

**THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
AND BUSINESS MEETING TO VOTE OUT THE  
NOMINATION OF ROBERT B. ZOELICK TO  
BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE**

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**HEARING**

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED NINETH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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FEBRUARY 16, 2005  
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**THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND BUSINESS MEETING TO VOTE OUT THE NOMINATION OF ROBERT B. ZOELICK TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE**

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**WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2005**

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Alexander, Martinez, Biden, Sarbanes, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

Today the Committee welcomes our Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. Although she appeared before us four weeks ago, this is the first time that she has testified before the Congress as Secretary of State, a very special occasion. We welcome her in this new capacity. We look forward to many such appearances in the future.

The Foreign Relations Committee, Congress, and the American people have followed your recent travels, Ms. Secretary, to Europe and to the Middle East, with very great interest. We are excited to learn more about the progress you have made in advancing relations with important friends and allies. The United States needs partners in the world who will work with us toward mutual goals.

The international debate on Iraq exposed the division within the Atlantic Alliance over the best methods to combat terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. This has strained some of our traditional partnerships, but it has not broken them. We applaud your efforts to improve the dialog with friends and allies who have shared our values for generations.

During the last several years, American foreign policy has achieved an extensive list of accomplishments, many of which require resources and attention to nurture. The people of Iraq have held successful elections under difficult circumstances. Schools are operating, police and army units are being trained, free media is

being established, and women are participating in societies in ways they have not done before. Violence continues as the opponents of freedom and stability seek to reverse the course of democracy. But elections have provided a basis for moving forward with self-government in Iraq.

We also are encouraged by openings in peace negotiations between Israel and its Palestinian neighbors. We applaud the role that you have played in moving these talks forward, and we are interested in your report on this subject.

In his recent Inaugural and State of the Union addresses, President Bush placed the advancement of freedom and democracy at the core of U.S. foreign policy. American encouragement and assistance has contributed to important democratic successes in Ukraine and Georgia. In the Middle East, our efforts and the democratic advances in Iraq and Afghanistan are helping to spark a debate over modernization and democracy. It is vital that the United States back up our rhetoric with resources and action. Democracy-building is hard work, but the President is right that such efforts are the means through which our own security and prosperity will be achieved.

The United States also has had successes in the area of non-proliferation. In Russia, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and its associated programs continue to safeguard and destroy the arsenal of weapons of mass destruction built by the former Soviet Union. Through the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, we have secured \$10 billion in commitments for this endeavor from our allies. Congress passed legislation that allows the Nunn-Lugar program to be used outside the states of the former Soviet Union. With President Bush's strong encouragement, chemical weapons destruction at Shchuchye in Russia has been accelerated. We must ensure that the funding and momentum of the Nunn-Lugar Program and other nonproliferation efforts are not encumbered by bureaucratic obstacles or undercut by political disagreements.

The Bush administration also has recruited more than 60 countries to join the Proliferation Security Initiative, a program that has enhanced our ability to interdict illegal weapons-of-mass-destruction shipments around the world.

Through the Energy Department, the administration established the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which aims to secure high-risk nuclear and radiological materials globally. In addition, it secured the passage of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 in April 2004, which, for the first time declared that weapons-of-mass-destruction proliferation is illegal.

Libya's decision to open its weapons-of-mass-destruction program to international inspection is a continuing success for United States foreign policy, resulting from close coordination with allies, firm diplomacy, and the demonstration of our resolve in Iraq and Afghanistan.

State Department diplomacy has provided constant encouragement to the promising talks between nuclear weapons states, India and Pakistan, that represent the best chance in years to reduce tensions on that subcontinent.

The President put forward bold plans to fight the global spread of AIDS and to establish the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which will encourage political and economic progress in developing nations that embrace positive reforms. Congress worked closely with the White House and the State Department on these initiatives and passed legislation that would implement them.

We've also extended the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which will expand our economic cooperation with that continent.

These and other efforts, including our response to the tsunami disaster, demonstrate that the United States intends to provide leadership in fighting the poverty and disorder that so often are at the root of conflict.

This partial list of foreign policy successes and priorities shows how expansive the global challenges are for our country. These challenges cannot be met merely through insightful decision-making. Effective diplomacy requires that our policymakers and diplomats have at their disposal an array of smoothly functioning foreign policy tools, including foreign assistance, public diplomacy, secure embassies, and post-conflict reconstruction capabilities.

I have spoken often of the diminishment of U.S. foreign policy capabilities and resources that took place during the 1990s. The foreign affairs budget has been underfunded since the end of the cold war. The American public generally understands that the United States reduced military spending in the 1990s, following the fall of the Soviet Union. Yet few are aware that this peace dividend spending-reduction theme was applied even more unsparingly to our foreign affairs programs.

In constant dollars, the foreign affairs budget was cut in 6 consecutive years, from 1992 to 1997. This slide occurred even as the United States sustained the heavy added costs of establishing new missions in the 15 emergent states of the former Soviet Union. In constant dollars, the cumulative effect was a 26-percent decrease in our foreign affairs programs. As a percentage of GDP, the 6-year slide represented a 38-percent cut in foreign affairs programs.

By the beginning of the new millennium, these cuts had taken their toll. The General Accounting Office reported that staffing shortfalls, lack of adequate language skills, and security vulnerabilities plagued many of our diplomatic posts. In 2001, the share of the U.S. budget devoted to the international affairs account stood at a paltry 1.18 percent, barely above its post-World War II low, and only about half of its share in the mid 1980s.

Under President Bush and Secretary Powell, funding for the Foreign Affairs account has increased substantially. The President has requested increases in each of the last four budgets. In this year's budget, the President has requested a 13-percent increase for the Foreign Affairs account, the largest percent increase of any account in the budget. This is a tangible demonstration of the President's commitment to diplomatic strength, and Congress must now do its part by providing the resources the President needs to carry out an effective foreign policy.

Secretary Rice, we are eager to hear your views on the health of our alliances, the Bush administration's plans for making further progress in Iraq and Afghanistan, the status of negotiations pertaining to Iran, North Korea, and the Arab-Israeli peace process,

and your assessment of the State Department's budget. We thank you for joining us today. We look forward to your discussion.

And I call now upon the distinguished ranking member for his welcoming remarks, Senator Biden.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE**

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Madam Secretary, welcome. Great job. You made us proud. You did a wonderful job of your maiden voyage. I really mean it. You said this was going to be the term of diplomacy, and you did it with grace and strength, and I applaud you for it.

And while you were away—you may not have noticed—there were an awful lot of pictures of you and me hugging after I said, "Don't listen to Rumsfeld." [Laughter.]

And several reporters called me and said—mainstream international reporters said, "If she doesn't listen to Rumsfeld, what in the heck would make you think she'd listen to you?" I said, "I had no thoughts that that would happen." But I'm sure that you've, for the record, discounted my recommendation, as you probably should.

But I really mean it, it was a first-rate performance, and I was really pleased. Quite frankly, I was excited about it. I was excited about the opportunity that I think you've opened up for the President's trip. I think you have presented him with a glide path that is going to be a very different environment, because of you having been there, than might have existed, fairly or unfairly. I think you've set this up perfectly. And now I hope our European friends, as I said in Davos, in my private meetings with heads of state, including France, should get over it. I know they're characterized as the bluest state. But the truth of the matter is, they need us. And, in my view, I think we need them.

Your trip provided, I think, a fresh start and a chance to repair some of the damage done to our transatlantic relationship after the diplomatic battles over Iraq and other issues. And I think you made important progress.

But diplomacy requires not only listening—it ultimately involves mutual agreement. It remains an open question—open to me, only; I speak for myself, I must tell you—it remains an open question just how prepared the President is to reach out and swallow hard, sometimes, to reach some mutually beneficial agreements. And I must tell you, I have my concerns about how magnanimous our European friends are prepared to be. But this is a time for magnanimity, not of our mutual self interest.

We agree, for example, to invite Europe to play a meaningful role in helping chart Iraq's course. And I think the public has come to conclude, as I have believed, and maybe you and others, that Iraq is not a prize. It's a country trying to recover from decades of despotic rule. And Europe has as much at stake in the stability of Iraq as we do, and, I would argue, in some cases, more at stake than we do.

And I was very disappointed the last year and a half, quite frankly. I think some of the European countries—and they're going to get angry with my saying this, but I've said it to them personally—basically sat on their hands because they didn't want to do



anything they thought would promote the reelection of George Bush. I may be wrong about that. But whether I'm right or wrong, it's over. It is over. And that's why I think they may be inclined, with your leadership and the President's forcefulness—they may be prepared to play a much larger role.

That's why I proposed—and I'm not married to the concept, and sometimes I think if I propose it, if I suggest it, it's maybe the death knell; I sometimes hesitate to agree with my colleagues, because I think I hurt them—but I think this is an opportune time to set up a contact group on Iraq. I think this is an opportune time to include the major European powers. I think it's an opportune time to go to the Secretary General of NATO, the Presidency of the EU, our Ambassador in Iraq, to form a group that literally meets on a monthly basis, to coordinate the international community's policy toward and assistance for Iraq.

I think it's time to make Iraq the world's problem. And in my discussions—and you have had much more depth in your discussions with the Europeans than I have had, in the last month, on your recent trip, but I think they're ready. I think they're ready if you can use your fertile imagination to come up with a construct that allows them to sit at the table without us, in fact, giving up anything, other than the right for them to share their obligation and pain of what's going to have to happen between now and, at least, next December or January, when the elections are final, the constitution is written.

And sometime—you don't have a lot of time now, but sometime, I'd like to maybe come to your office and lay out, in a little more detail, the notion—again, I'm sure there are other people who have better ideas, but some way to get them at the table on a regularized basis. Now, I haven't had any formal discussions with any newly elected Iraqis, although some I've met have been elected—I think it gives them a foil, as well. It gives them an opportunity to look to those who want them to be more xenophobic in their approach, whether they're Shia or Kurds, to say, "Look, the international community's here. We're sitting here, and we're available, and the way to get the most help is"—but that's just me. I'd be interested to have an opportunity to talk with you a few minutes.

And the thing that concerns me the most is our policy on Iran as it relates to United States/European unity. I'd like, again, in that same meeting, to give you the opportunity to go into some detail of what I was told, and some of my other colleagues were told, by Chirac about where he was and what he was prepared to do, and so on and so forth. And I'd like to just give you the benefit of that, to see if what I'm hearing is actually accurate.

For example, we had the Foreign Minister, yesterday, from Egypt. We hosted him. And I asked a question that I had spent a lot of time with Mubarak, in January, talking about, and that is their offer of considerably more help to train. Considerably more. You know how President Mubarak is; he said, "We need more. More. We'll help you more," and so on. So I asked. I asked the Foreign Minister. Because some of my colleagues—not my colleagues here—were kind of new to that idea, and he said, "Yeah. We're ready to help more." And so, we asked the Ambassador to check it out. I mean, because he didn't know the answer to that.

So, I guess what I'm trying to say is that sometimes, what I get over the transom and what I get in my visits is totally consistent with what the real offers are. And Iran is a place that is of considerable concern to me. I, quite frankly—and I'm not going to ask you now—I don't understand our policy. I'm not being facetious. And I don't understand how it intersects with the European efforts.

To me, it seems like we're sitting on the sidelines a bit, both in regard to Iran and North Korea, Madam Secretary. I think the Europeans and the Asians, they have to—our allies, our friends, our interlocutors—they have to be prepared to put more sticks in the bag. But we have to prepare to put more carrots in the bag, as well.

And I may be wrong, but I've not heard anybody come up with a better idea, so far, as to how to proceed here, because one of the things that I don't believe, as some have written, as your number two—and he is a first-rate guy—we're going to vote for him. I think he'll pass, you know, overwhelmingly. But he had written an article, back in 2000, saying time was on our side in Korea. I would strongly argue that time is not on our side in Korea. And I'm not at all sure negotiations, no matter how well conceived, no matter how many sticks or how many carrots are in the bag, will change that fellow in the North. I just don't know. I am not willing to bet my daughter's graduate-school tuition on it. And so, I don't fully understand our approach.

And the question I have is: Are we going to also take some new approaches on contentious issues, that I think we're right on in substance, but we're wrong on in our style? Kyoto. We were right about needing to do more in Kyoto. I think we were dead wrong walking away, just simply walking away. Like it or not, many of our friends have committed to Kyoto, and we can't just shrug our shoulders and endlessly debate the science. I think, instead, we should engage our allies in constructive dialog about a way forward, and I would argue we should do that on the International Criminal Court, and we should do that on a number of things. We should not sign on the way it is, but I think we should not sign off and walk away.

Can we engage in our allies in advancing the bold agenda of human freedoms set forth in the President's Inaugural Address? And how is that going to coexist with our policies in the global struggle against terrorism? Will our close allies in the war on terrorism, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt—I'm finding in my visits there a little resistance, already, to, "What do you guys mean by 'advancing freedom'? What do you mean by it?" And I say, "I'll tell you what I mean by it. I mean, you've got to change." But there is this real feeling of, "What's the deal here? What are we talking about?" And I say that because I got to meet with a lot of the foreign ministers and heads of state of those countries in Davos, and they seek, as they call them, those bilateral meetings, to ask "What's going on?" And I tell them, "You've got the wrong guy. You should talk to Hagel. He's a Republican. He'd know better than me."

But, all kidding aside, will they respond to this reform agenda by reducing cooperation with us with regard to terror and al-Qaeda? I don't think so, but it's a big issue.

And a liberal democracy, as you know, Madam Secretary, is more than just an election. It must rest on a foundation of a strong civil society, educational opportunity, political pluralism, independent media, a private sector where people invest, and the rule of law. And that takes time. And our aid programs in places like Egypt and Pakistan, I think, have lagged in supporting these sectors.

I think we should be more direct with our dollars in developing the strong nongovernmental institutions in those countries to build democratic foundations that we need. And I think we should seek help in this venture. For example—you may remember, because, you poor woman, you had to spend so much time with me when Henry Hyde said, “Joe will meet you.” Remember that meeting? And so, we got a chance to meet a lot.

And you may remember—and I’m going to try to revive it with my colleagues, and I think you may be sympathetic to the idea—that when I came back from Afghanistan, right after the Taliban fell, I had an opportunity to meet with you, and I was told, at the time, you could build a school in Afghanistan for \$20,000, and have a teacher run it for a year. That’s the total cost. And I suggested maybe our goal should be to build a thousand schools in Afghanistan. Because you have educated me—as well as informed me in policy, you were the first one to talk to me about the madrassas and how the Saudi—whether it was the Saudi Government or not, the Saudis were building—I believe the number in Pakistan and Afghanistan was close to 7,000. I may be mistaken about that, but I think that’s right.

And I think we have to do two things. We have to hold the Saudis in this—I’m sorry to go on so long, Mr. Chairman, I’ll finish in a moment—as we look at the aid package this year, I think we should be insisting that the Saudis, for example—and they are making progress, they are working at it—they should have a law applied in their country, like ours.

There’s a place called Fishtown in Philadelphia. It’s the Irish section. I remember, in the early ’80s, speaking at a bar in Fishtown, campaigning for a mayor. And because my mother’s name is Finnegan and I’m an identifiable Irish politician, I got all this stuff about, “Why aren’t we helping in the north more?” It turns out, after I came back from that, the FBI calls later and says, “They’re about to crack down in that area, because there’s a significant amount of money going to the IRA to purchase weapons.” Now, it’s against the law for us to do that.

The Saudis should make it against the law to help any outfit if it turns out that the mosque that they build is one that venom is being preached from about taking down the United States. If we can produce, for example, books coming out of the madrassa and present it to the Saudis, that it’s about “Kill Americans,” then they should act. They should be held to the same kind of standards that we hold people here to, because our lives are at stake. They don’t quite get that yet. They’re doing a lot. They’re doing a lot. But there’s still a lot of charities out there that are not held to a followup standard as to what’s happening once the madrassa is built.

I also think we should insist that that aid not go from us without going through the host government. When I was in Kirkuk, with my friend here, we rode by and saw these magnificent, shiny, new

mosques. I mean, they were magnificent. And everything else was desolation. And we turned to our host, who is now the Foreign Minister, and turned and said, "What's this?" And he just nodded his head, and he went, "Saudis. Saudis." No permission sought.

And we've got to compete. These madrassas are a little bit like the way people used to send kids to monasteries in the 14th century. You get three square meals, you get some kind of education, you're out of the house, and you're indoctrinated.

Now, let me turn quickly to the budget. I think you did well on securing increases when many other agencies in government took reductions, but I think the budget is a disappointment in a few places. Specifically, it breaks the commitment the President made to the world, and omits billions of dollars in costs from the discipline of the budget process by putting them into this supplemental. And 3 years ago, in Monterrey, Mexico, the President pledged to the world that we would increase our core development assistance over 3 years, resulting in \$5 billion in new funds by fiscal 2006.

The President's budget seeks just \$3 billion for the Millennium Challenge Account, and falls far short of the promised \$5 billion. Now, I know the Congress has not pursued it. The Congress has not gone forward. But I don't think it's any excuse for the President not to push it, because if he pushes it, we've got a shot up here.

I also would suggest that the budget doesn't include things that should be in the budget. This is not your fault, quote, "responsibility" or whatever. But the idea that we're putting the Baghdad Embassy in the supplemental emergency, what's the game here? That's a direct budget item. We knew we were going to have to build that. That should not be in a supplemental. That should be in the budget, the 2006 budget.

It doesn't include funds for, for example, foreign military financing for Afghanistan, where we've been working to help them build a new state over 3 years.

It doesn't include costs of a new \$400 million "Solidarity Initiative" announced by the President last week to, quote, "strengthen the capabilities of our partners to advance democracy and stability around the world."

To my mind, this is kind of an old idea wrapped in a new package, using foreign aid funds to reward and support our allies. But maybe there's no other choice now. I mean, \$100 million to the Poles. The Poles can't afford to be there. But the idea, up to now, we're trying to convince the American people that we have these allies of the willing that are there. We should tell them: they're willing as long as we help defray the costs. I'm happy they're there. And I support the payment. But we mislead when we include that stuff in supplementals when we know those costs are going to be necessary.

I'd probably support many of these requests, just on their merits. But I wonder why these costs, many of which are clearly foreseeable, get punched into a supplemental and are not directly in the budget.

To govern is to choose, Madam Secretary, which you know as well as I do, and the President refuses to make some of these hard

choices between advancing his global agenda and his fealty to a tax-cutting agenda that has converted trillions of dollars of the surplus into massive deficits, along with other things, including 9/11 costs.

But I would ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that the remainder of my statement be placed in the record. Madam Secretary, I think you're off to a great start. You're one of those folks who I think can do the hundred in ten flat. And now we've finally given you a lane here. I just hope they follow it.

At any rate, I thank you for being here and thank you for listening.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden. Your statement will be published in the record in full.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM  
DELAWARE

Madam Secretary, welcome back to the Committee, and welcome back from your trip to Europe and the Middle East. You did a tremendous job. And you opened a real opportunity for the President to have a successful trip later this month.

Your trip provided a fresh start—a chance to repair the damage done to the transatlantic relationship after the diplomatic battles over Iraq and other issues. As I've said before, our European friends need to get over their problems with this administration. They need us. And, I believe, we need them. I think you made important progress, and I congratulate you. But diplomacy requires not only listening—it ultimately involves mutual agreement. And it remains an open question just how prepared the President is to reach out and reach some mutually beneficial agreements with our friends.

Will we agree, for example, to invite Europe to play a meaningful role in helping Iraq chart its democratic path?

Iraq is not a prize; it is a country trying to recover from decades of despotic rule. Europe has as much at stake in its stability as we do, and arguably more.

That's why I've proposed a Contact Group—to include the major European powers—to coordinate the international community's policy toward and assistance for Iraq. It's time to make Iraq the world's problem, not just our own. In my discussions, I think Europe is ready to help.

What is our policy on Iran and can we agree with Europe on a common strategy? Our European friends seek our help in their negotiating effort, but we remain largely spectators. If the use of force is not on the agenda at this time, then what is?

In other words, if the time for diplomacy is now, what is our plan to undertake it with respect to Iran?

Similarly, what will the Administration do during this term with regard to North Korea's nuclear program? In the past four years, North Korea has increased its nuclear weapons capacity by as much as 400 percent. This is a country that will sell anything to anyone for the right price. Time is not on our side.

In both North Korea and Iran, the best path forward would be for our Asian and European partners to show more sticks—that is, to make clear to North Korea and Iran the kind of sanctions and isolation they risk if they don't do the right thing.

But we, in turn, have to show more carrots—that is, to make clear to North Korea and Iran what they might gain if they do the right thing.

No one knows whether a coordinated carrots and sticks approach with our partners will succeed in either case. But no one has put forward a better alternative to make us more secure. And treading water for another four years is not an option.

Will we take a new approach on the contentious issue of climate change? The Kyoto Protocol takes effect today. Like it or not, many of our friends have committed to it; we cannot just shrug our shoulders and endlessly debate the science.

We should instead engage our allies in a constructive dialogue about the way forward on a challenge we all confront. That applies to Kyoto and to other issues like the International Criminal Court. We should not sign on the way things stand—but we cannot just sign off and walk away.

Can we engage our allies in advancing the bold agenda of human freedom set forth in the President's inaugural address, and how will it co-exist with our policies in the global struggle against terrorism?

Will close allies in the war on terrorism—such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt—resist democratic reform, or will they respond to our reform agenda by reducing cooperation against al-Qaeda and its allies?

Liberal democracy is more than just elections. It must rest on the foundation of a strong civil society, educational opportunity, political pluralism, independent media, a thriving private sector and the rule of law. Our aid programs in places like Egypt and Pakistan have lagged in supporting these sectors. We should direct more of our aid dollars to developing strong non-governmental institutions to help build the democratic foundation, and we should seek allied help in this venture.

In addition, we have to be more aggressive in ending the export of radical ideologies. We have to be proactive, for example, in combating the madrassas which poison children's minds but also put food in their stomachs and clothes on their backs. When I went to Afghanistan just after the Taliban fell in 2002, I was told that for just \$20,000, we could build a schoolhouse and staff it with a teacher for a year. I discussed the idea with then National Security Advisor Rice. I'd like to see us act on this idea to help countries like Afghanistan compete with the madrassas.

Let me turn now to the budget. You did well to secure increases when many other agencies in the government took reductions.

But the budget is also a disappointment for what it does not include. Specifically, it breaks a commitment the President made to the world, and it omits billions of dollars in costs from the discipline of the budget process by putting them into the supplemental.

Three years ago, in Monterrey, Mexico, the President pledged to the world that the United States would increase our core development assistance over three years, resulting in \$5 billion in new funds by Fiscal 2006.

The President's budget seeks just \$3 billion for the Millennium Challenge Account next year, far short of the promised \$5 billion. True, Congress has not provided the full amounts requested by the President, but that is hardly an excuse for abandoning his own commitment. His leadership is critical.

The budget is notable for other things it does not include:

It does not include the costs to build a new Embassy in Baghdad, even though we have known for two years that we will need to do so.

It does not include funds for continued Foreign Military Financing for Afghanistan, where we have been working to help them build a new state for over three years.

It does not include costs for the new \$400 million "Solidarity Initiative" announced by the President last week, which, we are told, will "strengthen the capabilities of our partners to advance democracy and stability around the world." To my mind, this is an old idea wrapped up in a new package: using foreign aid funds to reward and support allies.

Where can we find all these items? In the "emergency" supplemental transmitted by the President on Monday. I would probably support many or all of these requests on their merits. But I wonder why these costs—many of which are readily foreseeable—are included in the supplemental.

To govern is to choose. Yet the President refuses to make some of these hard choices—between advancing his ambitious global agenda and his fealty to a tax cutting agenda for the most fortunate among us that has contributed, along with other problems like 9/11, to converting trillions of dollars in surplus into massive deficits.

Advancing American security through a strong military and active international diplomacy is a primary function of government, and the duty of a great power. I have not hesitated to support necessary funding for international programs.

But it is simply wrong to impose the costs of protecting ourselves today onto the backs of tomorrow's generations—and that is exactly what the President's supplemental does by adding recklessly to the deficit.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just mention, before I call on Secretary Rice, that in the event that 10 members of the committee, a quorum, should appear, we will move to a discussion, if necessary, and a vote on Robert Zoellick to be Under Secretary of State, so that that nomination can be considered on the floor. Our leader, Dr. Frist, has indicated that he would be receptive to that occurring. I've mentioned this to Dr. Rice prior to the meeting so that she would not see this as an intrusion, and she welcomes such an intrusion, if such would occur.

If that is not possible, I have asked the indulgence of the ranking member that the nomination might be discharged from the committee so that it does get to the floor, so that we do have a number two person at the Department prior to our recess, because life goes on in our diplomacy and in the Department. But, in any event, we will hope for the quorum of the Senators.

Dr. Rice, thank you, again, for coming, and please proceed with your testimony.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF  
STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Senator Biden, for those comments. And I look forward, obviously, to continuing to consult and to work with this committee, and to discussions of ideas that you may have.

This is clearly a time of challenge, but it is also a time of hope and opportunity. And the committee has been a stalwart supporter of the Department and of our diplomacy, and I look forward to continuing to work, from a strong bipartisan consensus, to ensure that the men and women of American diplomacy have the resources they need to conduct their vital mission.

Mr. Chairman, I'm going to make some remarks from my testimony and then enter the entire testimony into the record, if that's all right.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be published in full in the record.

Secretary RICE. Thank you.

The President's fiscal year 2006 international affairs budget for the Department of State, USAID, and other foreign affairs agencies totals \$33.6 billion. On Monday, President Bush submitted a fiscal year 2005 supplemental request, including about \$5.6 billion for international affairs activities and \$701 million in tsunami relief for the Department and for USAID.

In his recent State of the Union message, President Bush spoke of the unprecedented efforts we have undertaken since September 11 with our friends and allies around the world to defeat terrorism. But, in the long term, as President Bush has said, the only force powerful enough to stop the rise of tyranny and terror and to replace hatred with hope is the force of human freedom. The President has charged the men and women of the Department of State with helping to create a balance of power in the world that favors freedom, and I feel privileged to lead them in that effort.

