing liberal, Western economies.

The new allies were given NATO membership not because of their military prowess (though all were expected to modernize their military forces and did so in fits and starts), but because their membership helped repair the divisions of Europe left by the cold war. And NATO membership would help these nations develop the potential we knew they had for developing over time the Western military and civil institutions important to the alliance.

So the alliance grew over the past 10 years: First in 1999 came Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, followed in 2004 by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The alliance consensus was that all 10 candidates met the article 10 standard that they were in a position to further the principles of the treaty and would contribute to the security of the alliance. They also met the Perry principles. However, all of these new allies were given membership despite still having work to do to meet NATO military requirements and complete civil reform efforts at home.

Now, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia are following in the train of those first 10 new members and are being considered for membership after working closely with NATO for years through membership in the Partnership for Peace and participating in the Membership Action Plan. But unlike the 10 nations that preceded them just a few years ago, there is debate about their readiness for membership.

But we have to consider their candidacy in the same context we used to consider the latest 10 new members—will their membership contribute to alliance security by creating a Europe “whole, free, and at peace”? Like the 10 nations that preceded them as candidates, do Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia meet the article 10 requirements, as we interpret them today, that they be in a position to further the principles of the treaty and to contribute to the security of the alliance? Will today’s NATO allies be willing to honor their article 5 commitments if any of these countries were subject to aggression?

The answer to those questions is that NATO membership for these three is just as logical, just as consistent with past decisions, and just as important for alliance security as was membership for the 10 newest allies—if not more so, given alliance security concerns in their region, especially with Kosovo’s declaration of independence last month.

Bringing in new members to NATO as a way to address European regional security concerns has been an important role for NATO, dating back to the inclusion of Germany as a member in 1955 as part of an agreement to allow Germany to rearm. At the end of the cold war, as the West began to deal with simmering ethnic tensions, NATO’s role as an agent for regional stability became even more useful, especially in the Balkans.

This newest round of enlargement would also build upon the reasoning behind Slovenia’s NATO (and EU) membership as the first nation from the former Yugoslavia to join these institutions, which was partially based on the importance of enhancing regional stability by increasing Slovenia’s clout as a leader in organizing and promoting regional confidence-building initiatives. NATO and EU membership for Slovenia also sent a signal to nations in the region, many with ethnic problems and civil dysfunction like corruption, that reforming domestic laws and institutions to conform to European standards can lead to integration into European institutions.

Membership in such institutions as the EU and NATO brings peer pressure on members to act responsibly; nations if left on their own are freer to exploit regional problems to their advantage. The pressure by peers and by the institutions will make it very difficult for members to engage in acts that contribute to regional instability. The personal relationships that develop between leaders, and the peer pressure and institutional help that come from NATO membership, is one reason why Turkey and Greece have not engulfed the Eastern Mediterranean in war over the past 60 years.

NATO membership for Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia will bring to bear that historic role of NATO as agent for regional stability as described above. Membership will give these three nations a focus on regional stability, and the responsibility for security that comes with NATO membership will make these three nations regional activists for stability. All three have already demonstrated such efforts through their work in the Southeast European Defense Ministerial initiatives, participation in its regional peacekeeping force (SEEBRIG) and leadership hosting PFP exercises and programs. Finally, like with Slovenia, admission of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to NATO will send an important signal to other nations in the region, like Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro, that the door to membership is open to those nations that accept the values and institutions shared by the allies.

But most importantly, the peer pressure both from fellow allies and from NATO as an institution will ensure that as the Balkans continue to move beyond its painful and violent transition to a stable and democratic region, these three nations will themselves ratify their roles as part of the solution to regional issues, and not be part of the problem. These three nations have shown by their actions that they understand the responsibilities which come with NATO membership, and are already acting as agents of stability and security in the Balkans.

Europe truly cannot be said to be “whole, free, and at peace” without the Balkan nations being part of those institutions, NATO and the EU, that produce and guarantee that state. It is illogical to leave these three outside of an integrating Europe at a time when Balkan tensions can be lessened by adding the presence of three NATO allies in the region.

However, I am also concerned about the amount of work that remains to be done and the usefulness of the “carrot” of NATO membership in helping governments make difficult decisions about reform. My experience with NATO enlargement from its earliest days is that reform efforts can lose momentum after a nation enters the alliance, as political imperatives go elsewhere. Increases in military spending and painful civil reform decisions become harder to make when NATO membership no longer tops the Prime Minister’s priority list.

Therefore, I would like to recommend to the committee that at the NATO summit in Bucharest, invitations for membership be extended to Albania, Croatia, and Mac-

edonia. But it should be recognized explicitly that each nation still must meet or make credible progress toward meeting an achievable but essential capability goal or goals in civil or military areas. A summit deadline to accelerate civil reform efforts was used with good effect during the first round of enlargement, when allies felt aspirant progress in key areas was too slow. If nations do not meet these goals or if NATO planners cannot certify that significant progress is being made toward meeting them, then accession to NATO membership is postponed until such time as progress can be certified.

Timing is key. Invitations extended at Bucharest must then be ratified by each of the 26 NATO allies, some pro forma and some, like the approval of the U.S. Senate, both rigorous and systematic. While time is short for this ratification period, which ideally should be completed before NATO's 60th anniversary summit in 2009 where it is intended that new allies will be welcomed into the alliance, there should be enough time to begin an intensive effort to make significant progress in important civil areas. I have no doubt that this committee and the full Senate will want to be assured of that progress.

While I leave the specific capability goals to be determined by NATO planners and experts, the three nations could use the next year to intensify efforts to make civil reforms, such as fighting corruption or organized crime, or military reforms to improve the deployability, sustainability, or interoperability of their forces. The requirement to meet civil-military capability goals for NATO accession should provide ministries political clout in capitals to meet important goals before the NATO accession process is completed, rather than afterward, when NATO is no longer the priority.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia should be offered invitations to join the alliance at the Bucharest summit, invitations that will continue the construction of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. But let us use the time between invitation and accession to initiate an intensive effort to make further progress toward meeting important objectives in their civil-military reform efforts.

