

Testimony of Frank A. Rose
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Good Morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker and Members of the Committee.

It is a great honor for me to come before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as President Obama's nominee for the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, which we have renamed within the Department the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (or AVC). I would like to thank President Obama and Secretary Kerry for the confidence they have shown in me by nominating me for this position. I would also like to acknowledge my mother Athalyn and my sister Nikko who are here today to provide moral support. Finally, let me acknowledge my colleagues on the panel, especially, Rose Gottemoeller, with whom I have worked closely for the past 4 years and in whose path I will follow if the Senate agrees to confirm me in this position.

The Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Bureau traces its history back to the 1980s in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency where it was known as the Bureau for Intelligence, Verification, and Information Support (IVI). It was then reestablished in the State Department by the Congress in Public Law 106-113. This important law defines the fundamental purpose and critical national security function of the AVC Bureau and establishes the Assistant Secretary as having the lead within the Department of State on, "all matters relating to verification and compliance with international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments."

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report that accompanied P.L. 106-113 called for an Assistant Secretary with a "true commitment to vigorous enforcement of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and sanctions." This is an essential mission for U.S. national security. So let me commit to you today, that if confirmed in this position, I will focus on continuing to effectively conduct rigorous compliance assessments and ensure that countries are accountable for the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament commitments they have made.

This core verification and compliance mission also puts the Bureau at the center of key national security efforts of the Obama Administration.

The effective and timely verification of arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments is essential to U.S. national security. The United States must be assured that countries in compliance with their commitments. As a result, verification regimes are crafted that often provide for on-site inspections, which allow the United States or multilateral organizations to have a physical presence to monitor compliance with another country's commitments. The staff of the AVC Bureau has a deep expertise, knowledge and commitment to the verification and monitoring of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and commitments. Many of the Bureau's staff members have served as inspectors in arms control agreements, such as the START Treaty, the New START Treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the Open Skies Treaty, and other agreements, such as Libya's 2003 commitment to renounce weapons of mass destruction. This experience ensures that our compliance assessments are thorough, precise and timely. AVC is now playing a key role supporting the efforts to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons and will play a critical role in assessing the initial documents that Syria has provided to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

As part of its responsibilities, the AVC Bureau is statutorily charged with producing several reports on the compliance of countries with their arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament agreements. The largest and most important of those reports is the Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, which we call the Compliance Report for short and once was also known as the Pell Report.

For the last four years, in my current job as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, I have been responsible for overseeing the Annual Report on Compliance. This is an incredibly important report which the Obama Administration takes very seriously. The compliance assessments in this report undergo a rigorous review to ensure the findings are factually based and have the concurrence of key U.S. government departments and agencies, including the Intelligence Community. This massive effort results in a comprehensive package that distills numerous Intelligence Community and inspection reports, and provides a comprehensive assessment of compliance with a wide-range of agreements and commitments, from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), to the 1999 Vienna Document, to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Also included is information on the steps the U.S. Government has taken to resolve any compliance concerns.

Despite this massive undertaking, I am proud to say that the Obama Administration has transmitted the Compliance Report to Congress every year for the past four years. I will admit, however, it has been a challenge to meet the report's April 15 deadline. Should I be confirmed in the position of Assistant Secretary, I want to commit to you that I will look at ways of developing a more efficient process so that we can get this important report to Congress in a timelier manner. As always, if confirmed, I will be prepared to discuss compliance issues with you at any time.

The AVC Bureau also produces three other reports that are required by Senate Resolutions of Advice and Consent. These include the Condition (5)(C) Report: Compliance With the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe; the Condition (10)(C) Report: Compliance With the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; and the Annual Report on Implementation of the New START Treaty.

Beyond the experience of AVC staff and these reports, the Bureau is seeking to develop new technologies that can be used to verify and monitor compliance with arms control agreements and commitments. One of the AVC Bureau's main efforts is through the Key Verification Assets Fund, known as the V-Fund, which was established in the Bureau by Public Law 106-113. This is a modest fund that we use to preserve critical verification assets and to promote the development of new technologies. In many cases, the AVC Bureau uses the V-Fund as "seed money" which we can leverage to influence the development of new technologies rather than replace or duplicate activities underway by other Government agencies. The objective is to encourage other agencies either to develop new technologies or to adapt existing projects to meet the Governments arms control verification needs. In addition, in order to better organize these efforts, the AVC Bureau has created a Verification Technology Research and Development Needs document, which identifies the priority needs of the Bureau for research and development programs to address critical arms control and nonproliferation technology requirements in the realm of verification and transparency.

The AVC Bureau also uses Congressionally-appropriated funds to build and enhance the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which complements our own national technical means. When North Korea announced it had conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013, the sensors of the International Monitoring System (IMS) rapidly provided information that described the location, seismic magnitude, time and depth of the events.

Radionuclide detections at IMS stations in Japan and Russia were collected nearly 2 months after the 2013 event and were consistent with a nuclear explosion in North Korea. These detections played a key part in the U.S. and other states' efforts to verify North Korea's claims it had tested a nuclear device.

The Bureau is also seeking to engage more with civil society on verification issues and has begun an Arms Control Innovation Challenge. This challenge is now in its second iteration and seeks new, innovative ideas from the general public to heighten awareness on the topic of arms control. AVC is looking to use this challenge to develop new inspection tools, processes and ideas that could supplement or even replace current technical approaches which date back to the Cold War, with modern methods that capture the capabilities of mobile devices and easy information sharing. It is also an opportunity to engage the larger community including students, technologists, inventors and educators, to participate and become part of the solution to the verification and monitoring challenge. The 2013 challenge asks the public, "What Information Technology Tools and Concepts Can Support Future Arms Control Inspections?"

