| 111 | TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION S. |
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| То | promote peace, stability, improved governance, and economic development in Southern Sudan and Darfur, and for other purposes. |
| | IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES |
| Mr. | Kerry (for himself, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Wicker, and Mr. Feingold) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on |
| То | A BILL promote peace, stability, improved governance, and economic development in Southern Sudan and Darfur, and for other purposes. |
| 1 | Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- |
| 2 | tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, |
| 3 | SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. |
| 4 | This Act may be cited as the "Sudan Peace and Sta- |
| 5 | bility Act of 2010". |
| 6 | SEC. 2. FINDINGS. |
| 7 | Congress makes the following findings: |

(1) Sudan has been the scene of terrible conflict

in recent decades, including a civil war between

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North and South that raged for over 20 years and genocidal violence in Darfur that has been carried out by government forces and their militias.

- (2) On August 12, 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher designated Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2371).
- (3) United States Government engagement, particularly the work of then Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan, John C. Danforth, in close coordination with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the Governments of the United Kingdom and Norway, helped the parties to the North-South conflict in Sudan to reach the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which, on January 9, 2005, brought a formal end to that civil war.
- (4) The CPA called for wealth and power sharing, national elections, democratic and military reforms, specific protocols for border states, the formation of a semi-autonomous government in the

South, and referenda on self-determination for the South and the territory of Abyei to be held by January 2011.

- (5) The CPA has maintained the larger peace to date and the parties have made progress on a number of elements of the agreement, but the process has not led to a democratic transformation, as called for in the 2005 Agreement, and key issues remain outstanding, notably border demarcation and preparations for the 2011 referenda. As the CPA draws to a close, critical questions of post-referenda citizenship and revenue sharing must be resolved.
- (6) At the same time that efforts were underway to solidify peace between the North and South, the situation in Darfur deteriorated so significantly that Secretary of State Colin Powell on September 3, 2004, and Congress on September 7, 2004, described actions by the National Congress Party (NCP) government and its proxy militias as genocide.
- (7) According to United Nations estimates, over 300,000 people were killed in the conflict in Darfur and over 2,600,000 have been displaced internally while another 250,000 Darfuris have sought refuge

in Chad, and these processes of displacement continue.

(8) On March 29, 2005, and April 25, 2006, the United Nations Security Council issued Security Council Resolutions 1591 and 1672, respectively, condemning the continued violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Darfur region of Sudan and, in particular, the continuation of violence against civilians and sexual violence against women and girls, determining that the situation in Darfur constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region, and calling on member states to take certain measures against persons responsible for the continuing conflict.

- (9) The United Nations established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in 2005 and the African Union/United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2006 with respective authorized strengths of 10,715 and 25,987 troops and police.
- (10) On March 4, 2009, the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for the arrest of President of Sudan Omar Al Bashir, charging him with 5 counts of crimes against humanity and 2 counts of war crimes, and on July 12, 2010, issued

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an additional warrant for President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan for genocide committed in Darfur.

(11) In Darfur, despite peace agreements between the government and certain armed groups, including the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006 and other ceasefire and preliminary framework agreements, instability and violence, including direct conflict between and among armed groups and the government and militias, continues with ongoing civilian casualties and displacement, and the grievances that sparked the Darfuri rebellion as well as the consequences of the genocidal violence carried out and supported by the government remain unaddressed. As stated in the Report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), "Ensuring stability in Darfur requires a political process, in which due attention is paid to the inter-connected pillars of peace, justice, and reconciliation."

(12) In response to the crisis in Darfur, the international community, led by contributions from the United States, has undertaken a massive humanitarian operation to provide food, water, sanitation, medical support, and other assistance to the millions of Darfuris displaced or otherwise affected by the violence, an effort that was jeopardized by the

Government of Sudan's expulsion of 13 international nongovernmental organizations in March 2009.

- (13) Criminal activity, widespread violence directed against civilians, peacekeepers, and aid workers in Darfur, and an environment of impunity contribute to ongoing instability and jeopardize humanitarian assistance, individual and community safety and well being, and opportunities for development.
- (14) The United States Government provides substantial capacity-building and other assistance to Southern Sudan, but the humanitarian, developmental, and governance challenges remain enormous and have direct implications for the stability of the larger region.
- (15) Abyei, the subject of the Protocol between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict, and the scene of major violence in 2008, remains a potential flashpoint and unresolved element between the parties. Serious challenges in the critical north-south border areas of Abyei, Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan, parts of which are highly militarized, persist, and inter-ethnic tensions, growing dissatisfaction with the slow imple-

1 mentation of the CPA, and the perceived lack of 2 peace dividends contribute to a volatile situation.