Should NATO offer to Ukraine and Georgia participation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP)?

Arguments are similarly strong for offering participation in NATO's Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest summit. While MAP, in and of itself, is not assurance of membership, it is a powerful tool when used by planners in MAP countries to accelerate reform efforts, many of which are shaped by the MAP

Georgia

Since the end of the cold war, NATO has developed a number of ways for nations to establish a relationship with the alliance short of membership. For example, membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) offers many nations a way to tailor their relationship with NATO so that it suits their nation's ambition and abilities and has always been a necessary way station to NATO membership for those who want it. The Membership Action Plan, by contrast, is a step beyond PFP and is offered as a further and deeper relationship with NATO for countries that want to become members. Work with NATO through MAP helps aspiring members make those additional civil and military reforms necessary to be considered a viable candidate for membership. But participation in MAP is no guarantee of membership in NATO, it merely offers a path in that direction . . . the decision is up to the allies. However, NATO should not offer—and has never in the past offered—MAP to an aspirant whom allies collectively do not think has the potential for eventual membership, or to a nation where the people do not want NATO membership.

Georgia has been in PFP since 1994 and took another step toward membership by beginning an Intensified Dialogue with NATO in 2006. The Georgian people and government have made clear they would like to join the alliance and Georgia has made great strides in military and civil reform efforts, illustrated by Georgian forces deployed in Iraq and in Afghanistan and especially by improvements in the Georgian economy. Participation in MAP will help Georgia continue to make progress in its march toward membership, especially in judicial reform, where NATO has stressed the need for a more independent Georgian judiciary. The frozen conflicts in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia complicate Georgia's relationship with NATO and make some allies squeamish about extending MAP. Progress must be made in finding a solution to these problems, and U.S. leadership in helping Georgia to find a way forward is critical. But as the process toward membership continues, Georgia should not be penalized if it works to resolve these problems and others do not.

Georgian aspirations were dealt a blow last November when, in response to opposition protests, a state of emergency was declared and there was violence in the streets. Efforts at political outreach by the Saakashvili government and upcoming parliamentary elections this spring may help restore faith that Georgian democracy is back on track.

The issue of MAP for Georgia should be an easy one: MAP should be extended to Georgia at the Bucharest summit. If, however, there is not consensus to do so, I would like to offer a suggestion made by former Ambassador to Ukraine, Steven Pifer, for NATO at ministerial or ambassadorial level to decide the question of MAP after the spring parliamentary elections, if allies need reassurance that democratic reform is working again in Georgia. At a minimum, the alliance could offer a program of intensive military reform assistance to Georgia similar to that between NATO planners and Ukraine to give Georgian reform efforts a boost until there is consensus at NATO to offer Georgia participation in MAP.

However, in the minds of some observers, the question surrounding MAP for Georgia is not just whether it (and NATO) are ready to move to a closer relationship. The question is whether the offer of MAP is worth it if it were to provoke a harsh reaction by Russia to what it sees as a hostile NATO penetrating into an area that some Russians still cannot accept as no longer a part of its sphere of influence. At its root, the issue is not MAP, but what MAP represents—the ability of a sovereign Georgia to decide for itself whether it wants to join a transatlantic institution that Russia sees, at least here, as encroaching upon its own interests in a way it regards as unacceptable. Russia has legitimate interests in the security policies of its neighbors, but has no legitimate reason for concern if those neighbors wish to join NATO. At the end of the day, the long-term NATO-Russia relationship cannot be built on the basis of a cordon sanitaire between Russia and its NATO neighbors.

The issue is not new. When the three Baltic Republics expressed a desire to join NATO, there was Russian concern about that as well. But the Baltic nations and NATO pressed ahead with developing a relationship based on the simple but important truth that the decisions of sovereign nations were theirs alone to make and not the province of third parties. Georgia as a sovereign nation has the right to seek NATO membership, and the alliance should make that decision based on its needs and its criteria.

Ukraine

NATO has a special relationship with Ukraine and even a special committee devoted to developing NATO-Ukraine initiatives—the NATO-Ukraine Commission. NATO has worked closely with Ukraine for years, and has established an office there, to develop and implement initiatives that help Ukraine with reform efforts, especially on the military side.

Participation in MAP is a logical next step for Ukraine, and MAP should be extended to Ukraine at the Bucharest summit. This will take Ukraine one step closer to NATO membership. Progress in economic reform in Ukraine since independence in 1991 is impressive, with a growing market economy, foreign investment, and consistently some of the highest growth rates in Europe.

Its military reforms, lacking adequate funding and not keeping pace with reforms on the more successful civil side, have created smaller, more deployable units that have deployed abroad, taking part in NATO operations in the Balkans and in coalition operations in Iraq. Ukraine is also one of the few European nations with strategic lift. All indicators show extending MAP to Ukraine at the Bucharest summit as a logical next step in the NATO-Ukraine relationship.

However, unlike Georgia, support for NATO membership by the Government of Ukraine has been inconsistent and support for membership by the Ukrainian people is weak, reflecting the internal divisions in that country over the nature of its relationship with Russia and its Western neighbors. While this lukewarm support for NATO membership should not be an obstacle to extending MAP to Ukraine, it makes allies doubt Ukraine's commitment and ultimate direction toward membership. However, after years of indecision, in January of this year Ukraine's President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of the Parliament signed a letter to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer asking to participate in the MAP process.

