

ORAL STATEMENT FOR THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

HEARING ON THE NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT

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CHAIRMAN KERRY, RANKING MEMBER LUGAR, DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE. THANK YOU FOR ASKING ME TO APPEAR BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE TODAY TO TESTIFY ON THE NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT. AS MY LAST ASSIGNMENT ON ACTIVE DUTY – ENDING ON THE 2ND OF JULY THIS YEAR – WAS AS THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER OF OPERATIONAL NATO FORCES -- I WILL INITIALLY FOCUS MY COMMENTS ON THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE OF THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT THAT IS TO BE DEVELOPED BY NATO OVER THE COMING YEAR – FOLLOWED BY ADDRESSING OTHER KEY NATO ISSUES THAT I BELIEVE MAY BE GERMANE TO THIS COMMITTEE’S AREAS OF INTERESTS.

FIRST – I FIRMLY BELIEVE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT MUST INCLUDE TIMELY AND RELEVANT INPUT BY THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES – NOT ONLY FROM THE MILITARY COMMITTEE – BUT ALSO FROM THE SUPREME COMMANDERS FOR OPERATIONS AND TRANSFORMATION. THIS INPUT IS ESSENTIAL TO INFORM THE PROCESS OF JUST WHAT THE TWO COMPONENTS OF NATO’S MILITARY FORCES – THE COMMAND STRUCTURE AND THE FORCE STRUCTURE – CURRENTLY ARE CAPABLE OF AND WHAT CHANGES OR ADJUSTMENTS TO THOSE FORCES MIGHT BE REQUIRED BASED ON THE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT. WHILE THE MILITARY COMMITTEE INTERFACES DIRECTLY WITH THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL – THE NAC AS IT IS KNOWN – AND IS THE RECOGNIZED BODY IN NATO TO PROVIDE THE NAC MILITARY

ADVICE – ONLY COMMANDERS ARE RESPONSIBLE AND ACCOUNTABLE FOR NATO FORCES AND THEREFORE MAY HAVE DISTINCTLY DIFFERENT VIEWS THAN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. THAT – PLUS THE FACT THE ADVICE THEY MAY RENDER IS NOT A RESULT OF A CONSENSUS PROCESS – COMPELS ME TO ADVOCATE THAT THE STRATEGIC COMMANDERS BE CONSULTED IN THE STRATEGY CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS.

SECOND – MUCH OF THE 1999 STRATEGIC CONCEPT DOCUMENT IS STILL RELEVANT TODAY. FOR EXAMPLE – A SENTENCE FROM PARAGRAPH 4 IS PARTICULARLY COGENT : “ IT (THE ALLIANCE) MUST MAINTAIN COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND REINFORCE THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK AND ENSURE A BALANCE THAT ALLOWS THE EUROPEAN ALLIES TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITY.” INDEED – ALL GOOD WORDS. THE CHALLENGE TODAY – AS THEN – IS NOT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF WHAT NATO WANTS TO DO, SHOULD DO, OR FEELS COMPELLED TO DO. THE CHALLENGE FOR NATO IS MATCHING ITS LEVEL OF AMBITION WITH ITS POLITICAL WILL TO RESOURCE THE MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH ITS AMBITIONS – OR MORE SPECIFICALLY – CREATING AND SUSTAINING MILITARY CAPABILITY. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGY -- OR A STRATEGIC CONCEPT -- MUST ADDRESS A VISION OF THE END STATE, THE WAYS POSSIBLE TO ACCOMPLISH THAT VISION, AND THE MEANS – OR THE RESOURCES – NEEDED TO CREATE THE REQUIRED CAPABILITIES. THE 2010 STRATEGIC CONCEPT MUST – UNLIKE ITS PREDECESSOR – ADDRESS THE WAYS AND MEANS. ABSENT THAT – ONCE AGAIN – THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE VISION – OR LEVEL OF AMBITION – AND THE POLITICAL WILL TO COMMIT THE RESOURCES -- WILL CONTINUE. AND WHILE POTENTIALLY A PRODUCT OF THE CONSENSUS PROCESS – THE USE OF SUCH TERMS AND PHRASES AS “ ALLOWS GREATER PARTICIPATION” – IN PRACTICE IS NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO ACCOMPLISH THE SPECIFIED INTENT OF GREATER BURDEN SHARING.