- (16) Ethnic and communal violence in Southern Sudan has escalated in scope and intensity, resulting in increasing loss of life and displacement and further threatening stability in the region.
- (17) On February 2, 2010, testifying before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, stated that a number of countries in Asia and Africa are at significant risk of a new outbreak of mass killing over the next 5 years, but identified Southern Sudan as the area in which "a new mass killing or genocide is most likely to occur.".
- (18) In April 2010, Sudan held national elections but the SPLM and other opposition parties withdrew from most contests in Northern Sudan, citing intimidation, voter fraud, insecurity in Darfur, and other factors. The United States Government characterized the elections as not meeting international standards and marked by circumscribed political rights and freedoms, reports of intimidation and threats of violence in Southern Sudan, insecurity and ongoing conflict in Darfur, and technical problems, resulting in serious irregularities.

| SEC. | 3. | DEFINITIONS. |
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| 2 | In this Act: |
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| 3 | (1) Appropriate congressional commit- |
| 4 | TEES.—The term "appropriate congressional com- |
| 5 | mittees" means the Committee on Foreign Relations |
| 6 | of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs |
| 7 | of the House of Representatives. |
| 8 | (2) Government of Southern Sudan.—The |
| 9 | term "Government of Southern Sudan" includes the |
| 10 | regional Government of Southern Sudan based in |
| 11 | Juba as constituted as of the date of the enactment |
| 12 | of this Act and any successor government that— |
| 13 | (A) retains autonomy within Sudan or |
| 14 | achieves independence as a result of the ref- |
| 15 | erendum called for under the Comprehensive |
| 16 | Peace Agreement; or |
| 17 | (B) is recognized as an independent nation |
| 18 | by the United States Government. |
| 19 | (3) Marginalized populations of sudan.— |
| 20 | The term "marginalized populations of Sudan" |
| 21 | means— |
| 22 | (A) adversely affected groups in regions |
| 23 | authorized to receive assistance under section |
| 24 | 8(c) of the Darfur Peace and Accountability |
| 25 | Act (Public Law 109–344; 50 U.S.C. 1701 |
| 26 | note); and |

| 1 | (B) marginalized areas in Northern Sudan |
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| 2 | described in section $4(9)$ of such Act. |
| 3 | SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS. |
| 4 | It is the sense of Congress that— |
| 5 | (1) as affirmed in President Barack Obama's |
| 6 | strategy document, "Sudan: A Critical Moment, A |
| 7 | Comprehensive Approach," of October 19, 2009, |
| 8 | "The United States cannot succeed in achieving our |
| 9 | policy goals by focusing exclusively on Darfur or |
| 10 | CPA implementation—both must be addressed seri- |
| 11 | ously and simultaneously, while also working to re- |
| 12 | solve and prevent conflict throughout Sudan."; |
| 13 | (2) the situation in Sudan, particularly in the |
| 14 | potentially volatile year ahead, demands strength- |
| 15 | ened diplomatic, humanitarian, and developmental |
| 16 | efforts by the United States Government and other |
| 17 | bilateral and multilateral partners in order to see |
| 18 | the CPA through to a peaceful referenda process |
| 19 | and outcome, to increase the governance and institu- |
| 20 | tional capacities in Southern Sudan to better meet |
| 21 | the needs of the people whether as an independent |
| 22 | state or semi-autonomous region, and to help to fos- |
| 23 | ter peace and stability in Darfur; |
| 24 | (3) other governments and actors in the region |
| 25 | influence the security situation in Sudan and are in |

1 turn affected by it, thus elevating the importance for 2 the United States Government of working with part-3 ners in the region and heightening the responsibility 4 and interest of Sudan's neighbors and others in con-5 tributing to the process to enhance peace and sta-6 bility throughout the region; 7 (4) the peace process in Darfur requires the on-8 site participation of the organized parties to the con-9 flict who are willing to make a constructive commit-10 ment to the peace process, the Government of 11 Sudan, and elements of civil society, including 12 women, in negotiations in order to achieve a lasting 13 settlement; 14 (5) United States support for the Darfur peace 15 process would be enhanced by the appointment of a 16 full-time senior official to assist in those efforts; 17 (6) the ongoing rapprochement between the 18 Governments of Chad and Sudan offers an impor-19 tant opportunity for larger regional stability and 20 peace; 21 (7) countries with significant economic invest-22 ments in Sudan, including the People's Republic of 23 China, have a vested interest in peace and stability 24 in Sudan and a role and responsibility to work to-25 ward that goal;