Low public support for NATO membership has not kept MAP from being extended to other aspirants in a similar situation, who have used the MAP to help build support in their country for NATO membership. But clearly, successful MAP participation will require on Ukraine's side not only a clear and unambiguous desire and commitment to undertake the work that comes with MAP participation, but also real confidence that that commitment is backed by a broad consensus of the Ukrainian people. The outreach effort in Ukraine will be hard, especially given the difficulty in solidifying support for NATO in the government. Despite this weak sup-

port for NATO membership—which is not the issue here—MAP should be extended so that reforms can become sharper and more focused, while the Ukrainians sort out their future relationship with NATO.

But there is a similarity with the Georgian case for MAP, and that is Russia. Ukraine represents both an emotional and strategic center of gravity for Russians, and Ukrainian membership in NATO raises for Russians not just misplaced fears of NATO encroachment on its borders, but a shrinking of what Russian strategists see as their “sphere of influence.” Like with Georgia, some Russians still have a hard time adjusting to a sovereign Ukraine. But, Russian pressure should have no control over the decisions that a sovereign nation like Ukraine should make about what institutions it wants to affiliate with. Russia should have no veto in Kyiv, Tbilisi, or in Brussels.

Russia

Good relations with Russia are important for Georgia and Ukraine and for NATO. One of the great disappointments of the past 10 years is the deterioration in the relations between Russia and many nations and institutions in the transatlantic community, even as democracy itself has deteriorated in Russia.

Since Russia joined PFP, the NATO-Russia relationship has been based on practical cooperation, with NATO-Russia joint operations in the Balkans and in Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) in the Mediterranean. A Russian flag officer is even posted at SHAPE. The NATO-Russia Council, too, meets regularly, but recently there has not been much movement on joint NATO-Russia initiatives. Just this history of cooperation should demonstrate that Russian perceptions of NATO as a threat are misplaced and that there is a foundation of cooperation that can be built upon to help dispel this perception. But the mistrust that has grown recently between Russia and the West has caused us to lose a historic opportunity to work together at NATO to ensure transatlantic security—security just as important to Russia as it is for the other nations of the transatlantic community.

One of the many challenges of the period ahead will be to renew and strengthen the NATO-Russia relationship. This will take hard work on both sides; Russia and the nations of NATO will have to want to make the relationship work, which we all have an interest in given that our security is bound up with each other. This will call for creative ideas and determined leadership within NATO and in Moscow to figure out how we can get the relationship moving forward again in a practical direction.

The new Russian President would be pushing on an open door at NATO if he chooses to pursue mutual trust and a new strategic partnership. He could begin to demonstrate such leadership by supporting joint NATO, U.S., and Russian work in missile defense for Europe.

Afghanistan

In my judgment, a vibrant NATO depends on enlargement to bring in new allies with energy, new ideas, and capabilities to keep NATO relevant and robust. The NATO of the future that new allies will join will be shaped by many things, chief among them the outcome of the international effort to help Afghanistan stand on its own feet as a sovereign nation and not become a failed or failing state. NATO plays a critical role in that effort by providing a safe and secure environment for the international community to assist the Afghans in rebuilding their country, as well as assisting the Afghan Government in security-related development, including mentoring Afghan security forces.

The Atlantic Council released an issue brief last month here in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee room that expressed great concern with the state of this recovery effort in Afghanistan by both the international community (including NATO) and the Kharzai government. This study was concerned about NATO efforts because allies were not providing the capabilities requested by military commanders and lacked a sense of commitment to see the job through.

Mr. Chairman, I will let our study speak for itself, but among the recommendations we made, I would like to highlight the need for a comprehensive strategy that coordinates the civil and military security and reconstruction effort by the international community in Afghanistan. We recommended that NATO host with the Afghan Government a conference that pulls together the parties in the international community (such as the World Bank, the EU, the major NGOs) who are the primary contributors to Afghan civil reconstruction. Together with NATO, the international institutions represented at the conference could develop such a strategy. Once completed, this comprehensive strategy could be given U.N. approval and used by the Afghan Government and U.N. Representative Kai Eide to better coordinate and implement international reconstruction efforts with the Kharzai government. At the

Bucharest summit, the alliance must address not only the shortfalls in its ISAF mission in Afghanistan, but its “Vision Statement” on Afghanistan should be strong enough to move the international community to better organize its reconstruction efforts as well.

Missile Defense in Europe

A future mission for the alliance that new members will face is missile defense. At one end of the missile defense spectrum, NATO is considering how best it should protect deployed NATO forces in theater from missile attack. At a more strategic level, the United States has embarked on a bilateral—actually trilateral—program to build a third ballistic missile defense site with elements in Poland and the Czech Republic to provide most of NATO. Europe with protection from ballistic missile threats, both today but especially from prospective threats in the future. NATO has begun internal discussions about expanding NATO’s own planning to include a capability to defend those parts of alliance territory—in southeast Europe and Turkey—that because of proximity to the potential Iranian threat will be outside the coverage of the Third Site.

The Atlantic Council hosted a conference on the U.S. “third site” effort last year, and it was clear that most nations, including the two hosts for the site, were anxious to have the U.S. and NATO efforts joined together. Having NATO involved in an appropriate way in the Third-Site effort helps both host nations build support domestically for participating in the U.S. project and helps build acceptance more broadly across Europe and makes clear that the U.S. initiative is genuinely directed at contributing to multilateral security and is not a manifestation of supposed American unilateralism. There may be other ways where the U.S. and NATO could cooperate on European missile defense. NATO and Russia have worked together on missile defense as well, and it would be a natural fit for NATO, Russia, and the United States to work jointly on missile defense and so ease the paranoia that has grown up around the U.S. program, especially in Moscow. Such a joint approach, should be raised at the Bucharest summit with Russian President Putin should he participate.

NATO and the New Threats

Another issue that will shape NATO is how it prepares for a future security environment that includes security threats that are not the traditional military ones, but can have their own destructive impact, such as cyber attack or the use of energy access as a weapon. Certainly, Estonia considered itself under attack last year when its cyber space was invaded and computer systems brought down.