At the same time as the Bureau is carrying out this important verification and compliance mission, the Bureau was given the responsibility for the developing new arms control agreements as part of a 2010 restructuring contained in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (also known as the QDDR). This restructuring enhanced the Department's ability to utilize traditional arms control tools to address the growing challenge of weapons of mass destruction. By bringing the arms control mission together with the verification and compliance missions in a single bureau under one Assistant Secretary, the State Department has ensured that verification and compliance regimes are built into arms control agreements from their inception and that compliance with all such agreements is diligently verified. In practice, this means that the Bureau's experts, with their decades of verification and compliance experience, are integrated directly into the efforts to develop new arms control treaties and, in many cases, are the ones drafting the new agreements.

The New START Treaty, which requires the United States and Russian Federation to reduce their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 1,550 by 2018, is an excellent example of this approach. The Treaty contains a robust verification regime. Let me highlight a couple of the important verification mechanisms. For example, the verification regime requires twice yearly exchanges of data on facilities, numbers and locations, and notifications as required regarding movements of aircraft, flight tests, and new types of strategic offensive arms. To

confirm that data, the verification regime allows the United States to conduct 18 inspections annually in Russia and vice versa. In addition, each Party is required to conduct an exhibition of new strategic offensive arms, which allows us to inspect the design of any new system. The Treaty's central limits, combined with the monitoring provisions that enable compliance verification, enhance predictability and strategic stability between our countries, and ultimately increase U.S. national security.

There is still much work to be done on the arms control agenda. President Obama has spoken of his desire to negotiate a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). However, efforts to get such negotiations started in the Conference on Disarmament have been stymied. The United States remains committed to this important arms control treaty and is now examining other ways of making progress.

The modernization of the CFE Treaty, one of the three pillars of the conventional arms control process in Europe, is another area of focus for the AVC Bureau. Under CFE, thousands of inspections have taken place at military sites all over Europe, dramatically increasing confidence and military transparency on the continent by providing a means to verify the information provided in data exchanges. Together with our NATO Allies and our other European Partners, the United States is strongly committed to the preservation, strengthening, and modernization of the European conventional arms control regime, consistent with our core principles and concerns, such as host nation consent. We must adapt and improve the efforts to meet current and future security needs. The Vienna document is a good example of the use of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) to build predictability and mutual confidence in Europe.

The Bureau is also playing a lead role in the efforts to verifiably eliminate Syria's chemical weapons arsenal. The Framework Agreement for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons reached by Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Lavrov in Geneva calls for the elimination of Syria's chemical stockpile under the auspices of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which was established by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Bureau oversees the work of the U.S. Mission to the OPCW in The Hague, which is leading the effort to reach agreement on the expedited destruction of these weapons in Syria.

There are also several other issues where the AVC Bureau has the lead role within the Department.

For example, the Bureau has the lead within the Department on missile defense. The Bureau was responsible for the successful negotiation of missile defense basing agreements with Turkey, Romania and Poland for the implementation of President Obama's European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). Now that the EPAA is being implemented, the AVC Bureau has turned its focus to seeking missile defense cooperation in other regions. For example, the United States already has robust missile defense cooperation with Israel and is seeking ways to expand that cooperation. The United States is also working on several initiatives under the auspices of the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum to enhance missile defense cooperation with our GCC partners. Finally, we are working on enhancing missile defense cooperation with our Asia-Pacific partners such as Japan, South Korea and Australia.

Furthermore, like previous Administrations, we are working to develop missile defense cooperation with the Russian Federation. Such cooperation is in the national security interests of the United States. However, we have been clear that any cooperation with Russia will not come at the expense of the ability to defend the U.S. Homeland or our Allies and partners from missile attacks from countries like Iran and North Korea. As we have informed the Russian Government on numerous occasions, the United States will not accept any limits on U.S. missile defense capabilities.

The AVC Bureau also has the lead for the Department on issues related to national security space policy and cooperation. President Obama's National Space Policy directed the U.S. Government to work with the international community to develop transparency and confidence-building measures or TCBMs in outer space on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Such TCBMs can help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and miscalculations by encouraging openness, familiarity, and trust between governments. An example of TCBMs is the draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. The AVC Bureau is leading the U.S. Government's efforts to work with the European Union and other space-faring nations to develop this Code of Conduct, which seeks to establish non-legally binding guidelines for responsible behavior to reduce the hazards of debris generating events in space and increase the transparency of operations to avoid the danger of misperceptions.

These important issues underscore the important responsibility that I will be undertaking, should the Senate agree to confirm me as Assistant Secretary. It is an important responsibility that I cannot achieve alone. One of my primary goals, should I be confirmed in this position, is to ensure that AVC retains and

strengthens the expertise and experience that is essential for this important mission, but also to expand and develop the next generation of arms control, verification and compliance professionals.

In addition, having spent many years working in Congress on then-Senator Kerry's personal staff, and on the professional staffs of the House Armed Services Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I know how important it is to work closely on these issues with Congress. So let me conclude my remarks by pledging my strong commitment to working closely with Congress on all of these issues.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the Committee, thank you for your time today and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.