

Manager's Substitute Amendment

AMENDMENT NO. _____ Calendar No. _____

Purpose: In the nature of a substitute.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—117th Cong., 2d Sess.**S. 4509**

To provide for security in the Black Sea region, and for
other purposes.

Referred to the Committee on _____ and
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended
to be proposed by Mrs. SHAHEEN

Viz:

1 Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the fol-

2 lowing:

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Black Sea Security

5 Act of 2022”.

6 **SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON BLACK SEA SECURITY.**

7 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-

8 gress that—

9 (1) it is in the interest of the United States to

10 support efforts to prevent the spread of further

11 armed conflict in Europe by recognizing the Black

12 Sea region as an arena of Russian aggression;

1 (2) littoral states of the Black Sea are critical
2 in countering aggression by the Government of the
3 Russian Federation and contributing to the collec-
4 tive security of NATO;

5 (3) the repeated, illegal, unprovoked, and vio-
6 lent attempts of the Russian Federation to expand
7 its territory and control access to the Mediterranean
8 Sea through the Black Sea constitutes a threat to
9 the national security of the United States and
10 NATO;

11 (4) the United States condemns attempts by
12 the Russian Federation to change or alter bound-
13 aries in the Black Sea region by force or any means
14 contrary to international law and to impose a sphere
15 of influence across the region;

16 (5) the United States and its allies should
17 robustly counter Russia's illegitimate territorial
18 claims on the Crimean Peninsula, along Ukraine's
19 territorial waters in the Black Sea and the Sea of
20 Azov, in the Black Sea's international waters, and in
21 the territories it is illegally occupying in Ukraine;

22 (6) the United States should continue to work
23 within NATO and with NATO Allies to develop a
24 long-term strategy to enhance security, establish a
25 permanent, sustainable presence along NATO's east-

1 ern flank, and bolster the democratic resilience of its
2 allies and partners in the region;

3 (7) the United States should work within
4 NATO and with NATO Allies to develop a regular,
5 rotational maritime presence in the Black Sea;

6 (8) the United States should also work with the
7 European Union in coordinating a strategy to sup-
8 port democratic initiatives and economic prosperity
9 in the region, which includes two European Union
10 members and four European Union aspirant nations;

11 (9) Turkey's behavior towards some regional al-
12 lies and democratic states has been counter-
13 productive and has contributed to increased tensions
14 in the region, and Turkey should avoid any actions
15 to further escalate regional tensions;

16 (10) the United States should work to foster
17 dialogue among countries within the Black Sea re-
18 gion to improve communication and intelligence
19 sharing and increase cyber defense capabilities;

20 (11) countries with historic and economic ties
21 to Russia are looking to the United States and Eu-
22 rope to provide a positive economic presence in the
23 broader region as a counterbalance to the Russian
24 Federation's malign influence in the region;

1 (12) it is in the interest of the United States
2 to support and bolster the economic ties between the
3 United States and Black Sea states;

4 (13) the United States should support the ini-
5 tiative undertaken by central and eastern European
6 states to advance the Three Seas Initiative Fund to
7 strengthen transport, energy, and digital infrastruc-
8 ture connectivity in the region between the Adriatic
9 Sea, Baltic Sea, and Black Sea;

10 (14) there are mutually beneficial opportunities
11 for increased investment and economic expansion,
12 particularly on energy, climate, and transport infra-
13 structure initiatives, between the United States and
14 Black Sea states and the broader region;

15 (15) improved economic ties between the United
16 States and the Black Sea states and the broader re-
17 gion can lead to a strengthened strategic partner-
18 ship;

19 (16) the United States must seek to address
20 the food security challenges arising from disruption
21 of Ukraine's Black Sea ports, as this global chal-
22 lenge will have critical national security implications
23 for the United States, our partners, and allies;

24 (17) Turkey, in coordination with the United
25 Nations, has played an important role in alleviating

1 global food insecurity by negotiating two agreements
2 to allow grain exports from Ukrainian ports through
3 a safe corridor in the Black Sea;

4 (18) Russia has a brutal history of using hun-
5 ger as a weapon and must be stopped;

6 (19) countering the PRC's coercive economic
7 pursuits remains an important policy imperative in
8 order to further integrate the Black Sea states into
9 western economies and improve regional stability;
10 and

11 (20) Turkey's continued delay in ratifying Swe-
12 den and Finland's accession to NATO undermines
13 the strength of the alliance and inhibits the united
14 international response to Russia's unprovoked war in
15 Ukraine.