These new types of nonmilitary threats to the Transatlantic community call for a new way of thinking for allies as we consider NATO’s role in dealing with a future security environment that includes such nontraditional threats as cyber attack and energy security. These issues are difficult at NATO because there is no agreement among allies that these threats should even involve NATO. If NATO did become involved, questions are raised about what NATO could do on a practical basis in response.

First, energy security needs to be recognized at NATO as a legitimate security issue for the alliance where it has a role to play; a role perhaps not even imagined today. Therefore, allies need to think through possible NATO roles in energy security and include them in NATO defense planning. Ensuring energy security can be an important NATO–EU mission as well, where both institutions have equities at stake in ensuring the security of their member’s access to energy supplies. Both institutions would bring to the table important tools to provide for that security. For example, the alliance could work with the EU and with nations to help protect vital energy infrastructure in Europe which much of Europe depends on for energy transport. Both could also develop together better maritime domain awareness, which would help NATO and the EU respond to any threats to sea movement of energy resources. Finally, NATO and the EU could help train the military forces or law enforcement in energy-producing nations where security of energy infrastructure is a problem.

Summary

In summary, Mr. Chairman, while I have touched on many issues today, they all involve NATO’s future. I believe bringing Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia into the alliance is important to NATO’s future, but even more important for stability and security in Europe, especially in the Balkans. These three cannot rest on their oars however; they have much work to do. Extending a membership invitation at Bucharest with accession in 2009 made contingent by NATO nations in the ratification process on their meeting or making progress on priority civil-military capability goals will help them accelerate their work. I also believe extending MAP to Ukraine

and Georgia is important for NATO's future; MAP will help these countries take forward their already impressive reform efforts so that, one day, when NATO membership for these two countries is before this committee, they will be ready.

The NATO that nations continue to want to join as members must remain as vibrant, relevant, and capable into the future as it was when the North Atlantic Treaty was drafted and signed in 1949. Those first transatlanticists who drafted the North Atlantic Treaty wrote a document that continues to speak directly to issues of security and peace almost 60 years later, when countries unimaginable in 1949 as allies either have joined or are on the cusp of joining the alliance. These new nations will meet the challenges laid out by the treaty drafters in article 10, and will be in a position to take forward the principles of the treaty and to ensure the security of the alliance. I hope Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia will be joined by other new members over time. But one thing is certain, members, new and old, will face new threats to that security, and the alliance needs to begin planning for those new challenges now.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you very much. This has been a very good panel.

Let me—because you've answered, succinctly, a number of the questions each of us have had, I'm going to focus on two things, if I may.

One is, let me ask a rhetorical question. If we don't grant MAP status to Ukraine and Georgia, what in the devil does that say? The Russians threaten to target Ukraine and we conclude not to offer the status? It seems to me it's almost an overwhelming reason why you almost have to offer the status. Anybody disagree with that notion?

Yeah, Ron.

Dr. ASMUS. You know, we—just want to add a dose of European reality to this conversation, since I live in Brussels. And I'm in favor of MAP for Ukraine and Georgia, but I would say the chance of it happening at NATO in Bucharest are about 10 percent today; and they were zero percent a couple of months ago. And they've only become 10 percent because of the Russians saying the things they have.

And, when I listen to European colleagues, the first thing is, many of them don't—start with the question, Are Georgia and Ukraine part of Europe? And even some, like Vaclav Havel—

The CHAIRMAN. You said they "do not start."

Dr. ASMUS. They do start with the fundamental question, which is not fully answered in NATO—

The CHAIRMAN. Gotcha.

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. About whether these countries are part of the Europe that they think should be in the Alliance. And even a hero of ours, Vaclav Havel—I was stunned—at NATO, gave a major speech, 2 weeks ago, saying that Georgia is not part of Europe and should never become a member of NATO. Just to show you how complicated this debate is. Not some soft French or British or German—Vaclav Havel, freedom fighter hero, saying, "I think Ukraine is in, but Georgia isn't."

Second, you know, we have this vision of the nineties that you all contribute to, and we all helped, Baltic to the Black Sea. Ukraine and Georgia is not like adding Estonia or Hungary. This is a major strategic move deep into Eurasia and across the Black Sea. It's not just a little bit more of the same, it is a fundamental strategic move to transform Eurasia, and, you know, a huge part of what I still think of as Europe. And I'm in favor of that. But, not all Europeans have crossed that strategic bridge and said, "Yes,

we're going to spend 10 years, again, trying to transform the next part of Eurasia." And when you—when I go to Berlin—of course, some people, it is the Russia factor, let's be honest, Senator—but there's a lot of people—when I go to talk to Chancellor Merkel's adviser—it's not Russia, it is the—the questions they have about Misha's democratic credentials, about the solidity of the Western orientation of Ukraine, and they say, "MAP, for us, means a country's in NATO over the next 3 or 4 years." Now, I disagree with that. I think we should redefine MAP to get away from this issue, and we're not willing to cross that bridge.

So, I think we make it too easy for ourselves if we really want to convince the Europeans to go down this road with us, which is what I want to do, to say, "It's all because of Russian this, that, and the other thing." They're fundamental strategic questions here that many of us have answered for ourselves, but which haven't been fully thrashed out in the Alliance, as a whole, which is why we don't have consensus. And if we're honest—and I—one or two of you asked the question to, you know, Dan Fried, our good friend—the United States is not playing a leader—this Government, this administration, at this moment, has not made up its mind on the question of whether MAP should be granted. I think, Senator, you were very gentle in the way you put the question. But, we know that, without strong and assertive American leadership, for months, you're not going to build this consensus and achieve this kind of strategic breakthrough that I think everyone on this panel, and probably the vast majority of your colleagues, want.