In order to advance our diplomatic mission of freedom, I recently traveled, as you know, to Europe and to the Middle East. I've spoken with European leaders about how America and Europe can best work together to serve freedom's cause worldwide. I emphasized with our European allies that we are in a new phase, that it was time to turn the page on whatever had happened before and to write a new chapter in our glorious alliance, an alliance that had faced down tyranny before and could do so again in the spread of democracy and freedom. And I just want to say that I found a quite open door. I found people who wanted to be constructive, who are looking for ways to move forward. And will continue to pursue, with vigor, that open door to a new path. The President travels to Europe at the end of the week, or the beginning of next week, and

he will have an opportunity to continue to press forward on this agenda.

We talked about a number of issues. Perhaps most importantly, we talked about the work that we have to do together in the Middle East, the work of the broader Middle East and North Africa initiative, but also the work of the Middle East peace process. And, as you know, next month, in London, Prime Minister Blair will convene an important conference to discuss Palestinian issues. And while we know that the path of democratic reform in the Middle East will be difficult and uneven, the spread of freedom, the work of generations, is urgent work that cannot be deferred. From Morocco to Jordan to Bahrain, we are seeing elections, and new protections for women and minorities, and the beginnings of political pluralism.

In support of these hopeful trends, the fiscal year 2006 budget request proposes enhanced funding for diplomatic and assistance activities in the Middle East, North Africa, and other majority-Muslim countries. The request includes \$120 million for the Middle East Partnership Initiative reform, \$40 million for the National Endowment for Democracy to support the broader Middle East, \$180 million for Muslim outreach through educational and cultural exchanges, and increases for a wide range of other public diplomacy and broadcasting initiatives geared toward Muslim publics, particularly toward young people.

Every leader that I met in Europe understood that our common interest now lies in building on the recent successes and stabilizing and advancing democratic progress in Afghanistan and Iraq. For our part, to build on the momentum in Afghanistan following last October's elections, President Bush has requested nearly \$1.1 billion. The money will be used to invest in health and education and clean water and free-market infrastructure that creates conditions for sustained growth and stability in this country that was once a terrorist haven, but is now an ally of the United States in the war on terror. The \$1.1 billion includes \$437 million for operations to continue the fight against drugs. And the fiscal year 2005 supplemental seeks \$2 billion for expanding police and counternarcotics programs and accelerating reconstruction and democracy and governance activities. The supplemental also includes \$60 million for Embassy security and operational costs.

To help advance the cause of democracy in Iraq, the President has requested \$360 million for economic assistance targeted toward basic needs, and the supplemental includes \$690 million to continue United States mission operations and \$658 million to construct a new Embassy compound in Iraq.

At their meeting in Sharm el-Sheik, President Mubarak, King Abdullah, and Prime Minister Sharon, and President Abbas all called this a time for opportunity. And I just want to say, it was remarkable to walk into the meetings with Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas and have them start with the same line, "This is a time for opportunity, and we must seize it."

President Bush has announced that he will seek an additional \$350 million to help the Palestinians build infrastructure and sustain the reform process over the next 2 years. Of that \$350 million, \$150 is in the budget request for 2006, and \$200 million is in the



supplemental request. And let me just say, I look forward to consultations with Members of Congress about how best to use this funding as we consult also with the members of the Palestinian Authority.

Even as we work with allies and friends to meet the great challenges of advancing freedom and peace in this vital region, there are other things that we must do to build on the hope for opportunity in other areas. We seek \$3 billion for the third year of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, this bold, growth-promoting approach to development which helps countries that govern justly, adopt sound economic policies, and invest in the welfare of their people. I cannot emphasize strongly enough how important it is that we receive this funding, because we are really now making a lot of progress in the development of compacts with countries, and it is a challenge to countries of the world to govern justly and to put together programs that can demonstrate that.

We are also seeking \$2.4 billion in development, child survival, and health assistance.

We're requesting \$5.8 billion in assistance to our partners in the global war on terror. And, in the supplemental, \$750 million is there to support our coalition partners, including those who are standing with us in Afghanistan and Iraq.

I'm sure that the members of this committee will agree that, when they engage effectively, multilateral institutions can multiply our strength as freedom-loving nations. And so, we are requesting \$1.2 billion for our U.S. obligations to international organizations, including to the United Nations, and \$1 billion to pay projected U.S. assessments for U.N. peacekeeping missions. We are seeking \$114 million to enhance the peacekeeping capabilities of non-U.N. forces, with a particular focus on Africa. In addition, the supplemental seeks \$100 million to support the North-South Peace Agreement, and \$242 million to address urgent humanitarian needs arising out of the ongoing Darfur crisis so that we can address Sudan.

We've seen how states where chaos and corruption and cruelty can pose a threat to their neighbors and regions, how that can come home to our own shores as a threat. And so, we are working to strengthen international capacities to address conditions in failed, failing, and post-conflict states. This committee has been particularly supportive of the President's charge to us, at the State Department, to coordinate our Nation's post-conflict and stabilization efforts. We are asking for \$24 million for the new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization that is housed in the Department. The fiscal year supplemental—2005 supplemental seeks \$17 million for startup costs and personnel costs for that Coordinator's office. And the 2006 budget request proposes \$100 million for a conflict-response fund, because one is often not able to see ahead in a way that is flexible enough to deal with arising crises.

Obviously, the United States wishes to stay at the forefront of the global fight against HIV/AIDS. We are requesting \$3.2 billion in total U.S. funding for care, treatment, and prevention efforts that can demonstrate the compassion of the American people.

And there are other ways that we demonstrate that compassion. We are requesting \$2.5 billion in food aid and famine relief, and

the supplemental requests \$950 million for rehabilitation and reconstruction associated with the devastation of the tsunami. That includes the \$350 million initially pledged for tsunami efforts.

I welcome this committee's help in ensuring that the men and women of American diplomacy are well equipped for the challenges ahead, in terms of training and technologies and safe workplaces. Secretary Powell made a great deal of progress in this area, and I want very much to build on the foundation that has been established. We are, therefore, requesting \$1.5 billion for security-related construction and \$690 million to increase security for diplomatic personnel and facilities.

One of the most important things that we can do is strengthen the recruitment of new personnel, and we are seeking \$57 million for 221 new positions to meet core staffing and training requirements. And so that people are properly trained and can use technology, we are asking for \$249 million for investment in information technology.

Let me say, too, that I, before this Committee, during my confirmation hearing, said how important public diplomacy will be for the Department. And in the fiscal year 2006 request we have included \$328 million for activities to engage, inform, and influence foreign publics. But our public diplomacy efforts cannot succeed if we close ourselves off from the world, so we are asking for \$931 million to improve border security at the same time that we increase our educational and cultural exchange programs to a total of \$430 million in fiscal year 2006. In other words, we will keep America's doors open and our borders secure.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, this is a time of global transformation, and it calls for transformational diplomacy. I've not outlined all of the elements here of the budget, but rather to highlight some that we consider particularly emblematic of what we must do.

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the support of this committee, and I'm happy to answer any questions that you and other distinguished members of the committee might have.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Rice follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF STATE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a time of challenge, hope and opportunity for America, and for the world. And as I mentioned during the Committee's consideration of my nomination, I look forward to working with you to build a strong bipartisan consensus behind America's foreign policy and to ensure that the men and women of American diplomacy have the resources they need to conduct their vital mission.

The President's FY 2006 International Affairs Budget for the Department of State, USAID and other foreign affairs agencies totals \$33.6 billion. On Monday, President Bush submitted an FY 2005 supplemental request, including \$6.3 billion for international affairs activities, of which \$701 million is for tsunami relief funding for the Department of State and USAID.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I will begin with an overview of President Bush's foreign policy mission, which we seek this Committee's support to advance.

In his recent State of the Union Message, President Bush spoke of the unprecedented efforts we have undertaken since September 11, 2001 with allies and friends around the world to defeat terrorism. The President spoke of the significant progress we have made confronting the enemy abroad, removing many of al-Qaeda's top commanders, cutting off terrorist finances, and putting pressure on states that

sponsor or harbor terrorists or seek to proliferate weapons of mass destruction. But in the long term, as President Bush said, "The only force powerful enough to stop the rise of tyranny and terror, and replace hatred with hope, is the force of human freedom."

President Bush has charged the men and women of the Department of State with helping to create a balance of power in the world that favors freedom, and I feel privileged to lead them in this effort.

To advance our diplomatic mission of freedom, I recently traveled, as you know, to Europe and the Middle East. I spoke with European leaders about how America and Europe can best work together to serve freedom's cause worldwide. President Bush will continue that conversation when he arrives in Europe on February 21.

Our European allies and we must put the power of our partnership to work to meet the challenges of a changing world—particularly in the Broader Middle East and North Africa. Efforts to encourage political pluralism, economic openness and the growth of civil society are critical to the future of this strategically important region. Recognizing this, through the G-8 we have established the Forum for the Future—a new partnership of progress between the democratic world and the nations of a vast region extending from Morocco to Pakistan. The first meeting of the Forum in Rabat last December was a success. We must now follow up on that success and we are committed to assisting the Forum to play a central role in advancing reform in the region.

Next month in London, Prime Minister Blair will convene an important conference of major donors to help the Palestinian people advance their political, security and economic reforms and build infrastructure for self-government. Also in March, under the auspices of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, Egypt will host a meeting in Cairo of G-8 and Arab League members to broaden the base of support for peace and reform.

The path of democratic reform in the Middle East will be difficult and uneven. The spread of freedom is the work of generations, but it is also urgent work that cannot be deferred.

From Morocco to Jordan to Bahrain, we are seeing elections and new protections for women and minorities, and the beginnings of political pluralism. In support of these hopeful trends, the FY 2006 budget request proposes enhanced funding for diplomatic and assistance activities in the Middle East, North Africa and other majority Muslim countries. The request includes \$120 million for the Middle East Partnership Initiative for reform, \$40 million for the National Endowment for Democracy to support the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, \$180 million for Muslim outreach through educational and cultural exchanges, and increases for a wide range of other public diplomacy and broadcasting initiatives geared toward Muslim publics, particularly populations not typically reached by other programs including women and young people. The success of freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq will give strength to reformers throughout the region, and accelerate the pace of reforms already underway.

Every leader in Europe I spoke to understands our common interest in building on recent successes and stabilizing and advancing democratic progress in Afghanistan and Iraq. For our part, to build on the momentum in Afghanistan following last October's elections, President Bush has requested nearly \$1.1 billion. This money will be used to invest in health, education, clean water and free market infrastructure that create conditions for sustained growth and stability. The \$1.1 billion includes funds for operations to continue the fight against drugs. The FY 2005 supplemental seeks \$2 billion for expanding police and counter-narcotics programs and accelerating reconstruction and democracy and governance activities. The supplemental also includes \$60 million for Embassy security and operational costs.

The European leaders I spoke with agree that it is time to close the book on our past differences over Iraq, and time for all of us to help the Iraqi people write a new book—the history of a democratic Iraq. To help the advance of democracy in Iraq, President Bush has requested \$360 million for economic assistance to continue work already begun under the IRRF and targeted towards helping the Iraqi government to create a functioning democracy and a justice system governed by the rule of law, to deliver basic services to its people, to collect revenues, to generate jobs and to develop a free market system capable of joining the global economy. The FY 2005 supplemental includes \$690 million to continue U.S. mission operations and \$658 million to construct a new embassy compound in Baghdad.

Of course, the process of reform in the Muslim world is not detached from the resolution of important political issues. In my recent travels I found no difference of view, at all, between the United States and Europe on the goal of an independent Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace with the Jewish State of Israel. We all support the process of reform in the Palestinian Authority. The successful Pales-

tinian elections of January 9, and the Israeli withdrawal plan for Gaza and parts of the West Bank, have created a new climate that is propitious for movement back to the Roadmap. And we thank Senators Biden and Sununu for serving on the U.S. Delegation that observed those key elections.

At their meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh with President Mubarak and King Abdullah, both Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas called this a time of opportunity must not be lost. And President Bush has invited both leaders to Washington in the spring. President Bush also has announced an additional \$350 million to help the Palestinians build infrastructure and sustain the reform process over the next two years. Of the \$350 million, \$150 million is included in the FY 2006 budget request and \$200 million is included in the FY 2005 supplemental.

And so I have returned from my travels to the Middle East and Europe confident that the parties now have before them the best chance for advancing peace that they are likely to see for some years to come.

Even as we work with allies and friends to meet the great challenge of advancing freedom and peace in the broader Middle East and North Africa, we will seize other important opportunities to build a world of peace and hope.

We will work to strengthen the community of democracies, so that all free nations are equal to the work before us. We must do all we can to ensure that nations which make the hard choices and do the hard work to join the free world deliver on the high hopes of their citizens for a better life. In much of Africa and Latin America, we face the twin challenges of helping to bolster democratic ideals and institutions, and alleviating poverty. We will insist that leaders who are elected democratically have an obligation to govern democratically. We will work in partnership with developing nations to fight corruption, instill the rule of law, and create a culture of transparency that will attract the trade and investment crucial to poverty reduction.

We seek \$3 billion for the third year of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, our bold, growth-promoting approach to development, which helps countries that govern justly, adopt sound economic policies and invest in the welfare of their people. We also seek \$2.4 billion in development, child survival and health assistance. This Budget exceeds the President's 2002 commitment for overall growth in core development assistance by requesting a total of \$19.8 billion, \$8.2 billion more than in 2002.

We will help countries enhance their capabilities to protect their citizens from traffickers and terrorists.

Our FY 2006 request includes \$734.5 million for the Andean Counter Drug Initiative to consolidate gains made in recent years in eradication, interdiction and alternative development.

We are requesting \$5.8 billion in assistance to our partners in the global war on terror. And the FY 2005 supplemental proposes \$750 million to support our coalition partners, including those standing steadfastly with us in Afghanistan and Iraq.

When they engage effectively, multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. We are requesting nearly \$1.2 billion for U.S. obligations to international organizations, including the United Nations, and a little over \$1 billion to pay projected U.S. assessments for U.N. peacekeeping missions. We are seeking \$114 million to enhance the peacekeeping capabilities of non-U.N. forces, with a particular focus on Africa. The FY 2005 supplemental request seeks \$780 million to fund the U.N.-assessed costs of new and planned peacekeeping missions in the Ivory Coast, Haiti, Burundi, and Sudan/Darfur, and includes \$55 million for a possible Sudan tribunal. In addition, the supplemental seeks \$100 million to support the North-South peace agreement and \$242 million to address urgent humanitarian needs arising from the ongoing Darfur crisis.

We have seen how states where chaos, corruption and cruelty reign can pose threats to their neighbors, to their regions, and to the entire world. And so we are working to strengthen international capacities to address conditions in failed, failing and post-conflict states. We know that this is an issue of special interest to you, Mr. Chairman, and President Bush already has charged us at the State Department with coordinating our nation's post-conflict and stabilization efforts. We are asking for \$24 million for the new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization housed in the Department. The FY 2005 supplemental seeks \$17 million for start-up and personnel costs for the Coordinator's Office. And the FY 2006 budget proposes a \$100 million Conflict Response Fund to quickly address emerging needs and help deploy trained and experienced civilian personnel immediately to an unstable region. We appreciate your support, Mr. Chairman, and that of the Committee, for this funding and look forward to working with you closely on reconstruction and stabilization issues.

The United States must stay at the forefront of the global fight against HIV/AIDS. We are requesting \$3.2 billion in total U.S. funding for care, treatment and

prevention efforts. We will demonstrate the compassion of the American people in other ways as well. Through our continued support of international and non-governmental organizations, we will ensure that America remains the world's most generous food and non-food humanitarian assistance provider. We are requesting \$2.59 billion in food aid and famine relief and non-food humanitarian assistance. The FY 2005 supplemental seeks \$950 million for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction of areas devastated by the Indian Ocean tsunami and for tsunami early warning and mitigation, including the \$350 million initially pledged by President Bush. \$701 million of the supplemental is for State and USAID, including for coverage of USAID's expenditures for relief efforts to date.

In all of these endeavors, the primary instrument of American diplomacy will be the Department of State, and the dedicated men and women of its Foreign and Civil Services and Foreign Service Nationals. Together, we will apply the tools of diplomacy to protect our homeland and advance the values for which it stands and to strengthen the community of democracies for the work of freedom worldwide.

I welcome this Committee's help in ensuring that the men and women of American diplomacy are well equipped for the challenges ahead in terms of training, technologies and safe workplaces. Secretary Powell and his team made important progress in these areas and we must build on the foundation they established.

We are requesting \$1.5 billion for security-related construction and physical security and rehabilitation of U.S. embassies and consulates, and \$690 million to increase security for diplomatic personnel and facilities. We have a solemn obligation to protect the people of our diplomatic missions and their families, who serve at our far-flung posts in the face of an ever-changing global terrorist threat.

We must strengthen the recruitment of new personnel. We are seeking \$57 million for 221 new positions to meet core staffing and training requirements. And as we seek out new talent, we also seek to further diversify our workforce in the process. We send an important signal to the rest of the world about our values and what they mean in practice when we are represented abroad by people of all cultures, races, and religions. Of course, we also must cultivate the people we already have in place—by rewarding achievement, encouraging initiative, and offering a full range of training opportunities. That includes the training and support needed to make full use of new technologies and tools, and we are asking for \$249 million from appropriations and fee revenues for investment in information technology.

Public diplomacy will be a top priority for me, as I know it is for this Committee, and the FY 2006 request includes \$328 million for activities to engage, inform and influence foreign publics. America and all free nations are facing a generational struggle against a new and deadly ideology of hatred. We must do a better job of reaching hard to reach populations, confronting hostile propaganda, dispelling dangerous myths, and proactively telling a positive story about America. In some cases, that may mean we need to do more of what we are already doing, and in other cases, it may mean we need new ways of doing business.

If our public diplomacy efforts are to succeed, we cannot close ourselves off from the world. We are asking for \$931 million to improve border security and for an increase of \$74 million over FY 2005 for educational and cultural exchange programs, bringing the total to \$430 million in FY 2006. We will continue to work closely with the Department of Homeland Security to identify and prevent terrorists and other adversaries from doing harm, even as we maintain the fundamental openness that gives our democracy its dynamism and makes our country a beacon for international tourists, students, immigrants, and businesspeople. We will keep America's doors open and our borders secure.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, this time of global transformation calls for transformational diplomacy. More than ever, America's diplomats will need to be active in spreading democracy, reducing poverty, fighting terror and doing our part to protect our homeland. And more than ever, we will need your support if we are to succeed in our vital mission for the American people.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you and the other distinguished Committee Members may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Rice, for that important statement.

We will now proceed with a round of questions. The Chair would recognize that we have a number of Senators present; and so, we'll start with an 8-minute round, and I'll commence with the first questions.

We're putting together, in the committee now, a Foreign Affairs authorization bill for early consideration on the floor. We'll have a business meeting shortly after the recess. As you may recall, in the past, the bill has met with difficulties and entanglements that had nothing to do with its contents. But how important is it to the Department that this legislation be passed? That is, an authorization bill. What would be the consequences if it were again deferred? And may I supplement the question by asking whether you are prepared to weigh in throughout the process of its consideration to emphasize the importance to our country and to our diplomacy of having this authorization.

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We need an authorization bill, and I think it's an opportunity to say important elements about our foreign policy. And not only will I look forward to weighing in, but I look forward working with the committee to try and achieve that goal.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you for that assurance. It will be important, because I suspect that we will have, first of all, a problem, hopefully not insuperable, of getting time on the floor, and, second, of working with Members so that extraneous amendments are not offered or threatened. In the past 2 years, at least, such amendments have jeopardized consideration of the bill, and, on one occasion, led to it's being taken down after 3 days of debate. So we're looking forward to doing our work quickly so that there will be an ample amount of time for floor activity.

Let me ask, with regard to the comments you made today on the Reconstruction and Stabilization Office, \$17 million, you indicated, would come from supplemental requests, \$24 million in the 2006 request, and then \$100 million subsequently. Describe why you chose these sums and what kind of activity do you anticipate, in terms of personnel or organization.

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much.

First of all, let me say that I've spent a good deal of time on this office since I've been at the State Department, because I think it represents, for us, a recognition that there is a new function to be performed, and that is to have a civilian counterpart to what can actually, very often, be done very quickly by the military, which is the deployment of people and a plan for civilian reconstruction. So, I think this is an extremely important office. I might just note, too, that its director, Carlos Pascual, our former Ambassador to Ukraine, has just gone to do some consultations with some of our allies about this, and there is a lot of interest in whether or not these might be capabilities that could be around different parts of the world.

We are asking for the \$24 million to have a baseline for the office, its requirements—its personnel requirements. But, frankly, we need to get it started. And so, that's why in the supplemental, so that we can get to some level of funding, a little over 50 people we could get to some level of funding, we've requested the \$17 million in startup costs, startup personnel costs.

The \$100 million conflict-response fund is recognition of the fact that there is the need, often, in times of crisis, to be able to use funding for unforeseen circumstances. I can name scores of them since we've been in office. But, for instance, Liberia, when it came

on, I think could not have been foreseen that we were going to be able to get Charles Taylor out. When you think about what we may be facing in Sudan, should we get lucky enough and good enough in our diplomacy to get to the point that we're actually in a post-conflict stabilization point in Sudan, we would need to have some flexibility. So that is what we envision.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that explanation. As you know, our committee has been deeply interested in this subject. At one time it was called nation-building. But whatever the terminology may be, the fact is that many of us felt that, as we proceeded into Iraq, the planning for what you do after major combat was deficient. And you have taken steps at the Department, in conjunction with the Congress and the various task forces, and have done so quickly and administratively. We appreciate that. I wanted to offer the question so you would have an opportunity to illuminate further.

Likewise, the flexibility you suggested is certainly imperative. In your testimony before us, earlier on, you endorsed the idea that the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction funds might be available outside the former Soviet Union in greater abundance, because of unforeseen circumstances; namely, that our forces may come across chemical, biological, or even nuclear material and weapons in places other than the former Soviet Union, and that we need to act upon this. That's the nature of our diplomacy, as well as our military action.

Let me ask about the Freedom Support Act assistance. That's diminished, in this request. It's true that Georgia has become a Millennium Challenge country, and, likewise, the administration's requesting \$60 million for Ukraine in the supplemental. But why the cuts in the Freedom Support Act at this particular juncture?

Secretary RICE. Well, first of all, Senator, let me—or, Mr. Chairman—let me say that it is—by no means, reflects any diminution in our interest in the continued democratization of the former states of the Soviet Union. There was a graduation schedule that was established at the time that the act was passed, and we're working within that graduation schedule.

Fortunately, Georgia has become a Millennium Challenge Account country. We are looking very hard at the Russia programs, because, of course, things improve, and sometimes there are setbacks, and we—right now, on the Russia program, a significant part of the reduction is on the economic-reform side, but there are some reductions on the democracy-program side, too. And, frankly, I think we will have to take a look at that as we go over the next 6 months to a year to see what more we need to do. Obviously, it's been an unfortunate set of setbacks on the democracy side, and I can assure you that we will be looking at that. But mostly this is done in conjunction with the graduation schedule that was established at the time and that, I think, for the most part, has served us well.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, your recent visit with your Russian counterpart was very important. And, of course, our President will be meeting with President Putin in Bratislava shortly. There is great concern in the Congress, and certainly you share it, with regard to democracy developments in Russia.

Secretary RICE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I would hope that there would be flexibility in the event that, for some reason, better news comes along, or other opportunities, so that we will not be flatfooted at that point. I know you are thinking ahead on this. I raise the issue simply so that there could be some colloquy on the fact that there may be ways for us to work with Russian friends, and, likewise, to move ahead on an agenda that has foundered a bit.

Secretary RICE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, there's been a transfer to DOD of authority to conduct training for military and civilian police training in Iraq and Afghanistan. Why is that authority being shifted to DOD from the State Department?

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, in Iraq we're in a combat environment. It's a wartime environment. And the integration, then, of security forces made sense in Iraq, under a single training so that the tradeoffs can be made to fight the war—or to fight the terrorists there.

In Afghanistan, we have, at this point, not transferred the civilian police functions to the Defense Department. We are in a different stage in Afghanistan, and I—we, in discussions between Don Rumsfeld and myself, thought that this was probably not the time to do that. Obviously, the training of the Afghan Army was transferred to DOD—again, because the Afghan Army fights as, really, a coalition partner in the war on terrorism.

But it seems to us, in Iraq, where it really is an environment in which they are trying to use all of the security assets of the country, that having those under single training made sense. In Afghanistan, we've maintained the practice of the civilian police training being in the State Department at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

There you go talking to Rumsfeld again. [Laughter.]

Madam Secretary, I have a number of questions, and some of them are specific, and I don't expect you to have, at your fingertips, the answer to all these questions. And so, if you don't, just let me know and we will put them in the record. Okay?

One very specific question I have is: The President's budget request—this is about nuclear test-monitoring devices—the President's 2006 budget includes only \$14.35 million to the International Monitoring System being established by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission. The point of this is, that's 25 percent below the amount requested in 2005, and 30 percent below what's needed in 2006.

Now, your budget justification calls this, quote, “a key element in our global effort against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, an important supplement to U.S. monitoring capabilities.”

So my question is: Why are we cutting it? We're not talking about a lot of money here. If you don't know, fair enough, let me know.

Secretary RICE. I will have to get back to you, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. Okay.

Secretary RICE. I assume it has to do with specific activities that are to be funded, but let me get back to you.



Senator BIDEN. I would very much like to know that——

Secretary RICE. Of course.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. Because I think the budget statement attached is absolutely right. And, you know, if the Lord Almighty could come down and say he's going to put his own tsunami system in, as it relates to nuclear weapons, and be able to detect any nuclear blast anywhere underground or aboveground in the world, that would be a very good thing for us to know and have, and it's something that we've all talked about before, so I'd be interested in the rationale for that.

I never want to get in an argument with you, because it's hard to win one, but I want to talk about force training for just a second. Not going back to numbers, but last month we had a little discussion about that. There's been a lot of discussion since then. And no need to rehash that debate. But I note, earlier this week, the President's supplemental asked for \$5.7 billion to train Iraqi forces, quote, "to accelerate efforts to provide assistance to Iraq's security forces so they can increasingly assume responsibility for the nation's security," end of quote.

Now, this comes on top of \$5 billion that we allocated to security and law enforcement in FY04. That's out of that supplemental of \$18.4 billion that we haven't spent yet.

Now, the supplemental request continues to say, quote, "The Iraq interim and transitional government, with coalition assistance, has fielded over 90 battalions in order to provide security within Iraq. All but one of these battalions, however, are lightly equipped and armed and have very limited mobility and sustainment capability. These limitations, coupled with the more resilient insurgency than anticipated when the Iraqi security forces were initially designed, have led the Prime Minister of Iraq to request forces that can participate in"—and a quote within a quote—"the hard end"—end of internal quote—"of the counterinsurgency, and to do so quickly."