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(8) to prepare for potential outcomes before and after the scheduled referenda on secession, the United States Government should continue to engage with local and international partners in contingency planning, especially to consider ways to help prevent or respond to possible large-scale violence, dislocation, or other humanitarian emergencies; (9) it is critical that the parties to the CPA, assisted by mediators and other witnesses to the agreement, which included the representatives of Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, the African Union, the European Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States, the United Nations, and the United States, address unresolved issues and finalize preparations for the January 2011 referenda, reach basic agreements on key issues, and establish a framework for post-referenda negotiations; (10) while the United States Government is a major contributor to humanitarian and developmental work in Sudan, increased assistance from multilateral, regional, and other bilateral sources will be critical to sustaining peace and promoting hu-

manitarian relief, economic development, and recov-

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ery, and it is important that the international community resolve difficulties in the delivery of assistance through multilateral vehicles, make a sufficient commitment of food assistance, and provide oversight;

(11) resource management, transparency, accountability, and service delivery are critical components of effective governance, and the Government of Southern Sudan and state and local authorities in Southern Sudan, as they continue to receive outside assistance, should demonstrate a commitment to improvements in these sectors;

(12) in the event that the Government of Southern Sudan achieves independence and is recognized by the United States Government, and in the months leading up to such a potential development, it is important for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury to examine the statutory and other sanctions currently applicable to Sudan, to determine how the sanctions regime would be affected by the independence of Southern Sudan, and to consult with Congress on changes that may be needed under such circumstances;

(13) in order to increase the diplomatic capacity of the United States Government, facilitate humani-

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tarian and developmental assistance and oversight of aid, and support efforts of the Government of Southern Sudan to improve governance and enhance security, the United States Government should maintain the position of a special envoy, appoint a senior official to assist with the Darfur peace process, and accelerate plans for construction on additional or expanded facilities and other housing for personnel to support an enhanced United States diplomatic and development presence and to allow for expanded deployment of personnel;

(14) the United States Government—

(A) recognizes the importance of the UNMIS and UNAMID missions and anticipates the continued need for their presence in the coming years;

(B) emphasizes the importance of proactive diplomacy and contingency planning by the international community for Darfur, Southern Sudan, the "Three Areas" of Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile State, and Abyei, and other vulnerable populations, including those in Eastern Sudan, and recognizes the importance of the full implementation of the Abyei Protocol

| 1 | and that resolution of Abyei's status is a crit- |
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| 2 | ical element of a sustained peace; |
| 3 | (C) notes that UNAMID continues to lack |
| 4 | critical enablers, including utility helicopters, |
| 5 | and that the absence of such enablers undercuts |
| 6 | the ability of the mission to carry out its civil- |
| 7 | ian protection mandate, and notes with concern |
| 8 | that UNMIS is facing diminishing aviation re- |
| 9 | sources at a moment when mobility is critical; |
| 10 | (D) notes that the mission and potentially |
| 11 | the personnel of UNMIS should continue to |
| 12 | evolve after the completion of the terms of the |
| 13 | CPA in order to maintain its civilian protection |
| 14 | function while strengthening its institution- |
| 15 | building abilities; and |
| 16 | (E) urges each to pursue its mandate of ci- |
| 17 | vilian protection assertively; |
| 18 | (15) key benchmarks to measure progress with |
| 19 | respect to the relationship between the United |
| 20 | States and Sudan include humanitarian and peace- |
| 21 | keeper access to and within Darfur, committed en- |
| 22 | gagement to resolve the conflict there and uphold |
| 23 | justice and accountability, demarcation of borders, |
| 24 | adherence to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, |
| 25 | including holding the referenda for Southern Sudan |

1 and Abyei as provided for in such agreement within 2 the time provided, and a framework agreement for 3 the resolution of post-referenda issues; 4 (16) in the event of the obstruction of efforts 5 to achieve these benchmarks, additional responses to 6 such obstruction include expanded travel restrictions 7 against individuals responsible for such actions, 8 blocking the assets of such individuals and, as prac-9 tical, transactions with the financial institutions that 10 support them, opposition to international debt relief 11 measures, engagement to promote multilateral sanc-12 tions, and stricter enforcement of multilateral arms 13 embargoes; 14 (17) in the event of the achievement of these 15 benchmarks, phased and graduated responses in-16 clude steps to permit certain forms of trade and in-17 vestment in Sudan in specific sectors (other than the 18 petroleum sector), the exchange of ambassadors, and 19 a review of foreign assistance restrictions, economic 20 sanctions, and other statutory provisions; and 21 (18) the full normalization of relations between 22 the United States and Sudan, including support for 23 international debt relief, requires the peaceful imple-24 mentation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a