So, this is a big move. It's a hard move. If we had 6 months to go, I would have been much more optimistic. But, to think that we can turn this around in a couple of weeks, unless the President gets on the phone and really engages, personally, with key leaders, to move them, I think we're going to end up with very little for Georgia and Ukraine, and then people will be asking the question, Senator, that you asked, in spite of all this stuff; then, the Georgians and Ukrainians are going to be very, very nervous, and we will understand exactly why they feel vulnerable.

The CHAIRMAN. Phil. And then you, Bruce.

Dr. GORDON. Yes, I'll—just two very brief points.

Ron is absolutely right that the Europeans, at present, are quite hostile to this invitation. But, I would remind us all—and those of us who have watched NATO for a number of years have seen this so many times—an issue on which the Europeans were uncomfortable, skeptical, and opposed, and eventually, after United States leadership, came around. And that's true whether it was enlargement to the initial countries who got in, or to the Baltic States, or the NATO Response Force, or—earlier, I gave the example of Afghanistan, where, just a few years ago, it was just—not even a prospect to imagine NATO doing this mission; and, of course, NATO has now taken it over. So, I do think that it is possible, with United States leadership and a bit more help from the Russians, who are making the case for Ukraine. and NATO, that we could move this ball.

The second thing I would say, Senator Biden, in response to your specific question, "What happens if we don't?"—well, here's what

happens. Then NATO holds a 60th anniversary summit very early on in the new President's administration, and this comes up again, because, of course, the Georgians and the Ukrainians will ask for it again. And then we get to be in the position then of saying no again, which sort of says, well, every time the Russians rattle their sabers, we say no, or saying yes and being able to begin a new administration by having this crisis with Russia. Not an approach that I would recommend.

The CHAIRMAN. Well stated.

Bruce.

Mr. JACKSON. Sir, can I suggest that this—a rejection at Bucharest would be even worse than you have sketched out.

One, undoubtedly, President Putin will announce at Bucharest that, under his administration, he has succeeded in closing Europe's open door, and there is now a Russian space of influence. And, frankly, the world press will undoubtedly agree with him, because it appears to be true.

Second, the EU has said, "If we wait a little bit more, it'll be easier for us." Actually, the reverse is the case. What you cannot do at Bucharest—Chancellor Merkel is not going to want to do in Germany, in 12 months; it'll be harder there. And, frankly—if we delay—we're talking about an extended period of time.

Also, this will not be the first rejection for Ukraine, this will be the second, because we rejected the request of the Kuchma Government on the quality of the government, and on arms traffic issues at Istanbul. And we said that, "If you get a democratic government, conduct free and fair elections, and ask us again in a clear way, we will say yes." Well, they did. It would be devastating to our credibility if we said, "Under those circumstances, where you have"—

The CHAIRMAN. Bruce, do you disagree? Ron says that, no matter what we all say right now, unless somewhere there's a transformative moment at the White House and the President wakes up tomorrow morning and decides to make this a priority, that there is a 10-percent chance that such an invitation will be made. Do you—

Mr. JACKSON. I always get in awkward situations. But, I think if you're making the case that the administration was late to the game, and does not get fully engaged in the game, I think that's a fair criticism, that accounts for—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I'm not making a criticism, I'm just making an observation. I mean—

Mr. JACKSON. That's—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Short of the President deciding this is critical, this is important for Bucharest—

Mr. JACKSON. Short of that—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Short of him making that clear, is there any—

Mr. JACKSON. Both Paris and Berlin have said we won't be the only one opposing it, you know, if the others agree. They're still hiding behind that—if America really wants it, and the rest of the Europeans come, they will go along. They have said that. Now, the vote count today is somewhere—we're short of that position, but there's 3 weeks to go.

I should also point out that, you know, there is a security liability, basically defining a security perimeter. Today we do not have a dialogue with these countries. That's devastating. And also, a point that's persuasive to President Sarkozy. In the new United States administration, and in 2009, under the Lisbon Treaty, there are things we need to talk about, such as energy security and the Russian relationship. The two countries, we need to participate in that, are Georgia and Ukraine. We will not be able to begin the dialogues on energy security without having a relationship with these countries.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you—my time is up, but let me ask you one other question. Am I misreading this, or is it likely that we're not going to get an agreement negotiated between FYROM—Macedonia and Greece? Greece is going to veto, if that occurs. What about the other two? Is it all or none?

Mr. JACKSON. Well, sir, I—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. JACKSON. Right now, it doesn't look likely. They are going back again, I guess negotiations are beginning again, but they are far apart, and, frankly, I didn't—Senator Menendez isn't here—the Greeks have been hardening their position for the last 3 or 4 months, and they don't really want an agreement. And both governments, both in Skopje and in Athens, are too weak to cut the Gordian Knot, and both of them need this standoff as a political plus.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the other two? They're in? You mean—you know some are making the argument “all or none,” you know, the way to put pressure on the Greeks is to say, you know, “If you veto, you know, Macedonia”——

Mr. JACKSON. You get into—it seems to me, you're probably going to find it's one or three. You could probably get away with Croatia, if you wanted to do an entire round for—what is it? Three million people. But taking only Albanians after Kosovo, and then leaving out the only multiethnic Slav community in the south, basically, it could break the Ohrid Framework structure.

The CHAIRMAN. Anybody have a view on—I'd like all of your——

Dr. ASMUS. I——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Opinions on that, and——

Dr. ASMUS. Senator, I think——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Then I'll cease.