Now, suffice it to say, by requesting another \$5.7 billion the administration is, I assume, with your cooperation and others, that—listening to General Petraeus, who is reorganizing and essentially altering the way we're going about dealing with the training of a security force. And, as you know from General Petraeus, there's a long way to go. I mean, we can do it, but there's a lot of hard slogging.

Now, I want to combine that with the question that has become—and it's literally a question; I don't know the answer to it—a lot of Senators were in Davos last month, a lot of us heard the same thing, a lot of us have been in and out of Europe and the Middle East in December and January. I've made a total of three trips. And we've been told repeatedly—not just me, but many of my Republican colleagues—by many foreign leaders and their governments, that they've made offers to train. Chirac, when we met with him 2 weeks ago, he's very regal, and he's very diplomatic, and he talked about how he wanted to show me—I didn't demand of him to show it; I would never demand of a President anything—the proposal he had to train 1,500 Iraqi officers, and had been made 6 months ago, and, *mon dieu*, he does not understand why, no one has responded, et cetera. I take him at his word that he submitted it. I don't know who he submitted it to.

So here's my question: We're going to spend, as we should—I'm not contesting the number—over \$10 billion from the FY05, which we haven't spent out yet, the \$5 billion, to the FY06 request for 5.7—the supplemental request. So we're talking over \$10 billion, which indicates we recognize there's a lot of work to do to train.

Now, I don't expect you to have this information, but I would like you—obviously, respond if you'd like—for the record, could you provide us a comprehensive list of the countries that actually have made an offer—that you're aware of—to assist in training Iraqi security forces—police, army, national guard, any security forces—a description of the specific offers they have made, when the offers were made, and what your response has been and will likely be?

I'm prepared to vote another \$5.7 billion for that, but I'd like to know the context in which I'm—not “I am,” but I, one of a hundred am—appropriating the money for that purpose. So it would be a very helpful thing if you—I mean, amazing if you knew it now; I can't imagine how you would—let me know; if not, would you be willing to submit that for the record?

Secretary RICE. I will try and submit that for the record.

Let me just explain why there is sometimes the question of offer versus offer—

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Whether there was an offer. I also was just in Europe, as you know, and I talked to—almost to everybody about this issue. We had a NATO ministerial where we talked about training for the Iraqi security forces, police, and army forces as perhaps the most important thing that we could do for the Iraqi people at this point. And, of course, NATO is going to have, or has, a training mission, but it's principally for leadership training.

There is a question of what training goes on inside Iraq, what training goes on outside Iraq, and then NATO has come up with a concept of perhaps a trust fund that could fund people who are training inside Iraq, but perhaps fund it by those who really don't feel that they can send forces in.

Senator BIDEN. Right.

Secretary RICE. And so, sometimes there is a bit of a mismatch between what is needed in the overall plan for security forces and the kinds of offers that you get to do training inside or outside Iraq. And what we're trying to do—and I have to say, a lot of this, of course, depends on how the Iraqis see it, because it's not just been responding to General Petraeus; it's also been responding to the interim government, that—

Senator BIDEN. Right.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Has had its own ideas about security training—is just to, in almost matrix-like fashion, take what has been offered, what is needed, and put it together into a security assistance plan that makes sense. And we started that work. NATO is a very good venue for that, at least for the European allies.

But I can get you what has been offered. For instance, some of it was offered directly to the Iraqi Government, that has not always had the capacity to respond, given that they've been a little overwhelmed doing other things. And so, we will pull it together for you, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. Great.

Secretary RICE. But I just think we need to understand that sometimes there's an ill fit between what is offered and what is needed. But we believe that everything that is offered can ultimately be used.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I close, Mr. Chairman by saying: I would argue that's one of the reasons why a contact group, or something like it, might be a good idea, number one. And, number two, one of the things that I get mixed messages on, and my colleagues have all been there, is, What is the plan?

I'll close with a quick example. I was joking with Petraeus. I said, "Wouldn't it help if the Germans were offering to train out of country"? Go out and identify over the next 4 months, or 2 months, whatever it takes, the most competent mid-level Iraqi officers who were part of the Iraqi military force—obviously, all Ba'athist, but we used Nazis, we used a lot of people in the nations we defeated—and have them fly down in a 747, put 500 of them on a plane—literally, not figuratively—send them into Germany for 6 months of training. He said, "That would be a good idea." Said that to Allawi; he said, "That would be a great idea."

So I don't know what our plan is. So the combination of the two points would be helpful. And I would suggest that maybe this notion of a contact group, or whatever you want to call it, might be a facilitating mechanism.

I'll come back with other questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me go over.

Thank you, Madam Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Let me just supplement Senator Biden's request by the thought that is sometimes expressed that the training needs to occur in Iraq, that the continuity or the formation of support with our troops, who are literally living with some of the Iraqi recruits, are important, and that conducting this process somewhere outside the country doesn't work so well. I don't want to get into that argument. I've heard it. But it's an important part of this debate, because essentially a lot of the training is being offered outside of the country. So we need to evaluate. Does it work the same if it is inside the country? And, as a matter of fact, how important is it that it occur in one place or the other?

Senator BIDEN. We need an official policy statement, to us, as to whether you value it inside or out. You know, I talk to the folks in the ground there, and my friend from Minneapolis was there recently—you talk to them, they say, "No, we'll take it outside"—

Secretary RICE. Yes.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. "As well as in." So we'd like to know that.

Secretary RICE. Of course. We are, by the way, encouraging people to do it outside, if that's all they can do. It's not necessarily, of course, one for one. If you're willing to do it inside, it fits a little better.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And welcome home, Madam Secretary. I would add my thanks to your efforts, which is appearing, more and more, that they, in

fact, made a difference. We know—you know better than most—that there’s now a great deal of follow-through. I think with the President going to Europe here over the next few days, following on your trip, as well as Secretary Rumsfeld’s trip, that adds to the dimension here that is reflected in your testimony this morning, as it was reflected in your initial testimony before this committee. So thank you for your efforts.

And I also noted that Secretary Rumsfeld even reached out to Old Europe, which we’re all grateful for. So there’s a—I wouldn’t necessarily term it a “jolly” spirit, but certainly an improved spirit environment from where we were a year ago. And I think we build on that to deal with these great challenges that you have dealt with here this morning and as you are referencing in your budget request.

I think, generally, it’s a good budget, makes a lot of sense. You’re building on, as you noted, to what Secretary Powell has been able to accomplish in the last 4 years. There’s been a remarkable reversal in the trend and momentum, and you are going to be able to capitalize on that and build on that, as well. So, thank you.

You noted in your testimony, when you referenced the potential that we have in the Middle East—specifically, Israeli-Palestinian developments—that the President has announced an additional \$350 million to help the Palestinians build infrastructure and sustain the reform process over the next 2 years. And I appreciate you reaching out to this committee, when you noted that you would be interested in having our input, as well.

Now, based on that, a couple of questions. Have you thought through how you would use private involvement, private investment in this? And I’m particularly interested in thinking—all of these experiences are learning processes and experiences. I have been very critical of the slow economic development in Iraq. We made some big mistakes there. We were thrust into a situation that I don’t think we planned for very well or anticipated. However, that aside, that behind us, we should have learned something from what we didn’t do in Iraq over the last year, especially the last two, and that was: Get that economic development down into the areas where the real people are that can develop confidence and support for a government—demonstration projects, hospitals, schools. And I think it’s critically important that the Israeli-Palestinian Arab world, private sector, be engaged in that.

Could you define that a little bit and tell us what your thoughts are that would supplement this \$350 million that the President’s asked for, which I strongly support?

Secretary RICE. Well, it’s a very good point, Senator. Now, obviously, one of the problems is to get the—as you’re moving toward greater stability so that, in fact, foreign investment can be attracted—I had conversations with the Israelis, including with Deputy Minister Peres, who is overseeing a lot of this, about the Gaza withdrawal and economic development. And this is very much on his mind, too: Can we get private-sector initiatives to come in? I think that what we should do—right now we’re focused on short-acting USAID kinds of projects that can show immediate impact for the people of the Gaza as the Israeli withdrawal goes forward. We’re concentrating on projects that can ease movement for the

Palestinians so that they can work. For instance, some joint work on checkpoints that would be done, about \$50 million, that we're calling Building Bridges, which really is the Freedom of Movement Initiative. But, ultimately, this is an area which once, in parts of the Palestinian territories, at least, did have private-sector activity of considerable strength.

And what I would like to do is to look at some of the mechanisms that we use for the stimulation of private-sector engagement—whether they're U.S. Government's—or to simply send a message that private-sector engagement and private-sector investment in this region is going to be extremely important.

I think it's something that the Palestinians understand. It's going to require, on their part, some greater—as they're trying to do now—some greater transparency, some work on the corruption front so that there isn't a kind of tax that is inappropriate.

I think if they do their reform initiatives on corruption, on transparency, on budget transparency, and on rule of law, and if we do our work to make some quick-acting efforts on behalf, particularly, of the Gaza, that will open up a lane for private investment in the medium term, which we should not just encourage, but we should see if there are ways that some of the vehicles that we use in the United States to encourage private—in the U.S. Government to encourage private-sector investment can be used here.

Senator HAGEL. Structurally, you're planning for that? I noted that you were framing this thing in a way to take advantage of those options and openings, if they develop.

Secretary RICE. That's right. I should also note that one of the things that we did with the Egyptians and the Israelis, of course, these qualified industrial zones, which permit special kinds of arrangements where, in fact, there could be private investment. We've talked about whether or not we can look to—look at some of these other areas so that the trade environment is one that also encourages growth and then private-sector investment.

The near-term problem, I think, though, is to do something about the Palestinian rule of law and transparency and corruption initiatives, because, without that, I think you're going to choke off private investment, even if you are encouraging it. But, as a medium-term measure, I couldn't agree more that we need to structure this in a way in which there is room for private investment.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Let me get your sense of what happened in Beirut a few days ago. We all agree, a very destabilizing and very, very tragic situation. What is your sense of what happened? What are we doing in regard to consultation with allies? How are we trying to head off any further attacks, whatever we can find out—who was behind it? What are we doing? Is this going to shape relationships now in the future differently with Syria? Obviously, the President has recalled our Ambassador. Tell us what you can about that situation.

Secretary RICE. Of course. First, to say that the most important call is for an investigation of what has happened there. We don't know what the responsibility is. Nonetheless, the—as to Resolution 1559 noted, the Syrian presence and the Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs has, of course, created a destabilized environment in Lebanon. And that's why there has been a call for the Syrians

to stop that interference and to remove their forces, because it is a destabilizing environment in what is a developing democratic process in Lebanon.

We have said that it really ought to be—if you take Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian territories—the fourth democratic election in the Middle East.

We are in very close contact. We had a President's statement yesterday at the United Nations that calls for an investigation, calls for calm. We've been in close consultation with our allies. I, myself, talked with my French counterpart. The French—we and the French were the cosponsors of 1559, and we are trying to achieve, first of all, calm in the region—that's very important, that people react calmly, and that there not be further violence; second, that there be an investigation of what happened there, and a transparent investigation of what happened there; and, third, that the Syrians accept their responsibilities, under Resolution 1559, to stop their destabilizing activities in the region.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Madam Secretary, for coming before the committee.

I just want to follow up on your exchange with Senator Biden and also some of the conversations we had during your confirmation, and underscore how strongly I feel, and many of my colleagues feel, about the need to bolster burden-sharing in Iraq and to welcome the help that others have offered when it comes to training Iraqi security forces. I was struck by how this subject just kept coming up again and again yesterday in the various meetings we were having with different officials, both from our country and from overseas. I and many others feel a great deal of urgency about this.

One other matter I want to mention. It seems to me that one often-overlooked element of the long-term fight against terrorism is more focused and energetic commitment to fighting corruption. Whether it's the fact that radical Islamist parties in Southeast Asia and North Africa try to attract support, in part, because they tap into populist sentiments about wanting more honest, though they may say virtuous, and less corrupt, though they may say decadent, governments; or the fact that paying off customs officials and local law enforcement officers makes it possible for terrorists to cross borders and then plan and execute operations, it's clear that a thriving culture of corruption works to the advantage of those who would do us harm.

How should the U.S. Government address this issue in our foreign policy? And how is this important priority reflected in this budget?

Secretary RICE. Well, the anticorruption initiatives are extremely important. You might note that in many of the USAID programs, there are—many of the countries with which USAID deals, we actually have anticorruption initiatives with these countries, because corruption is, first, in attacks on development, as I think the World

Bank has said. It is also an important element of danger, as you have noted. The same corrupt practices that can lead to drug-running or human trafficking can also lead to terrorism, because it's problems with corrupt judges or corrupt border officials or corrupt police. And so, it has been a major element.

I would note, for instance, that it is one of the key indicators that we look to when we're looking for Millennium Challenge Account funding for a country, is how well they are doing on corruption.

We've had anticorruption initiatives that are not just bilateral U.S. anticorruption initiatives, as well. A couple of years ago, the G8 had anticorruption initiatives. We've had anticorruption initiatives in APEC. We want this to be a major element of our multilateral diplomacy, as well as of our bilateral diplomacy.

So, I would note that if you look at the MCA as a kind of bellwether for how we view the corruption element, it is a key element in corruption, but there are also anticorruption activities with countries that will not qualify for the MCA.

One of the countries we've been most interested in working with in that regard, we have a major effort with Nigeria, for instance, where they have a new finance minister, who's trying very hard on the anticorruption side.

I think you would find anticorruption initiatives embedded in almost all of our bilateral diplomacy. And sometimes we have great successes. Georgia was considered one of the most vulnerable to corruption just 3 or so years ago, and now is an MCA country, because of the progress that it's made on corruption.

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate that answer and the general commitment that you've stated, and I will look to the places you've cited. I will note, for example, that, in the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement request, INL, that there's an over—there's over a 50-percent reduction in funds requested for anticorruption programs from last year to this year. And when you start talking about countries like Nigeria, it makes me wonder a little bit.

But let me ask you a different question. I share the President's enthusiasm for supporting democratization around the world, though sometimes I disagree with the administration about the most effective ways to do it. Having served on the Subcommittee on African Affairs for over 12 years now, I'm interested in how this principle applies to Africa. How does the administration propose to support democratization in Zimbabwe? How about Uganda or Chad—where serving presidents are in various stages of pursuing constitutional changes that will enable them to serve for a third term, which many of us believe is not a great idea? And in Rwanda, where the government has grown increasingly intolerant of dissent, how do the President's words, and the administration's concern, about democratization relate to these countries and the populations that heard those words?

Secretary RICE. Well, the most important thing that we can do is, we make it an agenda item with each and every country in the world, and we make clear that, no matter what elements of cooperation we may have on other issues—for instance, we have very good cooperation with Uganda, as you know, on HIV/AIDS, but it is—does not mean that the political development of Uganda toward

a more open political system is unimportant to us. In fact, it's very important to us. Similarly, in Rwanda, even though we have very good relations with Rwandan Government, they've served in—their forces have been willing to serve in places where they were needed—we have been very clear that we expect the movement toward the democratic processes and establishment of democratic institutions to continue.

So, in places where we have good relations on other areas, the importance is not to let it supplant the need for continued pressing on the democracy agenda.

In places where we don't, like Zimbabwe, I think we've been pretty strong on Zimbabwe. I think so much so that we've caused some outbursts from President Mugabe about both the President and about me. But I think we should continue, and we will continue. We need help on Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth, where they were suspended from membership. We need help on Zimbabwe from the South Africans, who have a good deal of influence there. And it is—the Zimbabwe situation is, therefore, part of our bilateral diplomacy with other countries, particularly with South Africa, but also the members of the Commonwealth.

So, you can be assured, Senator, that this is very high on our agenda, because we believe that in Africa, just like every place else, the accountable government, transparent government, democratic principles, and democratic institutions contribute to stability and contribute to better governance. And, finally, when we—again, when we set up a program of development assistance, like the MCA, this is one of the criteria that we use.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. I appreciate your fairly strong comments on Zimbabwe. I'd submit it doesn't take much to get Mr. Mugabe to have an outburst, so that shouldn't be the test, as I know you know.

Secretary RICE. I agree.

Senator FEINGOLD. So I hope that the administration will continue to look for opportunities and seek my help and the help of others on the committee to be very firm in that regard.

The last question I'll ask has to do with the fact that the \$82 billion supplemental appropriations request that was sent to Congress contains a request for \$4.8 million for additional broadcasts into the broader Middle East. And I would be curious to know how you feel we should evaluate the efficacy of our broadcasting initiatives, because more money is being put into it. And I'm wondering if there is a good way to monitor the value and the effectiveness of this.

Secretary RICE. Well, one of the things that the Broadcasting Board is going to do is to set up—they intend to be able to do more, for lack of a better word, market research and market segmentation research, which, I think, will help us to know what is really happening. And that's part of this request. They will have more effort in that way.

But the efficacy of these programs, I think, should not just be measured in how many people you're reaching, although that's an important part of it. But if I go back to my experience as a Soviet specialist during the cold war, it was probably Radio Free Europe and Voice of America that did as much, if not more, for our efforts



there than many of the other things that we did when we couldn't reach these populations in any other way. And if you look at Radio Sawa or Radio Farda or the desire to have Persian-language broadcasting or the—what is really a capital expenditure for a tower that will allow broadcasting into places in Central Asia where democracy is not on the march, and ought to be, I would hope that we would be able to evaluate these programs, in terms of who they're reaching and comments that you get, but also to recognize that this is a long-term struggle, and that, very often, you're reaching people who may not even be willing to say to you, "I'm being reached," given the environments in which they live.

I'm a very big supporter of our international broadcasting efforts. I think we ought to be looking at what more we can do, because this has been a winner for us in the past. It's not just broadcasting. We also ought to be exploring new media, what we can do through the Internet and the like. But I think this is a very big winner for us.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

At this moment, I will call the committee into a business session. Now that a quorum is present, I would call members' attention to the agenda. The hearing is now recessed, to reconvene shortly at the conclusion of the business meeting. For the interest of our audience, this should take just a moment.

The sole item on the agenda today is the nomination of Robert B. Zoellick to be Deputy Secretary of State. Senator Biden, do you have a further comment, or—

Senator BIDEN. I only have one comment. I'd like the record to show that Democrats are here and ready to vote. [Laughter.]

So, we're really here, Madam Secretary, and we're ready to vote.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the distinguished ranking member. [Laughter.]

Is there further debate?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Hearing none, I ask the nomination be approved. All in favor, say aye.

[A chorus of ayes.]

The CHAIRMAN. Opposed, no.

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. The clerk will record that all present voted aye, and we will send the nomination to the floor for consideration of our colleagues.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I would ask the record be kept open for those who wish—not to hold up going to the floor, but those who wish to vote, unless you—if you have the proxies, that they be recorded, as well, that everybody has an opportunity to vote.

The CHAIRMAN. The point is well taken. And I do have proxies in favor of Ambassador Zoellick, from Senator Hagel, Senator Sununu, Senator Allen, Senator Alexander. And if others wish to vote, they'll have that opportunity, and—

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Within the business day.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the ranking member. I thank the indulgence of the Secretary. This concludes the business meeting. I now call to order the hearing.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Dr. Rice.

Secretary RICE. Thank you.

Senator CHAFEE. I see in the budget we're budgeting \$734½ million for the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative, and I'm wondering how we're doing on the war on drugs, and not only in the Andean area, but also Afghanistan and other areas.

Secretary RICE. Thank you.

In the Andean area, I think we can cite progress from the really foresightful way that the Andean Initiative was put together, because it was put together, yes, as an eradication initiative, but it was also put together in a way that was regional, so that there was an understanding that if you succeeded in one place, you didn't want a drug infestation in another. And so, this regional approach has been very effective.

It is a broad-scale initiative. And, given Colombia's circumstances, in particular, one where we're now partnering with a government that has gotten even tougher—very, very tough on narco-trafficking through its efforts with the FARC, the Andean Initiative has, I think, succeeded, and we just need to continue to succeed, because, of course, what happens is that it's—you're never completely through with this kind of initiative. It breaks out in other places. But, I think, you can say that the Andean Initiative has been a great success. And if you talk to the Peruvians or to the Colombians or to the Bolivians, for that matter, I think you will find that.

We're just starting in Afghanistan, and it is, frankly, one of the most difficult and challenging problems, because, while we are making a lot of progress in Afghanistan on—since the election of Karzai, the economy is making some progress, they're making some progress in the—getting the warlords out of business. A lot of progress has been made in Afghanistan. I don't think that anyone will tell you that we're satisfied with the state of counternarcotics in Afghanistan, where the numbers have been going up.

We have a five-pronged strategy with the Karzai government to deal with counternarcotics there. It is a strategy that the British have been in the lead in, but we're taking a much more active role now. We've talked to the Russians about their involvement, perhaps, in counternarcotics, because this is a scourge that is hurting very much in Europe. It appears on the streets in Europe.

The five parts of it include, not just eradication, as important as eradication is, and not just alternative livelihoods, as important as alternative livelihoods are, but also helping the Afghans with the law-enforcement side having to deal with counternarcotics, training their police to be counternarcotics police. Karzai has put in place a Minister who is to oversee the entire counternarcotics effort. And it turned out that there needed to be a significant public affairs campaign in Afghanistan to delegitimize the growing of poppy in this country that has been at civil war and has, therefore, been doing this for quit a long time.

So I would say, Senator, that the lesson of the Andean Initiative is that if you fund it properly, stay with it, regionalize it, and get good, strong support from the governments, you have a chance of success. Afghanistan is at the beginning of that process, but we're going to have to have the same kind of commitment to Afghanistan that we've had in the Andean region.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.

One of the curious things in Bolivia, of course, is the rise of the political party of the coca growers. And so, as we promote democracy, that's a phenomenon that exists—

Secretary RICE. It's a—

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. In Bolivia.

Secretary RICE. It's—

Senator CHAFEE. They have a—actual political party that's very successful.

Secretary RICE. We're very concerned about that party, we're very concerned about the challenges to the president there. We're concerned about—I won't name any names of the—of our concerns there, but—because it's a democratic process—but, obviously, efforts to stabilize Bolivia—we had an initiative last year on trying to do some things, in terms of economic development to try and help the Bolivians.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.

Switching back to the Middle East and Senator Hagel's questions on the horrific bombing in Lebanon and our decision to recall our Ambassador, on the surface it seems—prior to any proof, what's the symbolism of that action?

Secretary RICE. Well, we have been very clear that we don't know the—who is responsible for the bombing, but that there needs to be an international investigation of that. But the Syrians, given their position in Lebanon, given their interference in Lebanese affairs, given the fact that their forces are there, given the terrorists that operate in southern Lebanon, with Syrian forces in close proximity to them, does put on the Syrians a special responsibility for the kind of destabilization that happened there, in that this sort of thing could happen. That's why recalling the Syrian Ambassador made sense. It also is the culmination of a long series of problems with the Syrians, including ineffective or incomplete efforts to deal with the fact that Syrian territory is contributing to the insurgency in Iraq.

And Deputy Secretary Armitage, before he left office, went to Syria. He delivered a very strong message to the Syrians about this problem of insurgents operating out of Syria. We, frankly, did not get much in the way of help. And the Syrians need to understand that the United States is very serious about activities out of Syria that may be endangering our forces.

And so, this—the proximate cause was Lebanon, but, unfortunately, we have an increasing list of problems with the Syrians.

Senator CHAFEE. And how long do you expect this to occur, having our Ambassador not in place?

Secretary RICE. It's indeterminate at this point, Senator, but we will make known that there are some steps that we would like to see taken. But I would not want to get into a situation in which we've said, "Do this, and then we will return the Ambassador." I

think we will have to see how seriously the Syrians take this signal.

Senator CHAFEE. And are there actions beyond that in regards to Embassy and its presence there, or is it just the symbolism of our lead—

Secretary RICE. Well—

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. Diplomat that—being withdrawn?

Secretary RICE. I don't believe, at this point, that we need to contemplate any further actions, in terms of the Embassy. It's a very strong signal to return one's Ambassador, as you know, Senator. As I described for the chairman, we are also doing some other things, in terms of the United Nations, in terms of our diplomacy with the French, out of Resolution 1559, to try and get the Syrians to live up to their obligations.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Dr. Rice.

Secretary RICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, I want to join my colleagues in welcoming you before the committee. I think this is your first hearing with us since your confirmation. We look forward to many more.

I have some very specific questions I'd like to put to you. The budget request from the administration reduces the amount for UNICEF by \$11 million from what was appropriated last year, down from \$125 million to \$114 million. Now, this strikes me as coming at an especially odd moment, as your former colleague in government and former Cabinet member, Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman, is about to assume the position of executive director of UNICEF on May 2. So I'm curious, What's the rationale behind the proposed cut? And it's not exactly the best launching pad for the new executive director, who has come out of this administration and into the UNICEF position.

Secretary RICE. I understand, Senator. There isn't intended to be, here, any diminution of our support for UNICEF. I will check. It may be this was, in fact, what the President requested last year. Is that—one of the—let me get you an answer on this one, Senator. I'll—

Senator SARBANES. I think—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Have to get the specific—

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. I think this figure is even less than the President requested last year, and it's almost 10 percent less than what the Congress provided.

Secretary RICE. Senator, we'll—

Senator SARBANES. If you were going to be the executive director at UNICEF, you wouldn't feel this was a very good sendoff into your new position, would you?

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, Ann Veneman is a terrific choice, and she's a good friend. I will check to see on what basis this was made.

Let me just say that we are operating in an environment, a budget environment, in which we—

Senator SARBANES. Now, I want to—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Have done—

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. Want to—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Very well.

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. I want to pursue that budget environment. You've led me right on into my next question, and I appreciate that very much. I'm concerned by the lack of priority for the needs of children, which extends beyond UNICEF to the entire budget for child survival. The overall account for child survival and health is cut from \$1.54 billion to \$1.25 billion, a total cut of \$286 million. Even when you count the \$170 million that was transferred from child survival to global AIDS—because we're trying to compare apples to apples, and I'm trying to anticipate the response that says, well, we shifted some of that money somewhere else in order to roughly accomplish the same purposes—we still get a cut of about 8 percent in child survival and maternal health, a 30-percent cut in other infectious diseases, and I can go on through a number of others.

Now, is the justification for these that you have a tight budget and you have to make these cuts?