comprehensive peace agreement in Darfur that is

| 1 | credibly implemented, sustained improvement in se- |
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| 2 | curity and services that improve living conditions in |
| 3 | Darfur, including humanitarian access, full coopera- |
| 4 | tion with UNAMID and UNMIS, a cessation of all |
| 5 | support for international terrorism, and credible and |
| 6 | locally supported efforts to achieve accountability, |
| 7 | justice, and reconciliation, as consistent with existing |
| 8 | United States law and the terms of relevant United |
| 9 | Nations Security Council resolutions. |
| 10 | SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY. |
| 11 | It is the policy of the United States— |
| 12 | (1) to support efforts to help create a more |
| 13 | democratic, accountable, and inclusive government in |
| 14 | Sudan that respects human rights, protects civil lib- |
| 15 | erties, and contributes to peace and stability in the |
| 16 | region; |
| 17 | (2) to promote and work toward a definitive |
| 18 | end to conflict, gross human rights abuses, and |
| 19 | genocide in Darfur, and to promote peace through- |
| 20 | out Sudan; |
| 21 | (3) to respond vigorously to efforts that either |
| 22 | undermine the credibility of the self-determination |
| 23 | referenda provided for by the CPA, undermine peace |
| 24 | and stability in Southern Sudan, or prevent the end |
| 25 | of the conflict in Darfur, including working with bi- |

| 1 | lateral and multilateral partners, including the |
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| 2 | United Nations, the African Union, the European |
| 3 | Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, |
| 4 | to take appropriate measures in the event of such ef- |
| 5 | forts; |
| 6 | (4) to promote and, together with the parties to |
| 7 | the CPA and others, to work toward full implemen- |
| 8 | tation of the agreement in such a way that results |
| 9 | in a peaceful, unified Sudan or an orderly path to- |
| 10 | ward 2 separate and viable states at peace with each |
| 11 | other; |
| 12 | (5) in order to help create conditions more con- |
| 13 | ducive to peace, development, democracy, and sta- |
| 14 | bility in Sudan, to— |
| 15 | (A) work with nongovernmental organiza- |
| 16 | tions, the Government of Southern Sudan, and |
| 17 | other bilateral and multilateral entities to pro- |
| 18 | vide critical humanitarian assistance in South- |
| 19 | ern Sudan and other areas; |
| 20 | (B) promote implementation of the CPA |
| 21 | by all parties, including the conducting of |
| 22 | peaceful and credible referenda on self-deter- |
| 23 | mination in January 2011 and foster commit- |
| 24 | ments from countries in the region, multilateral |
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| 1 | partners, and other key countries to accept the |
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| 2 | outcome of such a process; |
| 3 | (C) support capacity building of the Gov- |
| 4 | ernment of Southern Sudan and that of state |
| 5 | and local authorities in the South, including |
| 6 | through the possible support of technical advi- |
| 7 | sors, in order to strengthen the abilities of the |
| 8 | Government of Southern Sudan to provide crit- |
| 9 | ical services to their people, whether as an inde- |
| 10 | pendent state or semi-autonomous region; |
| 11 | (D) assist the parties to the CPA and rein- |
| 12 | vigorate international engagement from regional |
| 13 | partners and others, including the People's Re- |
| 14 | public of China, in resolving post-referendum |
| 15 | issues, including questions regarding citizenship |
| 16 | and migration, future cooperation in the oil sec- |
| 17 | tor and wealth-sharing, security arrangements |
| 18 | security of border areas, water use, liabilities |
| 19 | and assets, and matters of currency and fi- |
| 20 | nance; |
| 21 | (E) help the parties to defuse tension in |
| 22 | Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile State |
| 23 | through successful conducting of the ref- |
| 24 | erendum for Abyei and the popular consultation |
| 25 | process for the other two areas, as required |

| 1 | under the CPA, and the promotion of construc- |
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| 2 | tive political engagement to address other con- |
| 3 | cerns in those areas; |
| 4 | (F) assist the Government of Southern |
| 5 | Sudan in enhancing governance and service de- |
| 6 | livery, reintegrating returnees, strengthening |
| 7 | the rule of law, building an effective police force |
| 8 | and criminal justice system, helping to trans- |
| 9 | form its security forces into a professional body |
| 10 | abiding by principles of civilian rule, protection |
| 11 | of human rights, and accountability, reducing |
| 12 | corruption, improving transparency, and build- |
| 13 | ing effective political capacity in a democratic |
| 14 | environment; |
| 15 | (G) assist the Government of Southern |
| 16 | Sudan in creating comprehensive controls over |
| 17 | small arms stockpiles, clearing landmines and |
| 18 | explosive remnants of war, and implementing |
| 19 | the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Con- |
| 20 | trol, and Reduction of Small Arms and Light |
| 21 | Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the |
| 22 | Horn of Africa, done at Nairobi April 21, 2004; |
| 23 | (H) promote improved financial manage- |
| 24 | ment within the Government of Southern |
| 25 | Sudan; |