Dr. ASMUS. I think you said it in your opening remarks. You have to treat these countries as individual countries on their own merits while then thinking about the regional context. We had this discussion. There was one point, in the late nineties, where we seriously considered doing two out of three Baltic countries, because one was falling behind. It scared the bejesus out of the one that was falling behind, and it caught up again. Thank God it did. And it was the threat of leaving it behind that scared it. But, this—Macedonia is hostage to someone that's a little bit above its head and its paygrade to being resolved here. I think, in theory, we should be willing to do A2, but A2—I mean, leave my skepticism aside for a second—if the goal here is to stabilize the region, the most fragile country is Macedonia, of these three. So, if you leave the most fragile country outside and vulnerable, in terms of what

you're accomplishing strategically, you know, I—you know, I—because, you know, Macedonia is part of the Albanian/Kosovo, you know, set of issues. And if that's what—if that's what this round of enlargement is supposed to be about, strategically, then, I think, you know, you've got to bring Macedonia in as part of solving that—or your contributing to progress on that set of issues. And—

The CHAIRMAN. But, you can't bring Macedonia in if the Greeks say no and it seems pretty clear to me, in my meetings, that it's not likely, between now and Brussels, there's going to be an agreement.

Dr. ASMUS. I think—I have—and I don't mean this as a—you know, these are issues—if you want to get these issues right, this really requires some heavy lifting from our President. You know, this is a—these are Presidential—

The CHAIRMAN. Ron, I tried.

Dr. ASMUS. You know?

The CHAIRMAN. I tried. [Laughter.]

You know, I mean—

Dr. ASMUS. I mean—

The CHAIRMAN. You know—

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. You're prodding—

The CHAIRMAN. And we've both tried.

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. And if you make it absolutely—

The CHAIRMAN. You know, I mean—

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. Positively—

The CHAIRMAN. The hell. [Laughter.]

Dr. ASMUS. You know, I think this could be an issue—

The CHAIRMAN. I can't help you there.

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. Like Madrid, that goes—that is unresolved going into Bucharest, into the meeting of heads of state, and they have to resolve it at, you know, a closed meeting—

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. Just like we had to do that in Madrid.

The CHAIRMAN. I'm sorry, Mr. Townsend. I—you've—

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you, Senator. Not a problem.

I just wanted to say that, while the issue on the name and—between Greece and Macedonia is a hard one, I will put in a little bit of optimism, saying, I guess, kind of, what Ron was saying there, that I have certainly seen, in the past, very, very tough questions that seemingly look like they're not going to be resolved by two countries, that melt away as you get closer to a summit, particularly if one of those countries wants to become a NATO ally. So, I certainly expect there will be lots of skirmishing, lots of hand-wringing in the days to come, but it could very well be, in the day or so, or maybe even at the summit, as Ron suggested, the doors will close, and all of a sudden there'll be a new name that pops out for what we call "Macedonia."

And one more point, Senator, if I may, with Ron. Ron, I also lived in Brussels, and, in fact, worked at NATO, where I had to exercise that leadership to move allies that were very reluctant, in a lot of ways, to move in certain directions. And I think the example of the first round of enlargement is one of those, as we all

worked on that, and we had a lot of heavy lifting to do, in terms of leadership.

And I just want to go back, as far as Georgia and Ukraine and MAP is concerned. It is about U.S. leadership. I think we do have a strategic window of opportunity here to go to just the Membership Action Plan, and I think we ought to not lose sight of what we're talking about here. We always say that, when you into the MAP, obviously there is—membership is an ultimate goal, but, as far as MAP is concerned, by itself as a tool, it's a very strong one that nations can use to refine and to sharpen their ability to take on reform. And I think Ukraine and Georgia are there for that. And it's—again, it's a strategic question, here. And I think MAP is the right way to go. But, we'll never get there unless we have strong leadership. We can turn those—the same European nations that I dealt with, that you're dealing now with, Ron.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar, I'm sorry for going over.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just continue on the conversation that you've initiated here. Dr. Asmus and Dr. Gordon, and Bruce Jackson have been very helpful to both of us for many, many years as we have thought about the future of NATO and prepared for summits. I recall before the Riga summit, we had a number of dinner discussions with leaders like GEN Jim Jones and others who were working in Europe—our colleagues pointed out that while there wasn't a lackadaisical attitude of the Europeans, but there was not an overwhelming interest in Riga. People were going to show up and at least record their attendance, sort of like Senators going over to make sure they vote, but there was no passion for reform, reformation, and what have you. There was nothing really in the offing. And, therefore, we weren't going to take up membership questions at Riga. At Riga, I recall that the greatest news story was whether President Putin would come. President Chirac reportedly was going to invite him. And so, the whole area, for 48 hours, was clouded—will he come, or will he not? You know, the discussion going on around the table, about Afghanistan was lost, it seems to me, in translation. Ultimately, President Putin didn't come, and, therefore, life went on. But, that was the end of the summit.

Now we come around to another one, but this time the suggestion is a more serious one, and we're talking about membership invitations and the extension of MAPs. And so, that really calls, as we've all said today, for heavier lifting. I'm hopeful that this hearing may be helpful in ensuring that occurs. Our friend Secretary Fried has testified, that he's heard us many times. I know he is working very hard on behalf of the President. But, I think the President, the Secretary of State, and others, will really have to focus on this. It's a short period, but it appears to me that Europeans will once again show up with little initiative. I am just concerned that there will not be a sense of urgency at Bucharest with regard to membership. I think the future of NATO is countermanded by a feeling that, all things considered, Europe is not at war and they don't want to rile up the Russians. President Putin has been extremely aggressive, to say the least, and he has clearly threatened European governments with violence should certain actions be taken at Bucharest—almost any action, for that matter.

Russia, at this point, even though it has a relationship with NATO, really doesn't want to have a better one, under his regime at least. And that's too bad. We wish that that was not the case.

But, I would say that this has to be a decision on our part—that is, the United States—as to what we believe is in the transatlantic interest, including our own security. And if we are lackadaisical about the situation, and decide that we'll just show up and things will just fall into place, I am afraid it will be a disappointing experience. This is especially true given that this was supposed to be the year of membership action—the disappointment and ramifications of why certain things didn't happen are more severe.