Secretary RICE. Senator, I think, in a tight budget environment, we've done really very well. I think that the President's budget for the State Department accounts represents a recognition of how important the diplomatic initiatives are, how important our work is in support of the war on terrorism, how important our work is in support of the compassion agenda. My understanding of this particular case is that, in addition to the point that you've made about the \$171 million that was transferred to the global AIDS account for focus countries, that this is essentially what the President requested in fiscal year 2005, and that this is what the administration believes is needed in those accounts. I understand that there was a plus-up in that account in 2005.

Senator SARBANES. Well, let me pursue this a little bit. The administration, when it put forth the Millennium Challenge Account, argued quite strongly that it would not come at the expense of core development and humanitarian programs. Now, I'm being told this morning, "Well, we have a tight budget. We have to pull back." We have to constrain our commitment to these well-established and, I think, by and large, effective programs, yet the budget proposes an increase for the Millennium Challenge Account from \$1.5 billion to \$3 billion. That's a \$1½-billion increase. The cuts I've been talking about are in the tens of millions, or maybe in the hundreds of millions in certain instances.

Now, I've supported the Millennium Challenge Account, but I just want to make this observation. There's been \$2.5 billion appropriated for the Millennium Challenge Account thus far. You're asking for \$3 billion in this budget; \$2.5 billion has been appropriated over a 2-year period—\$1 billion in FY04, \$1½ billion in FY05. And my understanding is that not a single dime of that has moved out to provide assistance to countries.

Now, if that's the case, why are we plussing-up the Millennium Challenge Account by quite a substantial margin at the expense of some of these core humanitarian and development programs which deal with some of the most vulnerable populations?

Secretary RICE. Shall I respond, Senator? Thank you.

Well, first of all, again, on the child survival and health programs, the request is almost straight-lined from what the President had requested before. The Millennium Challenge Account—the Millennium Challenge Corporation is a very, very high Presidential priority for three reasons. First of all, because it—

Senator SARBANES. I'm not contesting the Millennium Challenge Account. I'm simply asking—you have \$2½ billion that has been appropriated, none of which has moved out of the pipeline. Two and one-half billion dollars. And now you're coming in and requesting a jump to \$3 billion—from \$1½ billion last year to \$3 billion this year. Three billion dollars. Another \$1½ billion for an account that already has \$2½ billion unspent. You're going to add 3 to it. You're going to go to \$5.5 billion, and no money has been spent from that account. And yet you're cutting these other core humanitarian and development programs. What is the rationale for that?

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, we're not cutting the other programs, we're requesting what we requested—

Senator SARBANES. Well, I—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Last year.

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. I mean, we—

Secretary RICE. But—

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. I mean, I can show it to you. I mean, we'll have to differ on that, but I think we can—

Secretary RICE. I'm looking at it, Senator, and I think the request is similar to what we requested in 2005.

But let me answer the question about the Millennium Challenge, and not having yet spent the money. First of all, it did take about a year to get the corporation authorized and up and running. They now are making a good deal of progress in getting these compacts put together. It is a process that requires countries to apply with a plan that shows that they are meeting, not just the requirements of a good program that they would like to carry out, but that they are meeting the requirements, in terms of transparency and good governance and democratization and anticorruption, all of the things that the Millennium Challenge requires of these countries.

The money has to be there in order for the corporation to be able to make multiyear commitments to these compacts that are being signed with these countries. And so, I think you will see a more rapid, now, spend-out of these—or obligation of these funds, because they now are developing the compacts. It sometimes even requires countries to make changes in their laws so that they can receive this funding on things like I was just talking with Senator Feingold about, for instance, on anticorruption. So the money needs to be there so that the compacts can be backed up by the actual funding being in place.

Finally, I would just say, Senator, that we would like to meet the President's commitment of increasing American development assistance through the MCA by 50 percent. It will not be in 3 years; it will now be in 4 years. And in order to be on a glide path to do that, and to be able to have the resources available to these programs that are going to be funded, these compacts that are going to be funded, this is the level of funding that we need.

Senator SARBANES. Well, but, you know, you can meet that target and take the money out of other programs. You're just shifting

it from one pocket to another. Presumably, I will question you again about this next year when we look again to see how much is in the Millennium Challenge Account if we don't shift some of that money in order to cover these problems.

Let me make one final observation. The Millennium Challenge Account does not help ordinary people struggling to survive under fragile, undemocratic, or corrupt governments. Child survival and health programs in the past have worked on a humanitarian basis. The same thing is true of UNICEF, as well as some of these other programs we're talking about. The goal of the Millennium Challenge Account, which is in effect to get these countries to pull themselves up by their bootstraps and improve their processes and so forth, is a laudable goal. But if you're going to shift resources over into that, then there's less available to help people who are, in effect, the victims of an inadequate or corrupt government in their country. And that doesn't seem, to me, to be fully responsive, on the part of the United States, to the kinds of challenges we confront around the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Allen.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Dr. Rice, for being here with us.

Looking at this budget, it is a tight and taut budget, but I think that, in looking at it, that the priorities and expenditures seem very reasonable. There'll be differences on some on the edges, but let's not look at the negatives, let's look at the positives.

One thing I would like to ask you, and it's not in here, reading through it, was something that I and this committee worked on last year and brought this up with Ambassador—soon to be your partner—Zoellick, and that has to do with intellectual property protection. We had added funds in there. So much of what we produce with our innovations are intellectual property, which are stolen in various countries—China is one of the main thieves that don't seem to think much of it. Other developing countries need assistance so they understand this concept of property rights, that it's not to be stolen or infringed upon. Could you share with us how assistance in the protection of our intellectual property, our innovations, are addressed in this budget?

Secretary RICE. Yes. And, in fact, there are—and, as a part of these programs, IPR initiatives with these countries—with a number of countries. With China, it's principally—of course, we don't fund—

Senator ALLEN. Right.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Programs with the Chinese, but you're right that we have been very concerned about IPR in a number of other countries. And we do have, as a part of our general development assistance programs, IPR initiatives as a part of that.

Senator ALLEN. Let me add—I didn't mean to bring it up, but since Syria was brought up, I think, in view of the assassination yesterday of former Prime Minister Hariri in Beirut, I urge you to tighten sanctions on Syria. Our message to the Syrians and any of these other undemocratic regimes are those that—I think that we have to be clear, we have to be direct, it has to be that terrorist

activity is not going to be tolerated. We passed the Syria and Lebanese Sovereignty Act of 2002, on which you based your May 2004 trade sanctions against Syria. And that was passed in response to Syria's support for terrorism, its occupation of Lebanon, and its pursuit of dangerous weapons.

I was just in Iraq and Israel over this past weekend. Syria, at best, you could say, is negligent, insofar as stopping terrorist activity from coming into Iraq. And this is from General Casey. Meeting with leaders from Prime Minister Sharon and Minister Netanyahu, General Gilad, the reality is that Syria continues to be a problem funding terrorist activities—not just in Lebanon, not just in attacking in Iran, but also Hezbollah and others. There is a worry that Syria, in funding some of these organizations, would actually take out Abu Mazen, or Mahmoud Abbas. And this is a terrorist state.

I urge you to not let Syria off the hook. We may not know the specific complicity in this particular assassination, but they have 15,000 troops in Lebanon which would like to also control their own destiny. Here's the fact, Syria continues to harbor leaders who plan and finance terrorist attacks. We know this. They do it against Israeli citizens. They have operatives in Islamic Jihad, Hamas, the popular front for the liberation of Palestine, and the Martyrs Brigades regularly receive training in Syrian camps. And as long as they continue—in Syria—to occupy Lebanon and train suicide bombers, I don't think the region is safe.

So, I urge you all, in the administration, to take strong action against Syria. And I know there's others who may have another view, but, speaking for myself, I hope you take tough, strong, serious action against Syria. Do you want to comment—

Secretary RICE. Yes.

Senator ALLEN [continuing]. On that diatribe?

Secretary RICE. Well—

Senator ALLEN. The thing is, now, you commented on, on the other one, that was not quite of the same angle of—

Secretary RICE. No, I'm—

Senator ALLEN [continuing]. Approach to Syria.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. I'm happy to comment. There is no doubt that Syria is a big problem. And one of the reasons that we have been strong in supporting—or in sponsoring Resolution 1559 is that we need the international community united against what Syria is doing, and what Syria is using both its own territory for and what it's using the territory of southern Lebanon to do.

I do think that the recall of the Ambassador is a strong signal. And, as I said, while Lebanon was the proximate cause, this has been growing for some time. You were—you gave us the tool of the Syrian Accountability Act. We were able to use part of that. We continue to review what else we might do.

But we do have to get international pressure on Syria to stop doing some of the things that they were—that they're doing. We were just with—I was just also with President Abbas and with Prime Minister Sharon, and they are trying very hard to push toward some kind of more positive future. And here you have Hezbollah and other terrorist groups, many of them supported by Syria, trying, literally, to blow up the process.



And so, we are sending very strong messages to Syria. I think the message that we sent yesterday was an important one, and we'll see how they respond.

Senator ALLEN. What can the international community do? Clearly, the Egyptians can be helpful, but what can they do, tangibly? Withdrawing our Ambassador is a nice—it's a strong diplomatic signal, but what can our friends, or sometimes friends in the Middle East, or in Europe—what can they do—

Secretary RICE. Well, I think that—

Senator ALLEN [continuing]. To put pressure on Syria?

Secretary RICE [continuing]. If they can send the Syrians a message that this kind of behavior in which they're engaged is not acceptable, then perhaps the Syrians will start to worry more about their isolation, not just from us—their isolation, politically and economically—not just from us, but from others, as well. And, thus far, we've been the only ones to be willing to look at something like the Syrian Accountability Act. But, ultimately, if the Syrians continue down this road, others are going to have to look at similar modes.

Senator ALLEN. I would hope you'll continue to get others. Sanctions are important, but they're most effective if they're joined by other countries. Otherwise, they circumvent them.

Secretary RICE. Right.

Senator ALLEN. Let me, finally, say, you talked about the time of opportunity, that it must not be lost, right now in Israel, vis-à-vis Palestine, with the death of that corrupt terrorist, Yasser Arafat. There is an opportunity. I would encourage you to make sure that the funding that we give to the Palestinians ends up in tangible projects so that it cannot be embezzled or moved away. I find it just absolutely deplorable that they're paying Yasser Arafat's wife \$20 to \$25 million so she'll tell them where all the money is that he purloined and embezzled away from the people of the Palestinian areas. And so, for the credibility of what our funds are going to, to help the Palestinian people, if they were tangible projects rather than money into governmental accounts, I think that will help the credibility of that funding and also actually help the people. Not that I'm saying Abu Mazen would divert it, but the specter of corruption has been there, and there needs to be greater confidence in the transparency and the integrity of Palestinian leaders.

Secretary RICE. I appreciate that, Senator, and we will consult with you on moving forward with the—if we get the allocation—on how it's spent.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Rice, welcome.

I'm glad that the Syria Accountability Act is giving you the tools you need. I was the author of that, with Senator Santorum. We got that through the State Department under—former leadership never supported it. And I was very pleased the President eventually signed it. And I think it could be a model.

I also want to say that Senator Allen makes a good point, in terms of funding to the Palestinian Authority. We're still—we've lost, it seems, \$9 billion in Iraq. We can't find it. We had some hearings that said that millions of dollars were being stuffed into pockets in Iraq. And it's important to have some strings on these funds.

These funds that you're asking for, for the Authority, which I support, they are from our taxpayers, so we really need to, as Senator Allen, said, put some strings on there, put some transparency into that.

I want to make some comments and then ask you some questions.

Senator Biden raised some questions about—in general; it's not just the State Department—these supplemental requests. The administration is clearly funding the war in Iraq through supplemental appropriations. And the ordinary person will say, "Well, what's the difference? They're coming out and asking for the funding." Well, the difference is, the war is off-budget. It doesn't show up in the budget deficit. And I think this approach to budgeting is not giving the American people the true cost of the war in Iraq. And we need to level with the American people.

There's not a penny of this war in the—for this war in the 2006 budget now. I haven't heard anyone say we're bringing the troops home in 2005; nothing in the 2006 budget at all. Frankly, I believe—I served on the Budget Committee for many years, in the House and also in the Senate—that, basically, it hides the deficit number. The dollars go straight to the debt. We're borrowing. It goes straight to the debt. It doesn't show up in the deficit. If it was put into the budget, it would show up. It would be the highest deficit in history.

An example of this, which I find really interesting, is that when we were leading up to the war, many of us talked about the first gulf war and burden-sharing for the cost. As I know that you know, we paid only 20 percent of that war, and our allies paid 80 percent. When we asked about it, we were told by the administration, "We have a coalition. There is burden-sharing," and they were very proud of that. And we were all welcoming whatever partners came in.

Now the American taxpayers are asked to pay between \$200 and \$400 million to these coalition partners. So, in essence, we're paying them for what they did. Now, whether that's right or wrong, begs the question. The point is, we were told there was financial burden-sharing, and, at the end of the day, there isn't.

Maybe it wouldn't be so bad if this budget didn't cut education and local law enforcement, transit programs, and other things. But I think my constituents, at any rate, are not exactly happy with the way the cost of this war is escalating.

When you went through progress for women, it very much interested me. And I noticed that you, rightly, left out Saudi Arabia, did you not?

Secretary RICE. I did.

Senator BOXER. Yes. As we saw, the men go to vote. Here we are in the 21st century. So I'd love to work with you in the future. Maybe we can have some type of targeted effort on women's rights

in Saudi Arabia that we could work on together. Because, clearly, if you listen to Bernard Lewis—and I'm sure you've read many of his writings—a very esteemed historian, who says that if he was to name one reason why the Muslim world is backward, it's because of the treatment of women. So I hope we can work on that.

Now, my questions revolve, again, around Iraq. The Iraqi elections were a very important marker along a difficult and oftentimes painful journey we are making in order to bring our troops home. Fifty-eight percent of Iraqis voted. And that was wonderful. The question that is so important for our troops coming home is, out of the 42 percent who didn't vote, how many of those are sympathetic to the insurgents? Iraqi intelligence estimates there are as many as 200,000 sympathizers and as many as 30,000 armed insurgents. Our own estimates have grown from 5,000 insurgents to 20,000 insurgents. So whatever we do in Iraq, there will not be success until the insurgency becomes weak. We all want our troops to come home, and that great time is tied to a more secure Iraq.

To that end, Senator Lugar held a very important hearing 2 weeks ago, after the Iraqi election, that featured the testimony of General Gregory Newbold, a retired Marine Corps general. General Newbold is a hero who commanded the first marines who landed in Somalia in 1992, and he served as the director of operations of the Joint Chiefs. He was a prime planner for the Iraqi war. He was very involved in that war.

This is what General Newbold had to say about our policy in Iraq. And he made three points, and I'm going to tell you what they are and ask you to respond to them.

Quote, "We have to understand that the fundamental reason for the insurgency, the thing that ties all of the various groups together, is their view that we, the United States, are an occupying power." That's his first point.

Second, he said, quote, "We should implement a regionalization strategy that empowers the more stable provinces. To the stable areas, we should offer increased financial assistance, less coalition presence, and greater autonomy in disbursing aid."

And, third, General Newbold called on the administration to put a 2-year goal for total U.S. withdrawal. He said, and I quote, "Close-mindedness about discussing anything except that our withdrawal is wholly condition-based fuels the perception that we have no intention of withdrawing."

So do you agree or disagree with Marine General Newbold's three points here: One, that we are viewed as an occupying power; two, there should be less coalition presence and more autonomy into stable areas; and, three, we should set a 2-year goal for total U.S. withdrawal?

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator.

As to—let me start with number two, if—

Senator BOXER. Okay.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. You don't mind. In fact, I think that if you looked on the ground, that is essentially what is happening, is that there is greater local autonomy, both in terms of security forces, because there are places that these security forces are capable of acting—

Senator BOXER. Can you name those areas—

Secretary RICE. Well, for—

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Those regions?

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Instance, in the south. If you look at a place like Najaf, which, just a little while ago, was under a threat from another kind of insurgency, the Mahdi Army of—

Senator BOXER. Yeah.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Muqtada al-Sadr, I think you will see that our forces have not been in Najaf for some time. That really is an area that is controlled by Iraqi police and Iraqi forces. It is also an area where the governance structures are working and where provincial leaders are working—

Senator BOXER. So do you think—I mean, I don't—we don't need to go—

Secretary RICE. Just as—

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Into it at great length—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Just as a—

Senator BOXER [continuing]. So you agree with that point he's making, that in the—that there should be less coalition presence and more autonomy in the stable areas.

Secretary RICE. I think you're getting it, because the coalition presence—

Senator BOXER. So you think it's done?

Secretary RICE. No, I don't think it's done, but I think you are getting it, because the coalition presence is more keyed to places where it's needed, and the places where it's needed are not places—

Senator BOXER. Okay, so it's—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Which are stable.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. So you would agree with his comment. You don't think it's an appropriate criticism, because you think it's being done. Is that an accurate—

Secretary RICE. I just think that that's the direction—

Senator BOXER. Okay.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. In which it's moving.

Senator BOXER. And what about his other two points? Your views—

Secretary RICE. On those, I have to say that I think, first of all, American forces are operating there under a multinational U.N. mandate to help the Iraqis do what they cannot do for themselves. And the Iraqis, themselves, will say that without those forces they could not maintain stability in the country. We gave over sovereignty to this country in June 2004, and they've just had an election. These are not occupying forces, the American and other coalition forces, they are forces that are there as a multinational force to provide stability for this new government.

I think it would be a mistake to have a specific 2-year goal, because the only people that I think you will empower with such a goal will be those who hope that we will leave, and leave the place a vacuum, so that they can start again repressing their fellow citizens, as they did under Saddam Hussein.

A goal that says that, as the Iraqis' forces are trained, and as Iraqis can do these functions for themselves, we will be more than happy to leave, I think, is the right way to talk about this.

Senator BOXER. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I—conclude this round and just say this.

I think that this Marine General—I think you should meet with him—I think that he brings to the table real-life experience in war that you and I don't have. And I think that his comment was, at the conclusion of the hearing, when we asked if he was hopeful as he laid out these ideas, he said, "I have absolutely no reason to believe that this administration will change a process that resulted in this mess to begin with." So he's very critical. And this is someone who planned the war in Iraq.

And I just think you're again laying down these condition-based reasons, and the message the people are getting is, we may never leave there. And that was his point. He didn't set a timetable, but he said it should be our goal.

Anyway, thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Boxer.

Let me say that I'm advised that Secretary Rice can stay with us until about 12:20, and I appreciate that. I'm going to try to call upon Senator Martinez and Senator Obama for their regular rounds, and then Senator Boxer has some additional questions, and I would like to recognize her if there is time at that point.

Senator Martinez.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today.

And, Dr. Rice—Secretary Rice, welcome back. And I should say that I'm extremely pleased with the great success of your recent European trip. I know how important our bilateral—our relations with the European friends is, and I think you've made great progress. I commend you and congratulate you on what, I think, was an extremely successful trip. But I think all Americans cheered for you and were pleased to see.

I want to also associate myself with the comments of Senator Allen with respect to Syria. And, I think, it's correct that you would take the action that you would take today, with the withdrawal of the Ambassador. Even though the immediate responsibility for the horrible acts of this week has not been known yet, I do believe that the lack of sovereignty of the Lebanese people ought to be something we keep uppermost in our mind, and it is, I think, a crucial element of achieving a lasting Middle Eastern peace, is to have Lebanon be a free and independent state where the terrorism in the southern part of Lebanon is curtailed.

I wanted to ask you two very specific areas in the area of Latin America, one is Plan Colombia. How do you perceive the success of Plan Colombia, and where do you think it will be going in this upcoming budget?

Secretary RICE. Well, we obviously have to continue support for Plan Colombia, particularly at a time when we have a president, in President Uribe, who has put his country on a course to really deal with the narco-trafficking of FARC.

The Plan Colombia, of course, does not operate in a vacuum. It does operate in the context of an Andean Initiative, which, I think, is also very important, because, as we've said, if you eradicate in one area and you have growth in another, this will not work.

We're also looking to the Colombians for what I will call more normalization of our relationships. For instance, Bob Zoellick, when he was USTR—I guess he still is USTR, but will shortly not be—has engaged the Colombians in discussions on an FTA, which would give longer term economic growth to Colombia.

So we will continue the efforts of Plan Colombia in the way that they've been continued, but, I think, as they make progress against the FARC, you'll want to see the transitioning of some of this to an effort to grow the economy, to do all of the things that will ultimately make this a really stable democracy. And, I think, we believe we have a very excellent partner in President Uribe.

Senator MARTINEZ. I had talked to you in the past in terms of the importance of promoting democracy. I know the President's Inaugural speech and, obviously, in his State of the Union message, as well, it's a clear purpose of the current foreign policy of this administration to pursue freedom and democracy whenever possible. And you know of my great passion to see that also come to the enslaved people of Cuba.

And I was very pleased with your commitment to the promotion of democracy through a means of communication to people that otherwise have no means of receiving information.

I know, from talking to former Soviet dissidents, as well as other freed Europeans, and seeing the comments that they make, that Radio Free Europe was a great constant source of information, of encouragement. Likewise, I've had recent experiences in TV Marti. And some of my initial remarks as a Member of this Senate were broadcast back to Cuba by TV Marti, and I've had very encouraging feedback of the great encouragement that people received from my ascending to this office.

I wonder if, in your current budget, we'll continue to have the same commitment the President expressed in May toward the commitment to be able to overcome the continued jamming of Radio and TV Marti by the Cuban Government with the technological means that we know can do it.

Secretary RICE. Yes. Well, as you know, Senator, we have committed over \$37 million to broadcasting in Cuba, looking at platforms, as well, as a part of that. And there's a real commitment to broadcasting in Cuba, because, as I have mentioned about the more general issue of broadcasting, it's one of our best tools.

This is not a matter of propaganda. This is a matter of simply getting the truth to people who would otherwise not be able to get the truth. And so, as a part of a broad emphasis on broadcasting, which I think is reflected in the budget in increases for broadcasting, the Cuban broadcasting piece of this also received significant funding, and should continue to.

Senator MARTINEZ. Great.

I wanted to also let you know that Chairman Lugar has given me the responsibility of chairing the African Subcommittee, and I will be looking forward to getting with you and other members of your team, as you continue to shape your team, to work in that very important area, where I also have a lot to learn, but I also hope to make some contribution to this committee's work.

Secretary RICE. Thank you. I look forward to working with you.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez.

Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Rice, congratulations on your confirmation and what appears to have been a successful trip. Welcome back.

I missed some of your opening testimony, although I have the opportunity to read it. And so, I apologize if I end up going over some ground that you already answered.

The first issue I want to focus on, and we talked a little bit about this during your confirmation hearing, was the issue of loose nuclear material. And, you know, the President's statement, shared by nominee John Kerry, about the number one priority being securing loose nuclear material, I wanted to find whether the budget request here has accelerated our ability to secure those—that nuclear material. And, if so, do we, at this point, have some sense of a timeline? I'm working off a previous estimate that, if we were going off—

Secretary RICE. Right.

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. On our current pace, it would take about 13 years. Have we ratcheted that up? And, if so, can you give me some sense of what this budget does to that process?

Secretary RICE. Well, most of the funding for the kinds of programs that will accelerate the securing of nuclear materials actually reside in the Energy Department budget. And, in my previous life, we worked very hard to make certain that the Energy Department could be on a time schedule that would secure those materials within 4 years, not 13, which would have been the natural—

Senator OBAMA. Right.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Glide path. I have not, myself, reviewed the Energy Department's budget submission, but that's where—

Senator OBAMA. Okay, so that's where—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. That would be.

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. The money's going to be housed. And so—

Secretary RICE. That would—

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. We're going to have—

Secretary RICE. We have, in State, some Nunn-Lugar-type programs, and, for instance, assistance for WMD scientists—

Senator OBAMA. Right.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. To do other things; flexibility, for instance, that allowed us to do something about Libyan scientists. But the great bulk of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is either in Energy or in Defense.

Senator OBAMA. Okay. And is that coordinated—

Secretary RICE. It's coordinated—

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. Through your office?

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Through the National Security Council.

Senator OBAMA. The National Security Council, okay. So in your previous job, you would have—

Secretary RICE. I did—

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. Been involved—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Coordinate it, yes.

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. In that. Okay. Why don't I shift gears, then, and ask a little bit about some of the public diplomacy issues and other initiatives that are contained in this budget.

It strikes me that promoting democracy, in and of itself, is an important function. But, as is true, I think, in this country, democracy works best when we have an informed citizenry. One of the repeated problems we've always heard about, and I've experienced firsthand, when you travel in Muslim countries, is the huge numbers of young people who lack educational opportunity. And that void has then been filled in many areas of the Middle East with Madrasas and other schools that are not necessarily promoting the sort of civic virtues that, you know, not only we might encourage, as Americans, but that would help sustain the long-term, stable democracy. And I'm wondering, in this budget, where some of that—if you agree with that, that that's an important priority, and, if so, what are we doing through the State Department, and where will that be reflected in the budget, some expenditures, in terms of promoting education, in these countries?

Secretary RICE. You would look, principally, to, really, two sources. First of all, through the economic-support funds. We often are supporting educational initiatives in various countries. For instance, in Pakistan we've had a program of almost \$100 million in Pakistan of trying to support educational initiatives that are Pakistani educational initiatives.

As you might appreciate, Senator, this is a delicate matter.

Senator OBAMA. Yeah.

Secretary RICE. The idea that the United States would come in and impose, somehow, educational programs in these countries would be not very well received. So what we've done is to work with countries to develop their—to help fund their own educational initiatives that we feel are strong. And some of the best are in places like Pakistan. USAID also has a number of educational initiatives in key countries. But the textbook reform initiatives—there would be, for instance, in the Palestinian territories, if you were to look, one of the major textbook reform initiatives there is actually a USAID initiative. So we are trying to approach this question of the ideology of hatred that gets taught, unfortunately, at the earliest stages.

On the public-diplomacy side, and I appreciate very much your support for that, we are plussing-up public diplomacy in the budget, because we need not only to be able to add to the infrastructure of public diplomacy—that is, what we do out in the field through our Embassies—but also in educational and cultural affairs. And I hope we will get the support of this committee for a significant increase that we've made to the educational and cultural affairs accounts to increase our educational—

Senator OBAMA. Right.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Exchanges. And one of the initiatives that we're looking at is how we can use these to reach disaffected populations within countries. I'm sure that if you had done some exchanges with the United States in 1950 or 1955, you might not have gotten a very diverse group.

