

*Ben Schatz*  
S.L.C.

Schatz 1st Degree 1

AMENDMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_ Calendar No. \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose: To require a report on the impacts on the Islamic Republic of Iran of sanctions imposed by the United States.

**IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—118th Cong., 2d Sess.**

**S. 2626**

To impose sanctions with respect to the Supreme Leader of Iran and the President of Iran and their respective offices for human rights abuses and support for terrorism.

Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. SCHATZ

Viz:

1 After section 2, insert the following:

2 **SEC. 3. REPORT ON IMPACTS ON THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC**

3 **OF IRAN OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE**

4 **UNITED STATES.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the

6 date of the enactment this Act, the Secretary of State,

7 in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and

8 drawing on subject-matter experts including economists

9 and statisticians from the Department of State and the

10 Department of the Treasury, shall submit to the appro-

1 priate congressional committees (as defined in section  
2 2(c)) a report on the impacts on the Islamic Republic of  
3 Iran of sanctions imposed by the United States.

4 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection  
5 (a) shall include an assessment of the following:

6 (1) The impact of sanctions imposed by the  
7 United States on the following:

8 (A) Problematic activities and policies of  
9 the Islamic Republic of Iran, including ballistic  
10 missile development, proliferation of Iranian  
11 drones and missiles to state and non-state ac-  
12 tors, uranium enrichment, and funding of ter-  
13 rorist groups in the “Axis of Resistance”, and  
14 how sanctions have meaningfully impacted the  
15 ability of such groups to operate.

16 (B) Key officials of the Iranian regime, in-  
17 cluding their access to alternative financial  
18 markets, their standard of living, and impacts  
19 to their personal wealth.

20 (C) The operations of independent civil so-  
21 ciety organizations in Iran, including the ability  
22 of such organizations to access products that  
23 would allow them to document and share  
24 human rights abuses, promote democratic  
25 norms, and engage in political dissent.

1           (D) The efficacy of licensing actions aimed  
2           at ensuring the people of Iran have access to  
3           circumvention technologies around Iranian re-  
4           gime firewalls and censors to promote internet  
5           freedom, including General License D-2 of the  
6           Department of the Treasury.

7           (E) The standard of living of the people of  
8           Iran, including—

9                   (i) the impact on the purchasing  
10                  power of the people of Iran and their abil-  
11                  ity to afford and acquire food and medi-  
12                  cine; and

13                   (ii) changes in the size of the working  
14                  and middle classes in Iran, including im-  
15                  pacts to the poverty rate in Iran.

16           (F) The growth of unofficial economies  
17           controlled by officials of the Iranian regime and  
18           members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard  
19           Corps.

20           (2) What industries in Iran remain unaffected  
21           by such sanctions.