IF THE INTENT IS FOR THE NEXT NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT TO STRENGTHEN THE ALLIANCE – THEN THAT DOCUMENT MUST BE WRITTEN TO MANDATE “OPTING IN “ -- NOT ACCOMMODATE “ OPTING OUT” !

THIRDLY – THIS STRATEGIC CONCEPT MUST ADDRESS THE DEVELOPMENT – BY BOTH NATO COLLECTIVELY – AND NATIONS INDIVIDUALLY – OF CAPABILITIES SPECIFIED AS REQUIRED IN THE STRATEGY. CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT IN THE ALLIANCE IS A COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TASK. DEFENSE SHARES OF NATIONAL BUDGETS ARE SHRINKING AMONG NATO MEMBER NATIONS. THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT MUST ADDRESS THIS CRITICAL AREA – NOT ONLY FROM THE CONTEXT OF BALANCING BOTH NATO AND NATIONAL INVESTMENTS BUT – ADDITIONALLY – OPENING LINKAGES TO REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO ENHANCE THIS MILITARY CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT.

LASTLY – MAY I OFFER TWO RELATED POINTS OF CONSIDERATION. FIRST – AS WE HAVE SEEN REPEATEDLY OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS IN EVERY MILITARY OPERATION UNDERTAKEN – THE CIVIL –MILITARY COMPONENT TO OPERATIONS IS CRITICAL AND MUST RECEIVE MORE ATTENTION. THE 1999 STRATEGIC CONCEPT GAVE THIS AREA SHORT SHRIFT – ABOUT 7 SENTENCES! SECONDLY -- WE CAN'T CONTINUE TO SPAR WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) CONCERNING SECURITY CAPABILITIES! WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT COOPERATION BUT HAVE REALLY NOT DONE MUCH IN TERMS OF WORKING TOGETHER IN ANY MEANINGFUL WAY. THIS NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT MUST SET THE CONDITIONS FOR REAL, MEANINGFUL COOPERATION WITH THE EU. THERE HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE A MYRIAD OF OPPORTUNITIES –

WE MUST GET THIS RIGHT. I BELIEVE THIS TO BE A PRIORITY POLITICAL DELIVERABLE FOR THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT.

IF I MAY – I WOULD LIKE TO TOUCH ON A FEW OTHER TOPICS RELEVANT TO THIS COMMITTEE’S INTEREST.

FIRST – THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO OF OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. WHILE THE SACEUR – AND AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY SINCE – I HAVE STATED PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY THAT NATO MEMBERS MUST FULLY SOURCE THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE FORCES (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN IF THE ALLIANCE IS TO PREVAIL. FIRST AND FOREMOST – NATO MUST RESOURCE THE NATO TRAINING MISSION – AFGHANISTAN – THAT THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AGREED TO AT THE 60TH SUMMIT THIS PAST APRIL. BUILDING COMPETENT, CAPABLE, UN-CORRUPT SECURITY FORCES IS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TASK IN AFGHANISTAN. I DO NOT BELIEVE AFGHANISTAN IS ON THE VERGE OF FALLING TO THE INSURGENTS – BUT I DO BELIEVE THE INSURGENCY HAS SPREAD – NOT SURPRISINGLY – TO THE WEST AND A BIT TO THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY. THERE ARE 2 REASONS FOR THIS IN MY MIND – A LACK OF SECURITY FORCES AVAILABLE IN ALL DISTRICTS AND MUNICIPALITIES – BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY – A GROWING TREND OF LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT AT ALL LEVELS BY THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN DUE TO INCREASED CORRUPTION, INABILITY BY ANY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT TO DELIVER SOCIAL SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE, AND A GENERAL FEELING OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT. NATO IS EAGERLY AWAITING THE OUTCOME OF THE U.S. STRATEGY/RESOURCE DISCUSSIONS AND THE DECISION THAT WILL FOLLOW. I BELIEVE ONCE DECIDED – ANOTHER WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY WILL BE OPEN TO ENLIST GREATER NATO

MEMBER CONTRIBUTIONS TO ISAF AND AFGHANISTAN – BOTH IN THE MILITARY AND THE CIVILIAN SECTOR.