Senator OBAMA. Right.



Secretary RICE. Similarly, educational exchanges with other countries where people are not fully into the mainstream might not give you diversity, in terms of the Muslim population. So—

Senator OBAMA. Right.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. We're looking at that.

Senator OBAMA. Well, I think that would be very positive. I appreciate your statement that, on the education front, if it was perceived that we were structuring curriculums that extolled the virtues of the United States, then, you know, there would be suspicion, and it probably would lose credibility.

You know, it's not only the ideology of hatred, I guess, that I want to reach at. I mean, I am confident that if young people have prospects and hope in these countries, then that is the most important ingredient in stabilizing the countries and incorporating them into a modern, global political economy.

And so, I would be interested, maybe if your staff could just give me some sense of how those projects are moving forward and how they're funded, how we evaluate them, where they've been most successful. That's something that I would be interested in.

Let me just pick up on one last point, because I'm sure I'm going to be running out of time fairly soon.

Progress on Iraqi oil production. You know, the State Department now is going to be involved, as I understand it, in the reconstruction process, in supervising some of that. And, you know, we had, obviously, very optimistic estimates, in terms of how quickly we would get Iraqi oil production up and running. Recognizing that the insurgency has stalled some of that, we have also been hearing some disturbing reports about mismanagement of some of the aid that's gone there and how that's been handled.

Can you give me a sense, at this point—your best assessment of where we're at, in terms of Iraqi oil production, how soon some of that money is then going to be plowed back into reconstruction, and what that means for United States taxpayers, in terms of the burdens that they are carrying?

Secretary RICE. Well, we were doing, really, rather well, in terms of getting production back up to prewar levels for most of the last several months—at one point, about 2.5 million barrels a day—and then being able to export. The problem has arisen, of course, because of, literally, sabotage of some of the oil infrastructure and efforts now to protect that oil infrastructure through the Ministry of Oil and through the Ministry of Interior, with forces that are dedicated to that.

We do have significant projects that are aimed at the rehabilitation of existing Iraqi oil infrastructure so that they can, not only increase their production, but maintain it. As you know, with oil infrastructure, that's one of the problems. It's not just getting it to a certain level, but it's actually maintaining it. And because Iraq was, in effect, isolated from the international technology for oil, it was a—it's a fairly—had been a fairly creaky infrastructure. But, again, it was producing pretty effectively.

What we hope to do is that there will be investments in the oil infrastructure. But, of course, ultimately the answer for the Iraqis will be to get private capital investment in their oil infrastructure. And if the security situation gets somewhat better, I think you will

see that kind of investment, because there are a number of countries that have expressed to the Iraqis their desire to help with investment in infrastructure. The Iraqis, of course, are also going to have to make some decisions about what laws they will have about foreign investment and what that will mean.

But the—it's very high on the agenda of infrastructure to help the Iraqis continue their oil production at least at prewar levels. Much beyond that, you would have to do pretty major investments in their oil infrastructure, just because it's very creaky from having been isolated from the international system for so long.

Senator OBAMA. Okay.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Obama.

We will commence a second round. And I will pass, withholding my questions, and recognize the distinguished ranking member.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I understand the Secretary has to leave shortly, and I have an opportunity, as you do, to speak with her frequently. What I'll do is submit my questions in writing.

I have some questions, Dr. Rice, about Iran. I have questions, followup, about oil. We're at prewar levels, but there's a \$30 billion investment needed, and how we're going to go about that. And I have questions about the issue about how we deal with our friends in the region, particularly the Saudis, as it relates to the charitable organizations that still are in operation.

But I'll yield to my colleague and friend from California for her questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be as brief as possible.

I have, really, one question about Iran, but it's—I'm going to preface it.

When we look at the administration's policy in Iraq, it's very much a hands-on policy, to put it mildly. It is now pretty much—with your request to pay back the coalition partners, it's almost 100-percent funded, maybe 97- or 95-percent funded, by American taxpayers. We know, day after day, it's—we're calling the shots there. And whether you believe, as General—Marine General Newbold does, that we're seen as an occupier, the fact is, our presence there is enormous. It's huge. And we still won't set a goal for when—a goal—for when we want to leave. And we haven't heard any statements that, you know, we won't be there for the indefinite period.

So, if you contrast that to Iran, it's such a stark difference in the way we're approaching it. Here we are, you know, day in and day out, a hands-on policy in Iraq, and, in Iran, we're outsiders looking in. And your comment that came out of your meetings—and, by the way, I'm really glad that we saw you with our allies, and I hope the days of "Freedom Fries" and "Old Europe"—obviously, Secretary Rumsfeld handled that adroitly—and comments that we should forgive Russia, ignore Germany, and punish France—that that's part of the past. And it looked like that was the case, and it was reassuring, I think, to the world, to see that. So, thank you for that.

But the Europeans have said they need you as help in order to achieve a negotiated solution. To quote the French Foreign Minister, he said, "We need the confidence and the support of the United States in this very delicate phase, and that's the message we convey to Condi Rice," unquote.

Your comment, coming out of last week, was, "Negotiations between Iran and Europe cannot go on forever." That was the quote that made it here.

Now, I don't blame you for criticizing negotiations between Europe and Iran if you believe they're not working. That's—you've got to call it the way you see it. I don't have a problem with that. But you're being critical from the outside looking in. And so, if the talks need a jumpstart, why don't we get involved? As my colleague, Senator Biden, has been quoted as saying, Why aren't we part of the dialog? How can that hurt? It can only help. Especially with you coming in now and us having this fresh start.

So, rather than say, "These negotiations can't go on forever," why don't we become part of the dialog there?

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator.

Let me say, I—we've not been critical of these negotiations. In fact, I heard, from our European partners, that they believe that, without our cooperation, coordination, consultation, that they would not be in the position that they are now. I believe that Secretary Straw said something—

Senator BOXER. Coordination in—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Along those lines.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. What way?

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Along—

Senator BOXER. Coordination—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Those lines.

Senator BOXER. Coordination in what way?

Secretary RICE. We talk frequently about what is happening in the negotiations, what is being offered to the Iranians, what needs—the Europeans, I think, are being very straightforward with the—

Senator BOXER. So you talk—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Iranian—

Senator BOXER [continuing]. To the Europeans, but you don't talk to the Iranians.

Secretary RICE. No. And I would hope that we wouldn't allow the Iranians to create another condition for doing what it is that they need to do. And I said, when I was in London, that the Europeans have given the Iranians a path by which to demonstrate to the world that they're prepared to live up to their international obligations. And the Iranians ought to take that offer.

Senator BOXER. Right. So you think the Europeans are pleased with what you're doing. Then why would they say, "We need the confidence and the support of the United States in this very delicate phase, and that's the message we convey to Condi Rice"?

Secretary RICE. Well, I tried to reassure them, and—when I talked with them—that we, in fact, do want their negotiations to succeed, that we believe that we are getting information and consultation with the Europeans about what they are requiring of the Iranians. We are completely in agreement with them that the Ira-

nians ought to stop enriching and that the Iranians ought to be involved, instead, in a kind of fuel-provision arrangement, which is something, by the way, that the President proposed at the National Defense University some time ago.

So we are hopeful that the Europeans can do what they hope to do with the Iranians. I don't think we need to create new conditions of the United States, as to do—

Senator BOXER. Well, no one is asking for new conditions. I don't think so. I think—so do you agree with Senator Biden, when he says we should be part of dialog, that you're already part of the dialog?

Secretary RICE. I believe that we are a part of the dialog with the Europeans about how the Iranians could come into compliance with their international obligations.

Senator BOXER. Okay. So we are in dialog with the Europeans, even though they're complaining and want more support from you. You feel satisfied we're giving them that support. But we are not in dialog—

I want to yield to you, yes.

Senator BIDEN. No, no, just a moment—

Senator BOXER. Yes, that's what I—

Senator BIDEN. I don't think we should only be in dialog with the Europeans. I think we should be in dialog with the Iranians—

Senator BOXER. That was the point—

Secretary RICE. That, we—

Senator BOXER [continuing]. I started—

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. As well.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Are not.

Senator BIDEN. Yeah.

Senator BOXER. That's the point—

Secretary RICE. We are not in dialog with—

Senator BOXER [continuing]. I was—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. The Iranians.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Trying to make here. So, I think a dialog goes on between both sides. That's what—I didn't want to put words in Senator Biden's mouth. But the fact is, a dialog means you're talking to all the sides.

So, you're saying you're talking to the Europeans. It seems to me they would like a little more. And I'm just hoping that you're not wedded to that approach, because, as my mother always taught me, from the time I was a child, words are okay. It's okay to talk. It's okay to have differences. It's okay to lay them out. And I think you're so articulate, and I think if you set your mind to it, we could have a breakthrough over there.

Secretary RICE. Well, I appreciate that, Senator, but let me just say, the Iranians know what they need to do. They don't need to talk to us about it. They know what they need to do. They need to live up to their international obligations. They need to stop enriching. They need to stop trying to, under cover of a civilian nuclear power program, get a nuclear—

Senator BOXER. Well, you—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Weapon.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Keep saying the Iranians know what they need to do. I think maybe they need to hear it in a more

direct fashion. I mean, my mother always said I knew what I needed to do, but, believe me, she told me again and again what I had to do.

So, I wouldn't downplay the fact that your being more involved there, with both sides, is a small matter. I think it's a big matter, and I hope you will, perhaps, follow the advice of a couple of us, who think a little bit more dialog with both sides might break through.

Secretary RICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.

Thank you very much, Secretary Rice. We very much appreciate your coming to the committee today, and your forthcoming responses to our questions. We look forward to working with you on the budget and on our authorization bill.

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much, Senator. I look forward to working with you, too.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

#### ADDITIONAL STATEMENT AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

##### PREPARED STATEMENT OF U.S. SENATOR LAMAR ALEXANDER

At her confirmation hearing before this committee last month, Secretary Rice stressed, "The time for diplomacy is now." She said there would be a new emphasis on diplomatic activity to advance the Administration's foreign policy objectives. Actions speak louder than words, and the actions of both the Secretary and President Bush have shown the truth of her statement.

Secretary Rice has just returned from a trip to Europe and the Middle East that has helped jump-start the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians. The President has unveiled a budget request that puts greater emphasis on diplomacy as a tool in the War on Terror.

The President's budget calls for a 13-percent increase in the international affairs budget over what was appropriated last year. That's a higher increase than in any other part of the budget, except for Commerce—Defense and Homeland Security each rose by about 4 percent. That 13-percent increase includes more money to fight HIV/AIDS around the world and more money for the Millennium Challenge Corporation that helps poorer countries that have committed to democracy, open markets, and the rule of law.

I was pleased to see an increase of 19.4 percent (\$70 million increase) for education and cultural exchange. We are living in a time when American motives are widely questioned and often misunderstood. Few things will do more to help other cultures understand us (and help us understand them) than increased contact through bringing students and leaders here and sending our students, leaders, and others there. This is true not only in the Arab world, which is rightly the focus of our efforts to "win hearts and minds," but also in Russia, China, and other countries where the people were taught to hate Americans in the past.

Today our nation faces three critical challenges:

1. Defeat terrorism.
2. Succeed in an increasingly competitive global marketplace.
3. Preserve our common American culture.

Increased cultural exchange is not a silver bullet for solving any of these problems, but it is a tool that can help, especially with the first two.

To defeat terrorism, we need more cultural exchange with the Middle East. As more Arabs study and visit the United States, they will understand our character and desire to be a force for freedom—not tyranny—in their part of the world. As more Americans visit the Arab world, we will come to understand their culture, and respect their religious choices.

To improve our competitiveness, we need more cultural exchange with the burgeoning economies of the world, especially China. If the United States is to successfully access the Chinese market, more Americans need to understand their lan-

guage, culture, and business practices. Similarly, if China is to continue growing and attracting investment from the West, they need more Chinese that understand our language, culture, and legal structures for protecting business investments.

Spending money on cultural exchange, however, is not enough to facilitate stronger connections between Americans and the world. Our visa policy must show a similar dedication to openness, while still preserving American security. Since September 11, 2001, we have clamped down and our visa policy has become stricter. As a result, applications to American graduate schools declined 28 percent last year. Those from China fell 45 percent; from India, 28 percent. We must reverse this trend.

Last week, the State Department took an important step in the right direction by announcing a change in the visa mantis clearance process that will extend the validity of that clearance to the duration of study (up to 4 years) for students who remain enrolled in the same program here in the United States. The average time for a mantis clearance is also now down from 77 days to a mere 14. This is a dramatic improvement.

Yet more can be done. Next month, I hope to hold a roundtable with key Senators and key decisionmakers from involved agencies to see what more steps can be taken to improve our visa policy so that we no longer discourage foreign students and researchers from visiting the United States. I ask Secretary Rice to help me identify the key decisionmaker in the State Department who should attend that discussion.

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RESPONSES FROM SECRETARY OF STATE CONDOLEEZZA RICE TO QUESTIONS  
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR

*Question.* I am concerned about the funds available for the Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry. Like its predecessors in the former Soviet Union, the ISTC and STCU, its goal is to re-employ former weapons scientists in peaceful pursuits. It is intended to keep hundreds of individuals with WMD expertise from selling their expertise to rogue states and terrorist organizations. The Committee looks forward to working with you to ensure that this important program is continued. Can you share your thought on the program and your plans for its future?

*Answer.* The State Department's program to redirect Iraqi weapons scientists to peaceful, civilian employment in support of Iraqi reconstruction is a priority non-proliferation effort, and the program office—the Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry (IICSI)—has been operating in Baghdad for nearly a year.

Well over a hundred Iraqi scientists, technicians and engineers with WMD or missile expertise are currently participating in IICSI activities for which they receive monthly stipends. The Center, working with the Embassy, is now actively involved with Iraqi government ministries to find participating scientists permanent positions with those ministries. At the same time, IICSI continues to expand its outreach to other Iraqis with WMD experience who have not yet benefited from the program.

We are determined to maintain this vital program in operation as long as it is needed and have included it in our FY 2006 budget request.

*Question.* The administration is proposing a total of \$3.2 billion in funding to fight the international HIV/AIDS epidemic. Of that amount, \$300 million is allocated to be distributed multilaterally through the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria with the rest to be allocated through bilateral channels. Why are we not putting more funding into the Global Fund? Is the administration disappointed in its administration of funds or its accountability in the use of resources? How would you characterize the best balance we should aim to strike between bilateral approaches and multilateral approaches in fighting HIV/AIDS?

*Answer.* The U.S. Government provided \$2.4 billion under the Emergency Plan for international HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria activities in fiscal year (FY) 2004, more funding than all other donor governments combined. U.S. Government agencies operate or fund HIV/AIDS research, prevention, care and treatment programs in more than 100 countries. The FY 2005 budget is \$2.8 billion, and the administration has requested \$3.2 billion for FY 2006.

In total, the United States has pledged 35 percent (\$2.12 billion) of the \$6.0 billion in pledges to the Fund through 2008, and 32.4 percent (\$1.08 billion) of the \$3.3 billion contributed to date. Nevertheless, as you know, the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003 mandates that the U.S. contribution to the Fund may not exceed 33 percent of total contributions at any time during the period of FY 2004–FY 2008. On July 31 of each year from 2004 through 2008, Ambassador Randall L. Tobias, the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, assesses the cumulative amount of non-U.S. government contributions to the Fund—

measured from October 1, 2003—to determine how much of our annual appropriation from the Congress designated for the Fund we can contribute and still stay below that 33 percent threshold.

It is important to emphasize that in FY 2004, the United States was unable to contribute the full \$547 million Congress appropriated for the Fund because other donors' contributions were not sufficient to allow us to provide this amount without exceeding the 33 percent cap, mandated by the Congress. The \$87.8 million the U.S. Government was unable to contribute last year remains available for contribution through this Fiscal Year, in addition to the appropriation of \$347 million for FY 2005. This brings the total possible U.S. Government pledge for FY 2005 to \$435 million, but, as with last year, other donors must contribute enough to the Fund to keep our share below the Congressionally imposed 33-percent ceiling. For the United States to maximize its possible Fiscal Year 2005 contribution to the Fund, other donors will need to have contributed (not just pledged) approximately an additional \$836 million by July 31, 2005.

There is no set formula for balancing funding between bilateral programming and the Global Fund. The United States is guided in its decision-making largely by the emergency nature and other needs of the pandemic. With two decades of expertise fighting HIV/AIDS in the United States and worldwide; field presence and strong relationships with host governments in over 100 countries; and well-developed partnerships with non-governmental, faith-based and international organizations that deliver HIV/AIDS programs, the U.S. is uniquely positioned to scale up funding and HIV/AIDS services rapidly, efficiently, and effectively. The balance the Emergency Plan has struck between its bilateral and multilateral contributions ensures our tax dollars are spent in the most effective ways possible in combating HIV/AIDS internationally.

We are deeply committed to the long-term success of the Global Fund as an international instrument for financing health interventions; the United States was the first donor to the Fund, and we have always been and remain the largest. Our investment in the Fund is now our largest commitment to combating malaria and tuberculosis around the world, and allows us to have projects (one-third funded by the United States) in countries where we do not have our own bilateral programs.

The Global Fund is, however, still a comparatively new institution, and is still in the process of establishing the institutional infrastructure and management processes and controls to ensure the organization fulfills its specific mandate and that it uses funds efficiently and effectively. The Global Fund is a critical part of the Emergency Plan's overall strategy. It will be very difficult to achieve the long-term victory we envision in the worldwide campaign against these diseases without it, but other nations need to do more to meet the terrible challenge of global HIV/AIDS. The United States has led the way in helping create the Global Fund, and has set a high bar through our own contributions for other donors to match our efforts by increasing their financial commitments to the Global Fund.

*Question.* The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108–25) states the Sense of Congress that by the end of fiscal 2006, U.S. assistance programs should be providing anti-retroviral therapy to 2 million patients. Are we on track to meet this target? The legislation also requires that for fiscal years 2006 through 2008, 10% of authorized funds be devoted to helping orphans and vulnerable children. How will you meet this target under the FY 2006 request?

*Answer.* The Emergency Plan has moved rapidly to support national strategies for treatment in partnership with the public and private sectors, committing more than \$231.9 million for ART, or 40.8 percent of the total resources available in the 15 focus countries. The results of these joint U.S./host-country efforts are impressive. In the first eight months of the Emergency Plan, the United States has supported ART for 155,000 HIV-infected adults and children in the 15 focus countries, achieving 76 percent of its target for June 2005. As a reference point for this rapid progress, in December 2002, one month before President Bush announced the Emergency Plan, only 50,000 people were reported as receiving ART in all of sub-Saharan Africa. Eight months into the Emergency Plan, three times that number were receiving treatment. The Plan is well on track to meet the goal of supporting ART for 2 million adults and children in five years.

The Emergency Plan is dedicated to expanding care and ART to HIV-infected children, supporting ART for at least 4,800 children during the first reporting period. Few sites are currently able to disaggregate data by adults and children, so the number of children receiving ART is likely underreported.

The Emergency Plan includes a range of activities aimed at improving the lives of children and families affected by HIV/AIDS. Activities include caregiver training;

access to education; economic support; targeted food and nutrition support; legal aid; medical, psychological, or emotional care; and other social and material support.

In FY04 President Bush's Emergency Plan moved rapidly to expand services for orphans and vulnerable children, committing \$36,322,000 of the resources available in the focus countries. With an emphasis on strengthening communities to meet the needs of orphans and vulnerable children affected by HIV/AIDS, supporting community-based responses, helping children and adolescents meet their own needs, and creating a supportive social environment, these resources led to supportive care for 630,200 orphans and vulnerable children in the 15 focus countries, provided primarily through community- and faith-based organizations. In addition to the amount dedicated to the resources for orphans and vulnerable children previously mentioned, the Emergency Plan also supported antiretroviral treatment for orphans and vulnerable children living with HIV/AIDS, significantly increasing funds for this important group to over 10% of the budget for the fiscal year.

*Question.* The MCC has not been funded at the level requested for the last two years. This year, the administration is asking for \$3 billion. Do you expect full funding this year? What would be the consequences of not having the full \$3 billion for FY06?

*Answer.* Yes, we do expect full funding of the MCC budget request this year. Funding the MCC at the full \$3 billion level requested will be crucial to fulfilling President Bush's commitment to reduce poverty by promoting economic growth in the developing world. With full funding, the MCC can achieve tangible results by working in partnership with eligible countries to break the cycle of poverty. Not only does this reflect America's core values, but by stimulating economic growth and encouraging good governance, it also enhances U.S. security and promotes freedom and democracy throughout the world.

*Question.* Given the recent Volcker Commission revelations about mismanagement and corruption within the United Nation's Oil-for-Food program, how would the administration view the legislation that would withhold all or some of our dues payments to the United Nations?

*Answer.* We are concerned about the issues identified in the interim Volcker Commission report and the need to improve oversight within the United Nation's (UN) system. In response to a U.S.-led reform initiative, the General Assembly this past December strengthened the regulations for the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) reporting procedures which now requires the OIOS to make original versions of its reports available to member states on request. This represents a significant and positive reform that will provide greater insight into the U.N.'s operations, and we continue to actively press for further improvements in U.N. oversight.

We have requested \$439 million for the U.N. Regular Budget for FY06. We believe the adopted U.N. budget level advances U.S. interests in important ways.

The constructive linkage between withholdings of U.S. dues and advancement of U.N. reform is unclear. Withholding payment will compound current cash flow problems which already exist as a result of our recurring late ("deferred") payment.

*Question.* The FY 2006 budget request includes \$328 million within the Diplomatic and Consular Program for public diplomacy. What new ideas do you have for working with public affairs officers and public diplomacy officers in the embassies to provide improved support and guidance for their work? How can we better address the anti-American opinion that often appears in the foreign press?

*Answer.* The Department has worked closely with embassies to develop new initiatives such as American Corners, the Partnerships for Learning compendium of exchange programs, and active exploitation of Internet and language-versioned website material, for just three examples. The public diplomacy bureaus and the Office of the Under Secretary meet regularly with public diplomacy directors of the regional bureaus to ensure close coordination with embassy programs.

The Under Secretary's Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, created in September 2004, was created to strengthen strategic focus, coherence and accountability in public diplomacy and public affairs. It has begun to address this by:

- Coordinating public diplomacy components in the Mission Program Plan and Bureau Program Plan processes, the central processes of the Department for developing funding and other resource support for embassy initiatives;
- Expanding the PART process to cover all public diplomacy programs. (PART has been implemented successfully in ECA for the past several years.) PART will provide bureaus and field posts the first set of realistic performance indicators for public diplomacy and public affairs;



- Directing public diplomacy resource managers to match their budgets country-by-country with policy priorities.

The goal is to ensure that we provide our public diplomacy officers overseas and in Washington with support and guidance necessary to engage, inform and influence publics in support of our national foreign policy objectives, and to be able to demonstrate to the Executive Branch, Congress, and the taxpayer with confidence that public diplomacy and public affairs resources are being used effectively.

As for addressing anti-American opinion in foreign press, there is no easy answer. We must stay engaged with foreign media and opinion leaders; we must be part of the discussion of critical issues. We support our embassies in the effort in several ways:

- The daily policy guidance process, which ensures that embassies have current U.S. policy positions;
- Website support, which provides policy and background material for distribution in country, often in the vernacular, including Arabic, Chinese, Russian, French, Spanish and Persian, as well as English;
- Frequent briefings of foreign journalists, in the Foreign Press Centers in Washington and New York and Los Angeles;
- Video News Releases directed to foreign broadcasters;
- Television co-operative programming and other programs to help foreign broadcasters and other journalists to understand U.S. positions and policy on current issues;
- An office dedicated to countering disinformation and misinformation that shares its responses throughout the interagency community.

*Question.* What criteria are used for selecting new countries to participate in the GPOI? What percentage of those new countries do you expect to be outside Africa in FY 2006? Will the addition of new countries increase the overall number of troops to be trained in FY 2006 over FY 2005, or will the number of troops to be trained in Africa be decreased to accommodate the addition of training in other countries?

*Answer.* In Africa, peace support training is implemented through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. Currently, ACOTA plans to increase the number of partner countries, as well as expand the training provided to existing ACOTA partners. Candidates for ACOTA partnership must be countries that have participated in peace support operations or expressed a serious intention to do so and have competent and professional militaries that serve an elected civilian government. The units selected for training must be absent reports of gross abuse of human rights. New candidates for ACOTA partnership are determined through an interagency process in which several offices in the Departments of State and Defense, along with the National Security Council, are represented.

We are still finalizing with DOD how peace support capabilities will be developed in other regions of the world. Since each region is different, the approach to enhancing peace support capabilities may be different. Therefore, it is premature to determine what the percentage of new countries to be trained will be vis-à-vis African countries. Nonetheless, GPOI envisions assisting countries that have a history of participating in international operations.

Training under GPOI will not occur at the expense of training in Africa. New countries trained through GPOI will be in addition to an increased number trained through the ACOTA program. The total number of troops trained in FY 2006 should increase over the number of troops trained in FY 2005.

*Question.* MEPI has been criticized for duplicating efforts of USAID and other State Department Assistance programs. Is it time to establish a single account with a Coordinator to ensure that this is a high priority program and gets the full attention and is as effective in its implementation as possible?

*Answer.* The Department of State does not think that legislation is necessary at this point to establish a single account with a Coordinator. The Deputy Secretary of State, by virtue of his global portfolio oversees strategy direction and implementation of our freedom agenda. The newly appointed Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS) for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) will specifically serve as Coordinator for Broader Middle East Initiatives. While the Department believes it has the right structure, it will continue to determine if any other organizational changes are necessary.

Under the guidance of both the Deputy Secretary and NEA PDAS, MEPI will continue to coordinate with its counterparts in the State Department and other U.S. government agencies, including USAID, through both formal and informal mecha-

nisms, such as regular program and status meetings, inter-agency pillar committee meetings, and coordinated strategic planning and budgeting.

*Question.* The Supplemental includes \$200 million for assistance for the Palestinian Authority with additional \$150 million in the FY 2006 budget request. Has the State Department worked with Palestinian President Abbas to develop a plan which identifies priorities and needs for the use of these funds?