16 **SEC. 3. UNITED STATES POLICY.**

17 It is the policy of the United States to—

18 (1) actively deter the threat of Russia's further
19 escalation in the Black Sea region and defend free-
20 dom of navigation in the Black Sea to prevent the
21 spread of further armed conflict in Europe;

22 (2) advocate within NATO, among NATO Al-
23 lies, and within the European Union to develop a
24 long-term coordinated strategy to enhance security,
25 establish a permanent, sustainable presence in the

1 eastern flank, and bolster the democratic resilience
2 of United States allies and partners in the region;

3 (3) advocate within NATO and among NATO
4 Allies to develop a regular, rotational maritime pres-
5 ence in the Black Sea;

6 (4) support and bolster the economic ties be-
7 tween the United States and Black Sea partners and
8 mobilize the Department of State, the Department
9 of Defense, and other relevant Federal departments
10 and agencies by enhancing the United States pres-
11 ence and investment in Black Sea states;

12 (5) provide economic alternatives to the PRC's
13 coercive economic options that destabilize and fur-
14 ther erode economic integration of the Black Sea
15 states;

16 (6) ensure that the United States continues to
17 support Black Sea states' efforts to strengthen their
18 democratic institutions to prevent corruption and ac-
19 celerate their advancement into the Euroatlantic
20 community; and

21 (7) encourage the initiative undertaken by cen-
22 tral and eastern European states to advance the
23 Three Seas Initiative to strengthen transport, en-
24 ergy, and digital infrastructure connectivity in the

1 region between the Adriatic Sea, Baltic Sea, and
2 Black Sea.

3 **SEC. 4. BLACK SEA SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT STRAT-**
4 **EGY.**

5 (a) BLACK SEA SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
6 STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of
7 the enactment of this Act, the National Security Council,
8 in coordination with the Department of State, the Depart-
9 ment of Defense, and other relevant Federal departments
10 and agencies, is authorized to direct an interagency strat-
11 egy to increase coordination with NATO and the Euro-
12 pean Union, deepen economic ties, strengthen energy secu-
13 rity, support efforts to bolster their democratic resilience,
14 and enhance security assistance with our regional partners
15 in accordance with the values and interests of the United
16 States.

17 (b) PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES.—The initiative es-
18 tablished under subsection (a) shall have the following
19 goals and objectives:

20 (1) Ensuring the efficient and effective delivery
21 of security assistance to regional partners in accord-
22 ance with the values and interests of the United
23 States, prioritizing assistance that will bolster de-
24 fenses against hybrid warfare and improve interoper-
25 ability with NATO forces.

1 (2) Bolstering United States support for the re-
2 gion's energy security and integration with Europe
3 and reducing their dependence on Russia while sup-
4 porting energy diversification.

5 (3) Mitigating the impact of economic coercion
6 by the Russian Federation and the PRC on Black
7 Sea states and identifying new opportunities for for-
8 eign direct investment from the United States and
9 cooperating countries and the enhancement of
10 United States business ties with regional partners in
11 accordance with the values and interests of the
12 United States.

13 (4) Increasing high-level engagement between
14 the United States and regional partners, and rein-
15 forcing economic growth, financing quality infra-
16 structure, and reinforcing trade with a focus on im-
17 proving high-level economic cooperation.

18 (5) Increasing United States coordination with
19 the European Union and NATO to maximize effec-
20 tiveness and minimize duplication.

21 (c) ACTIVITIES.—

22 (1) SECURITY.—The strategy established under
23 subsection (a) should include the following elements
24 related to security:

1 (A) A plan to increase interagency coordi-
2 nation on the Black Sea region.

3 (B) An assessment of whether a United
4 States-led initiative with NATO allies to in-
5 crease coordination, presence, and regional en-
6 gagement among Black Sea states is advisable.

7 (C) A strategy to increase security assist-
8 ance toward Black Sea states, focused on
9 Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, and
10 Georgia.