| 1 | (I) engage in intense dialogue with key bi- |
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| 2 | lateral and multilateral partners to identify con- |
| 3 | crete steps that could be taken multilaterally to |
| 4 | respond to actions by the North or the South |
| 5 | or any other party that undermines peace in |
| 6 | Sudan, interferes with humanitarian relief, im- |
| 7 | pedes future development, or undercuts stability |
| 8 | in Darfur; and |
| 9 | (J) support viable local efforts to prevent |
| 10 | and mitigate conflict and enhance reconcili- |
| 11 | ation, including disarmament, demobilization, |
| 12 | and reintegration of remaining militias and |
| 13 | other armed groups, including potential hybrid |
| 14 | tribunals for acts committed in Darfur as called |
| 15 | for by the Peace and Security Council of the |
| 16 | African Union; and |
| 17 | (6) in order to help create conditions more con- |
| 18 | ducive to peace, the distribution of humanitarian re- |
| 19 | lief, future development, and stability in Darfur, |
| 20 | to— |
| 21 | (A) promote peace and security for the |
| 22 | people of Darfur, including through sustainable |
| 23 | peace agreements arrived at with consultation |
| 24 | with civil society; |

| 1 | (B) identify and prioritize the filling of |
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| 2 | gaps in humanitarian assistance by sector, in- |
| 3 | cluding protection, and by access to under- |
| 4 | served populations in need; |
| 5 | (C) support international mediation efforts |
| 6 | to help create a lasting peace in Darfur; |
| 7 | (D) promote simultaneous stabilization ef- |
| 8 | forts where conditions permit while maintaining |
| 9 | vital humanitarian assistance; |
| 10 | (E) support and enhance the efforts of |
| 11 | UNAMID and others to provide civilian protec- |
| 12 | tion, including protection against sexual and |
| 13 | gender-based violence; |
| 14 | (F) encourage and strengthen initiatives |
| 15 | for ending violent conflict; |
| 16 | (G) support international efforts, including |
| 17 | those of the International Criminal Court, to |
| 18 | bring those responsible for genocide, crimes |
| 19 | against humanity, and war crimes in Darfur to |
| 20 | justice and to work with Darfuri civil society to |
| 21 | support locally owned accountability and rec- |
| 22 | onciliation mechanisms that may hasten peace |
| 23 | and make it more sustainable; |
| 24 | (H) promote livelihood and other opportu- |
| 25 | nities for youth, women, and others; |

| 1 | (I) assist with the rehabilitation and |
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| 2 | strengthening of ecosystems and natural re- |
| 3 | source management as part of a broader effort |
| 4 | to reduce environmental drivers of conflict and |
| 5 | enhance rural and urban development; |
| 6 | (J) work with key bilateral and multilat- |
| 7 | eral partners, as well as local actors, to develop |
| 8 | contingency plans to address potential post- |
| 9 | 2011 scenarios and humanitarian and other |
| 10 | needs; and |
| 11 | (K) promote democratic processes and po- |
| 12 | litical reforms at the national and subnational |
| 13 | levels that enhance the government's respon- |
| 14 | siveness to the needs of the people of Darfur. |
| 15 | SEC. 6. SECURITY, CIVIL AVIATION, AND POLICE ASSIST- |
| 16 | ANCE. |
| 17 | (a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Con- |
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| 18 | gress that— |
| 18 19 | |
| | gress that— |
| 19 | gress that— (1) security assistance to the Government of |
| 19 20 | gress that— (1) security assistance to the Government of Southern Sudan is intended to— |
| 19 20 21 | gress that— (1) security assistance to the Government of Southern Sudan is intended to— (A) assist with the continuing efforts of |

| 1 | ular, nonpartisan professional army in accord- |
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| 2 | ance with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| 3 | (B) enhance the ability of the Government |
| 4 | of Southern Sudan to prevent and respond to |
| 5 | internal conflict in order to protect the lives |
| 6 | well being, and property of civilians while civil- |
| 7 | ian police capacities are being built; and |
| 8 | (C) enhance the ability of the Government |
| 9 | of Southern Sudan to respond to the threats |
| 10 | posed by transborder armed groups, such as the |
| 11 | Lord's Resistance Army, maintain its territoria |
| 12 | integrity, and promote regional stability; and |
| 13 | (2) assistance to the civilian police and crimina |
| 14 | justice sector in Southern Sudan is intended to— |
| 15 | (A) enhance the effectiveness and account |
| 16 | ability of the Southern Sudan Police Service |
| 17 | and its ability to carry out critical functions of |
| 18 | civilian protection and law enforcement, includ- |
| 19 | ing through support for community-based police |
| 20 | ing; and |
| 21 | (B) support efforts within the judiciary to |
| 22 | establish and uphold the rule of law, protect |
| 23 | human rights, and ensure due process. |
| 24 | (b) Security, Aviation, and Police Assist- |
| 25 | ANCE.— |