I would just say, with regard to Ukraine, specifically—all of you have pointed out, correctly, that not only has Mr. Yanukovich and his supporters demanded a referendum, so has the President of the country and Prime Minister Tymoshenko. And you can still, I suppose, take polls in Ukraine that find a majority of people in that country are not in favor, although they may be more willing to consider it. At the same time, the MAP program is an opportunity for a dialogue with a very important country.

Some of you have testified, as we have, it would be well if Europe included Russia. This is not an impossibility. Therefore, Ukraine should not be out of the question.

Now, Georgia, everyone said, "Well, that really is provocative." People farther away from Georgia than, say, the Poles, would say, "You're really asking for it, there. We didn't want to come to a summit just to have an argument, and then, worse still, to see President Putin, the next day, issuing threats that generally censure our activities. This is just a mess."

I am afraid that is where we're headed, without leadership on the part of our country, defining what we believe is in our own security interests and those of Europe, and trying to be more persuasive to countries that may feel their stake in all of this is not that great.

I want to emphasize the energy picture. When I was in Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan we discussed about how Europe might gain a degree of security if some of the natural gas and oil moved along a southern course through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline or various other pipelines that are suggested going into Europe. The Russians responded rapidly. President Putin was on the phone with the President of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and concluded a very large agreement, which doesn't obviate other possibilities, but is a symbolic step. This represented personal diplomacy on Putin's part. Likewise, 3 weeks after I was in the region, Bulgaria and Serbia reached an agreement with Russia that included turning over 50-percent control of their pipelines to Gazprom.

While we're quibbling over NATO membership, the realities are that the energy situation is being solved to the detriment of Europe. These countries are choosing to conclude bilateral agreements with Russia. It has become a bilateral situation, an existential problem for individual countries. So, it's all well and good to have a NATO Alliance. The fact is, the whole thing might crumble, simply because the individual countries have these very, very

tough energy problems they have to solve if they're going to have economies at all, and Russia is the answer.

And, finally, Russia is the answer, because it's wealthy. It's wealthy because it has the natural gas and the oil. It is not because it developed a sophisticated economy, a rule of law, courts, all the rest of it. It found more gas and oil. And it will have a lot more, as a matter of fact.

So, those are the realities that need to be discussed at the summit. This really isn't even on the agenda. It's always said to be an EU issue, "We don't deal with economics in NATO." Well, why not? You know, if there was ever a security issue or that threatened the future of these countries, energy is it.

So, this is my own opportunity to give a statement, a point of view. But, I ask if any of you have any reaction to all of this.

The CHAIRMAN. By the way, before you do, I rest my case why he should be Secretary of State.

But, go ahead, answer the questions. [Laughter.]

Dr. ASMUS. Senator, I think—I suspect many of us agree with you. And, as I think Bruce pointed out, if you want an energy security policy, Ukraine and Georgia have got to be part of it. But, I—you know, I think—you know, we're at this, sort of, awkward moment in the Alliance, where, you know, this administration's coming to an end, some of the damage has been repaired, some of it hasn't. Europeans are also, let's be honest, calculating, "How much do you invest in this last summit," versus waiting for the next President? Do we save the big moves for the first summit with—I mean, there's a lot of political calculation going on. And, I mean, Phil and I were just in Moscow together, and I have—we had some meetings together, and I had one very interesting one, where Phil couldn't join me. The Foreign Ministry called me in late at night, and wanted to talk about Bucharest. And I was very curious to see what their agenda was, because it goes to a lot of these issues. Well, you know, they were—first, they were going to make their views on Kosovo well known to the Alliance. OK. I understood what that means.

And then they said, "Well, you know, no MAP for Ukraine and Georgia is a precondition for the President coming—the President's coming."

And I said, "Well, what does that mean?"

And they said, "Well, we don't expect any surprises, and we've been assured there won't be any surprises."

And I said, "Well, what does that mean?" You know?

And they said, "A3"—they said, "we don't care. We don't care about A3. But, Ukraine and Georgia are red lines. No visit if there's movement on there, but our assessment is, you will do nothing."

And he said, "When—and our big goal is to do a deal with Bush on missile defense." That's the Russian priority for Bucharest. And, you know, that's a different agenda.

And I look at that and say, "Well, how do I reconcile that with what I hear in Brussels and what I hear in Washington? And where are we going to be? And could we—could this be a very exciting, interesting, controversial—in other words, messy—summit?" Absolutely. What are we headed into? And do we really have this

thing under control so that we can take steps that we can build on, you know, with the next administration?—et cetera, et cetera. I—the pucker factor is going up to——

[Laughter.]

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. To use an old Midwestern expression.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Dr. GORDON. Can I just say to Senator Lugar, your—we've talked about this a number of times—your leadership on the energy issue has been formidable, and your arguments always compelling. I think you know the reaction to your statement as well or better than we do, which is, as compelling as the arguments are, the Europeans, as I think you pointed out, can't even agree among themselves—I mean, they say, "No; this is an EU matter. Don't get NATO into it." But, they won't even do it as the EU. Every single time Russia has offered a national gas deal to a European country, they have taken it. So, I think, you know, again, that—it would be terrific if we could add energy to the Bucharest summit and get people to do it. It's not going to happen at Bucharest. Maybe it'll wait until you're Secretary of State to show leadership on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I thank you very, very much. Your testimony is always helpful. I hope folks down the street were listening. And I hope we figure out what it is this Bucharest summit is about.

But, at any rate, thank you very much.

We're adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on the enlargement and effectiveness of NATO.

This is certainly a timely hearing. In 3 weeks, leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will meet at a summit in Bucharest, Romania, to address issues critical to American national security and the future of the Euro-Atlantic community. NATO leaders must seize this opportunity to strengthen transatlantic ties, augment alliance members' contributions to common missions and continue to build the integrated, stable, and prosperous Europe that is a vital interest of the United States.

