

**Testimony for Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs**  
*“Countering the Lord’s Resistance Army”*

**Amanda J. Dory,**  
**Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, African Affairs**

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to update the Subcommittee on the Department of Defense’s (DoD) role in implementing the U.S. strategy to help our regional partners counter the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Consistent with the legislation passed by Congress in 2010 and signed into law by the President, the United States continues to pursue a comprehensive, multi-year strategy to help our regional partners mitigate and eliminate the threat posed by the LRA.

The U.S. strategy outlines four pillars for our continuing support: increasing the protection of civilians; apprehending or removing Joseph Kony and senior commanders from the battlefield; promoting the defection, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters; and increasing humanitarian access and providing continued relief to affected communities.

The militaries of Uganda, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan, in collaboration with the African Union, continue to pursue the LRA and seek to protect local populations. They are leading this effort. They have made progress, but there are significant challenges to pursuing LRA groups across this vast, densely-forested region. To enhance their efforts, the President authorized a small number of U.S. forces to deploy to the LRA-affected region to serve as advisors to the forces pursuing the LRA and seeking to protect local populations. U.S. forces began this deployment in October 2011 and small teams of advisors moved to forward operating locations in LRA-affected areas at the end of 2011 and early 2012.

DoD’s contribution to this multinational effort is in line with the new Defense Strategic Guidance, which states, “Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives on the continent, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.” In this operation, U.S. forces are combat-equipped for self-defense purposes, but do not have an operational role. U.S. advisors are supporting the regional forces in an advisory capacity and seeking to enhance our partners’ capabilities to achieve their objectives and accomplish their mission against the LRA.

Approximately 100 U.S. military personnel are deployed for this operation across the four LRA-affected countries. There is a command-and-control element in Uganda that is working to synchronize and oversee DoD's counter-LRA efforts and to coordinate at the headquarters level with the Ugandan forces.

Small teams of U.S. military advisors are also now working with the Ugandan military and national military forces in field locations in LRA-affected areas of Central African Republic and South Sudan. In these two countries, U.S. advisors have helped to set up Operations Fusion Centers to enable daily coordination, information-sharing, and tactical coordination. The U.S. advisors are also integrating local civilian leaders into the work of the partner forces, to improve the effectiveness of civil-military relations.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.S. advisors are supporting efforts by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and the Congolese military (FARDC) to increase the protection of civilians and address the LRA. The advisors are working at MONUSCO's Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC), which serves as the intelligence fusion hub for these efforts in the DRC. U.S. advisors are connecting the work of the JIOC and that of the Operations Fusion Centers in CAR and South Sudan to increase cross-border analysis and regional coordination on LRA movements.

Over the last few months, the main body of U.S. advisors began the actual work of advising and supporting partner operations. In the DRC, U.S. advisors are helping MONUSCO and the FARDC to develop their operations in LRA-affected areas. For example, U.S. advisors assisted with the planning for a joint FARDC-MONUSCO operation in December 2011 to help deter the LRA from committing large-scale attacks during the Christmas season, as they have done in the past. In CAR and South Sudan, U.S. advisors are providing planning, training, and intelligence support for the ongoing efforts to track and intercept LRA groups.

We believe our support is helping the partner forces to better locate LRA groups and improve their operations. But, the partner forces continue to face significant challenges in terms of their capabilities to quickly pursue LRA groups across this vast area approximately the size of California. DoD appreciates the support provided by the authority in Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012, which allows the expenditure of \$35 million to provide enhanced logistical support, supplies, and services to the regional partner forces. DoD intends to use this authority to provide enhanced mobility support to the regional forces and supplies to upgrade the Operations Fusion Centers.

U.S. forces have also been helping our regional partners to increase their engagement with local civic leaders and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to increase the flow of information and effectiveness of operations. U.S. forces are also working with partner militaries to integrate civilian protection into operational planning. The State Department has deployed a civilian field officer who is working with U.S. military advisors in this regard.

In coordination with our embassies in the region, U.S. military advisors are coordinating closely with the UN in their efforts to promote the defection, disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of former LRA fighters and associated persons. For example, U.S. military advisors have recently helped to transport MONUSCO leaflets encouraging LRA defections for distribution in the CAR. In addition, the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) has developed plans for how they can reinforce existing information operations by the UN and non-governmental actors to encourage LRA defections.

USAFRICOM also plans to utilize its existing rewards program and fund small-scale efforts to increase information-gathering efforts throughout LRA-affected areas. We believe that the use of the State Department's War Crimes Rewards Program to target Joseph Kony and top LRA commanders would significantly enhance and complement this effort. We support legislation that would expand the authority for this program for these purposes. This program would provide an additional tool to help generate information about the location of LRA leaders, and encourage more LRA fighters to defect.

I will close by saying that we believe the U.S. military advisors have established a good foundation and made initial progress, especially considering the complexity of the operating environment, the number of partners involved, and the remoteness of the operational areas. As the President said on April 23, upon ordering the deployment last year, he directed his National Security Council to review our progress after 150 days. Having completed this review, the President announced that our advisors will continue their efforts to support the regional forces. However, we want to continue to stress that this is just one component of the overall U.S. strategy and that our regional partners are the ones in the driver's seat. This is not an open-ended deployment and we will continue to regularly assess their commitment to this mission and whether we are making sufficient progress collectively to justify the continued deployment of U.S. advisors.

DoD appreciates Congress's strong commitment to countering the LRA and your support for the efforts of our deployed personnel, and we look forward to working with you in the months ahead.