*Answer.* The \$200 million in supplemental assistance for the West Bank and Gaza is intended to support reform and expand economic opportunities for the Palestinian people. This assistance will also help the Palestinians to address key economic and technical issues as they coordinate with Israel to ensure successful Gaza disengagement. It is urgently necessary because the next six months—well before FY06 resources would be available—will see opportunities for progress unprecedented in recent years as regards the peace process: intensified USG involvement in strengthening the PA security services, i.e. General Ward's mission; completion of Israel's disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank (July–September); Palestinian legislative elections (mid-July); continuing Palestinian municipal elections (April and August); and, ideally, an accelerating process of confidence-building and improvements on the ground that will strengthen Abu Mazen and Palestinian moderates. Finally, this assistance will strengthen our arguments to regional states that they need to do more in the way of monetary assistance to the Palestinians and the PA.

The \$150 million request for FY 2006 will focus on medium-term development needs, including reconstruction of Gaza and revitalization of the Palestinian economy in the wake of Israel's withdrawal; establishing the necessary foundations for emerging democracy such as reforming governing institutions and strengthening civil society; and infrastructure development, especially water.

*Question.* Will the funds be used to provide direct aid to the Palestinians or will some or all of it be provided through NGO's or multilateral organizations?

*Answer.* The current assistance package will be channeled through existing mechanisms, including U.S., Palestinian, and international NGO's. Although we do not have any plans to provide direct budgetary support to the PA at this time, we would like to keep the option available, particularly in light of the PA's estimated \$500 million dollar budget gap for 2005. There have been two instances that direct budgetary assistance has been made available to the PA. In December 2004, the U.S. provided \$20 million directly to the PA to finance utility bills in arrearages; another \$20 in direct budgetary assistance was provided in the summer of 2003 for payment of bills in arrears as well as for badly needed infrastructure repairs. Consistent with past decisions on direct budgetary assistance, we will coordinate with Congress as to the best use of appropriations.

*Question.* Do you agree that Palestinian assistance needs to move quickly to ensure there are concrete aid benefits to the people? How can you speed the delivery process once the assistance is approved by Congress?

*Answer.* We agree that assistance is urgently necessary because the next six months—well before FY06 resources would be available—will see opportunities for progress unprecedented in recent years as regards the peace process: intensified USG involvement in strengthening the PA security services, i.e. General Ward's mission; completion of Israel's disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank (July–September); Palestinian legislative elections (mid-July); continuing Palestinian municipal elections (April and August); and, ideally, an accelerating process of confidence-building and improvements on the ground that will strengthen Abu Mazen and Palestinian moderates. Accordingly, the USG reprogrammed \$41 million from previously allocated assistance into quick-disbursing programs designed to make an immediate, tangible impact on the lives of Palestinians, particularly in Gaza.

The United States needs to act quickly to ensure that this time of opportunity is not lost to those who would continue violence. To do this, the new Palestinian President must be supported, and the people of the West Bank and Gaza to see that their daily lives are improving.

*Question.* I understand that General Ward is being named to coordinate the security assistance to the Palestinian Authority. Who is going to coordinate the economic and technical assistance and ensure that bottlenecks in the process are removed?

*Answer.* General Ward's mandate is security. We are seriously looking at what we need to do on other areas such as reconstruction and development. On the political side, the Quartet will continue to meet and encourage both the Israelis and the Palestinians as we move toward the Roadmap. As we have consistently stated, the

Palestinians must continue to improve the security situation in order to achieve a lasting peace.

Regarding economic assistance and potential bottlenecks, our missions in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem will continue to work with the Palestinians, Israelis, the World Bank, fellow donors and other interested parties to ensure economic and technical assistance is delivered efficiently, effectively, and tailored to USG policy interests, most importantly the President's vision of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security.

*Question.* What concrete steps could our "Quartet" partners, the Europeans, Russia and the United Nations take to facilitate positive outcomes? Are we going to coordinate our assistance with other donors?

*Answer.* The international community, and specifically the Quartet, has a vital role in helping Israelis and Palestinians make progress toward the two-state solution. The Quartet continues to support the progress made by both the Israelis and the Palestinians, condemn terror in the strongest possible terms, and encourage other members of the international community to help contribute to our efforts to achieve peace. Within the Quartet framework, the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLIC) is one mechanism by which the international donor community coordinates its assistance to the Palestinians.

*Question.* Do you envision providing assistance to Israel to facilitate its disengagement from Gaza and sites in the West Bank? What do you see as the risks of this effort?

*Answer.* The administration fully supports Israel's plan to disengage from Gaza and parts of the northern West Bank. We view disengagement as an opportunity for a return to the roadmap and fulfillment of the President's vision of two states living side by side in peace and security.

To date, we have not received any request from the Government of Israel for assistance in carrying out disengagement. Should we receive such a request, we would give it appropriate consideration.

*Question.* The FY05 Supplemental includes a request for \$150 million in additional Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Funds for Pakistan. In yesterday's hearing, Mr. Zoellick noted we had come a long way with Pakistan in terms of our counterterrorism cooperation, but that we still had work to do.

How do we intend to use the new FMF money for Pakistan? What expectations do we have of Pakistan regarding counterterrorism cooperation, nuclear non-proliferation, progress in peace talks with India, and democratic development?

*Answer.* The \$150 million was requested to enable the administration to honor its commitments. In FY05 the administration requested \$300 million in ESF and \$300 million in FMF as the first tranche of the President's five-year assistance package to Pakistan. Congress appropriated \$300 million in ESF, but only appropriated \$150 million in new FMF for Pakistan, directing the administration to take the remaining \$150 million from unobligated, prior-year ESF and FMF balances. Because FMF is "obligated upon apportionment" and pursuant to the transfer statute in the FY 2005 Appropriations Act, there are no unobligated FMF funds. Reprogramming unobligated ESF funds for military purposes runs counter to long-standing practice that funds provided for economic purposes should not be transferred for military purposes. This is further codified in permanent legislation in section 610 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibits the transfer of ESF into FMF.

This assistance is intended to help us build a stable, long-term relationship with Pakistan as recommended by the 9/11 Commission. The FMF monies will be used to provide the Pakistani military with capabilities that contribute to counterterrorism operations, enhance border security, and meet Pakistan's legitimate defense needs. The Government of Pakistan has demonstrated its commitment to combating terrorism and is very well aware of the importance the U.S. Government attaches to preventing the spread of nuclear technologies, pursuing regional stability, and building a stable democracy.

*Question.* To follow up the question of why the Department of Defense is training civilian police forces in Iraq, could you please provide for the record a summary of what the State Department's role is in DOD's review of the Iraq security forces training undertaken by General Luck? Is the Department of State, the traditional expert on civilian police force training, engaged in the review process?

*Answer.* GEN (Ret.) Gary Luck led an interagency team to Iraq January 13-20. The purpose of the team was to assess ways in which to accelerate the development of the Iraqi security forces' capacity to play a greater role in fighting the insurgency against the Iraqi Government and people. The team did not focus on the technical skills imparted in basic military and police training. Rather, the team's strategic

focus was on assisting Iraq's Transitional Government to develop leadership and coordinate and combine security resources to maximize effectiveness in this critical post-election period.

The Department of State contributed two officers to General Luck's team. In addition, two senior police officers from Coalition partners participated: Deputy Chief Constable Colin Smith of the UK and BG Leonardo Leso of the Italian Carabinieri. Among those whom team members interviewed were participants in both the DOD police training efforts of the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT) and the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) representatives in the Embassy, INL-funded police trainers and advisors, and the Iraq Reconstruction Management Organization's (IRMO) Senior Consultant to the Ministry of Interior.

In addition, the State Department's Senior Advisor and Iraq Coordinator Ambassador Richard Jones led an interagency team to Iraq February 4–8 to look at non-security aspects of building the capacity of Iraq's post-election Transitional Government, including in such areas as the Ministry of Interior, which controls the police. LTG Odierno of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who participated in both the Luck and Jones missions to Baghdad, served as the link between the two.

*Question.* The State Department currently has authority under the Foreign Assistance Act to ask other agencies to act on its behalf to carry out such activities in other countries, so there is no reason to create a new authority for DOD to undertake the civilian police training mission in Iraq. Why not rely on current authority to allow DOD to carry out such activities rather than seek a new authority for the Department of Defense to carry out what has traditionally been a foreign assistance function?

*Answer.* The Department of State agrees that existing foreign assistance authorities authorize civilian police training by the appropriate U.S. Government entity. Special circumstances that affect U.S. foreign policy interests should continue to be addressed through current interagency mechanisms rather than through new legislation that would extend foreign assistance authorities to the Department of Defense.

*Question.* The Administration's request for assistance to the Philippines for FY 2006 represents a decrease in excess of 30 percent from last year's requested level. This reduction in assistance is perplexing when compared to the President's budget justification stating that winning the war on terrorism is his highest foreign policy justification.

The President has referred to the Philippines as a key partner in the war on terror. The recent bombings in three Philippines cities reportedly carried out by the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group demonstrate the need for sustained assistance to the Philippines.

What is the rationale behind requesting a reduced amount of assistance for the Philippines?

In light of the increased terrorist violence, what steps will the United States take to expand counterterrorism cooperation with the Philippines?

*Answer.* The Economic Support Fund (ESF) request level for the Philippines for FY 2005 was higher than it is in FY 2006 due to expectation that a final peace agreement would have been reached between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 2004. Had a peace agreement come about, additional funding would have been needed to assist its implementation. This did not occur, for a variety of reasons. There was a hiatus in the peace process during the Philippine election campaign and the post-election government restructuring. The Government's failure to deliver on commitments made to the Moro National Liberation Front in 1996 has given rise to doubts on the part of Muslims in general about its willingness to address legitimate grievances. Continued violence by MILF hardliners raises doubts about MILF cohesiveness as a negotiating partner. A key unresolved issue has to do with ancestral domain, the Moro demand for territory to constitute a homeland. The Government of the Philippines, with facilitation by the Government of Malaysia, plans to resume peace negotiations with the MILF in Kuala Lumpur in April, with ancestral domain on the agenda.

The U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP), which President Bush offered to President Arroyo as a resource for the peace process, is still ready to play a role whenever the parties agree. However, to date, USIP has not been invited to the negotiations. USIP is pushing ahead with projects including an intensive study of the issues of ancestral domain, which could be useful in helping to reach an agreement. According to USIP, Philippines Foreign Secretary Romulo has said that ancestral domain provisions of any settlement will be limited to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), an idea MILF officials reject.

The other significant difference between FY 2005 and FY 2006 is the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) request level. For FY 2005, additional FMF funds were requested as part of an effort to jumpstart the new Philippines defense reform initiative. In light of the Philippines commitment of significant national funds for defense reforms, our FY 2006 \$20 million FMF request remains in line with allocations in recent fiscal years.

Prevention of and response to terrorism in the Philippines remains a top administration priority. In that regard, we have requested a significant increase in Anti-Terrorism Assistance from the NADR-ATA account from \$500,000 in FY 2005 to \$5 million in FY 2006. Among the programs being considered is an in-country counterterrorism training program similar to the one that has been very successful in Indonesia. Starting in late 2005 and continuing into 2006, we expect a dramatic increase in law enforcement and counterterrorism cooperation with Philippine police.

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RESPONSES FROM SECRETARY OF STATE CONDOLEEZZA RICE TO QUESTIONS  
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PAUL SARBANES

*Question.* This year's appropriation bill asked the Department to recommend as part of the President's FY 2006 budget how best to fund and manage a scholarship program at the American universities in the Middle East. What are your plans in this respect?

*Answer.* The Department has reviewed the language in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, regarding the funding of scholarships at American educational institutions in the Middle East. Currently, USAID through its programs in Lebanon and Egypt is funding scholarships to American universities. The scholarships offer a cross-section of students access to an American-style education that fosters openness, tolerance and critical thinking. In Lebanon, USAID supports scholarship programs at the American University of Beirut (AUB) and the Lebanese American University (LAU). USAID has allocated \$3.4 million in FY 2005 funds to support these universities programs, as well as \$600,000 for two high school scholarship programs in Lebanon. FY 2006 funding is anticipated to be at the same level. In addition, under its Leadership for Education and Development Program (LEAD), USAID offers full tuition scholarships to the American University in Cairo for 162 public school graduates (54 annually, one male and one female from each of Egypt's governorates).

The Department supports the continuation of such scholarship programs by USAID and USAID's budget request to continue these programs in FY 2006.

*Question.* In the Supplemental request, there is a completely new fund of \$200 million called the "Global War on Terror Partners Fund." From all appearances, this fund will reward nations that support our foreign policy objectives with large infusions of cash. It is my understanding that \$100 million of this will go to Poland, which is one of our partners, and which I certainly support. But I would like to know why this money could not be channeled through normal foreign assistance accounts, such as ESF, which was created for exactly this type of purpose? Which other countries do you plan to assist under this account? And, why was it requested as an emergency supplemental, rather than part of the regular foreign operations budget?

*Answer.* The President submitted to Congress a request that funds the immediate, urgent needs to fight the Global War on Terror and to deal with major unanticipated costs and emergencies. While many of our coalition partners have the ability to shoulder the costs of troop contributions and other support requirements, many other of our partners in freedom have limited national budgets to offset these costs. In many cases, these willing allies are faced with constrained budget resources while at the same time facing a growing demand from their citizens for increased social spending. Thus, this Fund reflects the principle that an investment in a partner in freedom today will help ensure that America will stand united with stronger partners in the future. The criticality of these funds is to ensure that we:

- Support the broader strategy against terrorism;
- Prevent/diminish economic and political dislocation that threatens security of key friends and allies;
- Promote economic growth, good governance and democracy; mitigating root cause of terrorism;
- Offset budget costs associated with troop contributions that would otherwise support increasing civil demands for social programs.
- Programs may include:

- Enhanced support for border security units and improving interdiction and enforcement infrastructure of counternarcotics units;
- Accelerate training and equipping border personnel to prevent illegal migration, smuggling of goods, narcotics trafficking and transiting of terrorists.

Without the immediate influx of assistance supporting these objectives and our partners, our ability to conduct the Global War on Terror could easily be reversed.

What follows, is the list of countries deemed partners in the GWOT for the purposes of this Fund.

LIST OF POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS

Afghanistan	Greece	Oman
Albania	Hungary	Pakistan
Algeria	India	Philippines
Armenia	Indonesia	Poland
Azerbaijan	Jordan	Romania
Bulgaria	Kazakhstan	Russia
Croatia	Kenya	Slovakia
Colombia	Kyrgyz Republic	Slovenia
Czech Republic	Latvia	Tajikistan
Djibouti	Lithuania	Tunisia
Egypt	Macedonia	Turkey
Ethiopia	Malaysia	Turkmenistan
El Salvador	Moldova	Ukraine
Estonia	Mongolia	Uzbekistan
Georgia	Morocco	Yemen

RESPONSES FROM SECRETARY OF STATE CONDOLEEZZA RICE TO QUESTIONS  
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH BIDEN

*Question.* In your discussions during your recent trip to Europe, did you reach any understandings with regard to support we are prepared to provide to the EU-Three effort on Iran? If so, could you please describe the specific steps we are prepared to take?

What did the British, the French, and the Germans tell you they thought would be needed to reach a deal with Tehran?

Has the Administration decided its posture with regard to the EU-3 effort?

*Answer.* We welcome the efforts of the EU-3 and have been working very closely with them on Iran for some time. We continue to share the goal of ensuring that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. While we welcome the EU-3's efforts in this regard, we continue to remain deeply skeptical that Iran will agree to end its nuclear weapons program absent further international pressure. We continue to support the ongoing investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and maintain that the IAEA Board of Governors must report Iran's noncompliance with its Safeguards Agreement to the U.N. Security Council.

*Question.* During your confirmation hearing, you indicated that even if Iran were to make a verifiable agreement to end its nuclear program, it would still not be sufficient to warrant changes in our approach because of other Iranian activities. Have you told the Europeans that if they make progress in other areas of concern to us, we would then be prepared to more actively join with their efforts? If so, how have they responded?

*Answer.* We have always said that we support a peaceful, diplomatic, multilateral resolution to this matter and continue to believe such a resolution is possible. At this point, all options are on the table. We welcome Foreign Minister Fischer's reaffirmation that if Iran does not keep its pledge to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, the EU-3 will support reporting Iran to the U.N. Security Council.

*Question.* The aftermath of the Iraqi elections seems to offer another opportunity to involve key allies in the effort to stabilize Iraq. I have proposed that the President establish a contact group as a way to share in decision-making and coordinate assistance. The group could consist of the United States, the Iraqi government, major European powers, NATO, key regional allies, and the U.N. The group would serve as a sort of board of directors, and we would in effect be the chairman of the board because we are the largest outside provider of troops, resources, and advisers.

a. Are you planning any mechanism like a contact group? If not, why?

b. What specific commitments did you gain for support for Iraq during your trip?

Answer. The United States strongly supports the Iraqi Interim Government's efforts to coordinate international assistance aimed at stabilizing Iraq and contributing to its economic recovery. These efforts have been broad-based and inclusive, as was clear during the several donor conferences held last year as well as the Sharm al Sheikh conference hosted by Egypt.

We will continue to look for ways to enhance the role of the international community in Iraq's recovery. An important initial step in that process will be to seek the views of the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG), once it is formed. Pending the establishment of the new Iraqi government, I discussed mechanisms for enhancing international assistance to Iraq with my counterparts during my recent visit to Europe. President Bush also plans to raise this issue during his upcoming visit to Europe. During my recent visit, I found our European allies very engaged on the goal of improving assistance coordination. I am optimistic that the international community increasingly understands the importance of helping Iraq ensure stability and make progress on its path toward full democracy.

Encouraging international efforts to contribute to Iraq's security, political transition, and economic recovery was a central part of my recent visit to Europe. The European Commission (EC) has been among the major contributors to Iraqi reconstruction efforts, donating 320 million euros in 2003 and 2004. EU member states pledged almost another 1 billion euros at the Madrid Donors' Conference. EU member states were also among the Paris Club creditors who agreed to forgive 80 percent of Iraqi sovereign debt, totaling \$32 billion in debt relief. Several EU member states also provide bilateral assistance to Iraq.

During my visit, I discussed with my European counterparts ways to implement the European Commission's offer of an additional 200 million euros for Iraq's reconstruction in 2005. We also discussed mechanisms to enhance coordination of international assistance to Iraq, pending consultations with the Iraqi Transitional Government. President Bush plans to continue these discussions during his upcoming visit to Europe, and I believe we will make significant progress in the near future.

*Question.* The February 17th unclassified version of State Department's Iraq Weekly Status Report lists the "Total trained and equipped ISF (Iraqi security forces)" as 136,342, but noted that these figures do not include unauthorized absences from either Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Interior forces. In an average week, what proportion of each of the components of the Iraqi security forces are on unauthorized absence?

Answer. The proportion of unauthorized absences for military and police during an average week varies widely between components, geographic region and levels of insurgent intimidation in the area and the time of year. Historically, unauthorized absence rates have ranged from over 50 percent in some cases to negligible in others.

The Department of Defense is the lead agency responsible for reporting Iraqi security force training numbers. Ministry of Defense totals do not include unauthorized absences; Ministry of Interior totals do include unauthorized absences. The State Department remains dedicated to supporting DOD's efforts to establish a responsible, professional, and accountable Iraqi security force.

After the issuance of National Security Presidential Directive 36 in May 2004, which placed the responsibility of developing Iraqi security under the charge of DOD, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) was established and tasked with developing a new culture for security forces—one of responsibility, professionalism, and commitment. Under the former regime, many organizational rules, including leave policies for security officials, were not enforced in a way resembling Western policies. Within the military forces, unauthorized absences appear somewhat ingrained within Iraq's military culture. MNF-I has taken steps to replenish the ranks of units with excessive unauthorized absences, and intends to continue attacking the problem until each Iraqi unit is filled with committed soldiers. Specifically, MNF-I is working with Iraqi military leadership to drop absent soldiers from the rolls and create vacancies that can be matched against replacements (760 soldiers recently filled vacancies in Iraq's 1st Division that were the result of casualties and unauthorized absences). In addition, MNF-I and Iraqi military leaders are directly recruiting former soldiers to serve as individual replacements, and overrecruiting to account for training losses and unauthorized absences. Further, MNF-I is working through Advisory Support Teams to ensure Iraqi leaders at lower levels understand the negative impact of unauthorized absences.

Lastly, MNF-I has focused efforts on toughening the basic training of units in order to identify uncommitted soldiers during training, rather than during combat operations. The preliminary results of these measures are encouraging, and as Iraqi

military units gain more operational experience and confidence, the level of unauthorized absences drops. Our experience tells us that after initial training, every Iraqi unit loses a portion of soldiers. Those who stay, however, have been hardened, and have fought well in Najaf, Samarra, Fallujah, Mosul, and in support of the Iraqi elections.

By all accounts, unauthorized absences are not a problem within the specialized police and paramilitary forces. The elite nature of their duties and the highly discriminating nature of their force selection make it likely that this trend will continue. MNF-I continues to observe these forces to ensure that manning levels do not drop after changes in leadership occur within the Iraqi government.

Though accounting for absences in military and paramilitary forces is relatively straightforward, the nature of duty within conventional police forces and the lack of MNF-I oversight on the ground in each of the 1,200 police and border stations make real time duty strength assessment more difficult. Many stations still do not operate at night, and the lack of automated systems for reporting daily personnel strength makes routine data collection extremely difficult. It may take several months before MNF-I is able to determine the level of unauthorized absences within conventional police forces with the same fidelity as military forces.

*Question.* Could you provide us a comprehensive list of the countries that actually have made an offer that you're aware of, an offer to assist in training Iraqi security forces—police, national guard, any security forces—a description of the specific offers they have made; when the offers were made, and what your response has been and likely will be?

*Answer.* Manning, training, and equipping the Iraqi security forces under the auspices of the Multi-National Forces—Iraq, falls under MNSTC-I and Lieutenant General Petraeus. He is also “dual-hatted” as Commander, NATO Training Mission—Iraq (NTM-I), as the leader of that effort. NATO is executing a series of formal courses in Iraq under NTM-I. Iraqis also attend NATO schools outside Iraq. We understand that MNSTC-I carefully considers all offers made to the Multi-National Force to train the Iraqi security forces. For specific details of the training offers made to MNSTC-I, I will defer to my colleagues at the Department of Defense.

Regarding bilateral offers to train Iraqi security forces made directly to the government of Iraq, we have compiled as much information that we were able to collect, however, we often do not have information about bilateral offers made directly to the government of Iraq by other sovereign governments. With that in mind, the information below is the best information we have available and is not intended to represent a definitive list of bilateral offers made to the Iraqi government.

- *Spain:* Spain has proposed training Iraqi security force personnel at its de-mining center; that offer was made through NATO. The Spanish are considering offering training in the region (outside Iraq) but have made no official offer yet.
- *France:* The French have offered to train 1,500 Iraqi police/gendarmes over an 18-month period. This offer has been made numerous times, at various levels, including by President Chirac to IIG President Al-Yawer in Paris in January 2005. The French training would take place outside of Iraq, most likely in Qatar or in France. The French have made it clear they would be willing to offer the training in out years as well. The Iraqis have not responded to this offer. Separately, the French have offered (through an EU assistance program to Iraq) to provide a 4-week training program to 160 Iraqi police in France this summer.
- *Italy:* Outside of their NATO contributions, the Italians have trained approximately 69 Iraqi staff officers at Italian War College. Italy's Chief of Police has expressed interest in training up to 50 Iraqi police in antiterrorism and organized crime (Mafia) investigations; however, the Iraqis have not yet made a policy decision on this offer.
- *Germany & UAE:* The Germans have been conducting training for both the Iraqi Police Service and the Iraqi Army in the UAE. Four classes in police fundamentals of crime scene investigation (more than 400 students) were executed in 2004 and plans are to continue the program into 2005. Further, there are currently 30 Iraqi police officers attending a course in personal protection training designed to train Iraqi police to protect politicians. That course will be followed by a two-month course in hostage rescue techniques for the same group of police officers (the UAE police will provide that follow-on training). German training programs for the Iraqi Army consist of truck driving and maintenance courses to support vehicles donated to the Iraqi Army and sold to the UAE. That program is expected to continue into 2005 and a schedule is in place. During Chancellor Schroeder's visit to the UAE March 4-5, 2005, the UAE, Germany, and Iraq signed an agreement for additional Iraqi military training. Germany will supply the instructors and construction equipment to train and equip



an Iraqi engineering unit. The UAE will continue to cover most of the expenses and provide facilities.

- *Belgium:* The Belgians have pledged to send 15 to 20 trainers to the UAE to assist the German-led training effort.
- *Turkey:* The Government of Turkey made a bilateral offer to train Iraqi Security Forces before the January 2005 elections. Turkey was disappointed that the Iraqis did not accept or even respond to the offer, which still remains open. The Turks have offered at least five other specific courses through NTM-I.
- *Jordan:* Pilot, crew, and technician training for the UH-1 helicopter and the C-130 aircraft has been conducted in the Kingdom; 313 Iraqis have been trained to date; 1,661 new Iraqi military officers and NCOs (including females) have been trained. Almost 100 Iraqi liaison officers and interpreters have been trained. Over 150 members of Iraqi special police forces have received training at a 12-week course in Jordan; more are currently in training. Jordan also hosts the International Police Training Center (JIPTC) where State/INL international police trainers implement basic police training and border enforcement officer training. The Jordanian Armed Forces also have personnel conducting NCO training in Iraq.
- *Egypt:* President Mubarak made an offer to train Iraqi security personnel “in any discipline” in September 2003. Under a bilateral agreement, the Egyptian Ministry of Interior conducted police training for approximately 258 Iraqi police officers in August 2004. Furthermore, in 2003, 146 Iraqi army personnel received a three-week training course in Egypt. Embassy Cairo informs us that President Mubarak’s security personnel training offer remains valid and the Egyptian Government is prepared to train up to 500 army personnel in four-week training cycles, or up to 5,000 per year; the Iraqi government has not responded.
- *Morocco:* In July 2004, King Mohammed VI’s offer to Prime Minister Allawi to host training courses for the Iraqi police, army, and civil protection units was publicly announced. The King offered training in all fields at all Moroccan training centers and institutes. Our information is that the Iraqi government has not responded.

Both MNF-I and our Embassy in Baghdad are ready to support any offer by our allies to contribute to the MNF-I and MNSTC-I programs to train the Iraqi Security Forces. We understand, based on statements made by Iraqi government officials, that it prefers training be conducted in Iraq and coordinated by MNSTC-I or NTM-I. We have supported the Iraqi government’s desires and have emphasized with others that in-country training is the preferred option. However, the Iraqi Government and its allies are free to conclude their own bilateral agreements. We will offer the Iraqi government resources and expertise to assist them in evaluating and facilitating bilateral training offers where possible. But, in the end, acceptance or rejection of bilateral offers of Iraqi Security Force training is ultimately an Iraqi Government decision.