11 (D) Prioritization of intelligence, surveil-
12 lance, and reconnaissance systems to monitor
13 Russia's operations in the Black Sea region.

14 (E) An assessment of the value of estab-
15 lishing a joint, multinational three-star head-
16 quarters on the Black Sea, responsible for plan-
17 ning, readiness, exercises, and coordination of
18 all Allied and partner military activity in the
19 greater Black Sea region.

20 (F) An assessment of the challenges and
21 opportunities of establishing a regular, rota-
22 tional NATO maritime presence in the Black
23 Sea, including an analysis of the capacity, capa-
24 bilities, and commitment of NATO members to
25 create this type of mission.

1 (G) An overview of Foreign Military Fi-
2 nancing, International Military Education and
3 Training, and other United States security as-
4 sistance to the region.

5 (H) A plan for communicating the changes
6 to NATO posture to the public in allied and
7 partner countries, as well as to publics in the
8 Russian Federation and Belarus.

9 (I) A plan for combating Russian
10 disinformation and propaganda in the Black
11 Sea region, utilizing the resources of the United
12 States Government, including the Global En-
13 gagement Center.

14 (J) A plan to promote greater freedom of
15 navigation to allow for greater security and eco-
16 nomic Black Sea access.

17 (2) ECONOMIC PROSPERITY.—The strategy es-
18 tablished under subsection (a) shall include the fol-
19 lowing elements related to economic prosperity:

20 (A) A strategy to foster dialogue between
21 experts from the United States and from the
22 Black Sea states on economic expansion, for-
23 eign direct investment, strengthening rule of
24 law initiatives, and mitigating economic coer-
25 cion by Russia and the PRC.

1 (B) A strategy for all the relevant Federal
2 departments and agencies that contribute to
3 United States economic statecraft to expand
4 their presence and identify new opportunities
5 for private investment with regional partners in
6 accordance with the values and interests of the
7 United States.

8 (C) Assessments on energy diversification,
9 focusing on the immediate need to replace en-
10 ergy supplies from Russia, and recognize the
11 long-term importance of broader energy diver-
12 sification, including clean energy initiatives.

13 (D) Assessments of potential food security
14 solutions, including sustainable, long-term ar-
15 rangements beyond the Black Sea Grain Initia-
16 tive.

17 (3) DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE.—The strategy
18 established under subsection (a) shall include the
19 following elements related to democratic resilience:

20 (A) A strategy to increase independent
21 media and United States-supported media ini-
22 tiatives to combat foreign malign influence in
23 the Black Sea region.

24 (B) Greater mobilization of initiatives
25 spearheaded by the Global Engagement Center

1 and the United States Agency for International
2 Development to counter Russian propaganda
3 and disinformation in the Black Sea region.

4 (4) REGIONAL CONNECTIVITY.—The strategy
5 established under subsection (a) shall promote re-
6 gional connectivity by sending high-level representa-
7 tives of the Department of State or other agency
8 partners to—

9 (A) the Black Sea region not less fre-
10 quently than twice a year; and

11 (B) major regional fora on infrastructure
12 and energy security, including the Three Seas
13 Initiative Summit.

14 (d) IDENTIFICATION OF NECESSARY PROGRAMS AND
15 RESOURCES.—Not later than 360 days after the date of
16 the enactment of this Act, the interagency shall identify
17 any necessary program, policy, or budgetary resources re-
18 quired, by agency, to support implementation of the Black
19 Sea Security Strategy for fiscal years 2024, 2025, and
20 2026.

21 (e) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS
22 AND AGENCIES.—Nothing under this section shall be
23 deemed to authorize the National Security Council to as-
24 sume any of the responsibilities or authorities of the head
25 of any Federal department, agency, or office, including the

1 foreign affairs responsibilities and authorities of the Sec-
2 retary of State, to oversee the implementation of programs
3 and policies under this section.

4 **SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.**

5 In this Act:

6 (1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-**
7 **TEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional com-
8 mittees” means—

9 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
10 the Committee on Armed Services, and the
11 Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
12 and

13 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
14 Committee on Armed Services, and the Com-
15 mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
16 resentatives.

17 (2) **BLACK SEA STATES.**—The term “Black Sea
18 states” means Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova,
19 Ukraine, and Georgia.