ANOTHER KEY ACTIVITY IN NATO IS THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF FRANCE IN THE MILITARY STRUCTURE. MY ASSESSMENT IS THAT EFFORT IS ON TRACK – THOUGH MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE. AN IMPORTANT AND HIGH VISIBILITY ACTIVITY IS THE ALLOCATION OF FLAG OFFICER POSTS OF THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE TO NATO MEMBERS TO BID ON – TO INCLUDE FRANCE. THAT PROCESS WAS COMPLETED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE LAST SPRING -- APPROVED BY THE NAC -- AND IS NOW – AND FOR THE NEXT 9 MONTHS OR SO – A WORK IN PROGRESS. OF NOTE IS THE FACT THAT TWO OF THE SENIOR POSITIONS – THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND FOR TRANSFORMATION – AND – THE COMMANDER OF THE JOINT FORCES COMMAND HEADQUARTERS IN LISBON, PORTUGAL – BOTH CHANGED TO FRENCH FLAG OFFICERS IN JULY AND SEPTEMBER RESPECTIVELY. AT THE STAFF LEVEL – THE FRENCH ARE NOW IDENTIFYING STAFF OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS TO FILL POSITIONS ON MANY OF THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE HEADQUARTERS STAFFS. IN SUM – MY ASSESSEMENT IS THAT ALL IS WORKING AS INTENDED AT THIS TIME BUT IT WILL BE SEVERAL MONTHS BEFORE A JUDGEMENT CAN BE MADE WITH REGARD TO EFFICACY.

NATO'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP HAS STATED THAT ENLARGEMENT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF NATO AND ITS DOORS REMAIN OPEN. FROM THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE ON ENLARGEMENT – WE MUST MAINTAIN THE RIGOROUS STANDARDS ALREADY ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE THAT NEW MEMBERS ARE PROVIDERS OF ALLIANCE SECURITY – NOT CONSUMERS OF SECURITY. ADDITIONALLY – WE HAVE LEARNED MUCH OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES CONCERNING THE

PROCESSES AND PROGRAMS FOR ENLARGEMENT – PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP), MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN (MAP), ETC. BASED ON THAT EXPERIENCE – IT IS NOW TIME TO UPDATE OUR TEMPLATES TO REFLECT THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND DIFFERENT SECURITY CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT TOOLS . EVERY POTENTIAL MEMBER IS UNIQUE AND WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT IN OUR APPROACH. WITH REGARD TO UKRAINE AND GEORGIA – WHILE MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, COOPERATION, AND ASSESSMENTS ARE ON-GOING – ANY PROGRESS TOWARD NATO MEMBERSHIP REMAINS FIRMLY IN THE POLITICAL ARENA.

MILITARY TO MILITARY COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA REMAINS DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX. NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES MUST RECEIVE POLITICAL GUIDANCE TO FULLY RE-ENGAGE WITH RUSSIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES – IF THAT GUIDANCE HAS BEEN FORTHCOMING – IT HAS BEEN VERY RECENTLY. I BELIEVE THE KEY FOR OPENING THIS EFFORT IS TO FIND AREAS OF COMMON MILITARY INTERESTS FOR BOTH NATO AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND PURSUE THOSE. COUNTER-PROLIFERATION, COUNTERTERRORISM, HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF, AND COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS ARE BUT A FEW OF THE AREAS OF COMMON INTERESTS. THESE BECOME THE START POINT FOR THIS ESSENTIAL COOPERATION.

IN MY PREVIOUS COMMENTS ON THE NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT I INDICATED MORE MUST BE DONE WITH THE EU. MY EXPERIENCE DURING MY TIME AS SACEUR WAS THAT FROM THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE – THERE WAS INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM ON BEHALF OF BOTH EU AND NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO FIND OPPORTUNITIES TO TRAIN AND OPERATE TOGETHER. THAT SAME EXPERIENCE INFORMS MY JUDGEMENT THAT SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES EXIST THAT – UNTIL ERODED OR BREACHED – WILL PREVENT THIS NEEDED

COOPERATION. THIS IS A HIGH-PRIORITY AREA FOR THE POLITICOS OF BOTH NATO AND THE EU – AND BILATERALLY FOR THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN NATION LEADERS. OUR MIL TO MIL EFFORTS ARE REPEATEDLY THWARTED BY OLD FEUDS AND RIVALRIES THAT DO NOT SERVE ALLIANCE NOR EU INTERESTS. THEY CAN'T CONTINUE TO BE IGNORED.

ONCE AGAIN – CHAIRMAN KERRY, RANKING MEMBER LUGAR – AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE – THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY. I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR QUESTIONS.