(1) In General.—

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(A) AUTHORITY.—If the President has not made a certification under section 12(a)(3) of the Sudan Peace Act (Public Law 107–245; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) regarding the noncompliance of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) or the Government of Southern Sudan with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan, the President, notwithstanding any other provision of law, may, for the purpose of constituting a professional military force and strengthening police capabilities to provide civilian protection and uphold the rule of law, authorize the provision of the following assistance to the Government of Southern Sudan: (i) Non-lethal military equipment and related defense services, including training, controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 C.F.R. 120.1 et seq.) if the President— (I) determines that the provision of such items is in the national inter-

est of the United States; and

| 1 | (II) not later than 15 days before |
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| 2 | the provision of any such items, noti- |
| 3 | fies the Committee on Foreign Rela- |
| 4 | tions of the Senate and the Com- |
| 5 | mittee on Foreign Affairs of the |
| 6 | House of Representatives of such de- |
| 7 | termination. |
| 8 | (ii) Equipment and training related to |
| 9 | civil aviation infrastructure to promote |
| 10 | safety, security, and air navigation in |
| 11 | Southern Sudan, if the President— |
| 12 | (I) determines that the provision |
| 13 | of such items is in the national inter- |
| 14 | est of the United States; and |
| 15 | (II) not later than 15 days before |
| 16 | the provision of any such items, noti- |
| 17 | fies the Committee on Foreign Rela- |
| 18 | tions of the Senate and the Com- |
| 19 | mittee on Foreign Affairs of the |
| 20 | House of Representatives of such de- |
| 21 | termination. |
| 22 | (iii) Training and equipment for police |
| 23 | forces, including training on human rights, |
| 24 | civilian protection, gender-based violence, |
| 25 | and the role of security forces in maintain- |

| 1 | ing the rule of law. Assistance in this Act |
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| 2 | may be made available to the Government |
| 3 | of Southern Sudan to provide appropriate |
| 4 | lethal equipment and training of police is |
| 5 | the President— |
| 6 | (I) determines that the provision |
| 7 | of such items is in the national inter- |
| 8 | est of the United States and appro- |
| 9 | priate oversight and accountability |
| 10 | mechanisms exist; and |
| 11 | (II) not later than 15 days before |
| 12 | the provision of any such assistance, |
| 13 | notifies the appropriate congressional |
| 14 | committees of such determination. |
| 15 | (B) Sunset.—The authority provided |
| 16 | under subparagraph (A) shall expire on Sep- |
| 17 | tember 30, 2014. |
| 18 | (2) Notification requirement for secu- |
| 19 | RITY ASSISTANCE TO INDEPENDENT STATE OF |
| 20 | SOUTHERN SUDAN.—For fiscal years 2011 through |
| 21 | 2014, in the event of the recognition by the Presi- |
| 22 | dent of the State of Southern Sudan as an inde- |
| 23 | pendent country, the President shall notify the ap- |
| 24 | propriate congressional committees not later than 15 |
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| 1 | days before obligating any lethal or non-lethal secu- |
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| 2 | rity assistance. |
| 3 | (3) End use assurances.—For each item ex- |
| 4 | ported pursuant to this subsection, the President |
| 5 | shall include with the notification to Congress under |
| 6 | clauses (i)(II) and (ii)(II) of paragraph (1)(A) and |
| 7 | under paragraph (2)— |
| 8 | (A) an identification of the end users to |
| 9 | which the of assistance is being made; |
| 10 | (B) the dollar value of the items being pro- |
| 11 | vided; |
| 12 | (C) a description of the items being pro- |
| 13 | vided; and |
| 14 | (D) a description of the end use |
| 15 | verification procedures that will be applied to |
| 16 | such items, including— |
| 17 | (i) any special assurances obtained |
| 18 | from the Government of Southern Sudar |
| 19 | or other authorized end users regarding |
| 20 | such equipment; and |
| 21 | (ii) the end use or retransfer controls |
| 22 | that will be applied to any items provided |
| 23 | under this subsection. |