*Question.* The President’s \$81.9 billion supplemental request explains the need for an additional \$5.7 billion for training Iraqi security forces by noting in part that “all but one of these 90 battalions, however, are lightly equipped and armed, and have very limited mobility and sustainment capabilities.”

In light of this fact, could you elaborate on the criteria used to designate a member of the Iraqi security forces as “trained and equipped” in the Iraq Weekly Status Reports?

*Answer.* The term “trained” was defined by the Department of Defense to be quantifiable and consistent. An Iraqi Security Force member is considered trained and equipped after he completes the appropriate institutional training program, demonstrates the ability to meet the minimum standards established in the program, and is provided with the essential equipment items required for an assigned mission. Roughly 140,000 Iraqis have achieved the established standards for the institutional phase of their training, received their required equipment, and graduated from their respective courses. Most forces, however, still lack the capacity to conduct and sustain independent counterinsurgency operations and therefore continue to develop their skills through on-the-job training, mentoring and experience gained in actual operations.

Iraqi police courses are offered at regional training centers and are coordinated by the Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. DOD’s Multi-National Security Training Command (MNSTC-I) coordinates Iraqi Army courses at the basic training center at Kirkush Military Center. Graduation rates from these two training facilities indicate an objective measure of evaluated training in a controlled environment under supervised conditions.

Key elements presently being addressed for “post-graduate” forces include leadership, establishing properly manned, trained and capable headquarters, reversing absenteeism, and revitalizing a military ethos committed to national service under civilian control. The State Department remains committed to supporting DOD’s efforts to provide Iraqi security forces with the training and equipment necessary for lasting effectiveness.

*Question.* I share the Administration’s opposition to the prospect of the European Union lifting its embargo on sales of weapons to China.

- a. What specific concerns does the Administration have?
- b. What is the likelihood the EU will not proceed to end the embargo?
- c. Assuming the EU does proceed to lift the embargo, are there other steps we’re urging them to take that would mitigate our concerns? If not, what do we intend to do about it?

*Answer.* The embargo was imposed in response to the killings of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Chinese citizens by Chinese troops during the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Fifteen years later, over 200 citizens remain in prison for their political activities during the Tiananmen demonstrations, and China has refused to undertake a reassessment of the event. In addition, the Government has never provided a comprehensive, credible accounting of all those missing or detained in connection with Tiananmen. Overall, although China clearly has made significant progress in the areas of economic and social reforms since 1989, there has been very little political reform and government authorities continue to suppress any religious, political or social groups, as well as individuals, that they perceive to be a threat to government power or stability. Citizens who seek to express openly dissenting political or religious views face repression. Lifting the embargo would send a signal that the EU considers the lack of accountability for the Tiananmen massacre and the current poor human rights situation acceptable.

From a strategic perspective, the lifting of the embargo would send the wrong signal regarding arms sales to China and likely result in an increase in arms sold to China. If the EU lifts the embargo, the overall restraint inherent in an EU-wide policy would be gone. While there may be no current intentions to sell specific weapons, even with the arms embargo and a Code of Conduct in place, the sales of licensed military-related goods to China by European states doubled from 2002–2003. The pressure from China and from domestic industries to make additional sales will only increase with the embargo lifted. Lifting the embargo sends a clear signal that the EU is open to considering military exports to China. The Administration is unconvinced that the EU’s proposed arms export regimes to replace the embargo, consisting of an enhanced Code of Conduct and a “toolbox” for post-embargo states, could fulfill the commitment the EU made in December 2004 that EU member states would not increase arms exports to China in quantitative or qualitative terms. Lifting the embargo would also send a signal to non-EU arms exporters that sales to China are acceptable. An increase in arms sales would be perceived as destabilizing by China’s neighbors.

While the EU continues to state it is working towards lifting the embargo, it is not clear that a consensus has been reached on lifting the embargo under the current Luxembourg Presidency. We are hopeful that senior EU and EU Member State officials will recognize the validity of repeated Administration and Congressional arguments, as well as the views expressed by many others (including Europeans), that lifting the embargo at this time would be unwise.

We have advised the EU that we will not negotiate terms for lifting the embargo nor will we intercede with Congress. Our position is clear: ending the embargo is a bad idea and we will not support the European Union doing so. Rather than rush to lift the embargo, we have encouraged our European partners to engage with us and the Japanese on a strategic dialogue regarding China.

*Question.* On February 1, the King of Nepal dismissed his country’s government, suspended civil liberties (including right of assembly and freedom of the press), placed dozens of top political figures under summary detention, and gave free rein to security forces whose human rights record had already been described by the State Department as “poor.” In light of this setback to democracy, does the Administration plan to alter its FY 2006 request for 168 percent increase in foreign military financing to Nepal?

*Answer.* We are deeply troubled by King Gyanendra’s February 1 dismissal of the government, declaration of a state of emergency, suspension of fundamental rights, and detention of politicians, journalists and human rights activists. This serious setback for Nepalese democracy risks eroding even further the Nepalese Government’s ability to resist the Maoist insurgency. We have repeatedly called on the government to restore democracy and engage in dialogue with legitimate political forces,

essential elements in pressuring the Maoists to return to the negotiating table and reach a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

In recent years, the Maoist presence has spread dramatically throughout Nepal. The Maoists have made clear their intention to impose a dictatorship, severely limit political and economic freedoms and export their revolution to neighboring states. The humanitarian ramifications of such a regime would be immense, reminiscent of the nightmare brought upon Cambodia by Pol Pot.

Given this stark situation, the U.S. must balance its assistance programs to help Nepal prevent a Maoist takeover and build a peaceful and prosperous future without condoning the King's actions or any future decisions that would run counter to restoration of democracy. Nepal's security forces play a critical role in denying the Maoists a military victory. Thus, at this time we do not intend to alter our FY 2006 request, but are carefully reviewing our military assistance programs.

*Question.* Some vitally important State Department programs find useful work for former nuclear, chemical and biological weapons scientists in Russia and elsewhere. The budget for these programs would increase by \$2.1 million in FY 2006.

At the same time, however, these programs are being asked to take on more responsibility in Iraq and Libya—tasks that could easily cost \$10–\$15 million. So they're faced with the prospect of having to divert money from the effort in Russia in order to redirect scientists in Iraq. Your Department's own budget justification underscores the problem. It states that the FY 2006 budget:

- Will allow only “minimal support” to the Biotechnology Engagement Program that the Department of Health and Human Services conducts for your Department;
- May allow the Department of Agriculture to “begin a modest engagement” with former biological weapons institutes in Ukraine, which no other U.S. program has ever reached; and
- Will limit the Bio-Industry Initiative to engineering assessments of how to reconfigure former Soviet biological weapons plants, business plans, and research projects, despite the fact that “several expert assessments begun in past years are now complete and larger reconfiguration projects are ready for funding”—that will not be forthcoming under this budget.

Then there is the important project to find peaceful careers for former weapons of mass destruction scientists in Iraq. That is a vital effort in a country that is rightly the focus of tremendous concern. And your own budget justification states: “To continue operations beyond FY 2005 . . . significant additional funding will be needed in FY 2006.”

The President has said he is committed to keeping the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's most dangerous regimes, but this budget simply does not match his rhetoric. We cannot expect to successfully stop the proliferation of weapons expertise if we are not willing to commit the necessary resources to the fight.

Why aren't you doing more to insulate former Soviet weapons scientists from the lure of overseas employment or contracts?

Answer. The Department of State is making a significant, effective effort. State's Science Centers Program manages USG participation in the two intergovernmental organizations created to redirect former Soviet weapons scientists away from marketing their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) expertise to proliferant states and terrorist groups and towards sustainable civilian employment. Since 1994 through the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and 1996 through the Science and Technology Center (STCU) in Kiev, the U.S. and its international partners (Canada, EU, Japan, S. Korea, Norway) have funded peaceful, multi-year research projects engaging over 60,000 former weapons scientists.

In the last few years, the U.S. emphasis in the Science Centers has been on integrating former weapons scientists into the global scientific and business communities. The Centers have developed comprehensive programs to train scientists to interact with western counterparts and business people. They run grant writing workshops to explain how to write competitive scientific project proposals for a western audience. They give business training and run seminars to explain patent filing and other intellectual property rights issues. In addition, both Centers have a “Partners Program” that matches ex-Soviet WMD institutes with western companies and research organizations and helps them formulate cooperative business arrangements.

*Question.* The President's supplemental request includes \$200 million in economic support funds “to help Palestinians build democratic institutions, develop infrastructure, and support critical sectors such as education, home construction, and basic

social services. Of these funds, \$50 million will also be used on programs to help Israelis and Palestinians work together on economic and social matters, including movement of people and goods in and out of Israel.”

Please provide more information on how the State Department plans to use this \$200 million. How do you expect this money to be distributed? How will accountability and transparency be assured? What do you hope to accomplish with this funding, and in what timeframe? Have you been able to leverage the President’s offer to gain additional pledges of assistance from others, in particular the Gulf States?

Answer. The \$200 million in supplemental assistance for the West Bank and Gaza is intended to support reform and expand economic opportunities for the Palestinian people. This assistance will also help the Palestinians to address key economic and technical issues as they coordinate with Israel to ensure successful Gaza disengagement. It is urgently necessary because the next six months—well before FY06 resources would be available—will see opportunities for progress unprecedented in recent years as regards the peace process: Intensified USG involvement in strengthening the PA security services, i.e., General Ward’s mission; completion of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank (July–September); Palestinian legislative elections (mid-July); continuing Palestinian municipal elections (April and August); and, ideally, an accelerating process of confidence-building and improvements on the ground that will strengthen Abu Mazen and Palestinian moderates. Finally, this assistance will strengthen our arguments to regional states that they need to do more in the way of monetary assistance to the Palestinians and the PA.

The current assistance package will be channeled through existing mechanisms, including United States, Palestinian, and international NGOs. Accountability and transparency are issues we take most seriously. The U.S. Government, working through USAID, maintains close accounting of all USG funds. Working with the full range of agencies and resources available at Embassy Tel Aviv and Consulate General Jerusalem, USAID carries out background checks on all Palestinian NGOs that are recipients of funds to ensure there are no links to terrorist organizations or to organizations that advocate or practice violence.

Since 1995, the GAO has conducted four separate program reviews, one each in 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998. None of these reviews has reported any irregularities in the management or controls of ESF funds by USAID or its contractors and grantees. Since then, the USAID Mission has developed a comprehensive risk assessment strategy. All Mission institutional contacts and grants—of which there are approximately 100—are audited on an annual basis by local accounting firms under the guidance and direction of USAID’s Inspector General.

The IMF provides the USG with updates on contributions to the Palestinian Authority. Major contributors since 2002 include: Saudi Arabia, which has provided bi-monthly budgetary support in the amount of approximately \$15 million; Libya (contributed \$11 million in 2004); and Tunisia (contributed \$2 million in 2004). Several other Arab states made pledges to the Palestinian Authority in 2002, which currently remain unmet. We are encouraging them, and others, to recognize the opportunity that now exists and do what they can to help the PA close its budget gap and support the new PA leadership as it moves forward with reforms and a renewed dialogue for peace.

*Question.* Why is the Iraqi scientists program not funded in either the FY 2006 budget or the Iraq supplemental recently submitted by the President?

Answer. The State Department’s program to redirect Iraqi weapons scientists to peaceful, civilian employment in support of Iraqi reconstruction is a priority nonproliferation effort, and the program office—the Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry (IICSI)—has been operating in Baghdad for nearly a year.

Well over a hundred Iraqi scientists, technicians and engineers with WMD or missile expertise are currently participating in IICSI activities for which they receive monthly stipends. The Center, working with the Embassy, is now actively involved with Iraqi government ministries to find participating scientists permanent employment with those ministries. At the same time, IICSI continues to expand its outreach to other Iraqis with WMD experience who have not yet benefited from the program.

We are determined to maintain this vital program in operation as long as it is needed and have included it in our FY 2006 budget request.

*Question.* How do you plan to address the budget deficiencies in these important nonproliferation programs?

Answer. This administration has always strongly supported nonproliferation and threat reduction programs. State’s programs are part of the broader U.S. effort in

support of the global partnership and are complemented by nonproliferation and threat reduction programs at the Departments of Energy and Defense. The President's budget reflects this support by providing enough resources to meet their programmatic needs in the context of overarching budgetary limitations. We will continue to work closely with the Congress to ensure these programs are adequately funded and will continue to provide substantial funding for these programs in the outyears.

*Question.* The FY 2006 budget request includes \$8.75 million for the Small Arms and Light Weapons Destruction program.

a. How much of this budget will be devoted to MANPADS destruction, and how much to destroying small arms and light weapons?

b. Can this budget fund all requests for destruction assistance received by the State Department, or do we turn countries down due to lack of funds?

*Answer.* MANPADS destruction is the office's highest priority NADR SA/LW activity and takes precedence over other destruction efforts. We cannot state exactly how much of the FY 2006 funds will go to MANPADS, given the inherent uncertainty in convincing states to agree to destroy weapons that they often view as vital to their national security and/or a valuable commodity. As an illustrative example, MANPADS destruction accounted for roughly 75 percent of the almost \$4 million in FY 2004 funds appropriated by Congress. We expect MANPADS to remain our number one priority for the foreseeable future.

Historically, the primary constraint on the destruction program has not been a lack of funds, but getting countries to agree to destroy weapons that are often viewed as vital to their national security and/or a valuable commodity. It has been the job of the State Department to convince countries of the need to destroy excess/at-risk stockpiles in order to prevent proliferation. Recently, however, several countries have requested international assistance with the destruction of large post-Cold War stockpiles of weapons and/or munitions. These requests were not known at the time of our FY 2006 budget submission. We will look to assist where we can, but will also look to the donor community for support as well.

*Question.* The President's budget for FY 2006 includes a U.S. contribution of only \$14.35 million to the International Monitoring System being established by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission. That is 25 percent below the amount requested for FY 2005 and at least 30 percent below what is needed for FY 2006.

The Department's budget justification calls this program "a key element in our global efforts against the proliferation of nuclear weapons" and "an important supplement" to U.S. monitoring capabilities.

Why, then, is the Administration proposing this cut?

*Answer.* The \$7.65 million cut in funding for the International Monitoring System (IMS) does not signal a change in U.S. policy toward the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The U.S. continues to support and participate in those activities of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) in Vienna that pertain to the IMS, and the U.S. has no plans to press the PrepCom to lower its budget to a level commensurate with the \$14.35 million that the Administration has allocated for it in FY06.

Unfortunately, budgets are very tight and cuts had to be made, even among programs supported by the Administration. A number of other cuts were made in the Department's program requests, including in the areas of non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. The level of funding for a program in any given year's budget does not necessarily have a bearing on the funding level for that program in the succeeding years.

It is important to note that the U.S. continues to observe a nuclear testing moratorium and encourages other states not to test. While the U.S. does not support the CTBT and will not become a party to it, the U.S. has gone to great expense to develop a Stockpile Stewardship Program to help ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile without testing.

*Question.* In his second Inaugural Address, the President spoke eloquently about promoting human freedom. Within a day, however, the Administration was attempting to downplay its significance, suggesting it would not lead to new directions in American foreign policy. But the President's words cannot be erased from history; their echoes have already given hope to democrats and dissidents, and it would hardly serve his goals to adhere to the status quo.

What are the ramifications of the President's address? Do you expect any new directions in our policy?

Answer. The President's second Inaugural Address marked a reaffirmation and strengthening of our existing policy. Promotion of freedom has been a cornerstone of our national strategy since September 11, 2001 attacks. We believe the expansion of ordered liberty to be the most effective long-term deterrent to the security threats posed by religious extremism, instability, tyranny, and terrorism. Besides being in our national interest, promoting human rights and democratic institutions are also consistent with our national ideals. The American transition and universal human rights standards both recognize the intrinsic and inalienable dignity of the human person, and the rights and freedoms that stem from that dignity. It is the responsibility of governments to respect and secure those rights for their citizens.

These principles have characterized the Administration's foreign policy. As the President declared on his September 20, 2001 address to Congress, "The advance of human freedom—the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time—now depends on us." This was reaffirmed in the National Security Strategy issued on September 17, 2002, which declared one pillar of our foreign policy to be "we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent," because "freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birth-right of every person—in every civilization." The President expanded on these principles in his November 6, 2003 address to the National Endowment for Democracy. "The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country . . . And we believe that freedom—the freedom we prize—is not for us alone, it is the right and the capacity of all mankind."

As the President affirmed in his second Inaugural Address, the Administration's foreign policy will continue to adhere to these principles, as we work to implement the President's agenda of promoting human rights, democracy, and rule of law around the world.

*Question.* In light of the objectives set forth in the President's address, why is the budget for the HRDF in the Department being reduced from \$36.7 million in FY05 to \$27 million in the FY06 budget?

Answer. Administration requests to fund the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) remained consistent from FY 2005 to FY 2006. HRDF is designed to provide funds to innovative seed projects that support and strengthen democratic institutions, promote human rights, and build civil society, which can be used as models for future funding by other departments or agencies. This level of funding, in conjunction with other funds administered by DRL, allow for the adequate funding of current priorities.

In addition to HRDF funds, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor also administers other substantial funds to promote similar objectives. These include Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds (IRRF), and ESF for Cuba, NED grants and Burma, and some Assistance for Eastern Europe & Baltic States (AEEB).

*Question.* Why is funding for the Partnership to Eliminate Sweatshops, a modest program funded at just under \$2 million per year, proposed for elimination in the FY06 budget?

Answer. While there is no request for a separate budget line item for this program in FY 2006, DRL will continue to seek ways to support the program's goals through the use of funds under HRDF. The activity and its goals have not been abandoned.

*Question.* The Administration is proposing to the U.N. Security Council that an international tribunal be established to prosecute war crimes committed in Darfur rather than support a referral to the International Criminal Court.

- a. Why are we suggesting that another tribunal be established?
- b. What is the projected cost of such a tribunal, and what will be the U.S. share?
- c. Will such a tribunal be limited in duration, and if so, for how long?
- d. How long will it take to set up such a tribunal to prosecute alleged war criminals compared to allowing the prosecutions to proceed at the Hague?

Answer. We have proposed the establishment of a "Sudan Tribunal" because we seek a fundamental African role in accountability, and because of our concerns regarding the International Criminal Court (ICC). This proposal, and our overall ICC policy, is consistent with the American Servicemembers' Protection Act, passed by the Congress with strong bipartisan support, which prohibits assistance and support for the ICC. We believe the Rome Statute establishing the ICC is fundamentally flawed and cannot support it. It creates a prosecutorial system that is an unchecked power and is open for exploitation and politically motivated prosecutions. A referral by the U.N. Security Council, as currently proposed by ICC supporters for the Darfur case, would not address these fundamental ongoing concerns we have with the ICC, and our concerns about the exposure of U.S. servicemembers, officials, aid workers, and other citizens to unwarranted investigation and prosecution by the

ICC. In addition, the ICC does not have temporal jurisdiction to prosecute the range of crimes referred to by the U.N.'s Commission of Inquiry in that some of these crimes were committed prior to July 1, 2002.

At the same time, we strongly support a call for accountability for the atrocities in Darfur, and believe that a Sudan Tribunal—created and mandated by a UNSC resolution and administered by the African Union (AU) and the United Nations—is the best means of providing this accountability. The Tribunal could be based in Arusha, Tanzania, at least initially, and could share the existing infrastructure of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). This approach would respect the AU role in building institutions and solving problems in Africa. The AU has played a critical leadership role in Darfur; this type of court would allow the AU to continue that leadership role as accountability is pursued.

Start-up costs for the Tribunal's first 6–8 months of operations are estimated at \$30 million. As the Tribunal becomes fully operational, we anticipate that the costs will rise; however we believe the costs will be manageable. Our preferred funding option is U.N. assessed contributions, under which the U.S. portion would be approximately 25 percent (assuming the model for the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals is used). The Tribunal would operate initially for 3–5 years, renewable annually as needed.

Any court that takes on Sudan war crimes would require substantial new staff and budgetary resources. The ICC, for example, has a limited presence in Africa, and this staff is occupied with the Uganda and Congo investigations and possible ICC action in the Central African Republic. The ICTR, in contrast, has extensive infrastructure on the ground. We therefore do not see a significant difference in start-up time or cost between the ICC and an AU–U.N. Sudan Tribunal.

*Question.* The African Union (AU) has made an admirable attempt to respond to the crisis in Darfur, but even with the help of the international community, the AU has managed to put only about 1,900 troops on the ground out of a mandated 3,200 since last fall. It is apparent that we cannot rely on the AU alone. What additional steps is the Administration going to take to help improve the security situation in Darfur and bring an end to the ongoing genocide?

*Answer.* The solution to the crisis in Darfur will require a combination of political, peace monitoring, and humanitarian actions. On the political side, we will continue placing great pressure on the GOS to end the activities of the militias and to comply with their obligations under various U.N. Security Council resolutions. Upcoming talks in Abuja will provide an opportunity to reinvigorate the April 8, 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement.

In terms of peacekeeping, we have confidence that the African Union offers the best approach for immediately improving the security situation in Darfur and bringing an end to atrocities. African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) personnel have proven to be both effective and innovative, and have approached their task with a high degree of professionalism. They have produced tangible improvements in security in the areas where they have deployed. There are more than 2,300 AMIS personnel currently deployed, including the full complement of protection forces and most of the military observers. We are working with other donors and African countries to enable the AU to deploy the remaining military observers and civilian police units in the coming weeks.

AMIS has adopted an active approach to its mandate that is achieving results on the ground. In addition to investigating allegations of ceasefire violations, patrol teams respond to fast-breaking situations where attacks are imminent. They have directly prevented village destruction and displacement through their quick response. Also, patrols are coordinating with women's groups in Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps to provide protection while women gather firewood outside the camp. Sector commanders routinely mediate between tribal leaders to cut short the spiral of violence and revenge.

The security situation in Darfur, while improved since January, remains fragile and continues to negatively affect the humanitarian situation. Attacks on villages continue while rape, banditry, and roadside attacks contribute to serious insecurity throughout Darfur. A recently concluded assessment visit by the AU and U.N., with technical assistance from the EU and the United States, examined the AU mission's capacity to deliver security and will make recommendations on strengthening the mission. The Department will analyze the results of the mission and determine how it can support any needed adjustments to the mission and force structure.

The United States continues to lead the international response to Darfur. We have contributed \$588 million for humanitarian assistance in Darfur and for the 213,000 refugees across the border in Chad. We have also committed more than \$95 million to the AU mission and are providing military and civilian observers and ex-

perts to the mission, the latter of which is vital in the effort to strengthen the AU's command and control capabilities. With our continued pressure and support and the support of the international community, security that is needed to make real progress in Darfur will be attained.

*Question.* The budget request for the Andean Regional Initiative is largely unchanged over last year, at \$735 million. Plan Colombia was supposed to be a five year plan, ending this year. What do you anticipate for the future of the program?

*Answer.* USG support for Plan Colombia is a key part of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), which is how the Andean Regional Initiative has been known since its mission has focused more directly on counternarcotics. This answer will refer to ACI.

U.S. policy is to respond to the Andean region's social, economic, governmental, narcotics, and terrorism challenges in a balanced and comprehensive manner. Our programs support, but do not substitute for, the broader efforts of the region's governments and societies. Failure to sustain our programs until the host nation can completely take them over could have serious consequences and lead to greater availability of cocaine and heroin on the streets of America at a lower price. All our programs must strive for handoff to the host nation, but not before the host nations are ready. Each ACI country will make progress at its own pace.

In the coming years, we expect the focus and balance of USG assistance to the region will gradually shift both programmatically and/or geographically. For example, we expect to see a relative decline in police and military support programs that are operational in nature, but an increase in institutional development and professionalization activities for the police and military. There may also be the need to consider increases in general economic development assistance as the narcoterrorists' influence decreases. Host nation or other international funding will increase over time, and USG funding likely will decrease.

Future plans for the ACI program vary in each of the seven ACI countries. In the source countries where we have invested significant funding, such as Colombia, we are at the mid-term point for certain projects. In the transshipment countries, our investment has not been as significant and we have not moved to the mid-term stage in a comprehensive fashion. However, for countries like Brazil, Ecuador, and Panama, our programs serve as models for greater host nation investment.

*Question.* Since 2000, when aggressive aerial eradication programs began in Colombia, coca cultivation in the country has been cut almost in half. At the same time, the street price of cocaine is as cheap as ever (in 1999 it was 135.51 per gram; in 2003, 106.54 per gram).

a. How are we doing on reaching the goals of Plan Colombia, broadly speaking?  
b. Why are we not seeing an increase in the price of cocaine, signaling lower supply of the drug on our streets? Are we reducing the flow of drugs to the United States as a result of Plan Colombia?

*Answer.* The Andes produce most of the world's cocaine and increasing amounts of heroin. We are meeting Plan Colombia eradication and interdiction goals established for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), which includes Plan Colombia. We have made significant strides against this drug supply in the past 3 years, especially in Colombia. Our efforts are hurting narcotraffickers in all aspects of their business. However, narcotraffickers have not relented in replanting illicit drug crops, processing illegal drugs and smuggling the drugs; so much work remains to be done under ACI.

ACI reduces the quantity of illicit drugs produced in this hemisphere through ongoing eradication programs and vigorously combating the drug trafficking of those illicit drugs through law enforcement interdiction programs. In 2004 ACI programs in Colombia alone eradicated over 130,000 hectares of coca and seized over 175 metric tons of cocaine. This is an unquestionable success.

It is difficult for the State Department to make predictions or give definitive responses to questions about price and purity of street drugs in the United States. The U.S. street price of drugs is derived through the interaction of many factors, and the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy is more directly engaged in the study of how price and purity are affected by ACI's successes.

*Question.* In your testimony, you state that in Latin America we face the "twin challenges of helping to bolster democratic ideals and institutions, and alleviating poverty." The hemisphere still has many fragile democracies. The FY 2006 foreign aid request anticipates yet another decline in development assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. What justifies this decrease? Are we not undermining vital tools that can help advance democracy and alleviate poverty by such reductions in assistance?



*Answer.* The Western Hemisphere is extremely critical to the United States. In as much, the specific reduction in the Development Assistance account of roughly \$32 million is balanced by the request for \$30 million from the newly expanded Transition Initiative Account for Haiti.