A top priority for the summit must be to reinforce NATO's critical mission in Afghanistan. The contributions there of all the NATO allies alongside more than a dozen other countries bear testimony to how the alliance can contribute to the 21st century missions that are vital to the security of the United States and its allies. NATO's involvement provides capabilities, legitimacy, and coordination in Afghanistan that simply would not be available if NATO did not exist.

Success in Afghanistan is vital to the security of the United States, to all NATO members and to the people of Afghanistan. NATO's leaders must therefore send an unambiguous message that every country in NATO will do whatever needs to be done to destroy terrorist networks in Afghanistan, to prevent the Taliban from returning to power, and to bring greater security and well-being to the Afghan people. This will require adequate numbers of capable military forces and civilian personnel from NATO members, and putting more of an Afghan face on counterinsurgency operations by providing more training and resources to the Afghan National Army and police forces, and by embedding more Afghan forces in NATO missions. We must also win long-term public support through assistance programs that make a difference in the lives of the Afghan people, including investments in infrastructure and education; the development of alternative livelihoods for poppy farmers to undermine the Taliban and other drug traffickers; and increased efforts to combat corruption through safeguards on assistance and support for the rule of law.

Success in Afghanistan will also require the removal of restrictions that some allies have placed on their forces in Afghanistan, which hamper the flexibility of commanders on the ground. The mission in Afghanistan—legitimized by a United Nations mandate, supported by the Afghan people, and endorsed by all NATO members after the United States was attacked—is central to NATO’s future as a collective security organization. Afghanistan presents a test of whether NATO can carry out the crucial missions of the 21st century, and NATO must come together to meet that challenge. Now is the time for all NATO allies to recommit to this common purpose.

The summit must also address the question of the alliance’s expanding membership. NATO’s enlargement since the end of the cold war has helped the countries of Central and Eastern Europe become more stable and democratic. It has also added to NATO’s military capability by facilitating contributions from new members to critical missions such as Afghanistan.

NATO enlargement is not directed against Russia. Russia has an important role to play in European and global affairs and should see NATO as a partner, not as a threat. But we should oppose any efforts by the Russian Government to intimidate its neighbors or control their foreign policies. Russia cannot have a veto over which countries join the alliance. Since the end of the cold war, Republican and Democratic administrations have supported the independence and sovereignty of all the states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and we must continue to do so. President Putin’s recent threat to point missiles at Ukraine is simply not the way to promote the peaceful 21st century Europe we seek.

NATO stands as an example of how the United States can advance American national security—and the security of the world—through a strong alliance rooted in shared responsibility, and shared values. NATO remains a vital asset in America’s efforts to anchor democracy and stability in Europe, and to defend our interests and values all over the world. The Bucharest summit provides an opportunity to advance these goals and to reinforce a vital alliance. NATO’s leaders must seize that opportunity.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT, U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

Chairman Dodd, Ranking Member Lugar, I want to thank you for holding this hearing today and moving forward quickly with the protocols of membership for Albania and Croatia. I am excited by the prospects of these two nations joining NATO, but I must also express my disappointment that Macedonia was not invited at the Bucharest summit. It is unfortunate that the security of Europe must take a back seat to other issues—especially at a time like this.

Over the last several weeks we have seen a remarkable shift of events in Eastern Europe and a reemerging Russia that should make us all take pause. Clearly, the expansion of NATO is in the best interests of Europe and the United States, but more importantly it is a matter of security and safety for our friends and allies in Eastern Europe.

As we all know, no one is ever forced to join NATO, in fact if a nation wants to become a member, they must work diligently to live up the standards of NATO, make changes to their political and military structures, and meet other benchmarks.

For this reason, I reject the notion some have made that NATO enlargement is designed to threaten the security of other nations. Rather it is these nations that fear a weakening of their power and influence because they offer little in the way of prosperity and security. There may be a lot of tinsel and wrapping, but there is no substance they can offer. Their power is based on nothing more than threats and coercion. In this world of competing interests, the prosperity and security of the West are far more appealing than the old tired habits of propaganda, corruption, and oligarchs.

Hence, each country has the right to choose if they want to side with the U.S. and Western Europe or with Russia and the East, but if they choose the West we should not feel constrained by the tirades of former KGB officers. We cannot, and should not, abandon the desires of a sovereign nation to protect and defend their own freedom.

We have seen the security that NATO can provide. In 2004 we welcomed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the alliance. The same countries that once fell under the Soviet “sphere of influence,” are now conveniently excluded from the sphere of influence that Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev speak of today. We should not erect fences to others who wish to follow in their footsteps.

In fact, it is the newest members of NATO that have been some of the most powerful voices and, through their example, models to their older counterparts of what

it means to confront threats and challenge aggression. They do not place caveats on their forces like other NATO members, and they are willing to make the case to their citizens about NATO's missions and why it is important to fight. These newer members bring a fresh perspective that is healthy for the alliance.

And that brings us to the central point. Under U.S. leadership, NATO has been and remains the preeminent guarantor of security in Europe. We should not allow the alliance to be diluted or challenged by other organizations and policies that duplicate the structures of NATO, but remove the voice of the United States and other allies. This is especially true when rival organizations will call on the equipment and resources the United States provides.

I am especially concerned that these discussions are particularly distracting when there is a lack of consensus on the strategic threats that face Europe and NATO. Without a strategic focus, no organization can be successful for long. And despite the very real threat of terrorism in Europe, many NATO members feel the war on terror in Afghanistan is not worth their time or effort. While some in Europe ignore the terror threat, there are emerging threats to Europe's energy security. Russia is hoarding oil and gas and building a network of pipelines to encircle and individually manipulate each European country.

Countries like Albania and Croatia, know all too well the threats that can emerge quickly and need to be vigilant. Their voices in NATO will serve the interests of NATO and Europe well. They have provided leadership and demonstrated their commitment to the security and stability of Europe. It is time we welcome our close friends into NATO.