28 1 (4) Waiver authority.—Section 40 of the 2 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780) shall not 3 apply to assistance provided under paragraph (1). 4 SEC. 7. MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. 5 (a) Rule of Construction Regarding Votes Op-Posing Loans.—Provisions of law that direct the United 6 7 States Government to vote against or oppose loans or 8 other uses of funds, including for financial or technical assistance, in international financial institutions for 10 Sudan shall not be construed as applying to Southern 11 Sudan or to technical assistance relating to the implemen-12 tation and peaceful fulfillment of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. The Secretary of Treasury shall submit a notification to the appropriate committees 14 15 of Congress prior to relying upon the rule of construction set forth in this section to vote for or support a loan or 16 17 other use of funds.

- 18 (b) Appropriate Committees of Congress De-
- FINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate commit-19
- tees of Congress" means the Committee on Foreign Rela-20
- 21 tions and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
- Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-
- 23 fairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the
- House of Representatives.

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| 1 | SEC. 8. MEASURE TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC VIABILITY AND |
| 2 | SECURITY IN SOUTHERN SUDAN. |
| 3 | (a) Authority.—Notwithstanding any other provi- |
| 4 | sion of law, in the event that the Government of Southern |
| 5 | Sudan is recognized as an independent country by the |
| 6 | United States Government and has agreed to a revenue |
| 7 | sharing arrangement with Sudan, in order to facilitate the |
| 8 | economic development and self-sufficiency of such inde- |
| 9 | pendent country and to promote peace prior to and fol- |
| 10 | lowing the culmination of the CPA, the President may |
| 11 | waive the prohibition on the transshipment of petroleum |
| 12 | originating in Southern Sudan through the country of |
| 13 | Sudan upon prior notification to the appropriate commit- |
| 14 | tees of Congress that the exercising of such a waiver is |
| 15 | in the national interest of the United States. |
| 16 | (b) Appropriate Committees of Congress De- |
| 17 | FINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate commit- |
| 18 | tees of Congress" means the Committee on Foreign Rela- |
| 19 | tions and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban |
| 20 | Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af- |
| 21 | fairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the |
| 22 | House of Representatives. |
| 23 | SEC. 9. CONSOLIDATION AND AMENDMENT OF REPORTING |
| 24 | REQUIREMENTS. |
| 25 | (a) REPORT ON SOUTHERN SUDAN—Not later than |

25 (a) Report on Southern Sudan.—Not later than

26 one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and

- 1 annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in
- 2 consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads
- 3 of other relevant agencies, shall submit to the appropriate
- 4 congressional committees a classified report, together with
- 5 an unclassified executive summary, that includes the fol-
- 6 lowing:

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- 7 (1) An assessment of progress made during the 8 previous calendar year toward meeting the policy ob-9 jectives set forth in section 5.
 - (2) A description of United States Government programs contributing to the achievement of the policy objectives set forth in section 5, including the amounts obligated and expended on such programs during the preceding fiscal year.
 - (3) An assessment of the levels and nature of violence, human rights violations, and conflict within or involving Southern Sudan, including sexual and gender-based violence and the role played by other governments and actors in the continuation of violence, and a description of prevention and resolution efforts by the United States Government, the Government of Southern Sudan, civil society, the United Nations, and other parties.
 - (4) a description of incidents which may constitute crimes against humanity, genocide, war

1 crimes, and other violations of international humani-2 tarian law by all parties to the conflict in Sudan, in-3 cluding slavery, rape, and aerial bombardment of ci-4 vilian targets. 5 (5) A description, to the degree practical, of the 6 accrual, transparency regarding, and management of 7 oil and gas revenues by the Government of Southern 8 Sudan and of the state of oil production and re-9 gional transshipment of oil and gas from Southern 10 Sudan to other markets. 11 (6) A description of transit patterns across bor-12 ders between Northern and Southern Sudan and of 13 the status of marginalized populations, including dis-14 placed persons from Southern Sudan living in the vi-15 cinity of Khartoum. 16 (7) A description of the status of Abyei, if 17 Abyei becomes separate from Sudan as a result of 18 its referendum, and an assessment of the level and 19 nature of conflict in Abyei. 20 (8) A description of the role and size of United 21 Nations peacekeeping missions in Southern Sudan, 22 including conflict prevention and mitigation activi-23 ties. 24 (9) A description of efforts by the Government 25 of Southern Sudan to undertake security and justice