*Question.* The request for the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) has increased this year from \$731 million to \$734.5 million. At the same time, the allocations to several countries—for example, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador—have been cut. I note that these are also countries that are facing challenges to political stability, and in which there have been indications that coca cultivation could be on the rise. What is the justification for cutting funding to these countries, especially when the request for the ARI account has been increased?

*Answer.* Every year INL programs are reviewed to ensure we devote the resources available to the programs where they will have the greatest impact.

Our request for FY 2006 includes a new program to upgrade the helicopters performing critical counternarcotics missions in the region. This new initiative, the Critical Flight Safety Program, will fund modifications to refurbish and restore Vietnam-era aircraft. These upgrades are necessary for the continued safe execution of aviation operations. This \$40,000,000 program necessitated reductions in the country accounts for all ACI-supported countries except Colombia.

The reduction in funding to Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador by no means indicates flagging counternarcotics performance or a failure to recognize the challenges those countries face. The Department is very concerned about Bolivia, and in particular, the 6 percent increase in coca cultivation in 2004. Bolivia will receive 4 upgraded helicopters from the Critical Flight Safety Program in FY 2006. In Peru, we are also concerned about an increase in new coca cultivation areas and the potential for opium poppy cultivation. Ecuador, however, is making increased use of its own resources and has made significant advances in securing its northern border with Colombia.

Despite the challenges ACI countries face, each one is conducting important counternarcotics efforts and making noteworthy achievements to prevent illegal drugs from entering the U.S. Now is not the time to reduce ACI funding because the success of our efforts in the Andes could be lost if we do not maintain aggressive counterdrug programs and continue to encourage growers to enter legitimate markets. The increase in our request for ACI funding highlights the Department's recognition of the strategic importance of the ACI and the key role each of the ACI countries play in our counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere.

*Question.* The aid request for El Salvador calls for a sharp increase in Foreign Military Financing, making it Latin America's second largest FMF recipient, with \$13 million. Why is this substantial increase in military assistance proposed for a country that is at peace and that can afford few funds for military spending? What equipment or services would be provided, and what threat is the assistance meant to address?

*Answer.* El Salvador has been a staunch supporter of our efforts in Iraq. Originally under the Spanish command along with the other Latin American countries who initially participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom, El Salvador was the only Latin American country to remain in Iraq after the Government of Spain pulled its troops out. The fourth contingent of Salvadoran troops arrived in Iraq in mid-February. This support has been extraordinary for a small country with modest economic resources.

The requested FY 2006 funds would focus assistance on supporting El Salvador's interdiction efforts, including counternarcotics and border control programs, and enhancing its capabilities to participate in future coalition and multilateral operations, including peacekeeping. Specifically, the assistance would include spare parts and equipment for fixed and rotary wing aircraft, naval vessels and vehicles, as well as helicopter upgrades; vehicles; training; and command, control, and communications equipment for the army, air force and navy. Funds would also be used for individual soldier equipment, GPS systems, night vision goggles, and training.

*Question.* A growing issue in Central America is the problem of youth gangs and related violence. Some governments in the region have taken particularly hard-line approaches and appear interested in having their militaries play a role in policing and anti-gang activities. Gangs are a law enforcement problem, not a military one, and they're also a problem that has social dimensions. What does the State Department intend to do to help Central American governments avoid militarizing their response to this problem, as well as to help them address both the social and the law enforcement aspects of the problem?

Answer. The violent youth gangs currently operating in Central America have developed from a variety of factors—both sociological and historical. They are one aspect of a general rise in crime that has followed the end of armed conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala and the restructuring of police forces and criminal justice systems throughout the region. Notwithstanding the significant efforts that many of these countries have made to reorient their police forces to the requirements of civilian and democratic policing, the development of these new police organizations has not kept up with the increasing demands placed on them. Gangs are one of these demands.

The suggestion that militaries should be brought in to help control the gang problem reflects the institutional weaknesses of the police forces and the criminal justice systems. The antidote to this is to help the police forces of the region focus their resources and energies more effectively on gangs—to analyze their movements, identify their leaders and develop the evidence needed to gain convictions for the serious crimes that are being committed.

In prior years, in El Salvador, we supported the formation and provided in-service training for anti-gang units in the Civilian National Police (PNC). Current projects in Guatemala and Panama are working with the police in specific communities to improve their capacity to target gang leaders more effectively. The Department is in the process of analyzing how these efforts may be extended to other countries in the region and how the police forces of Central America can be encouraged to take a more rigorous analytical approach to gangs within their jurisdiction and share that information across boundaries. This would include sharing of information to develop high priority cases with prosecutors in both Central America and the United States.

The Department and USAID are also active on the social side of the gang problem. Some examples include: support for prevention and rehabilitation programs of the National Council of Public Security in El Salvador that are carried out in schools and include tattoo removal; support for NGO efforts in Guatemala to mitigate delinquency in three geographic areas, establish a “Model Youth Home,” and lobby for changes in national policy on crime prevention and economic development; and support through the Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence to develop crime prevention plans at the municipal level in six Central American countries.

*Question.* Several years ago, the scope of the Enduring Friendship initiative was described in concept as including the waters of the Western Hemisphere and was based on a unanimous invocation of the mutual defense clause of the Rio Treaty after the 9/11 attacks. As recently as spring of 2004, CINCSOUTH Gen. Hill made similar statements in Congressional testimony. Enduring Friendship is presented in the FY 2006 budget as a Caribbean regional initiative, involving only the Dominican Republic and Panama and “more modest support” for the Bahamas and Jamaica.

a. What caused the scaling down of the initiative? Were nations unwilling to cooperate and if so, why?

b. What is the allocation of funding to each of the 4 countries referenced in the CBJ as receiving funds under this initiative?

c. What are the anticipated phases of growth of the Enduring Friendship program? Which, if any, nations and areas are planned for expansion beyond the Dominican Republic and the Caribbean?

d. Does the initiative contemplate joint exercises or joint interdiction activities with U.S. forces or is it only to provide equipment and training? Will the current Status of Forces Agreements for port calls in the Caribbean be adequate or will the United States need to negotiate new Status of Forces Agreements in portions of the Caribbean?

Answer. Recognizing the growth in worldwide requirements for Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the Department of State, after consulting with the Department of Defense and our partners in the region, decided to begin implementation of Enduring Friendship with a limited number of Caribbean basin partners where the project would have the most impact. There is enthusiastic support in the region for Enduring Friendship and the decision to limit the number of countries supported in FY 2006 should not be seen as an indicator that countries do not want to participate. Beginning with four key maritime allies—the Dominican Republic, Panama, the Bahamas and Jamaica—the initiative’s immediate objective is to allow coalition forces to maintain command of the Caribbean’s critical choke points and to react to shifting threats in the Caribbean basin.

Another important objective for Enduring Friendship in FY 2006 is to affirm the concept that regional and multilateral maritime interdiction cooperation will act as a force multiplier for the assets currently protecting the southern approaches to the

United States. As this concept is tested, subsequent FMF requests could seek to expand the number of countries participating in Enduring Friendship. However, for the foreseeable future, we do not see participation in Enduring Friendship expanding beyond the southern approaches to the United States.

As part of Enduring Friendship in FY 2006, we anticipate providing the Dominican Republic \$2,500,000; Panama \$1,750,000; the Bahamas \$400,000; and Jamaica \$350,000. After FY 2006 funds are appropriated, the Department would determine final allocation figures for the countries involved in Enduring Friendship and notify Congress through normal procedures. The equipment and training will better enable those countries to participate in joint exercises and operations with the United States and other forces in the Caribbean. Through Enduring Friendship, we can help these countries capitalize and expand upon existing architectures and procedures to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.

The USG continues to pursue standing Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) with Caribbean countries where there is not an existing long-term SOFA. Of the four countries for which we have requested FY 2006 funding, we currently have a SOFA in place with the Dominican Republic to cover U.S. personnel participating in exercises. The USG is currently in the process of negotiating standing SOFAs with many additional WHA region countries. If we were unable to negotiate a standing SOFA with a country which we were going to engage as part of Enduring Friendship, we could seek to negotiate an exercise-specific SOFA with the country which would provide coverage to U.S. personnel for that exercise only.

*Question.* You have been a strong advocate of the President's forward strategy of freedom around the world. Yet millions of refugees enjoy no such freedom even though the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees provides for their rights to work, practice professions, run businesses, own property, and move freely. Of the 12 million refugees in the world, more than 7 million have been confined to camps or segregated settlements or otherwise deprived of these Convention rights for 10 years or more. In fact, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that the average length of major refugee situations increased from 9 years in 1993 to 17 years in 2003.

As Secretary, what will you do to bring the forward strategy of freedom to "warehoused" refugees?

*Answer.* The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees lays out the obligations that parties, as hosting countries, have toward refugees. The United States expects all parties to the Convention to uphold these obligations.

The best solution for refugees is to make it possible for them to return to their homes. Voluntary, safe return of refugees depends on successful efforts to address the political and humanitarian dimensions of the conflict situations that lead them to flee. We are encouraged by a number of peace agreements and other fundamental changes in the internal situation of nations that have led or will lead to refugee returns. For example:

Since the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, more than three million refugees have returned from Pakistan and Iran and other countries. This continuing repatriation represents one of the largest refugee solutions in modern times.

The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on January 9, 2005, commits the parties to ending more than two decades of civil war. We are working hard to ensure that over 500,000 refugees displaced by the decades of conflict will be able to return home to their communities in the South. We remain deeply concerned about the violence in Darfur, however, and are working diligently with the African Union, United Nations, European Union, and other allies to help end the insecurity there so that refugees from Darfur now living in Chad can voluntarily return home in safety.

On August 18, 2003, leaders from the Liberian Government, rebel groups, political parties, and civil society signed an accord that laid the framework for constructing a two-year National Transitional Government of Liberia. An elected government will replace the transitional government this year. An estimated 100,000 of 350,000 Liberian refugees have already returned.

In Angola, the April 2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) formalized the de facto cease-fire that prevailed following the death of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002. As a result of the cease-fire and MOU, there have been over 300,000 returns to date, with the possibility of another 150,000 more.

The peace process in Burundi, beginning with the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 2000, made 90,000 facilitated repatriations possible in 2004.

Over 270,000 refugees have returned to Sierra Leone since 2001, thanks to the peace agreement signed in 2001, the presence of the United Nations Mission in Si-

erra Leone (UNAMSIL), and presidential and legislative elections held in Sierra Leone in May 2002.

We will continue to work to secure political and humanitarian solutions, including safe and voluntary repatriation.

The United States will remain a leader in international efforts to find durable solutions for the plight of refugees and will continue to urge countries to be generous in giving aid, providing protection, and allowing refugees to move and work freely while in exile. We will continue to push for local integration of refugees in host countries, including full recognition of their legal rights, whenever possible. We will also continue to advocate for and provide refugee resettlement through a robust U.S. refugee admissions program in appropriate cases. In the FY06 budget request, the President has made clear his commitment to significantly growing this program, in part, to address the plight of warehoused refugees.

*Question.* Why has the Administration requested \$11 million less than was provided in last year's appropriation for the U.S. contribution to UNICEF just as Secretary of Agriculture Veneman is about to assume the position of Executive Director of the organization?

*Answer.* Our FY 2006 request (\$114 million) for UNICEF from the International Organizations and Programs (IO&P) account represents a 5 percent decrease from the FY 2005 Administration request level (\$120 million) as a result of overall budget constraints that affected the majority of voluntary contributions funded from that account. The request for UNICEF remains the largest in that account and in no way reflects diminished support for UNICEF or its critical mission. We anticipate that overall U.S. contributions to UNICEF will remain consistent with recent years.

The United States looks forward to continuing our strong partnership with UNICEF under the leadership of Secretary Veneman. The United States is UNICEF's largest donor, and we strongly support its mission to promote the survival, education, health and protection of children worldwide. In addition to funding the State Department provides for UNICEF's core budget through the IO&P account, the United States supports UNICEF's work by providing funds (from other accounts and U.S. agencies) earmarked to support specific efforts or programs such as polio eradication and emergency response.

*Question.* The Committee has just learned that in 2003, the Department spent nearly \$700,000 on a series of events, including a concert, in Paris in connection with the rejoining of UNESCO. Many of the arrangements were handled by a public relations firm which also handled events for the President's first inaugural. The Inspector General, Office of Audits, questioned some \$140,000 of the costs incurred by this public relations firm. I supported the re-joining of UNESCO, but given the limited budget for cultural affairs programming, this seems like an excessive expenditure of funds.

- a. Why was such an expenditure considered necessary and appropriate?
- b. How was the public relations firm chosen? Were competitive procedures used? If not, why not, and what was the legal basis of the decision not to use competitive procedures?
- c. What was the final cost of the event and how much of the costs questioned by the Inspector General were recovered from the public relations firm?

*Answer.* The U.S. was rejoining UNESCO as a member after nineteen years. Several bureaus at the State Department—the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), the office for Public Diplomacy (R), the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO), and the U.S. Observer Mission for UNESCO worked with the NSC on events surrounding the re-entry of the U.S. Among events discussed was the sponsoring of an appropriate cultural event in the context of U.S. re-entry to UNESCO. Because of ECA's long-standing expertise in cultural programming, the Department determined that ECA was the best manager for the event. However, ECA's program funds were not used to fund the event.

The event showcasing American culture was attended by 1,000 guests, including delegates from the member countries, the members of the U.S. delegation in attendance at the general conference, and senior international staff of UNESCO.

The final decision to have a cultural event showcasing American talent was not made until the summer of 2003, just 90 days before the opening of the UNESCO General Conference which was scheduled for September 29, 2003. Because of the short time period before the event there was not time for a formal competition. R asked ECA and State's contracts officer to review respective GSA Federal Supply Schedules, including their rates and capabilities. ECA knew that the vast majority of expenses would be spent for talent and talent-related reimbursable expenses, and for the venue, therefore, these expenses would be about the same for whatever vendor was selected. The firm chosen was on the GSA Schedule. The Department's con-

tracts office awarded a firm-fixed price GSA Federal Supply Schedule Delivery Order with a fixed price line item for labor and a reimbursable line item for travel, site build-out and talent components.

The final cost was \$692,182.08 (\$641,447.60 was paid out of R's D&CP funds, and \$50,734.48 was paid out of retained USIA gift funds). After the event, the GCJPR firm came in with an additional bill of \$95,123.96 above the contract, so the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs requested that State's Office of Inspector General (OIG) conduct a review of the bills to determine whether the costs claimed by GCJPR were reasonable and allowable under the delivery order and under the Federal Acquisition Regulations.

The audit report noted "findings and questioned costs" of \$143,317.79 out of the bills. Upon receipt of the report, ECA reviewed the questioned costs and accepted \$53,676.36 as having a basis to be questioned. The other costs, while mentioned in the report, were acceptable to the State Department's contracts office, such as the actual impact of the fluctuating exchange rate on the budget. The \$53,676.36 in questioned costs were recovered by subtracting them from the additional bill which came in.

*Question.* I share some of the administration's reservations about the Kyoto Protocol. However, I was very disappointed that at the recent meetings in Buenos Aires, the position of the United States was that it was premature to even begin discussions on the next stage of international negotiations, beyond Kyoto. That is not an acceptable position.

By now, the United States must have some idea about the next steps beyond the first reporting period of Kyoto. Our country is the biggest historical contributor to the problem of climate change. The President acknowledges that there is a problem. We are signatories to the U.N.'s Framework Convention on Climate Change, which commits us to share in the effort to limit human impact on our planet's climate. If it is our position that the current international effort is not appropriate, we have a responsibility—as a party to the Framework Convention—to be part of the solution.

If it is the Administration's position that the current Protocol fails to set adequate commitments for developing nations, then what is our strategy for fixing that? If it is the Administration's position that the commitments on developed countries are not economically sustainable, what do we have to offer as an alternative?

I would appreciate a response that does not simply refer to the current array of ad hoc bilateral discussions and programs, but one that engages with the specific problems with the current Kyoto Protocol, our current and future obligations under the Framework Convention, and offers a path toward future U.S. engagement in an international solution.

*Question.* If it is the Administration's position that the current Protocol fails to set adequate commitments for developing nations, then what is our strategy for fixing that? If it is the Administration's position that the commitments on developed countries are not economically sustainable, what do we have to offer as an alternative?

*Answer.* The United States decided in 2001 not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol because it would harm the U.S. economy and it contains no commitments for developing countries. Having reached this decision, we are not seeking to "fix" that instrument or to offer an "alternative." The United States remains a party to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, meeting its commitments and participating actively in that forum. Through our multilateral initiatives (on nuclear energy, carbon capture and storage, hydrogen, methane recapture and fusion); our participation in other multilateral initiatives on energy efficiency and renewable energy; and in our bilateral climate change programs with developed and developing countries, we are promoting practical, focused efforts to bring down the cost of existing technologies and to develop new technologies that will help all countries meet the challenge of climate change.

*Question.* When do you anticipate providing the Administration's treaty priority list for the 109th Congress?

*Answer.* The Treaty Priority List has been prepared and is being cleared throughout the executive branch; we plan to submit it to the Committee shortly. The Department recognizes the importance of this list in assisting the Committee to organize its work and is very appreciative of the cooperation it has received from the Committee in the treaty law area during the 108th Congress.

*Question.* In rejoining the International Coffee Agreement, why did the United States treat it as an executive agreement and not submit it to the Senate for advice and consent?

Answer. The 2001 International Coffee Agreement (the “2001 ICA”), was treated as an executive agreement primarily because its limited scope does not include economic or market-regulatory provisions, such as export controls, quotas or the operation of a buffer stock, which require the enactment of legislation, unlike other, generally older, commodity agreements submitted for Senate advice and consent, including the 1983 International Coffee Agreement (the “1983 ICA”).

We had a similar situation with the 1984 International Sugar Agreement. The 1977 International Sugar Agreement, which expired at the end of 1984, was done as an advice and consent treaty. The 1977 Agreement contained both export controls and the operation of a buffer stock. The 1984 International Sugar Agreement provided for the continued existence of the International Sugar Organization that administered the 1977 Agreement, but did not contain the economic or market-regulatory provisions included in the 1977 Agreement and expressly limited the function of the Organization to the administration of the new 1984 Agreement. As a result, the 1984 International Sugar Agreement was treated as an executive agreement. Similarly, we have treated as executive agreements the International Tropical Timber Agreements of 1983 and 1987, the International Sugar Agreement of 1987, and the International Agreement on Jute and Jute Products of 1982 and 1989. None of these agreements have economic or market regulatory provisions.

The 2001 ICA contained no economic or market-regulatory provisions and the International Coffee Organization (the “ICO”), established by the agreement, is a commodity organization that principally facilitates research and development and market promotion.

In sum, the limited scope and effect of the ICO’s activities, the fact that no implementing legislation was needed to enact trade restrictions (as there had been for the 1983 ICA) and our past practice, led us to conclude that the 2001 ICA should be treated as an executive agreement.

*Question.* Section 2242 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1995 and 1999 provides that it “shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States.” The provision implements Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. The President himself has underscored the importance of this commitment, by stating that “Torture is never acceptable, nor do we hand over people to countries to do torture.”

a. What is the State Department’s role in assuring compliance with this provision in cases where other U.S. government agencies have a person in their custody or control?

b. By what means does the United States assess, in such cases, the “substantial grounds” standard? Which agency of the U.S. government has the lead role in such assessments? What is the role of the Department of State?

c. Which agency of the U.S. government has the lead role in seeking assurances from foreign governments that a person will not be subject to torture, if the person is delivered to the custody or control of a foreign government? What is the role of the Department of State?

d. Since the enactment of Section 2242, have there been any instances in which the United States has not effected the involuntary return of a person because the United States concluded that there were such “substantial grounds”? If so, how many such instances and what country or countries were involved that resulted in such a conclusion?

Answer. Section 2242 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1995 and 1999 accurately describes the policy of the United States, not to transfer a person to a country if it determines that it is more likely than not that the person will be tortured. In several different contexts, described below, the Department of State (Department) works with other U.S. government agencies to implement this policy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> §2242 and Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) refer to the return of individuals to another state where there are “substantial grounds for believing” that the individual would be subject to torture. At the time it became a State Party to the CAT, the United States submitted a formal understanding “[t]hat the United States understands the phrase, ‘where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture,’ as used in Article 3 of the Convention, to mean ‘if it is more likely than not that he would be tortured.’” U.S. statements of policy have followed the formulation provided in the U.S. understanding to the CAT.

## IMMIGRATION REMOVAL CASES

The Department plays a limited role in the implementation of this provision in the immigration removal context. In that context, regulations contained in 8 CFR 208.16–.18 permit aliens to raise claims under Article 3 of the (CAT) during the course of immigration removal proceedings. Accordingly, in the immigration removal context, immigration judges review such claims and determine whether it is more likely than not that the applicant would be tortured. See 8 CFR 208.16.

In practice, the record demonstrates that individuals seeking protection under Article 3 of the CAT in many cases have obtained protection under these regulations. In the period from 1999 when the regulations implementing Article 3 of the CAT went into effect, through 2003, the available data indicates the following statistics regarding grants of protection by immigration judges based on the Torture Convention:

- 519 grants in FY 2000;
- 554 grants in FY 2001;
- 546 grants in FY 2002;
- 486 grants in FY 2003; and
- 532 grants in 2004.<sup>2</sup>

These statistics demonstrate that immigration judges routinely issue decisions that prevent individuals from being involuntarily returned to a country where the judge has determined that the individual is more likely than not to be tortured in the country of removal. In exceptional cases where an arriving alien is believed to be inadmissible on terrorism-related grounds, Congress has authorized alternate removal procedures that do not require consideration or review by immigration judges. See INA §235(c). The implementing regulations provide that removal pursuant to section 235(c) of the Act shall not proceed “under circumstances that violate . . . Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture.” See 8 CFR 235(b)(4). Removal pursuant to INA §235(c) procedures is extremely rare.

In a small number of appropriate cases, pursuant to 8 CFR §208.18(c), the U.S. may consider diplomatic assurances that the alien will not be tortured that were received from the country of proposed removal. In such removal cases, the Secretary of Homeland Security (and in cases arising prior to the enactment of the Homeland Security Act, the Attorney General), in consultation with the Department of State, would carefully assess such assurances to determine whether they are sufficiently reliable so as to allow the individual’s removal consistent with Article 3 of the CAT. The United States reserves the use of diplomatic assurances for a very small number of the most sensitive of cases where it believes it can reasonably rely on such assurances that the individual would not be tortured. In no case would the United States return an individual where it determined that it was more likely than not that the person would be tortured.

## EXTRADITION CASES

Department of State regulations set forth at 22 CFR Part 95 describe the process through which the Department evaluates Article 3 claims in the extradition context. Pursuant to these regulations, whenever allegations relating to torture are raised by the fugitive or other interested parties, appropriate policy and legal offices within the Department review and analyze information relevant to a particular case to determine whether it is “more likely than not” that an individual will be tortured upon extradition to the requesting State. Information provided by the relevant regional bureau, country desk, or U.S. embassy also plays an important role in the evaluation of torture claims. Based on the analysis of relevant information, the Secretary of State may decide to surrender the fugitive to the requesting State, deny surrender of the fugitive, or condition the extradition on the requesting State’s provision of assurances, deemed to be credible by the Secretary of State.

Since promulgation of the Department of State’s regulations, torture claims have been raised in less than 1 percent of extradition cases and surrender warrants have been issued in all cases. In some of those cases, it was determined that the evidence

<sup>2</sup>The data were compiled by the Department of Justice’s Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) and represent decisions taken by the Immigration Courts. Accordingly, the data do not include the following: (1) decisions on cases appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals; (2) cases in which individuals were granted protection and were removed to third countries where there are no substantial grounds for believing that the alien will be subjected to torture; (3) cases in which Article 3 protection was subsequently terminated, when substantial grounds no longer exist for believing the alien would be tortured if removed to a particular country; and (4) cases in which the U.S. removed an individual subject to assurances that he or she would not be tortured.

submitted by the claimants provided no basis to conclude that it would be more likely than not that the claimants would be tortured. In several cases, assurances, which were deemed adequate, were received from the requesting country. As is true in the removal context, the United States reserves the use of diplomatic assurances for a very small number of the most sensitive of cases where it believes it can reasonably rely on such assurances that the individual would not be tortured.

TRANSFERS OF INDIVIDUALS FROM GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA

The Department of State also plays a role in the assessment of nonrefoulement concerns relating to individuals detained by the U.S. Armed Forces at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As described recently in an affidavit by Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Pierre-Richard Prosper filed in various habeas cases, notably including *Abdah, et al. v. Bush, et al.*, CA No. 04-254 (HHK) USDC DDC (March 8, 2005), the Department of Defense consults with appropriate United States Government agencies, including the Department of State, before determining whether to transfer particular individuals. The United States generally seeks to return the detainee to his or her country of nationality. In some cases, however, transfers cannot easily be arranged. For example, the United States has made clear in the context of the war against al-Qaida and the Taliban that it does not transfer individuals to other countries where the U.S. believes it is more likely than not that they will be tortured. Of particular concern to the Department of State in making recommendations on transfers is the question of whether the foreign government will treat the detainee humanely, in a manner consistent with its international obligations, including the Convention Against Torture.

The Department of State generally has responsibility to communicate on these matters as between the U.S. and foreign governments. The Department of State receives requests from foreign governments for the transfer of detainees and forwards such requests to the Department of Defense for coordination with appropriate Departments and agencies of the United States Government. Once the Department of Defense has approved a transfer from Guantanamo Bay and requests the assistance of the Department of State, the Department of State initiates transfer discussions with the foreign government concerned and pursues assurances considered necessary and appropriate for the particular country, including in any cases in which continued detention is foreseen, assurances of humane treatment and treatment in accordance with the international obligations of the country concerned, including under the Convention Against Torture.

Decisions with respect to Guantanamo detainees are made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular circumstances of the transfer, the country, the individual concerned, and any concerns regarding torture that may arise. If a case were to arise in which the assurances obtained from the receiving government are not sufficient when balanced against treatment concerns, the United States would not transfer a detainee from Guantanamo to the control of that government unless the concerns were satisfactorily resolved. Circumstances have arisen in the past where the Department of Defense elected not to transfer detainees to their country of origin because of torture concerns.

In sum, in the aforementioned contexts the Department of State plays a role in the evaluation of torture concerns to assure compliance with the policy set forth in §2242(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1995 and 1999.