1 sector reform, including an assessment of the capa-2 bilities of the military and civilian police force and 3 progress on implementing both the SPLA Act and 4 the Police Act. 5 (10) A description of United States security as-6 sistance provided in the period covered by this re-7 port, and a description of any unauthorized re-8 transfer or use of security assistance furnished by 9 the United States. 10 (11) A description of efforts by the Government 11 of Southern Sudan to develop accountability mecha-12 nisms for the security forces, including the develop-13 ment of a military justice system. 14 (12) In all reports except the initial report, a 15 description, sector by sector of the implementation 16 of the Southern Sudan development and stabilization 17 strategy submitted under subsection (b). 18 (b) STRATEGY ON SOUTHERN SUDAN.—Not later 19 than January 31, 2012, the Secretary of State shall sub-20 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a multi-21 year strategy to provide assistance in support of govern-22 ance and the rule of law, humanitarian aid, development, 23 and security in Southern Sudan, including— 24 (1) specific and measurable goals; 25 (2) benchmarks and timeframes;

| 1 | (3) an implementation plan to achieve the pol- |
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| 2 | icy objectives set forth in section 5; and |
| 3 | (4) a monitoring and evaluation plan. |
| 4 | (c) Report on Darfur and Other Marginalized |
| 5 | AREAS IN SUDAN.—Not later than one year after the date |
| 6 | of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for |
| 7 | 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the |
| 8 | Secretary of Defense and other relevant agencies, shall |
| 9 | submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re- |
| 10 | port that includes the following: |
| 11 | (1) An assessment of progress made during the |
| 12 | previous calendar year toward meeting the policy ob- |
| 13 | jectives set forth in section 5. |
| 14 | (2) A description of United States Government |
| 15 | programs contributing to the achievement of the pol- |
| 16 | icy objectives set forth in section 5, including the |
| 17 | amounts obligated and expended on such programs |
| 18 | during the preceding fiscal year. |
| 19 | (3) An assessment of the levels and nature of |
| 20 | violence, human rights violations, and conflict within |
| 21 | Darfur, including sexual and gender-based violence, |
| 22 | and a description of as prevention and resolution ef- |
| 23 | forts by the United States Government, the Govern- |
| 24 | ment of Sudan, civil society, the United Nations, |
| 25 | and other parties. |

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| 1 | (4) An assessment of the roles played by other |
| 2 | governments and actors in the continuation or pre- |
| 3 | vention and resolution of conflict in Darfur. |
| 4 | (5) A description of incidents that may con- |
| 5 | stitute crimes against humanity, genocide, war |
| 6 | crimes, and other violations of international humani- |
| 7 | tarian law by all parties to the conflict in Sudan, in- |
| 8 | cluding slavery, rape, and aerial bombardment of ci- |
| 9 | vilian targets. |
| 10 | (6) A description of aerial bombardment of ci- |
| 11 | vilians by government forces, capabilities and role of |
| 12 | peacekeeping forces in providing civilian protection, |
| 13 | and the impact of criminal activity on the security |
| 14 | environment for civilians and aid workers. |
| 15 | (7) A description of the political status, levels |
| 16 | and nature of violence, and other developments with- |
| 17 | in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. |
| 18 | (8) A description of the political status, levels |
| 19 | and nature of violence, and other developments with- |
| 20 | in Eastern Sudan. |
| 21 | (9) A description of the economic impact of oil |
| 22 | exploitation within Sudan and of other sources of oil |
| 23 | investment or revenue within the country. |
| 24 | (10) In all reports except the initial report, a |
| 25 | description, sector by sector, of the implementation |

1 of the strategy on Darfur and other areas in Sudan 2 submitted under subsection (d). 3 (d) STRATEGY ON Darfur OTHER AND 4 MARGINALIZED AREAS IN SUDAN.—Not later than Janu-5 ary 31, 2012, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 6 appropriate congressional committees a multi-year strat-7 egy to support the objectives for Darfur and other areas 8 in Sudan included in this Act, including— 9 (1) specific and measurable goals; 10 (2) benchmarks and timeframes; 11 (3) an implementation plan to achieve the pol-12 icy objectives set forth in section 5; and 13 (4) a monitoring and evaluation plan. 14 (e) Elimination of Existing Reporting Re-15 QUIREMENTS.—The Sudan Peace Act (Public Law 107– 245; 50 U.S.C. 1791 note) is amended— 16 17 (1) in section 8— 18 (A) by striking subsections (b), (c), and 19 (e); and (B) in subsection (g), by striking "or (b)"; 20 21 and 22 (2) by striking section 11. 23 SEC. 10. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 24 It is the sense of Congress that, of all amounts appropriated for fiscal years 2011 through 2014 for the Depart-

- 1 ment of State and foreign operations, such sums as may
- 2 be necessary should be used to carry out activities author-

3 ized under this Act.